United States v. Causby
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), was a United States Supreme Court Decision related to ownership of airspace above private property. The United States Government claimed a public right to fly over Causby's farm, while Causby argued such low-altitude flights entitled the property owner to just compensation under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment." The Court agreed a taking occurred and: Nullified the doctrine that ownership extends indefinitely upward, affirmed that navigable airspace was public domain, concluded flights so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with  the enjoyment and use of the land constitute a taking. Much of the holding has been superseded by more recent cases and changes in the regulations relied upon. Background. Thomas Lee Causby was a land owner less than a half mile from the end of the runway of Lindley Field, an airstrip in Greensboro, North Carolina. During World War II, the United States military flew planes into the airstrip and as low as above Causby's Farm thereby interfering with the productive use of the Causby farm. Vibrations and sounds caused by the aircraft prevented use of property as a  chicken farm, killing more than 150 chickens. The Court of Claims ruled that a land owner's domain includes the airspace above it, and ruled that Causby was entitled to just compensation for the government having 'Taken' his property by conducting overflights through the airspace above his property. The United States appealed this ruling against them, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case, regarding the contradiction between the common laws of property ownership (without any height limit) against the assertion of a federal claim that flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical invasion of the  property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property. Holding. The Court recognized that a claim of property ownership indefinitely upward "has no place in the modern world." effectively nullifying the common law ad coelum doctrine. The Court affirmed the right to of transit through navigable airspace: However, the Court held that the flights occurred outside of navigable airspace: Ultimately the Court agreed with the Court of Claims and held that a taking had occurred because flight occurred outside of navigable airspace : This meant that the government conducting such low-level flights constituted a "taking" of Causby's  property, and under the Constitution's takings clause, he was owed compensation. On remand, the Court of Claims was tasked with defining the value of the "property interests" that had been taken from Causby by flyovers. Because the lowest plane flew at , the tallest object on Causby's land was tall, and flights above the tallest terrain were considered within the public easement declared by Congress, the Court needed to determine the value owed the farmer for public use of his airspace between . The Court of Claims did not need to compensate the farmer for use below , because the planes  did not fly below that height. Compensation was owed based on the occupancy of the property, and not damage to chickens. Dissent. Justice Black, joined by Justice Burton, dissented with the decision. Black wrote that the majority opinion created: The minority opinion was predicated on interference with private property being resolved at the State Court level through tort law, rather than in a federal court with constitutional jurisdiction. However, the U.S. government filed its appeal based upon an assertion of ownership to low altitude airspace, which the court roundly rejected, and as a case filed by the federal government it  automatically became a federal court issue. The dissenting opinion would have forced the issue of compensation into State court. The principle on which the dissent was based was later rejected in a 1962 ruling that established that all federal “takings” claims need to be litigated in a federal court with jurisdiction over U.S. Constitutional issues. Changes to reliance and precedent.. The Court relied on the flights occurring outside of "navigable airspace" and thereby relied on the definition of navigable airspace in reaching it's decision. At the time this was defined as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight  prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority." Shortly after this decision Congress redefined navigable airspace to include "airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft.". Additionally the Court relied on "the minimum safe altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority" to determine what was "navigable airspace". Minimum safe altitudes have changed since the decision with helicopters, balloons, ultralights and other aircraft having no minimum safe altitudes. In light of these changes, since Causby held that taking occurred from flights outside navigable airspace and that they need not determine at that time the precise limit of  airspace in public and private domain, questions were left. One such question "can taking occur within navigable airspace" has been addressed in later cases, most notably in Branning v. United States, which held that aircraft noise from operations within navigable airspace did amount to a taking.