Kaprun disaster
The Kaprun disaster was a fire that occurred in an ascending train in the tunnel of the Gletscherbahn Kaprun2 funicular in Kaprun, Austria, on 11 November 2000. The disaster killed 155 people (150 on the ascending train, two on the descending train and three in the mountain station). There were 12 survivors. Most of the victims were skiers on their way to the Kitzsteinhorn Glaciers. The train. The Gletscherbahn Kaprun 2 was a funicular railway running from Kaprun to the Kitzsteinhorn, opened in 1974. In 1993, it was modernized, giving the trains a sleek, futuristic look, also making  them the pride of Austria's ski resorts. This railway had the unusual track gauge of and a length of , with of track inside a tunnel. The train climbed and descended the tunnel at , inclined at 30 degrees (for a grade of about 58%). There were two carriages on a single track, with a section allowing them to pass each other halfway. One carried passengers up the mountain while its twin simultaneously descended. The tunnel terminated at the main reception centre, called the Alpincenter, where a powerful motorized winch system pulled the wagons. There were neither engines, fuel tanks, nor  drivers, only low-voltage electrical systems, hydraulic tanks (used for the brake system) and an attendant who operated the hydraulic doors. Each train had four passenger compartments and a cab at front and rear for the attendant, who switched back and forth as they travelled up and down. It could carry up to 180 passengers. The disaster. On 11 November 2000, 161 passengers and one conductor boarded the funicular train for an early morning trip to the slopes. Before the passenger train left the lower terminus shortly after 9:00a.m., the electric fan heater in the unattended cabin at the lower  end of the train caught fire, officially due to a design flaw that caused the unit to overheat. The resulting fire severed plastic pipes carrying flammable hydraulic fluid from the brake system, fueling the fire rapidly whilst resulting in the loss of fluid pressure which caused the train to halt unexpectedly into the tunnel (this was a standard safety feature). Several minutes later, the train conductor, who was in the control cabin at the upper end of the train (as the train was ascending), realized that a fire had broken out, reported it to the control centre, and attempted to  open the hydraulically-operated doors, but the system pressure loss prevented them from operating. The train conductor then lost contact with the control centre, because the fire had burned through a 16kV power cable running alongside the length of the track, causing a total blackout throughout the entire ski resort. The passengers, by this stage aware of the fire and unable to exit through the doors, attempted to break the shatter-resistant acrylic windows in order to escape. Twelve people from the rear of the train, who successfully broke a window with a ski pole, followed the advice of another  escapee who had been a volunteer firefighter for 20 years, and escaped downwards past the fire and below the smoke, to safety. Many of the still-trapped occupants had by now lost consciousness due to toxic fumes. Eventually, the conductor managed to unlock the doors manually, with those passengers still conscious spilling out into the tunnel and fleeing upwards and away from the fire. The tunnel acted like a giant chimney, sucking oxygen in from the bottom and rapidly sent the poisonous smoke, heat and the fire itself billowing upwards. All the passengers ascending on foot, as well as the  train conductor, were asphyxiated by the smoke and then burned by the raging fire. The toxic smoke quickly reached the halted second train killing the conductor and sole passenger heading downward, before arriving at the Alpine Centre located at the top end of the track away. Two employees of the Alpine Centre who first noticed the smoke, alerted employees and customers before escaping through an emergency exit, leaving the doors open and increasing the tunnel's chimney effect through increased air flow, further intensifying the fire. The centre filled with smoke quickly and all but four people escaped from the  centre. Firefighters arriving at the centre managed to save one of the four, while the other three died of asphyxiation. Investigation and trials. In the subsequent criminal trial in Salzburg, 16 accused were charged, including the management of Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG. The indictment was based on § 170 StGB, causing a conflagration through negligence and § 177 StGB, negligent public risk. Below the 16 accused persons are listed and the related reasons for their acquittals including quotations from the judgment itself as well as some votes against the judgement which came from German prosecution some years after the trial in Austria: Three  employees of Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG were accused. Specifically the technical director, the main manager and the manager. According to the indictment, when the wagon bodies were rebuilt in 1993/94 they had failed to ensure their safe construction and equipment in accordance with the state of the art. The acquittal was based, among other things, on the legal standards of the time, which related to the fire protection safety standards for funicular railways. In relation to these Austrian legal norms, the judgment stated: "A review of the same showed that the relevant norms did not exist here and therefore claims (...) could  not be derived from this legal material". It was noted: "The fire trigger was a design, production and material defect in the fan heater housing and no dirt residues or oil leaks". Years later, the German public prosecutor's office in Heilbronn contradicted this judgement in their own investigation report, in which it was stated that the space heater had no design errors. Instead, it had been modified to be illegally installed into the funicular against its intended use as home appliance only. Six years after the fire in Kaprun, the German authority was able to prove both, the presence  of dirt and hydraulic oil in the identical fan heater from the undamaged second train. This finding of evidence was based not only on material examinations but also on original photos from the Austrian authority itself. In the earlier Salzburg trial the fan heater had not been examined inside on the explicit instructions of the judge at the time. Accused. Two managing directors of the Austrian Swoboda Karosserie- und Stahlbau GesmbH (Carvatech since 2005) were accused, whose employees disassembled simple household fan heaters of the Fakir Hobby TLB brand instead of suitable Domo fan heaters and installed them in an  improper in-house design in the valley-side drivers' cabs. According to the acquittal, the managing directors themselves were not at fault, because they had given their purchasing department clear instructions to purchase a device that was "officially approved". In this case specifically a Domo fan heater. The same one that the Swoboda company had already legally built into the Salzburg fortress funicular railway back then. When ordering, one of the managing directors enclosed the associated instructions for use, so that the purchasing department would really order the right device again. After the staff of the Swoboda purchasing department discovered  that Domo fan heaters were not available at the time, they ordered simple devices for private households as an alternative, namely Fakir Hobby TLB fan heaters. According to the acquittal, the Swoboda management itself had no knowledge that other unsuitable devices had now been purchased by the purchasing staff. According to the judgment, a foreman of the Swoboda company, who picked up the devices ordered from the Höller-Eisen company in Gmunden, did not notice that the purchasing department had actually purchased unsuitable devices and handed them over for installation trusting that the order was correct. This is also why  the electrical workshop of the Swoboda company later handed over manuals for the actual Domo fan heater to the Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG. These manuals for the correct Domo devices were included in advance with the documents for the glacier railways and also for the Siemens company, which later also participated in the construction of the train. The responsible personnel at Swoboda assumed from the outset that the correct equipment would be installed in the train at the time of delivery. Even Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG had correctly requested "4 fan heaters like Salzburg fortress railway" from Swoboda in their order, that  is, approved and above all suitable devices. In the written judgment regarding the now wrongly installed fan heater, it was stated that "the radiator was provided with all the appropriate security stickers". "The evidence procedure also revealed that the wrong operating instructions were given to Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG, namely the manual of a Domo fan heater." And "(...) that Siemens AG (...) also had a data sheet about the Domo fan heater" However, the fact that the user manual of the Fakir devices generally expressly referred to the fact that the device should not be opened for safety reasons and that security  stickers etc. would become invalid was not mentioned in the judgment. The fact that the fan heater was opened by Swoboda, rebuilt and built into the lift in two separate parts was not mentioned in the judgment. The fact that the overheating protection was bypassed was also concealed. The judge Seiss was confronted with this fact by the TV station ATV in 2020 and stated that he did not know anything about a possible conversion of the device, which is why it was not mentioned in the judgment. For the original order of the Domo fan heater by the management  of Swoboda, the following is again noted in the judgement: "(...) as it was used in an officially approved manner in the Salzburg funicular railway at that time". The German VDE, which certified the fan heaters for domestic use, determined after the judgment that the modification of the heater by Swoboda invalidated its certification and that the method of installation was prohibited no matter what the fan was used for. Three employees of the German Mannesmann-Rexroth AG (Bosch Rexroth AG since 2001) were accused. These installed flammable oil-carrying hydraulic lines in both trains directly behind and above the positions  of the valley side heaters. Although published images from Austrian authority show hydraulic oil in the radiant heater of the "glacier dragon" train that has been preserved, the opposite was stated in the judgment. In the photos there would only be red-colored condensation, caused by a reflection. The discovery of the hydraulic oil was officially withdrawn in court by two people who were explicitly interviewed, but was confirmed by one of the two witnesses after the trial, as well as by the dismissed chief assessor Anton Muhr, who still rejects the view of the court. Contrary to practice, the  oil was not sampled in the first process. The verdict finally stated: "As already generally stated, the fire of November 11, 2000 was not a leak in the hydraulic system, no hydraulic oil leaked (...)". The three defendants of Mannesmann-Rexroth AG were acquitted on the following grounds: "It is expressly stated that when the cables were laid by the three accused hydraulic technicians, the fan heater was no longer installed. (...) It cannot be determined when it was reinstalled after the work was completed. (...) It can no longer be determined who removed these fan heaters before the piping work began ." This means that in the judgment it is assumed that the technicians did not know that a fan heater would be installed near the pipes they laid and that the opposite, i.e. that the fitters were aware of it, could not be proven. Three officials from the Ministry of Transport were accused, who had issued the railway operating license. These were again acquitted on the grounds that the Fakir fan heaters would have been suitable, since they would have valid security stickers, and that the danger of fire on funicular railways would not have been known: "Regarding the officials of  the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (...) With regard to the materials used, as well as the technology and safety devices and the fan heater, reference should be made to the statements already made (...) Even in the railroad building permit procedure, the authority had no indications, incidents or concerns that funicular railways could be dangerous in terms of fire protection (...)". Two inspectors from the TÜV were accused, who approved the train and did not complain about existing defects. These shortcomings mainly related to statements by the expert Anton Muhr. The latter criticized a timber shoring that was not registered  with the TÜV, which was installed by employees of the Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG in the desk near the fan heaters and was stuffed with rock wool. According to the expert Muhr, this rock wool was sucked in by the fan heaters. Here it is said in the acquittal: "(...) that it was not possible to determine when the wood shoring was sealed with the stone wool in the evidence procedure, so it could not be said that at the time of the inspection by the TÜV employees the wool would already have existed. (...) The court assumes that (...) concerning the time of  installation (...) the installation was made before the inspection done by the TÜV. (...) a conspicuity of the timber shoring was not given (...) "and further it says" that the timber shoring has no actual connection with the development or spread of fire. "In relation to the hydraulic lines on the rear wall of the fan heater it was said: "With regard to the laying of the hydraulic lines on the rear wall of the fan heater, it is (...) assumed that the hydraulic system (...) is a complex assembly, so that (...) this system was not up for a review at this time." Two technicians  and a builder who were involved in the installation of a fire door at the exit station of the mountain station were accused. After successful closure at the moment of the power failure at the mountain station, an attempt was made to manually open the door by the operations manager who did not close it afterwards, allowing smoke to enter from the tunnel, which cost the lives of several people in the mountain station. In concrete terms, however, the three suspects were a technician who had installed the door, a test technician who had carried out the official inspection of  the door, and a builder who had inspected the system again in September 2000. However, the persons mentioned were not found at fault, since the door worked as prescribed and in the event of a fire it should not have been opened by hand or left open afterwards. Quotation: "(...) whereby the question of single or multiple closing was seen by the court in such a way that closing the door once is sufficient, which (...) derives from the wording of the Ö-Norm (...)". Nearly one year after the fire, the official inquiry determined the cause was the failure, overheating and ignition  of one of the fan heaters installed in the conductor's compartments that were not designed for use in a moving vehicle, much less a train. The ignition was caused when a design fault caused the unit to overheat, which in turn caused the plastic mount for the heating element to break off, causing the element to jam against its plastic casing and catch fire. A slow leak of highly flammable hydraulic oil was ignited by the burning, melting heater, which in turn melted the plastic fluid lines, further feeding the flames and also resulting in the hydraulic pressure loss  which caused the train to stop and the doors to fail. The structural flaws of the funicular trains, especially the lack of safety mechanisms, were found to have played a role in the tragedy. Each funicular unit had its fire extinguishers out of the passengers' reach in the sealed attendants' compartments. No smoke detectors were installed. There was no cellphone reception within the tunnels, which meant passengers had no method of contacting the attendant. Professor Joseph Nejez, a funicular train expert, said the designers throughout the years had a perception that a fire could not occur since no fire had  occurred in a funicular cabin prior to the Kaprun disaster. The train complied with area safety codes, which did not address the systems installed on the train during its 1993 upgrade. The onboard electric power, hydraulic braking systems, and fan heaters intended for use in homes instead of trains increased the likelihood of fire. Investigation report from the Heilbronn Public Prosecutor's Office. The Salzburg judgment still causes incomprehension among many people today. "It cannot be, that 155 people die and nobody is to blame," is a common refrain. Lawyers on the other hand argue, that guilt presupposes that  people acted wilfully or negligently. If they failed to see that their behaviour was wrong, they are not to blame. According to the verdict, no misconduct could be proven in the Salzburg trial, including negligence. Accordingly, the judge of the Salzburg proceedings justified the acquittal. After the main litigation in Austria, the Gletscherbahnen Kaprun AG sued in 2005 against Fakir, the manufacturer of the Hobby TLB fan heater. The technical manager, the former commercial manager, two former managers as well as the owner and the manager of the company F + P Thermoplast (later Simm Kunststofftechnik) were charged. The accusation  was based on the suspicion "[...] of negligent homicide in 155 cases in connection with the fire disaster on November 11, 2000 at the Kitzsteinhorn in Kaprun/Austria". The Salzburg public prosecutor's office thereupon sent a request for legal assistance to the public prosecutor's office in Heilbronn, "because the company headquarters of the Fakir company is in Vaihingen / Enz", as the report says. The results of the investigation by the Heilbronn public prosecutor finally concluded, that there was "no indication of any criminal behaviour on the part of the accused" at Fakir. Invalid test marks on the heater. One  of the most important arguments put forward by the Salzburg court was that the device would be suitable in terms of test marks, since the funicular was not a vehicle in general according to Austrian law at that time. Also the device would have a test mark from the VDE (Association for Electrical, Electronic & Information Technologies) which is one of the largest technical and scientific associations in Europe. VDE embraces science, standardization work and product testing and certification under one roof. However, the German investigators stated that, regardless of the place of use, a completely new VDE approval would have  been required simply by converting the device with modified switches, dismantling and assembling it without groove and tongue connected to a metal plate, etc. besides the now secondary argument, that the device was only tested and approved for use in living spaces, which takes a back seat in view of the situation. The expert Anton Muhr already recognized that in addition to the VDE, approval from the TÜV would also have been necessary. Because there was a draft in the driver's cab on the valley side, an unannounced wooden sheeting was subsequently installed there by the operator, which was  stuffed with rock wool. According to expert Muhr, this rock wool was sucked in by the fan heater. In 2010 he said in a broadcast on ORF regarding the conversion of the driver's desk: "That was the big problem. This subsequent heating conversion. And that should have been approved. One should have indicated, that a change had been made. The TÜV would have recognized this source of danger and stopped the whole thing." The Salzburg Regional Court had expressly stated in the previous main trial that the device had the corresponding test marks from VDE and GS. The "Geprüfte  Sicherheit" ("Tested Safety") or GS mark is a voluntary certification mark for technical equipment. It indicates that the equipment meets German and, if available, European safety requirements for such devices, and could only be installed in the railway because of this elementary fact, otherwise not. In the report, the investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor kept the Salzburg court's own words in mind "(...) that only a fan heater with a certification mark was allowed to be installed". A representative of the VDE stated expressly for the report: "The device has been structurally changed, so the approval of the mark  expires." The report sums up: "The fan heater Hobby TLB should not have been installed in the funicular because the test marks, that were assigned as a living space heater, were no longer valid". Alleged delivery without original packaging and manuals. A central argument, which was repeatedly used against the manufacturer Fakir, was that the four fan heaters, two of them for the driver's cabs on the valley side and two for the driver's cabs on the mountain side, had been delivered without manuals, which meant that nobody could have suspected that the devices were unsuitable. This claim  was unequivocally refuted in the report. The court in Salzburg only stated that the railway's designer or supplier, Swoboda, did not deliver any manuals to the Gletscherbahnen: "According to the court's findings, the Gletscherbahnen did not have any operating instructions for the Fakir Hobby TLB device." Swoboda had however, ordered the four fan heaters from a wholesaler named Hoeller. The state police department in Stuttgart expressly states, that the delivery regulations of the devices from Fakir to dealers such as the Hoeller company are: "After the final assembly and technical inspection of the assembled devices, they are packed , provided with guarantee documents and operating instructions and finally sealed. This seal is intended to document to the future buyer that the packaging has not been opened since final assembly at the factory." It follows that Fakir had delivered these four individual devices to the wholesaler in their original packaging and sealed with manuals. There is no indication in the Salzburg judgment, that Fakir had delivered the devices without manuals, which was repeatedly brought up by representatives of this argument. The Salzburg judgment was somewhat vague: "It could no longer be clarified whether these devices, the fan heaters, were originally  packaged by the Hoeller company and sent to the Swoboda company and whether an operating manual was attached." This raises the suspicion that Swoboda disposed of the instructions after the devices were installed and did not hand them over to the Gletscherbahnen. In addition, the packaging bore a "red [...] label", stating that the devices were only suitable for "residential purposes". "This is clearly visible from three sides of the packaging," the investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office stated. In response to the argument that the responsibility lies only with the company Swoboda, the investigators of the Heilbronn public  prosecutor hold the Gletscherbahn over: "[...] [T] he Gletscherbahn Kaprun AG could have ensured that the unsuitable device was replaced. None of this happened, although the Gletscherbahn had its own electricians, i.e. specialists." The devices in the driver's cabs on the mountain side however were at least replaced by the Gletscherbahnen in the spring of 2000, before the accident. It is noted that "the originally installed Hobby TLB fan heaters have been replaced by Stiebel Eltron fan heaters." Incidentally, the new devices on the mountain side were no longer built into the desk, but hung in their original state on  the side facing the driver. Alleged flammability of the plastic. The regional court in Salzburg found in the trial that "the plastic housing of the fan heater started to burn, did not go out itself and continued to burn. This means that the properties of the fan heater specified in the VDE test reports with regard to fire safety were not met." The result of the investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor is different. They found that only with the first application for approval at the VDE in 1991 "the front part of the Hobby TLB housing would not have  passed the needle flame test", but this was corrected by a different plastic: "On April 23, 1992 the flammability test was repeated and passed". The investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office state: "The fan heater Hobby TLB was therefore flame retardant according to the VDE guidelines and in this sense intrinsically safe." Furthermore, it is stated: "The German Plastics Institute has determined in its report, that the plastic used for the rear housing part corresponds to the highest fire protection class for such plastics." Alleged construction flaws and damage. Another important argument against Fakir was always that "The  choice of the injection point for this fan heater [...] should have constituted a real and serious production fault, but also a design fault [...]", as the Salzburg judgment says. Regarding the expert Maurer, who claims to have found out this error, the investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office stated in advance: "During the investigations it emerged that the expert Maurer is not an expert on plastic issues. As such, he was never registered in the Austrian list of court experts." During the preparation of his report for the court, the expert Maurer discovered damage to the "mounting dome" of  the fan heater from the counter-train, which he also photographed. Maurer noted, for example, that the fastening screws of the heater star had broken out of the rear wall of the fan. Based on the condition of the device, the expert Maurer concluded that there must have been a design flaw which caused the damage to the device. What does not fit together with these observations made by the expert in 2002, however, is the fact that the damage to the device during the securing in Kaprun was not comprehensible for his colleagues. It is recorded as follows: "Dipl.-lng . (graduate engineer) Bind stated during his interrogation on October 4, 2006 in Vienna, that he had not noticed any damage that day, especially in the area of the mounting dome. He could not understand the pictures in the Maurer report." It is also stated: "According to the statements of the experts Muhr and Lange, who owned the fan heater in March 2001, the fan heater was intact. Mrs. StA (public prosecutor) Danninger-Soriat also confirmed that the fan heater was still undamaged at the on-site visit during the trial in Linz in July 2002." Evidence of the undamaged fan  heater was already available from the KTZ (forensics) in Vienna, but, as with expert Anton Muhr, they did not release the images as expert Maurer needed them. Almost two years had passed between the securing of the device and the inspection by the expert. The expert Maurer assumed that he had received the fan heater from the train in its original condition, but this was not the case. The surveyor Geishofer, like many other investigators and other surveyors, had the fan heater temporarily in their possession. The device was badly affected by this change of ownership. The expert Geishofer found , among other things, with regard to the often-examined device from the train: "The rotary knobs - on and off switch, temperature regulator - were missing" and further "the motorized heating element unit was loose in the housing." One heating element fixation was already "torn in a star shape" and the second one "no longer available". He also stated: "The heating element itself was mechanically deformed in a number of places", and in particular: "The torn fixation of the heating element was also initially attributed to damage that could have occurred in the course of transport or the disassembly and inspection." When  handing over the device, the appraiser Geishofer did not inform the appraiser Maurer that, to his own knowledge, the damage was not caused by the heater itself. The expert Maurer neither had photos of the original condition nor did he know that the device was originally undamaged. Probably because of this, he concluded that it must have been a constructional fault. But it were just several retrospective damages. After elaborating these connections, the investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office stated: "Based on these findings, the result of Maurer's report must be questioned, because he assumed false assumptions . He was of the opinion that the fastening dome broke while it was still installed in the train, which was demonstrably not the case." The investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor noted: "This shows that the experts and forensic technicians involved in the proceedings did not work together, communicated and exchanged in the close manner required for such proceedings." Finally, reference is made to the specially arranged investigation by the German Plastics Institute in Darmstadt (DKI), which, in addition to various methods, also examined the housing of the fan heater using "X-ray computed tomography and polarized transmitted light microscopy  and came to the conclusion that with regard to manufacture of the plastic housing no production errors are recognizable and that the housing parts correspond to the then and today's state of the art, both in terms of the plastic used and the construction." Search of the Fakir factory. In order to ensure that Fakir was not hiding anything with regard to production errors, a search warrant was issued by the Heilbronn public prosecutor, and the entire company building was searched. The result of the search of the relevant files was: "An evaluation of these files did not reveal  any findings that were relevant for the investigation [...]." With reference to the Maurer report, the LPD (state police headquarters) Stuttgart stated: "There were also no documents whatsoever found regarding the formation of binding seams in the area of the mounting dome." The LPD Stuttgart finally stated that "the questions listed in the search warrant" to Fakir were answered in writing by the latter and concluded: "This letter did not result in any further investigations either." Vehicle or rolling stock? It was also argued in the judgment that the funicular was not actually a vehicle under Austrian law at that time , which means that the installation of a fan heater for the living room, such as that made by the manufacturer Fakir, was legitimate. In the operating instructions it was specifically pointed out that the device was unsuitable for vehicles. As already stated above, however, from the point of view of the investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office, the question of the concept of the vehicle as such is becoming obsolete, since the modification of the device alone would invalidate its VDE approval. Because even in the opinion of the Salzburg judgment itself, the device would generally no longer  have been suitable for installation without a valid test mark. However, the VDE was not consulted in the trial at that time. The court declared the certification marks valid. The investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor allow themselves a quite ironic reference to German law with reference to the discussion about the legal concept of a vehicle in Austria: "The view of the court in Salzburg, that the trains of the Gletscherbahn Kaprun AG are not vehicles, may be due to special definitions common in Austria. According to the usual definitions in Germany, the trains of the Gletscherbahn Kaprun AG  were clearly vehicles." However, this statement should not be understood as if the investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor wanted to put German law over Austrian law. Even before the accident in Kaprun, there was an EU cableway directive in which, with reference to funiculars, it was clearly and repeatedly referred to vehicles (unlike in Austrian law at the time, according to which a funicular was not a vehicle in the traditional sense). In the directive from the year 2000 one reads among other things about "vehicles of funicular railways". However, as stated in the judgment, the violation of this  guideline, which was admitted by the court, does not represent any criminal liability in the respective EU member state. The non-binding nature of EU provisions or guidelines in the member states of the EU was decided from European Court of Justice itself. Proof of hydraulic oil. The judgment also stated that there was no hydraulic oil in the heater’s housing, which is a key point. The investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office state: "Dr. Ackermann in his report came to the conclusion that hydraulic oil could be detected on the larch wood board as well as  on the back of the fan heater housing." The fact that the judge Seiss had expressly ordered that the fan heater inside should not be examined for oil, but only on the outside, as it turned out, is questionable. It is also stated: "Mr. Mag. Dipl.-lng. Udo Geishofer noticed on October 10, 2002 that red, sticky deposits were visible on the underside of the rear wall, particularly in the area of the power connection cable. These are the same applications that were already visible in the pictures of the KTZ from the tunnel from November 2000." A former appraiser in  the trial testified before the German authorities that he had not investigated the adhesions identified in his report because this would not have been his field of expertise. What the appraisers appointed by the court did not do, the investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor caught up. "The investigations by the KTI, the Forensic Institute, of the LKA (state criminal investigation office) Stuttgart have shown that residues of hydraulic oil were found inside the fan heater, exactly where reddish applications can be seen in the pictures of the KTZ - 6 years after the accident." This contradicts the statement in the  judgment: "As already stated in general, the cause of the fire on November 11, 2000 was not a leak in the hydraulic system, no hydraulic oil leaked [...]." Pictures from the KTZ also show that the oil was from the beginning on exactly where it was later found by investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office, who stated: "6 years after the accident, there are still shiny red applications to recognize at the point where the electric cable of the fan heater is led into the inside of the housing. [...] Evidence of hydraulic oil wetting could be provided on the  outside as well as on the inside." A forensic technician from the KTZ who was questioned later said: "At that time I did not pay any attention to oil in detail." This contradicts other statements like that investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office state: "The statement by the expert Bind, that he did not pay any attention to oil at the time, contradicts a statement by the expert Muhr. According to his statement, the KTZ discussed oil in connection with the radiant heater as the cause of the fire at the beginning of the investigation. [...] The content of  this statement was confirmed [...] several times by federal prosecutor Mrs. Danninger-Soriat [...]." Unsuitable power connection of the fan heater. The fan heater was also permanently wired to the power supply system of the train, while the operating instructions clearly state: "The device is not suitable for connection to permanently installed cables. [...] After use or before repair and maintenance work, pull out the mains plug." Since the fan heaters only received electricity at the mountain and valley stations, the safety temperature limiter was reset every time the station was undocked, so that any overheating could not be noticed. In the investigation  report of the Heilbronn public prosecutor’s office it is stated: "Here, too, the question arises why the employees of Swoboda and Gletscherbahn Kaprun AG did not recognize this weak point, although, as the court found, only specialists and experts were at work." Disregard of (safety) technical principles. An expert from DEKRA Dortmund stated: "At the time of the reconstruction of the train in Austria there were no special regulations that dealt with funiculars. In my opinion, the general rules of technology were violated during the rebuilding, this can also be found in the report (meaning his own report)." The  most important points are: "Immediate proximity between the fan heater as a possible ignition source, the high pressure oil lines behind and below and the wooden installation, the use of GRP (glass fibre reinforced plastic) instead of the approved aluminium, the lack of opening options for the doors for the passengers, the lack of fire-fighting options for passengers, the lack of communication between passengers and operating staff among others." The Salzburg court did not seem to be interested in these logical and obvious technical principles. Fundamental defects in the train were not only discovered by the Heilbronn public prosecutor  and other institutions. Even the expert Maurer, who considered the fan heater to be a general faulty design, noted in the Salzburg process that a suitable fan heater for the railway had to be made of metal and not plastic. However, this statement was not recorded in the court record. Inaccurate examination of the devices. The annual revision work on the glacier railways is also criticized, in which the fans were not examined carefully enough. It was noted, "[...] that at least the oil load inside the heater would have been detectable during the revision work. When asked why the devices  were not opened for testing, a company electrician merely replied: "We did not consider that necessary." Expert Muhr is confirmed. At the end of the approximately fifty-four-page report, the main appraiser Anton Muhr, who was dismissed in the main trial and who fell ill with a severe depression in the course of the trial, should also experience late satisfaction. Here the investigators of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office explicitly describe the "correctness of the expert opinion of the expert Muhr" in their report. Criticism of later appraisers. With regard to the expert opinion used in the trial , which, unlike that of Anton Muhr, spoke of damage of the fan heater itself and which denied any presence of hydraulic oil, it is finally stated in the investigation report of the Heilbronn public prosecutor that "the expert opinion, that according to local view ultimately led to the acquittal, have assumed insufficient conditions." Judiciary has obstructed investigations. It is also pointed out, that the permission to testify for KTZ employees was deliberately restricted by the Austrian judiciary when investigators from the Heilbronn public prosecutor wanted to question them. For example, "the permission to testify for the file’s manager at  that time [...] was restricted to such an extent, that he was only allowed to state his own perceptions." Also, the investigators from Heilbronn did not receive for their investigations the housing parts of the fan heater, which had served in the Salzburg appraisals for the justification of production errors with the devices of the enterprise Fakir. These had been removed from the heater before it was handed over to the investigators. In the investigation report of the public prosecutor's office in Heilbronn, the distortion of facts by the "Kriminaltechnische Zentralstelle" (KTZ) from Vienna is revealed. The KTZ was sent  to Kaprun on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior and, instead of finding out the cause of the fire, stopped its work prematurely. In view of the large number of foreign victims, the public prosecutor and investigating judge had decided that external, non-governmental experts should be entrusted with the task of recording of findings. The KTZ fire experts were then to assist them, but refused to cooperate. The KTZ had sent the fan heater to Vienna for investigation immediately after the seizure in Kaprun. The device, like all other evidence, was to be examined as quickly as possible  in Salzburg by the external expert Anton Muhr on the instructions of the Salzburg investigating judge. A few weeks later, however, the Vienna KTZ sent the device to the Salzburg Regional Criminal Police Office (LKA) instead of Anton Muhr, without informing Muhr or the responsible public prosecutor respectively investigating judge. Because of this behaviour and the ongoing suppression of evidence, three Viennese officials were reported, and the head of the KTZ, Volker Edlinger, was suspended on suspicion of abuse of authority. Volker Edlinger admitted in a TV interview in 2020 that the fan heater, quote: “was installed illegally” and that  this fact was “downplayed”. Now the LKA Salzburg also concealed the receipt of the device from the above-mentioned authorities and only released the heater several months after receipt in March 2001. The responsibility for this was carried at that time as head of the LKA Salzburg and chief investigator of Kaprun, Franz Lang. However, unlike his Viennese colleague Edlinger, he was not prosecuted for this. Because the Vienna KTZ did not cooperate with the external expert Muhr and withheld evidence despite repeated requests by the Salzburg investigation judge, the Salzburg Regional Court even considered having a house search carried  out at the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna. However, because of concerns about damage to the image of the Republic, the Salzburg court decided against a house search. Unsuitable fan heater as the final cause. In conclusion it was stated: "As a result of the investigations by the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office, it can be stated that the accident on November 11, 2000 could have been avoided if the Swoboda company had installed fan heaters suitable for vehicles that were available on the market." In relation to the new evidence that emerged from the investigations of the Heilbronn  public prosecutor's office, the last sentence stated: "Thus, a different outcome of the trial would have been expected." Expert commission found no failures. A few days after the accident, the at that time minister of the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology, Monika Forstinger, presented an international commission of experts with the task of finding out whether the accident could have been prevented in Kaprun. This commission started its work in November 2000 and on 11 December 2001 it presented a final report. As was the case in the Salzburg trial, the team of experts stated that everything  had been done correctly in Kaprun in terms of fire protection and that no one could have expected such a disaster to occur. It is said that "[...] the accident in Kaprun represents a risk that is new to this extent and has not yet been recognized. [...] Accordingly, rescue or self-rescue concepts, as provided in newer railway or road tunnels, do not form an appropriate basis for the system design of tunnel funicular railways." The Austrian ministerial official Horst Kühschelm who had approved the reconstruction of the Kaprun glacier railways in 1993 by the authorities also participated in this expert  commission. This result contradicts the results of the Heilbronn public prosecutor's office established years later. The investigation report refers to the safety concepts of that time in Switzerland and France, where strict fire protection regulations were already in place in funiculars in 1988. The existing fire protection regulations "go far beyond the safety precautions that the Gletscherbahn Kaprun AG has built into their funicular railway." Although this commission of experts had officially found no deficiencies in Kaprun, it submitted numerous suggestions for changes to the safety of tunnel funicular railways. These proposals were later enshrined in law. The letter  of recommendation contains suggestions such as "[...] for example fire alarm system with suction system for early fire detection in the driver's cabs, automatic fire extinguishing systems for rapid extinguishing assistance in the electrical engineering area and in the driver's desk, improvement of the communication between the car attendant and the passengers, visual monitoring of the passenger area". The fact that these life-saving systems were later prescribed by a decision of the government at the time shows a clear contradiction between the official representation of politics and the judiciary, according to which there were no safety deficiencies in  Kaprun, while numerous safety devices were required by law after the accident which presumably would have saved the lives of the victims of Kaprun. The at this time public prosecutor Danninger-Soriat suspected a guided action behind the result of the expert commission, which exonerated politics, and criticized this in Book "155 The Kaprun Cover-Up" with the words: "That is an Acquittal for the Ministry of Transport and acquittal for the Supreme Railway Authority." In both the Austrian and German media repeatedly speculated about whether politics and indirectly also the economy had not actively tried to steer the trial  in their favour. These speculations are based primarily on obstruction by the judiciary, which has been criticized by many of the bodies involved. Casualties and aftermath. The funicular was never reopened after the disaster and was replaced by a gondola lift, a 24-person Gletscherjet1 funitel. The tunnel was sealed and the elevated track and stations were demolished by 2014. The site has been frequented by some skiers who wanted to explore its dark interiors and film the remains of the burned tunnel. The track and tunnel remained in place for over a decade after the disaster, although never used  by paying passengers. As of 2014, the track and supporting structure below the tunnel have been completely removed, with just a gap in the trees to indicate where it stood. Skiers and sightseers now reach the Alpincentre using either the Gletscherjet1 or Panaromabahn cable cars to an intermediate station, followed by the Gletscherjet2 cable car or Langwiedbahn chairlift to the Alpincentre (typically only one of each operates in the summer period, when there is less traffic), though they can also still use the original Gletscherbahn1. On 19 February 2004, Judge Manfred Seiss acquitted all 16 suspects, including company officials, technicians , and government inspectors, clearing them of criminal negligence. Seiss said there was insufficient evidence to find the suspects responsible for the conditions that led to the blaze. In September 2007, the public prosecutor's office determined the manufacturer of the electric heater was not responsible. One of the victims was Sandra Schmitt, a 19-year-old German freestyle skier who at the time was the reigning Women's Dual Moguls World Champion. Josef Schaupper, a seven-time Deaflympic medalist, was also killed in the fatal accident along with his fellow deaf skiers. Another was United States Army Major Michael Goodridge  with his wife Jennifer and sons Michael (7) and Kyle (5). Memorial. On 11 November 2004, a memorial to the victims was officially inaugurated. The elongated blocks of exposed concrete and glass steles are located opposite the valley station of the Gletscherbahnen. The difference in colour of the glass strips should symbolise every individual human being. The individual glass slits are each dedicated to a specific person. Each slit of light stands as a symbol for a life.