Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA)
The Signal Intelligence Regiment () (KONA) was the basic element of the field organisation of the German Army (Heer) signals intelligence organization during World War II. The KONA regiment were mobile communication reconnaissance units which were assigned to an army group and operated close to the front lines within the theatre of operations to intercept and build intelligence, via evaluation services (cryptanalysis) and disseminate the intelligence to senior staff locally and in the OKH/GDNA headquarters in the rear. To quote World War II cryptographic historian, Christos Triantafyllopoulos: "The KONA units did not have the ability to  solve complicated Allied cryptosystems. Instead they focused on exploiting low/mid level ciphers and even in this capacity they were assisted by material sent to them by the central cryptanalytic department. This was the German Army High Command's Inspectorate 7/VI" Sources. The remains of Signal Intelligence Regiment 1 (abbr KONA 1) was a signals regiment that surrendered to American troops near Tausing, located close to and northwest of Liezen, Austria on 9 May 1945. Commanded by the fanatical Nazi Major Ernst Hertzer, the remains of the regiment consisted of around 700 officers, enlisted men and women who were  sent to the abbey at Stift Tepl, that was being used as a Prisoner of War enclosure. They had destroyed all their papers en route except those document they considered the most important for reconstruction of their records. The remaining documents were kept in three briefcases plus a single book. On the afternoon of 9 May, with strong rumours of Russians approaching the area, the three briefcases were burned with only the book remaining. The book remained in the unit vehicles after an extensive search and was never found. Between 23 May and 28 May 1945, over 350 prisoners were  screened at a town called Konstantinsbad close to Plzeň in the Czech Republic. All primary personnel were interviewed, with a further 41 chosen for further questioning. Some reports were written at Plzeň but most TICOM documents relating to KONA units were written between 30 May and 2 June at Oberursel near Frankfurt am Main. Further interrogations were undertaken and more specific information given when the group was moved to Revin. In total, the material created consisted of 31 reports supported with supplements giving information of the makeup and organization of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung unit 1. History. KONA 1 operated in  the southern sector of the Russian Front from June 1941 until May 1945, intercepting and evaluating Russian Army, Russian Army Air and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) traffic. Certain personnel within Kona 1 appeared to have succeeded in reconstructing the detailed Order of Battle of the Russian military, and in predicting the timing and location of Russian offensive before they occurred The results were achieved by close integration of all sources of information as opposed to cryptanalysis of Russian ciphers, although low and medium grade Russian ciphers were read. The ratio of general evaluation against pure cryptanalysis  was about three to one which was due to the following: From an examination of the cryptographical processes of Russian security, Kona 1 appeared to have determined that one time pads were used for high grade ciphers, and a number of code books and recyphering tables were used for medium and low grade ciphers. Medium and low grade ciphers appear in most cases were within the capability of KONA 1 to be available for reading. Captain Roman Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1, and commanding officer of the Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (abbr. NASS) of the KONA regiment, stated that even  if identification of individual formations wasn't possible, KONA was still successful in formulating a picture of groupings and number of formations. As regards the Russian Rifle Corps and Divisions, KONA had to rely on other means to gather signal intelligence KONA 1 successes may be considered overenthusiastic. Organization and Functions. KONA Regiment. The purpose of a KONA regiment was to supply intelligence to the Staff (military) of the Army Corps, Armies and Army Groups. Each KONA unit consisted of a Regimental Evaluation centre and possibly 5 or 6 intercept and intelligence companies. The KONA regiment operated with the signal  intelligence platoons operating close to the front line, with its companies situated close to army HQ and the main evaluation unit situated in the rear at Army Group Headquarters (abbr. HQ). Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies () (abbr.NANAK or NAK) were tasked with intercepting low level traffic. These were evaluated as they came in, with all intelligence passed to Senior Staff of their assigned Army Group as it became available, with all intercepts and immediate reports passed back to an evaluation platoon at company headquarters, for further evaluation. Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies () (abbr. NAFAK or FAK) intercepted high level  traffic, undertook some immediate evaluation which was passed to Senior Staff, and also passed back reports and intercepts to the regimental Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (abbr. NAAS). In 1944, the Signal Intelligence Battalion () (Abbr. NAA) was introduced into the organization of the KONA. These battalions were small administrative units, which acted to co-ordinate unit activities at Army level. Major Hertzer, Commanding Officer of KONA 1 stated that the NAA supervisors were generally elderly soldiers, who duty was to gather opinions and make small adjustments in close range signal, intelligence platoons, i.e. NAZ. Colonel Boetzel, head of the OKH/GdNA , stated that the NAA was not an effective improvement. Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (NAAS). The Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre () (NAAS) centre was situated close to an Army Group HQ The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence. Sections 1 to 3 analysed the relevant material in both raw and processed state: corrected mistakes in the Signals companies solutions, i.e. signals on which no work had been done (at Company level) were, if there was sufficient material, passed to the section dealing with "New Developments". There were also responsible for checking the solutions offered in  their respective (2,3, and 4-figure) fields. The New Developments section did the real cryptanalysis. It normally concentrated on difficult systems which the Signal Companies had neither time nor man-power to deal with adequately, if at all. The Analysis section consisted, in the main, of mathematicians and its work was of mathematical, systematic or analytic nature: Intercepted NKVD signals were worked on in the NKVD section of the NAAS, if they originated in the Regiments area. The remainder were sent by courier to LNA. The solved keys were passed, as necessary to the Book-building section () to be completed . This section worked in close contact with the analytic section, where a commonality of tasks, that of establishing the basic form of the key, existed. The section responsible for P/L text scrutiny investigated questionable translations, corruptions and abbreviations. FESTE AND FAK. The function and organisation of cryptanalysis in the long range companies, both Feste and FAK, appears to have been much the same in each. On paper, cryptanalysis at company level was a part of the evaluation platoon, in contrast to its independent position as a separate section in the NAAS. It appeared to have functioned independently, in practice , because of the special nature of the work. The evidence indicated there may have been 15-20 people engaged in cryptanalytic work in the company evaluation platoons. The cryptanalysis group was divided into separate sections for plaintext message translation, 2,3,4-figure traffic, with a separate section for each, and a general section which kept card indexes and lists, and performed certain administrative duties. These sections, besides being responsible for the solution of new systems, the recovery of additive, and the decoding of solved systems, played an important part in traffic identification through a study of the keys employed. The key  indicators, which Russia ciphers placed at the beginning and often at the end of the messages, were arranged by the numerical designation arbitrarily assigned by German staff to Russian keys in an index file. Cryptanalysts relied heavily upon the card indexes (described above) in their work, and also had at hand graphic and statistical presentations of signal letter, arbitrarily, and trigraphic frequencies, and lists of pattern words. They cooperated closely with the personnel engaged in the final evaluation section, often passing notes with the translated messages calling the attention of the evaluations to the key employed on the message, or  to peculiarities which might have a significance when viewed in relation to the total data. Moreover, the cryptanalysts kept in touch with those responsible for intercept, to the end of obtaining the best possible copy for the new systems. Reports resulting from Evaluation. The finding of the intelligence units were passed to the operating agencies in various reports, and the intelligence contained therein was made available by an efficient reporting system. Captain Roessler observed that: The companies were required to provide highly detailed reports. They had to exercise their own judgement, showing initiative and intelligence in selecting the items to  be passed on. A great deal of material was never reported at all but simply went into the card indexes of the companies. The companies had to distinguish urgent from routine items, and the NAAS frequently rebuked the forward units for a failure to send back in a "flash" what they had allowed to get through only in a routine report. The NAK maintained an evaluation platoon at Company HQ which correlated and interpreted the materials from other platoons, and reported the findings laterally to Army Corps command staff and upward to the NAAS. The basic technical report at company  level was the "Day Report" made by the intercept operators, listing all traffic head on the frequencies monitored. There were columns for recording the time of intercept, the frequency upon which the traffic was taken, the call signs to and from, the contents of the transmission, the intercept number and remarks. All intercept operators made similar logs, which gave a picture of the total traffic carried on a particular link or network. These logs provided the company evaluation sections with the subject matter studied in drawing up their "Situation Report". A typical Situation Report described the deployment and status of  identified Russian units and reported any appearance of a new unit. The reports issued by the FESTE and the FAK were much the same. These included: These reports were sent to the NAAS for further interpretation and significant intelligence items were then passed laterally to the Armies. A long range company needed an average of 16 typist hours to get out its daily report for the NAAS. The Feste on the Eastern front issued in addition to the reports listed above a type of report known as the "5-figure offer" was to assure the maximum exploitation of information available , and in effect constituted invitations to all KONA's to check the data in these reports with their own files. They listed all current data derivable from the external characteristics of messages consisted of 5-figure groups. The section at the NAAS for technical and tactical analysis collated and combined the significant findings from all these reports with the data at hand, passed material not immediately expoitable to the various specialists in the NAAS for the further "squeeze" and passed its combined report to the Army Group. Roesser referred to the daily Situation Reports issued by the NAAS as a  Location Report (). Information furnished by members of In 7/VI showed that the Signal Intelligence Reports issued by the Evaluation Centres of some regiments were called Radio Position Messages Report (). These consisted of four component reports: These reports went beyond In 7/VI and were passed to the "Army Group Commander" as well as to the Army High Command the other echelons and commands on a distribution list of 14 listings.