Operation Harpoon (1942)
Operation Harpoon or Battle of Pantelleria (Italian: "Battaglia di Mezzo Giugno") was one of two simultaneous Allied convoys sent to supply Malta in the Axis-dominated central Mediterranean Sea in mid-June 1942, during the Second World War. Operation Vigorous was a westward convoy from Alexandria run at the same time Operation Harpoon was an eastbound convoy operation from Gibraltar. Two of the six ships in the Harpoon convoy completed the journey, at the cost of several Allied warships. The Vigorous convoy was driven back by the Italian fleet and attacks by Axis aircraft. News of the  two operations had been unwittingly revealed beforehand to the Axis by the US Military Attaché in Egypt, Colonel Bonner Fellers, who had been submitting detailed military reports on British activities to Washington. The American code was later revealed by Ultra intercepts to have been broken by Italian military intelligence (). Background. Malta. Siege, 1942. In 1942, Axis bombing of Malta smashed the docks, ships, aircraft and airfields by the end of April 1942. Axis bombing was switched to targets preliminary to invasion: camps, barracks, warehouses and road junctions. After 18 April, German bombing suddenly stopped and Italian bombers took over, regularly  bombing with small formations of aircraft. During the month, Axis aircraft flew more than against the Royal Air Force (RAF) all but which were fighter sorties. The British lost down in combat against losses incurred during the dropping of of bombs, three times the March figure, on the docks, on airfields. The bombing demolished or damaged were killed and wounded. Good shelters existed but some of the casualties were caused by delayed-action bombs. As Malta was running short of supplies, Convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March. The convoy was the subject of a half-hearted attack by  the Italian Fleet; the Italians intercepted the convoy and inflicted much damage on several escorts in the Second Battle of Sirte but the weaker British force fended off the Italian squadron. The attack on the convoy meant that the convoy reached Malta in the morning and not at night as expected, leaving the merchant shis exposed to Axis air attack. In the following 48 hours, all the merchant ships were sunk off Malta or destroyed inside the port; barely of supplies were unloaded. Rations of meat, fats and sugar were cut further and on 5 May, the bread ration was  reduced to per day, enough to last until late July; pasta rations had already been stopped and there had been a poor winter potato harvest. Three destroyers, three submarines, three minesweepers, five tugs, a water carrier and a floating crane were sunk in port and more ships damaged. The island continued to function as a staging post but the Axis bombing campaign neutralised Malta as an offensive base. Two boats of the 10th Submarine Flotilla had been sunk, two were damaged in harbour and on 26 April the flotilla was ordered out because of mining by small fast craft, which  were undetectable by radar and inaudible during the bombing; the surviving minesweepers were too reduced in numbers to clear the approaches. Three reconnaissance aircraft remained and only sorties were flown, with eleven more by Fleet Air Arm (FAA) aircraft during the month. By the start of June, only two Fairey Albacores and two Fairey Swordfish were left. Offensive operations. From December 1941, bombing neutralised Malta, decrypts of Italian cipher messages showed more sailings and fewer losses and on 23 February 1942, an Italian "battleship convoy" reached Tripoli. By the end of February, had crossed without escort and a blackout caused  by a change to the machine, in early March, made little difference to the British for lack of means. After the British broke back into supply journeys had been made by May, only nine being spotted by air reconnaissance. On 14 April, five Malta aircraft were shot down and the submarine was lost. On 10 March, the cruiser was sunk by a U-boat and on 10 May, three of four destroyers were sunk by the . In February and March, Axis losses were of supplies sent, in April less than one per cent and May losses were The Axis was  able to reinforce North Africa sufficient for Rommel to try to attack before the British. In late April, the British Chiefs of Staff ruled that there would be no convoy to Malta in May, because the Italian fleet could be expected to sail and convoy would need battleship and aircraft carrier cover, which was not available. An operation to fly Spitfires to Malta succeeded and anti-aircraft ammunition was to be supplied by fast minelayer, with which Malta must hold on until mid-June, when the situation in the Western Desert should have been clarified. If Martuba or Benghazi in  Cyrenaica had been captured by the Eighth Army, a westbound convoy from Alexandria might survive without cover from battleships and aircraft carriers. It would also be known if aircraft had been diverted to the Russian Front and if the crisis in the Indian Ocean had abated, sufficient for ships to escort a fast convoy from Alexandria. Section::::"Unternehmen Herkules". Operation Hercules () was an Axis plan to invade Malta and during 1942, reinforcement of the in Sicily and the bombing campaign against the island led to speculation that it was the prelude to invasion. Gleanings from prisoners of war and diplomatic sources  led to a certain apprehension about the meaning of troop movements in southern Italy. The absence of evidence from signals intelligence and air reconnaissance led to a conclusion that an invasion was not imminent but the need to protect the source of information meant that this was not disclosed by the British. That preparations were being made was revealed on 7 February through the decryption of Enigma messages but by 23 March the invasion scare died down and more bombing was expected. By 31 March the progress of the Axis bombing campaign led to a prediction that the attempt would  be made in April but this was soon discounted because although the bombing offensive increased from in February, to in March and in April, Enigma decodes showed that there were still aircraft in Sicily, not the originally intended, because aircraft were detained in Russia by the Soviet winter offensive and on 26 April, Enigma revealed that II was being withdrawn. By 2 May, a bomber group and a fighter group had been withdrawn with more to follow, which explained the lull. Hitler was lukewarm about the operation, in case the Italian navy left down German airborne forces but the capture  of Tobruk in mid-June made it appear that an invasion was redundant. Hitler and Mussolini agreed to pursuing the British into Egypt for the rest of June and into July, which meant cancelling Hercules. Western Desert Campaign. After the success of Operation Crusader (18 November – 30 December 1941), the Eighth Army advanced westwards to El Agheila in Libya, capturing airfields and landing grounds to provide air cover for Malta convoys. The British misjudged the speed of Axis reinforcement and expected to attack well before the Axis but forestalled the Eighth Army by beginning an offensive on 21 January 1942 . By 6 February, the British had been defeated, forced to retreat east of the Jebel Akhdar back to the Gazala line just west of Tobruk, where had begun its retirement seven weeks earlier. At the Battle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June), attacked first again but appeared close to defeat until 11 June. The Allied Operation Julius began on the same day as the broke out and by 14 June, forced the British to retreat towards Tobruk. The Axis forces pursued the British into Egypt and the Desert Air Force lost the Libyan landing grounds from which to cover Malta  convoys. Prelude. Operation Julius. Two weeks before the convoys, the carrier began operations to deliver to Malta, which increased the number to fighters. Air operations for the two convoys began on 24 May, when Vickers Wellington bombers of 104 Squadron from Malta began bombing airfields and ports in Sicily and southern Italy. On 11 June, the Wellingtons were withdrawn to accommodate six Wellington torpedo bombers of 38 Squadron, Bristol Beaufort torpedo-bombers of 217 Squadron and Martin Baltimore reconnaissance aircraft of 69 Squadron. Aircraft from Gibraltar, Malta and Egypt also began reconnaissance flights on 11 June, searching for the Italian  fleet. Twelve Beauforts of 39 Squadron were based at Bir Amud in Egypt, near the Libyan border, five B-24 Liberator bombers of 160 Squadron and about of the Halverson Detachment United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) at RAF Fayid, were also made available. Short-range fighters based in Palestine, Egypt, Cyrenaica and Malta were to provide air cover and as the convoy moved out of range, protection would be taken over by Curtiss Kittyhawks of 250 Squadron equipped with long-range fuel tanks, Bristol Beaufighters from 252 Squadron and 272 Squadron and Beaufighter night fighters from 227 Squadron. Air cover  from Cyrenaica could not overlap with coverage from Malta leaving a gap but Wellingtons of 205 Group and the light bombers of the Desert Air Force would attack Axis airfields in North Africa. 201 (General Reconnaissance) Group would provide reconnaissance and anti-submarine sorties and a small sabotage party was to land on Crete and attack Axis aircraft on the ground. Operation Vigorous. Vigorous was planned as a joint Royal Navy–RAF operation, to be conducted from the headquarters of 201 (General Reconnaissance) Group by Admiral Henry Harwood and Air Marshal Arthur Tedder, with Rear Admiral Philip Vian in command  of the convoy and escorts (Force A). If a larger Italian force attacked, Vian was to protect the convoy with smoke and the escorts were to repulse the attackers with torpedoes and try to inflict early casualties against two of the Italian ships using gunfire. The success of the convoy would depend on the Italian fleet being damaged by air and submarine attack before it could close on the ships, rather than on surface action because the battleships and were still out of action. Force A comprised four Dido-class 5.25-inch light cruisers and a C-class anti-aircraft  cruiser, three 6-inch Town class cruisers and four corvettes, two minesweepers, four Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) and two rescue ships. The former battleship was pressed into service to masquerade as a contemporary battleship. Two submarine flotillas were to send nine boats to screen the convoy and to patrol areas that the Italian fleet was likely to be found. Convoy. 12 June. Convoy MW4 left Gibraltar on 12 June 1942, with six merchantmen (the British "Troilus", "Burdwan" and "Orari," the Dutch "Tanimbar", the American "Chant" and the tanker "Kentucky") carrying of cargo and oil. The Harpoon convoy was escorted by  Force X, the anti-aircraft cruiser , nine destroyers, the fast minelayer and smaller ships. Distant cover was provided by the battleship , aircraft carriers and "Eagle", cruisers , and , with several destroyers. "Eagle" carried 16 Sea Hurricanes of 801 Naval Air Squadron (801 NAS) and 813 NAS and four Fairey Fulmars of 807 NAS. "Argus" had two more Fulmars of 807 NAS and 18 Swordfish of 824 NAS. 14 June. The convoy was attacked by the Italian submarine "Uarsciek" at which claimed a hit but the explosion was premature. At dawn an Italian aircraft spotted the convoy north of Cape Bougaroni, about  halfway between Algiers and Bizerte. Two British fighters managed to shoot it down before it could send a sighting report. "Escapade" fired on a submarine but it turned out to be "Westcott" returning from refuelling. The was in the vicinity and at fired two torpedoes at "Eagle", which logged an underwater explosion at The crew of "Giada" heard three explosions and claimed a hit. Another Italian aircraft saw the convoy at south-west of Cape Teulada in Sardinia, close to the operational area of (Air Sardinia) which had been reinforced to 175 operational bombers and fighters, a greater force than  anticipated by the British. The first air attacks were made by Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 torpedo bombers, which sank "Tanimbar", south of Sardinia. "Liverpool" was damaged and towed back to Gibraltar by "Antelope", under air attack (arriving on 17 June). Later on 14 June, the covering force returned to Gibraltar, short of the Strait of Sicily. The fast minelayer "Welshman" was detached and travelled to Malta alone, delivered ammunition, then sailed back next day to rejoin the convoy escorts. 15 June. At dawn on 15 June, near Pantelleria, the lightly defended convoy was subjected to a coordinated attack by Axis  aircraft and the Italian 7th Cruiser Division ( [Vice-Admiral] Alberto da Zara), , and the destroyers "Ascari", "Alfredo Oriani", "Lanzerotto Malocello", "Premuda" and "Ugolino Vivaldi". The five fleet destroyers in the convoy escort made a smokescreen and attacked the Italian squadron but the Tribal-class destroyer and the were hit by the Italian cruisers and disabled. The cruiser "Cairo" also received two hits from Italian gunfire. Italian reports claimed that the destroyers "Vivaldi" and "Malocello" closed to within of the merchantmen and hit one of the freighters at about "Vivaldi" was eventually hit by a shot from the British destroyers and  caught fire, was taken in tow and saved by "Malocello" and "Premuda". Both forces broke off the engagement at about and the Italians lost track of the convoy. The tanker "Kentucky", "Chant" and the freighter "Burdwan", already disabled by air attack, were abandoned by their escorts, which had been trying to scuttle "Kentucky" and "Burdwan" with gunfire and depth charges, when the Italian cruisers returned shortly before noon. "Burdwan" and "Kentucky", already on fire, were sunk by gunfire from "Raimondo Montecuccoli", "Eugenio di Savoia" and the destroyers "Ascari" and "Oriani"; "Kentucky" was also struck by a torpedo from "Oriani". "Ascari  finished off Burdwan", which by then was an abandoned hulk, with two torpedoes. "Chant" had already been sunk by bombing and the Italian squadron found her smouldering wreck site. While scaring off the small escorting vessels of the crippled ships and according to post-battle reports from both sides, "Raimondo Montecuccoli" hit the minesweeper at ""approx. 26.000 yards"". Fires broke out on "Hebe", which received extensive splinter damage. Electrical cables to sweep magnetic and acoustic mines, low power wires, steering gear, echo sounding gear and voice pipes were broken, the Kelvin sounding machine and the commanding officer's cabin damaged , while a whaler was rendered unseaworthy. "Partridge" was recovered and taking "Bedouin" in tow when the Italian cruisers with two destroyers reappeared; the tow was cast off, leaving "Bedouin" adrift. At "Partridge" managed to withdraw and run for Gibraltar but "Bedouin" had already been hit during the battle by at least twelve shells plus several near misses and had taken on a severe list. "Bedouin" was eventually sunk by an aerial torpedo from a SM.79 bomber that "Bedouin" shot down as it sank. Twenty-eight of the "Bedouin" crew were killed and more than 200 were rescued and taken prisoner  by the Italians; the majority by the small hospital ship "Meta". In the evening, the surviving ships ran into a minefield off Malta. The destroyers "Badsworth" and "Matchless" and the freighter "Orari" struck mines and were damaged; the Polish destroyer sank after midnight. Of the six merchantmen, "Orari" and "Troilus" reached Malta, the former having lost some cargo in the mine explosion; "Hebe" also struck a mine and suffered further damage, requiring a month in dry dock. Aftermath. Analysis. Captain Hardy reported, In 1960, Ian Playfair, the British official historian, wrote that the relationship of the "battle for supplies" with  the land war reached a climax in the second half of 1942. Far from the Eighth Army capturing airfields to the west in the Cyrenaican bulge, the army had been defeated at Gazala while Operation Julius was on and lost the landing grounds to the east. The disaster at Gazala had led to the military forces on Malta trying to save Egypt rather than vice versa. Vigorous had been a "disappointing operation" and turned back because the British and US air attacks on the Italian battle fleet had failed to inflict the damage hoped for. Force A could not hope  to prevail in a surface action, a view echoed by Greene and Massignani in 2003. The two ships of Operation Harpoon that reached Malta delivered of supplies which, with a decent harvest, might keep the population of Malta fed until September but the loss of the tanker "Kentucky" and the consumption of aviation fuel at Malta, led to fighters being given priority over the offensive force. Transit flights through Malta, except for Beauforts, were suspended; only close-range air attacks on easy targets were to be permitted and more fuel for the fighters was to be carried to Malta by  submarine. In 1962, the British naval official historian, Stephen Roskill, called the Axis success undeniable. Malta had not been supplied and the British had lost a cruiser, three destroyers and two merchantmen against the sinking of "Trento" and minor damage to "Littorio". No attempt was made to run another convoy from Alexandria until the Eighth Army had conquered Libya. Roskill wrote that with hindsight, the course of events on land made naval operations in the central Mediterranean inherently dangerous. During the operation, the withdrawal of the Eighth Army forfeited one of the airfields being used for air cover. With Axis  aircraft based along the length of the route to Malta, air power decided the course of events, although the diversion of Axis bombers against the convoys had been of some benefit to the British as they conducted the "scuttle" to El Alamein. In 1941, ships sailing for Malta had arrived but in the first seven months of 1942, of ten were sunk, ten turned back damaged, three were sunk on arrival and seven delivered their supplies. The Axis operation against Harpoon was the only undisputed squadron-sized victory for the in the Second World War. In their 1998 publication, Greene  and Massignani wrote In 2001, Giorgio Giorgerini wrote that the Battle of Pantelleria was not a strategic success because two merchantmen reached Malta but was a satisfying tactical success; one of the few instances in which Italian warships fought aggressively enough against their opponents, even though somewhat exaggerated beyond its merits in later writing. In 2007, Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones wrote that FAA fighters shot down aircraft and ships' gunners destroyed another sixteen, for a total of aircraft. In 2003, Richard Woodman wrote that on 16 June, Harwood reported that, In a later report, Harwood blamed the RAF for not providing  enough aircraft capable of defeating the Italian battle fleet. The only success of Julius was the arrival of the two ships from Harpoon. Casualties. The British suffered casualties of twenty-eight men killed on HMS "Bedouin", fifteen on HMS "Liverpool", thirteen on ORP "Kujawiak", nine on HMS "Badsworth", two on HMS "Cairo", one on HMS "Partridge", three on the auxiliary minesweeper "Justified", twenty-three on "Tanimbar", four on "Chant", three on "Burdwan". The ten most injured survivors of "Bedouin" were picked up by a CANT Z.506 (Heron) seaplane after a aircraft had spotted them and dropped a flare. On 16  June, sent the Italian hospital ship which spent two days rescuing survivors and was mistakenly attacked one evening at by six Fiat CR.42 Falco fighters of the 54° , four armed with bombs; three survivors from "Chant" were also rescued, a total of 217 men. Orders of battle. Allies. United Kingdom