Robert D. Rupert
Robert D. Rupert (born 1964) is an American philosopher. His primary academic appointment is at the University of Colorado at Boulder (UCB), where he is Professor of Philosophy, a fellow of UCB's Institute of Cognitive Science, and a member of UCB's Committee on the History and Philosophy of Science. He is Regular Visiting Professor at the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn Centre and is the co-editor in chief of the "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science". Rupert's research addresses questions in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of science, metaphysics , and epistemology. He has authored over 50 articles in these areas. His book, "Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind", was published in 2009 by Oxford University Press. Education. Rupert received his B.A. in Philosophy from University of Washington in Seattle (1987) and his M.A. (1990) and Ph.D. (1996) from the University of Illinois at Chicago. His dissertation was entitled "The Best Test Theory of Extension." Career. Rupert joined Texas Tech University as a Visiting Assistant Professor in Philosophy in 2000 and, in 2001, became Assistant Professor of Philosophy. He left Texas Tech in 2005 and joined the Philosophy Department at  the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he was promoted to Associate Professor in 2009 and Professor in 2013. From 2013 to 2016, he also held a twenty-percent faculty appointment in the University of Edinburgh's School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences. He has been awarded visiting or research fellowships by the Australian National University, Ruhr University, Bochum, and Western University (Ontario). He has also held visiting positions at the University of Washington, Seattle, and New York University. During academic year 2005–2006, he was a fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities. From 2015 to 2020. he  served as an Associate Editor of "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science" (BJPS), becoming Co-Editor-in-Chief of the journal in 2020. Research and work. Rupert's early research focused on naturalistic theories of mental content and related questions about concept acquisition. He is the progenitor of the Best Test Theory of Extension, which assigns content to mental representations on the basis of patterns of causal interaction between the developing subject and kinds and properties in the subject's environment. He argued that there is a fundamental overlap between the causal interactions that establish mental content and, at  the same time, stabilize and give integrity to the vehicles possessing said content – an idea that he pursued within the frameworks of dynamical systems theory (Synthese 1998) and cognitive neuroscience (Journal of Philosophy 2001). Rupert has also published papers on a cluster of issues in the metaphysics of mind and philosophy of science, including mental causation, the nature of properties, and the relation between the sciences of the mind and the more fundamental sciences. The best-known and most influential aspect of Rupert's research focuses on situated cognition, which includes topics related to the extended mind, enactivism, embodiment, and  distributed cognition. In 2004, he published "Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition." This paper had sizeable impact on the debate about extended mind and extended cognition, as did his more comprehensive treatment of situated cognition in 2009's "Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. In the latter, he introduces the Conditional Probability of Co-contribution account of cognitive systems, which specifies what it is for a cluster of mechanisms to be bound together into a single cognitive system (or cognitive self), thereby, he argues, delineating the boundary of genuinely cognitive processing. Rupert's interest in distributed cognition gave rise  to an adjacent research program, on the topic of group minds. In this domain, he has attempted to identify the abstract properties that groups of humans share with individual humans, such that groups might properly be said to have mental or cognitive states of their own. Although his best-known work on this topic (Episteme 2005) takes a skeptical tone, his current efforts in this regard focus on graph-theoretic properties of networks – such as a network's having a small-world architecture – as candidates for such shared properties. In the area of cognitive systems and nature of cognition, Rupert  has argued that the mind is massively representational and that philosophers of mind should set aside their commitment to a metaphysically distinctive personal-level. According to the former proposal, cognitive science should attend to the sheer number of mental representations with the same content that contribute to the production of an action or form of behavior. Rupert's work on the personal level encourages a flattened conception of the mind, according to which the mental states and processes often thought to be at a distinctive level – the level of the whole person – should be treated instead as states and processes  sitting right alongside such states and processes as those at work in early visual processing or in the subconscious processes that fluidly determine whether incoming speech makes sense. In addition, Rupert has an ongoing interest in epistemology, which has produced papers on metaphilosophy, the a priori, and on the role of so-called subpersonal processing in the determination of epistemic value.