Battle of Hatvan
The Battle of Hatvan was the first battle in the Spring Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848–1849, fought on 2 April 1849 between the Habsburg Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army. This battle was the start of the Hungarian offensive whose aim was to liberate central and western Hungary, and its capital, from imperial occupation. The Austrian force was commanded by General Franz Schlik, while the Hungarians were led by Colonel András Gáspár, and lieutenant-colonel Ernő Poeltenberg. The Polish Legion under Colonel Józef Wysocki also fought alongside the Hungarians. The Hungarians were victorious , and advanced towards the Hungarian capitals, Buda and Pest. Background. After the Battle of Kápolna on 26–27 February 1849, the commander of the Austrian imperial forces Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz thought that he had destroyed the Hungarian revolutionary forces once and for all. In his report of 3 March sent to the imperial court in Olmütz, he wrote that: """I smashed the rebel hordes, and in a few days I will be in Debrecen" (the temporary capital of Hungary)". Despite this he did not attack the Hungarian forces, because he did not have any reliable information about the  strength of the Hungarian forces he would face if he crossed the Tisza river. But because of his caution he lost the opportunity to win the war. While he was debating whether or not to attack, the Hungarian commanders who were discontented with the disappointing performance of Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński as commander-in-chief of the Hungarian forces, blaming him for the defeat at Kápolna, started a "rebellion", holding a meeting in Tiszafüred, which forced the Government Commissioner Bertalan Szemere to depose the Polish general and install Artúr Görgei instead. This infuriated Lajos Kossuth, the President of the National  Defense Committee (interim government of Hungary), who wanted to execute Görgei for rebellion. Finally the Hungarian generals’ support for Görgei forced him to renounce his plan and accept the deposition of Dembiński. But Kossuth's antipathy towards Görgei prevented him from accepting Szemere's decision, and he named Lieutenant General Antal Vetter as commander-in-chief instead. But Vetter fell ill on 28 March, so two days later Kossuth was forced to name Görgei temporary commander-in-chief of the main Hungarian force. These days and weeks of unrest, uncertainty and changes could have been an excellent opportunity for Windisch -Grätz to cross the Tisza river and defeat the Hungarian army once and for all. But instead of attacking, and paralyzed by increasing fear of a Hungarian attack, the Austrian field-marshal tried to discover the numbers and strength of the Hungarian armies which were on the Eastern bank of the Tisza river, but his spies were unable to obtain any information. Because of this he spread his troops out to prevent an outflanking attack from the north, which he feared would relieve the imperial siege of the fortress of Komárom, and could cut his lines of communication. Meanwhile, on  30–31 March the plan was devised for the Hungarian army's Spring Campaign. Under the overall command of the most capable Hungarian general, Artúr Görgei, the best generals were appointed to lead the corps preparing to attack the Austrians and liberate Hungarian lands west of the Tisza river (consisting of much of the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, occupied by the Habsburg forces). Görgei's army numbered 47,500 men and 198 guns organized in 4 army corps led by General György Klapka (I. Corps), General Lajos Aulich (II. Corps), General János Damjanich (III. Corps) and Colonel András Gáspár (VII . Corps). The imperial forces under Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz had 55,000 men and 214 guns and rockets organized in 3 army corps led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić (I. Corps), Lieutenant General Anton Csorich (II. Corps), General Franz Schlik (III. Corps), and one division under Lieutenant General Georg Heinrich Ramberg. Prelude. The Hungarian plan for the Spring Campaign, as elaborated by Antal Vetter, was that Gáspár's VII. Corps was to draw Windisch-Grätz's attention by making an attack from the direction of Hatvan, while the other three corps (I., II., III.) would encircle the Austrian  forces from the southwest and cut them off from the capital cities (Pest and Buda). According to the plan, VII. Corps had to stay at Hatvan until 5 April, then on the 6th it had to reach Bag. The attack on the Austrian forces had to occur on 7 April at Gödöllő, from two directions, while the I. corps would advance to Kerepes, and fall on the Austrians from behind, preventing them from retreating towards Pest. The key to this very risky plan was that the Austrians should not discover the Hungarian movements until they completed the encirclement. This is  why a very great responsibility lay on Gáspár's shoulders to lead VII. Corps in a way which would not betray the campaign's strategy. This meant he had to make the enemy commander facing him believe he was confronted by the whole Hungarian army, distracting his attention from the Hungarian I., II., and III. Corps, which meanwhile were advancing towards Gödöllő from the southeast. If Gáspár had failed in this task, Windisch-Grätz could have sent overwhelming forces to destroy him, which would then have opened the way for the Austrians to the interim Hungarian capital, Debrecen. On 1  April a division of Gáspár's VII. Corps led by Lieutenant-Colonel Ernő Poeltenberg was in Hort, with only a minor unit stationed in Hatvan. Schlik's imperial III. Corps came from the west, entered the town and chased out the Hungarians towards Hort, killing two Hussars. Schlik was sent by Marshal Windisch-Grätz to conduct a reconnaissance in force to discover the strength and positions of the Hungarian forces in that area. Hearing this, Görgei sent Colonel András Gáspár there with a division, ordering him to defend Hort at any cost. Battle. On 2 April, at 5 o'clock, the  two Hungarian division commanders ordered a cavalry reconnaissance towards Hatvan, whose report made Gáspár think the enemy had a squadron in front of Hort, and that the edge of the vineyards was held by enemy infantry. So he decided to push his vanguard forward, and to advance west of Hort village with his division. At 11:30 his vanguard reported that more Austrian cavalry squadrons were arriving together with many kaiserjägers. Gáspár sent two squadrons of hussars, but seeing that the imperials were sending more cavalry together with cannon, he ordered to the two divisions to fall back a little and  form battle order on the heights before the second stone bridge west of Hort. Schlik's troops debouched Hatvan led by the Parrot's brigade, which he ordered to advance against the enemy in front of Hort in order to force them to reveal their strength. According to some accounts, Schlik was in a light-hearted mood, and told his officers that the battle would be a joyous rabbit hunt. He did not imagine that in the end his troops would become the hunted. At 1 o'clock Parrot's brigade came face to face with Gáspár's and Poeltenberg's  troops, and started its attack. Schlik also ordered two other infantry brigades (the Künigl and Fiedler brigades) and a cavalry brigade (the Montenuovo cavalry brigade) to support the attack. Until 3 o'clock the battle continued mostly just with a cannonade. Gáspár was waiting for his two cavalry squadrons from Ecséd, and the brigade sent to Csány to arrive before starting his own attack. Meanwhile, because of the Hungarian resistance, Schlik was unable to push forward either. At this moment the detached troops arrived and Gáspár gave the order to attack. He sent three brigades from Poeltenberg's division to outflank  the enemy. The cavalry squadron and two cannons under Lieutenant-Colonel Lajos Zámbelly moved around the left wing, while Liptay's brigade advanced on the right wing. For now Gáspár did not move while he waited for his encircling manoeuvre to be completed. But Schlik sensed that something dangerous was happening, and ordered his troops to retreat to the vineyard-covered hills between Hort and Hatvan. Poeltenberg's division advanced and started a concentric attack from three sides against Hatvan together with Zámbélly and Liptay. After positioning some of his infantry and artillery on the heights in front of the  bridge on the Zagyva river, Schlik ordered his sappers to build another bridge to enable him to withdraw his troops, guns and baggage from Hatvan as fast as possible. Meanwhile, General Damjanich of Hungarian III. Corps had sent Józef Wysocki's division, whose approach was observed by Schlik, and the Austrian retreat became more panic-stricken. In the end the imperial infantry which defended the Zagyva bridges and covered the imperial troops crossing to the other bank succeeded in demolishing both bridges, thus preventing the Hungarians from catching them and encircling them. Schlik's cavalry retreated between Bag and Hatvan , while his infantry and artillery moved to Aszód, than to Gödöllő. Aftermath. The battle of Hatvan was not a very important victory, but its influence on the morale of the Hungarian troops was remarkable. The most important result of the battle was that Gáspár succeeded in making Schlik think that he faced the whole Hungarian army, not just VII. Corps. Windisch-Grätz continued to be unsure about the plans and dispositions of the Hungarian main army, and because of this he remained mostly incapable of stopping them advancing from two sides on his headquarters at Gödöllő. After the victory at  Hatvan, the other, more numerous Hungarian army, consisting of three corps, won another victory at Tápióbicske then approached Isaszeg where the decisive battle of the first phase of the Spring Campaign took place on 6 April. This victory earned Colonel András Gáspár the rank of general, together with the position of leader of VII. Corps Before this he was only interim commander of this corps, standing in for Görgei who had to hand it over when he took over command of the whole Hungarian army except the Transylvanian and Southern armies. Although Lajos Aulich had been designated the new commander  of VII. Corps, he was away, so until he arrived, Gáspár as its senior staff officer had had to perform the role.