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W ongeveer 19 cm x H ongeveer 10.5 cm x D ongeveer 2 cm SA Military Intelligence > Interviews > An interview with General Johann van der Merwe regarding the poisoning of Rev. Frank Chikane in 1987.
Date of interview: 7 July 2009
Location of interview: Montana, Pretoria
Length of interview: 27 minutes 6 seconds
Name of interviewee/s: General Johan van der Merwe
Audio file name/s of interview: AL3283_PTA_VDMERWEJOHAN_20090707
Interviewer	Ek gesels hier met genenraal Johan van der Merwe, voormalige kommissaris van die Suid-Afrikaanse polisiemag, oor die voorval waartydens eerw. Frank Chikane vergiftig sou word.
Generaal, kan jy ons net vertel die aanloop en hoe het die hele voorval en die beplanning verloop het van hierdie spesifieke geval.
Johan	Ek het gedurende 1987 ŉ vergadering by die kommandementshoofkantoor van die Suid-Afrikaanse weermag in Pretoria bygewoon. Wyle generaal Kat Liebenberg, wat toe die hoof van die Suid-Afrikaanse leёr was, het voorgesit tydens die vergadering.
Generaal Kat Liebenberg het by die vergadering verduidelik dat opdrag van hoёr gesag, hy het nou nie vanselfsprekend nie gesê wie die hoёr gesag was nie, dat daadwerklik opgetree moet word teen politieke aktiviste wat burgerlike ongehoorsaamheid aangemoedig het en besig was om die land in chaos en geweld te dompel.
Lede van die inligtingsdiens het die vergadering onder andere die afdeling militêre intelligensie, die veiligheidstak en nasionale intelligensiediens. Ek kon nie meer onthou wie die persone wat daar was nie, om die waarheid te sê tydens die vergadering het ek nie juis veel aandag gegee aan die verloop van die vergadering self nie want jy het soveel van daardie vergaderings bygewoon dat dit mettertyd by jou verby gegaan het.
Daar is toe bespreking gevoer hoe daar te werk gegaan moet word en generaal Liebenberg het dit duidelik gestel dat in die uiterste geval ,as al die ander pogings nie geslaag het nie, so ŉ aktivis om die lewe gebring moes word.
Daar was toe nou by die vergadering oorweeg watter stappe in die opsig gedoen kon word en daar is besluit dat die nasionale intelligensie sal aandag gee aan die aktiviste in die buiteland, die veiligheidstak sou in die binneland en die weermag sou omliggende gebiede. As ek nou sê buiteland bedoel ek Europa en ander plekke sou nasionale intelligensie gekonsentreer het terwyl die weermag die omliggende gebiede om die RSA sou aandag gee.
Daar was nie in daardie stadium baie duidelik uitgestippel hoe presies dit sou verloop nie en dit was maar aan die mense, daar was die verteenwoordigers oorgelaat om in oorlegpleging met hul eie afdelings die aangeleentheid verder te voer.
Hulle het ook dan ŉ lys aan ons oorhandig wat ek aanvaar deur afdeling militêre intelligensie opgestel was, waarop die name van die aktiviste verskyn het. Nou ek kan onthou dat eerw. Frank Chikane was eerste op die lys gewees, Joe Slovo was ook op die lys gewees. Daar was verskeie ander persone gewees maar ek kan nie meer onthou wie die ander persone was wat op die lys verskyn het nie.
Ek het daarna teruggegaan na mnr. Adriaan Vlok wat toe die minister van wet en orde was gaan spreek met die verwagting dat hy sou waarskynlik as dit nou van hoёr gesag was wat die opdrag uitgereik het, alles daarvan geweet het. Ek het die lys aan mnr. Vlok oorhandig en hom verduidelik wat by die vergadering bespreek is en ek was heel uit die veld geslaan toe mnr. Vlok sê, nee, hy weet niks van die aangeleentheid nie.
Nou ek het daarna aan mnr. Vlok gesê, wel ons het nou een van twee keuses, of hy moet nou vir mnr. PW Botha of generaal Magnus Malan gaan vra of ons die opdrag moet uitvoer. Want ons kan nie maar die ding netso los nie want dit is duidelik dat die hele aangeleentheid het een of ander amptelike stempel gedra. Dit het nie maar sommer netso uit die lug uitgeval nie.
Mnr. Volk het gesê, nee daar is nie ŉ manier dat hy vir mnr. Botha of generaal Malan daaroor kon nader nie. Want so iets word net nie gedoen nie. In elk geval ek en hy het toe maar besluit om so ŉ projek in werking te stel, aandag te gee aan die aktiviste.
Ek het vir generaal Sarel Strydom, hy het van Pietersburg af gekom, en het my daarna opgevolg in Suidwes-Afrika wat toe later Namibiё geword het, toe terug verplaas na veiligheidshoofkantoor toe. Ons het toe besluit hy is die aangewese persoon om so ŉ projek te belas. Hy was baie ervare veiligheidsman, iemand wat nie iets halsoorkop sou doen nie en wat beslis ook nie ŉ persoon goedsmoeds sou doodmaak nie.
Besluit om hom te belas met die taak om aandag te gee aan die aktiviste. Hy het op sy beurt van die mense wat hy geken het, kolonels Gert Otto en Manie van Staden, albei kolonels, het hy nadergetrek om hom by te staan met die taak en ons het vir hom die lys gegee en hom verduidelik dat alles moontlik moet gedoen word om daai aktiviste se bedrywighede te ontwrig.
Dit was die kerngedagte dat die invloed wat hulle uitgeoefen het en die optredes waarby hulle betrokke was moes sover as moontlik met alle middele waaroor die staat beskik het in die wiele gery word.
En ons het dit aan hom verduidelik en gesê dat in die uiterste gevalle kon die mense om die lewe gebring word, maar mnr. Vlok het toe nog bygevoeg in so ŉ geval moet hulle eers met hom raadpleeg voordat hulle darem nou sommer ŉ ou om die lewe bring.
Generaal Strydom het toe die land ingevaar en met al die afdelingsbevelvoerders van die veiligheidstak oor die hele aangeleentheid gaan raadpleeg. Ten eerstens met die oog daarop om stappe te koördineer om teen die aktiviste op te tree wat toe nou al reeds volledig ŉ proses was wat aan die gang was, daar was ŉ noodtoestand, mense is aangehou en in ŉ groot mate is al jou regsmiddele reeds ingespan op daai tydstip om jou aktiviste aan bande te lê jy kon nie veel meer doen nie as wat ons gedoen het nie, maar vir die wis of onwis is daar met die afdelingsbevelvoerders geraadpleeg om te hoor wat verder gedoen kan word en die gedagte is ook genoem dat in die uiterste gevalle waar die persoon se bedrywighede die veiligheid van die land in so ŉ mate in die gevaar gestel het, dat dit nodig mag wees om sy lewe te neem, dit oorweeg moes word.
Nou bykans sonder enige uitsondering het die afdelingsbevelvoerders vasgesteek en gesê, nee, hulle maak nie mense dood nie. Daar was nie enige een wat bereid was om daarby betrokke te raak nie.
Nou so het generaal Strydom geworstel van tyd tot tyd verslag gedoen aan mnr. Vlok saam met my oor die verloop van die proses wat eintlik niks opgelewer het nie. As gevolg van die feit dat op daai tydstip alles moontlik gedoen is. Jy kon eintlik niks meer rondom dit bedink wat oorspronklik en nuut was om die mense aan bande te lê nie.
Hoe dit ook al sy, so het die proses voortgegaan en hier in 1989 toe het generaal Strydom na my toe gekom en gesê, nee wat, hy is nou dik vir die ou storie. Hierdie proses werk nie, daar gebeur niks nie en hy wil nie meer langer daarmee voortgaan nie.
Toe het ek gereёl dat hy oorgeplaas word as afdelingskommissaris by Noord-Transvaal en hy is vervang deur generaal Chris Smit. Die ander twee lede, kolonels Otto en Manie van Staden, het nog gebly saam met generaal Chris Smit.
Intussen is ek gedurende Oktober ’89 is ek bevorder tot adjunk-kommissaris en oorgeplaas na die uniformafdeling . Ek is opgevolg deur generaal Basie Smit. Hy het van die speurafdeling, hy was toe al ŉ rukkie by die veiligheidstak. Hy het van die speurafdeling gekom en was nie ŉ baie ervare veiligheidsman nie en ek het oorhoofs in bevel gebly van die veiligheidstak alhoewel hy direk bevel geneem het van die veiligheidstak, generaal Basie Smit.
Generaal Chris Smit, Gert Otto en Manie van Staden, het toe met die projek voortgegaan en hulle het met Wouter Basson kontak gemaak. Wouter Basson het hulle voorgestel daar by hom, omdat hulle bewus was dat Wouter Basson betrokke was by die weermag se navorsingslaboratorium, wat onder andere ondersoek ingestel het in sekere toksiese middele en ander dinge, het hulle met hulle geskakel.
Wouter Basson het toe dr. Immelmann aan hulle voorgestel. Hulle het natuurlik almal van skuilname gebruik gemaak. Die dr. Immelmann het aan hulle gesê hy beskik oor ŉ middel wat ŉ persoon ŉ hartaanval kon gee . Dit was ŉ pynlose dood gewees en wat nie maklik opgespoor kon word nie.
Hulle het toe, eintlik het generaal Smit het toe besluit hy gaan dit in die geval van eerw. Chikane gebruik. Hy en kolonel Otto het toe op ŉ dag, hulle het inligting gekry dat eerw. Chikane hier gedurende 23 April 1989 op pad is Windhoek toe. Hulle het toe gegaan nadat hulle die middel by dr. Immelmann gekry het, wat lid van dr. Basson se personeel was, lughawe toe gegaan en sy tas daar gaan onderskep en hulle het van hierdie middel op sy onderklere gespuit.
Daarna is eerw. Chikane toe nou Windhoek toe, waar hy die onderklere aangetrek en siek geword het. Toe het hy teruggekom RSA toe. Hier is hy behandel in ŉ hospitaal. Hy het verbeter en is weer daarna na die buiteland toe na Amerika toe.
Daar het hy weer dieselfde tas met dieselfde onderklere gebruik. Hy het toe weer siek geword en hy is weer daar in die hospitaal opgeneem en ondersoek en hulle het toe vasgestel hy ly aan vergifting van die besondere toksiese middel. Dit is ŉ paraoxi.
Hulle het hom toe behandel . Hy het toe herstel en weer teruggekom RSA toe.
Die proses het toe later ontwikkel dat ou dr. Wouter Basson is toe daarna aangekla weens verskeie moorde onder andere ook die moord op eerw. Chikane.
Nou tydens die ondersoek teen hom het adv. Anton Ackermann en Torie Pretorius het hulle toe nou onder andere vir Chris Smit, Gert Otto en Manie van Staden genader en hulle daarvan beskuldig dat hulle betrokke was by die voorval van eerw. Chikane.
Hulle het toe nou verduidelik hulle weet niks. Hulle weergawe gegee van hul werksaamhede waarby hulle betrokke was en al die ander dinge. Alle betrokkenheid ontken oor die hele voorval en hy het hulle toe nou aangebied om hulle as getuies te gebruik ingevolge Artikel 204. Dit beteken dat as hulle bevredigende getuienis lewer die hof hulle daarna kan vrywaar van vervolging.
Maar aldrie het botweg geweier en gesê hulle weet niks en daar is niks waaroor hulle kan getuig nie. Hulle het toe voortgegaan en dr. Wouter Basson aangekla weens die moord. Hulle het gebruik gemaak
Interviewer	Dit is nie moord nie. Dit is poging tot moord.
Johan	Poging tot moord, ja, ek sê moord, ekskuus tog.
Hulle het onder andere gebruik gemaak van Charles Zeelie en nog ŉ lid wat beweer het dat hulle met Gert Otto en Manie van Staden en Chris Smit oor die aangeleentheid geskakel. Hulle sou betrokke gewees het by die hele poging daar op die lughawe en wat daarmee gepaard gaan, wat heeltemal onwaar is. Hulle het nooit van iemand anders gebruik nie. Hoe en waar daai getuienis vandaan kom, waar hulle daai getuienis uitgekrap het is vandag nog ŉ raaisel. Daai ouens was nooit by die voorval betrokke nie. Later toe ons die werklike feite kry was dit baie duidelik gewees dit was flagrante leuens gewees.
Hulle het hulle toe gebruik as getuies en ou regter Willie Hartzenberg het vir Wouter natuurlik op al die klagtes vrygespreek.
So ŉ tyd daarna hier gedurende, ek dink dit was 1990 gewees, toe besluit Anton Ackermann op ŉ dag hulle gaan nou vir Chris Smit, Gert Otto en Manie van Staden gaan hulle vervolg oor die hele aangeleentheid.
Hulle het hulle toe in kennis gestel dat hulle gaan vervolg en hulle het ook vir Jan Wagener, wat nou vir ons manne in al die sake optree laat weet en Jan Wagener het my laat weet en ek het hom gaan spreek.
Ons het toe met mnr. De Klerk geskakel en gesê kyk ons probeer nog deurgaans om ŉ proses te kry om die aangeleentheid op een of ander manier te beredder.
Ons het toe in die hele proses intussen het ons probeer om te kyk of ons nie aanvullend tot die amnestieproses ŉ ander proses kon in werking stel nie. As ek sê ons is dit ek en mnr. Vlok wat maar deurgaans in oorlegpleging met Jan Wagener en al die ander mense gekyk het na ŉ ander proses.
Maar tot op daai tydstip het niks ontwikkel nie. Die probleem waarmee ons geworstel het, jy kon niks doen aan die soort sake tensy daar ŉ proses in plek was nie.
Nadat die proses nou so ontwikkel het dat hulle nou hierdie drie wou vervolg het, mnr. De Klerk toe weer, destyds was dit nog Mbeki, geskakel en daar het toe rondom dit ŉ reёling gekom dat hulle eers voorlopig die vervolging agterweё sou hou met die oog daarop om te kyk of daar nie moontlik ŉ ander manier is waarop hierdie sake besleg kon word nie.
Dit het daartoe gelei dat die riglyne deur die nasionale vervolgingsgesag in oorlegpleging met die minister van justisie uitgereik is.
Jy sal nou weet ek praat van die riglyne waar persone betrokke was by dade met ŉ politieke motief waar hulle met die nasionale vervolgingsgesag kon onderhandel en die nasionale vervolgingsgesag in sekere gevalle kon weier om te vervolg as dit in openbare belang is.
Daai riglyne is toe uitgereik. Na daai riglyne verskyn het, het ek, mnr. Vlok en generaal Chris Smit en die ander twee lede, Gert Otto en Manie van Staden, het ons beёdigde verklarings ingedien waar ons nou volledige besonderhede verstrek het vir die inligting vir die nasionale direkteur van openbare vervolging met die oog daarop om ingevolge daardie riglyne hanteer te word.
Ons het onder andere ook, en ek het vir die ouens gesê, kyk kêrels, jy gaan nie in die proses in nie want ons verstrek nou feite wat nou heeltemal bots met feite waaroor Anton Ackermann en Torie Pretorius beskik het toe hulle Wouter Basson vervolg het.
Onder andere Charles Zeelie en die ander lid se betrokkenheid wat totaal geheel en al op leuens berus het. Daai getuienis is verwerp deur regter Willie Hartzenberg. Hulle sou dit weer so gebruik het. So die beste is dat ons voor die tyd ŉ poligraaftoets doen oor al hierdie aspekte.
Dat daar nie twyfel is oor ons geloofwaardigheid nie. Dit is omtrent jou enigste manier net ŉ poligraaf want daar’s niks anders wat jy kan doen, bo en behalwe nou as jy ander stawende getuienis kon kry wat nou natuurlik nie bestaan het nie.
Toe het ek en mnr. Vlok, generaal Chris Smit en Sarel Strydom het ons gegaan vir ŉ poligraaf en ons het al die kritiese vrae rondom dit, jy kan, ek het nie geweet jy kan net vyf vrae doen tydens ŉ poligraaf-ondersoek nie, maar jy kan nie, dit is die maksimum wat ŉ poligraaf kan hanteer, vyf, jy moet besluit wat die vyf kritiese vrae is.
Ons het gaan sit saam met die operateur om vyf kritiese vrae uit te werk sover ons betrokkenheid betref. Nie net by die eerw. Chikane-voorval nie, maar ook soortgelyke moorde in die verlede en al’s wat saamhang want daar het mos die indruk bestaan dat ons mense links en regs vermoor en dit was alles opdragte wat ons van hoёr gesag uitgereik het.
So ons het al daai apsekte het ons in daai vrae ingebou om dit volledig te dek. Ons het die uitslag van ons poligraaftoets saam met ons aansoeke vir die nasionale direkteur van openbare vervolging gestuur. Ons het gesê wel hier is ons aansoeke, hier is al die feite.
Dit was toe nog adv. Pikoli. Hy het na ŉ lang geruime tyd uiteindelik vir ons teruggestuur. Ek dink dit was amper ŉ jaar wat hy daarmee gesit het en gesê het hy weier om dit so te hanteer. Hy gaan nog steeds vir Chris Smit, Gert Otto en Manie van Staden vervolg.
Ondanks die feit dat hy toe geweet het dat daai projek het eintlik sy ontstaan by my en mnr. Vlok gehad. Nou ons was by die vergiftiging van eerw. Chikane nou nie self persoonlik nie, ons het nie eers daarvan geweet nie. Die ouens het maar op hul eie gesag, op eie houtjie dit nou maar gedoen nie uit eie gesag nie want dit het uit die projek voortgespruit.
Dit was nou ŉ proses wat hulle self hanteer het. Ons was nie daarby betrokke gewees nie. Ons het nie eers daarvan geweet nie, om die waarheid te sê ek het wel vermoed toe ek sien hierdie voorval in die koerante rondom dit nou uitslaan. Dit kan dalk ons mense wees. Maar niemand het my ooit niks kom sê nie.
So ek het nou nie daarvan geweet nie. Nog minder mnr. Vlok presies geweet. Ons het almal vermoed want inderdaad. Nou moet ek weer terugkom, ek spring bietjie rond want ou praat nou vinnig, De Wet.
Toe die amnestieproses begin het. Dit is miskien wat ek moet baie sterk beklemtoon. Toe die amnestieproses begin het toe kom Sarel Strydom en Manie van Staden na my toe en sê, jis jong, hulle weet nie self nie presies wat daar gebeur het nie, maar hulle het ŉ onrustige gevoel die Chikane-voorval, hy was eerste op die lys, hou verband met daai projek van hulle.
Hulle voel ons behoort hier amnestie te vra. Die ouens wat daarby betrokke was want hulle weet nou nie hoe dit gebeur het nie, maar hulle dink dis wat gebeur het.
En toe gaan ek na Chris Smit toe en Gert Otto, eintlik Gert Otto want Smit sit toe in Port Elizabeth.
Gaan toe na Gert Otto, en sê, Gert was julle betrokke by die Chikane-voorval? Hy sê, ja. Ek sê dan moet ons amnestie vra hier gaan bleddie groot twak kom.
In elk geval hy sê maar hulle kan nie amnestie vra sonder dat Immelmann en Wouter by kom nie. Toe sê ek, gaan sien hulle. Gaan sien hy toe vir Wouter Basson. Toe sê Wouter, man ek was nie betrokke nie, Immelmann was. Wat julle wil maak is julle moeilikheid, maar die weermag het besluit hulle vra nie amnestie nie, so ek sê nou al vir jou daar gaan niks gebeur nie.
Toe kom Gert terug na my toe en sê nee, Wouter sê hulle gaan nie amnestie vra nie. Immelmann is betrokke, maar Immelmann sê hy vra nie amnestie nie en klaar.
Toe gaan ek na Kat Liebenberg toe en sê, Kat ons moet saam kom gesels. Bring vir ou Jannie Geldenhuys want Jannie Geldenhuys was hier in 1987 die hoof van die weermag, bring hom ook by dat ons saam die ding pak.
Ons kan nie alleen op ons eie amnestie vra nie. Toe het ons die klomp weermaggeneraals daar gehad en ŉ klomp polisiegeneraals die ding bespreek. Maar ou Kat was bereid om amnestie te vra, maar Jannie Geldenhuys glad nie. Hy’t gesê, nee. Nee, nee hulle omstandighede is anders .
Die proses wat wel waar is, was hierdie proses maar baie riskant want die WVK-wet was onredelik. Die vereistes wat gestel was in die geval van lede van die veiligheidsmagte was totaal onredelik. Jy moes eers bewys dat jy in die loop en omvang van jou pligte en binne die uitdruklike of versweё bevoegdhede van jou bevoegdhede opgetree het.
Wat eintlik beteken het dat jy moes wettig opgetree het. Dit was die vereistes wat ons rondom moes voldoen en Jannie sê nee jy sal nooit daaraan kan voldoen nie. Hulle sê hulle gaan nie amnestie vra nie, glad nie.
Toe besluit ons daar is nie ŉ kat se kans om amnestie te vra as jy nie saam met hulle ingaan nie want dis die eerste ding wat ons geweet het daar moes ŉ volle blootlegging gewees het, ons kon nie ŉ volle blootlegging nie. Ons gaan onmiddelik vasval hulle gaan ons onmiddelik en die weermag teen mekaar afspeel en ons amnestie weier. Dan is jy eers in ŉ groot gemors.
Toe sê ons, nee kom ons kyk of ons nie liewer ŉ ander proses kan beding nie. Los die ding. So ons het toe nie amnestie gevra nie. Alhoewel ons was bereid om amnestie te vra en dit is hoekom die ander proses ontwikkel het.
Toe hy nou weier om ons ingevolge die riglyne te behandel en weereens net vir Chris, Gert en Manie. Al weet hy van my en mnr. Vlok se betrokkenheid, hulle te vervolg. Toe sê generaal Chris Smit en Gert en Manie hulle verkies dat hulle maar die verhoor hanteer. Toe sê ek, nee, nie in ŉ duisend jaar nie dit sal so immoreel wees as wat kan kom.
Eerstens, hulle sê maar daai getuienis waaroor Wouter Basson beskik is niks werd nie. Hulle kan hulle nooit op daai getuienis skuldig bevind nie. Toe sê ek vir hulle, kêrels, daai getuienis is genoeg om julle op jul verdediging te te plaas. As hulle julle eers op verdediging plaas dan moet jy onder eed gaan lieg. En dis nou een duur les wat ek oor baie jare geleer het, jy moet verskriklik goed kan lieg as jy in so proses wil ingaan om jou los te lieg.
As jy een alleen is het jy nog ŉ buitekans. As jy drie is, het jy geen kans nie, want drie kan nie so lieg nie. As hulle jou alleen aankla kan jy nog verbykom, maar drie kan nie.
Ek sê eerstens, tweedens moet julle onder eed gaan lieg wat ek dink is totaal immoreel. En derdens beteken ek en Adriaan gaan sit rustig eenkant en kyk en as hulle jul skuldig vind dan huil ons saam met julle, maar ons kan niks vir julle doen nie, niks! Niks, niks niks nie. Dit gaan nie werk nie.
Ek sê nie eers amper nie. Nie oor my dooie liggaam nie kan julle hier in ŉ strafverhoor instap nie. Die risikos is te groot. Ek sê al is dit so dat daai getuienis verwerp is dink ek nie kan julle daai kans waag nie, nie eers amper nie, want dit beteken as julle skuldig bevind word is julle weg voor. Dan kan ons vir julle niks doen nie.
Toe gaan sien ek vir Adriaan en sê ons moet hier gaan vir ŉ pleitooreenkoms. Kyk, dit was maar ŉ helse storie. Nie een het mooi geweet waar staan hy met so ŉ pleitooreenkoms nie. Maar ek het vir hulle gesê, kêrels, dit is al kans wat ons het. As almal hier saam ingaan vir ŉ pleitooreenkoms, Anton Ackermann, daarvan is ek oortuig, sal oor mekaar val as ek en Adriaan by kom om ons pleitooreenkoms te gee. Vir julle sal hy nooit op jul eie ŉ pleitooreenkoms gee nie.
As ons by kom sal hy want hy het nie ŉ greintjie getuienis teen ons nie. Hy sal dit nooit hê nie. Want hierdie outjies het nie die vaagste benul waar pas ons in die prentjie nie. Hulle het nog nooit van ons gehoor nie. Hulle het nie geweet van hierdie projek wat ons goedgekeur het nie.
Hulle het die projek geёrf, dis waar, maar waar hy vandaan kom het hulle ook nie geweet nie. Hulle het ook nie gevra nie. Hulle het aangegaan.
In elk geval toe hulle sê ons moet maar aangaan toe kry ons Johan Engelbrecht by, sit om ŉ tafel en Johan sê, ja, hy stem dat ons gaan. Hulle het toe vir Anton Ackermann gaan sien. Toe’t hulle op ŉ pleitooreenkoms besluit. Toe het hulle maar besluit in die proses, omdat ek die ding gedruk het , want ou Adriaan en ek het toe intussen, soos jy weet, mos met Chikane gaan gesels.
Ons het met hom gaan onderhandel om te kyk of ons nie die ding kan beredder nie.
Chikane het deurgaans gesê hy wil nie vervolging hê nie. Ja, maar hy sal dit nog moet kry. Ek dink hy het dit vermoedelik gelees , maar hy het deurgaans die indruk geskep hy weet nog nie wat aangaan nie.
Na ons elke dekselse feit blootgelê het, het hy nog voorgegee hy weet nie presies nie. Toe ons hom gaan sien sê ons kry daai goed, kyk daarna, maar hy het toe nog onder andere gesê, Chikane, hulle is besig om te kyk na ŉ stelsel om aan te sluit by die amnestieproses.
As ek sê hy, dan is dit hy, die president en die ander mense van die nasionale uitvoerende komitee van die ANC. Waarop dit sou neerkom as ŉ persoon ŉ blootlegging sou doen dan aanvaar hulle daardie blootlegging en op grond daarvan sou die nasionale direkteur van openbare vervolging dan weier om te vervolg.
Blyk dit later dat hy gelieg het. Vir wat vir my nogal sin gemaak het. Dit beteken hulle gaan nie probeer om die waarheid vas te stel van dit wat jy aan hulle voorhou, solank dit natuurlik vanselfsprekend strook met beskikbare feite wat met ŉ politieke motief verband hou.
As jy dan die feite aan hulle voorhou blyk dat daai feite voldoen aan ŉ politieke motief dan gaan hulle op grond daarvan weier om te vervolg.
Blyk dit later hulle kry getuienis dat jy gelieg het dan vervolg hulle jou. Dan kan jy nou nie meer daarop beroep nie.
Ons dink dis ŉ goeie plan. Hy het heel inskiklik gewees. Gesê hy wil nie vervolging hê nie. Hy wil die waarheid weet.
Toe ons nou met die aanbod kom om pleitooreenkoms te sluit het ons weer na Chikane toe gegaan en ons sê nou goed ons gaan in so ŉ proses in. Dis hoe die ding nou gaan ontwikkel, toe het Anton Ackermann ook na hom toe gegaan en vir hom gesê dis hoe die ding gaan ontwikkel .
Chikane was heel gelukkig gewees oor die hele verloop daarvan. So het Anton Ackermann ons laat verstaan. Chikane is volledig ingelig. Hy verstaan dit. Hy gaan akkoord daarmee.
Daarna is die pleitooreenkoms toe gesluit en besluit omdat ek die ding gedruk het moet ek beskuldigde nommer een wees, Adriaan sal beskuldigde nommer twee wees, en dan nou Chris Smit.
Ons het ook gesê Adriaan en ek is darem die ouens wat die projek goedgekeur het ons twee kry tien jaar en die ander ouens kry vyf jaar opgeskort vir vyf jaar.
En dis die storie.
Transcript: Download (69 KB)
Interviewer	I am talking here with general Johan van der Merwe, former commissioner of the South African police force about the incident when rev. Frank Chikane was poisoned.
General, could you tell us about this incident and how the planning was done for it.
Johan	I attended a meeting in 1987 at the command headquarters of the South African defence force in Pretoria. The late general Kat Liebenberg, who was at that stage chief of the army, was the chairman of the meeting. General Kat Liebenberg explained at the meeting that he had received orders from higher authority, he obviously didn’t elaborate on who that higher authority was, that there must be more decisive actions against political activists who promoted civil unrest en were responsible for creating chaos and violence in the country.
Members of the intelligence services attended the meeting, among others, the section military intelligence, the security branch and national intelligence. I can’t remember who the persons were, and to be quite honest I didn’t give much attention about what was going on during that meeting because one attended so many of these meetings that things sometime pass your memory.
The modus operandi of the planned actions was discussed and general Liebenberg stressed the fact that in cases where all other efforts failed, such an activist had to be killed.
While it was considered at the meeting what kind of actions should be taken, it was decided that national intelligence would focus on activists abroad, the security branch would internally and the defence force the neighbouring states.
When I say abroad, I mean Europe and other countries would be for national intelligence while the defence force would concentrate on the countries around south Africa.
At that stage the precise kind of actions were not particularly stipulated and it was left to the people there to take action in consultation with their different departments.
They also handed out a list to everybody that I believed was compiled by military intelligence, with the names of the activists on it. I can still recall that rev. Chikane’s name was at the top of the list. Joe Slovo was also there. There were several other people’s names on there as well, but I can’t remember them.
Afterwards I went to Mr. Adriaan Vlok, the minister of law and order, to discuss the matter with him. I thought he would know about it seeing the orders had come from higher authority. I handed the list to Mr. Vlok and explained to him what was discussed at the meeting. He was completely taken aback and said, no, he didn’t know anything about it.
I then told him, well, we now have two choices, either he go and ask Mr. PW Botha or general Magnus Malan if we have to carry out these orders. We couldn’t just leave the issue as it is while it was clear it had some kind of official blessing. The list didn’t just fell from the sky.
Mr. Vlok said no there is no way that he is going to talk to Mr. Botha or general Malan about it. This is not done. In any case we decided to put such a project in place and focus on the activists.
I then approached general Sarel Strydom. He came from Pietersburg and took over command in South West Africa, which later became Namibia, from me, and was subsequently transferred, back to security headquarters. We decided he was the right person for the project. He was a very experienced security branch officer, somebody with a cool head who wouldn’t summarily kill somebody.
Decided to give him the task of attending to the activists. He then appointed people he knew, colonel Gert Otto and colonel Manie van Staden, to assist him, and I explained that everything possible should be done to disrupt those activists’ activities.
It was the principle idea that the influence they had and the activities they were involved with had to be disrupted by any means possible.
And we explained this to him and said that in the most extreme circumstances people may be killed, but Mr. Vlok then still added that in such extreme cases he should be approached before such a person were to be eliminated.
General Strydom went away and held meeting with all the divisional commanders of the security branch countrywide about this issue. Firstly to coordinate the steps against the activists which were at that stage already well under way with the state of emergency in the country, people were detained and to a certain extent all the judicial support available were utilised to act against the activists.
We couldn’t do more than we did, but for safety’s sake we consulted with all the divisional commanders to find out what more could be done and the ideas were exchanged whereas in most serious cases where a person’s activities was endangering the safety of the country, that it may have become necessary to consider taking his life.
Now, with almost no exception the divisional commanders stood fast and said, no they do not kill people. Not one of them was prepared to become involved in such actions.
Now like this general Strydom was struggling and reported from time to time back to me and Mr. Vlok about a process that was going nowhere, because at that stage everything possible was being done.
We reached the point that there was nothing left to think of something new and original to act against these people.
Be it as it may, the process carried on and here in 1989 general Strydom came to me and said, no he had enough of this story. The process wasn’t working, nothing was happening and he didn’t want to carry on with it any longer.
I subsequently arranged for him to be transferred as divisional commissioner Northern Transvaal and he was replaced by general Chris Smit. The other two members, colonels Otto and Van Staden, stayed with general Chris Smit.
In the meantime I was promoted in October 1989 to deputy commissioner and transferred to the uniform branch. I was replaced by general Basie Smit who came from the detective branch and was then already for a while at the security branch.
Being a detective, he didn’t have much experience at the security branch and I stayed chiefly in command of the security branch although he took direct command of the security branch, that was general Basie Smit.
General Chris Smit, Gert Otto and Manie van Staden then carried on with the project and they made contact with Wouter Basson. Wouter Basson introduced them to his people where he was involved with the defence force’s research laboratories who, among others, researched certain toxic substances and other things.
Wouter Basson then introduced dr. Immelmann to them. They obviously all used pseudonyms. This dr. Immelmann told them he had a substance that would give a victim a heart attack. It was a painless death and couldn’t be easily traced.
They then, actually general Smit then decided he was going to use this in the case of rev. Chikane. He and colonel Otto then on a day, they received information that rev. Chikane was on April 23, 1989 on his way to Windhoek. They then took the poison they acquired from dr. Immelmann to the airport, intercept his suitcase and spray some of this substance on his underwear.
The reverend left for Windhoek where put some of these doctored underwear on and fell ill. He was hospitalised and treated. He recovered and later on left for America.
There he used the same suitcase with the same underwear. He became ill again and the tests conducted in the hospital they discovered that he was poisoned with this particular toxic substance. It was called paraoxi.
They treated him recovered and returned to South Africa.
The situation later on developed that dr. Wouter Basson was charged for several murders, among others, that of rev. Chikane.
Now during his hearing adv. Anton Ackermann and Torie Pretorius approached Chris Smit, Gert Otto and Manie van Staden and accused them of being involved in the incident with rev. Chikane.
They explained that they knew nothing about it. They explained what kind of work they were doing and with what they were involved. They denied any complicity and were offered to testify in terms of Section 204 of the Criminal Procedures Act meaning that if they testified to the satisfaction of the court they would we indemnify from any prosecution.
But the three declined and explained they knew nothing and therefore there was nothing to could testify about. They then carried on charging dr. Wouter Basson for murder. They made use of...
Interviewer	It wasn’t murder. It was attempted murder.
Johan	Attempted murder, yes, I said murder, my apologies.
They, among other, made use of witnesses like Charles Zeelie and another member who claimed that they were in contact with Gert Otto, Manie van Staden and Chris Smit in this matter. They claimed they were involved in the incident at the airport, but it was totally untrue. How and from where those testimonies came from, where they dug it up, still stays a mystery. Those guys were never involved in the incident. Later when we got hold of the true fact it was clear that it was flagrant lies.
They were used as witnesses and old judge Willie Hartzenberg exonerated Wouter on all the charges brought against him.
Sometime after this, I think it was in 1990, Anton Ackermann decided that they were going to charge Chris Smit, Gert Otto and Manie van Staden.
They informed them about the decision to prosecute and also let Jan Wagener, who was our boys’ lawyer in all the cases, knew about it. He contacted me and I went to see him about the pending court case.
We then went to see Mr. De Klerk and told him that we were trying to find a solution in order to put the whole thing in order.
We also, in the meantime, looked at the whole process to see if we couldn’t, in addition to the amnesty process, put another process in place. When I say we, I mean me and Mr. Vlok who continuously negotiated with Jan Wagener and the others trying to find another process.
But, up to that stage, there were no progress. The problem we were battling with was that you couldn’t do anything about these cases unless another process wasn’t put in place.
When this process development to the point that they wanted to prosecute this three, Mr. De Klerk again, at that time it was still Mbeki, approached him and a an agreement was reached that they would temporarily put the prosecution on ice while they were looking at alternatives ways of handling theses court cases.
The national prosecuting authority then issued guidelines after consultation with the minister of justice.
You would understand I now mean guidelines where people, who were involved in deeds with political motives, could negotiate with the prosecuting authority where they could refuse to prosecute in the cases that were in public interest.
Those guidelines were then issued. After this I, Mr. Vlok, general Chris Smit and the other two members, Gert Otto and Manie van Staden, handed our sworn statements in wherein we fully disclosed everything in order for the prosecuting authority to deal with the prosecution in terms of the guidelines.
We also, among other, and I told the guys, look boys, we are now going into this process with facts that were contradictory to the fact that Anton Ackermann and Torie Pretorius had when they prosecuted Wouter Basson.
Among others Charles Zeelie and the other member’s involvement were total lies. Those testimonies were rejected by judge Willie Hartzenberg. So the best for us would be to undergo polygraph tests beforehand.
So that there were no doubts about our credibility. That was about the only way, a polygraph, because there were nothing else we could do to get corroboration which obviously didn’t exist.
Then I and Mr. Vlok, general Chris Smit and Sarel Strydom went for a polygraph and we did all the critical questions about it, I didn’t know you are only allow five questions during a polygraph test, that is the maximum that a polygraph could handle, you had to decide what the most critical questions were.
We sat down with the operator to work out five critical questions as far as our involvement. Not only with the rev. Chikane incident, but also similar murders in the past and everything that goes with it, because there was the impression that we murder people left, right and centre, and it was all orders from a higher authority.
So we made a point of building all those issues into our questions to cover it all completely. We handed our polygraph tests together with our applications to the national director of public prosecutions. We said, well, here are our applications, here are all the facts.
It was then still adv. Pikoli. After a while our applications were send back to us. I think it was almost a year that he had it with him and he informed us that he was not prepared to handle it in such a way. He still persisted in charging Chris Smit, Gert Otto and Manie van Staden.
Despite the fact that he realised that, that project had its origin with me and Mr. Vlok. Now, we were not directly involved in the poisoning of rev. Chikane, we didn’t even know about it. The guys operated on their own initiative because it was part of a project.
It was a process they handled themselves. We were not involved with it. We didn’t even know about it, to be honest I did suspect it when I started to read articles in newspapers about it. It could’ve been our own people. But nobody came and tells me anything.
So I didn’t know about it. Mr. Vlok also didn’t know anything. We all suspected, indeed. Now, I have to come back, I jump around a bit, De Wet.
When the amnesty process started. This may be something I have to stress. When the amnesty process started, Sarel Strydom and Manie van Staden came to me and said, gee whiz, they don’t know themselves what exactly happened there, but they had an uncomfortable feeling that the Chikane incident, he was first on the list, relates to their project.
They felt that we should apply for amnesty for it. The guys involved in it, because they didn’t know how it happened, but that was the way they think it did happen.
I then went to Chris Smit and Gert Otto, in fact to Gert Otto because Chris Smit was then in Port Elizabeth.
Went to Gert Otto and said, Gert were you involved in the Chikane incident? He said, yes. I said, then we have to apply for amnesty otherwise we are going to pick a lot of bloody problems.
In any case he said that they couldn’t apply for amnesty without Immelmann and Basson being part of the application. I then said, and then go see them. He went to see Wouter Basson. Wouter’s reaction was that he was not involved, Immelmann was. What you want to do about it is your problem, but the defence force had decided they don’t apply for amnesty, so I tell you know nothing is going to happen.
Then Gert Otto came back to me and said, no, Wouter said they won’t apply for amnesty. Immelmann was involved, but Immelmann said he don’t want amnesty and finish and klaar.
I then went to Kat Liebenberg and said: Kat we should talk together. Bring old Jannie Geldenhuys because Jannie Geldenhuys was the head of the defence force in 1987, bring him in for us to tackle the problem together.
We can’t apply for amnesty on our own. We got the defence force generals together and we discussed it with the police generals. Old Kat was prepared to apply for amnesty, but Jannie Geldenhuys refused. He said: No, no, their situation was different.
It was true that the process was very risky, the TRC-law was unreasonable. The requirements for members of the security forces were totally unreasonable. You firstly had to prove that you acted within the parameters of your responsibilities and operated within your powers.
What it actually meant was that you acted legally. This was the conditions and Jannie said, no, we would never be able to fulfil. They said they were not going to apply for amnesty, never.
We then decided there was no way of applying for amnesty without going in with them because we realised the first precondition was full disclosure, we couldn’t fully disclose in this way. We would immediately get stuck, they would play us and the defence force off against each other and deny us amnesty. Then we were in even greater trouble.
We then said, no; let us look at negotiating a different process. Leave this. We didn’t apply for amnesty. But, we were prepared to apply for amnesty, but that is why we developed this other process.
When he (Pikoli) refused to treat us according to these guidelines and only decided to prosecute Chris, Gert and Manie, although he knew of me and Mr. Vlok involvement, the trio wanted to go it alone. I said, no, not in a thousand years, this would be very immoral.
Firstly they said those evidence from Wouter Basson were worth nothing. They would never be able to convict them on it. I told them, guys, that evidence is sufficient to put you on your defence.
When they put you on your defence you have to go and lie under oath. And this is one very expensive lesson I have learnt through the years, you have to be very good to lie if you want to go the road of lying yourself out of something.
If you are on your own, you have a slight chance. If you are three, you have no chance, because three can’t lie the same. If they prosecute you on your own, you may be able to get by, but three are out of the question.
I say, secondly you have to go and lie under oath and I feel that is immoral. And thirdly means that I and Adriaan go sit quietly on the side and see you being convicted, and then we all cry together, but we can’t do a thing for you. It wouldn’t work.
I said, not at all. Over my dead body I will allow you to walk in here into a criminal trial. The risks were too high. I felt even with the slightest possibility that those evidence were rejected, I didn’t think it was a chance worth taking. It would’ve meant, if they were convicted, it was the end of the road for them. Then we couldn’t do anything further for them.
I went to see Adriaan and suggested we should go for a plea bargaining. Look, this was a hell of a thing for us. Not one of us knew where we were standing with a plead bargain. But, I told them, guys this is our only chance.
I believed if all of us go for a plea bargaining, that Anton Ackermann would fall over his own feet when we tell him that I and Adriaan would like a plea bargain. Without the two of us, Ackermann wouldn’t fall for this move. For you he would never give you guys a plea bargain.
He didn’t have a shred of evidence against us. He would never have had it. Because this man had no clue whatsoever where we fit into the bigger picture. They have never heard of us. They didn’t know of this project we had approved.
They inherited the project, that is true, but where it had originated from they had no clue. They also didn’t ask questions, but merely carried on with it.
In any case, when they gave us the go ahead, we brought Johan Engelbrecht around a table and Johan said, yes, he agrees with us. They went to see Anton Ackermann and decided on a plea bargain.
They decided in the process, because I pushed the issue, because Adriaan and I had in the meantime, as you know, went to see Chikane.
We went to negotiate with him in an effort to see if we couldn’t put things in order.
Throughout the discussions Chikane made it clear that he didn’t want any prosecution. He said he still had to receive the plea bargaining, but I think he had read it, but gave the impression that he didn’t know what was going on.
After we disclosed every fact, he still gave the impression he didn’t know. When we visited him, we asked him to get the information and look at it, but he indicates, among other, they were still busy looking at a system to latch on with the amnesty process.
If I say he, then it was he, the president and other people of the national executive committee of the ANC. It would’ve meant that if a person made a disclosure it would be accepted and on these grounds the national director of prosecution would then refuse to prosecute.
It later became clear that he had lied about this. It did make sense to me. It would’ve meant that they were not going to ascertain if it were the truth being disclosed, as long as it agreed with the available information that could be linked to a political motive.
If you did provide them with facts that seemed to satisfy the conditions for political motives, it would be sufficient grounds to refuse prosecution.
If it later turns out that you lie you may be prosecuted. We thought that was an excellent idea. He was very accommodating about it. Said he didn’t want prosecution. He wanted to know the truth.
When we came to the point of plea bargaining we, again went to Chikane and told him we were going into such a process. This was how the process would develop; Anton Ackerman also went to see him and told him we were going into such a process.
Thereafter the plea bargains were clinched and it was decided, while I pushed the whole idea, I would be accused number one, Adriaan would be number two and then Chris Smit and the rest.
We also indicated that it was Adriaan and I who approved the project and we would get ten years and the other guys each five year all suspended.
Translation: Download (66 KB)
Description: This interview with General Johann van der Merwe, a former commissioner of the SAP, regarding the poisoning of Rev. Frank Chikane in 1987, consists of an audio recording, transcript and English translation. This interview was conducted, transcribed and translated by De Wet Potgieter on behalf of SAHA in 2009.