Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI), also shortened to IN, DOE-IN, DOE/IN, I&CI, or OIC (the former two being more common in official documents), was established in 2006 by the merger of various pre-existing Energy Department intelligence and security organizations. It is an office of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence activities throughout the DOE complex; due to this central role, OICI is designated DOE's Headquarters Intelligence (in contrast to field intelligence). As a component of the United States Intelligence Community in addition  to the Department of Energy, OICI reports to the Director of National Intelligence in addition to the Secretary of Energy. Overview. The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence provides information to the Secretary of Energy and other senior federal policymakers. A member of the United States Intelligence Community, it contributes unique scientific and technical analysis capabilities to United States national security as a whole, as well as energy security specifically. The Office protects information and technology vital to the US' national security and economy, leveraging its specific expertise in nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, nuclear energy, radioactive waste and energy security. Mission . OICI is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence functions of the Department of Energy complex, including the national laboratories and nuclear weapons construction, decommissioning, assembling, storage, etc. facilities not under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Defense (the DoE and DoD share responsibility for the United States' nuclear stockpile). In terms of counterintelligence, the Office safeguards intellectual property in the form of national security information and technologies, and protects Department of Energy employees and scientific staff. In terms of intelligence, the Office makes use of the Department of Energy's scientific and technical expertise to provide products to  policymakers covering, in addition to energy security, the national security areas of defense, homeland security, cybersecurity, and intelligence. OICI's intelligence analysis focuses on Department-relevant fields, such as foreign nuclear weapons and fuel cycle programs, nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism, counterintelligence issues, energy security, cyber intelligence, and strategic science and technology. OICI's counterintelligence focuses on fostering threat awareness within the DOE complex (the Department itself plus the national laboratories and DOE contractors), analyzing threats to better protect DOE assets from foreign intelligence and terrorism, evaluating insiders and foreign visitors for espionage risks, and investigating cyber threats, terrorism , and espionage. OICI's cyberspace expertise, including basic research, cyber threat analysis, information technology, supercomputing, and cybersecurity, is extended to the nuclear weapons enterprise and electrical grid providers for defense against cyberattacks and supply chain attacks. Organization. A component of both the Energy Department and Intelligence Community, OICI is led by a director. Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The director of OICI (D/OICI) is selected by the Energy Secretary with the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); the organization reports to both individuals in its capacities as an Energy Department and Intelligence Community agency . The removal of the director shall include the consultation of both the Secretary and DNI. Importantly, the above consultations, as specified by statute, do not limit the president's powers of appointment and removal: the president can appoint and remove OICI directors at will, omitting or ignoring consultations entirely. Under US law, the director must be substantially experienced in intelligence affairs and come from the Senior Executive Service or its equivalent intelligence agency counterparts (some of which require the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence). The director is assisted by deputy directors, such as the deputy director for counterintelligence , implying one deputy director for each directorate; additionally, there is also an OICI Director of Security, although no Security Directorate is known to exist, and a Deputy Director of the Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP), currently Drew Nickels. The director of OICI is a member of the National Intelligence Board. In addition to their duties of overseeing the Office, since June 10, 2019, OICI directors have also been charged which determining which foreign government-sponsored talent recruitment programs pose intellectual property and espionage threats (such as China's controversial Thousand Talents Plan). Foreign governments deemed to be "of risk" will  have American DOE/NNSA researchers and contractors barred from recruitment. Directors. The director in 2006 was an individual who joined DoE in November 2005 and held a position relating to intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters, according to a DOE OIG report. In a 2008 letter, former Energy Department counterintelligence official Terry Turchie names the director of OICI (only created in 2006) as former CIA officer Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who served as OICI director for three years before joining Harvard's Belfer Center in 2009. As such, Larssen served from 2006 to ~2009 as OICI's first director (OICI was  created in 2006) and is the individual described in the OIG report. Edward Bruce Held, a former CIA officer and intelligence author, was director as late as September 2012 but left before April 2013. The directorship of OICI was held by Steven K. Black in 2015. Held's Deputy Director for Counterintelligence was Charles K. Durant (also referred to as IN-20) and the Director for Security was Eric Jackson. Current Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Chief Security Officer Kerry Stewart is a former Director for/of Security for OICI. Directorates and agency structure. OICI is divided into three or four  directorates. The following three directorates were attested to in both 2009 and 2013: The Energy and Environmental Security Directorate is mentioned in a 2009 Congressional Research Service document, but is absent in a 2013 outside OICI fact list. The Directorate may have been absorbed, abolished, or divided, or incorrectly omitted in 2013. Other non-directorate organizations exist within OICI, such as OICI's Security Office and the (executors of the) Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP), also led by directors. Additionally, a Cyber Directorate, may also exist, as evidenced by DOE's Deputy Director for Cyber. Other. OICI's lead individual  for climate and environmental security analysis is a member of the Climate Security Advisory Council convened by the Director of National Intelligence and set to expire/disband on December 20, 2023. OICI's director is the program manager for DOE's NIP (National Intelligence Program) funds, used to pay OICI analysts. Employees. On February 25, 2016, a male OICI employee, whose name is redacted, was arrested for solicitation for prostitution in Washington, D.C. The employee arranged for escort services while working at OICI headquarters inside a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF) using his Department email address. The incident was investigated  as DOE OIG Case No. 16-0033-I. Criticism. In a September 2008 letter to then Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce John Dingell, longtime counterintelligence agent and senior Energy Department counterintelligence official Terry D. Turchie strongly condemned the then-new Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and its director Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, crediting "the dangerously chaotic state of counterintelligence within DOE" for his resignation. Much of Turchie's criticism focused on his perception that the new Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence was "restructuring around intelligence collection and away from sound counterintelligence principles" with "potentially catastrophic consequences;" for  this, Turchie faulted Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer he described as "intent on the primacy of intelligence over counterintelligence." He also criticized Mowatt-Larssen for alleged "purge[s]" of highly qualified counterintelligence officials for "dar[ing to] challenge [his] changes based on their concern for the rule of law or the dramatic and disastrous impact his changes would have had on DOE counterintelligence overall."