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ÜNİVERSİTE HOCAMIZ ÇEVİRİ ÖDEVİ VERDİ SALI GÜNÜNE KADAR YAPMAM GEREKİYOR İNTERNETTE DÜZGÜN CEVİRİ YAPAMIYOR. BUNU CEVİREBİLCEK OLAN VAR MI? Sleeping hegemons: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity transgressions Eelco van der Maat Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University Abstract It is not clear why some territorial transgressions lead to intervention by the international community and others do not. As most territorial transgressions lead to a reaction from the international community but a few, however, do not, this study examines the main determinants for non-intervention by capable members of the international community, following violation of the territorial integrity norm by a deviant state. This article focuses on which characteristics of the norm-transgressing state, the conflict, and the state capable of enforcing the norm affect the occurrence of non-intervention. This comparative study examines six major alleged transgressions of the territorial integrity norm the occupation of Tibet, the Suez crisis, the 1967 six-day war, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara, and the 1989 Gulf crisis using a multi-methodological approach based on qualitative methods, most notably fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Analysis reveals that the absence of high security costs to the hegemon in combination with strategically important security relations between the transgressor and the hegemon or absence of military and economic vulnerability are generally necessary and sufficient for non-intervention. Keywords causal complexity, fsQCA, territorial conflict, third-party intervention Introduction It is a commonly heard complaint that the USA or the broader international community has a dual standard when it comes to upholding its norms.1 This dual standard seems to apply even to norms as strong and firmly institutionalized as the territorial integrity norm, which Zacher (2001) shows to have become a central pillar of the international order, especially following the Second World War. It is striking, for example, that in some instances of territorial aggrandizement, such as when Iraq forcefully invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait, the international community reacted with a swift military intervention in order to restore the prewar territorial boundaries. Yet in other cases, for example when Indonesia invaded would-be-independent East Timor or when Israel occupied the Sinai, West Bank and Gaza Strip, the international community seemed unwilling to intervene. Why do capable members of the international community sometimes go to great lengths to uphold norms and at other times seem unwilling? This article aims to present us with empirical insights into this question by focusing on the firmly established territorial integrity norm. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following research question, Why do capable states intervene in some instances of transgression of the territorial integrity norm and not in others? and the sub-question, Which characteristics of the norm transgressing state, the conflict and the capable power affect the occurrence of intervention? . In order to answer these questions, this study applies the relatively new method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to six major transgressions of the territorial integrity norm. Following Zacher (2001), this study describes the territorial integrity norm as the growing respect for the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries. Furthermore, territorial transgression will be used to indicate the forceful occupation and subsequent annexation of the contested territory by the transgressor , whereas intervention will be used to denote the reaction of the international community. Moreover, particularly in the case of major territorial transgressions, capabilities matter and few states are therefore able to intervene as capable powers. Though intergovernmental and smaller regional powers do intervene in conflicts, this particular study is less equipped to examine the role of these actors because of the specific nature of our case population. Therefore this study focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on the hegemonic power of the USA, not only because it is the most frequent intervener with military and economic instruments (Regan, 2000), but also because it was capable, though not always willing, to intervene in all the examined conflicts.2 Though some case studies touch upon the process by which states decide to intervene, these arguments generally lack empirical testing (e. g. Brands, 1987; Western, 2002). Moreover, even less is known about which factors determine the decision of capable states not to intervene. In addition to a better understanding of the territorial transgression norm, explicit awareness of its limitations is important for two reasons: it will provide us with insight into when third-party conflict resolution is unlikely to succeed; and more importantly, it may actually strengthen the norm in the long run. Knowing when an unwillingness to intervene makes third-party conflict resolution likely to fail is especially relevant in light of the possibility that poorly timed and failed mediation attempts may actually hamper future resolution attempts (see Regan & Stam, 2000). Zacher (2001) shows that in cases of territorial transgression the international community generally attempts to intervene to restore the prewar borders. However, to better understand in which cases the international community will intervene and in which cases it will not, we should turn to the broader intervention literature. Most of the empirical studies of intervention focus on the determinants for success, which lie outside the scope of the current study (e. g. Regan, 1996; Fisher, 2007; Ang&Peksen, 2007). Fewer studies, however, are directed at the conditions under which intervention is likely to take place. Moreover, the few studies that do address the conditions under which a party intervenes commonly suffer from selection bias, due to a selection on the instances of intervention (e. g. Brands, 1987; Western, 2002; Regan, 1996). Two studies deal specifically with intervention in civil strife, in which intervention is assumed to end ongoing hostilities between the parties. With respect to intrastate conflict, Regan (1998) finds that conflict intensity, humanitarian crisis, and the Cold War make intervention more likely, whereas a greater number of bordering countries makes intervention less likely. However, these findings are less relevant to the current study, seeing that in the case of major territorial transgressions the transgressor has already defeated the weaker party; conflict intensity and refugees are therefore less of an issue. In a large-N study of US interventions in internal wars during the Cold War period, Yoon (1997) examines the effects of strategic, economic and domestic factors on the probability of US intervention in internal conflicts during the Cold War and finds that domestic factors and Cold-War-specific factors are especially relevant for explaining intervention. Following Yoon (1997), possible explanations for non-intervention seem to fall into three general categories: strategic costs and benefits, economic relations, and domestic factors. More specifically, we can embed these explanations in the broader theoretical debates of the International Relations field; from the theoretical approaches of realism, neoliberal institutionalism and domestic level theories, several relevant explanatory variables can be distilled to be tested. Broadly speaking, all three approaches aim to explain how states act and offer perspectives that provide insight into the determinants of non-intervention. When taken together, their variables form expected causal patterns that can be matched to causal patterns in the data in order to allow the testing of the explanatory power of these approaches. Before turning to the operationalization of the distilled variables and the expected causal patterns, it seems to be in order to discuss the most relevant characteristics of each approach. Variables based on realism According to realism, states may pay lip service to norms like the territorial integrity norm, but norms do not influence state behaviour, since states are primarily interested in power and relative security gains (Grieco, 1988, 1990; Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979). Relative security gains refer to the central concern of the state to increase and maintain its security above those of other states. Therefore, from a realist perspective, we would expect that states are not willing to intervene following a transgression of the territorial integrity norm, unless intervention is expected to generate relative security gains (Morgenthau, 1967; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). From this assumption we can derive an expected causal pattern based on four explanatory variables, which are expected to make the capable power more or less likely to intervene, namely, high security costs of the transgression or gains of intervention to the capable power; the presence of important security relations or alliances between the transgressor and the capable power; the military vulnerability of the transgressor; and the economic vulnerability of the transgressor. Two of these factors relate to the willingness of capable powers to intervene. High security costs refers to the relative security costs and/or benefits that the power can expect if it intervenes in the conflict. These may be determined by the relative costs and benefits of the transgression on the one hand and by the relative costs and benefits of the intervention on the other hand. Possible costs of the transgression include regional instability and threats to the geostrategic interests (Morgenthau, 1967; Waltz, 1979).3 From this point of view, we can expect that the capable power will behave as a rational security-maximizing actor in its decision to intervene. Important security relations refers to the strategic importance of the transgressor to the capable power. Some quantitative realist scholars, such as Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita (1979) and Kim (1991), argue that states with similar alliance portfolios are less likely to go to war, owing to similar strategic preferences, which would also affect the willingness to intervene. Note that it is not the existence of an alliance or security relationship as such, but rather the strategic importance of this relationship that determines whether the capable power intervenes. Qualitative research allows an in-depth examination of the actual strategic importance of security relations, irrespective of the presence of a formal alliance. The strategic importance of these security relations is expected to influence the willingness of the capable power to intervene. Military vulnerability is determined by the relative military strength of the transgressor with respect to the capable power. Material capabilities are based on population size, productivity measured in GDP, military expenditure, army size, nuclear weaponry and economic resources such as steel and coal production (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987). In line with realist theory, it is expected that the relative capabilities of the transgressor state are decisive in determining intervention; the higher the costs the transgressor state could induce upon the intervening powers, the less likely intervention would become (Regan, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow & Zorick, 1997). Economic vulnerability refers to the vulnerability of the transgressor to economic pressures and sanctions. It is a qualitative measure based on a variety of characteristics of the transgressor state that is part of both the realist and neoliberal institutionalist expected causal patterns. Both from the realist assumption that economy is a strategic asset and the neoliberal institutionalist assumption that economy is a central drive for states, two expectations follow that are relevant to our research questions. First, it is expected that a vulnerable economy would make the transgressor likely to yield to economic pressures, and second, this would lower the costs of intervention, making intervention more likely (Regan, 1998). Variables based on neoliberal institutionalism Where realism assumes that states are concerned with relative and security gains, neoliberals argue that states are more concerned with absolute and economic gains. Another contrast is that neoliberal institutionalism is less state-centred than realism and perceives a far greater role for institutions, such as the United Nations (Keohane, 1982, 1989). The expected explanatory pattern of neoliberal institutionalism is constructed from three potential explanatory variables: namely, the aforementioned economic vulnerability of the transgressor; the interdependence between the transgressor and capable power; and the relative institutional capabilities of the transgressor. Interdependence focuses on the capable power and refers to the extent of trade relations between the transgressor and capable power. Though criticism has been expressed by realist scholars, liberal theory asserts that there exists a negative correlation between interdependence and conflict.

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