War of succession
A war of succession is a war prompted by a succession crisis in which two or more individuals claim the right of successor to a deceased or deposed monarch. The rivals are typically supported by factions within the royal court. Foreign powers sometimes intervene, allying themselves with a faction. This may widen the war into one between those powers. Wars of succession were some of the most prevalent types of wars by cause throughout human history, but the replacement of absolute monarchies by an international order based on democracy with constitutional monarchies or republics ended almost all  such wars by 1900. Terminology. Descriptions. In historiography and literature, a "war of succession" may also be referred to as a "succession dispute", "dynastic struggle", "internecine conflict", "fratricidal war", or any combination of these terms. Not all of these are necessarily describing armed conflict, however, and the dispute may be resolved without escalating into open warfare. Wars of succession are also often referred to as a "civil" war, when in fact it was a conflict within the royalty, or broader aristocracy, that civilians were dragged into. It depends on the circumstances whether a war of succession is also a "civil  war in the sense of intra"state war (if it is limited to armed conflict inside one state), or it may be an "inter"state war (if foreign powers intervene; sometimes called 'international' war), or both. Therefore, names or descriptions of a war may simply depend on one's perspective; for example, Nolan (2008) stated: 'The Williamite War of 1689–1691, sometimes known as the Jacobite War, was a war of succession in England and an international war for or against France for most non-Irish participants. But it was a civil war in Ireland.' Similarly, scholars sometimes disagree whether the 1657–1661 Mughal  dynastic conflict (which consisted of several subconflicts, phases, and factions) should be labelled a 'war of succession' or a '(princely) rebellion'. Orders of succession. There are several different typs of orders of succession, some of which may not have been enshrined in law, but only established in local custom or tradition. Across times and places, orders of succession have switched from one system to another. Some prominent examples are: Analysis. Common elements. A war of succession is a type of war concerning struggle for the throne: a conflict about supreme power in a monarchy. Although it is typically associated with  hereditary monarchy (either with primogeniture or some other principle of hereditary succession), the concept has also been applied to elective monarchies. It may be intrastate war, an interstate war (if foreign powers intervene), or both. A succession war may arise after (or sometimes even before) a universally recognised ruler over a certain territory passes away (sometimes without leaving behind any (legal) offspring, or failing to clearly designate an heir), or is declared insane or otherwise incapable to govern, and is deposed. Next, several pretenders (also known as 'claimants', 'candidates', or 'rivals') step forward, who are either related to the previous  ruler (by ancestry or marriage) and therefore claim to have a right to their possessions based on the hereditary principle, or have concluded a treaty to that effect. They will seek allies within the nobility and/or abroad to support their claims to the throne. After all options for a diplomatic solution –such as a sharing of power, or a financial deal– or a quick elimination (in effect a coup d'état) –e.g. by assassination or arrest– have been exhausted, a military confrontation will follow. Quite often such succession disputes have led to long-lasting wars. Potential candidates were not always limited  to members from the royal household; depending on circumstances, aristocrats of other noble families within the realm were eligible to replace the deceased monarch, and could seize the opportunity of a succession crisis to take control of the state and found a new dynasty. Factors that increased the risk of a succession crisis included lack of legitimate heirs (especially when the (ruling branch of a) dynasty died out), illegitimate children, contested inheritance, and the creation of collateral dynastic branches. The last factor in particular had the potential to not only stimulate wars of succession upon a monarch's death, but  also princely revolts by cadets and cousins while they were still alive. The minority of a ruler necessitated regents and ministers to run state affairs until they came of age, which made opposition from military and administrative elites to the underage monarch easier, and also increased the risk of widespread political instability and civil conflict. Some wars of succession are about women's right to inherit. This does not exist in some countries (a "sword fief", where the Salic law applies, for example), but it does in others (a "spindle fief"). Often a ruler who has no sons, but does  have one or more daughters, will try to change the succession laws so that a daughter can succeed him. Such amendments will then be declared invalid by opponents, invoking the local tradition. In Europe, the Holy Roman Emperor (or King of the Romans) increasingly regularly granted smaller inland fiefs to heirs according to the female lineage since the 13th century. Prevalence and impact. Land inheritance disputes were frequent in agrarian societies, and the 'increasing subdivision of estates was a common cause of the undermining of territorial aristocracies' in cultures across the world. For example, in the 10th and 11th centuries , Sassanid Persia, various states in India, the Song dynasty of China, and medieval Europe, all struggled with succession crises. According to British statesman Henry Brougham (Lord Chancellor 1830–34), there were more and longer wars of succession in Europe between 1066 and the French Revolution (1789–99) than all other wars put together. "A war of succession is the most lasting of wars. The hereditary principle keeps it in perpetual life – [whereas] a war of election is always short, and never revives", he opined, arguing for elective monarchy to solve the problem. According to Kalevi Holsti (1991, p. 308, Table 12.2), who  catalogued and categorised wars from 1648 to 1989 into to 24 categories of 'issues that generated wars', 'dynastic/succession claims' were (one of) the primary cause(s) of 14% of all wars during 1648–1714, 9% during 1715–1814, 3% during 1815–1914, and 0% during 1918–1941 and 1945–1989. Braumoeller (2019) attributed this drastic decrease (and practical extinction) of wars of succession from the 18th century onwards largely to the fact that 'succession no longer serves either to cement territorial holdings legitimized by continuous bloodlines or to create de facto alliances or long-standing allegiances among the Great Powers.' He added that 'an international  order based on political democracy more or less eliminates the incentive for wars of royal succession.' Wars of succession have throughout history often been the worst-case scenario for absolute monarchies and other autocracies, as they are commonly known to be at their weakest and most vulnerable when the ruler dies and it is uncertain who will be the successor. Rival claims to ultimate power within such a regime are very prone to spiralling out of control into violence, because such regimes operate according to rule by force, or might makes right. A succession crisis not only risks dragging the  entire population into 'civil' war between factions backing rival pretenders, but the power vacuum it creates also presents oppressed groups within the state with an opportunity to revolt, as well as vassal states outside it to reclaim their independence, and while the state is weakened, it also provides rulers of neighbouring states the chance to invade to further their own interests (with or without their own claim to the throne, or while backing another claimant within the state). In numerous cases, the enormous long-term political and economic instability created by wars of succession caused the fall of the dynasty  or the state, or both. Scholars such as Johannes Kunisch and Johannes Burckhardt (1997) blamed wars of succession in early modern Europe on notions such as the divine right of kings and absolutism, because they created inherent problems in 'a state system that had known neither effective forms of cooperation nor a clear hierarchy that had neither experienced a formal equality between its members nor clear borders.' Nolan (2008) added about the 1650–1715 period in Europe: 'Complex issues of succession of Bourbon and Habsburg were the daily stuff of high European politics at all times, and the bane of the  lives of the masses of peasants swept away by ebbing and waning tides of peace and the maelstrom of war.' To him, the Nine Years' War and (1688–1697) and War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) were the 'two great, climactic conflicts that submerged local conflicts', so that these decades produced 'a generation of war that swirled around the dynastic ambitions and personal convictions of Louis XIV.' Prevention and mitigation. Throughout the centuries and across the planet, various attempts have been made at prevention or mitigation of wars of succession. Applicability. It can sometimes be difficult to determine whether a war  was purely or primarily a war of succession, or that other interests were at play as well that shaped the conflict in an equally or more important manner, such territory, economy, religion, and so on. Many wars are not called 'war of succession' because hereditary succession was not the most important element, or despite the fact that it (partially) "was". For example, the Great Northern War (1700–1721) was primarily about territory, but during 1704–1706, it was focused on the royal succession in Poland. Similarly, wars can also be unjustly branded a 'war of succession' whilst the succession was actually not  the most important issue hanging in the balance, such as when Louis XIV used dubious succession claims as an excuse to declare the War of Devolution (1667–1668) that he rather sought to fight for territorial gain. Some wars of succession were about multiple simultaneous disputes, such as in the cases of the Nine Years' War (about England, the Palatinate, and Cologne) and the War of the Polish Succession (about Poland and Lorraine). The outbreak of a war can be motivated by a succession dispute, but its focus or scope can shift over its course, and vice versa, particularly if a  new succession crisis erupts in the middle of a war that originally began for different reasons (e.g. the Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743)). Patterns by continent. African patterns. In various African cultures, the order of succession has changed over the course of centuries from one type to another, and especially during a switch there were several wars of succession before the new system was consolidated. For example, the death of mai Idris I Nigalemi (c. 1370) of the Kanem–Bornu Empire triggered a war of succession, because it was unclear whether collateral (brother to brother) or filial/patrilineal (father to son ) succession was to be preferred; patrilineal had been dominant until early 14th-century Kanem–Bornu, but was replaced by collateral by 1400. The "Kano Chronicle" records father–son succession in the Kingdom of Kano, but always mentions the name of the ruler's mother, which may point to vestiges of a preceding matrilineal system. The Kingdom of Yatenga switched from collateral to filial succession in the late 18th century. Several Bunyoro wars of succession took place in the Empire of Kitara in the 17th and 18th century; they almost always coincided with rebellions in its tributary states, indicating that vassals  regularly sought to exploit their suzerain's weakness during succession disputes in order to reclaim independence. Americas patterns. In Andean civilizations such as the Inca Empire (1438–1533), it was customary for a lord to pass on his reign to the son he perceived to be the most able, not necessarily his oldest son; sometimes he chose a brother instead. After the Spanish colonization of the Americas began in 1492, some Andean lords began to assert their eldest-born sons were the only 'legitimate' heirs (as was common to European primogeniture customs), while others maintained Andean succession customs involving the co -regency of a younger son of a sitting ruler during the latter's lifetime, each whenever the circumstances favoured either approach. Asian patterns. Burma. Helen James (2004) stated that in the late 17th-century Burmese Restored Toungoo dynasty 'the transfer of power upon the death of a monarch was always a problem, for there were many contenders to the throne owing to the practice of polygamy. The sons of the major queens frequently contested the succession.' Alaungpaya, founder of the new Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), intended his successors to be appointed by agnatic seniority (from brother to brother), according to James  in an attempt 'to avoid the bloodshed that accompanied each transfer of power at the death of a Burmese monarch. It was a vain hope. The directive itself led to bloody succession crises, as some of his sons sought to pass the crown to their sons instead of their brothers, thereby thwarting Alaungpaya's dying wish.' His oldest son Naungdawgyi had to fight a two-year war of succession (1760–1762) to assert his authority. Hsinbyushin's succession was not challenged, but designating his son Singu Min as heir rather than a younger brother bred an imminent succession dispute just before  his death. The next king Singu managed to avoid a war of succession by having most of his potential rivals killed or exiled in a timely manner, although Singu's reign was cut short by a princely rebellion in February 1782, in which Phaungkaza Maung Maung seized the throne for seven days before Bodawpaya killed and replaced him. Bodawpaya successfully eliminated all his rivals upon enthronement, and in 1802 ended 'twenty-five years of conflict between lineal and collateral succession' in favour of the former, according to Koenig (1990). Nevertheless, two kings were overthrown by their brothers in coups in  1837 and 1853, and in 1866 the crown prince (the king's brother) was assassinated by two of the king's sons. When the last Burmese king Thibaw Min (r. 1878–1885) began his reign, he had about 80 of his relatives murdered to prevent any challenge to his accession. China. According to Arthur Waldron (2008), 'throughout their history, Chinese states have been overwhelmingly land-based and (...) their wars have chiefly been wars of succession and overland conquest.' In the alleged first dynasty, the Xia, as well as the confirmed Shang dynasty, both father–son and older brother–younger brother succession  appear to have existed, with agnatic primogeniture gradually becoming a frequent practice in the late Shang. The Rebellion of the Three Guards (c. 1042–1039 BCE) after the death of King Wu of Zhou is perhaps the first war of succession in Chinese recorded history. During the reign of Duke Zhuang, Zheng was the most powerful Spring and Autumn period state, but the 701–680 BCE war of succession following his death reduced it to one of the weakest. As the authority of the Zhou dynasty declined, the states' power increased (the Age of Hegemons), and whenever the Zhou royal clan was  unable to solve a succession crisis by itself, leading states were expected to militarily intervene on behalf of the "legitimate" heir, which occurred frequently in the 7th and 6th century. However, as the states grew more powerful and dukes had to delegate control over certain areas to kinsmen as their territories enlarged, they increasingly risked internal dynastic struggles as well. Especially the largest states experienced this problem, namely Qi (e.g. the War of Qi's succession in 643–642 BCE) and Jin; in the latter case, this eventually led to the Partition of Jin in 403 BCE, which ushered in the  Warring States period. After uniting all states into his Qin dynasty, the first Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang failed to establish secure succession rules before his death in 210 BCE, upon which his clan immediately lost control of the government to Li Si and Zhao Gao, and his dynasty fell soon after (207 BCE). Winning the subsequent Chu–Han Contention and founding the Han dynasty, Emperor Gaozu sought to ensure a stable succession process that would not endanger the dynasty. He strengthened the designated heir's position by creating the office of the Crown Prince, in which a group of  officials educated and served the designated heir well in advance until his time to succeed would arrive. This crown prince system prevented a lot of succession disputes during the Han dynasty, and although it frequently malfunctioned in the Three Kingdoms, Jin and Northern and Southern dynasties periods, it 'matured' during the Tang and Song dynasties. Nevertheless, the Han state did suffer dynastic instability several times. When a Han emperor died without officially appointing a successor, his widow, the empress dowager, had the sole right to appoint one of the late emperor's surviving sons or relatives to the position. At  such times, or when an infant emperor was placed on the Han throne, a regent, often also the empress dowager or one of her male relatives, would assume the duties of the emperor until he reached his majority. Sometimes the empress dowager's faction—the consort clan—was overthrown in a coup d'état or a war of succession. For example, Empress Lü Zhi was the "de facto" ruler of the court during the reigns of the child emperors Qianshao ("r". 188–184 BCE) and Houshao ("r". 184–180 BCE), but her faction was overthrown during the Lü Clan Disturbance upon her death  in 180 BCE, and Liu Heng was named emperor instead. Japan. The Yamato state did not have clear rules on succession (such as primogeniture), and the death of a monarch frequently resulted in a crisis with multiple claimants from several powerful clans vying for the throne. The religion-based Soga–Mononobe conflict (552–587) between the pro-Shinto Mononobe clan and the pro-Buddhist Soga clan sometimes resulted in wars of succession, particularly in 585–587. To prevent further challenges to his power due to succession crises and to enforce the adoption of Buddhism, clan leader Soga no Umako had Emperor Sushun  assassinated in 592, and instead installed Suiko as empress (the first woman on the imperial throne in Japanese history) with Prince Shōtoku as regent, while holding the reins of power behind the scenes. This configuration led to a stable reign of empress Suiko until 628, 'a remarkably long span for that period.' However, when she died and Shōtoku's son Prince Yamashiro claimed the throne, he was rejected by the Soga clan in favour of Emperor Jomei. After the latter died in 641 and was succeeded by his wife, Empress Kōgyoku, Yamashiro once again claimed the throne, but he and  his family were killed (possibly by suicide) when soldiers of Soga no Iruka attacked. The latter was subsequently murdered in the 645 Isshi Incident by Prince Naka-no-Ōe, who installed puppet Emperor Kōtoku before taking the throne himself as Emperor Tenji in 654. Tenji's death in 672 caused the Jinshin War; as there were still no rules for succession, any close kin of the deceased emperor regardless of gender could claim equal rights to the crown. Fitnas in early Islamic states. The historical "Fitnas" and similar conflicts in early Islam were essentially wars of succession, resulting not (primarily ) from religious disputes, but from a lack of agreement in early Islamic political thought on how to politically organise the early Muslim community. In particular, there was no consensus on the exercise of power and how leaders should be appointed. This lack of constitutional theory has been attributed by Ali Abdel Raziq (1888–1966) to the idea that the prophet Muhammad had been primarily concerned with religious regulations, and had not given priority to founding a political system, never left a known successor (= caliph), nor established standard rules by which future leaders were to be appointed. After his death in  632, this compelled the Companions to find "ad hoc" solutions to the leadership question, causing succession disputes that resulted in the "Fitnas", most notably the First Fitna (656–661), the Second Fitna (680–692), the Third Fitna (744–747), the Fourth Fitna (809–827), and the Fitna of al-Andalus (1009–1031). Eventually, the disputes led to the major schism between Sunni Muslims, who held that the leader should in some way be elected from within the Quraysh, and Shia Muslims, who held that the leader must be a direct biological descendant of Muhammad through Ali, and that each leader personally designated his own successor . The Umayyad Caliphate (661–750) followed neither school of thought, because its founder Mu'awiya I was neither a descendant of Muhammad, nor a Companion elected as caliph; instead, the Umayyad basis of power was military success and wealth acquired from conquest. Therefore, many early Muslims perceived this dynasty to lack legitimacy, and this 'arguably biggest problem' contributed to its downfall during the Third Fitna (744–747) and the closely connected Abbasid Revolution (747–750). Islamic dynasties. Other wars of succession in later Islamic polities in Asia (mostly Perso-Arabic, Turkic, and Mongolic monarchies) that haven't been named 'fitnas' have also occurred, such  as during the Abbasid Caliphate, where a peaceful transition of power upon the caliph's death was the exception rather than the rule. According to Justin Marozzi (2015), the 775 succession of Al-Mansur by Al-Mahdi "was, by the standards of the future, blood-soaked successions of the Abbasid caliphate, a model of order and decorum." During the period of Abbasid fragmentation into autonomous dynasties (c. 850–1050), this was still a common problem according to Antony Black (2011): 'Most dynasties were disabled by succession struggles; it was difficult to establish a constitutional rule for succession in the face of  Islamic Law and tribal custom, which divided a patrimony equally among all sons. (...) To gain the succession within a clan dynasty you needed, once again, to demonstrate that God was on your side. This meant acquiring support through a combination of military success and good repute.' Eric J. Hanne (2007) reached a similar conclusion about the Buyid dynasty in particular: 'As the Buyids had traditionally divided up their lands among brothers, uncles, and cousins, the familial confederacy, a frail situation at best, only worked when one had a strong personal figure such as 'Adud al-Dawla (d. 372/983), whose suzerainty  was accepted only after prolonged internecine warfare.' Wars of succession could sometimes cause more instability to the realm than whatever stability the most capable of rulers could achieve in times of peace. Citing Ibn Khaldun, Black argued that this was one major factor why virtually all Islamic dynasties (with the notable exception of the Ottoman Empire) lasted only about 100 to 200 years before falling apart due to succession crises. According to Rashid al-Din Hamadani's "Jami' al-tawarikh" (c. 1316), the Ilkhanate was plagued with succession struggles, misrule and corruption from its founding by Hulagu Khan in the  1260s until the accession of Ghazan in 1295, the first Ilkhan to convert to Islam, and to make efforts to base the Ilkhanate's legitimacy on that religion. However, because Ghazan was Rashid's patron, this account of the early Ilkhanate's instability may have been exaggerated in order to glorify Ghazan and legitimise his reign. Indian subcontinent. In the Mughal Empire (1526–1857), there was no tradition of primogeniture. Instead it was customary for sons to overthrow their father, and for brothers to war to the death among themselves. 17th-century French traveller François Bernier, who spent about 12 years  in India (1658–1670; partially overlapping with the Mughal war of succession of 1657–1661), praised Aurangzeb as 'a great King' with 'a versatile and rare genius', but was critical of the 'unjust and cruel' means by which he and other Mughal emperors rose to power through war rather than the European method of succession 'in favour of the eldest son by wise and fixed laws' that Bernier himself was familiar with. Judith E. Walsh (2006) stated that wars of succession were 'the one problem the Mughals never solved', and that after Aurangzeb's death in 1707, repetitive 'succession struggles brought Mughal  power more or less to an end'. On the other hand, scholars such as Faruqui (2002) have posited that studies which argue Mughal succession struggles have weakened the empire may be influenced by 'a long held bias in Western European writings favoring the institution of primogeniture over all other modes of forms of succession.' Instead, Faruqui sought to 'demonstrate how, far from weakening the empire, intra-dynastic collaboration and strife was a crucial site for the production and reproduction of Mughal power.' Malay Archipelago. Wars of succession after the death of Hayam Wuruk such as the Regreg War (1404–1406) are  commonly recognised to have weakened the Javanese empire of Majapahit in the 15th century, and to have been one of the leading causes of its eventual downfall in 1527. The Samudera Pasai Sultanate in northern Sumatra experienced a throne struggle in 1412–1415, in which the Ming Chinese fourth treasure voyage of admiral Zheng He intervened. Starting with the death of Sultan Agung of Mataram in 1645, every time the sultan of Mataram died, a war of succession broke out, and these recurrent conflicts crippled the state. From the Trunajaya rebellion (1674–1681) onwards, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) began to  exploit the dynastic crises to expand its economic, political and territorial control over Java by supporting their preferred candidate for the throne with superior firepower, in return for extensive concessions upon victory. The Javanese Wars of Succession (1703–1755) enabled the Company to weaken and eventually split Mataram into smaller states that it could easily control. An early 19th-century British writer observed: "In Malay States, a "War of Succession" almost invariably follows the decease of the Rajah, and with their other feudal contentions are the bane of them all — oppressing the inhabitants, checking industry, and obstructing commerce." He recommended that  the British government take certain measures to prevent these wars from happening in the interest of both natives and foreigners, but argued that the English should not become 'conquerors and oppressors' to the Malays, 'as the Dutch are in all their possessions throughout the Archipelago'. The British would establish "indirect rule" over the Malay States and turned the sultans essentially into their agents. In 1819, the British would exploit the Johor Sultanate's succession crisis to partition its territory with the Dutch, keeping mainland Johor including Singapore for themselves and ceding the Riau-Lingga Sultanate to the Netherlands. While Brunei  remained an absolute monarchy, the kings of independent Malaysia have assumed more ceremonial roles of identity within a constitutional framework. Vietnam. About the Hoa Lư-based early Vietnamese kingdom of Đại Cồ Việt (968–1054), Nicholas Tarling (1992) noted: '[T]he Hoa-lu kings ruled chiefly by threat of violence, and the death of each one was followed by a war of succession.' By contrast, rulers of the later Trần dynasty (1225–1400) had adopted the practice of '[abdicating] the throne to their chosen adult heirs upon the death of their predecessors, thereafter ruling as 'senior' kings.' Tarling added that 'the Tran kings  made decisions in consultation with their uncles, brothers, and cousins, thereby fostering solidarity within the royal clan,' and that the dynasty began to collapse when these rules were no longer observed. When the childless king Trần Dụ Tông failed to designate an heir, his death in 1369 marked the beginning of two decades of succession-based warfare, until prime minister Hồ Quý Ly seized power and restored order in 1390, and abolished the Tran dynasty in favour of his own in 1400. Siam/Thailand. With the exception of Naresuan's succession by Ekathotsarot in 1605, 'the method of royal succession  at Ayutthaya throughout the seventeenth century was battle.' Although European visitors to Thailand at the time tried to discern any rules in the Siamese order of succession, noting that in practice the dead king's younger brother often succeeded him, this custom appears not to have been legally enshrined anywhere. The ruling king did often bestow the title of "uparaja" ('viceroy') upon his preferred successor, but in reality, it was an 'elimination process': any male member of the royal clan (usually the late king's brothers and sons) could claim the throne of Ayutthaya for himself, and win by defeating  all his rivals. Moreover, groupings of nobles, foreign merchants, and foreign mercenaries actively rallied behind their preferred candidates in hopes of benefiting from each war's outcome. European patterns. Causes. The origins of wars of succession in Europe lie in feudal or absolutist systems of government, in which the decisions on war and peace could be made by a single sovereign without the population's consent. The politics of the respective rulers was mainly driven by dynastic interests. German historian Johannes Kunisch (1937–2015) ascertained: "The all-driving power was the dynasties' law of the prestige of power, the expansion of  power, and the desire to maintain themselves." Moreover, the legal and political coherence of the various provinces of a 'state territory' often consisted merely in nothing more than having a common ruler. Early government systems were therefore based on dynasties, the extinction of which immediately brought on a state crisis. The composition of the governmental institutions of the various provinces and territories also eased their partitioning in case of a conflict, just like the status of claims on individual parts of the country by foreign monarchs. Early medieval Europe was rife with conflicts over property or property rights. R. I.  Moore (2000) characterised the situation as 'apparently endless and pointless internecine conflict which raged at every level of aristocratic society from the tenth century onwards. It continued everywhere in Latin Europe (though taking a somewhat different form to the east of the Rhine) throughout the eleventh century, and did not subside in most regions until well into the twelfth.' Usually, a designated or prospective heir to a property (typically but not always the owner's oldest son) would face off demands by uncles and brothers, aunts and sisters (often represented by their husbands) and their children to grand them a  fair share in the inheritance. Moore stated: 'Title to landed property would always remain a source of endless and bitter contention, governed by infinitely various and complicated combinations of differing legal traditions and local customs and conditions.' Justifications. To wage a war, a justification is needed ("Jus ad bellum"). These arguments may be put forward in a declaration of war, to indicate that one is justly taking up arms. As the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) noted, these must make clear that one is unable to pursue their rightful claims in any other way. The claims to legal titles from  the dynastic sphere were a strong reason for war, because international relations primarily consisted of inheritance and marriage policies until the end of the Ancien Régime. These were often so intertwined that it had to lead to conflict. Treaties that led to hereditary linkages, pawning and transfers, made various relations more complicated, and could be utilised for claims as well. That claims were made at all is due to the permanent struggle for competition and prestige between the respective ruling houses. On top of that came the urge of contemporary princes to achieve "glory" for themselves. Prince-bishoprics. In some  cases, wars of succession in Europe could also be centred around the reign in prince-bishoprics. Although these were formally elective monarchies without hereditary succession, the election of the prince-bishop could be strongly intertwined with the dynastic interests of the noble families involved, each of whom would put forward their own candidates. In case of disagreement over the election result, waging war was a possible way of settling the conflict. In the Holy Roman Empire, such wars were known as diocesan feuds. Primogeniture and international law. After numerous familial conflicts, the principle of male primogeniture originated in Western Europe  the 11th century, spreading to the rest of Europe (with the exception of the Kyivan Rus') in the 12th and 13th century; it has never been widely adopted outside Europe. This restricted the number of potential heirs to the oldest son of the reigning monarch, thereby facilitating undivided inheritance and a great reduction of potential sources of property conflict. Another major effect of the near-universal introduction of male primogeniture was the strengthening of patrilineality, and the structural undermining and destruction of the women's property rights, be they mothers, wives or daughters. For example, women in northern Italy, who  had the ancient right to inherit a "tercia", one third of their husband's estate, lost it in the 12th century (Genoa: 1143). However, it did not prevent the outbreak of wars of succession altogether. A true deluge of succession wars occurred in Europe between the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and the Coalition Wars (1792–1815). According to German historian Heinz Duchhardt (1943) the outbreak of wars of succession in the early modern period was stimulated on the one hand by the uncertainty about the degree to which regulations and agreements on hereditary succession were to be considered a respectable part  of emerging international law. On the other hand, there was also a lack of effective means to provide them recognition and validation. Jeroen Duindam (2021) noted that, 'when the internal challenges to dynastic supremacy had abated' in 17th- and 18th-century Europe, the royal courts forged more and more marriages alliances with the ruling houses of other sovereign states, which 'helps to explain the prevalence of international wars of succession' in that period. Wars of succession in Europe gradually came to an end in the 19th century, when absolute monarchies were replaced by an international order based on democracy, featuring  constitutional monarchies or republics. List of wars of succession. Note: Wars of succession in transcontinental states are mentioned under the continents where their capital city was located. Names of wars that have been given names by historians are capitalised; the others, whose existence has been proven but not yet given a specific name, are provisionally written in lowercase letters (except for the first word, geographical and personal names).