Chinese information operations and information warfare
Informatized warfare of China is the implementation of information warfare (IW) within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and other organizations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Laid out in the Chinese Defence White Paper of 2008, informatized warfare includes the utilization of information-based weapons and forces, including battlefield management systems, precision-strike capabilities, and technology-assisted command and control (C4ISR). However, some media and analyst report also uses the term to describe the political and espionage effort from the Chinese state. Definitions. People's Liberation Army defines the term informatization to describe  the implementation of information technology in the digital age, and as an evaluation criteria of its military modernization effort. The Chinese military leadership aims to transform PLA from conducting people's war to engage in warfare conditions of informatization, which includes moving the military doctrine from weapon platform-centric to cyber-centric. The indicated characteristic of the cyber-centric force is the utilization of network linkages (data-link) among platforms. United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission defines "Informationization" and informatized warfare in Chinese military doctrine as follows: "[A]t the operational level appears focused on providing an integrated platform  for joint war-zone command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) connectivity, and for peacetime command and control (C2) within the PLA’s Military Regions." United States Defense Intelligence Agency defines China's "informatized warfare" as similar to U.S. military's concept of net-centric capability, which means the military's capability to use advanced information technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage over an adversary. In 1995, the father of Chinese IW, Major General Wang Pufeng, wrote "Information war is a crucial stage of high-tech war... At its heart are information technologies, fusing intelligence war , strategic war, electronic war, guided missile war, a war of "motorization" [jidong zhan], a war of firepower [huoli]—a total war. It is a new type of warfare." In two articles in the "Liberation Army Daily", of 13 and 20 June 1995, Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei of the Academy of Military Science, Beijing, noted several definitions. They concluded: They went on to state: A July 1998 conference held in San Diego, sponsored jointly by the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy and the Taiwan-based Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, "brought together Chinese military experts to discuss  the non-hardware side of the People's Liberation Army's modernization." In his presentation, James C. Mulvenon stated: "Chinese writings clearly suggest that IW is a solely military subject, and as such, they draw inspiration primarily from U.S. military writings. The net result of this "borrowing" is that many PLA authors' definitions of IW and IW concepts sound eerily familiar." In December 1999, Xie Guang, the then Vice Minister of Science & Technology and Industry for National Defence, defined IW as: In a strategic analysis paper for the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses written in 2006, Vinod Anand  examines the definitions of Chinese Information Warfare. He notes that although Chinese understanding of IW was initially based on western concepts, it has increasingly moved towards evolving its own orientation. This list omits an element that plays a large role in Chinese IW and IO: computer network operations. Background. China's interest in information warfare began after the United States victory in the first Gulf War (1990–1991). U.S. success was the result of information technologies and the total dominance it was able to provide in the battle space. From that point forward, the PLA began to seriously invest in and  develop its own concepts of information warfare and what they mean to China. The idea of a revolution in military affairs including information warfare has arisen as a school of thought in Chinese warfare. China's leadership has continuously stressed using asymmetric techniques to counter more powerful nations, such as the United States, and information warfare is a tool that the PLA uses to achieve their goals. While China has adopted the idea of information dominance, its method for going about information dominance differs, using ancient political warfare methods such as the Thirty-Six Stratagems. Nature. The Chinese strategy of  information warfare focuses on the use of what China calls "strategems" to build and maintain information superiority. These strategems help China compensate for its deficiencies in technology-based weapons, and may contain efforts to create cognitive errors and to influence the contents, process, and direction of thinking of an adversary. Cyberspace operations are used to achieve information dominance through reconnaissance and espionage, conducting network intrusions to steal and possibly alter data. The Chinese concept of "Unrestricted Warfare" combines elements of information operations, cyberspace operations, irregular warfare, lawfare, and foreign relations, carried out in peacetime, as well as in conflict. The  United States is viewed as a militarily superior foe whose advantages can be overcome through strategy and information operations. The U.S. reliance on technology, both in the military and in the civilian population, creates a vulnerability that can be exploited, along with "theoretical blind spots" and "thought errors", such as the absence of a comprehensive theory in United States Department of Defense doctrine that combines all elements of information warfare. In cyberspace, computer network espionage plays a large role in Chinese efforts to pursue a competitive advantage. In 2009, China was suspected of stealing large terabytes of design data for  the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from defense contractor Lockheed Martin's computers. In 2012, a Chinese version, the J-31, appeared to rival the F-35. In 2014, a Chinese national was indicted for theft of sensitive trade secrets defense contractors, particularly data relating to Boeing's C-17 military transport aircraft. Industrial espionage such as this yields economic benefits, as well as military and national security advantages for China, while eroding the technical superiority of the United States. Another concern with this type of espionage is that detailed knowledge of the F-35 and C-17 platforms could afford China the ability to hack  a plane's command and control system, to alter its course or possibly disable it in a time of crisis. In addition, a network intrusion could allow an undetectable cyber weapon to be planted, lying dormant until activated during a conflict. On the defensive side, China employs a combination of legal policies and information technology for censorship and surveillance of dissenters in a program called "The Golden Shield". This is often referred to as "The Great Firewall" of China. In addition, the People's Republic of China actively promotes the idea of "cyber sovereignty", putting borders on the internet based  on territorial integrity. This may be a way for the government to bypass the democratic free-flow of information that the internet represents. Reportedly, the CIA has chronicled China's information warfare activities inside the United States, where financial incentives such as personnel and support in funding are aimed at academic institutions and think tanks to dissuade them from research that paints China in a negative light. In a February 2018 hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, FBI Director Christopher Wray described so-called Confucius Institutes, Chinese language and cultural centers at universities that may be used as espionage tools  to influence public opinion or to stifle academic freedom by limiting or disallowing discussions on certain topics. China has invested heavily in the motion picture industry as a way to gain cultural and economic influence, though reportedly China's relationship with Hollywood has started to cool. China has also been propagating an image of itself as a peaceful, nonthreatening nation focused on internal development rather than the pursuit of international power. UN Statements such as Communist Party leader Xi Jinping's leadership "will never pursue hegemony, expansion, or sphere of influence" exemplify these attempts at influencing perception. Chinese information warfare  doctrine suggests that these tactics are part of a broader strategy of encouraging complacency in potential adversaries. Other tactics include using international fora to promote the idea of arms control for "information weapons" in order to maintain control over its own information apparatus and to level the playing field with technologically advanced powers. Chinese disinformation operations have continued to evolve with operations in 2021 being significantly more sophisticated and resilient than operations in 2019. China has devoted significant human and financial resources to their operations. Asymmetric warfare. The PLA places an emphasis on asymmetric warfare, particularly using information warfare to  compensate for technological inferiority. In a 2001 paper in the U.S. "Military Review", T. L. Thomas examines the writings of Major General Dai Qingmin (Director of the PLA's Communications Department of the General Staff responsible for IW and IO), Senior Colonel Wang Baocun (of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences) and others on the ways that China is employing "Electronic Strategies" to realise the benefits of asymmetric warfare. Thomas also summarises the April 2000 issue of the Chinese journal "China Military Science" which contains three articles on information warfare subjects. The only article written in English ("The Current  Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Asia-Pacific Security," by Senior Colonel Wang Baocun) presents a quite different approach to an article Wang Baocun wrote only three years previously where he presented a description of IW which contained the elements of Soviet/Russian military science. In the article "On Information Warfare Strategies", by Major General Niu Li, Colonel Li Jiangzhou and Major Xu Dehui (of the Communications and Command Institute), the authors define IW stratagems as "schemes and methods devised and used by commanders and commanding bodies to seize and maintain information supremacy on the basis of using  clever methods to prevail at a relatively small cost in information warfare." Informationization. Information warfare is a subset of informationization. As a result of technological advancement, China has now entered an era where Informationization is the military concept of the present and future. Informationization "entails embracing all the opportunities and technologies the Information Age can offer and integrating them into military systems". China's 2004 White Paper on National Defense outlines the importance of informationization. The U.S. Department of Defense's 2009 Annual Report to Congress on "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" defines local wars under  conditions of informationization as "high intensity and short duration fighting against high technology adversaries" ... "capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries". Additionally, local war under informationization is an effort which seeks to fully develop and link land, air, sea, space and the electromagnetic spectrum into one system. China's military strategy is focused on fighting and winning "informationized local wars." Three warfares. China's "three warfares" strategy involves using public opinion (or media) warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare (lawfare). 3W's was introduced in 2003. Examples. COVID-19. The Chinese  government has actively engaged in disinformation to downplay the emergence of COVID-19 in China and manipulate information about its spread around the world. Chinese information operations against the United States. Computer network operations, including cyber operations, are being undertaken by both Chinese citizens and the Chinese government. Because the United States has a weak critical infrastructure, it is vulnerable to Chinese cyber operations. As was described to the United States Congress: Chinese information operations against Taiwan. The PRC is actively seeking to unify Taiwan with China and uses information operations as an important part of that work. China's actions  against Taiwan have been described as an active information war. Despite the large resource outlay the Chinese have been relatively ineffective in influencing the Taiwanese public. According to James C. Mulvenon rather than risk failure of a militarily forced unification, which could lead to international recognition of the independence of Taiwan, PRC leadership could potentially use computer network operations to undermine the will of Taiwan by attacking Taiwanese infrastructure. In 2022 Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau revealed that it had identified more than 400 social media accounts being used to push disinformation to Taiwanese citizens as part of  Chinese content farms. Chinese information operations against India. The "Times of India" reported that during the 2017 Doklam standoff China used information warfare against India. Chinese information operations against the Philippines. In 2020, Facebook took down a Chinese network which was part of a disinformation campaign against the Philippines. The campaign used false profiles to influence public opinion, particularly related to politics. The campaign was dubbed "Operation Naval Gazing" by security researchers. Facebook is the dominant information source in the Philippines. Twitter. In June 2020, Twitter shut down 23,750 primary accounts and approximately 150,000 booster accounts which were being used  by China to conduct an information operation aimed at boosting China's global position during the COVID-19 outbreak as well as attacking traditional targets such as Hong Kong pro-democracy activists, Guo Wengui, and Taiwan. Twitter said that the accounts had pushed deceptive narratives and spread propaganda. YouTube. In August 2020 Google removed over 2,500 channels on YouTube which they suspected of spreading disinformation for China. The deleted channels mostly featured content in Chinese and included coverage of divisive issues like Black Lives Matter.