Leon Lemmer: Chinese indringing in Australië en elders – praag.co.za
In my jeug het Australië algemeen as “wit Australië” bekend gestaan. Die Australiese federasie is in 1901 gevorm en in 1931 is die land se onafhanklikheid deur Brittanje erken. In 1851 tot 1861 was daar goudkoors in Australië, soos ietwat later in Suid-Afrika. Soos in Suid-Afrika is Chinese mynwerkers en Indiese suikerplantasiewerkers in die 19de eeu in Australië ingevoer. By die blankes was daar teenstand teen veral immigrante uit China en die eilande in die Stille Oseaan, soos die naby geleë Melanesië, waarvandaan Australië se oorspronlike inheemse bevolking gekom het. Hierdie inheemses is tans minder as 3% van die bevolking van sowat 25 miljoen. In 1967 is volle Australiese burgerskap aan hulle toegestaan.
Anders as grootliks monokulturele Australië was Nieu-Seeland, soos Suid-Afrika, ‘n multikulturele Britse kolonie. Nieu-Seeland se Maori’s kom oorspronklik uit Polinesië en is tans byna 15% van die bevolking van sowat 4,9 miljoen. Asiate is bykans 12% van die bevolking (Chinese sowat 100 000 en Indiërs bykans 70 000), met blankes se dalende meerderheid op 73%. In 2013 was daar 54 279 Suid-Afrikaanse inwoners in Nieu-Seeland. Nieu-Seeland skyn (amptelik) minder begaan oor Chinese indringing te wees, onder meer omdat Australië se grondgebied 28,7 keer groter as dié van Nieu-Seeland is en daardie land dus meer potensiële leefruimte aan massas Chinese immigrante kan bied.
Juis vanweë Australië se eertydse bekendheid as ‘n blanke land is dit moeilik om te bepaal watter persentasie van sy huidige bevolking blank is. Die blankes is steeds stewig in die meerderheid maar as persentasie van die bevolking verswak hulle posisie voortdurend. Daar is bykans ‘n miljoen Chinese inwoners met ietwat minder immigrante uit die Indiese subkontinent. Daar is ook sowat ‘n kwartmiljoen Filippyne en ietwat minder Viëtnamese. Teen 2016 het 162 449 Suid-Afrikaners hulle in Australië gevestig. Soos die Britse koningshuis onlangs het Australië sedert 1973 ooreenkomstig die mode doelbewus al hoe meer multikultureel geword.
Toe ek met leeswerk vir hierdie rubriek begin het, het ek die volgende publikasie bestel: Clinton LeFort, White Australian policy (2014, 12p; Amazon Kindle R3,44). Daar is dosyne publikasies van hierdie outeur op Amazon beskikbaar, maar hierdie een is sekerlik die swakste waarde vir geld wat ek by Amazon ervaar het. Anders as wat ek gehoop het, bied die teks geen kernagtige opsomming van die onderwerp nie. Slegs enkele feite word in ‘n swak geformuleerde teks genoem en selfs herhaal. Daar is ook drukfoute.
“In 1901 in order to safeguard a higher standard of living and to maintain a unified nation of British influence a White Australian Policy was enacted” (Kindle 8). “The significant contribution of the White Australian Policy referred to the unity of one people and one nation … At first sight the White Australian Policy could be understood as a racist expression. The commonwealth [federation of Australia] had far more lofty ideas than racism. The White Australian Policy had for its sole purpose to unify the ethnic unity of the entire Australian nation; this was particularly true for the British population influence. White Australian [Policy] meant a share[d] commonality among those of the same ethnic background” (29). “Its aim was to consolidate those elements of national interest that unified British influence, while at the same time ridding itself of elements of national disunity” (45).
“Following the need to allow British and other European countries preference of immigration status over … non-European countries, the Australian Government between the years 1901-1973 developed a White Australian Policy. This preference was later dismantled over several years to allow other Europeans as well as non-Europeans equal status of immigration” (14). Met die Japannese het die Australiese blankes destyds ‘n beter verhouding as met ander Asiate gehad (50). Chinese immigrasie is reeds in 1855 deur wetgewing beperk (57), nadat sowat 25 000 Chinese immigrante in 1854 tot 1857 as goudmynwerkers in Australië aangekom het (62).
Oor hierdie onderwerp verskaf ‘n Wikipedia-artikel, “White Australia policy,” vollediger inligting as LeFort. Dit is veral die blanke arbeiders wat teenstand teen nie-wit immigrante gebied het. Aanvanklik is by voorkeur net Britse immigrante toegelaat omdat kulturele eensoortigheid nagestreef is en daar gepoog is om die nadele van multikulturaliteit, bv etniese wrywing, te vermy. Daarna is ander Europeërs ook as immigrante toegelaat. In 1973 is afgesien van ras as ‘n toelatingskriterium, wat in 1975 opgevolg is deur wetgewing wat rassediskriminasie verbied (‘n stadium wat tot op hede nog nie in Suid-Afrika bereik is nie). Vanaf die 1850’s was die sterkste besware deurgaans teen die Chinese immigrante. Sedert 2009 word meer Chinese as enige ander etniese groep egter as immigrante toegelaat.
In die vorige eeu is vier Statebondslande – Australië, Nieu-Seeland, Kanada en Suid-Afrika – erken as gebiede waar daar ‘n gevestigde Europese bevolking woonagtig is. In 1994 het Suid-Afrika as dié Afrika-bakermat van Westerse beskawing op ‘n verraderlike manier ondergegaan. Ons eertydse vaderland word deesdae glad nie meer as ‘n beduidende blanke enklave gereken nie. Terselfdertyd is oordrewe multikulturaliteit in Kanada nagestreef. In die bevolking van 37 miljoen is daar in Kanada meer as ‘n miljoen Chinese. Meer as 60% van die immigrante is deesdae Asiate, veral Chinese en Indiërs. Ek het voorheen verwys na wat Ricardo Duchesne oor hierdie onderwerp geskryf het (Praag 24.02.2018).
Australië is tradisioneel beskou as ‘n “outpost of the British race.” Dit is heeltemal verstaan- en regverdigbaar dat Australië ingevolge sy Wit Australië-beleid aanvanklik sodanig wou bly. Sy geografiese ligging in die Ooste, ver verwyderd van die oorwegend blanke Weste, het egter die voortsetting van hierdie immigrasiebeleid aan bande gelê. Daar is geswig voor die politieke byderwetsheid van multikulturaliteit. Australië het ‘n diverse en “oop” samelewing geword, met die noodwendige gevolg dat sy tradisionele blanke kulturele identiteit al hoe meer verwater word. Die nabyheid van China, die land met die grootste bevolking ter wêreld (meer as 1,4 biljoen), hou rasioneel (eerder as rassisties) ‘n wesenlike kulturele bedreiging vir blanke Australiërs in. Sake word verder gekompliseer deurdat sowel die in- as uitvoer van hierdie twee lande wedersyds van mekaar afhanklik is; van Austalië se kant in groter mate as van China se kant. Sy geografiese ligging veroorsaak dat Australië ingevolge sy handelsbande ‘n Oosterse land is terwyl hy ingevolge sy kultuur tradisioneel ‘n Westerse land is.
Soos in Brittanje, Wes-Europa en Kanada is daar in Australië (en Nieu-Seeland) deesdae die neiging om die gevare wat nie-wit immigrante vir die blankes se kultuur inhou, te onderskat en selfs te ignoreer; veral in politieke geledere asook in die hoofstroom-inligtingsmedia. Teen hierdie tendens in is die volgende boek van Clive Hamilton, ‘n Australiër (gebore in 1953), gepubliseer: Silent invasion: China’s influence in Australia (Richmond, Victoria: Hardie Grant Books, 2018, 376p; Amazon Kindle $11,49). Allen & Unwin sou aanvanklik die boek gepubliseer het, maar het besluit dit sou beter wees om liewer nie die Chinese regering aanstoot te gee nie (Kindle 109). Hierdie soort sensuur kan ‘n algemene tendens word. “One might expect that Cambridge University Press (CUP) would be one of the fiercest defenders of academic freedom, yet in August 2017 it buckled to pressure from Beijing and blocked 300 online articles from its respected journal China Quarterly, articles red-flagged by the Chinese censors for dealing with issues like the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square massacre” (3737).
Hamilton is ‘n dosent wat spesialiseer in toegepaste etiek. Hy gaan uit van die standpunt dat geestelike of kulturele welstand (“wellbeing”) belangriker as ekonomiese voorspoed is. “Since the 1980s, we have set economy before everything else and put power in the hands of those who tell us we must sacrifice everything to it, including our sovereignty as a free country” (5129). “There is a … reason for our sensitivity to economic pressure: the enormous influence of free-market thinking whose unspoken assumption is that the economy must come before everything else, including our freedom. China apologists repeatedly downplay or evade the importance of freedom and the threats to it. Or they insist that economic growth is the best way to guarantee freedom, as if money can buy the rule of law rather than corrupt it” (2555). “The perception of our economic dependence gives China immense influence over Australia” (2561).
Die outeur is besorg oor die toenemende houvas wat China op Australiese aangeleenthede kry; dermate dat die land se soewereiniteit al hoe meer bedreig word (169). “We have been allowing it to happen under our noses because we are mesmerised by the belief that only China can guarantee our economic prosperity and because we are afraid to stand up to Beijing’s bullying” (179). “China is the second-ranked economic power in the world (first by some measures)” (136). “Around a third of our exports go to China” (2101). Daar is “the belief (much exaggerated) that only China saved us from the 2008 global recession and has been the main source of our prosperity ever since” (184). “In addition to being our largest tradingpartner, China is ‘our largest source of immigrants, our largest source of overseas students and our largest source of international tourists'” (1384). “Australia ranks second behind the United States as a destination for the massive capital outflow from China” (2123). Maar benewens Chinese eienaarskap van Australiese bates is daar “the substantially larger amount owned by American and Japanese companies” (2118).
Aan die begin van sy voorwoord noem Hamilton dat “a handful of very rich Chinese and Chinese-Australian businessmen had become the largest donors to our major political parties. They had bought a lot of influence” (105). Daar is diegene wat beweer dat die nuwe Chinese dissipelskap vir Australië nie gevaarliker as die tradisioneel oorheersende Amerikaanse invloed is nie. Hamilton dink anders: “There is a world of difference. Australia may have sacrificed some of its independence, mainly in defence policy, to be in an alliance with the United States, although the degree is open to debate. But after decades of ‘American colonialism’ do we really feel that our daily lives or democratic freedoms are constrained by this foreign power?” (120). “The United States hasn’t attempted to erode the rule of law. Nor has it attempted to mobilise a diaspora to oppose Australian policy” (125). Hamilton verwys hier na bv die protesoptogte wat Chinese in Australië hou en die aandrang van die Chinese regering dat Chinese Australiërs lojaal aan China moet wees. China wil Amerikaanse invloed in Australië neutraliseer: “China must wean Australia off Uncle Sam’s tit” (2284). Weens die toegeeflikheid teenoor China in amptelike geledere kan hierteenoor geredeneer word: “No need to wean as this kangaroo will hop to where there’s plenty” (2284).
“The CCP [Chinese Communist Party/Chinese Kommunistiese Party – CKP) adopts a cynical attitude towards international law – use it when convenient, ignore it or denounce it otherwise” (959). “China’s Supreme Court has rejected the principle of independence of the courts from the political system as ‘erroneous western thought'” (985). “China’s legal system is not independent but a tool of the state” (985). In ‘n mate is dit ook waar van Suid-Afrika, soos bv Hermann Giliomee uitgewys het. Die CKP “condemns academic freedom as a ‘polluting’ Western idea” (1832), soortgelyk aan die Suid-Afrikaanse universiteite wat geen poging aanwend om akademiese vryheid te handhaaf nie. Dit is nie net aan anti-Westerse en pro-Afrika-sentiment te wyte nie, maar ook aan kruipsug. “Academic freedom is not only the ‘moral foundation of the modern university’ but is at the very heart of free speech in Australian society” (3737).
In Suid-Afrika word vryheid van uitdrukking egter al hoe meer aan bande gelê en daar is van owerheidsweë dreigemente om dit te vererger. Die ANC sou myns insiens hartstogtelik graag vryheid van denke (veral van Afrikaners) aan bande wou lê, soos in China: “The party’s program of ‘thought management’ sets the political and ideological rules that constrain the relationship, rules that no university in Australia would accept for its own staff and students” (3742). Soos in China word “interventionist academic policing” (3652) deur die ANC-regering sonder gesonde weerstand deur al die plaaslike universiteite toegelaat. Van Australië word gesê: “Our universities ‘have substantially withdrawn their capacity for sustained, genuinely independent analysis of contemporary China or of Chinese history'” (3674). Anders as tydens apartheid, klink daar bitter min kritiek uit die plaaslike universiteite op teen die ANC-regime.
“The rate of immigration from China is too fast to allow assimilation, so that parts of Sydney no longer feel like Australia. Chinese-heritage (and other Asian) students are monopolising places at highly desirable selective schools [and universities]” (189). “There are five times more Chinese students in Australia than in the United States” (4171). “Nearly half of the students had overstayed their visas” (591). Dit is soortgelyk aan wat in Suid-Afrika gebeur. Veral aan die eens Afrikaanse universiteite word voorkeur aan swart studente uit sub-Sahara-Afrika bo blanke studente gegee sodat daardie inrigtings hulle rasprofiel ingevolge transformasie kan “verbeter”; dus sodat die kampusse so vinnig en soveel moontlik verswart kan word. Baie van hierdie buitelandse swartes vestig hulle in Suid-Afrika, onder meer omdat universiteite en ander instansies onder regeringsdruk verkeer om eerder swartes as blankes in diens te neem en te bevorder.
Daar is Chinese Australiërs wat hulleself as Australiërs beskou en eerder Taiwan (“Republic of China” – ROC) ondersteun. “They have watched with dismay and a sense of foreboding as new waves of Chinese have arrived – billionaires with shandy histories and tight links to the party [CCP], media owners creating Beijing mouthpieces, ‘patriotic’ students brainwashed from birth (but still seeking residency), and professionals marshalled into pro-Beijing associations set up by the Chinese embassy. And among many, a pervasive sentiment that ‘their hearts lie in the Chinese motherland’, as the CCP likes to put it” (194). Die CKP gaan uit van die veronderstelling dat “overseas Chinese have the potential to become politicized and mobilized as a highly coordinated ethno-nationalist force with transnational loyalties to influence political, economic, diplomatic, and military outcomes” (1057).
Die Chinese inwoners wat lojaal teenoor Australië is, “are deeply worried about the growing influence of the Chinese Communist Party in the million-strong [“over one million” – 547, 5180) diaspora in this country. They are worried about the coming backlash, when Anglo-Australians wake up to what is happening” (199). “They can see that as each year passes the number and influence of Chinese-Australians loyal to Australia are being swamped by the number and influence of Chinese in Australia loyal to Beijing and who regard the PRC [People’s Republic of China] motherland as their true home” (214). Waarna China streef is “to counter and eliminate dissent and critical voices. But this ‘negative’ goal has a positive counterpart – to use the diaspora to transform Australian society in a way that makes us all sympathetic to China and easy for Beijing to control. Australia will then assist China to become the hegemonic power in Asia and eventually the world” (553). “It’s for this reason that … the CCP now promotes emigration of Chinese nationals” (563). ‘n Ander rede is: “There are more migrants leaving China illegally than legally” (563).
‘n Kernoorweging is dat China ‘n kommunistiese land is; dat die Chinese regering en die CKP identies is. Daardie party “is engaged in a systematic campaign to infiltrate, influence and control the most important institutions in Australia. Its ultimate aim … is to break our alliance with the United States and turn this country into a tribute state” (140). Die CKP het in 2004 in Beijing op hierdie strategie besluit: “Henceforth Australia should be included in China’s ‘overall periphery'” (147) – soortgelyk aan Amerika se Monroe-leer, wat uit 1823 dateer, waarvolgens sowel Noord- as Suid-Amerika die VSA se invloedsfeer is. “Its recent occupation of islands, and the building of military bases on them, brings China’s southernmost border close[r] to [Australia]” (153).
“The first objective of including Australia in its overall periphery … was to secure Australia as a reliable and stable supply base for China’s continued economic growth over the next twenty years. The longer-term goal was to drive a wedge into the America-Australia alliance” (153). Besonderhede word deur die CKP uitgewerk oor hoe “China could most effectively attain … ‘comprehensive influence over Australia economically, politically, culturally, in all ways’ … China would also use economic measures to force Australia to make concessions on a range of matters, including military affairs and human rights” (158). “Australia (along with New Zealand) was seen as the ‘weak link in the western camp’ and has been the site for the Chinese party-state to test its methods of infiltration and subversion … Australia’s openness, relatively small population, large number of Chinese immigrants and commitment to multiculturalism have weakened our capacity to recognise and defend against this threat” (169).
“New Zealand has shown itself to be more responsive to Beijing’s demands than Australia” (941). “China plans to dominate the world, and has been using Australia and New Zealand as a testing ground for its tactics to assert its ascendancy in the West” (2205). “As the CCP sees it, Australia has three advantages as a testing ground for its expansion into the Western world. The first is our geopolitical position, which actually makes us ‘the weak link in the western camp’. The second is our very large community of ethnic Chinese, ‘people who have intimate and diverse links with the PRC, have often been ideologically trained, and a majority of whom have a strong sense of Chinese chauvinism’. And the third is our multicultural policies, which permit Chinese loyal to Beijing to promote ‘Chinese values and customs’ as excuses for advancing the positions of the CCP” (2642). Australië betaal ‘n duur prys vir sy “oopheid”; dus sy versaking van sy eertydse “bunker mentality” (2094) weens sy omarming van multikulturaliteit.
Hamilton toon met talle voorbeelde aan hoe sommige Australiese politici, wat hy by die naam noem, met oorgawe aan die Chinese regering se verwagtinge voldoen (bv 474). Ook hoe aktief die Chinese ambassade-personeel met inmenging in die Australiese politiek is, bv onder die dekmantel van frontorganisasies. “Trade unions number among the organisations in this country targeted for infiltration by the CCP’s agencies” (382). Waaroor Hamilton veral besorg is, is dat ‘n Chinese biljoenêr beheer oor die hawe van Darwin, in die noorde van Australië, verkry het (411). Dit is juis van daar af wat indringing in Australië veral in ‘n oorlogsituasie kan geskied. “A 99-year lease of Darwin Port was sold to a Chinese company with close links to the CCP in 2015. In 2014 China Merchants, a state-controlled conglomerate, paid $1.75 billion to buy the Port of Newcastle, the world’s biggest coal export port and close to the air force base at Williamstown. When the Port of Melbourne was sold to a consortium of investors in 2016, the Chinese state-owned sovereign wealth fund CIC Capital grabbed a twenty per cent share” (2344). “The United States government has learned to be more guarded. It has noticed, for example, Chinese companies attempting to buy land, ports and industrial facilities in close proximity to military installations” (2289).
Die boodskap wat amptelik deur die Chinese regering versprei word, is ‘n hervertolking van hulle geskiedenis – soortgelyk aan die manier waarop die ANC die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis vervals. “It was no longer an internationalist story that united the oppressed of China with the oppressed around the world but a nationalist story that set the Chinese people against the rest of the world” (278). Daar word op die uniekheid (“exceptionalism” – 327) van die Chinese nasionale identiteit en “a strong sense of chosenness” (440) aanspraak gemaak. “No longer victims, they would be victors” (294). “The century of humiliation that ended in 1949 [when the Communists were victorious] was succeeded by a hunderd-year marathon in which China will resume its place at the centre of the world” (411). Dit is nie bloot ‘n voorstelling van China se “regaining its past glory as a great nation” nie (272) maar ‘n aanspraak dat China “the world’s greatest civilisation” is (278), wat as “socialist” (322) – en nie as kommunisties nie – gekarakteriseer word.
Die 21ste eeu toon na bewering “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (411). Terselfdertyd sal dit glo die “post-American era” wees (422). “China aims to achieve global dominance not by direct military confrontation with the United States but by pursuing economic domination” (451). Oorheersing deur handel en kulturele indringing deur migrasie word “China’s soft power” genoem (671, 722). “To be Chinese is to belong to a race” (761). Die Chinese regering bevorder ‘n “common ethnic consciousness” by alle Chinese (795). Dit is in skrille teenstelling met die identiteitsontkenning wat polities byderwets in die Weste gepredik word: dat alle mense wesenlik eenders is, dat ras bloot ‘n konstruk en eintlik ‘n illusie is, dat kultuurverskille oorbrugbaar is, dat assimilasie en integrasie van almal in die samelewing moontlik is, ens.
Teen hierdie dwaasheid in het Brittanje vir Enoch Powell gehad. In Australië is daar bv Pauline Hanson: “She made her name in the 1990s by warning darkly of Australia being swamped by Asians … ‘The Chinese are the most racist people in the world'” (817). Hanson is teen Asiate, swart Afrikane en Moslems as immigrante, asook teen multikulturalisme (kyk die Wikipedia-artikel oor Hanson). In hierdie konteks is daar die volgende kompliment: “The right is more consistent in its scepticism towards China. The right has always held a knee-jerk hostility to anything that has the word ‘communist’ attached to it” (998). Blankes wat as groep hulleself as meerderwaardig beskou, word polities byderwets veroordeel maar “Chinese historically have seen themselves as superior to other Asian people” (822). Dieselfde kan van die Japannese gesê word. Vandaar die bitterheid waarmee die Chinees-Japannese Oorlog (1937-1945) geveg is. “Accusing China critics of racism and xenophobia is an effective tactic because it builds on white Australia’s deplorable [?] history, including anti-Chinese sentiment going back to the goldfields” (2262).
In China “from the early 1990s every child who began school became the subject of an intense and unrelenting program of patriotic education” (294), wesenlik “anti-Western nationalism” (299). Die CKP word identies met die Chinese nasie verklaar (305, 327), wat herinner aan die ANC wat homself graag as die enigste verteenwoordiger van die plaaslike swartes beskou (het). “Controlling people’s thoughts obviates the need to control their behaviour and the party has striven constantly to implant patriotic thoughts into the minds of the people” (310). “Monuments, memorial halls, historical relics and museums have sprouted, all reinforcing the new narrative” (317), wat ewe-eens aan die nuwe Suid-Afrika herinner. Die Chinese party-staat “values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights” (428). “The CCP line [is] that economic progress trumps abuses of human rights” (1003).
“One Belt, One Road (OBOR) – also known as the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) – is a grand strategic agenda designed to link China as well as Africa and Oceania. Inspired by the ancient Silk Road, and first mentioned by President Xi Jinping in 2013, it now has two routes, one over land and one across the seas. The driving force behind the strategic initiative is the vast sums of cash China has in reserve for investment and foreign aid. One powerful motive is to sustain China’s economic expansion by sending Chinese money, businesses and labour overseas, with a view of diversifying energy supplies, stimulating underperforming home provinses, and cultivating outlets to fill China’s huge industrial overcapacity for steel and other building materials. Yet its ambitions go well beyond economic ones”(2371). “OBOR has found more immediate acceptance in New Zealand [than in Australia], with the National Party government willingly signing up to it” (2489).
“Ports are particularly valued because of China’s dependence on sea trade and for their strategic functions in times of peace and conflict” (2422). “In July 2017, Sri Lanka found it necessary to sell a seventy per cent stake in the [Hambantota] port to China in a bid to recover from the heavy burden of repaying a Chinese loan obtained to build the facility. The creation of crippling indebtedness is a powerful Chinese tool under OBOR. Other nations, particularly those with a history of conflict with China, like Vietnam and India, are far more sceptical, seeing the New Silk Road as a formidable means for China to advance its stategic as well as its economic dominance. An Indian scholar has argued that China is using OBOR as ‘the silk glove for China’s iron fist’. China already dominates some small and poor nations in Southeast Asia (such as Cambodia and Myanmar) and Africa (Namibia, Angola). Its growing influence in Latin America prompted the head of Mexico’s trade agency to say, ‘We do not want to be China’s next Africa'” (2410). “It would be naïve to try to separate the flow of OBOR investment funds to countries like Malaysia and Indonesia from China’s commitment to controlling the South China Sea” (2422). Hou in hierdie konteks ook in gedagte daar is “the Chinese maritime militia, a vast reserve army of military-trained civilians working in the fishing industry and ports” (2432). “It would be only a matter of time before China sent its armed forces abroad to protect Chinese owned facilities and Chinese citizens” (2444).
Oor Chinese imperialisme skryf Hamilton: “I felt fearful, afraid for Australia’s future being stolen from us by an overwhelmingly powerful force” (1086). “While a number of countries (such as Brazil and Argentina) have taken measures to stop Chinese firms buying up their arable land, Australia’s free trade agreement with China is removing barriers and global banks are lining up to facilitate the buy-up” (2134). Daar is ‘n groot wanbalans: “Australia’s import barriers are virtually non-existent while China’s remain formidable” (2609). ‘n Soortgelyke wanbalans kom by immigrasie voor: “China has very restrictive immigration policies” (4352) – soos ook Japan. Van Westerse lande soos Australië, daarenteen, word egter verwag dat hulle hulle vir ongebreidelde immigrasie moet oopstel.
“Real estate has generated more anxiety than any other China-related issue” (4415). “In 2016 overseas buyers, eighty per cent of them Chinese, snapped up twenty-five per cent of all new housing in New South Wales, and sixteen per cent in Victoria. The percentages would be higher for Sydney and Melbourne” (4432). ‘n Koerantberig verwys na “Chinese developers ‘roaring back into Melbourne’ in the second half of 2016, with three-quarters of available development sites sold to mainland Chinese investors” (4454).”Cities around the world, led by Hong Kong and Vancouver, have taken measures to severely limit real estate investment from the Chinese mainland” (4437).
Hamilton stel maatreëls teen Australië se buitensporige afhanklikheid van China voor, bv Australië “[should] embark on sustained efforts to diversify our economy so that we become less reliant on China … we should build a more balanced alliance with the United States by pursuing an Alliance of Asian Democracies, bringing together the democratic states of India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, New Zealand and Australia” (5155).
China is nie net besig met die “bullying of its neighbours” nie (1003) maar ook met extending its new form of imperialism in places like Africa” (1008). Naas handel, gaan dit vir China sekerlik ook om “non-commercial goals” (2156). “China is a dictatorship that controls much of the economy and uses this control to pursue political influence and regional strategic dominance” (2622) met wêreldoorheersing as sy uiteindelike doel. Kulturele indringing word met onder meer “Confucius Institutes” vermag (935). “Confucius Institutes are ‘an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up'” (4029). “Today there are over 500 Confucius Institutes around the world. Publicly, their tasks are to teach Chinese language, promote Chinese culture and encourage advanced China studies” (4035). Die geld vir hierdie institute “is actually provided by the CCP’s External Propaganda Department and is ‘laundered’ through the Ministry of Education” (4040).
“China must make the requirements of the socialist core values system permeate every aspect of cultural undertakings” (4104). “In the United States, the conservative National Association of Scholars (NAS) called for them [Confucius Institutes] all to be closed down. It was echoing the conclusions of the American Assosiation of Professors, which in 2014 characterised the institutes as ‘an arm of the Chinese state’, denouncing them as an arrangement that ‘sacrificed the integrity of the university'” (4064). “Several universities have closed their institutes in response to these concerns, including the University of Chicago, Pennsylvania State University and a number in Canada” (4080). Dit is amper onnodig om by the voeg dat die Universiteit Stellenbosch, wat deesdae ‘n toevlugsoord vir bykans enige euwel (insluitende kommunisme) is, ‘n Konfusiaanse Instituut huisves.
Suid-Afrika is kwesbaar vir Chinese indringing, onder meer weens die ANC-regering se onkundigheid, gebrekkige toewyding en misdadige neigings, soos korrupsie. Die ANC-regering is nie bedag op die Geel Gevaar (“Yellow Peril” – 4804) nie, net so min as wat hy hom steur aan die wesenlike gevare wat die Swart Gevaar en die Rooi Gevaar vir die land inhou. ‘n Enkele familie, die Indiese Guptas, het plaaslik in ‘n merkwaardige mate met staatskaping geslaag. Die CKP kan sekerlik baie erger en meer as die Guptas in Suid-Afrika vermag. Die ANC-regering het (anders as Botswana – 2689) bv reeds geswig deur op Chinese aandrang nie die Dalai Lama in die land toe te laat nie (2684). Naas Botswana is daar ook ‘n mate van weerstand teen Chinese invloed in Zambië: In 2007 “the opposition leader in Zambia, Michael Sata, was expressing it bluntly: ‘We want the Chinese to leave and the old colonial rulers to return … At least Western capitalism has a human face; the Chinese are only out to exploit us'”(2717).
Waar sal Afrikaners tuis voel? In Afrika wat reeds deur sosialistiese swart Afrikane oorweldig is of in Australië wat al hoe meer deur Chinese ingeneem word? ‘n Moontlike antwoord is: Ware tuiskoms vereis dat Afrikaners ‘n eie tuisland moet hê, ‘n heenkome vry van brutaliteit, maak nie saak op watter kontinent nie (met die moontlike uitsondering van Antarktika).
Skrywer Leon LemmerGepubliseer op 16 Junie 2018 16 Junie 2018 Kategorieë Leon Lemmer, RubriekeSleutelwoord Australië, China, dalai lama, Guptas
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