Egalitarian cake-cutting
Egalitarian cake-cutting is a kind of fair cake-cutting in which the fairness criterion is the egalitarian rule. The "cake" represents a continuous resource (such as land or time), that has to be allocated among people with different valuations over parts of the resource. The goal in egalitarian cake-cutting is to maximize the smallest value of an agent; subject to this, maximize the next-smallest value; and so on. It is also called leximin cake-cutting, since the optimization is done using the leximin order on the vectors of utilities. The concept of egalitarian cake -cutting was first described by Dubins and Spanier, who called it "optimal partition". Existence. Leximin-optimal allocations exist whenever the set of allocations is a compact space. This is always the case when allocating discrete objects, and easy to prove when allocating a finite number of continuous homogeneous resources. Dubins and Spanier proved that, with a continuous "heterogeneous" resource ("cake"), the set of allocations is compact. Therefore, leximin-optimal cake allocations always exist. For this reason, the leximin cake-allocation rule is sometimes called the Dubins–Spanier rule. Variants. When the agents' valuations are not normalized (i.e., different agents may  assign a different value to the entire cake), there is a difference between the "absolute utility profile" of an allocation (where element "i" is just the utility of agent "i"), and its "relative utility profile" (where element "i" is the utility of agent "i" divided by the total value for agent "i"). The absolute leximin rule chooses an allocation in which the absolute utility profile is leximin-maximal, and the relative leximin rule chooses an allocation in which the relative utility profile is leximin-maximal. Properties. Both variants of the leximin rule are Pareto-optimal and population monotonic. However, they  differ in other properties: Relation to envy-freeness. Both variants of the leximin rule may yield allocations that are not envy-free. For example, suppose there are 5 agents, the cake is piecewise-homogeneous with 3 regions, and the agents' valuations are (missing values are zeros): All agents value the entire cake at 15, so absolute-leximin and relative-leximin are equivalent. The largest possible minimum value is 5, so a leximin allocation must give all agents at least 5. This means that the Right must be divided equally among agents C, D, E, and the Middle must be given  entirely to agent B. But then A envies B. Dubins and Spanier proved that, when all value-measures are strictly positive, every relative-leximin allocation is envy-free. Weller showed an envy-free and efficient cake allocation that is not relative-leximin. The cake is [0,1], there are three agents, and their value measures are trianglular distributions centered at 1/4, 1/2 and 3/4 respectively. The allocation ([0,3/8],[3/8,5/8],[5/8,1]) has utility profile (3/8,7/16,7/16). It is envy-free and utilitarian-optimal, hence Pareto-efficient. However, there is another allocation ([0,5/16],[5/16,11/16],[11/16,1]) with a leximin-better utility profile. Computation. Dall'aglio presents an algorithm for computing  a leximin-optimal resource allocation.