SA Military Intelligence > Interviews > An interview with General Herman Stadler regarding the South African Defence Force's attack on the ANC bases in Botswana (reported at the time as the 'Guns of Gaborone'), 1985.
Length of interview: 9 minutes 14 seconds
Audio file name/s of interview: AL3283_PTA_STADLERHERMAN_20090831_1
Interviewer	Ek sit hier en gesels met generaal Herman Stadler, afgetrede voormalige hoof van die veiligheidstak se intelligensie-afdeling.
Generaal ek wil graag vandag met u gesels oor die voorval, soos die Sunday Times dit destyds gerapporteer het the Guns of Gabarone toe die weermag in Botswana die ANC-basisse aangeval het. Kan u asseblief net vir my skets wat het daar gebeur en die aanloop daarvan.
Herman	De Wet, ja, in daardie stadium was dit inderdaad so dat die ANC gebruik gemaak het van buitelandse fasiliteite, ons buurstate, veral van Botswana. Hulle het dit ten alle tye ontken.
Maar die feit van die saak is, ons het geweet dat hulle gebruik maak van fasiliteite in Botswana, Daar was verskeie kere saam met mnr. Pik Botha was daar gesprekke gevoer met die Botswana regering sook met hulle polisie, minister van buitelandse sake ens.
En ons het dit vir hulle baie duidelik laat verstaan dat dit die geval is, maar hulle het dit in ŉ mate ontken en hulle het eintlik niks daaraan gedoen nie. Op daardie stadium het die ANC, was die terreurveldtog maar redelik ernstig gewees en ons het toe nou, die Staatveiligheidsraad, het toe besluit dat daar ŉ hakkejag-tipe operasie op Botswana uitgevoer moes word.
Interviewer	Kan u net vir my sê wanneer min of meer, watter jaar is dit waarvan ons nou praat?
Herman	Jy weet, De Wet, soos die td aangaan vergeet mens maar so die datum of tye, maar ek dink dit hier so min of meer ’85 gewees.
In elk geval toe het hulle, dit was die Staatsveiligheidsraad, en nou die aangewese, ek weet nie of jy weet hoe die Staatsveiligheidsraad gewerk het nie. Hulle het sekere dinge geїdentifiseer deur middel van die sekretariaat van die Staatsveiligheidsraad waar ek ook op gedien het, waar ons dan die revolusionêre klimaat dan geskets het.
En toe is daar besluit, soos ek gesê het, om Botswana in te val. Dit was uit die raad van die saak die weermag se prerogatief gewees en ek was toe opdrag gegee om die weermag in te lig oor die teikens, die fasiliteite in Botswana wat ek toe gedoen het.
Met transpirante ensovoorts het ek die hele gebou geskets waar hulle kantore is, waar hulle rekenaars gehou word ens. En toe het ook verder, en dit was my taak toe gewees. Hulle het toe besluit om dit te doen en besluit op ŉ sekere datum.
Interviewer	Kan u net vir ons verduidelik. U sê u het die inligting gegee van die teikens en waar die ANC-kantore was en so aan. Hoe effektief was die intelligensie-eenheid om die ANC se fasiliteite in die buitelenad rondom die bedreiging te kan evalueer?
Herman	De Wet, ek meen jy weet net so goed soos enige persoon dat om ŉ terreurveldtog te bekamp moet jy steun op beriggewers, agente, en natuurlik wat ons baie gehelp het was die arrestasie van terroriste waar ons hulle dan in detail ondervra het en waar hulle al hierdie inligting vir ons baie duidelik geskets het. Dit is hoe ons maar ons inligting het. Met ander woorde kan ek met alle sekerheid sê my inligting absoluut korrek was.
So die voorligting wat ek gegee het was gebasseer op daai feite. Ek het ook onder andere aan my gevra ek moet darem ook net aan die mense sê hoeveel, was daar al sekere dinge gedoen vanuit die fasiliteite in Botswana.
Ek het toe 33 voorvalle uitgehaal. Weereens deur middel van ondervraging en ander bewyse. Ek kon ook bewys dat daardie 33 voorvalle het vanuit die fasiliteite binne Botswana plaasgevind.
Interviewer	Hoe wyd was daardie voorvalle gewees?
Herman	Dit was, dit het gestrek vanaf die Kaap af. Ek dink self Mpumalanga, daar was in Natal ŉ voorval. Ek kan nie presies almal onthou nie. Maar onder andere ook daardie boer en sy vrou wat hier in Swartruggens vermoor is. Dit was ook deur die ANC gedoen. Met ander woorde daardie feite, daar was ook aanvalle op polisiestasies in Kaapstad byvoorbeeld wat ek ook aan hulle geskets het.
Met ander woorde ek het nie net die fasiliteite nie, maar ook die bewyse verskaf wat vanuit daardie fasiliteite gepleeg was.
Nouja, op ŉ sekere datum moes hulle toe aanval en toe het ek opdrag gekry om mnr. Pik Botha ,wat minister van buitelandse sake was, te gaan voorlig sodat hy dan sy deel kan doen as daar dan nou so iets gebeur dat hy dan sal weet wat om vir die mense dan te sê.
Nou goed, die nag het hulle toe ingegaan, binne ŉ paar minute moes hulle ingaan en weer uitkom.
Interviewer	Kan u net voor u die voorval beskryf, net die moeite wat u moes doen om mnr. Pik Botha met hom te gesels en om hom aan die kant te kry?
Herman	Ja, dis nogal interresant. Almal van ons wat Pik Botha ken weet hy is maar ŉ moeilike kalant. Ek vind toe dat hy in daai stadium was hy naby Ellisras op ŉ wildplaas gewees waar hy besig was om te jag. Die weermag het toe vir my een van hulle jets gegee, daai kleintjies.
Ek het toe vir Craig Williamson wat my tweede-in-bevel was saamgeneem. Ons het daar aangekom en daar was ŉ kar wat vir ons gewag het en na die wildplaas toe gegaan. Toe ons daar kom is hy toe in die jagveld en ek vermoed hy het geweet ons kom, maar hy het hom nie daaraan gesteur nie. Wel, dit was sy prerogatief gewees.
Maar die vlieёnier het vir my gesê hy kan nie na sononder opstyg nie want daar was nie ligte op daardie baan nie en ons moet asseblief vir hom laat weet wat die situasie is. So skuins voor sononder het ek vir Craig gesê hy moet maar teruggaan dan moet hulle maar teruggaan Pretoria toe en dan moet hulle net die volgende dag vir my ŉ chopper of iets stuur om my dan te kom haal.
Ek het toe gewag en so om en by negeuur toe kom die klomp uit die jagveld uit. Maar nouja, ek wil nou nie skinder nie, maar toe het hulle al ŉ paar happe in gehad. En toe hulle nou daar arriveer, en ek is daarso, begin hulle te lekker gesels daar om die braaivleisvure.
Ek het gesukkel, maar uiteindelik so elfuur het ek vir Pik Botha eenkant gekry en hom toe volledig ingelig. Hy was toe bietjie bekommerd oor dat daar moontlik burgerlikes in die slag gaan bly.
Ek het hom verduidelik wat hulle gaan doen. Hulle gaan ŉ chopper in die lug laat hang en wat dan die mense onder op die grond dan waarsku en sê ons is nie agter julle aan nie, maar wil net die ANC-fasiliteite bykom. Hy was toe gelukkig daaroor en ek het toe die volgende oggend teruggekom.
Daardie nag het hulle toe die teikens aangeval. Ek was die heelnag saam met die weermag en geluister hoe die hele ding verloop. Baie interresant gewees.
Toe het hulle teruggekom en hulle het toe klomp goed saamgebring wat hulle daar gekry het. Onder meer vuurwapens en die komperstelsels ens. Met die gevolg die operasie was na my mening ŉ reuse sukses gewees. Behalwe dat van die burgerlikes het ongelukkig paniekerig begin raak en hulle het skynbaar uit hul huise gee pad en toe was hulle ook in die slag gebly. Ek dink, as ek dit nie mis het nie, dink ek daar was vier gewees. Kan nie al’s onthou nie.
Die groot in-ding was gewees, soos ek gesê het, onthou ons moes ons mense in Suid-Afrika beskerm en dit was die oorwegende faktor gewees waarom die Staatsveiligheidsraad besluit het om daardie fasiliteite aan te val om vir Botswana te wys maar julle huisves, julle grondgebied vir die ANC vir teikens om in ons land aan te val.
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Interviewer	I am sitting here talking to general Herman Stadler, retired former head of the security branch’s intelligence unit.
General, I would like today to talk to you about the incident, as the Sunday Times reported it at the time as the Guns of Gaborone, when the defence force attacked ANC bases in Botswana. Would you please describe what happened there?
Herman	De Wet, yes, at that stage it was a fact that the ANC was making use of foreign facilities, our neighbouring states, in particular Botswana. This was denied at all times.
But the fact of the matter was that we knew they were using facilities in Botswana. There were on several occasions discussions held between Pik Botha and the government of Botswana as well as with their police, minister of foreign affairs etc.
We made it very clear to them that this was the case, but they denied this to a certain extent and did nothing about it. At that stage the terror campaign of the ANC was very serious and we then, the State Security Council, decided we should launch a hot pursuit operation into Botswana.
Interviewer	Could you tell when, more or less, what year are we talking about now.
Herman	You know, De Wet, as time goes by one tends to forget times and dates, but I think this was about 1985.
In any case they then, the State Security Council, I don’t know if you know how the State Security Council operated. They identified certain things through the secretariat of the State Security Council, on which I also served, where we explained the revolutionary climate.
It was then decided, as I said, to invade Botswana. It was the prerogative of the defence force to do it and I had to inform them about targets, the facilities in Botswana, and I henceforth did so.
With the transparencies and so forth I showed them the whole building housing the offices, where there computers where etc. I furthermore briefed them because that was my duty. They then decided to go ahead and made a decision on a particular date.
Interviewer	Explain to us. You say you had given them the information on the targets and where the ANC offices were situated. How efficient was the intelligence unit to in order to evaluate the threat of ANC facilities in other countries.
Herman	De Wet, you know just as well as any other person that when you have to go up against a terror campaign you need informers, agents, and what, of course, also helped us a lot, were the arrests of terrorists where could interrogated them thoroughly and where they explained all these detail for us at length. This is how we got hold of our information. In other words I can say that my information was absolutely correct.
So the briefing I gave was based on those facts. I was also requested to inform the people what kinds of activities were launched from those facilities in Botswana.
I pulled out 33 incidents. Yet again, obtained from interrogations and other means. I was also in a position toi verify that those 33 incidents were in fact orchestrated from within those facilities in Botswana.
Interviewer	What was the extent of those incidents?
Herman	It was, it stretched as far as to the Cape. I think even Mpumalanga; there was an incident in Natal. I can’t remember exactly all the incidents. But also, among others, that farmer and his wife murdered in Swartruggens. This was also committed by the ANC. In other words, those facts, there were also attacks on police stations in Cape Town, for example, that I briefed them on.
In other words, I didn’t not only describe the facilities to them, but also the incidents committed.
Now, well, at a certain date they had launch the cross-border attack and I then received orders to inform Mr. Pik Botha, minister of foreign affairs, so that he could do his bit when things start to happen and knows what to tell the people.
Now, they crossed the border that night, they had to go in and return very quickly.
Interviewer	Could you, before going into these details, describe to what lengths you had to go to be able to inform Mr. Pik Botha about the planned attack.
Herman	Yes, that is quite interesting. All of us who knows Pik Botha, full well knows he is a difficult chap. At that stage I was told that he was on a hunting trip near Ellisras. The defence force made one of their jets available to me- one of those small ones.
I then took my second-in-charge Craig Williamson along with me. When we arrived there a car was waiting at the airstrip to take us to the game farm. Arriving there we were told he was out on a hunt, but I suspected that he knew we were coming to see him, but didn’t really care. Well, that was his prerogative, I suppose.
The pilot informed me that he couldn’t take off after sunset and asked us to keep him informed. Close to sunset I told Craig he must go back and fly back with the pilot to Pretoria. And send a chopper or something the next morning to fetch me.
I waited and about nine that evening the lot came back from the hunt. Now well, I don’t want to gossip, but it was clear they already had a few drinks. I was there, but the barbeque fire was the priority at that stage while they were chatting around the fire.
I battled, but eventually managed to call Pik Botha after eleven to one side and briefed him properly. He was a bit concerned that civilians may be caught in the cross-fire.
I explained to him how they were going to handle the operation. They will let a chopper hover overhead in the air explaining to the local population that they were not the targets and that the attack was aimed at the ANC facilities. He was then happy with the arrangements and I flew back the next morning.
That night the attacked the targets. I was in the whole night with the defence for4ce in their operational room listening how the operation went down. It was very interesting.
They returned to base and brought back with them a lot of things they confiscated on the sites. Among others firearms and computer systems. I thought the operation was a huge success.
It is a pity that some of the civilians became panicky and fled from their houses being caught up in the firing. I think, if I’m not mistaken, there were four fatalities. Can’t remember all the details clearly.
The main aim of this operation was to protect our own people in South Africa and the State Security Council wanted to show Botswana that they in fact do harbour ANC cadres using the neighbouring state as a springboard for attacks on our country.
Description: This interview with General Herman Stadler, a former head of the SAP Security Branch Intelligence Unit, regarding the SADFs attack on the ANC bases in Botswana in 1985, consists of an audio recording, transcript and English translation. This interview was conducted, transcribed and translated by De Wet Potgieter on behalf of SAHA in 2009.