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+The spear phishing emails contained three attachments in total, each of which exploited an older vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2012-0158	['T1203']
+After the handshake has been completed, the backdoor waits for a command, periodically pinging the C2 server. The response body from the C2 ping might hold the command and parameters (optionally). The updated Bisonal backdoor version maintains functionality similar to past backdoors built from the same codebase	['T1082']
+Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot’s behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. TLP: WHITE https://www.us-cert.gov/tlpCharacteristicsLokibot is an information stealer; the main functionality of its binary is to collect system and application credentials, and user information to send back to the attacker. We then conducted a static analysis to examine Lokibot’s techniques and targets. The response for this request is a customized 404 page, which can also be detected using Suricata signatures provided on the Malpedia page cited above as well. We also noticed that the value of the sub key is the path to the file that Lokibot created after its initial execution. The name of that registry key was the C2 URL.Figure 1 TLP: WHITE https://www.us-cert.gov/tlpThe compiler timestamp from the file header section was Oct 31, 2018, which is likely the date that the binary of this sample was compiled. This is a strong indication that the binary is a .NET library, because mscoree.dll and _CoreExeMain are primarily used to load .NET binaries. We determined that the binary was packed because we did not see the C2 URL or any signs of being an information stealer (such as an applications list) in the binary strings and resources. Figure 9Hollow Process; Manually Unpacking the First Stage BinaryWe tried to follow the binary with a debugger to determine where it unpacked itself in the memory, but Lokibot used a hollow process technique to obscure some of this activity	['T1071.001']
+The malware decrypts the C&C server domain and tries to connect to it. After the server accepts the connection, it sends a packet with the message ID = 0 and an empty payload to the client. In return, the malware collects information about the infiltrated computer and sends it back to the server in a response packet. This packet contains the following data	['T1041']
+SPEAR found that El Machete relied on two primary means to achieve persistence: scheduled tasks and the startup folder. Scheduled tasks commonly used ‘HD_Audio’, ‘Java_Upda’, or ‘Microsoft_up’ as the task name and generally pointed to one of the executables below	['T1204.002']
+Kimsuky is known for their complex infrastructure that uses free-registered domains, compromised domains, as well as private domains registered by the group	['T1583.001']
+The following file paths can be used to detect Tiny web shell, ChunkyTuna web shell, or Chisel if a network has been compromised by this attacker exploiting CVE-2019-19781	['T1083', 'T1505.003']
+Next, remove the attacker's certificate that was added to the system, using the Keychain Access application (certificate name: COMODO RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA 2). Finally remove tor and socat via HomeBrew (i.e. brew rm FORMULA). If didn't have HomeBrew already installed - meaning the malware installed it, that can be removed as well. Honestly, if infected with OSX/Dok it's suggested you just fully re-install macOS	['T1090.003', 'T1553.004']
+FALLCHILL uses fake Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications, encoding the data with RC4 encryption with the following key: [0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82]. FALLCHILL collects basic system information and beacons the following to the C2	['T1573.001', 'T1082', 'T1001.003']
+The module attempts to check if the extracted data is related to Microsoft Office or MS.Outlook. Autodiscover.xml” is a dynamically generated file that contains the data Microsoft Outlook needs to access the mailbox entered in the configuration wizard. The primary purpose of the Exchange Autodiscover service is to establish initial connections to Exchange user mailboxes. It then attempts to collect the AutoDiscover SMTP address of the dedicated exchange forest, and eventually puts all the extracted data in a variable called “text	['T1059.007']
+DarkWatchman runs through a standard set of operations on startup, and then continues to loop through a smaller group of functions on a regular basis to feed information back to the C2 server and get new commands. When initially executed by the scheduled task, DarkWatchman checks the registry for an autostart JavaScript snippet and if one exists evaluates it	['T1124', 'T1120']
+First observed by Microsoft on Jan. 13, 2022, WhisperGate malware is computer network attack (CNA) malware aimed at deleting Microsoft Windows Defender and corrupting files on the target. It consists of two samples: One appears as ransomware while the other is a beaconing implant used to deliver an in-memory Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) payload. The in-memory code uses Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINs) to evade detection and also performs anti-analysis techniques, as it will fail to detonate when certain monitoring tools exist. At the time of writing, there are two known samples identified as WhisperGate: Stage1.exe and Stage2.exe. Stage1.exe purports to be ransomware, as it overwrites the target’s master boot record with 512 bytes and upon reboot displays the following ransom note	['T1518.001']
+This program allows you to execute applications on remote systems without installing any client software. You can start a command prompt or just execute a command or exe on a remote machine	['T1569.002']
+Armed with boundless ambition and abundant resources, they looked over their options and picked… Cobalt Strike. Possibly it was meant to make attribution harder, and we can’t rule out the use of higher-tier payloads for higher-tier targets	['T1140']
+The second stage payload is shellcode that is embedded as a base64 encoded string array inside the macro that is decoded by using CryptStringToBinaryW (fig. 5). Other variants have used the UuidFromStringA function to decode the embedded payload and write it to an executable Heap	['T1059.005']
+At this point, the script establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server. If instead the server responds with any data other than the GUID, the second-stage script decrypts the data and saves it as a file. In both variants of the second-stage script, the payload is a DLL with a .SYS extension and saved in the %windir%\system32\drivers folder	['T1140']
+Collect file/folder/drive information - Download files and additional malware - Launch/terminate/enumerate process - Update configuration data - Delete files - Inject code from files to other running process - Utilize proxy - Open reverse shell - Run in passive mode — instead of actively connecting to the command and control (C&C) server, the backdoor will open and listen to a port then receive commands through it	['T1059.003', 'T1055']
+CookieMiner adopts techniques from the Google Chromium project’s code for its decryption and extraction operations and abuses them. Google Chromium is an open-source version of the Google Chrome browser. By abusing these techniques, CookieMiner attempts to steal credit card information from major issuers, such as Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover (Figure 3). The user’s saved login credentials are also stolen, including usernames, passwords, and the corresponding web URLs (Figure 4	['T1140']
+Since September of 2018, Redaman banking malware has been distributed through malspam. In this campaign, the Russian language malspam is addressed to Russian email recipients, often with email addresses ending in .ru. These emails have file attachments. These file attachments are archived Windows executable files disguised as a PDF document. In September 2018, the attachments were zip archives. In October 2018, the attachments were zip archives, 7-zip archives, and rar archives. In November 2018, the attachments were rar archives. And in December 2018, the attachments changed to gzip archives with file names ending in .gz	['T1204.002']
+The code randomly selects the filename of an executable or DLL file located in C:\Windows\system32. It will then query its resources and extract the FileDescription field to use as a folder name. If this does not work, the code randomly chooses a folder name from the %ProgramFiles% or C:\Windows (from GetWindowsDirectoryW) directories. It avoids using a name that may clash with existing files by making sure it does not contain: windows, Microsoft, desktop, system, system32 or syswow64	['T1569.002']
+Just to highlight its capabilities, TajMahal is able to steal data from a CD burnt by a victim as well as from the printer queue. It can also request to steal a particular file from a previously seen USB stick; next time the USB is connected to the computer, the file will be stolen	['T1115', 'T1020']
+The primary payload distributed by Blue Mockingbird is a version of XMRIG packaged as a DLL. XMRIG is a popular, open-source Monero-mining tool that adversaries can easily compile into custom tooling. During the incidents, we noted three distinct uses	['T1588.002', 'T1218.010', 'T1218.011']
+If the malware identifies a file named “mreb.xml” or a folder named “mreboot”, it loads a malicious “ssleay64.dll”, also written in Delphi, compiled by Borland Delphi, which has the following characteristics	['T1057']
+The latest variant of the Zeroaccess Trojan—Trojan.Zeroaccess.C—makes use of a novel technique to store its malicious content: it exploits a feature provided by the NT File System called Extended Attributes (EA	['T1564.004']
+Since its arrival, there have been several variants of the Conficker worm. They can all be referred to as the Conficker family of malware. These variants have improved upon Conficker's code and have been released in response to attempts to stop or remove Conficker's infestation. It should also be noted that Conficker.D does not spread by attacking new systems and just updates existing Conficker.C infected machines. See Appendix B, which contains a listing of links to Microsoft's Security Portal Threat Encyclopedia, for a full discussion of the variants of Conficker	['T1021.002']
+28 Apr 2020 - 11:30AM . Another in our occasional series demystifying Latin American banking trojans . In this installment of our series, we introduce Grandoreiro, a Latin American banking trojan targeting Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Peru. The authors of Grandoreiro seem to be developing the banking trojan very rapidly, as we observe at least several new versions each month. The spam emails appear to contain a link pointing to a website offering fake Flash or Java updates (see Figure 5). Notice the red arrow in lower left corner tailored for the Google Chrome web browser, but displayed in other browsers too. The images shown in Figure 10 come from three different builds of Grandoreiro. Self-protection & anti-emulation . For a Latin American banking trojan, Grandoreiro utilizes a surprisingly large number of tricks to evade detection and emulation. Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia and Trusteer are known banking access protection software popular in Latin America. Simple BAT script used by Grandoreiro to change Trusteer file path in hopes of making it unable to execute . Besides that, it also monitors hooks on important functions. List of configuration files used by Grandoreiro’s spam tool . As you can see, the tool is not fully automated, but relies completely on the configuration data. Its implementation shows similarities with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, which is why we believe it was written by the same authors. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . Hashes . Grandoreiro banking trojan . Grandoreiro Win32 downloaders . Grandoreiro spam tool . Windows Registry . - HKCU\Software\%USER_NAME% - HKCU\Software\ToolTech-RM User-Agent . - h55u4u4u5uii5 Filenames . - - MDL_YEL_01.dll - MDL_BLU_BR_02.dll - MDL_SIC_BR_03.dll - MDL_SANT_BR_04.dll - MDL_ITA_BR_05.dll - MDL_BRADA_BR_06.dll - MDL_SICCB_BR_07.dll - MDL_SAFRA_BR_08.dll - MDL_ORIGI_BR_09.dll - MDL_NORDES_BR_10.dll - MDL_BANEST_BR_11.dll - MDL_BANEZE_BR_12.dll - MDL_AMAZON_BR_13.dll - MDL_UNICRE_BR_14.dll - MDL_BRB_BR_15.dll - MDL_WUPDATE_BR_001.dll * %INSTALL_DIR% is the path where Grandoreiro is installed . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . Further reading . 28 Apr 2020 - 11:30AM . Sign up to receive an email update whenever a new article is published in our Ukraine Crisis – Digital Security Resource Center . Newsletter . Similar Articles . How Emotet is changing tactics in response to Microsoft’s tightening of Office macro security . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies – it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Discussion . - Home - About Us - Contact Us - Sitemap - Our Experts - ESET - Research - How To - Categories - RSS Configurator - News Widget	['T1185']
+Generate a particularly timed beacon that communicates over HTTP - Drop the command line Chinese language version of winrar on the target - Replace sticky keys with cmd.exe for persistence and access via RDP - Turn on RDP if it's not already enabled - Index and archive all office documents, compress and encrypt them with RAR and a specific password and store them in the recycle bin - Enable the support_388945a0 account and add it to the local admin group - Exfiltrate the data encoded over port 443 (but not SSL) - Setup an insecure service for persistence / privilege escalation	['T1098']
+A recent lull in the distribution of spam linking to the malicious downloader Hancitor has been snapped as researchers warn of new campaigns	['T1204.001', 'T1027']
+Its third function related to RDP uses the CredEnumerateA API to identify and steal saved credentials. It then parses the string “target=TERMSRV” to identify the hostname, username, and password saved per RDP credential	['T1056.004']
+The devices used in the DarkVishnya attacks varied in accordance with the cybercriminals’ abilities and personal preferences. In the cases we researched, it was one of three tools	['T1588.002']
+C2 commands are represented as seemingly random alphanumerical ASCII strings (e.g. KbwUQrcooAntqNMddu4XRj”) that are unique to each implant but known to the C2 server. These dynamic updates to Goldmax configuration data enable ability to set a new activation date, replace the existing C2 URL and User-Agent values, enable/disable decoy network traffic feature, and update the number range used by its PRNG	['T1041']
+To ensure the file has been successfully uploaded to Dropbox, BoomBox utilizes a set of regular expression values to check the HTTP response from Dropbox. As shown below, the regular expressions are used to check the presence of the is_downloadable, path_lower, content_hash, and size fields (not their values) in the HTTP response received from Dropbox. Notably, BoomBox disregards the outcome of this check and proceeds, even if the upload operation is unsuccessful	['T1480']
+Earlier, we mentioned that previous attacks were apparently delivered over two spear phishing emails, with the first only being used for reconnaissance. In the latest cases we only observed a single document being sent to the targets, with reconnaissance, exploitation, and payload delivery happening on the first attempt	['T1566.001']
+On one hand, Egregor has a similar strategy to other ransomwares, as it exfiltrates data, encrypts files and publishes them on its website in order to make victims pay the ransom. It is active since the beginning of September 2020 and impacts many sectors from insurance to transport. Its goal is lucrative	['T1105']
+Command execution: The execution is performed by the ShellExecuteW() API - Listing the running processes - Cleaning the malware: The malware first removes the registry key of the service and removes the library. As the library is currently running, the deletion cannot be performed immediately	['T1057', 'T1112']
+The APT-C-43 organization is good at launching attacks using phishing emails, and deploys the backdoor program Pyark (Machete) written in python after invading the victim’s machine	['T1059.006', 'T1059.006']
+The malware is distributed via social engineering techniques, which includes spear-phishing emails and infections via Web by a fake Blog website	['T1189']
+"From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. If the exploit is successful, the threat actors will attempt to drop and execute QuasarRAT. Within each of the HTML-formatted messages, an embedded image tag is used to beacon home to the attacker's domain, containing an unique identifier specific to the recipient. While the use of e-mail recipient tracking, a linked RTF document, and a final payload (QuasarRAT variant) remained the same, certain elements differed across campaigns observed. Exploitation and Malware Execution . Upon opening the above attachments, the recipient will be presented with a document that is a direct copy of a blog post or report released by the think tank organization being impersonated. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial ""qrat.exe"" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory. Conclusion . The addition of US-based think tanks to the list of organizations in the crosshairs of Patchwork shows an increasing diversity in the geographic regions being targeted"	['T1566.001']
+The PowerShell script executes a compressed first stage PowerShell child process, which then performs a second stage PowerShell process. The latter PowerShell injects a shellcode into its own process using well-known CreateThread and VirtualAlloc techniques	['T1059.001']
+Emotet gets an initial foothold on a victim machine or network by sending an email containing either a malicious link that leads to a downloader document or that has a malicious document attached. Anti-analysis tactics have been present in Emotet since at least 2015 and, in 2018, Emotet’s payload consists of a packed file containing the main component and an anti-analysis module. Either PowerShell or JavaScript is used to download the Trojan, which delivers a packed payload file to the victim machine. Once on a machine, the latest version of Emotet	['T1059.005', 'T1547.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1059.001']
+Being able to gather these configuration files allowed us to map the network infrastructure of Trickbot. The main module uses its list of hardcoded C&C servers and connects to one of them to download a second list of C&C servers, the so-called psrv list. The main module contacts this second layer of C&C servers to download the default plugins specified in the hardcoded configuration file. Other modules can be downloaded later upon receiving a command to do so from the Trickbot operators. The most prevalent of them are so-called dpost servers, used to exfiltrate stolen data such as credentials but, as detailed in the Appendix, others exist. Figure 5 illustrates this initial communication process	['T1057']
+The driver was not signed and used the same DSE exploit that the Pandora backdoor uses for it to load	['T1105', 'T1068', 'T1553.006']
+The malware installs itself via crontab (list of commands that are run on a regular schedule) to its target machine, as shown below	['T1053.003']
+TClient is actually one of Tropic Trooper’s other backdoors. The backdoor noted by other security researchers was encoded with different algorithms and configured with different parameter names in 2016, for instance. TClient uses symmetric encryption to decrypt its configuration with one 16-byte key in 2018. The image and table below illustrate TClient’s encrypted configuration that we decrypted (via Python code	['T1027']
+In 2018, CTU researchers observed several GOLD KINGSWOOD campaigns involving SpicyOmelette, a tool used by the group during initial exploitation of an organization. GOLD KINGSWOOD delivered SpicyOmelette through a phishing email containing a shortened link that appeared to be a PDF document attachment. When clicked, the link used the Google AppEngine to redirect the system to a GOLD KINGSWOOD-controlled Amazon Web Services (AWS) URL that installed a signed JavaScript file, which was SpicyOmelette	['T1105', 'T1204.001']
+Although the C2 traffic is secured by SSL/TLS, Karagany also encrypts and encodes the packet payloads before transmission to its C2 server using the AES-128-CBC algorithm and a pseudo-randomly generated initialization vector (IV) (see Figure 3	['T1573.002']
+This script then downloads and executes another encoded .vbs script from a paste.ee URL, as seen in Figure 5. Paste.ee is a less regulated alternative to Pastebin and we have seen multiple attacks using this service to host the payload. Since the website uses TLS, most firewall solutions cannot detect the malicious content being downloaded over the network	['T1102']
+Sliver is designed to be an open source alternative to Cobalt Strike. Sliver supports asymmetrically encrypted C2 over DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, and Mutual TLS using per-binary X.509 certificates signed by a per-instance certificate authority and supports multiplayer mode for collaboration	['T1071.001', 'T1071.004']
+PACT analysts found it particularly novel the way that DarkWatchman utilizes the registry: as a way to communicate between abstracted threads of operation, and as both persistent and temporary storage. It would appear that the authors of DarkWatchman identified and took advantage of the complexity and opacity of the Windows Registry to work underneath or around the detection threshold of security tools and analysts alike. In PACT’s analysis, this (along with DarkWatchman’s persistence and self-compilation mechanisms that make use of LOLbins) represents an important step in the evolution of threat actor TTPs on Windows systems	['T1027.004']
+Post-compromise, APT39 leverages custom backdoors such as SEAWEED, CACHEMONEY, and a unique variant of POWBAT to establish a foothold in a target environment. During privilege escalation, freely available tools such as Mimikatz and Ncrack have been observed, in addition to legitimate tools such as Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump. Internal reconnaissance has been performed using custom scripts and both freely available and custom tools such as the port scanner, BLUETORCH	['T1027.002', 'T1003.001']
+BIFROSE, known for evading detection by communicating with its C&C servers via Tor protocol, also has a version targeting UNIX-based operating systems, which are usually used in servers, workstations, and mobile devices. KIVARS has less functionality than BIFROSE, but its modular structure made it easier to maintain. KIVARS enabled attackers to download and execute files, list drives, uninstall malware service, take screenshots, activate/deactivate keylogger, show/hide active windows, and trigger mouse clicks and keyboard inputs	['T1083']
+As we reported in earlier blog posts, the threat actor NOBELIUM recently intensified an email-based attack that it has been operating and evolving since early 2021. In this blog, we highlight four tools representing a unique infection chain utilized by NOBELIUM: EnvyScout, BoomBox, NativeZone, and VaporRage. These tools have been observed being used in the wild as early as February 2021, attempting to gain a foothold on a variety of sensitive diplomatic and government entities	['T1566.001']
+The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links. Clicking the link leads to the download of a zip containing a VBS file (detected as Trojan.VBS.QAKBOT.SM) that then downloads a malicious executable file (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win32.QBOT.SMTH	['T1059.005']
+The components of the dropper package are executed in a number of steps; each stage involves a heavy dose of code obfuscation that is designed to shield the malware from detection. To lead researchers and anti-malware software further astray, some garbage code is also included	['T1027.001']
+Function Document_Open first calls the Main function to download binary data from hxxp://diangovcomuiscia.com/media/a.jpg and save as %AppData%\1.exe (MD5: ef9f19525e7862fb71175c0bbfe74247	['T1105']
+Cicada has historically been known to target Japan-linked organizations, and has also targeted MSPs in the past. The group is using living-off-the-land tools as well as custom malware in this attack campaign, including a custom malware - Backdoor.Hartip - that Symantec has not seen being used by the group before	['T1027']
+Interestingly, some of the custom tools described in Palo Alto Networks’ 2017 blogpost on Gamaredon are still being updated and in use today. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors	['T1105']
+To finalize, the script attempts to install reboot persistence for the trojan binary by adding it to /etc/rc.local	['T1574.006', 'T1037.004']
+All of these tools, with the exception of Mimikatz (which is almost always used maliciously), have legitimate uses. For example, PowerShell is widely used within enterprises and the vast majority of scripts are legitimate. Similarly, PsExec is frequently used by systems administrators. However, in this case, it was Thrip’s use of PsExec that drew our attention. Through advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning, TAA has trained itself to spot patterns of malicious activity. While PsExec itself may be innocuous, the way that it was being used here triggered an alert by TAA. In short, Thrip’s attempts at camouflage blew its cover	['T1588.002']
+TSCookie communicates to C&C servers using HTTP protocol and downloads “a module” and “a loader” for loading the module. The malware has an encrypted DLL file in its resource. When the malware is executed, the DLL file is loaded and executed on memory. The DLL file performs main functions such as communicating with C&C servers. Also, some samples launch another process and inject decrypted DLL file. The malware has configuration information encrypted with RC4, including C&C server information	['T1140']
+"Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to "".exe. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019"	['T1566.001', 'T1036.005']
+Here they logged into the target system and used remote access software to retain access. Next, malicious services created using msfvenom were started on the compromised computer. Because the hackers used fileless attacks and PowerShell, they were able to avoid allowlisting technologies and domain policies. If they encountered a allowlisting that could not be bypassed, or PowerShell was blocked on the target computer, the cybercriminals used impacket, and winexesvc.exe or psexec.exe to run executable files remotely	['T1059.001']
+Its sole purpose is to load setup.dll using LoadLibraryA. setup.exe is executed without arguments by the RARSFX, and checks whether it’s running with elevated privileges. If not, it will attempt to obtain such privileges using token impersonation if the version of Windows is below Windows 7 build 7601; otherwise it will attempt different UAC bypass techniques, allowing installation of the payload loader into one of	['T1134.002']
+In 2020 Pawn Storm spread simple Google Drive and IMAP Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to attack their usual targets, such as ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, the defense industry and the military. Recently, Norwegian authorities announced that Pawn Storm hacked the Norwegian parliament through brute force attacks	['T1110']
+Once OSX/Dok infection is complete, the attackers gain complete access to all victim communication, including communication encrypted by SSL. This is done by redirecting victim traffic through a malicious proxy server	['T1543.001']
+The Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This malware has been identified as WELLMAIL. Advanced persistent threat (APT) groups have been identified using this malware. The files are a variant of the WellMail implant	['T1571']
+Written in Go, GoldMax acts as command-and-control backdoor for the actor. The malware writes an encrypted configuration file to disk, where the file name and AES-256 cipher keys are unique per implant and based on environmental variables and information about the network where it is running	['T1027']
+In this version, a shortcut is created in order to launch winnit.exe in the following path %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Anti virus service.lnk	['T1036.005']
+The original JS file has been detected as JS/Nemucod.F436. tr and the downloaded Emotet exe has been detected as W32/GenKryptik.ADJR	['T1560']
+We have found a sample crypted by the CryptOne crypter as used by WastedLocker, which is capable of detecting/disabling a list of security software. It is believed that this tool is used during ransomware deployment, but we have no specific evidence that it was used by Evil Corp. However in the past we have seen execution of commands listed in the tool to disable Microsoft Windows Defender	['T1059.003']
+The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords	['T1574.002']
+2) The sample with less functionality needs to read and decrypt the stored registry values in order to communicate with the C&C or to inject to svchost	['T1012']
+Once the system identifier is obtained, the payload gathers system specific information and sends it to the C2 server. The tunneling protocol transmits data by sending a series of DNS queries with the data within the subdomain of the C2 domain. The following shows the specific IP addresses or strings used by the C2 to transmit a success or cancel message depending on the type of DNS query used for C2 communications	['T1016', 'T1132.001']
+"Emissary parses command and control responses for ""instru"", which will precede a GUID value that designates the command the C2 server wishes to execute on the system. Emissary can include up to 32 different commands within this data structure, but it appears the author has decided to include six commands within the Trojan. The following denotes the command handler structure used by Emissary v1.0"	['T1007', 'T1069.001', 'T1016']
+During our analysis we found similarities between Ferocious Kitten and other threat groups, namely Domestic Kitten and Rampant Kitten, both in terms of their TTPs and victims. Like Domestic Kitten, Ferocious Kitten has used the same set of C2 servers over long periods of time and shows the same URL patterns for C2 communication using only three letters such as “updatei[.]com/fff/” or “updatei[.]com/fil	['T1583.001', 'T1036.005']
+First, Wastedlocker decrypts the strings which are stored in the .bss section and then calculates a DWORD value that is used later for locating decrypted strings that are related to the encryption process. This is described in more detail in the String encryption section. In addition, the ransomware creates a log file lck.log and then sets an exception handler that creates a crash dump file in the Windows temporary folder with the filename being the ransomware’s binary filename	['T1543.003']
+We not only found the initial entry point, but we were able to follow Seedworm’s subsequent activity after the initial infection due to the vast telemetry Symantec has access to via its Global Intelligence Network. DeepSight MATI customers can leverage these unique insights to combat emerging cyber threats	['T1059.003']
+The attackers installed a backdoor macro in Microsoft Outlook that enabled them to execute commands, deploy their tools and steal valuable data from the compromised machines	['T1137']
+The actor has used a clever method to bypass security mechanisms in which it has embedded its malicious HTA file as a compressed zlib file within a PNG file that then has been decompressed during run time by converting itself to the BMP format. The second stage payload has the capability to receive and execute commands/shellcode as well as perform exfiltration and communications to a command and control server	['T1027.003']
+Next, it performs a massive printf loop - the first stage. Since before the loop FreeConsole has been called all printf calls do basically nothing: This code has been directly copied from the documentation of printf: So what is the purpose of those numerous printf loops. As a result, the massive amount of calls delay the execution process and overload the sandbox with junk data. This behavior is called API Hammering. API Hammering is not a new technique, we have already seen it several years ago e.g. Joe Sandbox detects the API hammering successfully and rates it as malicious: Right after the printf flood, the sample performs another loop to delay execution by creating and writing to a temporary file - the second stage. In between it performs random sleeps: Again, the purpose is to overload the sandbox and delay the execution	['T1497.003']
+If it believes it’s found a Windows server, Xbash will exploit the Redis vulnerability to create a Windows startup item (as shown in Figure 6), instead of a Linux cronjob	['T1059.005', 'T1547.001', 'T1105', 'T1059.001']
+The binary used the same string obfuscation technique - - Malicious document VBA code similarities with what’s shown in the screenshots - Digital signature signer name EGIS CO. in the dropped file	['T1553.002', 'T1027']
+Remcom: An open-source alternative to PsExec, which is a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes on other systems. Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM): An open-source alternative to the Windows Service Manager which can be used to install and remove services and will restart services if they crash. A custom screenshot and clipboard capture tool. SMB hacking tools: Used in conjunction with other tools to traverse target networks. UltraVNC: An open-source remote administration tool for Microsoft Windows. NBTScan: A free tool for scanning IP networks for NetBIOS name information	['T1018', 'T1569.002']
+Killkill: Stops the backdoor’s activities - interval: Changes the interval in which the backdoor retrieves jobs; the default interval is set at 120 seconds - cmd: Executes shell commands - exe:Reflectively injects a DLL downloaded from a specific URL	['T1055.001']
+Our findings indicate the actor attempted to blame multiple parties, including both Poland and Ukrainians themselves, despite the fact that technical indicators surrounding the attack do not support these false narratives. It was the Polish translation that was the first indicator since it was quickly discovered to just be a translation of the message in Russian using the popular platform yandex.ru's translation capabilities. SSSCIP has also made a connection between WhisperKill, a component of the WhisperGate malware that was deployed on Ukrainian systems, and the Encrypt3d ransomware, also known as WhiteBlackCrypt. WhiteBlackCrypt was reportedly used in operations against Russian targets in 2021	['T1059.001']
+BIFROSE, known for evading detection by communicating with its C&C servers via Tor protocol, also has a version targeting UNIX-based operating systems, which are usually used in servers, workstations, and mobile devices. KIVARS has less functionality than BIFROSE, but its modular structure made it easier to maintain. KIVARS enabled attackers to download and execute files, list drives, uninstall malware service, take screenshots, activate/deactivate keylogger, show/hide active windows, and trigger mouse clicks and keyboard inputs. A 64-bit version of KIVARS also emerged to keep pace with the popularity of 64-bit systems. XBOW’s capabilities are derived from BIFROSE and KIVARS; Shrouded Crossbow gets its name from its unique mutex format	['T1070.004', 'T1105', 'T1083', 'T1021', 'T1564.003']
+Some versions of the Orz backdoor have 32- and 64-bit embedded DLLs, stored internally as base64 strings	['T1082']
+"Below, we can see the malicious file ""untitled.exe"" using ""cmd.exe"" to execute the vssadmin.exe utility. It attempts to delete default Windows backup mechanisms, otherwise known as ""shadow copies,"" to prevent recovery of the original files from these backups. The ransom note, in this case, directs victims to either a .onion website on the Tor network or on the public web at the domain decryptor[.]top, registered on March 31 this year. With Sodinokibi, each encrypted system sees a distinct encrypted file extension. The ransom note filename also includes this extension as a prefix (ex"	['T1486']
+The malware calls Windows functions in a unique way to aid obfuscation, i.e. When the function ends, Windows makes a “ret” opcode then gets the last memory address that the malware pushed inside the stack, returning to this address and continuing the flow	['T1106']
+Advanced malware is becoming more evasive to avoid being detected by analysis sandboxes. Darkhotel uses a huge arsenal of system fingerprints, trying to determine whether it is running inside an analysis environment, and it avoids revealing its malicious behavior if a sandbox is detected. To avoid leaking details about the fingerprints it uses to identify sandboxes, Darkhotel uses just-in-time decryption as well as hashing of strings	['T1497']
+In one version of the malware, the code checks if the “ProgramData” folder has folders or files with the keywords “Kasper“, “Panda“, or “ESET	['T1082', 'T1083']
+Our colleagues from the IssueMakersLab team shared insights and information about the Andariel group, including that they attacked ActiveX vulnerabilities as far back as 2007. The team monitoring Andariel found that the cybercriminal group injected a malicious script on a South Korean think tank website for reconnaissance in January 2017 and then switched to inject an ActiveX zero-day exploit in mid-April. IssueMakersLab also listed the ActiveX objects that the Andariel group attacked	['T1203']
+Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. In observed instances the DLL is downloaded to C:\windows\system32\drivers\, renamed with a .sys extension, and then executed by rundll32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script	['T1218.005']
+Since February 2018, Emotet has been used to spread W32.Qakbot, a family of banking Trojans known for behaving like network worms	['T1210']
+One of the most notable functions of the initial dropper is to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control) in order to execute the next payload with higher privileges. Afterwards, the installer malware creates a downloader and a configuration file from its resource and executes it. The downloader malware uses the configuration file and connects to the C2 server to fetch the next payload. The downloaded payload is an image file, but it contains an appended malicious payload to be decrypted	['T1082']
+We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. Expiry: SessionType: HTTPMarketo2Learn more about this provider__cf_bmThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: 2 yearsType: HTTP25 Marketing cookies are used to track visitors across websites. The intention is to display ads that are relevant and engaging for the individual user and thereby more valuable for publishers and third party advertisers. This can be used for marketing purposes. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email	['T1027.003']
+Close analysis of the delivered payloads and legitimate resources retrieved from URLs by the first stage malware dropper reveals that TA416 is once again using an updated version of PlugX malware to target their victims. Historically, the group has relied on a variety of legitimate antivirus files, including the Avast file resource wsc_proxy.exe, to begin the process of DLL search order hijacking that results in PlugX malware installation. This is a legitimate executable file that is part of the publicly available media player Daum PotPlayer 1.5.29825, which Mandiant has previously documented as being susceptible to search order hijacking since at least 2016. The file DocConvDll.dll has also intermittently been used as a loader of the PlugX DAT configuration files. For those that are familiar with TA416’s historic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), this is highly similar to the Trident Loader method which the group used to install PlugX in previous campaigns	['T1036.005']
+The task file and its config are decrypted (CAST-128) and the task executed. There are some options that are retrieved from the Carbon configuration file: “time2task” is used to set a timeout for the task execution (1 hour by default) while “task_min” and “task_max” are used as to wait a random time between the execution of the tasks on the task list (the random time will be set between “task_min” and “task_max”). These parameters come from the section [TIME	['T1140']
+Network Reconnaissance – gathering information from machines on the network. Certutil – a command-line utility that can be exploited and used for various malicious purposes, such as to decode information, to download files, and to install browser root certificates. Adfind – a command-line tool that can be used to perform Active Directory queries. Csvde – can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. Ntdsutil – can be used as a credential-dumping tool. WMIExec – can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. PowerShell - a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. It can be used to find information and execute code, and is frequently abused by malicious actors	['T1047']
+The second main binary is a removable-drive monitor that searches for files that have an interesting extension (.pdf, .rtf, .doc, .docx). It then stages the files in an encrypted archive	['T1119', 'T1025']
+The actor moved laterally throughout some networks leveraging compromised service and user accounts obtained from the system on which they gained their initial foothold. Stolen credentials were then used to move laterally across the network via RDP and to install BEACON payloads providing the actors with access to nearly one hundred hosts	['T1572']
+Both backdoors target Arabic-speaking users. They use code that checks if the compromised machine has the Arabic language installed. This way, the attacker avoids systems belonging to non-relevant individuals as well as most sandboxes, Cybereason researchers note	['T1082']
+While it has been well known and utilized heavily by system administrators since its inception, WMI became popular in the security community when it was found to be used by Stuxnet3. Since then, WMI has been gaining popularity amongst attackers for its ability to perform system reconnaissance, anti-virus and virtual machine (VM) detection, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data theft. As attackers increasingly utilize WMI, it is important for defenders, incident responders, and forensic analysts to have knowledge of WMI and to know how they can wield it to their advantage	['T1546.003']
+Once the malware has persisted itself, it then checks whether there’s any existing stratum mining information stored in the following registry key value	['T1012']
+Turla has been around for many years as a state-sponsored actor and will likely not go away soon. Adversaries like Turla often use sophisticated malware, but they also often use what is good enough to fly under the radar. Talos has monitored many noisy Turla operations, for example. During their campaigns, they are often using and re-using compromised servers for their operations, which they access via SSH, often protected by TOR. One public reason why we attributed this backdoor to Turla is the fact that they used the same infrastructure as they used for other attacks that have been clearly attributed to their Penguin Turla Infrastructure. We will continue to monitor Turla and the other state-sponsored actors to protect our customers against these attacks. It isn't unlikely that the adversaries will manage to bypass one or the other security measures, but it is much harder for them to bypass all of them. These campaigns and the refinement of the TTPs being used will likely continue for the foreseeable future	['T1106']
+The first thread enumerates all processes of the system and creates the name of the process in upper case and calculates a hash with the name and compares it with a big list of hashes. It is typical in malware that tries to hide what processes they are looking for. If it finds one of them it will terminate it with “TerminateProcess” function after opening with the rights to make this action with “OpenProcess” function	['T1057']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Use archiving software to collect files in a password-protected archive. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1560.001']
+In this campaign, the threat actor also uses “init” and “systemd” services for persistence. The name of the service is “netdns. Below is a snippet from the setup script used by Rocke in a previous campaign that also uses the serviced called netdns	['T1543.002']
+"This binary has two main features. If it is executed with the ""help"" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. This has a notable side effect: if rmaserv.exe is executed isolated on a sandbox (so without the parameter), the service is not created. The second main feature is the service. This service has two features. This event is the mechanism used by the C2 contact module to alert the service executable to perform the cleaning of all components"	['T1543.003']
+Cofense Intelligence recently observed an email campaign delivering Revenge RAT that exhibited above- average sophistication in its delivery technique and persistence mechanisms. In this campaign, threat actors used redundant command and control infrastructure disguised as legitimate content to deliver a sample of Revenge RAT without leaving files on disk	['T1102.002']
+The code of the Defender.sct file is an obfuscated JavaScript. The main function performed by the SCT file is to Base64 decode the contents of WindowsDefender.ini file and execute the decoded PowerShell Script using the following command line	['T1059.007']
+The WellMess malware stores the C2 IP addresses it uses in the binary as a plaintext url. The format of the C2 url string for the example in Figure 3 would be one of	['T1016']
+newtask”- Execute arbitrary code on the local machine, download and execute a file from any remote server, kill or uninstall the program and sends updated fingerprint data	['T1105']
+This release adds features to spawn processes with an alternate parent process. This release also gives the operator control over the script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its attacks and workflows. This release of Cobalt Strike pushes back on this technique with the ppid command. If I’m in a SYSTEM context, I might use services.exe as my parent process and ask Beacon to use svchost.exe for its temporary processes. To benefit from the ppid command, your session must have rights to access the parent process. Beacon’s runu command runs an arbitrary command as a child of another parent. These commands offer means to spawn a payload, in another desktop session, without remote process injection. The Resource Kit . Cobalt Strike 3.8’s Resource Kit finally gives you a way to change Cobalt Strike’s built-in script templates. The Resource Kit is a collection of Cobalt Strike’s default script templates and a sample Aggressor Script to bring these into Cobalt Strike. The Resource Kit benefits from new Aggressor Script hooks to provide the PowerShell, Python, and VBA script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its workflows	['T1078.002']
+C2 Communication Malware C2 servers are stored hardcoded in binary and cannot be changed by operators dynamically, unless the malware’s executable binary is updated. In our binary, there are three hardcoded HTTPS URLs used for C2 communication. These C2 servers’ addresses were not seen in previous versions	['T1071.001']
+All the stages’ executables are created as chains to avoid detection and protect the C2 server	['T1027', 'T1105', 'T1560.001']
+"VERMIN collects all keystrokes and clipboard data and encrypts the data before storing it in the following folder: %appdata%\Microsoft\Proof\Settings. ED7BA470-8E54-465E-825C-99712043E01C}\Profiles\. Each file is saved with the following format: ""{0:dd-MM-yyyy}.txt"". The data is encrypted using the same method and 3-DES key, used to encrypt the configuration file. Vermin supports the following commands"	['T1115', 'T1560', 'T1119']
+Early in March 2019, a new macOS malware sample from the OceanLotus group was uploaded to VirusTotal, a popular online multi-scanner service. This backdoor executable bears the same features as the previous macOS variant we looked at, but its structure has changed and its detection was made harder	['T1222.002']
+In a nutshell, these commands allow the attackers to run, stop, and enumerate processes; read, write, and enumerate files and registry keys; collect and upload information about the device; and restart the device, wait, or exit. The command CollectSystemDescription retrieves the following information	['T1083']
+Upon clicking the URLs provided in the phishing emails, targets were redirected to a compromised server hosting JavaScript profiling scripts. Once a target host was profiled, victims downloaded a malicious Adobe Flash Player SWF file and an FLV file, detailed below. This ultimately resulted in a custom backdoor known as SHOTPUT, detected by FireEye as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, being delivered to the victim’s system	['T1204.001']
+WE VALUE YOUR PRIVACY This site uses cookies and related technologies, as described in our privacy policy, for purposes that may include site operation, analytics, enhanced user experience, or advertising. You may choose to consent to our use of these technologies, or manage your own preferences	['T1087.001']
+Gain access to the victim’s network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft activities. Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain service account. From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2) using a domain administrator’s account. Log in to O365 as a user with privileged access to cloud resources	['T1078.003', 'T1133']
+They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, KB77846376.exe, named after Microsoft update files. When planting webshells on the Outlook Exchange servers, they modified already existing legitimate flogon.js and logoff.aspx files. They relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools	['T1546.012']
+In a newly-identified campaign, FIN7 modified their phishing techniques to implement unique infection and persistence mechanisms. FIN7 has moved away from weaponized Microsoft Office macros in order to evade detection. This round of FIN7 phishing lures implements hidden shortcut files (LNK files) to initiate the infection and VBScript functionality launched by mshta.exe to infect the victim	['T1218.005']
+One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands. Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection	['T1566.002']
+Blue Mockingbird is the name we’ve given to a cluster of similar activity we’ve observed involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest Blue Mockingbird tools we’ve observed were created in December 2019	['T1543.003', 'T1546.003', 'T1496']
+As before, the malware uses a combination of RSA, RC4 encryption, and HTTPS to communicate with the C&C. An encrypted packet has the following structure: 4-byte CRC, followed by RSA_BLOB. After decrypting RSA (request packets cannot be decrypted without the C&C private key), we get a GZIP packet	['T1071.001']
+Collects information about the infected system, network, drives, and installed applications. Saves the collected information to a file named “info” in “%appdata%\Micorosoft\Templates” and sends it to the C2. Executes the KGH installer	['T1518']
+BlackTech is a threat group known primarily for conducting cyber espionage operations against targets in East Asia, with a focus on Taiwan and Japan. The group has likely been active for a number of years and is responsible for several separate campaigns leveraging overlapping infrastructure. BlackTech often abuses legitimate software tools and processes to achieve its goals, using stolen digital certificates and API hooking among other techniques	['T1106']
+This type of threat leverages a technique called reflective dynamic-link library (DLL) injection, also referred to as reflective DLL loading. The technique allows the injection of a DLL from memory rather than from disk. This technique is stealthier than regular DLL injection because aside from not needing the actual DLL file on disk, it also does not need any windows loader for it to be injected. Recently, we have witnessed threat actors using this technique to deploy ColdLock ransomware. Now, we have seen the same attack using a filelessly executed Netwalker ransomware	['T1106']
+1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. The VBS script will also add two important registry keys for persistence. The persistence technique observed in all intrusions uses COM hijacking. In this technique, the threat actor is able to add a Class ID in the current user registry hive (HKCU) referencing the malicious VBS script written previously to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs. This registry modification will effectively invoke the malicious VBS script any time a program or script references “Scripting.Dictionary” COM programs during their execution. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. Once successful, the macro invokes %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs again using explorer.exe, which in turn will execute the PowerShell snippet that connects to the C2 server and which we named LitePower Stager	['T1012']
+The payload decodes the response for an answer to the TXT query with base64 and decrypts using the same AES cipher and key as the request. The payload attempts to parse the decrypted cleartext using the regular expression “[^,]+” to get the command value and the command arguments that are split with a comma. The payload then checks the command value using a command handler that has the ability to execute commands and upload and download files, as seen in Table 1	['T1059.003']
+The payload initiates a communication with the C&C server to exfiltrate the stolen data and receive commands. Besides the stolen data, it sends the Windows product name and version, username, computer name, and domain name to the C&C server	['T1041']
+The custom loader DLLs dropped on disk carried compile timestamps ranging from July 2020 to October 2020, while the embedded Reflective DLLs carried compile timestamps ranging from March 2016 to November 2017. The presence of 2016-2017 compile timestamps is likely due to attackers’ usage of custom Malleable C2 profiles with synthetic compile timestamp (compile_time) values. libintl3.dll), and other legitimate applications. The Variant 2 custom loaders were mostly compiled from open-source source code of legitimate applications, such as 7-Zip and Far Manager (i.e. the open-source source code for these applications was modified to add in the malicious code). In some instances, certain development artifacts were left behind in the custom loader samples. For example, the following C++ header (.hpp) path was observed in a loader compiled from a modified Far Manager open-source source code (c:\build\workspace\cobalt_cryptor_far (dev071)\farmanager\far\platform.concurrency.hpp	['T1070.006']
+Persistence is ensured by creating a .LNK file in the Windows startup directory. Of importance is the fact that Grandoreiro uses the same algorithm for decrypting its internal strings as Casbaneiro	['T1547.001']
+Endpoint Protection . The Shamoon Attacks . W32.Disttrack is a new threat that is being used in specific targeted attacks against at least one organization in the energy sector. It is a destructive malware that corrupts files on a compromised computer and overwrites the MBR (Master Boot Record) in an effort to render a computer unusable. The driver is used to overwrite the computer’s MBR but may be used for legitimate purposes. The file is digitally signed - %System%\drivers\drdisk.sys - The device driver is a clean disk driver that enables user-mode applications to read and write to disk sectors. The driver is used to overwrite the computer’s MBR but may be used for legitimate purposes. The file is digitally signed - Executes the following commands that collect file names, which will be overwritten and writes them to f1.inf and f2.inf: - Files from the f1.inf and f2.inf will be overwritten with the JPEG image shown below. Overwritten files are thus rendered useless	['T1485']
+Ecipekac uses a new, complicated loading schema: it uses the four files listed below to load and decrypt four fileless loader modules one after the other to eventually load the final payload in memory	['T1140']
+An attacker who had already achieved remote code execution (RCE) could exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges. They then downloaded and ran a CVE-2016-0167 exploit to run subsequent code as SYSTEM	['T1105']
+"While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""File Uploaded"")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""< File Not Found >"")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>ABZFinish Overlaps with Previous OilRig Group Attacks Since May 2016, we have continued to monitor and uncover various attacks and tools associated with the OilRig group. However, as we continued to follow the trail of evidence, we found immediate links to past attacks and common artifacts from the OilRig group. This group has repeatedly shown evidence of a willingness to adapt and evolve their tactics, while also reusing certain aspects as well. 2) AutoFocus customers can track these tools with the ThreeDollars and OopsIE 3) Traps blocks the ThreeDollars delivery documents and the OopsIE payload"	['T1070.004']
+Obtain the size of the payload and encrypt that value using the same RC4 algorithm as in step 2. The size of the payload should be the total decrypted size of the payload	['T1027']
+Last January, we started investigating an ongoing campaign launched by Transparent Tribe to distribute the Crimson malware. The attacks started with malicious Microsoft Office documents, which were sent to victims using spear-phishing emails	['T1204.002', 'T1566.001']
+The DNS communication protocol is significantly different to the previous two modes. Data is sent to the C2 by DNS tunnelling. This involves prepending encoded data as a sub domain to a threat actor-controlled domain and then using DNS requests to transmit this data to the C2 with other DNS resolution services forwarding on the message	['T1071.004']
+There are several unnecessary jumps for control flow obfuscation, including simple opaque predicates leading to junk code. The obfuscation method is a simple one-byte XOR with the same hardcoded value for every piece	['T1027']
+One of the changes mentioned was that now, any Get-Domain* function uses LDAP enumeration, meaning that we can pull said information from a domain that trusts us. This is done with the -Domain <domain.fqdn> parameter	['T1482']
+Once encrypted, the system information is sent in the body of an HTTP POST. Figure 14 shows data sent over the network with the POST request	['T1041']
+The name Psylo is an anagram from the mutex created when initially running this payload, which is 'hnxlopsyxt	['T1070.006', 'T1105']
+The primary difference between Sample 2 and this sample is the file name used by the payload. The prior version used the name SafeApp.exe and installed the binary into %AppData% and added a Windows auto run registry entry against that file. Sample 3 does the same thing but makes the file name NeutralApp.exe. This is notable, because the malware checks for a copy of itself, and the name is static making it simple to identify infection. Due to the name change, the newer version runs even if SafeApp.exe is currently running on the victim machine	['T1036.005']
+The choice of terminology in URL paths and file names when delivering BackConfig malware in this, and other campaigns discussed later on, is clearly to blend in as benign operations, paths and filenames. Although spelled differently, it could be easy to believe the payload relates to the DHCP networking service	['T1036.005']
+Valak C2 over HTTP traffic returning ASCII data used to create malware items on the victim host	['T1041']
+Figure 9 suggests that this file was submitted to VirusTotal as “jesus.exe”, which is the name of the file in the downloaded zip, before it’s being renamed in the MSI payload	['T1105']
+Turla has developed a whole set of backdoors relying on the RPC protocol. These backdoors are used to perform lateral movement and take control of other machines in the local network without relying on an external C&C server	['T1090', 'T1570', 'T1049']
+Once executed, the SUNSHUTTLE backdoor enumerates the victim’s MAC address and compares it to a hardcoded MAC address value “c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a”. If a match is found the backdoor exits. The MAC address is likely a default MAC address for the Windows sandbox network adapter	['T1497.001']
+In the Sakula samples where the install process performed cleanup, the malware invoked cmd.exe. This process was instantiated by first performing a ping request to localhost to ensure the install process completed before the temporary file was deleted	['T1070.004']
+CTU researchers have observed TG-3390 actors staging RAR archives, renamed with a .zip file extension, on externally accessible web servers. The adversaries then issue HTTP GET requests, sometimes with the User-Agent MINIXL, to exfiltrate the archive parts from the victim's network (see Figure 16	['T1030']
+Once the library is called by one of the triggering events implemented in its code, it reads a configuration file from a shared Google Document	['T1102.001']
+AQUATIC PANDA is a China-based targeted intrusion adversary with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. It has likely operated since at least May 2020. AQUATIC PANDA operations have primarily focused on entities in the telecommunications, technology and government sectors. AQUATIC PANDA relies heavily on Cobalt Strike, and its toolset includes the unique Cobalt Strike downloader tracked as FishMaster. AQUATIC PANDA has also been observed delivering njRAT payloads to targets	['T1105', 'T1588.001', 'T1588.002']
+This batch file is responsible for deleting the original sample executable. It queries and stores the current cursor position several times to detect activity and identify if it is being executed in a sandbox or automated analysis environment. These measures are all designed to impede the analysis process and make it more expensive to identify what the malware is actually designed to do from a code execution flow perspective. Below the EAX register is stored in a variable to be reused later in order to allocate a heap memory chunk to initiate its own unpacked code. The malware also uses others techniques to make analysis significantly more difficult, like creating hundreds of case comparisons, which makes tracing code much harder. Below an example of several if conditional statements in pseudo code demonstrating this process and how it can result in impeding the ability to efficiently trace the code. In order to decrypt the malware code it's installs an exception handler, which is responsible for decrypting some memory bytes to continue it's execution. During this execution, the malware will then continue to patch itself and continue execution. The strings are encrypted using an XOR value, however each string uses a separate XOR value preventing an easy detection mechanism. Below is some IDA Python code which can be used to decrypt strings	['T1140']
+The actors behind the previous FormBook campaign used CVE-2017-0199 — a remote code execution vulnerability in multiple versions of Microsoft Office — to download and open an RTF document from inside a malicious DOCX file. We have also observed newer campaigns being used to distribute Agent Tesla and Loki that are leveraging CVE-2017-11882. An example of one of the malware distribution URLs is in the screenshot below. Many users have the assumption that modern Microsoft Word documents are less dangerous than RTF or DOC files. While this is partially true, attackers can still find ways with these newer file formats to exploit various vulnerabilities	['T1105']
+The malware communicates with its C&C server via TCP over the 5200 port. The packets’ payload is encrypted with RC4 using the password “warzone160\x00” (the final null terminator is used as a part of the encryption key	['T1573.001']
+The ‘showBackupIosFolder’ command is rather interesting, as it allows the threat actors to determine if a compromised system was used to backup an IOS device, such as an iPhone or iPad. We believe this command is used to determine if a mobile device was backed up, and we speculate that the actors would use other commands within XAgent to exfiltrate those files	['T1083', 'T1083']
+FIN6 conducted internal reconnaissance with a Windows batch file leveraging Adfind to query Active Directory, then 7-zip to compress the results for exfiltration	['T1018', 'T1069']
+"Online"" in this case refers to the attacker using the protocol of the targeted network service to quickly run through many password guesses"	['T1114.002']
+Finally, the script contents of blog-page[.]html schedule the same task (“MSOFFICEER”) to run itself. Revenge RAT used in this instance is not dropped to disk but is instead loaded into the memory of a process using the “Reflection.Assembly” PowerShell command. A similar method is used to execute the script content of the command and control locations rather than dropping the scripts to disk and then running them. By scheduling tasks to run scripts and binaries in memory rather than on disk, the threat actors are able to avoid some traditional means of detection	['T1053.005', 'T1059.003', 'T1059.001']
+commands executed by the command prompt: ECHO VER VER ECHO IPCONFIG /ALL IPCONFIG /ALL ECHO NET LOCALGROUP ADMINISTRATORS NET LOCALGROUP ADMINISTRATORS ECHO NET START NET START ECHO GPRESULT /Z GPRESULT /Z ECHO GPRESULT /SCOPE COMPUTER /Z GPRESULT /SCOPE COMPUTER /Z ECHO SYSTEMINFO SYSTEMINFO	['T1082']
+This command configures the system’s Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) module, which provides support in the system's access control policies, into permissive mode — that is, setting the SELinux policy so that it is not enforced. If the system has the /etc/selinux/config file, it will write these commands into the file: SELINUX=disabled and SELINUXTYPE=targeted commands. The former disables the SELinux policy (or disallows one to be loaded), while the latter sets selected processes to run in confined domains	['T1562.001']
+Designed to scrape both Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data, PUNCHTRACK is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher and is never saved to disk	['T1027']
+Ramsay will scan all the network shares and removable drives (excluding A: and B: drives usually reserved for floppy disks) for potential control files. First, Ramsay looks for Word documents and also, in more recent versions, for PDFs and ZIP archives	['T1135']
+"Successfully evicting TG-3390 from an environment requires a coordinated plan to remove all access points, including remote access tools and web shells. Within weeks of eviction, the threat actors attempt to access their ChinaChopper web shells from previously used IP addresses. CTU researchers discovered the threat actors searching for ""[company] login,"" which directed them to the landing page for remote access. After reestablishing access, the adversaries download tools such as gsecudmp and WCE that are staged temporarily on websites that TG-3390 previously compromised but never used"	['T1608.002']
+This payload, (SHA256: 0282b7705f13f9d9811b722f8d7ef8fef907bee2ef00bf8ec89df5e7d96d81ff), which we are tracking as MechaFlounder, was developed in Python and bundled as a portable executable using the PyInstaller tool. This secondary payload acts as a backdoor allowing the operator to upload and download files, as well as run additional commands and applications on the compromised system	['T1105']
+A subset of victims was targeted with data collection executables that were designed to look for removable media (most likely USB flash drives). The implant routinely scans for such drives, specifically targeting removable media (return value of GetDriveType is 2). If found, the implant uses an embedded version of WinRAR to execute these hardcoded commands	['T1120', 'T1120']
+Each value of the config is written to the registry after encrypting them using the DES algorithm. A new registry key is created under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ using either the SystemProductName value from the HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS key or the hardcoded string “68A-D3H-B1111 as a name	['T1112']
+It seems that in most cases, the malware sends out data using DNS_TYPE_TEXT requests, while the attackers issue commands separately over the TCP channel with the IP address associated with the DGA-generated subdomain	['T1095']
+On balance, the fall campaigns diverged from Bulgarian themed NetWire campaigns in the early summer in scope and scale. These campaigns distributed NetWire variants which used Bulgarian email lures, leveraged geofencing, and downloading EXEs through certutils. The low volume and tailored email lures suggest the actor put in effort to evade detection. The NetWire malware has been around since at least 2002 and has been consistently in use by various actors across the threat landscape. This analysis shows groupings of similar campaigns distributing NetWire based on message attributes, email lures and language, Office document metadata, VBA Macro code, and malware configuration	['T1204.002']
+The OilRig campaign has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness and desire to be iterative in their toolset, while maintaining some level of similarities over time. In this scenario, we were able to directly observe this type of behavior, while also implement a tool thought to be previously unrelated to OilRig. With the inclusion of ISMAgent within the OilRig toolset, we are beginning to see stronger relationships between the various documented groups operating in the Middle East. This region has proven to be a hot bed of espionage motivated activity over the last couple of years, and there appear to be no signs of this changing. As our research continues, our goal will be to generate even better understandings of the true extent of the various operations in this region and the relationships between them	['T1059']
+ACTINIUM’s operational infrastructure consists of many domains and hosts to facilitate payload staging and C2. In a single 30-day snapshot, MSTIC saw ACTINIUM utilizing over 25 new unique domains and over 80 unique IP addresses, demonstrating that they frequently modify or alter their infrastructure	['T1583.001']
+"X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system"	['T1105']
+The “.lnk” files being utilized by Mustang Panda typically contain an embedded HTA script that, once executed, will drop and open the decoy document while the malicious activity of the payload runs in the background. The final type of malicious document we observed were empty, and only contain an image, such as requesting for macros to be enabled, used to distract someone while malicious activity takes place in the background	['T1059.001']
+With this knowledge, we aim to equip you to stop the WIZARD SPIDER and GRIM SPIDER threat actors well before they have an opportunity to encrypt your data or cause serious harm to your business	['T1070.004']
+Recipients who click this link are directed to a web page that looks identical or similar to the spoofed library resource. After the victims enter their credentials, their web browsers are redirected to the next.php file, where the credentials are stored locally in the pass.txt file. The victim's browser is then sent to the legitimate site being spoofed (see Figure 2	['T1598.003']
+The contents of the README file, as well as the ransom message, are again specified in the config. The key requested by the attackers is a combination of the victim’s system information and generated encryption metadata (needed to derive the decryption keys for the files), AES encrypted and base64 encoded (see “File encryption” section for more details	['T1486']
+A request to upload data, which might include collected host data or retrieved files which were requested based on the attacker’s preferences	['T1005']
+The campaigns maintain persistence on machines by creating two daily scheduled task entries. The code, meanwhile, is still controlled by the FIN7 actors and may be leveraged in future attacks by the group	['T1053.005']
+FIN6 has traditionally conducted intrusions targeting payment card data from Point-of-Sale (POS) or eCommerce systems. Given that, FIN6 may have evolved as a whole to focus on these extortive intrusions. Which of those scenarios is happening would influence how pressing a threat the group’s card data breach tactics continue to be. Given that these intrusions have been sustained for almost a year, we expect that continued research into further intrusion attempts may enable us to more fully answer these questions regarding FIN6’s current status	['T1059']
+To interact with its C2 server, Kazuar begins its communication by creating an HTTP GET request to use as a beacon. The beacon, generated by the code seen in Figure 5 contains a cookie that has an “AuthToken” value that is a base64 encoded GUID used to uniquely identify the compromised system. Kazuar refers to this GUID as an “agent” identifier	['T1132.001']
+For all the fixed drives in the system, the network module stores the disk name and size, as well as computer and user name, Windows directory, host IP, etc. One interesting field is “vr”:”2.0″ which appears to be the malware version encoded in the communication protocol	['T1083']
+Windows Credential Editor (WCE) — obtains passwords from memory - gsecdump — obtains passwords from memory - winrar — compresses data for exfiltration - nbtscan — scans NetBIOS name servers	['T1588.002']
+FileName: Specified filename - PathToSave: Path to specified file - Execute: Create a process with the specified file - Delete: Delete the specified file - LoadLib: Load the specified DLL into the current process - ReadFile: Reads a specified the file - Rundll: Runs the specified DLL with a specified exported function - IP: Set C2 location - shell: Run additional code in a newly created thread	['T1070.004']
+In attempt to overcome network filtering solutions, the attackers implemented a stealthier C2 communication method, using “DNS Tunneling” – a method of C2 communicating and data exfiltration using the DNS protocol	['T1071.004']
+Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. The group has leveraged generic themes, such as resumes and CVs, since early 2019. From 2019 and continuing into 2020, the attackers started using honeytrap-themed lures to trick targets into opening ZIP archives and maldocs that posed as pictures of women. These maldocs did not contain popular news topics, as seen in older campaigns, but instead masqueraded as logistical and operational documents for the Indian Armed Forces. But Transparent Tribe's attacks are not limited to only India. In one campaign, the attackers used an Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)-themed maldoc to distribute CrimsonRAT in mid-2019. Then, in mid- to late-2020, the attackers targeted diplomatic entities with RAR archives pretending to be related to the British High Commision in Islamabad, Pakistan. In mid-2020, we observed the first instance of conference attendees being targeted in the form of a CrimsonRAT maldoc masquerading as the agenda for an Afghani conference. However, since the start of this year, the group has increasingly used lures disguised as content from Indian government-sponsored conferences	['T1204.002']
+Using previously stolen credentials the attacker logged into a domain controller and copied tools into the %TEMP% directory. Copied tools included AdFind.exe (Active Directory enumeration utility), a batch script (Figure 2), and a copy of the 7-Zip archive utility. AdFind.exe was executed using the previously noted batch script, which was crafted to pass the utility a series of commands that were used to collect information about Active Directory users, systems, OUs, subnets, groups, and trust objects. The output from each command was saved to an individual text file alongside the AdFind.exe utility (Figure 2). - This process was performed twice on the same domain controller, 10 hours apart. Between executions of Adfind the attacker tested access to multiple domain controllers in the victim environment, including the one later used to deploy Ryuk. The attacker logged into a domain controller and copied instances of PSExec.exe, a batch script used to kill processes and stop services, and an instance of Ryuk onto the system	['T1482']
+Previously the Iron group developed and spread cryptocurrency miners or cryptocurrency transaction hijacking trojans mainly for Microsoft Windows and only a few for Linux. Instead, Xbash aimed on discovering unprotected services, deleting victim’s MySQL, PostgreSQL and MongoDB databases, and ransom for Bitcoins. Xbash uses three known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis and ActiveMQ for self-propagation or infecting Windows system	['T1486']
+The Bazar loader and Bazar backdoor are named after their use of EmerDNS blockchain domains. Using Bazar domains has been trending recently among cybercriminals because they are able to evade takedowns and sinkholing that disrupts botnet communications	['T1036.005']
+All FakeM variants initiate communications with its C2 server and check the C2’s response for a command. Also, all FakeM variants share a common command handler with the same capabilities, as seen in Table 2. The limited command set suggests that FakeM’s functionality is obtained by additional assembly code provided by the C2 server with the 0x211 command	['T1083', 'T1217', 'T1057']
+The executable file is the Crimson “Thin Client”, which allows the attacker to gain basic information about the infected machine, collect screenshots, manipulate the file system and download or upload arbitrary files	['T1518.001']
+In this attack, the attackers exploit a misconfigured Docker API port to run an Ubuntu container with the kinsing malicious malware, which in turn runs a cryptominer and then attempts to spread the malware to other containers and hosts. Our analysis of this attack vector exposes the techniques used, starting with exploiting the open port, through evasion tactics and lateral movement, all the way up to the end-goal of deploying the cryptominer	['T1610']
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ setting the key “bookstore” to the value “regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s”, which ensures the malware runs every time at system boot	['T1547.001', 'T1218.010']
+The cybersecurity community has long known that any information technology tool that is used for legitimate purposes can also be manipulated by attackers to enhance their malware. Recently, however, many native Windows OS processes are being used for malicious purposes as well	['T1204.001']
+The droppers and downloader family names tend to be fast-moving targets due to the heavy use of obfuscation and simple functionality. For example, PowerPunch is executed from within PowerShell as a one-line command, encoded using Base64	['T1105']
+"Figure 2 - Data contained within the ""cookie:"" header of the initial traffic to the remote C2, being encrypted with RC6"	['T1573.001']
+The commands executed were used for discovery purposes, listing members of privileged groups and network information	['T1069']
+Fake domains . Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. Malicious file-sharing domains . Transparent Tribe also regularly registers domains that appear to be legitimate file- and media-sharing services. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. Transparent Tribe also delivers malicious archives containing CrimsonRAT executables using various themes, including honeytraps. Transparent Tribe uses generically themed content-hosting domains as well as malicious domains masquerading as legitimate defense-related websites. 55: How Transparent Tribe could e. Threat Source newsletter (May 27, 2021) Elizabethan England has nothing on modern-day Russia Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities . Threat Roundup for May 14 to May 21 Talos Takes Ep. 55: How Transparent Tribe could e. - Threat Source newsletter (May 27, 2021) - Elizabethan England has nothing on modern-day Russia - Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities . - Threat Roundup for May 14 to May 21 - Talos Takes Ep	['T1204.001']
+The backdoor collects the victim’s MAC address using the GetAdaptersInfo API. These IDs are then passed to the C&C server as one of the POST body parameters (MAC address is sent encrypted as discussed later	['T1016']
+The malware has been known to proliferate through network shares, removable drives, or software vulnerabilities. The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links	['T1091']
+KernelCallbackTable is initialized to an array of callback functions when user32.dll is loaded into memory, which are used whenever a graphical call (GDI) is made by the process. To hijack the control flow, malware replaces the USER32. Once the flow is hijacked and malicious code is executed the rest of the code takes care of restoring the KernelCallbackTable to its original state	['T1574.013']
+The payload created by the initial spear-phishing document loads the next stage as a backdoor running in-memory – the ThreatNeedle backdoor. The actor uses it to carry out initial reconnaissance and deploy additional malware for lateral movement. When moving laterally, the actor uses ThreatNeedle installer-type malware in the process. This installer is responsible for implanting the next stage loader-type malware and registering it for auto-execution in order to achieve persistence	['T1047']
+If the connection is successful, the following file name extensions are searched for within removable, fixed, or networked drives: doc, docx, xls, rtf, odt, txt, jpg, pdf, rar, zip, and 7z. Candidate files are queued up for upload. They are also inventoried via a specific MD5 hash value computed based on attributes of the target file and compromised host, such as the volume serial number, file size, and last write timestamp assigned to the file. Computed hashes are logged to an inventory log file that serves as a reference point checked by the malware to avoid duplicate exfiltration	['T1083', 'T1135', 'T1120']
+The third set of URLs is used to download the Tor client. We believe the client is decrypted using the configuration serpent key [7]. When the Tor client is retrieved, the bot creates a registry key named “TorClient” in the registry subfolder to store its data. This subfolder is located in HKCU\\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\{random guid}. This key contains the path to the client, which is dropped in the %TMP% folder, with a filename using the pattern [A-F0-9]{4}.bin	['T1027', 'T1140']
+LoudMiner is an unusual case of a persistent cryptocurrency miner, distributed for macOS and Windows since August 2018. It uses virtualization software – QEMU on macOS and VirtualBox on Windows – to mine cryptocurrency on a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, making it cross platform. The miner itself is based on XMRig (Monero) and uses a mining pool, thus it is impossible to retrace potential transactions	['T1496', 'T1564.006']
+The Anchor payload is delivered by AnchorInstaller AnchorInstaller unpacks the Anchor DLL and drops it in the %SYSTEMROOT% or %SYSTEMROOT%\System32 folder. The dropped DLL is loaded by the service netTcpSvc, which is created by the malware	['T1569.002']
+Suspicious obfuscation or deobfuscation activity - Suspicious script execution - A script with suspicious content was observed - PowerShell dropped a suspicious file on the machine - Anomalous process executing encoded command - Suspicious dynamic link library loaded - An anomalous scheduled task was created - An uncommon file was created and added to a Run Key - Suspicious screen capture activity - Staging of sensitive data - Suspicious process transferring data to external network	['T1053.005']
+Most of the plugins included in this sample were obfuscated with Eazfuscater.NET 3.3 and easily deobfuscated using de4dot	['T1027']
+The second, which ran from September 20 to 21, used an exploit for CVE-2017-8759 (patched last September), a code injection/remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft’s .NET Framework. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster	['T1203']
+The malware sends an HTTP GET request to its C2 IP address using HTTP over port 443. Figure 8 shows the GET request sent over the network	['T1560.003']
+Collects system, network and drive information and installed applications, saves it to a file named “info” and sends it to the C2 using iexplorer.exe	['T1005', 'T1074.001']
+First, the threat actor used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal with a generic name. This Service Principal was granted company administrator privileges. From there, the threat actor added a credential to this Service Principal so that they could access the Service Principal directly, without use of an O365 user account	['T1098.003', 'T1078.004']
+Usually comes as a DLL instead of an EXE file. By using the malware as a DLL, they can inject this module into a target process more easily than if they use an EXE sample of the malware	['T1055.001']
+"When the Trojan runs as an executable within the ""DsvHelper"" folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the 'DsvHelper' folder"	['T1547.009', 'T1547.001']
+Further the Avaddon ransomware deletes the volume shadow copies via wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive and vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet	['T1490', 'T1047']
+Listing running processes is also one of the capabilities of this malware and it stores that information in the 08.txt file, and this looks like the listing below	['T1057']
+Analysis of several backdoors identified in this recent operation revealed that Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin. Additionally, one analyzed sample of Kazuar is configured for commands sent through likely internal nodes in the government's network, while others use the more traditional method of external C&C nodes	['T1102']
+The screen capture utility appeared to be used for initial information gathering, as it was only used briefly at the beginning of each infection and not seen again. The information stealer was capable of stealing the contents of the clipboard, taking screenshots, recording keystrokes and stealing files and user credentials. After this initial activity, the attackers usually downloaded more of their tools to the computer using a PowerShell downloader and began moving across the victim’s network	['T1115', 'T1113']
+For indicator removal on host: Timestomp the adversary uses a Windows version of the Linux touch command. This makes sure the used tools by the adversary blend in with the other files in the directory when shown in a timeline. Creating a timeline is a common thing to do for forensic analysts to get a chronological view of events on a system	['T1070.006']
+Persistence using autorun keys - • Keylogger - • Directory and file listing - • Downloading secondary payloads from the C2 server - • Exfiltrating collected information from the host to the C2 server - • Executing arbitrary commands via cmd.exe or PowerShell	['T1041']
+"Many of the Fetch samples we analyzed attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings using AES. However, they all used the same key ""agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj"". The loader's main goal was to run a PowerShell command to execute shellcode. We found the PowerShell command used by Fetch within the source code of Magic Unicorn, which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents. The shellcode executed by this PowerShell is the exact same as in the delivery documents, using code from Metasploit which can obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL"	['T1059.001', 'T1027']
+Comparison between what malware is eventually used in active campaigns versus in-development malware allows us to understand what adaptations and modifications were made to each iteration of malware. Additionally, witnessing specific functionality changes within the malware itself, we attempt to make correlations between the new and old functionality. We were also able to gain insight into OilRig’s operational tempo by comparing the timestamps of files created during testing and the file delivered in an actual attack. We determined that OilRig began their testing activities 6 days prior to an attack, which ended 8 hours before the creation of the document that the actors delivered via a spear-phish email 20 minutes later	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+Sometimes the Winnti team registered their C&C units with public hosts. Judging by the samples identified, these C&C centers were subdomains of such domains as 6600.org, 8866.org, 9966.org or ddns.net	['T1583.001']
+"The parameters for each command are issued in hexadecimal format. For instance, the character A would be represented by the two characters 41, which is the hexadecimal representation of that character. This hexadecimal format is used extensively throughout this Trojan. The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""File Uploaded"")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data"	['T1132.001']
+The script shown in Figure 4 is almost identical to the one used by the script contents of 29[.]html (in Figure 3), the only difference being the absence of a sleep command and the usage of the “forfiles” utility	['T1202']
+As does Crutch v3, it persists using DLL hijacking. However, in this case the host application is an old Microsoft Outlook component that is dropped on the compromised system by the operators	['T1574.001']
+While observing the malware’s interaction with the second domain, lookplease.c1[.]biz, two text files were subsequently identified containing text encoded with the same custom base64 alphabet used previously. When decoded, these files were found to contain additional commands to be executed on the infected host	['T1027']
+"The exact file downloaded depends on the victim's system architecture. We visited this IP and found it was an open HFS hosting ""0720.bin"" along with 10 additional files: ""3307.bin,"" ""a7,"" ""bashf,"" ""bashg,"" ""config.json,"" ""lowerv2.sh,"" ""pools.txt,"" ""r88.sh,"" ""rootv2.sh"" and ""TermsHost.exe. The script downloads a file from GitHub called ""libprocesshider,"" which hides a file called ""x7"" using the ID preloader. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. Lowerv2.sh"" and ""rootv2.sh"" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components ""bashf"" and ""bashg,"" hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called ""XbashY"" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. The sample grabs the config file ""xmr.txt,"" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The actor . Through Rocke's MinerGate Monero wallet email rocke@live.cn, we were able to uncover additional information about the actor. It appears that they are relying on fake Google Chrome alerts, fake apps, and fake Adobe Flash updates to social engineer users into downloading malicious payloads"	['T1105']
+Store the AES key/IV and other metadata of the target file in a memory block and encrypt it using an embedded public RSA key (See Appendix section for a detailed description of the memory block	['T1486']
+Egregor downloads custom dynamic link libraries (b.dll, q.dll, etc) using bitsadmin and execute them on victim’s systems to encrypt data	['T1197']
+This is done most likely to force a reboot or dupe the user into restarting the machine. Terminating csrss.exe and wininit.exe, for instance, will cause a blue screen of death (BSOD). Terminating winlogon.exe will prompt the user to log in again, while terminating lsass.exe will cause a reboot. KillDisk also uses the ExitWindowsEx function to forcefully restart the machine	['T1529']
+NetWire is a publicly-available RAT that has been used by criminal organizations and other malicious groups since 2012	['T1566.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1204.001', 'T1204.002', 'T1566.002']
+"The ""rr.exe"" payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts. In the example above, the ""spp.exe"" executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at"	['T1547.001']
+Turla has extensively used Carbon, a modular backdoor framework with advanced peer-to-peer capability, for several years. A June 2020 analyzed instance of the Carbon backdoor augmented the traditional threat actor-owned C&C infrastructure with tasks served from Pastebin, a legitimate web service. The Carbon installer discovered by ACTI analysts dropped a Carbon Orchestrator, two communication modules, and an encrypted configuration file	['T1027']
+Given their capability and sophistication, it is unlikely that IRON RITUAL's intrusions will leave sufficient artifacts to allow researchers to associate their activities with previous or future Russian cyber espionage operations. The group has used malware including the SUNBURST (also known as Solorigate) backdoor and in-memory Cobalt Strike delivered using the TEARDROP and RAINDROP loaders	['T1484.002']
+FancyBear/APT28, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, has conducted several large credential phishing campaigns targeting ukr.net users, UkrNet is a Ukrainian media company. The phishing emails are sent from a large number of compromised accounts (non-Gmail/Google), and include links to attacker controlled domains	['T1598.003', 'T1586.002']
+We have observed Netwalker ransomware attacks that involve malware that is not compiled, but written in PowerShell and executed directly in memory and without storing the actual ransomware binary into the disk	['T1059.001']
+During our analysis, we observed this DDE downloading and executing a Zebrocy AutoIt downloader (f27836430…), configured to attempt to download an additional payload from 220.158.216[.]127. The DDE instructions also included another command that it did not run, which suggests it is an artifact of a prior version of this delivery document. The following shows this unused command, which exposed an additional server within Sofacy’s infrastructure would download and execute an encoded PowerShell script from 92.114.92[.]102	['T1105']
+WildFire detects malware samples used by this campaign. An Autofocus tag has been created for tracking CobaltGang actor group	['T1059.003']
+The SOMBRAT backdoor can communicate with its C2 server using both DNS and a proxy-aware, TLS-encrypted stream protocol. By default, the backdoor uses the DNS protocol; however, this can be reconfigured by the C2 server. Mandiant observed the domains feticost[.]com and celomito[.]com used for DNS C2 communications	['T1071.004']
+Copy itself into “C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common” and rename itself as ESTCommon.dll to pretend it is a DLL that belongs to ESTsecurity company	['T1036.005']
+The fifth-level subdomain is a data sequence number that allows the C2 server to reassemble the data, which will start with 1 and increment by 60 as the DNS tunneling protocol sends 60-bytes of encoded ciphertext within each DNS request. The fourth-level subdomain contains the 60-bytes of encoded ciphertext that RDAT sends to the C2, while the third- and second-level subdomains are the same as the beacon. In the above example, the AES key and IV would be tJ8ztJ8ztJ8ztJ8z, which would decrypt the third-level subdomain to the following cleartext	['T1573.001', 'T1001']
+For each folder discovered, it will enter it and search for more subfolders and files. The first step is to check the name of the folder/file found against a hardcoded list of hashes with the same algorithm used to detect the processes to close	['T1083']
+read By Josh Grunzweig and Jen Miller-Osborn . November 10, 2017 at 1:00 PM . Category: Unit 42 . Tags: Reaver, SunOrcal . Summary Unit 42 has discovered a new malware family we’ve named “Reaver” with ties to attackers who use SunOrcal malware. Reaver is also somewhat unique in the fact that its final payload is in the form of a Control panel item, or CPL file. While we don’t have information on the intended targets in this case, previous reports on this activity have identified targeting primarily among the “Five Poisons” which are movements the Chinese government perceives as dangerous. Reaver Malware Analysis To date, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified 10 unique samples and three distinct variants of a new malware family we have named “Reaver”. As such, we identify each variant as Reaver.v1, Reaver.v2, and Reaver.v3. The flow for Reaver is as shown: Figure 1 Reaver execution flow diagram . Reaver.v1 The earliest variant of Reaver begins by attempting to enable the SeDebugPrivilege privilege for the running process. A shortcut file is generated in the following path: - %TEMP%\~Update.lnk This ‘~Update.lnk’ file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows help.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified. It will specifically load this CPL file via a call to the built-in Microsoft Windows ‘control.exe’ utility. Data that is sent is compressed and then base64-encoded before being included in the requests. The following example Python code shows how this encryption takes place: After this data is exfiltrated, the malware expects 8 bytes of data that contains two DWORDs. AutoFocus customers can monitor activity using this malware with the following tags: Reaver SunOrcal - Reaver - SunOrcal Get updates from Palo Alto Networks	['T1082']
+To compromise targeted networks, GALLIUM target unpatched internet-facing services using publicly available exploits and have been known to target vulnerabilities in WildFly/JBoss. Once persistence is established in a network, GALLIUM uses common techniques and tools like Mimikatz to obtain credentials that allows for lateral movement across the target network. Within compromised networks, GALLIUM makes no attempt to obfuscate their intent and are known to use common versions of malware and publicly available toolkits with small modifications. The operators rely on low cost and easy to replace infrastructure that consists of dynamic-DNS domains and regularly reused hop points	['T1003.001']
+"The oldest version of Bisonal we identified was compiled on Dec. The attacker created a Windows library (.dll) designed as a Windows service (ServiceMain() entry point). When executed, the malware uses the Windows API to communicate with the Service Control Manager (SCM) and finally execute a thread. The C2 server of this first Bisonal variant is young03[.]myfw[.]us (port 8888). We can notice the usage of a dynamic DNS service. This is a Bisonal pattern. Even the newest version we identified used this kind of service. In this campaign, the rollback was not used as it is configured to localhost. The communication to the C2 server is performed by using raw sockets: The first action of the malware is to send the hostname of the infected system and the ""kris0315"" string"	['T1568', 'T1106']
+The communication between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server consists of JSON data exchanged via HTTP POST requests. The backdoor initiates requests to the C2 server and the C2 server may include commands to execute in the responses. The JSON data exchanged between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server contains three fields: ID, UUID, and Data	['T1041', 'T1071.001']
+As far as SPEAR could tell, all scripts were designed to be executed using Python v2.7. The group relied heavily on TLS-encrypted FTP using Python’s native ftplib library to transfer data out of target environments. The samples would also test connectivity to the C2 via HTTP requests using Python’s urllib library	['T1059.006']
+In this particular attack, we discovered that the C&C server of EmailStealer had an open directory, allowing us to view the information that EmailStealer stole. We presume the information, primarily comprised of lists of email addresses, will be used in future attacks	['T1087.003']
+In both variations, the install.bat batch file was used to install persistence for a trial-version of Cobalt Strike BEACON loader named storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f	['T1569.002', 'T1059.003']
+The multi-stage infection chain downloads a payload that wipes the MBR, then downloads a malicious DLL file hosted on a Discord server, which drops and executes another wiper payload that destroys files on the infected machines	['T1102']
+For initial compromise, FireEye Intelligence has observed APT39 leverage spear phishing emails with malicious attachments and/or hyperlinks typically resulting in a POWBAT infection. APT39 frequently registers and leverages domains that masquerade as legitimate web services and organizations that are relevant to the intended target	['T1566.002', 'T1505.003', 'T1566.001', 'T1078']
+"Cisco Talos has discovered a new malware campaign based on a previously unknown family we're calling ""PoetRAT. The droppers are Microsoft Word documents that deploy a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT). We named this malware PoetRAT due to the various references to William Shakespeare, an English poet and playwright. The RAT has all the standard features of this kind of malware, providing full control of the compromised system to the operation. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. The campaign shows us that the operators manually pushed additional tools when they needed them on the compromised systems. We will describe a couple of these tools. The most interesting is a tool used to monitor the hard disk and exfiltrate data automatically. In addition to the malware campaigns, the attacker performed phishing a campaign on the same infrastructure"	['T1125']
+an identifier unique for each victim (generated via CoCreateGuid API) - executable name and path - geolocation of the victim (retrieved via http://ipinfo.io/json) - strings necessary for creating and deleting the startup .LNK file - notes specific to the victim device (the C&C operator supplies these, if any, via a backdoor command) - flags to indicate an action has already been performed, such as stealing Google Chrome stored credentials stealing Outlook data - stealing Google Chrome stored credentials - stealing Outlook data	['T1555.003']
+In order to execute the payload, the attackers take advantage of a technique called DLL Search Order Hijacking. Once the malicious DLL is loaded, it will decrypt a part of its own code using a XOR loop (see Figure 4), patch the entry point of the legitimate executable and jump again, back to the malicious DLL (see Figure 5	['T1574.001']
+MCMD communicates to a HTTPS URL serving a PHP-based C2 panel hosted on likely compromised web servers	['T1071.001']
+Egregor masquerades svchost.exe process to launch an RClone client in order to exfiltrate data. Based on investigations and OSINT, we know that Egregor used at least three different configurations to exfiltrate data	['T1036.004']
+BRONZE BUTLER has used a broad range of publicly available (Mimikatz and gsecdump) and proprietary (Daserf and Datper) tools. It appears to have been sufficiently resourced to continuously develop and replace its proprietary tools over a long period of time. The threat actors developed remote access tools and malware that generate and use encrypted C2 communication, presumably to complicate detection and mitigation	['T1003.001']
+"The spreadsheet also creates a scheduled task named ""windows update check"" that runs the file C:\Users\<user_name>\.templates\System Manager.exe every minute. Figure 3 provides a snippet of VBA code that creates the scheduled task, clearly obfuscated to avoid simple detection"	['T1053.005']
+The delivery of the malware to the final victim is either though an email or a Web based vector	['T1189']
+DSInternals is a legitimate tool which can be used for querying Active Directory servers and retrieving data, typically passwords, keys, or password hashes	['T1036.005']
+HermeticWiper enumerates a range of Physical Drives multiple times, from 0-100. For each Physical Drive, the \\.\EPMNTDRV\ device is called for a device number	['T1082']
+Since the 2016 publication, Microsoft has come across an evolution of PLATINUM’s file-transfer tool, one that uses the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for communication. This channel works independently of the operating system (OS), rendering any communication over it invisible to firewall and network monitoring applications running on the host device	['T1095']
+To have some minimal form of obfuscation from prying eyes, the strings in the backdoor are compressed and encoded in Base64, or their hashes are used instead	['T1027']
+The BLUELIGHT malware family uses different cloud providers to facilitate C2. This specific sample leveraged the Microsoft Graph API for its C2 operations. Upon start-up, BLUELIGHT performs an oauth2 token authentication using hard-coded parameters. Once the client is authenticated, BLUELIGHT creates a new subdirectory in the OneDrive appfolder and populates it with several subdirectories used by the C2 protocol. The following subdirectory names were used	['T1102.002', 'T1071.001']
+The actors used valid credentials obtained using MimiKatz variants to escalate privileges. We’ve observed Mimikatz being executed both from the file system of victim hosts and via PowerShell cmdlets executed via Cobalt Strike BEACON. In multiple instances, the actors have launched attacks against Kerberos, including the use of RUBEUS, the MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet	['T1558.003']
+After the files are encrypted, the decrypter program attempts to delete any Windows Shadow Copies via this command	['T1570']
+If the user account doesn’t have local administrative or domain administrative permissions, the adversary attempts to discover which local or domain admin accounts exist, and exfiltrates the admin’s usernames. To identify if privileged users are active on remote servers, the adversary makes use of PsLogList from Microsoft Sysinternals to retrieve the Security event logs. The built-in Windows quser-command to show logged on users is also heavily used by them	['T1069.001']
+The email contains a web link for a Microsoft Word document. The Word document has macro code that retrieves a Windows executable for GuLoader. The executable retrieves an encrypted data file used for NetWire	['T1204.002']
+What is even more disturbing is that it can remotely activate the victim’s webcam and microphone and spy on the victim by taking pictures and recording sound. Screen activity can be monitored by capturing screenshots. What is particularly interesting about InvisiMole is that not only are the usual “whole display” screenshots taken – it can separately capture each window, which helps the attackers gain more information even when the windows are overlapped	['T1125']
+The 2018 variants of MCMD have the added ability to upload files from the infected device. The file is taken from the path shown in Table 2 but is uploaded with a filename comprised of the current value of the GetTickCount API call plus the .dat file extension. Figure 5 shows the format used during the file upload performed via HTTPS POST, with the file transmitted as raw binary data	['T1005']
+As seen in the screenshot above, data is passed into a decryption function before being used in a call to GetModuleHandleA. Before the hashing routine uses the module handle, the decrypted string representing the function name has its associated heap space freed and may be later overwritten. However, the reconstruction of this data is straightforward within the two core decryption algorithms we have observed. The first one relies on an encrypted blob whose first value is interpreted as the size of the decrypted data in DWORD (four-byte) chunks	['T1140']
+Because it can self-propagate, Emotet presents a particular challenge for organizations. Once on a computer, Emotet downloads and executes a spreader module that contains a password list that it uses to attempt to brute force access to other machines on the same network	['T1110.001']
+The outputs of the batch file included Active Directory users, computers, organizational units, subnets, groups, and trusts. With these outputs, FIN6 was able to identify user accounts that could access additional hosts in the domain. For lateral movement, FIN6 used another set of compromised credentials with membership to additional groups in the domain to RDP to other hosts	['T1482']
+The “AdapterTroubleshooter.exe” file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order hijacking technique. Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process	['T1574.001']
+Upon infection the malware copies itself to %appdata%\microsoft\microsoft [0-9]{9-15}\dwm.exe (9-15 digits in directory name “Microsoft”), and adds a link to the malware executable in the startup folder for persistence	['T1547.001']
+Cobalt Strike appears to be one of BRONZE PRESIDENT's preferred remote access tools. During one intrusion, the threat actors installed it on over 70% of accessible hosts. The group's Cobalt Strike installation typically uses a payload named svchost.exe in an attempt to disguise Cobalt Strike activity as the legitimate Windows svchost.exe executable. Its functionality includes uploading and downloading files, and it has configurable network protocols. The tool uses the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event consumer for persistence by installing a script to the system's WMI registry. RCSession — This basic RAT is installed via DLL side-loading, and CTU researchers observed BRONZE PRESIDENT installing it on multiple hosts during intrusions. RCSession was extracted from a file called English.rtf and launched via a hollowed svchost.exe process. CTU researchers have no evidence of other threat actors using RCSession or of wide proliferation of the tool, suggesting it may be exclusively used by BRONZE PRESIDENT. Nbtscan being used via RCSession to scan an internal IP range. Wmiexec — This publicly available tool uses WMI to create SYSTEM-level shells on remote hosts	['T1036']
+SDBbot stores its C&Cs in a plaintext string or file (“ip.txt”). It uses a plaintext protocol over TCP port 443; an example session is shown in Figure 14	['T1095']
+After the additional modules are hidden, the malware will launch itself by using DLL Search Order Hijacking	['T1574.001']
+Since version 0.1.6 Returns endpoints for the given protocol for the given email address. If the email address is invalid (i.e. the user does not exists) this takes ages	['T1589.002']
+SUNBURST's behavior is affected by the presence of malware analysis and security software. To disguise the strings used to detect these security tools, UNC2452 calculated and embedded a hash value for each string. The list of hashes and their corresponding strings can be viewed at this FireEye GitHub page	['T1562.001']
+When executed, it pings google DNS (8.8.8.8) to test internet connectivity, then proceeds to drop a VNC client and establishes a connection to a remote C&C server controlled by the attackers	['T1016.001']
+Trojan.Killdisk comes in the form of an executable file, which is signed by a certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd. The driver files are signed by a certificate issued to EaseUS Partition Master	['T1553.002']
+Pay2Key generates a pair of RSA keys and sends the public key to the server over raw TCP. The keys will be used to set up secure communication between the ransomware and the server. After sending the key, the ransomware will wait for messages from the server	['T1095']
+In November 2018, we covered a Trickbot variant that came with a password-grabbing module, which allowed it to steal credentials from numerous applications. In January 2019, we saw Trickbot (detected as TrojanSpy.Win32.TRICKBOT.AZ and Trojan.Win32.MERETAM.AD) with new capabilities added to its already extensive bag of tricks. Its authors clearly aren't done updating Trickbot — we recently found a new variant that uses an updated version of the pwgrab module that lets it grab remote application credentials	['T1552.001']
+The adversary started a password spraying attack against those domain admin accounts, and successfully got a valid domain admin account this way. We observed the use of Mimikatz on this system and saw the hashes of the logged in domain admin account going through the command and control channel of the adversary. The adversary used a tool called NtdsAudit to dump the password hashes of domain users as well as we observed the following command	['T1550.002']
+GRIM SPIDER also has been observed selecting a server to be the primary staging point. Subsequently, the adversary copies the Microsoft SysInternals PSTools archive to this system, and executes PsExec.exe, a utility that allows them to move laterally and execute commands on other Windows systems within the infrastructure. Using this common administrator tool, GRIM SPIDER can traverse the network, remotely installing TrickBot and adding persistence to new targets. TrickBot also has the shareDll module for propagating to other hosts using the current, active user credentials	['T1053.005', 'T1059.001']
+Once on the intended target’s network, the threat actors used privileged credentials to access the victim’s domain controller typically via RDP. Once on the domain controller, the threat actors used the batch scripts “dc.bat” and “dit.bat” to enumerate hosts, users, and additional information about the environment. The observed outputs (text documents) from these scripts were	['T1069.002', 'T1016', 'T1087.002']
+To fully exploit a target environment, IRON TWILIGHT used the XAgent (also known as Chopstick) modular remote access trojan (RAT) and the XTunnel persistent backchannel tool. XAgent can jump air-gapped networks by infecting USB storage devices and can be used against Windows and Unix-based operating systems. XAgent variants such as Komplex provide RAT functionality on the Mac OS X operating system, and the threat group maintains variants that operate on Apple iOS and the Google Android mobile operating systems. XTunnel provides IRON TWILIGHT with secure access to a compromised environment though a back connection created by the malware to a command and control (C2) server	['T1091']
+"The backdoor installer will drop a normal sidebar.exe file (a Windows Gadget tool, a feature already discontinued by Windows), a malicious loader (in ""C:\ProgramData\Apple\Update\wab32res.dll""), and an encrypted configuration file. UserInstall.exe will abuse the BITSadmin command-line tool to create a job and launch sidebar.exe"	['T1197']
+If the message starts with a K, it executes a kubectl command to the cluster using the paths it found earlier by running the command %ls %s --kubeconfig=%ls where: The first parameter is the global variable of the kubectl’s path. The first parameter is the global variable of the kubectl’s path. If the message starts with a C, it simply runs the command minus the first character as a regular Windows cmd command	['T1609']
+It uses masscan to search for kubelets in Kubernetes’ internal network. It uses kubelet’s API to search for running containers in a particular node	['T1046', 'T1046', 'T1613']
+The dropper then creates following registry entry to execute the Bisonal sample when the computer reboots: HKEY_CURRENT_USER \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\”vert” = “rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\pvcu.dll , Qszdez	['T1218.011']
+Basically, the bot provides the attacker with an ability to control an infected PC using a remote shell, RDP or VNC console. It provides remote task and file managers, streams the desktop to the attacker, allows using a web camera, and more	['T1021.001']
+In addition to the previously described trick EvilBunny performs hook detection to trick environments which hook time retrieval APIs. Every API is called twice to calculate a delta, while performing a sleep(1000) operation between iteration one and iteration two. The final condition is, if any of the three deltas is below 998 milliseconds execution will abort. This can only be the case if any of the three API’s return values is modified by a system monitoring solution, like a sandbox	['T1497.003']
+The C2 server will respond to requests from MobileOrder with commands that the Trojan refers to as “orders”. MobileOrder contains a command handler with functionality that provides a fairly robust set of commands, as seen in Table 6. The first byte of data provided by the C2 server is order number, which is followed by the encrypted data that needed to carry out the specific order	['T1041']
+This is a common trait in ThreatNeedle loaders. The most common example we’ve seen is similar to the ThreatNeedle installer – the malware decrypts an embedded string using RC4, and compares it with the parameter “Sx6BrUk4v4rqBFBV” upon launch. If it matches, the malware begins decrypting its embedded payload using the same RC4 key. The decrypted payload is an archive file which is subsequently decompressed in the process. Eventually, the ThreatNeedle malware spawns in memory	['T1140']
+Interestingly the malware appears to first checks to make sure the received command is for the actual host - via a call to a function named check_if_targeted. This function extracts values received from the server checking that	['T1622']
+"These malicious documents used by Konni APT have been weaponized with the same simple but clever macro. It just uses a Shell function to execute a one-liner cmd command. This one liner command gets the current active document as input and looks for the ""^var"" string using findstr and then writes the content of the line staring from “var” into y.js"	['T1057']
+The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM	['T1569.002']
+Despite the notion that modern cybersecurity protocols have stopped email-based attacks, email continues to be one of the primary attack vectors for malicious actors — both for widespread and targeted operations. Recently, Cisco Talos has observed numerous email-based attacks that are spreading malware to users at both a large and small scale. In this blog post, we analyze several of those campaigns and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These campaigns were all observed between mid-May and early July of this year, and can likely be attributed to one, or possibly two, groups. Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. The attacks we will be highlighting generally start with an email campaign, often targeted toward financial institutions. The malicious emails display a strong command of the English language, and their content may have been taken from legitimate emails relevant to the business of the targeted organization. The emails either contain a URL pointing to one of the three document types or have initial attack stages attached outright. It is essential to be aware of these attacks as emails look legitimate, but can result in the installation of a payload that can inflict significant financial damage to the targeted organization	['T1566.002', 'T1566.001']
+Before evidence of BlackEnergy2 use in targeted attacks was uncovered, we tracked strange activity on one of the BlackEnergy CnC servers in 2013. This strangeness was related to values listed in newer BlackEnergy configuration files. As described in Dmitry’s 2010 Black DDoS’ analysis, a configuration file is downloaded from the server by main.dll on an infected system. The config file provides download instructions for the loader. It also instructs the loader to pass certain commands to the plugins. In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the usual ‘ddos’ plugin listing. Displayed below are these new, xml formatted plugin names “weap_hwi”, “ps”, and “vsnet” in a BlackEnergy configuration file download from a c2 server. This new module push must have been among the first for this group, because all of the module versions were listed as “version 1”, including the ddos plugin	['T1083']
+When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs. The spear-phishing emails used a generic contract agreement theme (with the subject line “AGREEMENT & Confidential”) and contained a generic PDF document titled ``document.pdf. Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name. The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code. The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password. Note: no code within the PDF initiated a download	['T1598.003']
+It uses a WMIC interface to identify antivirus products installed on the compromised computer and firewall details	['T1047', 'T1518.001']
+Global Targeting Using New Tools . Leveraging its global footprint, FireEye has detected APT10 activity across six continents in 2016 and 2017. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system’s default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. The malware’s capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. Traditional and Novel Methods . This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim’s networks through service providers. In addition to the spear phishes, FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence has observed APT10 accessing victims through global service providers. APT10 actors issued the following commands to a SOGU implant at a victim: These commands included setting persistence on the victim’s system. Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim’s SOGU backdoor	['T1018']
+9 COMRAT Features: - command execution; - file download; - file upload; - information gathering; - C&C communication via HTTP requests	['T1071.001']
+This extreme level of variance was also applied to non-executable entities, such as WMI persistence filter name, WMI filter query, passwords used for 7-zip archives, and names of output log files. Tools and binaries used by the attackers (e.g. ADFIND legit tool) were always renamed and placed in folders that mimicked existing programs and files already present on a machine. This blending was not just used for files, but for other elements. Before running intensive and continued hands-on keyboard activity, the attackers took care of disabling event logging using AUDITPOL and re-enabling it afterward. In a similar way, before running noisy network enumeration activities (such as repeated NSLOOKUP or LDAP queries), the attackers carefully prepared special firewall rules to minimize outgoing packets for certain protocols. The firewall rules were also methodically removed after the network reconnaissance was completed. We believe that the attackers used timestomping to change timestamps of artifacts and also leveraged professional wiping procedures and tools to complicate finding and recovering of DLL implants from affected environments	['T1482']
+We not only found the initial entry point, but we were able to follow Seedworm’s subsequent activity after the initial infection due to the vast telemetry Symantec has access to via its Global Intelligence Network	['T1560.001']
+Analyzing Kobalos isn’t as trivial as most Linux malware because all of its code is held in a single function that recursively calls itself to perform subtasks	['T1027']
+The CRYPTO Mimikatz module provides advanced capability to interface with Windows cryptographic functions (CryptoAPI). Typical use is to export certificates that aren’t marked as “exportable	['T1552.004']
+open_link for reading content from the command-and-control (C&C) server - down_exec for downloading and execute a file - shell to run a command line shell command - locker to run the ransomware routine - kill to terminate a process or itself	['T1059.003']
+The SodaMaster module also shows an anti-VM feature. The malware looks for the presence of the registry key “HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe” on the victim’s system before proceeding to its main functionality. This registry key is specific to the VMware environment	['T1012', 'T1497.001']
+One of the most interesting payloads in these attacks is the Anchor_DNS malware, which was originally discovered in October 2019 by NTT Security. It is classified by NTT as a variant of the infamous TrickBot malware, which uses DNS tunneling to stealthily communicate with C2 servers. Though this variant was first discovered in October 2019, there is evidence that Anchor_DNS was used as far back as March 2019	['T1071.001']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. CTU researchers identified two versions of Daserf written in Visual C and Delphi. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server	['T1132.001']
+After GOLD GARDEN's retirement announcement, REvil activity increased with expanded delivery methods such as malicious spam campaigns and RDP attacks. This surge suggests that the ransomware operators deemed it ready for public release. On June 20, REvil was leveraged in a strategic web compromise (SWC) against the Italian WinRAR . it website, replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware to infect customers' systems	['T1195.002']
+"The data is XOR encoded into a binary blob and uploaded. All further reconnaissance and command response data is similarly encoded. This version of the implant used the "".jpg"" extension for nearly all files uploaded regardless of their content, with different subdirectories and base filenames indicating different types of command data. The reconnaissance data, for instance, is uploaded to the ""logo/title.jpg"" path"	['T1560.003']
+PlugX executes DLL hijacking with benign applications such as ESET antivirus, Adobe Update etc. However, the way the PlugX loader launches the payload is different from how it was done for the previous versions. Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB	['T1052.001', 'T1091']
+The attackers also bundled a stripped down, 11 year old copy of the VirtualBox hypervisor inside the .msi file, which runs the VM as a “headless” device, with no user-facing interface. Weaponized virtual machine . The Maze attackers delivered the attack components for the third attack in the form of an .msi installer file. The root of that virtual disk contained three files associated with the Maze ransomware: preload.bat, vrun.exe, and a file just named payload (with no file extension), which is the actual Maze DLL payload. The attack payload was a 122 MB installer with a 282 MB virtual image inside—all to conceal a 49 kB ransomware executable. The Maze attackers took a slightly different approach, using a virtual Windows 7 machine instead of XP. The virtual machine (VM) that Sophos extracted from the Maze attack shows that this (newer) VM is configured in such a way that it allows easy insertion of another ransomware on the attacker’s ‘builder’ machine. But the cost in terms of size is signficant: The Ragnar Locker virtual disk was only a quarter the size of the nearly 2GB virtual disk used in the Maze attack—all just to conceal one 494 KB ransomware executable from detection. The attackers also executed the following commands on the host computer during the Maze attack: This ran the Microsoft Installer that installs VirtualBox and the virtual hard drive. The Maze threat actors have proven to be adept at adopting the techniques demonstrated to be successful by other ransomware gangs, including the use of extortion as a means to extract payment from victims. Peter has been with Sophos since 2011 and specialises in ransomware attacks	['T1218.007']
+It uses the arguments to build a path for a launch item (here, launch agent) property list (/Users/user/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.questd.plist), as well then configuring said plist	['T1059.002', 'T1543.001']
+To make it run automatically when the system starts, it adds itself (runs filename.vbs) to the system registry as a startup program	['T1547.001']
+The malware will establish persistence by adding an entry to the registry. For example, the NetWire malware value under the Microsoft Run registry “ruj” points to the NetWire payload in the AppData directory	['T1547.001']
+Transmits payloads in modified RC4-encrypted chunks. This hardens the encryption of the network communication, as a single RC4 key will not decrypt the entire payload. Clears the host’s DNS cache every time it attempts to connect to its C2 server, thereby requiring that the host resolve the current IP address for the malicious C2 domain each time. Generates unique session keys for each connection to the C2 server. Obscures its connection protocol by connecting to the C2 server over a common port (443), thereby blending in with normal SSL network traffic. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools	['T1573.001']
+A command that was not available in the original PowerShell variant of RogueRobin but is available with the new C# variant is the x_mode. This command is particularly interesting as it enables an alternative command and control channel that uses the Google Drive API. The x_mode command is disabled by default, but when enabled via a command received from the DNS tunneling channel, it allows RogueRobin to receive a unique identifier and to get jobs by using Google Drive API requests	['T1102.002']
+In addition, OceanLotus is also known to use ‘watering hole attacks’, which involve the compromise of a website that the victim is likely to visit. In this scenario, the ‘prey’ is tricked into downloading and executing a fake installer or fake update for popular software from the booby-trapped website. Whatever the method of compromise, ultimately the same backdoor is deployed	['T1189']
+Some plugins remain mysterious and their purpose is not yet clear, like ‘usb’ and ‘bios’. Why would the attackers need information on usb and bios characteristics. It suggests that based on a specific USB and BIOS devices, the attackers may upload specific plugins to carry out additional actions. Perhaps destructive, perhaps to further infect devices	['T1120']
+After the code is successfully injected into one of the above processes, the loader uses several methods to autorun from the victim's machine	['T1055.012', 'T1055.013']
+EarthWorm, a simple network tunnel with SOCKS v5 server and port transfer functionalities - Mimikatz, and various versions including SafetyKatz - Nbtscan, a command line NetBIOS scanner for Windows - NetCat, a networking utility that reads and writes data across network connections - PortQry, a tool to display the status of TCP and UDP ports on remote systems - SMBTouch, used to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue - Various tools from the ShadowBrokers dump of NSA tools including, but not limited to: DoublePulsar EternalBlue EternalRocks EternalSynergy - DoublePulsar - EternalBlue - EternalRocks - EternalSynergy	['T1046', 'T1095', 'T1049']
+TSCookie supports multiple communication protocols (HTTP, HTTPS and custom protocol). The protocol that each sample uses is described in its configuration. If it is configured to use HTTP protocol, the following HTTP POST request is sent	['T1071.001']
+To hide malicious functionality – persistence and C&C communication – from static detections, the malware uses a common obfuscation technique known as “stackstrings” to build wide char strings	['T1027']
+"There is a normal usage of the Windows registry to provide a method of persistence for this RAT by adding in a registry key in the RUN hive which will execute the Python script ""launcher.py. During our investigation, we witnessed several registry modifications that resulted in the malware skipping the sandbox evasion checks and carrying out the execution by using a ""police"" keyword. This could be used for hosts already infected to ensure they do not re-check this environment. Start routine The communication between the scripts is done via a file called ""Abibliophobia23"" Commands and results are written into the file using a custom encryption scheme. Obfuscation algorithm It uses a char substitution cipher where the new char code is obtained after performing mathematical operations on the char code to be encrypted using the key parameters"	['T1027']
+After the malware sends system information, the C&C server responds with a command DWORD. Depending on the command, the C&C server then sends additional arguments. Some of the commands (mostly the shell and video related ones) make use of 48-byte data structures to store various data. There are other commands which create, delete, and query the status of these data structures, so it is defined in Figure 15	['T1059.003']
+"The malware performs connection to the C2 server by using InternetOpenA() with an hardcoded User-Agent: ""Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322"". Note the missing parenthesis at the end of the User-Agent. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011"	['T1204.002']
+1) Adds a registry entry in the current user’s RUN key (HKCU) for later execution when the user next logs in. The registry keys and executables may vary from one version of the malware to another	['T1547.001', 'T1218.011']
+The batch file kill.bat contains commands for stopping services, disabling services and killing processes. The processes and services are stopped to ensure no open handles exist for files that will be encrypted	['T1489']
+bk” allows the reverse SSH tunnel to be set up using a C&C specified remote host instead of the hardcoded C&C server	['T1573.002']
+The install.bat script then goes on to enumerate all local disks, connected removable drives and mapped network drives on the physical machine, so they can be configured to be accessed from within the virtual machine	['T1120']
+The payload also employs anti-debugging and evasion techniques by using windows APIs to make the research and detection of the malware difficult, as depicted below	['T1106']
+The file that we analyzed has a timestamp of “2021-12-28”. This wiper-ware got its name because the attackers used a code-signing certificate issued to “Hermetica Digital Ltd. This traces back to a small videogame design business based in Cyprus with no links to Russia that claims it never applied for a digital certificate, pointing to possible identity theft. Operating systems use code-signing as an initial check on software, so it may have been designed to help the rogue program dodge anti-virus protections	['T1553.002']
+After displaying the error dialog box, the Trojan will sleep for two seconds by running the following command that runs the choice application. The use of the choice command, as seen below, did not appear in previous versions of OopsIE and appears to have been added in the most recent version used in this attack. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. The Trojan accesses two resources, named Sch and VBS that contains obfuscated strings that contain the command to create the scheduled task and the VBScript to run. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. The %path% string in the scheduled task command will be replaced with the path to the following: %APPDATA%\Windows\ShwDoc.VBS The decoded string from the VBS resource is written to ShwDoc.VBS. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2	['T1053.005']
+We observed the use of Cobalt Strike’s C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018. They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019. An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike. This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike’s trial version are limited. More importantly: the trial version doesn’t support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn’t encrypted, such as DNS. In one intrusion we investigated, the victim had years of logging available of outgoing DNS-requests. The DNS-responses weren’t logged. This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim’s network was logged. We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format. As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity	['T1572']
+One other interesting aspect of the injector is its ability to load an assembly into an unmanaged process. This is accomplished with a native bootstrapper DLL, which gets injected into the remote process and prepares it so a .NET assembly can be injected afterwards	['T1055.001']
+The strain of PIVY in this attack used a DLL side-loading technique to stealthily load itself into memory	['T1574.002']
+NavRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to upload, download and execute files. The malware's author logs every action to a file (encoded). It's not often we are able to use the attacker's own logging capability to facilitate analysis, which can make our research easier. NavRAT starts by copying itself (~emp.exe) to the %ProgramData%\Ahnlab\GoogleUpdate.exe path. NavRAT then creates a registry key in order to execute this file copy at the next reboot of the system, an initial method of persistence. The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files. NavRAT has support for process injection. By using this method, it will copy itself into a running Internet Explorer process in order to avoid detection by running as an independent process. The malware uses the Naver email platform in order to communicate with the operators	['T1547.001']
+"This sample has a custom ""decryption"" routine that subtracts six from each character. The following strings are decrypted using this method"	['T1140']
+The tools uploaded to the webshells range from legitimate applications such as cURL to post-exploitation tools such as Mimikatz	['T1210']
+The first spam run on August 31 used a Rich Text Format (RTF) document laden with malicious macros. The second, which ran from September 20 to 21, used an exploit for CVE-2017-8759 (patched last September), a code injection/remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft’s .NET Framework. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster	['T1059.003']
+Even though the victims required MFA to access cloud resources from all locations, including on premises, the threat actor managed to bypass MFA through the theft of Chrome browser cookies. The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data protection API (DPAPI) data. In Windows, Chrome cookies and saved passwords are encrypted using DPAPI	['T1550.004', 'T1539']
+This routine won’t always be observed, however, as it would only be performed randomly. kaudited — A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. To ensure that the infected machine won’t crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions. The kaudited binary also drops a watchdog component that will monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process	['T1083']
+The OilRig group remains highly active in their attack campaigns while they continue to evolve their toolset. On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time	['T1059.003']
+Once executed, the loader uses a timer in order to delay the execution. This is likely used as an anti-sandbox method. After the delayed time has passed, the loader starts executing its core functionality	['T1497.003']
+We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. Expiry: SessionType: HTTPMarketo2Learn more about this provider__cf_bmThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: 2 yearsType: HTTP25 Marketing cookies are used to track visitors across websites. This can be used for marketing purposes. Expiry: 3 monthsType: HTTPMarketo1Learn more about this provider_mkto_trkContains data on visitor behaviour and website interaction. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email	['T1016']
+An individual who goes by the name LZX in some online forums is believed to be the original author of ZxShell. Since ZxShell has been around since at least 2004, numerous people have purchased or obtained the tools necessary to set up ZxShell command and control servers (C&C) and generate the malware that is placed on the victim’s network. ZxShell has been observed to be distributed through phishing attacks, dropped by exploits that leverage vulnerabilities such as CVE-2011-2462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322	['T1190']
+This archive contains two files, one a benign document and one an executable. The operator tries to fool the victim by naming the executable with an apparent document or image file name by incorporating the “double extension” trick.. This new campaign, depicted as Case 3 in Figure 1, uses a more involved procedure. One of the early checks made by the malware is for the existence of a specific path used to drop every file used during its execution. It starts the executable — audev.exe and checks in the list of processes to see if one of them contains the string audev. Delphi mail downloader . The main role of this downloader is to assess the importance of the compromised system and, if it is deemed important enough, to download and execute Zebrocy’s last downloader. Emails and passwords are used by the operator to send commands to the malware and also to retrieve information harvested from the victim’s computer. Capabilities . While there are some conditions and order in the execution flow to collect information about the victim, the following section describes different gathering capabilities. For each file found on the disk, it retrieves the full path and the last modified date of the file. The Subject: of the mail is the id of the victim and the file is sent as an attachment with a keyword corresponding to the file content. For example, for a scan command, the operator receives a file that contains the list of files matching the scan extensions along with each matching file	['T1083']
+In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. This backdoor is well-known in the security community as ANEL, and it used to come in beta or RC (release candidate) until recently. Part of this blog post will discuss the updates and differences we have observed across multiple versions of this backdoor	['T1566.001']
+Reaver encrypts this data using an incremental XOR key and uploads it to the configured remote server on the port specified	['T1560.003']
+This Korean-language file used the control server IP address 203.131.222.83. The implant is nearly identical to an unknown 2017 sample (8f2918c721511536d8c72144eabaf685ddc21a35) except that the control server addresses are different. The 2017 sample used address 14.140.116.172. Both implants specifically use FakeTLS with PolarSSL, which we saw in previous Hidden Cobra implants. PolarSSL libraries have appeared in implants since the Sony Pictures incident and were used exclusively in the implant Backdoor.Destover. This implant incorporated a custom control server protocol that sends traffic over port 443. The implementation does not format the packets in standard SSL, but rather in a custom format and transmitted over SSL—hence, FakeTLS. The control server traffic when compared to Backdoor.Escad is nearly identical	['T1001.003']
+CTU researchers have discovered numerous details about TG-3390 operations, including how the adversaries explore a network, move laterally, and exfiltrate data. As shown in Figure 11, after compromising an initial victim's system (patient 0), the threat actors use the Baidu search engine to search for the victim's organization name. If the OwaAuth web shell is ineffective because the victim uses two-factor authentication for webmail, the adversaries identify other externally accessible servers and deploy ChinaChopper web shells. Within six hours of entering the environment, the threat actors compromised multiple systems and stole credentials for the entire domain	['T1078']
+The DLL’s used were side-loaded in memory on compromised systems. After placing the DLL in the appropriate directory, the actor would change the date and time stamps on the DLL files to blend in with the other legitimate files in the directory	['T1574.002']
+"whoami & hostname & ipconfig /all & net user /domain 2>&1 & net group /domain 2>&1 & net group ""domain admins"" /domain 2>&1 & net group ""Exchange Trusted Subsystem"" /domain 2>&1 & net accounts /domain 2>&1 & net user 2>&1 & net localgroup administrators 2>&1 & netstat -an 2>&1 & tasklist 2>&1 & sc query 2>&1 & systeminfo 2>&1 & reg query ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"" 2>&1"	['T1087.002', 'T1087.001', 'T1069.002']
+The module also collects the physical address (MAC) and the IP address of the infected machine	['T1016']
+EntryPoint is the main export function of this dll. It starts its activities by resolving API calls. All the API call names are hard coded and the actor has not used any obfuscation techniques to hide them	['T1106']
+Word documents will first be collected and stored in a preliminary collection directory. The location of this directory may vary depending on the Ramsay version. Two of the directories we observed being used for this purpose were %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache	['T1119']
+The document attempts to execute code on the recipient’s computer, using a macro. The macro passes a Base64-encoded command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One PowerShell Command	['T1012', 'T1059', 'T1059.001']
+The decrypted JavaScript has some similar functionality to the ThreadKit builder which is heavily used by the Cobalt Gang 1.0	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+The configuration, along with downloaded plugins and all harvested data are stored in a custom database format inside a single file under the %TEMP% directory. The storage file is encrypted with AES-256 using a hardcoded key and is decrypted each time the malware needs to read or write it and re-encrypted after new data is added	['T1074.001']
+In this case, the usage of 1550 calls to printf is intended to overload sandbox analysis with junk data and delay execution, since it logs API calls	['T1497']
+The first stage starts, as in many other infection chains, with a malicious Microsoft Word document delivered inside a ZIP file. Once the document is opened, malicious macros are downloaded using the external template feature. The macros’ code in turn drops and executes the second stage of the attack, a PowerShell script encrypted inside the original Word document. Finally, the PowerShell script downloads and executes the last stage of the infection: the Bandook backdoor	['T1566.001']
+"We can notice that the developers wanted to hide some API usage. They use the LoadLibrary() API followed by GetProcAdress(). But they obfuscated the function name strings by splitting it in two. After the malware replaces the ""m"" by ""n:"" They use this trick for a couple of other API such as CreateThread(), CreatePipe(), PeekNamedPipe(), CreateProcessA(), CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(), ReadFile(), WriteFile() and, finally, the string ""cmd.exe. The attacker also implemented a new order: execution of a command by using named pipe to get the output of the executed command. The attackers execute cmd.exe, followed by the command to be executed. An interesting point is the adding of a charset on each executed command: This charset is designed to cover languages that use Cyrillic script such as Russian, Bulgarian and Serbian. sha256 : bb61cc261508d36d97d589d8eb48aaba10f5707d223ab5d5e34d98947c2f72af C2 server: kissyou01[.]myfw[.]us"	['T1059.003']
+Android.The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration	['T1102.002']
+It extracts and decrypts the stage 3 malware, which is stored in encrypted resources such as fake dialog boxes. The extraction method is the same, but the encryption algorithm (also XOR) is much simpler. The new payload is decrypted, remapped, and executed in memory, and represents the installation and persistence stage of the malware	['T1140']
+The Bazar loader will create another autorun entry by writing an adobe.lnk shortcut in the Windows Start menu Startup folder	['T1547.009']
+The Warzone payload is saved to the %ProgramData% folder as update.exe (SHA-256: 4500851dad1ac87165fc938fe5034983c10423f800bbc2661741f39e43ab8c8d) as shown in the above figure. In order to maintain persistence, an LNK file named update.lnk pointing to update.exe is dropped to startup folders - “%AppData%Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup	['T1547.001']
+Version 3 of Imminent Monitor introduced the ability to run a cryptocurrency miner on the victim machine – hardly the feature of a legitimate remote access tool (Figure 7	['T1496']
+Like the previous variants of EVILNUM, the actor set up accounts on GitLab and Digital Point, a web forum. The four primary URLs used as drop sites for one-way communications were	['T1102.003']
+NICKEL successfully compromises networks using attacks on internet-facing web applications running on unpatched Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint. They also attack remote access infrastructure, such as unpatched VPN appliances, as referenced in the FireEye April 2021 blog detailing a 0-day vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN that has since been patched	['T1190']
+Windbg, Autoruns, Wireshark) - It checks that there are no drivers loaded from security-related software (e.g. groundling32.sys) - It checks that the status of certain services belonging to security-related software meets certain conditions (e.g. windefend, sense, cavp) - It checks that the host “api.solarwinds.com” resolves to an expected IP address	['T1497.001']
+Recent attacks Symantec discovered the most recent wave of Tick attacks in July 2015, when the group compromised three different Japanese websites with a Flash (.swf) exploit to mount watering hole attacks. Visitors to these websites were infected with a downloader known as Gofarer (Downloader.Gofarer). Gofarer collects information about the compromised computer and then downloads and installs Daserf	['T1189']
+Apart from downloading and executing binaries from the control server, Gold Dragon generates a key to encrypt data that the implant obtains from the system. This URL is not used for control; the encrypted data is sent to the server ink.inkboom.co.kr, which was used by previous implants as early as May 2017	['T1560']
+BackdoorDiplomacy targeted servers with internet-exposed ports, likely exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities or poorly enforced file-upload security. In one specific instance, we observed the operators exploit an F5 BIP-IP vulnerability (CVE-2020-5902) to drop a Linux backdoor. In another, a Microsoft Exchange server was exploited via a PowerShell dropper that installed China Chopper, a well-known webshell in use, by various groups, since 2013. In a third, we observed a Plesk server with poorly configured file-upload security execute another webshell similar to China Chopper. See Figure 2 for an overview of the exploit chain	['T1190']
+Some versions of the Orz backdoor have 32- and 64-bit embedded DLLs, stored internally as base64 strings. These are used as loaders for future executable payloads, using the well-known process hollowing technique	['T1027']
+The KillDisk encryption system is also very robust, encrypting each file with its own AES key, and then encrypting the AES key with a public RSA-1028 key	['T1486']
+hooking the LdrLoadDll and LoadLibrary(Ex) APIs to prevent loading DLLs belonging to those products - checking if any of those modules are already loaded - trying to kill their running processes (based on process names) - blocking Diebold Warsaw on the firewall level - trying to break Trusteer by changing its file system path (see Figure 11) - changing ACLs on main Trusteer binary by running this command twice: cacls %PROGRAM_DATA%; Trusteer\Rapport\store\exts\RapportCerberus\baseline\RapportGH.dll” /T /E /C /P user:perm with user:perm set to Todos:N and then Everyone:N - - with user:perm set to Todos:N and then Everyone:N	['T1562.001']
+Since version 0.1.8 This function resets Azure AD Connect credentials to Azure AD and stores it to Azure AD Connect configuration database	['T1552.001']
+It uses Windows Crypto APIs to generate an MD5 hash using UUID1 (from Part 1). Before the hash is calculated, the length of the UUID is extended to 0x48 bytes by padding with null bytes	['T1027.001']
+When executing from any other context, it will steal information to send back to command and control servers, disable recovery options, and deletes shadow copies	['T1490']
+Starting on January 20, 2020, APT41 used the IP address 66.42.98[.]220 to attempt exploits of Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway devices with CVE-2019-19781 (published December 17, 2019	['T1190']
+The group has several ongoing operations, utilizing multiple exploits — two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer	['T1203']
+The backdoor exploited a vulnerability called “DLL hijacking” in order to “hide” the malware inside trusted software. This technique exploits a security vulnerability found in legitimate software, which allows the attackers to load a fake DLL and execute its malicious code	['T1574.002', 'T1574.002']
+The pipe is used to communicate with the target process and the transport module; the running code also reads its own image body and writes it to the pipe. It finds the running process that matches the target name, copies the buffer containing the payload into the process, then starts its copy in the target process	['T1055']
+As mentioned, the registry key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM) is where the malicious payload is stored. In this case, this is the Pillowmint Trojan. Pillowmint is stored and compressed in the registry key. In order to decompress and launch it, small shellcode is executed to decompress and allocate it into the parent process memory space. Execution is then transferred to the payload	['T1112']
+Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the Total SMB BruteForcer hacktool used by Leafminer for lateral movement. The tool requires input files with lists of IPs, users, and passwords respectively	['T1110.003']
+Using WMI to check BIOS version (SMBIOSBIOSVERSION) for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox and vm. Using WMI to check the BIOS manufacturer for XEN. Using WMI to check if the total physical memory is less than 2900000000. Using WMI to check if the number of CPU cores is less than or equal to 1	['T1082']
+The Disttrack dropper is responsible for installing the wiper component of this Trojan, however, it will only activate this component if the system time is greater than a preset date	['T1124']
+The cyber offensive programs attributed to these groups, targeting organizations around the world, have been documented for years	['T1106', 'T1573.001']
+Once loaded, `DWrite.dll` connects to a hard-coded IP and port from which it retrieves a decryption key and initialization vector (IV) to decrypt two embedded payload DLLs. To accomplish this task, the malware first generates a random file name to be used as a text log under the current user's %TEMP% directory; this filename starts with ~rdf and is followed by a set of random numbers. Next, the malware scans its own image to find the location of a 32-byte long multi-XOR key which is used to decode data inside its body. Part of the decoded data is an IP address and port which are used to retrieve the key and the IV for the decryption of the embedded payloads. The encryption algorithm uses the ChaCha stream cipher with a 256-bit key and 64-bit IV	['T1140', 'T1027']
+The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what	['T1053.005']
+NOBELIUM is the same actor behind the SolarWinds compromise in 2020, and this latest activity shares the hallmarks of the actor’s compromise-one-to-compromise-many approach. These delegated administrative privileges are often neither audited for approved use nor disabled by a service provider or downstream customer once use has ended, leaving them active until removed by the administrators. Partners can also use Partner Center Activity Log APIs to create a custom security dashboard on key user activities in Partner Center to proactively detect suspicious activities. We strongly encourage the use of strong authentication for all tenant administrators, review of devices registered for use with MFA, and minimize the use of standing high-privilege access. This can include the creation of users, consent of Azure AD applications, granting of roles to users and applications, creation of additional service principal credentials, and more. That persistence technique relies on maintaining access to victims’ mail system through the modification of permissions and addition of hidden credentials that allow the attacker to access emails remotely. Detection Name: Suspicious Addition of an Exchange related App Role Description: Addition of an Exchange related application role was observed. An account that can authenticate against an application service principal may also be able to access Exchange data and email. It alerts about users that were victims of password spray campaigns and managed to access your cloud applications from those malicious IPs. This can indicate that an attacker has compromised the app, and is using it for malicious activity	['T1098.002']
+Specifically, the BeagleBoyz have been known to create firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443. Depending on the configuration of compromised systems and the security environment of the victim’s computer network, the BeagleBoyz have used the following techniques to enter and control remote systems on a compromised network (Lateral Movement [TA0008	['T1562.004']
+The purpose of Trojan.Imecab is to set up a persistent remote access account on the target machine with a hardcoded password. Variants of the malware were also observed with the filename guester.exe which likely refers to the functionality of adding a powerful guest account to the system	['T1136.001']
+When REvil was first discovered, it was delivered to targets via exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. There are reports that the threat actors leveraged a strategic web compromise (SWC) to deliver REvil by compromising the Italian WinRAR . it website and replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers	['T1199']
+The actor leveraged vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure in order to hijack VPN sessions, or took advantage of system credentials that were stolen in previous operations	['T1190']
+Environment data exfiltration via POST It will perform a WMI query to enumerate installed security products	['T1518.001']
+Kroll identified a growing trend in Qakbot (also known as Qbot) cases targeting and exfiltrating locally stored emails to commit a sophisticated phishing method known as email thread hijacking	['T1114.001', 'T1114.001']
+"This is perhaps more eloquently stated by the CheckPoint researchers: ""As a result of all of the above actions, when attempting to surf the web, the user's web browser will first ask the attacker web page on TOR for proxy settings. The user traffic is then redirected through a proxy controlled by the attacker, who carries out a Man-In-the-Middle attack and impersonates the various sites the user attempts to surf. The attacker is free to read the victim's traffic and tamper with it in any way they please. So why redirect the user's traffic. However, as OSX/Dok is a port of a Windows banking trojan (Retefe), its main goal is to extract user's banking credentials from the redirected traffic, or manipulate traffic in order to gain access to financial accounts. For more information on this methodology, check out CheckPoint's follow-up report: OSX/Dok Refuses to Go Away and It's After Your Money. disinfection: Fully cleaning up a OSX/Dok infection is somewhat difficult due to the multitude of changes it makes to an infected system. First, if it still exists, remove the malware's initial Login Item ('AppStore'). Then, delete the two Launch Agents"	['T1543.001']
+1) The malware opens the target service process. 2) It allocates and fills four chunks of memory inside the service process. One chunk contains the entire malware DLL code (without PE headers). Another chunk is used to copy a basic Ntdll and Kernel32 import address table. Two chunks are filled with an asynchronous procedure call (APC) routine code and a stub. 3) It opens the service thread of the service process and uses the ZwQueueApcThread native API to inject an APC	['T1574.013']
+Grandoreiro chooses a different approach – a simple, yet very effective one. The resources section of the PE file is augmented by (usually 3) grande BMP images, making each binary at least 300 MB in size	['T1027.001']
+"features: Thomas Read, who also analyzed OSX/Dok, describes the malware's main goal: ""[OSX.Dok] uses sophisticated means to monitor-and potentially alter-all HTTP and HTTPS traffic to and from the infected Mac. Installing a proxy to MitM traffic is a common technique found in Windows banking trojans - who try to steal users' banking credentials. As previous noted, Dok appears to be a Mac port of the Windows banking trojan 'Retefe. Let's take a closer look at how the malware is able to proxy all web traffic on an infected host"	['T1557']
+Conficker will then generate a list of 250 domain names (rendezvous points) using a randomizing function that it seeds with the current UTC system date. All Conficker infected clients will attempt to contact the same set of domains for updates. This update probing is done on a daily basis and provides Conficker's authors with an effective updating mechanism that is highly mobile as its location is recomputed each day by all infected clients	['T1568.002']
+HELLOKITTY contains an embedded RSA-2048 public key. This public key is SHA256 hashed and used as the victim ID within the ransom note. This RSA pubic key is also used to encrypt each file's symmetric key. For the symmetric key, HelloKitty generates a 32 byte seed value based on the CPU timestamp. A Salsa20 key is generated and encrypts a second 32 byte seed value. The encrypted result is XOR’d with the first seed, resulting in a 32 byte key used to AES encrypt each file. After each file is encrypted, the original file size, magic value of DE C0 AD BA, and AES key are encrypted with the public RSA key and appended to the file. HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS appends this additional metadata to the encrypted file, while DEATHRANSOM does not. Depending on the version, HELLOKITTY may or may not change the file extension. Other samples of HELLOKITTY have used an embedded NTRU public key instead of RSA	['T1486']
+The ZIP also contains the Resource fork that contains the icon of the executable file. It mimics the icon Finder usually applies to JPEG or text files to increase the likelihood the recipient will double-click the file	['T1564.009']
+The task name is Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it mimics the AnalyzeSystem task performed by Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool	['T1036.004']
+In 2014, the group embedded Havex into legitimate remote management software for ICS and created industrial control scanning and enumeration modules	['T1195.002']
+1) The printer vulnerability MS10-061 exploited by Stuxnet – using a special MOF file, executed on the attacked system using WMI. 2) Remote jobs tasks	['T1210']
+The last type of shellcode is a Cobalt Strike stager. We have confirmed the use of several different Cobalt Strike stager shellcodes since October 2019. In addition, some of the observed Cobalt Strike stager samples included a setting in the HTTP header of their malicious communications to disguise them as common jQuery request in order to evade detection by security products	['T1071.001']
+It attempts to steal sensitive online banking information, such as user names and passwords from the following financial institutions	['T1185']
+The novel C2 channel in the RDAT sample uses email for a C2 channel by interacting with the local Exchange server with the EWS API. These two email addresses are used by the RDAT payload to send and receive emails to facilitate C2	['T1071.001']
+The SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code is embedded as an encrypted string. The dropper uses the ConvertTo-SecureString cmdlet and an embedded key to decrypt the source code prior to executing the Add-Type cmdlet. After defining a new .NET class for the backdoor, the dropper executes the backdoor's entry point. The dropper configures the backdoor with a C2 server address, RC4 encryption key, and sleep interval. Figure 7 shows the deobfuscated SMOKEDHAM dropper	['T1027']
+Screen activity can be monitored by capturing screenshots. What is particularly interesting about InvisiMole is that not only are the usual “whole display” screenshots taken – it can separately capture each window, which helps the attackers gain more information even when the windows are overlapped	['T1113']
+The backdoor establishes persistence by setting the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load registry key to point to its executable. This method is less common than Run or RunOnce keys but achieves its ultimate goal: the program listed in the Load registry value runs when any user logs on	['T1547']
+The main function defines a shellcode in hex format, and a target process which is Notepad.exe. Then, based on the OS version, it creates a Notepad.exe process and allocates memory within its address space using VirtualAlloc. It then writes the shellcode into the allocated memory using WriteProcessMemory. At the end it calls CreateRemoteThread to execute the shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe	['T1055']
+Raindrop is similar to Teardrop in that both pieces of malware act as a loader for Cobalt Strike Beacon. Raindrop uses a custom packer to pack Cobalt Strike. This packer is different to the one used by Teardrop	['T1027.002']
+The plugin_host.exe application imports several functions from a library named python33, which is how the legitimate application sideloads the malicious DLL named PYTHON33.dll. This is the first instance we have observed Sublime Text’s plugin host application used for sideloading. Like the plugin host application, the CreateMedia.exe application imports several functions from a library named CreateTsMediaAdm that is leveraged to load the malicious DLL named CreateTsMediaAdm.dll	['T1574.002']
+It also deletes Windows Event Logs : Application, Security, Setup, System. It is less focused on deleting documents. Only 35 file extensions are targeted	['T1485']
+They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, KB77846376.exe, named after Microsoft update files. They routinely used standard tools that would mimic legitimate administrator activities. This included heavy use of RDP and PsExec/WinRM. When planting webshells on the Outlook Exchange servers, they modified already existing legitimate flogon.js and logoff.aspx files. They used multiple staging folders and opted to use directories that were used infrequently by legitimate users or processes. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. They renamed their tools' filenames in the staging folder so that it would not be possible to identify the malware's purpose, even after it was deleted from the disk through the residual artifacts (e.g. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools	['T1074.001']
+In the instances we have observed, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails, luring the victims to open a malicious Microsoft Excel/Word document. The Word droppers were using standard VBA macros to download the payload	['T1204.002']
+Lazarus APT is one of the advanced APT groups that is known to target the defense industry. The group keeps updating its toolset to evade security mechanisms. Even though they have used their old job theme method, they employed several new techniques to bypass detections	['T1082', 'T1057']
+A second JavaScript command was also executed, which created a scheduled task to execute chfeeds.vbe multiple times a day	['T1053.005']
+In campaigns unrelated to these vulnerabilities, Microsoft has observed HAFNIUM interacting with victim Office 365 tenants. While they are often unsuccessful in compromising customer accounts, this reconnaissance activity helps the adversary identify more details about their targets’ environments	['T1592.004']
+Once the get_targets function returns (with a list of files that match these regexes) the malware reads each file’s contents, (if they are under 0x1c00 bytes in length) via call to lfsc_get_contents, and then exfiltrates said contents to the attacker’s remote command and control server (via ei_forensic_sendfile	['T1041']
+Filename: kxwn.lock:schemas File size: 609853 bytes MD5 hash: 4e1dec16d58ba5f4196f6a76a0bca75c SHA1 hash: a7c43d7895ecef2b6306fb00972c321060753361 Notes: Alternate data stream (ADS) PNG file with the PowerDuke backdoor component hidden and encrypted within using Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA	['T1027.003']
+The attackers then, once again, executed a command that would create a scheduled task on each computer they had copied the license.exe payload to, this time named Google Chrome Security Update, and set it up to run once at midnight (in the local time zone of the infected computers	['T1036.004']
+The malware uses a specific Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) for hiding the C2 address used during the attack: this is one of the key points that has helped in the campaign’s clustering	['T1568.002']
+In addition, FANCY BEAR’s X-Tunnel network tunneling tool, which facilitates connections to NAT-ed environments, was used to also execute remote commands. They also engaged in a number of anti-forensic analysis measures, such as periodic event log clearing (via wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security commands) and resetting timestamps of files	['T1070.001', 'T1070.001']
+XAgent also has a keylogger functionality that allows the threat actors to steal credentials as the user types them. XAgent logs key strokes by calling the CGEventTapCreate function to set an event hook to call a callback function named _myCGEventTapCallBack when it detects pressed keys. This callback function will call a function named pressedKeyWithKeyCode, which is responsible for logging the keystrokes. The keylogger will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log in the following format	['T1056.001']
+In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The malicious attachment was a simple PE file (SHA256: 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63) with the filename <redacted> Technical Services.exe. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The wave against the government entity (June 26) also involved a simple PE file attachment (SHA256: d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520) using the filename tafahom.exe. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1	['T1566.001']
+The decoy file, doc.rtf (MD5: AC0EAC22CE12EAC9EE15CA03646ED70C), contains an OLE object that uses Equation Editor to drop the embedded shellcode in %TEMP% with the name 8.t. Figure 2 shows the decryption mechanism used in EQENDT32.EXE	['T1559.002']
+The first approach involves spear-phishing targets using a document with remote content. As soon as the user opens the document, a “ping” request is sent to the attackers’ server. At this point, the attackers know the user has opened the document and send another spear-phishing email, this time containing an MS Word document with an embedded executable. The Word document usually exploits CVE-2012-0158. Sometimes the attackers send an MS PowerPoint document instead, which exploits CVE-2014-6352	['T1203']
+The first sample being captured was in April 2018 and since that we observed a lot more related ones. Attackers like to use spear-fishing email with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway. Decryption password is provided in the mail body and inside the attachment it is a MHTML macro based document with the .doc suffix	['T1566.001']
+The downloaded file tries to look trustworthy by using a well-known Adobe Reader icon and the filename “security” or “infos	['T1036.005']
+This cipher seems to be an RC4 alike algorithm with an already computed PRGA generated key-stream. It is important to note that this same cipher is used later on in the network communication protocol between trojan clients and their CNCs	['T1573.001']
+During our analysis, the C2 server provided a secondary payload that functionally appeared similar to the initial Zebrocy sample. The secondary payload was also written in Delphi and its developer configured it to communicate with its C2 server using HTTPS via the following URL	['T1140']
+Once the target’s machine is compromised, the attacker first enumerates all processes running in the system and all services. Then the attacker looks for all administrator accounts on both the local machine and the network. This technique allows them to map network resources and make lateral movements inside the network, landing in the perfect machine to match the attacker’s interest. This reflects the Poseidon Group’s familiarity with Windows network administration	['T1087.001', 'T1087.002']
+Here, we show an example of a PDF campaign as seen from the point of view of the affected user. This malicious PDF only contains a URL to entice the user to view the file. If the user chooses to click on the URL link and to read the actual content of the file, the browser will open a legitimate Google location which will redirect the browser to a malicious document. Browser redirection Finally, the malicious Word document is opened and the VBA macro code is run after the user allows for the editing of the content within Word. This eventually kickstarts the rest of the infection chain, terminates the Word process to hide the original file and opens a new Word instance to display a non-malicious decoy document dropped to the disk drive by one of the previous stages. Malicious Word document The decoy document remains constant throughout the campaign and is likely a side effect of the Threadkit exploit toolkit and cannot be relied upon for attribution	['T1204.001']
+Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe in and of itself is an unmanaged Windows executable that is generated when the high-level AD FS managed code is compiled. When executed, the unmanaged code inside Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe leverages Common Language Runtime (CLR) to run the managed AD FS code within a virtual runtime environment. This virtual runtime environment is comprised of one or more application domains, which provide a unit of isolation for the runtime environment and allow different applications to run inside separate containers within a process. The managed AD FS code is executed within an application domain inside the virtual runtime environment	['T1057']
+"When requested, with the correct Internet Explorer User-Agent, this host would serve additional obfuscated JavaScript code. As with the initial redirect, the attacker chose to bury their malicious code amongst legitimate code. In this particular case, the attacker used the ""bPopUp"" JavaScript library alongside their own code. This decision has two effects"	['T1189']
+While responding to multiple FIN7 intrusions, FireEye recovered a custom video recording capability used by FIN7 as a part of their operations. The attackers most likely leveraged this video recording capability in their arsenal to monitor operations in victim environments to inform later stages of their intrusions	['T1125']
+The initial lure is an email spoofing an email chain. These email chains are retrieved from email clients on previously infected hosts. The message has an attached ZIP archive and a message informing the user of a password necessary to open the attachment	['T1589.002']
+1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. 19: Check if a mouse is present. 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 2) 1: Get the name of the environment in which Microsoft Excel is running, as text, followed by the environment’s version number. 3) 19: Check if a mouse is present. 4) 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. If any of the above checks fail, or if the Windows environment matches any of the aforementioned versions predefined in the document (different documents have different predefined versions), the process will halt. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt	['T1497.001']
+Most WhiteBear samples are signed with a valid code signing certificate issued for “Solid Loop Ltd”, a once-registered British organization. Solid Loop is likely a phony front organization or a defunct organization and actors assumed its identity to abuse the name and trust, in order to attain deceptive code-signing digital certificates	['T1553.002']
+The execution starts with pushing a scheduled task from the AD to all the machines via group policy. The task name is Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it mimics the AnalyzeSystem task performed by Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool	['T1484.001']
+RTF documents sent in the observed campaigns contain exploits for several vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office, and they seem to be created using a version of an exploit toolkit, often referred to as Threadkit. Documents generated by the toolkit typically launch a couple of batch files, task.bat and task (2).bat that drive the rest of the infection process. Threadkit is not exclusively used by the actors behind the observed attacks but also by other groups utilizing various payloads, including Trickbot, Lokibot, SmokeLoader and some other banking malware. The embedded object triggers a download of an HTML page containing the VBScript that exploits the vulnerability and launches the shellcode. The HTML component of the exploit is based on the original exploit code discovered in May this year. CVE-2018-8174 VB script exploit code	['T1059.003']
+"Scheduled tasks require a time in which the task will run, which the dropper determines by calling the function NetRemoteTOD to obtain the time of day from the remote system. The dropper then adds 90 seconds to the time of day value on the remote system and uses this value as the ""JobTime"" to run the task in three minutes, which executes the payload on the remote system. The following pseudo-code shows the scheduled task creation process"	['T1053.005']
+IRON TWILIGHT operates two custom exploit kits. The Sednit exploit kit was used in spearphishing campaigns and strategic web compromises. In 2016, the threat group began using DealersChoice, a hybrid client/server exploit kit. DealersChoice was initially deployed as malware via an attachment to a spearphishing email. The malware profiles the target system and sends the results to a server-side component, which returns the appropriate exploit to compromise the target	['T1189']
+The “Rocke group”, a Chinese threat actor group who specializes in cryptojacking, has shifted gears on how they’re stealing your cycles. Rocke is actively updating and pushing a new dropper using Pastebin for Command and Control (C2). Recent updates to the C2 as of March 13th, 2019 have been seen, which leads researchers to believe this campaign is ongoing. According to VirusTotal, the threat detection of the new dropper is nearly non-existent. The group has been observed in previous campaigns to use “ld.so.preload” function to hook libc functions. The hooking is used to hide the dropper and the mining software installed by the malware and prevents it from showing up in the “currently running” process list. The miner uses a private mining pool hosted on DigitalOcean which is a change in the threat actor’s previous tactics	['T1574.006', 'T1014']
+The script above checks the system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine and attempts to execute a base64 encoded command that decodes to the following	['T1082']
+The malware also contains a custom obfuscation algorithm to hide registry keys, APIs, DLL names, and other strings from static analysis. Figure 10 provides the decompiled version of the custom decoding algorithm used on these strings	['T1027']
+Encode the collected information using a simple byte based XOR operation using the byte key: 0x34. Base64 encode (standard) the XORed data	['T1560.003']
+Conficker will then generate a list of 250 domain names (rendezvous points) using a randomizing function that it seeds with the current UTC system date. All Conficker infected clients will attempt to contact the same set of domains for updates. This same list of domain names is generated every 3 hours. This update probing is done on a daily basis and provides Conficker's authors with an effective updating mechanism that is highly mobile as its location is recomputed each day by all infected clients	['T1124']
+The Gh0stRAT dropper arrives on a PC through the use of EternalBlue/DoublePulsar. Once on a victim’s PC, the dropper executable is launched and it decrypts and loads the Gh0stRAT DLL into memory. It then passes the config buffer to the extracted DLL and calls the exported function (Shellex	['T1140']
+Analysis Subject: Darkhotel uses a series of checks on its program file to determine if it is being analyzed	['T1497.001']
+To infect individuals with access to the data the actors desire, Scarlet Mimic deploys both spear-phishing and watering hole (strategic web compromise) attacks	['T1036.002']
+To make the malware more persistent, it has an auto-start service that allows Trickbot to run whenever the machine boots. This service can have the following display names	['T1543.003']
+Similar to the previous NOBELIUM custom Cobalt Strike loaders, such as TEARDROP and Raindrop, these NativeZone loaders are responsible for decoding/decrypting an embedded Cobalt Strike Beacon stage shellcode and executing it in memory. Some of the NativeZone loaders feature anti-analysis guardrails to thwart analysis of the samples	['T1140']
+Since the decoy document is a benign file and does not contain any macros the victim does not suspect any malicious behavior	['T1564.001']
+According to Netlab researcher Hui Wang, at least one cryptomining botnet operator is also familiar with this service and has been using it to host a command and control (C&C) server behind ngrok's proxy network	['T1102']
+The macro also attempts to deactivate security mechanisms within Microsoft Office products by modifying the registry. First, the macro attempts to enable macros in multiple versions of Word, PowerPoint, Publisher and Excel by setting the following registry keys to the value of 1	['T1112']
+Stepping into the loaded PE,Bazar loader tries to avoid targeting Russian users by checking if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine. It calls setlocale, deobfuscating the “Russia” string by adding 0xf4 to each character, and finally resolving and calling StrStrA to check if “Russia” is a substring of the current locale. If so, the loader terminates. The Bazar Backdoor repeats this step as well	['T1082']
+GALLIUM has signed several tools using stolen code signing certificates. For example, they’ve used a credential dumping tool signed using a stolen certificate from Whizzimo, LLC, as shown in Figure 1. The code signing certificate shown in Figure 1 was no longer valid at the time of writing; however, it shows GALLIUM had access to such certificates	['T1553.002']
+RAR) included deleted items in Accessed Files STEALTHYATTACKER FUN FACT: Now it’s built-in. All rights reserved.23 Our Response: Tackled Attacker WMI Usage ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 24) 24. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.28 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS 29) 29. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30. All rights reserved.32 BONUS SLIDE: TOR backdoor (just because it’s cool) 33) 34) 34	['T1047']
+All strings within the dropper, as well as the backdoor, are encrypted using a hardcoded RSA256 key. There are two forms of encrypted strings: an RSA256-encrypted string, and custom base64-encoded and RSA256-encrypted string	['T1027']
+The macro runs a PowerShell command that will decode the contents of the %APPDATA%\Base.txt file and save it to the file %PUBLIC%\Libraries\servicereset.exe, which it will then execute. The “servicereset.exe” file is a new tool in OilRig’s arsenal that we call ISMInjector, which we will discuss in detail in the next section	['T1059.001', 'T1140']
+Pwn one to pwn them all In some of the instances we observed what appeared to be compromised accounts at third party organizations sending the malware. In one case, the attackers sent a malicious document which was nearly identical to a legitimate attachment which we observed later being sent to the same recipient	['T1566.001']
+The VB.NET variant (SHA256: e5aece694d..) is very similar to other known Zebrocy variants. It then uses the storage volume obtained from the GetDriveName function and calls GetDrive to get the SerialNumber of the storage device. The VB.NET variant then gathers system information and running processes like other Zebrocy variants by running the following commands	['T1082']
+In the low-integrity case (under UAC) the installer simply injects the stage 5 malware into the bogus explorer.exe process started earlier and terminates - In the high-integrity case (with administrative privileges or after UAC bypass), the code searches for the process hosting the Plug and Play service (usually svchost.exe) loaded in memory and injects itself into it	['T1055.001']
+The command line is then parsed to extract individual arguments, and SUNSPOT looks for the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution. This value is hard-coded in the binary, in an encrypted form using AES128-CBC, whose parameters are given below. The same material is used for all of the blobs encrypted with AES in the binary	['T1027']
+A Waterbear infection starts from a malicious DLL loader, as shown in Figure 1. We have seen two techniques of DLL loader triggering. One is modifying a legitimate server application to import and load the malicious DLL loader, while the second technique is performing phantom DLL hijacking and DLL side loading. Some Windows services try to load external DLLs with hardcoded DLL names or paths during boot-up. However, if the DLL is a legacy DLL (i.e. one that is no longer supported by Windows) or a third-party DLL (i.e. one that is not part of the original Windows system DLLs), attackers can give their malicious DLL a hardcoded DLL name and place it under one of the searched directories during the DLL loading process. After the malicious DLL is loaded, it will gain the same permission level as the service that loads it	['T1574.002', 'T1574.002']
+In addition to data theft, actors deploy MAZE ransomware to encrypt files identified on the victim network. Notably, the aforementioned MAZE panel has an option to specify the date on which ransom demands will double, likely to create a sense of urgency to their demands	['T1486']
+As mentioned in our earlier technical report on Trojan.Hydraq, the back door allows the attacker to perform any of the following activities: - Adjust token privileges. Create, modify, and delete registry subkeys. Read, write, execute, copy, change attributes of, and delete files. Uninstall itself by deleting the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[FOUR RANDOM CHARACTERS] subkey	['T1112']
+ACTIVEDS.dll is not signed and it is where the malicious code resides. There is a Windows DLL with that same name in the system folder, but since the malicious DLL is in the same directory as the TeamViewer executable, it is found first, and therefore is loaded instead of the Windows DLL. This is known as DLL search order hijacking. This ACTIVEDS.dll hooks several API calls in the TeamViewer executable to hide the application’s tray icon and to capture login credentials	['T1574.001']
+"It creates the folder ""\ProgramData\AuditService\"" and copies the clean file ""lsass.exe"" (taken from ""\Windows\System32\"") into the folder. It also drops a malicious file, ""sspisrv.dll"", into the folder. The tainted ""services.exe"" installs ""\ProgramData\AuditService\lsass.exe"" as an autostart Windows service named ""Audit Service"". When the new ""lsass.exe"" service autostarts, the malicious file ""sspisrv.dll"" sideloads in the same folder. lsass.exe"" will eventually crash because of a failure to load other dependencies. By the time of the crash, ""sspisrv.dll"" will already have injected malicious code into the system process ""svchost.exe"". The injected code is located at the entry point of the DLL and therefore gets executed as soon as the DLL loads. The injected code, which has typical backdoor capabilities, now resides in the tainted ""svchost.exe"	['T1547.008']
+This service serves the single purpose of checking every 60 seconds if the 'svcohos.exe' process is running. If not, the service will spawn a new instance of it. In doing so, this secondary malware sample acts as both a runtime persistence mechanism, as well as a persistence mechanism across reboots	['T1543.003']
+Later, the malware enters in a big block of trash code that also includes some elements to decrypt strings and important information for later. The malware uses some tricks to detect debuggers at this point	['T1027.001']
+The Windows operating system provides the functionality to allow custom DLLs to be loaded into the address space of almost all application processes via AppInit DLL registry key. This technique is not particularly complex; it is implemented in early Ramsay versions and is common in other malware families	['T1546.010']
+Both files are deleted from disk once the configuration files are read and loaded into memory. After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the server. It uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. Finally, the malware parses and extracts SMS message data from the network traffic	['T1049']
+C&C server domains and IP addresses are extracted with similar XOR routines; where Quarian uses a decryption key of 0x44, Turian uses 0xA9	['T1140']
+that displays a ransom note when the host boots (Figure 1) and, at the same time, performs destructive operations on the infected host’s hard drives	['T1542.003']
+Once the KeyBoy DLL has been executed, it validates that a particular string value (likely identifying the KeyBoy version) is set in the Windows Registry	['T1574.002']
+The installer stores the RAT component in the registry and establishes persistence for the loader component. In the analyzed sample, the installer was named “SdbInstallerDll[.]dll”. Most of its important strings and data were XOR-encoded with a hardcoded 128-byte key	['T1027']
+While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are	['T1140']
+Microsoft has detected multiple 0-day exploits being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server in limited and targeted attacks. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to HAFNIUM, a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures	['T1190']
+The scripts are responsible for deobfuscating and executing the main JavaScript file mspromo.dot. The file uses a character insertion obfuscation technique, making it appear to contain Chinese characters	['T1027']
+Throughout its code, Kazuar verbosely logs its activities by writing debug messages to log files stored within the “log” folder. Kazuar encrypts the debug messages saved in these log files using the Rijndael cipher. We decrypted the initial entry that was added to the log files during the execution of the Trojan	['T1027']
+Once the XSL script has identified that Avast is installed on the machine, it loads a malicious module Irdsnhrxxxfery64 from its location on disk. In order to load this module, it uses an ActiveX Object ShA created with Shell.Application capabilities. The object uses ShellExecute() to create an aswrundll.exe process instance and loads Irdsnhrxxxfery64. It loads the module with parameter vShow set to zero, which opens the application with a hidden window	['T1564.003']
+In multiple instances, the threat actors accessed workstations and servers on a corporate network that contained data output from control systems within energy generation facilities. The threat actors accessed files pertaining to ICS or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Based on DHS analysis of existing compromises, these files were named containing ICS vendor names and ICS reference documents pertaining to the organization (e.g	['T1135']
+MSOSTYLE.EXE is a legitimate file from the Microsoft Office 2007 package. It is responsible for sideloading the dynamic link library OINFO12.OCX	['T1574.002']
+Indeed, VboxVmService comes with a configuration file (see Script 5) in which it is possible to enable the AutoStart option so the virtual machine is automatically launched at startup	['T1543.003']
+In order to obtain credentials, the threat actor used another technique that can be seen in the below screenshots. They dumped specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, which contains password hashes	['T1003.002']
+Setting these registry keys both enables the AppInit_DLL functionality, and ensures that every user mode process that is spawned will load the ResN32.dll library	['T1546.010']
+The initial JS code that executes exe has a hardcoded absolute path, so executing it from another location or with another user will fail. The final More_eggs payload is encrypted with a key that has the hostname and processor family information appended at the end. An example key is	['T1027']
+The file encryption algorithm imports a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key from the encrypted strings table using CryptImportPublicKeyInfo, and for each file, generates a 128-bit RC4 key using CryptGenKey. The RC4 key is then used to encrypt the file in place. Once it is encrypted, the file is moved to a new file with the same name, and the file extension is appended with the keyword .locked	['T1486']
+It is important to take into consideration that the malware forges the POST string to make the connection with a random choice from a list of possible strings such as “forum”, “php”, “view”, etc. to make detection harder with IPS or other filters on the network	['T1568']
+"Once the preliminary system information has been gathered by the instrumentor, it will usually download and deploy three key implants on the endpoint. All these implants are DLL files meant to serve very specific purposes.A marker file ""qwer.txt"" is created by the instrumentor script prior to downloading and deploying any of the implants. This file acts as an infection marker for the implants that check for the presence of this file before performing any malicious activities. The instrumentor script downloads the DLL implants and then creates a temporary PowerShell script to deploy the DLL on the infected system.The DLL implants downloaded to a file on disk usually have their first byte modified. This is used as an evasion mechanism to prevent recognition of the executable file format. Once the DLL is downloaded, the PowerShell script resets its first byte to 0x4D. The DLL is then deployed on the endpoint using rundll32.exe.PowerShell script modifying and running the DLL implant using rundll32.exe"	['T1027']
+If the decryption of the parameters (target file path and replacement source code) is successful and if the MD5 checks pass, SUNSPOT proceeds with the replacement of the source file content. The original source file is copied with a .bk extension (e.g. InventoryManager.bk), to back up the original content. The backdoored source is written to the same filename, but with a .tmp extension (e.g. InventoryManager.tmp), before being moved using MoveFileEx to the original filename (InventoryManager.cs). After these steps, the source file backdoored with SUNBURST will then be compiled as part of the standard process	['T1480', 'T1565.001']
+Capture user input, such as keylogging (the most prevalent type of input capture), to obtain credentials for valid accounts and information collection (Input Capture [T1056]) - Obtain account login and password information, generally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software (OS Credential Dumping [T1056]) - Gather private keys from compromised systems to authenticate to remote services or decrypt other collected files (Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys [T1552.004]) - Manipulate default, domain, local, and cloud accounts to maintain access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment (Account Manipulation [T1098]) - Abuse hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process to mask the execution, allow access to the process's memory, and, possibly, gain elevated privileges (Input Capture: Credential API Hooking [T1056.004]) - Use brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable (Brute Force [T1110	['T1110']
+Process name, service name, and driver path listings are obtained, and each value is hashed via the FNV-1a + XOR algorithm as described previously and checked against hardcoded blocklists. If a blocklisted process is found the Update routine exits and the sample will continue to try executing the routine until the blocklist passes. Blocklisted services are stopped by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name>\Start registry entries to value 4 for disabled. Some entries in the service list if found on the system may affect the DGA algorithms behavior in terms of the values generated. The list of stopped services is then bit-packed into the ReportWatcherPostpone key of the appSettings entry for the samples’ config file. If any service was transitioned to disabled the Update method exits and retries later	['T1112']
+After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake. The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request's cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request	['T1112']
+Moreover, the attackers used the “right-to-left override” technique that causes parts of the executables’ names to be reversed, making them appear to have a different extension such as .jpg or .mp4, rather than their real one	['T1036.002']
+Besides the backdoor access, Skidmap also creates another way for its operators to gain access to the machine	['T1556.003']
+When launched, GoldFinder can identify all HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors such as network security devices that an HTTP request travels through inside and outside the network to reach the intended C2 server. When used on a compromised device, GoldFinder can be used to inform the actor of potential points of discovery or logging of their other actions, such as C2 communication with GoldMax	['T1016.001', 'T1016.001']
+We also discovered an interesting piece of rare malware created by this threat actor – a Bluetooth device harvester. This malware is responsible for stealing Bluetooth device information. It is fetched by a downloader, and collects information directly from the infected host. This malware uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices and saves the following information	['T1120']
+Most of the strings inside the module are encrypted with a homebrew XOR-based algorithm. In addition to that, API function names are reversed, presumably to avoid detection in memory	['T1027']
+The SQLRat script is designed to make a direct SQL connection to a Microsoft database controlled by the attackers and execute the contents of various tables. The script retrieves an item from the bindata table and writes the file to disk. This file appears to primarily be a version of TinyMet—an open source Meterpreter stager—but the actors have the option to store and execute any binary loaded into the table	['T1105']
+It attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard	['T1497.001']
+In addition to file name changes, the biggest (pardon the pun) change involves the Loader Trojan (Syncmgr.dll) appending junk data to the end of the Emissary DLL file to make incredibly large files. The reason for creating such large files is to trick antivirus applications into not scanning the file, as it could exceed the maximum size of files the antivirus can scan (even VirusTotal has a maximum file size of 128MB). For instance, the following pseudo code contains two loops that will end up appending 524,288,000 bytes to the end of file, resulting in a DLL that exceeds 500MB in size	['T1027.001']
+When running under a limited UAC account, the installer extracts d3d9.dll and creates a persistence key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run. This indicates that the authors are trying to hide some messages showed by the system during the setup process	['T1113']
+We analyzed different variants of malicious modules used by the Gamaredon group to inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on the compromised system. This is a very efficient way of moving laterally within an organization’s network as documents are routinely shared amongst colleagues. Also, as these macros are run when opening the documents, it is a good way to persist on a system as some of these documents are likely to be opened multiple times and at different times	['T1221']
+In brute-force mode, the tooling attempts many username: password attempts very rapidly for a much shorter time period. Organizations targeted by the tooling running in this mode typically see over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days	['T1110.001']
+Azorult uses a process hollowing technique to build the new malware image. First, the sample decrypts the payload in the memory. Then the sample creates a new suspended process of itself. The sample then injects a decrypted payload to the new process. Lastly, the sample resumes new process execution and exhibits malicious behaviors	['T1055.012']