Twee rampe: Die Nasionale Party-regering en die ANC-bewind – praag.co.za
Arthur Keppel-Jones (1909-1996) het die verloop van die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis in sy boek voorspel: When Smuts Goes: A history of South Africa from 1952 to 2010, first published in 2015 (Cape Town: African Bookman, 1947, 203p). Uit die datums blyk die aktualiteit van die teks. Die outeur was ‘n dosent in geskiedenis aan die Universiteit van die Witwatersrand, maar het hom in 1959 in Kanada gevestig. In 1972 het hy Suid-Afrika besoek en erken dat sommige van sy voorspellings foutief is. Sy pa was ‘n Brit en sy ma was ‘n afstammeling van die Britse setlaars.
Uit sy boek blyk Keppel-Jones se bewondering vir die Britte en selfs kolonialisme. Hy was ‘n Anglofiel wat bv van die veronderstelling uitgegaan het dat Rhodesië ‘n vesting van Britse voortreflikheid sou bly. Sy siening van die Afrikaner-bewind en Britse kolonialisme blyk uit die volgende: “The Republic had achieved its aim of keeping the Kaffir ‘in his place’. He had not been allowed to advance in civilization. That he would have made an advance, under the determined and patient guidance of civilised leaders, is proved by what has happened to the branches of his race in other African countries” (p 174).
Natal was Keppel-Jones se gunsteling provinsie omdat dit meer Britsgesind as die Kaap en veral as die Transvaal en Oranje-Vrystaat was. Hy het begrip gehad waarom sommige wou hê dat Natal van die Unie moet wegbreek. Hieruit kan reeds sy Afrikaner-haat afgelei word. Keppel-Jones was deurdrenk van liberalisme en was oortuig dat federalisme ‘n oplossing vir Suid-Afrika se grondwetlike probleme bied. Maar hy het gedink niks hiervan sou in Suid-Afrika tereg kom nie. Sy boek skets nie ‘n utopie nie, maar ‘n distopie.
Voordat ek Keppel-Jones se teks ontleed, is ‘n lemmeristiese historiese oorsig nodig:
Na Unie-wording was die eerste drie eerste ministers: Louis Botha (1910-1919), Jan Smuts (1919-1924, 1939-1948) en Barry Hertzog (1924-1939). Al was Hertzog ‘n Afrikaner, was sy bewind in samewerking met Engelse elemente. Die periode van 1910 tot 1948 kan as ‘n oorheersend Engelse/Britse periode in Suid-Afrika se politieke geskiedenis gekarakteriseer word. Van 1948 tot 1994 was die Nasionale Party (NP) aan die bewind, met as eerste ministers (en van 1984 af as staatspresidente): DF Malan (1948-1954), Hans Strijdom (1954-1958), Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-1966), John Vorster (1966-1978), PW Botha (1978-1989) en FW de Klerk (1989-1994). Dit kan die Afrikaner-periode genoem word.
Van 1990 tot 1994 was egter ‘n oorgangs- of afgrondsfase toe De Klerk evolusionêre politieke ontwikkeling vir revolusionêre oorgawe verruil het. Skielik was die tradisionele veiligheidsmagte (weermag en polisie) nie meer alleen in beheer van wet en orde nie. Wanneer daar ‘n samedromming van swartes was, is die beheer aan selfaangestelde ANC-“marshals” toevertrou. Dit was die aanvang van die tirannie van die meerderheid in die vorm van swart mag.
Sedert Unie-wording was daar dus ‘n Engelse (1910-1948), ‘n Afrikaner- (1948-1989) en daarna ‘n swart (in meer as een sin) periode. In breër verband kan gesê word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedenis uit drie eras bestaan: die voor-beskawingsperiode, die beskawingsperiode (1652-1989) en die na-beskawingsperiode. Hier verwys “beskawing” na Europese beskawing.
Keppel-Jones se teks handel oor die Afrikaner-era, wat hy gedink het in 1952 (en nie 1948 nie) sou begin, en daarna die swart-era tot 2010, wat hy voorspel het reeds in 1988 sou begin. Hy het gedink die bewind van sowel die NP as die ANC sou katastrofies wees. Die hele periode wat hy dek (1952-2010), word as twee opeenvolgende rampe gekarakteriseer. Sy rede vir 1952 as die begin van die NP-bewind is dat dit drie eeue na die landing van Jan van Riebeeck was. Weens gebrek aan ruimte sal ek nie elke keer kan verduidelik dat Keppel-Jones dít voorspel het, maar dat dát gebeur het nie.
Wat Keppel-Jones begeer het, is ‘n heeltemal ander soort revolusie as FW de Klerk se onderhandelde algehele magsoorgawe: “One purpose of the book is … that the salvation of the country can only lie in a reversal of historic tendencies, a reversal so thorough as to constitute a revolution” (p vi). Die “historic tendencies” waarna hy verwys en wat beëindig moet word, is veral die tradisie van rasse-segregasie; in werklikheid ‘n eg Britse tradisie, maar hy erken dit nie. As dogmatiese liberalis reken Keppel-Jones dat segregasie afgeskaf en algemene stemreg ingestel moet word en dat alles dan vorentoe vir al die inwoners wonderlik sal wees.
Jukskei (eintlik DF Malan) het in 1952 eerste minister geword. Hy was die leier van die linkervleuel van die NP. Bult (eintlik Hans Strijdom) was die leier van die regtervleuel en sou Jukskei in 1962 opvolg, maar as leier van ‘n NP-wegbreekgroep, die Christelik Nasionale Republikeinse Party (CNRP). Tereg word voorspel dat die kommuniste en vakbonde dadelik kortgevat is. Ook dat die blanke verteenwoordigers van swart belange in die parlement en die stemreg van bruines in die Kaapprovinsie afgeskaf is. Ook dat woon- en sakegebiede etnies geskei is en dat die Indiese regering daaroor besware in die Verenigde Nasies (VN) geopper het. Tereg is voorspel dat ‘n tevergeefse poging aangewend sou word om die aanliggende Britse protektorate (Basoetoland/Lesotho, Betsjoeanaland/Botswana en Swaziland) by Suid-Afrika in te lyf.
Die sterkste teenstand van die NP-regering het van die Engelse universiteite gekom. Fort Hare, die enigste universiteit vir swartes, is in 1963 gesluit. In werklikheid is Fort Hare in 1960 deur die NP-regering oorgeneem en nog vier nuwe universiteite vir nie-blankes is gestig (Durban-Westville, Noorde/Turfloop, Wes-Kaapland en Zoeloeland). Heel korrek voorspel Keppel-Jones dat sommige swartes, Indiërs en Jode in ondergrondse politiek saamgespan het. Baie Britsgesindes het geëmigreer. Radio-uitsendings is onder regeringsbeheer geplaas. Die NP het in 1958 die amp van goewerneur-generaal as seremoniële staatshoof, die eedaflegging aan die Britse kroon en die Britse vlag afgeskaf met die oog daarop om ‘n republiek buite die Britse Statebond uit te roep. Politieke gevangenes is gemartel en die paswette is in verskerpte mate toegepas. Die outeur noem uiteraard nie dat die eerste paswette tydens die eerste Britse bewind aan die Kaap (1797-1803) ingestel is nie.
Die NP-regering word (moontlik verkeerdelik) as sterk anti-semities voorgestel. As immigrante was Jode onwelkom en dié wat hulle na Uniewording hier gevestig het, is van hulle stemreg en burgerskap ontneem. “The English language was deprived of official status in 1964” (p 199). Afrikaans is in 1966 tot die enigste amptelike taal verklaar. Afrikaans word die onderrigmedium ook aan die tradisioneel Engelse skole en universiteite. “I find my children’s minds are being poisoned at school” (p 81). Plek- en ander name is verafrikaans. Net blankes (Jode uitgesluit) het burgerskap. Die Vierkleur is die landsvlag van die Republiek Ossewa, geproklameer in 1966. Die CNRP word die enigste politieke party en die staatspresident kry absolute mag. Pretoria word die wetgewende, uitvoerende en regterlike hoofstad. Die provinsies word afgeskaf. Nasionalisering word ingestel. Die regering word ‘n fascistiese regime genoem.
Die uittog van emigrante van 1955 af word die Tweede Groot Trek genoem. Die Indiërs kan na Indië en die swartes na buurlande gaan. Die vloei van swartes uit Suid-Afrika was soveel groter as die invloei dat die regering dit gestop het om te verseker dat genoeg goedkoop arbeid beskikbaar is. Oor so ‘n swart vlugteling skryf Keppel-Jones: “Should he, being summoned by any European to stop, refuse to do so, he could be shot” (p 85). Die lande waarheen blankes gegaan het, word korrek geïdentifiseer, behalwe Rhodesië en Kenia, wat Keppel-Jones steeds beskou het as lande wat aan blankes leefbare omstandighede bied. Oor Rhodesië is hy optimisties: “It is doubtful if any country has ever shown such rapid and startling development” (p 84).
Volgens Keppel-Jones was daar in 1972 opstande onder nie-wittes, veral swartes, teen die Afrikaner-regime. Dit het met moord, verminking, brandstigting en plundery gepaard gegaan. Die Transkei is selfs onafhanklik verklaar. In Zoeloeland was daar ‘n soortgelyke strewe. “The United Nations placed Zululand under British trusteeship, the building of the naval base at Kosi Bay was begun” (p 110). Die Afrikaner-regime het ingegryp. Dit word “the Tenth Kaffir War” genoem (p 90). In Johannesburg was daar “babies bleeding to death beside the corpses of their mothers … The people of Orlando and Pimville were … annihilated … About 50 000 were killed in the Western Native Township” (p 91-92). “Searches would be conducted and wherever any firearms were found in a non-European area, the nearest inhabited place would be razed to the ground and its inhabitants shot … A large proportion of those who had taken up arms against the régime had been killed in the fighting or after surrender” (p 105). Daar was vuurpelotons en konsentrasiekampe. Die outeur verskaf nooit weersinwekkende besonderhede oor wat swartes aan blankes gedoen het nie.
“Higher education for the non-Europeans had been abolished. In June, 1972, the Volksraad unanimously agreed to prohibit the teaching of reading and writing to any Native, Asiatic or Coloured person … No non-European might own any business or employ any person, nor might he practice any profession independently” (p 106). Tydens die bewind van die wit regime het die paaie slaggate gehad en dienslewering het gefaal, blykbaar omdat die swartes nie wou saamwerk nie. Die VN het ekonomiese maatreëls teen Suid-Afrika ingestel, bv “an increase in customs tariffs … to offset the advantage it gained from cheap labour” (p 121).
Die blanke regime se dilemma word soos volg beskryf: “If they fought their destruction was certain. But the alternative … giving rights and power to all the races … was an unmentionable horror … The evil genius of their history had driven them on to their present predicament, and would drive them on again to their inevitable end” (p 129). Dat apartheid ‘n voortsetting en aanpassing van die Britse beleid van rasse-segregasie was, word nie deur Keppel-Jones genoem nie. Hier is sy standpunt: “Some of the old social distinctions might have been retained if the Republic had followed a generous and liberal policy towards the black race from the beginning. But there is no chance of it now” (p 168).
In 1972 “the United Nations were called upon to consider whether they thought it wise to set the precedent of intervention in the internal affairs of another country. Every nation, surely, had political, economic and cultural traditions and usages which were suited to its own character” (p 134). In 1977 is Suid-Afrika uit die VN geskop en is oorlog verklaar. Die Britte en Amerikaners het die oorlog namens die VN teen die Suid-Afrikaanse regime gevoer. Dit word die “Derde Vryheidsoorlog” genoem (p 156). Van Simonstad en Kosibaai af het die Britte ‘n skeepsblokkade uitgevoer. Die Simonstadse vlootbasis is jare voor dit deur die Afrikaner-regime aan die Britte afgestaan. Die waarheid is die teenoorgestelde: Die NP-regering het hierdie vlootbasis ten duurste van die Britse regering gekoop. Vergelyk dit met die enklawe Walvisbaai wat deur die ANC-regering gratis aan Namibië oorhandig is.
Die Amerikaners het glo ‘n militêre basis in Mosambiek gehad en die Portugese regering was ook teen die blanke bewind gekant. Die oorlog is ook uit Rhodesië oor die Limpopo-rivier gevoer. Die swartes het in opstand gekom, “all whole-heartedly on the side of the invaders” (p 146). “Murders on lonely farms, in suburban homes and in dark city streets were a nightly occurrence” (p 139). Die Suid-Afrikaanse vloot was in Saldanhabaai. Daar was ook “a fleet of ox-wagons to eke out the resources of the railways” (p 140). Pretoria was “the last ditch of the régime” (p 157). “The people of the capital saw themselves as trekkers who had retired into laager to ward off the savage onslaught” (p 158). Vir die outeur was sy verwysings na ossewaens, juskei, trekkers, laer, ens, blykbaar baie snaaks.
“No candid mind could see for the Republic any prospect but complete and final collapse. The defeat would be absolute, unlike the defeat of almost any other state. When France fell in 1940, when Germany fell in 1945, there remained a French and a German people in occupation of their historic territories. These peoples could not be destroyed. They might recover their strength and greatness at some future time. The South African Republic was in a different sort of danger. The ‘nation’ there was not the people of the country, but merely a small section whose existence and identity depended on the subjection of the rest. Liberate the Africans and the ‘South African nation’ would vanish from the scene, never to return” (149-150). Dit is myns insiens Afrikaners se dure plig om Keppel-Jones in hierdie opsig vorentoe verkeerd te bewys.
“The world looked on at the nemesis which the White South African nation had brought upon itself” (p 152). “No one could deny that the Republicans had brought this on themselves … their possession rested in the last resort on bayonets, and we have knocked the bayonet out of their hands … we should have interfered in South Africa before it came to this” (p 154-155). Oor die Voortrekkermonument in 1977: “A neat bombing job on the evening of the 23rd blew the structure to atoms, wiped out the bitter-enders in it, and extinguished for ever the sacred flame of Republicanism that had hitherto symbolised the unquenchable motion of the Volk” (p 163). Let op die outeur se woordkeuse: neat, wiped out, sacred, unquenchable. Maar Keppel-Jones voel dat hy nog nie genoeg gif teen Afrikaners versprei het nie: “Not all the leading personalities of the Republic had the happiness to die while the Vierkleur still waved” (p 164).
“The whole story of the South African Republic might be interpreted in military terms as that of a people who failed to understand that they must cope with more dangerous weapons than assegaais. So obsessed were the Republicans with the romantic migrations of their ancestors that they could never get away from the picture of themselves as sturdy trekkers defending their race against the puny weapons of black savages. Had they fully understood … their task … it might have occurred to them that the only defence would lie in a policy that would satisfy the world’s conscience. But this had not occurred to them. So Pretoria was a laager, and its citizens would hardly have been surprised to see a posse of young heroes ride in through a gap in the wagons with a thousand sleek, bellowing cattle seized from the enemy” (p 158). Veediewe is dus helde in Keppel-Jones se oë.
Na die oorlog het die VN ‘n militêre goewerneur in Suid-Afrika aangestel. “The supremacy of the whites was to be destroyed – world opinion demanded it, the war had been fought for that purpose, and much trouble and suffering would be avoided if the white citizens made up their minds to accept the new situation with a good grace” (p 168). Wat voorsien word is “a great future for South Africa if only all races would co-operate in a spirit of true South Africanism” (p 169). “In the reconstruction of the political, administrative and social system of the country no distinctions were to be made on the ground of race or colour” (p 166). “In 2011 the census officials abandoned the practice of distinguishing between races in their returns” (p 178). Is daar enige moontlikheid dat dit in die nuwe Suid-Afrika sal gebeur, of is sodanige rassistiese grondslag veel eerder die alfa en omega van die ANC se beleid teenoor blankes?
As rassediskriminasie die grootste euwel in die ou Suid-Afrika was, waarom het die grondleggers van die nuwe Suid-Afrika nie die elementêre insig gehad om rassediskriminasie te verbied nie? Pleks daarvan word rassediskriminasie tot in die oneindige toekoms toegelaat, mits dit teen wittes, en net wittes, gepleeg word. Van almal, dus dié wat in die nuwe bedeling bevoordeel en dié wat benadeel word, word daar egter verwag om die nuwe Suid-Afrika te laat werk. Let op in hoeverre geregtigheid na Keppel-Jones se VN-oorlog seëvier: “It would be necessary to eject the great numbers of non-Europeans who had taken forcible possession of white men’s property. But for this the government had no stomach” (p 173).
Deel van “a great mass of sullen bitter-enders for whom adaptation was out of the question” (p 169) het in 1978 na Argentinië geëmigreer. Ander het na Duitsland gegaan. Al die lande wat met die blanke regime simpatie gehad het, kan as fascisties beskou word: Argentinië, Duitsland, Japan en Spanje. “The total drain of European population from South Africa between 1977 and 1983 fell slightly short of the million mark” (p 178).
Wat is hierdie studeerkamerliberalis se siening van swartes? Die swart boer “had been accustomed to a primitive standard of living. He would improve it a little – more mealie meal to fill the aching maw would be welcome. More cattle and wives would improve his social status. But beyond that what he chiefly wanted was leisure, inactivity in the sun, escape from the intolerable tyranny, too long endured, of we[r]k … The life of glorious ease and few, simple wants appealed to them. The result was a decline in agricultural production … The same problem had to be faced in industry and mining. Native workers in these occupations were willing to apply themselves to the old tasks sufficiently to make a living of sorts for themselves and their families. But very few could be found who preferred hard, sustained work and the comforts of a civilised life to spasmodic efforts punctuating a life of sunbasking leisure” (p 174).
Vergelyk dit met hierdie na-oorlogse werklikheid: “The dependence of the country’s economy on the shrinking but still significant European population. It provided the skill in industry and agriculture and almost all the leadership and organising capacity in trade and finance … The backward races must be educated, but how?” (p 175). Teen 1986 “the civil service had begun in the lower [!] grades to employ these [non-white] products of the schools” (p 179). In die nuwe Suid-Afrika word daar egter geëis dat die demografie (dadelik) op alle vlakke weerspieël word.
Die VN het gedink “the period of tutelage ought to last at least thirty years” (p 180). Maar die swartes se sug na mag kon nie beheer word nie. Ook weens die druk van die sogenaamde wêreldmening is spoedig besluit om demokratiese verkiesings met algemene stemreg te hou. In 1987 “town, village and distict councils were elected … Illiterate voters – the very great majority – were assisted by ballot papers in which the candidates were represented by pictorial symbols” (p 180).
“The first party to be organised was the African National Party [ANP – ANC?], which hoped to win votes by demanding loudly that the troops must go and the country be granted independence. It drew support mainly from the more backward Africans and worked closely with the witch-doctors … But the party was not exclusively African, and succeeded in rallying many Coloured and Asiatic supporters and not a few white collaborationists” (p 180). Keppel-Jones kan verskoon word as hy nie kon voorsien dat oud-Broederbonders onder die meelopers sou tel nie.
Ooreenkomstig die outeur se liberalistiese ideaal het die South African Progressive Party egter in 1988 die eerste demokratiese parlementsverkiesing gewen. ‘n Verdere vervulling van Keppel-Jones se liberalistiese droom is dat ‘n wit man in 1989 as die seremoniële president verkies is. Is daar enige kans dat ‘n wit mens (om van ‘n wit man nie te praat nie) so ‘n hoë pos in die sogenaamde nie-rassistiese en nie-seksistiese nuwe Suid-Afrika sal beklee?
Die eerste agt hoofstukke handel oor die dom en bose Afrikaner-regime. Daarna volg ‘n hoofstuk oor die VN-oorlog en een oor die VN-bewind, waartydens gepoog is om Suid-Afrika reg te trek. Na hierdie lang aanloop tot ‘n demokratiese, regverdige Suid-Afrika, word ‘n enkele hoofstuk aan die swart bewind gewei. Die opskrif is: “The return to barbarism” (p 184). Die tema is: “the extraordinary decadence of a once vigorous and apparently prosperous country;” dit “reduced the civilisation of South Africa to a level that was barbaric by the standards of the previous generation” (p 184). Twee destydse voorbokke vir “bevryding”, Alex Boraine en Sampie Terreblanche, het pas elk ‘n boek gepubliseer om uitdrukking aan hulle ontgogeling te gee. Wat albei van meet af aan moes besef het, is dat nóg verpligte rasse-skeiding nóg gedwonge rasse-integrasie vryheid is.
Daar word verwys na “the dishonesty and corruption of the great mass of officials … the failure … to set a high standard of morality and idealism … the sudden elevation of ignorant and starving people to positions of financial responsibility … it has been abundantly proved that a large part of the revenue stuck to the various palms through which it passed … Judges and magistrates abandoned the blindness of justice; the police, whose eyes could rightly have remained open, were willing to close them. Partiality and corruption so permeated the atmosphere that … wealth was universally acknowledged to be the only basis of security. This conviction intensified the struggle [!] to get rich by any and every means. In a country like South Africa the accumulation of wealth inevitably implied, as its corollary, the abject poverty of the vast majority of people” (p 185). “Corruption became … the main road to riches, and one got on to this road by way of official jobbery” (p 186).
Weens “poor workmanship … exports rapidly declined” (p 186). Daar was “unwillingness to make a greater effort than was absolutely necessary … The pursuit and idolatry of wealth by the liberated black man was a part of his inheritance from his white mentors and predecessors” (p 186). Aan wittes word dus deel van die skuld gegee. “If the reader is tempted to regard these things as the reflection of some weak strain in the African race, he must remember, first, that they are found in the people of European and of Asiatic descent also. And he must observe how different is the case of Africans whose history has been different from that of their fellows in the Republic” (p 196).
“Political orthodoxy was required of all officials. This meant in practice a control of the personnel by the government in power … It was inevitable that under these circumstances the physical condition of the country should deteriorate. Much of the damage inflicted in the war was never repaired” (p 186). “The energy which is absent from all these activities is given with reckless abandon to the pursuits of the leisure hours” (p 195). “Criticism is resented … Hard work and even the deference characteristic of good manners are regarded as the badges of servility” (p 196). “The poverty of the government prevented it from spending money on dams and other constructive works … the Natives continued to overstock the rapidly eroding pastures … Considerable areas formerly fertile land … turned in … to desert … Native names of towns everywhere supplanted the Dutch and English” (p 187). “Importunate beggars pester the traveller in every street” (p 196).
In 1996 was daar ‘n staatsgreep. Sowel die eerste minister as die president is vermoor. Daar was vier amptelike tale: Zoeloe, Sotho, Xhosa en Afrikaans. “The use of English had died out” (p 190). Die nuwe staatshoof is in 2002 in ‘n bomontploffing dood. Met iedere bewindsverandering word die regering meer radikaal. “The people in Britain and the United States were grievously disappointed by the results of their great efforts of 1977. In Britain many condemned the government’s hasty withdrawal from South Africa after a short occupation. They pointed to the contrast between the state of the Republic and the civilised conditions of the neighbouring British territories” (p 192). “Beyond the border you are in a different world” (p 196), bv in Swaziland “everything here suggests efficiency, prosperity, civilisation” (p 197).
Wat Keppel-Jones herhaaldelik probeer tuisbring, is dat Britse swart onderdane wonderlik vaar maar dat Suid-Afrikaanse swartes weens die Afrikaners se bose beleid heeltemal faal. “Work was … a burden imposed by his masters, something to be avoided if possible … The ruling race failed to impose the high standards of Europe on the Natives, because that would have raised them out of their humble position. The result was that the primitive standards of the backward people were ultimately accepted by the more advanced” (p 197-198).
‘n Lid van die vorige blanke bewind het sy standpunt soos volg gestel: “The Kaffir is really a cheerful, happy person who is content with little and respects a firm master. Our policy was one of firmness and of allowing him to develop along his own lines … Now the Kaffirs have got the country … and they are destroying it. We knew this would happen, but, of course, the English government only listens to Kafferboeties” (p 193). Onlangs is gesê dat ‘n land wat atoombomme kon vervaardig in Nelson Mandela se skoot geval het, maar dat hy ‘n land geken aan vuvuzelas nagelaat het.
“South Africa has reverted to its original state of savagery” (p 202). Die Afrikaners se standpunt is: “If only we had been left alone, we could have been a happy country, but we have always had interference from overseas” (203). Keppel-Jones se standpunt is: “Their national ox-wagon took the wrong road though another road was available” (p 202), naamlik die een wat die goeie Britte bewandel.
Soos verwag kon word, is sommige van Keppel-Jones se voorspellings korrek en ander verkeerd. Wat duidelik blyk, is dat hy enersyds ‘n naïewe liberalistiese Anglofiel was en andersyds dat hy hoogs negatief bevooroordeeld teen Afrikaners was. Met nabaat is dit ook opvallend hoe min hy werklik van die swartes gedink het. Maar hy kon onmoontlik FW de Klerk se onderhandelde algehele magsoorgawe voorsien het. Dit is so vergesog dat ek, wat die oorgang na die nuwe Suid-Afrika meegemaak het, na twee dekades steeds nie die bitttere werklikheid van sodanige absolute dwaasheid kan glo nie. Die blankes se nederlaag in Keppel-Jones se VN-oorlog sou ‘n mindere verleentheid gewees het. Maar De Klerk roem daarop dat hy, danksy sy versiende staatsmanskap, oorlog voorkom het.
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Skrywer Dan RoodtGepubliseer op 16 Maart 2014 16 Maart 2014 Kategorieë Leon Lemmer, RubriekeSleutelwoord Arthur Keppel-Jones, Britte, kolonialisme, Nasionale Party, When Smuts Goes
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