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+Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, and execute remote commands	['T1056.001', 'T1113']
+Spam seems to be the sole distribution method for Grandoreiro. The spam emails appear to contain a link pointing to a website offering fake Flash or Java updates (see Figure 5). Notice the red arrow in lower left corner tailored for the Google Chrome web browser, but displayed in other browsers too. We have seen Grandoreiro abusing the fear around COVID-19 as well (see Figure 6), as we already announced on our @ESETresearch Twitter account	['T1036.005']
+"Asterisk (*): Use the asterisk as a substitute for any string of characters, for example: dir *.txt lists all files in the current directory with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, .txt_old. dir read*.txt lists all files in the current directory that begin with ""read"" and with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, or .txt_old. However, typing dir t97* returns both files, because the asterisk wildcard matches the file t.txt2 to t97.txt by using its short name map T97B4~1.TXT. dir *.txt lists all files in the current directory with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, .txt_old. dir read*.txt lists all files in the current directory that begin with ""read"" and with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, or .txt_old. For example, if you use /o with the e and -s values for SortOrder (by using either /o:e-s or /oe-s), dir sorts the names of directories and files by extension, with the largest first, and then displays the final result. The alphabetic sorting by extension causes file names with no extensions to appear first, then directory names, and then file names with extensions. Using redirection symbols and pipes When you use the redirection symbol (>) to send dir output to a file or a pipe (||) to send dir output to another command, use /a:-d and /b to list the file names only. You can use FileName with /b and /s to specify that dir is to search the current directory and its subdirectories for all file names that match FileName. Dir lists only the drive letter, directory name, file name, and file name extension (one path per line), for each file name it finds"	['T1083']
+To gain initial access a target network, GALLIUM locates and exploits internet-facing services such as web servers. GALLIUM has been observed exploiting unpatched web services, such as WildFly/JBoss, for which exploits are widely available. Compromising a web server gives GALLIUM a foothold in the victim network that doesn’t require user interaction, such as traditional delivery methods like phishing	['T1136.002', 'T1190']
+One of the documents spreads what analysts are calling SQLRat, previously unseen malware that drops files and executes SQL scripts on the host system. The use of SQL scripts is ingenious in that they don’t leave artifacts behind the way traditional malware does. This technique has not been observed in previous campaigns associated with FIN7	['T1059.007', 'T1059.005', 'T1059', 'T1059.003']
+One such group is the infamous FIN7 known for its APT attacks on various organisations around the globe. Recently they developed Lizar (formerly known as Tirion), a toolkit for reconnaissance and getting a foothold inside infected systems. Disguised as a legitimate cybersecurity company, the group distributes Lizar as a pentesting tool for Windows networks	['T1106']
+Once Torisma is decoded from Base64 the implant is further encrypted using an AES key and compressed. The server-side ASP page does not contain any logic to decrypt the Torisma implant itself, rather it relies on decryption logic contained within the first stage implant	['T1140']
+"Then extract resource named as ""_7z"", and decompress it with lzma.dll to get the Imminent Monitor RAT (MD5: 4fd291e3319eb3433d91ee24cc39102e"	['T1140']
+The ‘md5_key’ argument in the function above is the MD5 hash of the previously defined ‘H7sVBirLvGwVfLSLSeI2’ string that was contained within Cardinal RAT’s embedded configuration. Now that we know how to decrypt the data, we can look at the previously shown PCAP data and determine what is being sent. The first message decrypts to the following	['T1140']
+Table 1 shows an overview of the compromised websites used as watering holes, infected JavaScript URLs, and SMB URLs used to collect NTLM hashes	['T1059.007']
+On the other hand, attackers can choose off-the-shelf tools such as the ones described, which can serve their purposes equally well if they are disguised. We choose to cover these campaigns to showcase the breadth of TTPs required for successful targeted attacks, ranging from proper reconnaissance all the way to delivery of the final payload through several intermediate infection stages. The TTPs we observed over the past two months are consistent with the previous activity of the so-called Cobalt Group. However, we have found some payloads that contain a message for researchers stating that the attackers are not the Cobalt group, which may indicate that the attacks are conducted by different actors despite the commonalities in TTPs	['T1070.004']
+While analysis of watchcat is still ongoing and we have yet to see an in-the-wild infection, it's clear that the rapid iteration of all these various Lazarus-related malware samples shows the actor is heavily invested in the macOS platform	['T1033']
+Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script. The compromised website used to host the DLL is different for every compromised network and includes websites of medical device manufacturers and IT service providers	['T1027']
+The droppers contain a variety of executables, all of these intended for spying on the victim. Below is an incomplete functionality list for the various Dtrack payload executables found	['T1057']
+The C2 channel uses HTTPS thanks to the INTERNET_FLAG_SECURE flag used when calling the HttpOpenRequestA function. The beacon HTTP request will look like the following	['T1071.001']
+In a multiple server configuration, where the servers are configured in a Database Availability Group (DAG), Volexity has proven an attacker does not need to acquire a user’s domain SID to access their mailbox. The only information required is the e-mail address of the user they wish to target	['T1589.002']
+In two recent campaigns, the attackers used newly created Blogspot domains as the initial landing page, which then redirected targets to credential phishing pages. All known attacker-controlled Blogspot domains have been taken down	['T1583.006']
+When calling the APIs, the main executable will drop the component file %User Temp%/ns{5 random characters}.tmp/System.dll. The main executable will then load the dynamic-link library (DLL) file, which has the export function “Call” used to call for the APIs	['T1129']
+tmp’ file is then copied to a filename of ‘Applet.cpl’, which is placed in the previously identified file path. The malware proceeds to identify the file path of either the common startup folder, or the user’s startup folder depending on if the SeDebugPrivilege privilege was obtained. In the event this privilege was obtained, the common startup folder is queried by reading the following registry key	['T1547.009', 'T1547.001']
+Developed in Python: Xbash was developed using Python and then converted into self-contained Linux ELF executables by abusing the legitimate tool PyInstaller for distribution. Targets IP addresses and Domain Names: Modern Linux malware such as Mirai or Gafgyt usually generate random IP addresses as scanning destinations. By contrast, Xbash fetches from its C2 servers both IP addresses and domain names for service probing and exploiting. Targets Windows and Linux: When exploiting vulnerable Redis service, Xbash will also figure out whether the service is running on Windows or not. Intranet Scanning Functionality: The Xbash authors have developed the new capability of scanning for vulnerable servers within enterprise intranet	['T1016']
+The other method used to execute the second stage in the victim’s system is DLL Hijacking. In this campaign, we have seen vmnat.exe, the legitimate VMware NAT service executable, abused for loading the malicious payload, although the group can use a number of legit executables in their attacks	['T1204.001', 'T1204.001', 'T1140', 'T1574.002']
+The Kazuar Trojan initially relies on its command and control channel to allow actors to interact with the compromised system and to exfiltrate data. Kazuar has the capabilities to use multiple protocols, such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP or FTPS, determined by the prefixes of the hardcoded C2 URLs. So far, we have only observed HTTP used as the C2 protocol in our sample set. All of the known Kazuar C2 servers appear to be compromised WordPress blogs, suggesting that the threat group using Kazuar in attacks also locates and exploits vulnerable WordPress sites as part of their playbook	['T1008', 'T1071.002', 'T1102.002', 'T1071.001']
+These 2 techniques have also been previously used by this actor. Finally the payload is executed by rundll32.exe (and the ordinal #1 in argument) or by explorer.exe if the COM Object hijack is performed. In this case, explorer.exe will instance the MMDeviceEnumerator class and will execute the payload	['T1027', 'T1546.015']
+"It collects open ports on the victim host by running the netstat command - It lists all the running processes - It lists available services on the system - It exfiltrates .ppt and .pptx file, in addition to the extension mentioned in the G1 variant - If a USB key is connected on the system, the malware steals the file based on an extension list - It supports file encryption (AES with the key ""lolomycin2017"") - It collects information on the account (account type, description, domain name, full name, SID and status) - It checks if the system is a virtual machine with several techniques"	['T1057', 'T1027', 'T1016', 'T1033', 'T1025']
+As discussed in Part 1, QakBot is an eCrime banking trojan that has the potential to severely impact an organization’s ability to operate. QakBot has the ability to spread laterally throughout a network utilizing a worm-like functionality through brute forcing network shares, brute forcing Active Directory user group accounts or via server message block (SMB) exploitation	['T1110', 'T1204.002', 'T1210']
+In addition to the numerous targeted attacks, Unit 42 discovered that the group also performed a litany of attacks and operations around the globe, involving both criminal as well as targeted attacks. Starting in February 2018, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a campaign of attacks performed by members of Gorgon Group targeting governmental organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. Additionally, during that time, members of Gorgon Group were also performing criminal operations against targets across the globe, often using shared infrastructure with their targeted attack operations. Also, interestingly, Gorgon Group has a diverse and active criminal element. RATs such as NjRat and infostealers like Lokibot were leveraging the same C2 infrastructure as that of the targeted attacks. Using numerous decoy documents and phishing emails, both styles of attacks lacked overall sophistication, but the effectiveness of this group and campaign cannot be denied	['T1588.002']
+"File collection: Collect document files with the suffixes "".txt"", "".doc"" and "".xls"" in the network sharing directory"	['T1083']
+In August 2018, Sednit’s operators deployed two new Zebrocy components, and since then we have seen an uptick in Zebrocy deployments. Zebrocy is a set of downloaders, droppers and backdoors; while downloaders and droppers are doing reconnaissance, backdoors implement persistence and spying activities against the target. These new components use a an unusual way to exfiltrate gathered information by using protocols related to mail services such as SMTP and POP3	['T1071.003']
+Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. Agent.btz file is not packed. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Note: an attempt to run a valid thumb.db file, which is an OLE-type container has no effect.Files thumb.dd and mssysmgr.ocxAgent.btz is capable to create a binary file thumb.dd on a newly connected drive. Posted by Sergei Shevchenko at Labels: Agent.btz Newer Post Older Post Home	['T1105']
+The VBS code in this file (Figure 10) has the ability to recreate the whole chain and download the same ZIP archive	['T1140', 'T1105', 'T1102.003']
+TrickBot, Anchor, and Anchor_DNS typically use a separate C2 infrastructure. However, in some instances of this attack, there was C2 server overlap between these infrastructures. For example, the IP 23.95.97[.]59, which is hardcoded in an Anchor sample, has also served Anchor_DNS and TrickBot	['T1095', 'T1071.001']
+Then, it downloads an additional file disguised as a JPG extension from the discord link. The downloaded file is reversed and takes the form of PE, and executes “Ylfwdwgmpilzyaph” method in the file in the memory	['T1140', 'T1036']
+The malware has been known to proliferate through network shares, removable drives, or software vulnerabilities. The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links. Clicking the link leads to the download of a zip containing a VBS file (detected as Trojan.VBS.QAKBOT.SM) that then downloads a malicious executable file (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win32.QBOT.SMTH	['T1204.001', 'T1204.002', 'T1566.002', 'T1566.001']
+We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central and Southwest Asia. The spear phishing emails and attached malicious macro documents typically have geopolitical themes	['T1566.001']
+EKANS, which was first observed in January 2020, has relatively basic ransomware behavior, as it primarily seeks to encrypt your files and display a ransom note when finished. Although EKANS is basic in terms of file encryption, it's worth mentioning that it does have some interesting functionalities that make it distinct from other ransomware strains. EKANS ransomware is written in Golang and includes a static “kill list” that will stop numerous antivirus and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) processes and services. After killing the processes, it then proceeds to delete shadow copies to disable any restoration capabilities. Like many ransomware malware families, EKANS attempts to also encrypt resources connected to the victim’s machine via the network	['T1490']
+One of the first modifications we witnessed in this new variant of BADNEWS is a new mutex that is created to ensure a single instance of BADNEWS is running at a given moment. This malware family used the new mutex ‘com_mycompany_apps_appname_new’. This variant of BADNEWS uses different filenames compared to previous versions. The following filenames are used by BADNEWS throughout its execution	['T1056.001']
+The link in both emails is a Google Docs link claiming to host a PDF file with a list of employees that have been terminated, as shown in Figure 3	['T1102']
+Of importance is the fact that Grandoreiro uses the same algorithm for decrypting its internal strings as Casbaneiro	['T1140']
+Another interesting piece of functionality is the ability to steal emails. These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails	['T1005', 'T1114.001']
+The PowerDuke backdoor boasts a pretty extensive list of features that allow the Dukes to examine and control a system. Volexity suspects the feature set that has been built into PowerDuke is an extension of their anti-VM capabilities in the initial dropper files. Several commands supported by PowerDuke facilitate getting information about the system	['T1057', 'T1082', 'T1083']
+We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central and Southwest Asia. The spear phishing emails and attached malicious macro documents typically have geopolitical themes. When successfully executed, the malicious documents install a backdoor we track as POWERSTATS	['T1036.005', 'T1204.002', 'T1218.003']
+The pseudo-HTTP protocol uses any proxies discovered by the HTTP proxy monitoring thread or added by the adminka command	['T1012']
+The file has three C2 URLs hardcoded into the file and communicates to these with HTTP POST multipart-form data boundary string. Like other HIDDEN COBRA malware, prtspool uses format strings to store data collected about the system and sends it to the C2s	['T1071.001']
+Shifting focus to the malware itself, file stealer samples connect to their C2 infrastructure in a unique manner. Rather than connecting directly to a C2 domain, the malware performs a DNS lookup to convert the domain to an IP address. Once complete, it establishes an HTTPS connection directly to the IP address	['T1071.001']
+Find out all system information, including hardware being used and the exact version of your operating system, including security patches	['T1547.001']
+The file “ml.dll” is a Taidoor loader. The file utilizes the export function called “MyStart” to decrypt and load “svchost.dll” (8CF683B7D181591B91E145985F32664C), which was identified as Taidoor malware. Taidoor is a traditional RAT. After the file is read into memory, the DLL uses a RC4 encryption algorithm to decrypt the contents of the file. The RC4 key used for decryption is, “ar1z7d6556sAyAXtUQc2”. After the loader has finished decrypting “svchost.dll”, the loader now has a decrypted version of Taidoor, which is a DLL. The loader then uses the API calls GetProcessHeap, GetProcAddress, and LoadLibrary to load the following DLLs, KERNEL32.dll, ADVAPI32.dll, and WS2_32.dll, which Taidoor will utilize. Next, the loader looks for the export “Start” in the Taidoor DLL and executes that function	['T1140']
+Logging keystrokes - Capturing audio from the computer’s microphone - Capturing screenshots - Capturing geolocation data - Taking photos from the computer’s web camera - Copying files to a remote server - Copying files to a special USB device if inserted - Hijjacking the clipboard and capturing information from the target machine	['T1125']
+This was a previously undiscovered RAT. It uses two components to avoid detection by a single component. The dropper uses an old trick in a new way: It appends the RAT to a Word document. Upon opening the document, a macro is executed that will extract the malware and execute it	['T1559.002']
+Netwire isn’t the only tool that uses this persistence mechanism: it has been used by Fysbis, Pupy, jRAT, and CrossRAT. In the case of Netwire, users can specify the name of the Autostart Entry and make it masquerade as something like a Linux system process if desired	['T1055.012']
+As shown above, some of the decoy URLs point to the domain name of the actual C2 (e.g. are known to the C2 as being decoy resources that serve no role in the regular C2 communication between GoldMax and its C2	['T1573.002']
+A review of samples of this phishing campaign shows that the attackers concentrated their attacks on individuals’ online accounts, especially personal emails (Gmail, Yahoo. and Outlook) and business emails (organization and university emails). After accessing the credential details of the accounts, they steal sensitive data from their victims	['T1114']
+The iContact binary appears to be a backdoor that gathers user and locale data and engages in encrypted communications with a C2 server over TCP	['T1033', 'T1573']
+Since 2013, just prior to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Gamaredon group has primarily focused its cyber campaigns against Ukrainian government officials and organizations. This link was recently substantiated on Nov. 4, 2021, when the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) publicly attributed the leadership of the group to five Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers assigned to posts in Crimea. Concurrently, the SSU also released an updated technical report documenting the tools and tradecraft employed by this group	['T1204.002', 'T1083']
+When we sum up the entire architecture of Guloader, we observe several stages and key features: 1) The malware initially come wrapped with a VB layer 2) After the VB part ends, the entire malware activity is executed by a shellcode. 5) The second shellcode downloads further malware	['T1105']
+In at least one instance of EnvyScout delivery, we observed further enumeration of the executing browser’s environment, wherein the user-agent was used to determine whether a Windows machine received an ISO payload	['T1059.003']
+The actor behind Bisonal is clearly motivated and has an interest in Russian, Korean and Japanese victims. The development of Bisonal has been active for more than a decade. We have observed the code evolving with the different publications but also with the evolution of Microsoft Windows. However, specific functions are still used today, many years after the original implementation of the Bional malware. Even if Bisonal could be considered as simple with less than 30 functions, it has spent its life targeting sensitive entities in both the public and private sectors. With this investigation and the analysis of this decade of activity, we hope to force this actor to innovate by providing a better understanding of his arsenal and more specifically how Bisonal works	['T1543.003']
+The file goopdate.dll has the hidden file attribute set and will not show in Windows Explorer on systems using default settings. Goopdate.dll is a highly obfuscated loader whose ultimate purpose is to load a Cobalt Strike stager into memory and then execute it. The Cobalt Strike stager will simply try to download and execute a shellcode from a remote server, in this case using the following URL	['T1036.005']
+The payload will then notify the C2 it has successfully downloaded and executed the secondary PowerShell payload. It does so using either the HTTPS/HTTP or DNS channels, depending on which method is successful. The payload will construct a message that has the following structure that it will then send to the C2: bye<char uuid[35]>d The message above is sent via a simple HTTPS/HTTP POST request to the C2 server. If that fails, the payload will use DNS tunneling by first issuing a DNS query to resolve the following domain to notify the C2 that the payload will send data to it in subsequent DNS queries: ns1. The executable obtains an embedded PowerShell script, decrypts it using RC4, then decompresses it using ZLIB, and saves the cleartext to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Out.jpg	['T1071.004']
+In furtherance of the APT10 Group’s intrusion campaigns, Zhu and Zhang, among other things, worked for Huaying Haitai and registered malicious domains and infrastructure	['T1583.001']
+Svchast.exe – This is the shellcode loader binary that spoofs the name of a legitimate Windows binary called svchost.exe	['T1547.001', 'T1036.004']
+The Docker Hub account of MegawebMaster has numerous public images, five of which have TeamTNT utilities with a significant amount of downloads. These five images include dockgeddon, docker, tornadopw, and dcounter (T1204.003	['T1608.001']
+While Emotet has been around for many years and is one of the most well-known pieces of malware in the wild, that doesn't mean attackers don't try to freshen it up. Cisco Talos recently discovered several new campaigns distributing the infamous banking trojan via email. These new campaigns have been observed following a period of relatively low Emotet distribution activity, corresponding with the observance of Orthodox Christmas in certain geographic regions. These new malicious efforts involve sending victims malicious Microsoft Word attachments with embedded macros that download Emotet. This latest strain has also gained the ability to check if the infected IP where the malicious email is being sent from is already blocklisted on a spam list. This could allow attackers to deliver more emails to users' inboxes without any pushback from spam filters	['T1566.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1566.002']
+The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family, which we analyzed in this report	['T1125']
+"This time, the text is from the novel ""The Brothers Karamazov"" by Fyodor Dostoevsky (a Russian writer). The malicious document drops a Python interpreter and PoetRAT. The author made a few changes to the PoetRAT malware, though. First, the malware uses pyminifier to obfuscate the Python script and avoid detection based on string or YARA rules: The obfuscation is a base64 and an LZMA compression algorithm. The most notable change is the protocol used to download and upload files"	['T1027', 'T1059.005']
+The malware uses Pastebin for Command and Control (C2). The URL “https://pastebin[.]com/HWBVXK6H” is used to check for the latest version of the malware. If a new version is available, the malware reaches out to “https://pastebin[.]com/yPRSa0ki”. The paste shown below serves as a redirect to the actual setup stript	['T1071.001', 'T1102.001']
+If it is running on an infected machine for the first time (depending on whether a flag file exists), it sends a POST packet to its command-and-control (C&C) server informing it that a machine has been infected	['T1083']
+The targeting of insurance and retail organizations is peculiar as it does not fit with this threat groups prior target set. The email subject and attachment file names used in the attacks on these seemingly atypical targets were similar in theme as those used when attacking government organizations. The lack of industry or target specific social engineering themes likely lowers the chances of a successful compromise and further confuses our understanding of the purpose of attacking these organizations	['T1059.005']
+Note- Guloader heavily uses time checks and other traditional anti-analysis techniques. Therefore, to save time, in this analysis I will use the ScyllaHide plugin. Also, several of the Guloader’s anti-analysis techniques are impossible to evade without manual intervention	['T1497.001']
+SDBbot RAT has been observed in Hive0065 attacks since at least September 2019 and has been used primarily as a secondary payload. This malware features remote-access capabilities, accepts commands from a C&C server such as video recording, and has the ability to exfiltrate data from the victimized devices and networks	['T1140', 'T1125']
+Upon execution, the document used template injection to download the next stage RTF exploit that downloaded the final stage Warzone payload using a DLL embedded in the RTF exploit	['T1221', 'T1221']
+Philadelphia ransomware has been circulating since September 2016. It first attracted our attention in April of this year [12] when we observed an actor customizing the malware for use in highly targeted campaigns. In a brief stint, TA505 distributed it in one large campaign in July, but we have not seen them use it since	['T1059.001']
+The APT actor scanned for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services and identified vulnerable systems, likely for future exploitation. This actor continues to exploit a Citrix Directory Traversal Bug (CVE-2019-19781) and a Microsoft Exchange remote code execution flaw (CVE-2020-0688	['T1190', 'T1595.002']
+MCMD provides the threat actor with a reverse command shell, which facilitates the execution of arbitrary commands on the impacted device, as well as the ability to upload and download additional files. In all observed cases, MCMD utilizes PHP pages on compromised websites for command and control (C2) capability	['T1105']
+A new service is then created using the service parser function ProcessScCommand. ZxShell implemented its own version of the Windows SC command. There are minor differences between the ZxShell implementation of this command and the original Windows one, but they are irrelevant for the purpose of the analysis The command used to install the service is	['T1569.002', 'T1543.003']
+Installs itself as a Windows service - Sets a specific keyword for communication - Exchanges messages and commands with the kernel driver - Performs backdoor functions	['T1569.002']
+Executing the browser from any other Chrome shortcut link will start and run it normally without the malicious extension, canceling out the malware’s ability to control what the victim does	['T1204.001']
+Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN). Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious	['T1105']
+Home - - Cloud security - Frontline workers - Identity & access - Information protection & governance - Ransomware - Secure remote work - Risk management - SIEM & XDR - Small & medium business - Zero Trust - - - Microsoft Defender - Microsoft Entra - Microsoft Purview - Identity & access Identity & access Azure Active Directory part of Microsoft Entra Microsoft Entra Permissions Management Microsoft Entra Verified ID Azure Key Vault - Azure Active Directory part of Microsoft Entra - Microsoft Entra Permissions Management - Microsoft Entra Verified ID - Azure Key Vault - - Microsoft Sentinel - Microsoft Defender for Cloud - Microsoft 365 Defender - Microsoft Defender for Endpoint - Microsoft Defender for Office 365 - Microsoft Defender for Identity - Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps - Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management - - Microsoft Defender for Cloud - Azure Firewall - Azure Web App Firewall - Azure DDoS Protection - GitHub Advanced Security - - Microsoft 365 Defender - Microsoft Defender for Endpoint - Microsoft Defender for IoT - Microsoft Defender for Business - Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management - Risk management & privacy Risk management & privacy Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance Microsoft Purview eDiscovery Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager Microsoft Priva Risk Management - Microsoft Purview Insider Risk Management - Microsoft Purview Communication Compliance - Microsoft Purview eDiscovery - Microsoft Purview Compliance Manager - Microsoft Priva Risk Management - Information protection Information protection Microsoft Purview Information Protection Microsoft Purview Data Lifecycle Management Microsoft Purview Data Loss Prevention - Microsoft Purview Information Protection - Microsoft Purview Data Lifecycle Management - Microsoft Purview Data Loss Prevention - Device management Device management Microsoft Endpoint Manager - Microsoft Endpoint Manager - Services Microsoft Security Experts Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting Microsoft Security Services for Enterprise Microsoft Security Services for Incident Response Microsoft Security Services for Modernization - Microsoft Security Experts - Microsoft Defender Experts for Hunting - Microsoft Security Services for Enterprise - Microsoft Security Services for Incident Response - Microsoft Security Services for Modernization - Partners - - - Customer stories - Security 101 - Product trials - How we protect Microsoft - Reports and analysis Reports and analysis Microsoft Security Insider Microsoft Digital Defense Report Security Response Center - Microsoft Security Insider - Microsoft Digital Defense Report - Security Response Center - - Microsoft Security Blog - Microsoft Security Events - Microsoft Tech Community - - Documentation - Technical Content Library - Training & certifications - - Compliance Program for Microsoft Cloud - Microsoft Trust Center - Security Engineering Portal - Service Trust Portal - Contact sales - More - Start free trial	['T1555', 'T1562.001']
+INDRIK SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating Dridex since June 2014. In 2015 and 2016, Dridex was one of the most prolific eCrime banking trojans on the market and, since 2014, those efforts are thought to have netted INDRIK SPIDER millions of dollars in criminal profits. Throughout its years of operation, Dridex has received multiple updates with new modules developed and new anti-analysis features added to the malware	['T1059.003']
+NetUser - provides more information about the user - SystemUpTime - records the amount of time the machine is running - WindowsVersion - determines the Windows version	['T1082']
+The signed Plead malware samples are highly obfuscated with junk code, but the purpose of the malware is similar in all samples: it downloads from a remote server or opens from the local disk a small encrypted binary blob. This binary blob contains encrypted shellcode, which downloads the final Plead backdoor module	['T1001.001']
+Persistence is established via the HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun key value for wdm set to the path of the executable. Previous samples have set persistence via Run key values for 360v	['T1547.001']
+One of the recent advancements by APT34 is the use of DGA to generate subdomains. The BONDUPDATER script, which was named based on the hard-coded string “B007”, uses a custom DGA algorithm to generate subdomains for communication with the C2 server	['T1568.002']
+DarkWatchman includes a feature complete C# keylogger that is dropped alongside the RAT in text format. The keylogger is provided as C# code and compiled during runtime from a Base64 PowerShell command stored in the registry. The keylogger code itself is obfuscated, with both function and variable names being randomized. However, there is no other obfuscation – no redundant logic or unnecessary functions – which leaves the entire compiled keylogger at 8.5kb	['T1010']
+This tool has been used by a few groups since at least 2012 based upon PEBuildDates). However this sample is a bit more interesting. Normally HTTPBrowser sends traffic over HTTP using a user-agent of HTTPBrowser/1.0. This sample uses DNS as a covert channel for communications. Specifically this sample utilizes DNS TXT records with 9 uppercase letters followed by a number and 7 more uppercase letters, then the C2 domain used. The other samples use the C2 domains of local.it-desktop.com and hi.getgo2.com	['T1071.001']
+1) Wscript makes subsequent DNS requests for a Stage Two payload 2) ‘Rundll32.exe -> PicturesViewer.dll, DllRegisterServer,’ allowing for C2 communication 3) MSIExec, spawning multiple Cmd.exe processes and Explorer injection 4) Commands run by the C2	['T1059.003', 'T1218.007']
+When G-Data published their Turla paper, there were few details publicly available on how victims get infected with this malware campaign. Our analysis indicates this is a sophisticated multi-stage infection; which begins with Epic Turla. This is used to gain a foothold and validate the high profile victim. If the victim is interesting, they get upgraded to the Turla Carbon system	['T1124', 'T1016']
+In March 2020, an additional version of the AppleJeus malware was identified. The download page has release notes with version revisions claiming to start with version 1.0.0, released on April 15, 2019	['T1587.001']
+Adding itself to startup is a classic technique for macOS, and is done by creating a .plist file in the /Library/LaunchAgents/ folder with a link to the malware	['T1543.001']
+The group has used Twitter accounts to find and monitor its targets to prepare well crafted spear phishing emails. The group also is using Gmail accounts to use for phishing attacks or registering domains. One of the Gmail accounts used by this actor is ” tjkim1991@gmail[.]com” which was used to register the following domains	['T1583.001', 'T1593.001']
+During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software. They were targeted via a malicious .ZIP file (SHA256 hash: b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf) that contained a ScreenConnect executable (SHA256 hash: 2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf	['T1566.001']
+Talos has found a new set of malicious blogs operated by Kimsuky delivering three previously unknown preliminary components: an initial beacon script, a file exfiltrator and an implant instrumentor. One of these components, the implant instrumentor, delivered an additional three types of malware	['T1105', 'T1218.011']
+REvil checks for command-line switches passed to the executable when it was launched. The analyzed sample supports a single command-line switch: -nolan. By default, REvil encrypts the contents of local fixed hard drives and network-attached shares. If the -nolan command-line switch is passed when the binary is launched, REvil ignores network-connected resources	['T1140']
+Masquerading - T1036 Phishing - T1566 Remote Access Software - T1219 Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001 Spearphishing Link - T1566.002 User Execution - T1204 User Execution: Malicious File - T1204.002	['T1204.002']
+Innovate and modify the code that accomplishes the installation, while the backdoor code remains more static - Use scripting languages such as JavaScript, JavaScript Scriptlets, VBScript, and XML - Use simple obfuscation such as base64, gzip compression, and insertion of garbage characters - Split functionality of the backdoor & code that establishes persistence for the backdoor into separate files and scripts	['T1027.001', 'T1027']
+While some variations exist in functionalities, the main purpose of these modules is to enumerate all documents on a compromised system and upload them to the C&C server. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript	['T1020']
+Warzone bypasses UAC (User Account Control) to disarm Windows Defender and puts itself into the list of startup programs	['T1562.001']
+It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost. It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost	['T1620']
+Each value of the config is written to the registry after encrypting them using the DES algorithm. A new registry key is created under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ using either the SystemProductName value from the HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS key or the hardcoded string “68A-D3H-B1111 as a name. Additionally, a hardcoded string -HjDWr6vsJqfYb89mxxxx is appended to the name	['T1543.003']
+Development of UBoatRAT At the time of this writing, we have identified fourteen samples of UBoatRAT and one downloader associated with the attacks. Most of UBoatRAT samples retrieve C2 address from GitHub as described above. Only one sample released in May connected to public blog service in Hong Kong and compromised legitimate web server in Japan as C2. The sample uses regular HTTP protocol for communication. The account for the blog, 'elsa_kr' has existed since April 2016 and has no meaningful contents at this moment	['T1071.001', 'T1102.002']
+When the Excel document is opened, two executables (utilman.exe and mpsvc.dll) will be dropped at folder %AppData%MicrosoftCorporation. A shortcut for utilman.exe is then created at the startup folder so that the dropped files execute during the next reboot of the machine and communicate with a command and control (C2	['T1547.001']
+The results will be stored in a JSON format, AES-encrypted and sent as an attachment using the Dropbox API	['T1573.001']
+The malware then checks the functionality of its tor proxy by utilizing the curl command to contact the command and control server. After connecting to the CnC, the malware sends the data it had collected earlier, such as system information, by sending POST requests through the TOR proxy. After exfiltration of the data, the malware deletes the temporary files containing the data it sent	['T1070.004']
+Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. Similar to attacks in 2019, the attacker appends data in order to generate a large binary. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019	['T1132.001', 'T1027.001']
+It is possible that Group 72 has a vulnerability research team searching for 0-day vulnerabilities in Windows	['T1203', 'T1190']
+Cicada clearly still has access to a lot of resources and skills to allow it to carry out a sophisticated and wide-ranging campaign like this, so the group remains highly dangerous. Its use of a tool to exploit the recently disclosed ZeroLogon vulnerability and a custom backdoor that has not been observed by Symantec before show that it continues to evolve its tools and tactics to actively target its victims	['T1199', 'T1210']
+WIZARD SPIDER has developed their tools over a number of years, and they continue to evolve the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) needed to monetize their criminal operations in an efficient and effective manner. TrickBot . TrickBot has remained a primary tool for WIZARD SPIDER and has grown to infect upward of one million systems worldwide. This has made WIZARD SPIDER’s TrickBot malware an extremely prevalent and widely tracked target. However, in spite of this, TrickBot activity has returned to its usual rapid pace, and the impact of the disruption operation was manifested as a short-term setback for WIZARD SPIDER. Ryuk’s Return . Since September 2018, WIZARD SPIDER’s Ryuk ransomware has been the group’s most lucrative operation for siphoning money from its victims through extortion. It is possible that Conti and Ryuk may continue to be used simultaneously by WIZARD SPIDER, with either one being deployed depending on particular characteristics of the victim organization. Conti has been continually improved by WIZARD SPIDER and has already been used to compromise over 120 victim networks, with stolen data listed on the Conti DLS. Conti victims span multiple sectors and geographies, the vast majority of which are based in North America and Europe (Figure 4). This opportunistic targeting is indicative of WIZARD SPIDER and wider ransomware operations. Conti Ransomware Victims by Sector and Geography (click image to enlarge) . Conti has been under active development throughout WIZARD SPIDER’s deployment of the ransomware in BGH campaigns. WIZARD SPIDER, with its diverse and effective toolset, has proven to be a highly capable adversary and continues to be resilient, reactive and resolute as they continue to run their formidable criminal enterprise	['T1204.002']
+Pteranodon is a backdoor which also can capture screenshots based on a configuration file created on the disk. Further, it uploads the screenshots to the C2 server unencrypted	['T1041', 'T1113']
+Then, hard drives on a system are enumerated and for each drive, the \\.\EPMNTDRV\ device is called. Then the driver that was extracted is loaded by creating a new service using the CreateServiceW which rewrites the first 512 bytes of the Master Boot Record (MBR	['T1134']
+In 2016, CTU researchers observed the group using native system functionality to disable logging processes and delete logs within a compromised environment. The threat actors used the appcmd command-line tool to unlock and disable the default logging component on the server (systsm.webServer/httplogging) and then delete existing logs from the system (see Figure 4	['T1562.002']
+Finally it calls “CreateThread” to create a thread within its memory space to make HTTPS requests to its C&C server	['T1071.001']
+Despite seemingly wide deployment of malicious capabilities in the region, follow-on activities by the group occur in areas of discrete interest, indicating a possible review of targeting. Following initial access, MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM deploying tools such as “Pterodo” to gain interactive access to target networks. In some cases, MSTIC has observed deployments of UltraVNC to enable a more interactive connection to a target	['T1021.005']
+The DOTM (Office template filetype) files are responsible for loading the patched DLLs onto the victim’s machine to collect and gather data. These DOTM files are created with DLL files encoded directly into the structure of the file. These DOTM files exist on remote servers compromised by the adversary; the first stage document contains an embedded link that refers to the location of this file. When the victim opens the document, the remote DOTM file that contains a Visual Basic macro code to load malicious DLLs, is loaded. Based on our analysis, these DLLs were first seen on 20 April 2020 and, to our knowledge based on age and prevalence data, these implants have been customized for this attack	['T1005']
+We can compare it to the sample e338d49c270baf64363879e5eecb8fa6bdde8ad9 used in May 2017 by Group 74. In this campaign, adversaries did not use any exploit. Instead,the payload is executed in standalone mode by rundll32.exe. Adversaries also changed some constants, such as the XOR key used in the previous version	['T1059.003']
+The Agent Tesla spyware Trojan has reportedly been around since 2014, but has undergone constant improvements and updates. Agent Tesla operators seem to have stayed in business for quite some time	['T1204.002']
+Now let’s extract the krbtgt account hash from a dev.testlab.local domain controller. Instead of having to install an agent, we can now use Mimikatz’ DCSync to extract the hash. One thing to note is that you need to specify “<NT4_DOMAINNAME>\krbtgt” for the specified user for this to work properly (you can find the domain shortname easily with whoami or other methods). In this case we’re using DEV	['T1550.003']
+Once a victim was accessed, attackers would determine if the user account was an administrator or normal user. They would then download post-exploitation tools that included password/process-dumping utilities, reverse-tunneling tools, and custom backdoors	['T1555.003', 'T1555']
+An APT group that we are calling BackdoorDiplomacy, due to the main vertical of its victims, has been targeting Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa and the Middle East since at least 2017. For initial infection vectors, the group favors exploiting vulnerable internet-exposed devices such as web servers and management interfaces for networking equipment. Once on a system, its operators make use of open-source tools for scanning the environment and lateral movement. In several instances, the group has been observed targeting removable media for data collection and exfiltration	['T1505.003']
+A day later, public reporting outlined new malware called WhisperGate that originally was observed on Jan. This malware disables Windows Defender Threat Protection, is destructive in nature and was discovered to have targeted multiple organizations in Ukraine. Microsoft has publicly attributed the use of this custom malware to a threat actor they refer to as DEV-0586	['T1218.004']
+After the macro is executed, it creates an EXE file in startup directory. This EXE file is “Flagpro”. In the most cases, this created EXE files are named “dwm.exe”. When the system launches next time, Flagpro, which was placed in startup directory as “dwm.exe”, will be executed	['T1547.001']
+"For the first time, the ROKRAT sample used during the ""North Korean Human Rights"" contained a browser credentials stealer. The code used to perform this task in the same that found within in a Freenki sample deployed in 2016. The malware is able to extract the stored passwords from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox. For Chrome and Firefox, the malware queries the sqlite database containing the URL, username and password: Additionally, they support the Microsoft Vault mechanism. Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer"	['T1203']
+"Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. The victim is encouraged to click on an embedded URL hosted on sharingmymedia[.]com, which then downloads ObliqueRAT, the trojan discovered by Talos in 2020 associated with threat activity targeting entities in South Asia. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. In such cases, adversaries would deliver phishing maldocs to targets containing a malicious VBA macro that extracted either the CrimsonRAT executable or a ZIP archive embedded in the maldoc. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. Figure 2 shows the attackers' use of HTTrack, a free website copier program, to duplicate a legitimate website to use for their own malicious purposes. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. The malicious domain prompts the victim to enter their name and email address to sign up and download a seemingly important ""guide on pay and allowance. Upon clicking ""Download Now,"" a malicious XLS file is downloaded onto the victim's computer. After enabling macros, the file executes CrimsonRAT on the endpoint.Figure 4: The ""Download Now"" button contains a link to a malicious XLS with CrimsonRAT embedded in it"	['T1566.002']
+The indian-attack[.]blogspot[.]com does not contain any malicious exploit code or payloads, but has a theme of terrorism in India. A blog with a theme related to India closely resembles the India News Tribe (intribune[.]blogspot[.]com) blog that ProjectM used in Operation Transparent Tribe to deliver Crimson payloads	['T1608.004', 'T1566.001', 'T1189']
+HyperStack checks the configuration file to determine if the Type equals SilentMoon. If yes, it generates an RSA PKCS key using CryptGenKey that is used for encryption of communication session keys. It then writes the RSA key to the PRVK key in the [Version] section of the config file. Turla’s Carbon backdoor also implements RSA encryption on the session keys for some of its C&C channels	['T1573.001']
+In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. These files have most recently been found in use by criminals to deliver commodity RATs such as Flawed Ammyy. In DarkHydrus's case, the preferred payload retrieved in their previous attacks were exclusively open-source legitimate tools which they abuse for malicious purposes, such as Meterpreter and Cobalt Strike. However, in this instance, it appears that this group used a custom PowerShell based payload that we call RogueRobin	['T1588.002']
+Below is a snippet from the setup script used by Rocke in a previous campaign that also uses the serviced called netdns. After the file is created, the access and modified time is changed before the file is marked as non-modifiable	['T1222.002']
+They were able to compromise critical assets including production servers and database servers, and they even managed to gain full control of the Domain Controller	['T1190']
+One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection	['T1583.006']
+0.js also downloads two additional files from the C&C server (green.ddd and green.tmp) The first of these files, green.ddd, is an executable file internally named “SEDll_Win32.dll”. This is a known backdoor used by this actor since 2014 for the same purpose: decrypting and executing the final JavaScript backdoor “Orz	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+NetPass.exe: a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. Outlook scraper: a tool that scrapes dates, names, email addresses, and email bodies from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts. WebBrowserPassView: a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Mail PassView: a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. The bypass component is used for enumeration of network resources and either find writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet then writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk	['T1110.001']
+"Let's use the mmls utility from Brian Carrier's Sleuth Kit: Let's see what we have here. Let's take a closer look at apg.exe and use PPEE: This looks like TeamViewer and is signed as TeamViewer, so does this mean it indeed is TeamViewer. Judging by the file's size, it has nothing to do with the original msi.dll, so it is clearly DLL Search Order Hijacking. Another interesting file is TeamViewer.ini: Here is anti-forensics: according to the configuration file, our ""TeamViewer"" did not keep any logs, and was apparently used as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Well, not bad. To extract data from it, you can use RegRipper again. Let's take a look, at WinPrintSvc.exe, for instance: Remote Utilities is another remote management tool. Apparently, this is the source of Remote Utilities. If you continue scrolling through the timeline, you will see traces of a rather suspicious directory and file being created: Despite the strange extension, fnbfdnja.hej has a familiar header: What will a checksum search on VirusTotal show us. We already know that it is RTM, and since it is RTM, the most likely vector of infection is a phishing email. In this case, the victim used Microsoft Outlook, so we found the .ost file with mail data in its usual location, and in it — the exact phishing email we have been looking for: On a final note, let us check one more interesting artifact"	['T1219']
+sendport' Toggle the use of PORT commands. By default, ftp will attempt to use a PORT command when establishing a connection for each data transfer. The use of PORT commands can prevent delays when performing multiple file transfers. If the PORT command fails, ftp will use the default data port. When the use of PORT commands is disabled, no attempt will be made to use PORT commands for each data transfer. This is useful for certain FTP implementations which do ignore PORT commands but, incorrectly, indicate they've been accepted	['T1048.003']
+HermeticWiper then changes the CrashDumpEnabled registry key value to 0, under the System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CrashControl registry setting, so that memory dumps are disabled	['T1562.006']
+1) NetPass.exe is a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. 2) Outlook scraper is a tool that scrapes names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts. 3) WebBrowserPassView is a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. 4) Mail PassView is a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. The bypass component is used for the enumeration of network resources and either finds writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk. Emotet’s access to SMB can result in the infection of entire domains (servers and clients	['T1110.001']
+This wormable exploit did come into being and is known today as the Conficker worm. It has also been referred to as the Conficker virus, Downadup and Kido. Conficker became one of the fastest and largest worm infections since the Sasser infection of 2004. Conficker's logic includes mechanisms to generate lists of new domain names on a daily basis to seek out Internet rendezvous points that the authors use for updates and for command and control of the machines infected. Conficker also uses binary validation techniques to ensure that updates are signed by its authors. So far, Conficker infected machines have not been used for any nefarious purposes, but the viability of a botnet of thousands, perhaps millions of computers available for use by criminal's remains a possibility. Furthermore, Conficker blocks access to security related sites such as Symantec or McAfee, thus preventing users from downloading tools to remove the infection	['T1562.001']
+The C# variant of Zebrocy is similar to other variants in functionality, but also has several unique attributes that are worth discussing. Like other Zebrocy tools, the C# variant gathers the storage volume serial number to use in outbound beacons to the C2 server. In this particular variant, the tool uses the Windows API function GetVolumeInformation to get the serial number of the C: drive. This variant of Zebrocy also takes a screenshot that it will transmit to the C2 server in JPEG format	['T1113']
+Attackers and groups routinely use file and URL scanning services to help develop and modify their malware to evade detections. We were already familiar with OilRig’s testing and development efforts as discussed in our previous blog, and we continually watch for changes to OilRig’s development techniques to give us insight into their methods. Gaining this developmental insight sheds light on OilRig’s advanced capabilities, giving us a more complete threat actor profile	['T1027.005']
+The Komplex payload uses the SERVERS variable to obtain the location of its C2, which it communicates with using HTTP POST requests. The payload generates a URL to communicate with its C2 server that has the following structure	['T1071.001']
+"The script downloads a file from GitHub called ""libprocesshider,"" which hides a file called ""x7"" using the ID preloader. The script looks for IP addresses in known_hosts and attempts to SSH into them, before downloading ""a7"" again from the actor's HFS at 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, and execute it"	['T1562.001', 'T1518.001', 'T1140', 'T1562.004', 'T1018', 'T1036.005']
+Analysis also revealed that the threat actors used compromised staging targets to download the source code for several intended targets’ websites. Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network (VPN) connections	['T1189']
+Emails dating more than three years prior to malware execution have been included in the collected EmailStorage folder, meaning that there may not be a date limit for the email enumerator. Kroll has identified instances where specific email messages were deleted within the EmailStorage folder. In some instances, the entire EmailStorage folder is deleted once messages have all been exfiltrated. Based on observed cases, there was no evidence that attachments were included in the collected data. Kroll collaborators at the National Cyber Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA) observed Qakbot samples sending SMTP traffic indicative of outbound spam thread hijackings	['T1070.004']
+Some of the native functionality that the malware provides without the use of a plugin includes collecting system data—such as computer name, username, current process, operating system (OS) version, local system time, and the current process that the malware is masquerading as (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033], Process Discovery [T1057], System Time Discovery [T1124], Masquerading [T1036]). The program also contains native C2 capabilities allowing it to communicate with the remote operator using an embedded SOCKS proxy or via domain name system (DNS) tunneling (Proxy [T1090	['T1090']
+Upon initialization, two optional command-line parameters may be used to specify how long the malware will sleep before destruction begins and the system is restarted	['T1497.003']
+The Lazarus group has been observed using Windows commands that differ from Andariel, such as preferring the “-ano” option with the “netstat” command and “find” as a filter command, rather than “findstr	['T1057']
+In most cases, the MSI file executed a function from the embedded DLL, but there were also other cases where a VBS script was used in place of the DLL	['T1218.007', 'T1218.007']
+We aim to support as many browsers and assistive technologies as possible, so our users can choose the best fitting tools for them, with as few limitations as possible	['T1555.003']
+We confirmed two different techniques used for distributing the Melcoz backdoor: the AutoIt loader script and DLL Hijack	['T1059']
+creates a scheduled task with the following naming convention (e.g “Notepad++ autoupdate#94654”): [random folder name in %APPDATA%] autoupdate#[random_number] - Writes NTFS ADS files ($TASK, $GUID, $FILE	['T1053.005']
+The threat actors tend to install malware on a large proportion of hosts during their intrusions. For example, the threat actors deleted volume shadow copies after using them for NTDS.dit retrieval	['T1070.004']
+psexec.py: PSEXEC like functionality example using RemComSvc (https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom). - smbexec.py: A similar approach to PSEXEC w/o using RemComSvc. Our implementation goes one step further, instantiating a local smbserver to receive the output of the commands. This is useful in the situation where the target machine does NOT have a writeable share available. atexec.py: This example executes a command on the target machine through the Task Scheduler service and returns the output of the executed command. wmiexec.py: A semi-interactive shell, used through Windows Management Instrumentation. dcomexec.py: A semi-interactive shell similar to wmiexec.py, but using different DCOM endpoints	['T1047']
+The macros are different. In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated	['T1204.002']
+The cyber offensive programs attributed to these groups, targeting organizations around the world, have been documented for years. Their goals have ranged from gathering data around military technologies to crypto currency theft from leading exchanges	['T1027']
+The malware also loads shellcode in an additional resource, MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb, which contains the METALJACK payload. The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com	['T1033']
+As has been previously reported, there are two variants of the trojan TinkaOTP. The version that has received the most attention contains the malware payload in the application bundle’s Resources folder. The file is a Mach-O binary disguised as a .nib file, at ../Resources/Base.lproj/Submenu.nib	['T1036']
+In addition to WiFi profiles, the executable collects extensive information about the system, including FTP clients, browsers, file downloaders, and machine info (username, computer name, OS name, CPU architecture, RAM) and adds them to a list (Figure 7	['T1082']
+The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. The backdoor's primary purpose is to download and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines	['T1105']
+We identified two lure ZIP files being used by Static Kitten designed to trick users into downloading a purported report on relations between Arab countries and Israel, or a file relating to scholarships. The URLs distributed through these phishing emails direct recipients to the intended file storage location on Onehub, a legitimate service known to be used by Static Kitten for nefarious purposes. 6] Anomali Threat Research has identified that Static Kitten is continuing to use Onehub to host a file containing ScreenConnect	['T1102.002', 'T1583.006']
+id-server connection . Post-Exploitation Analysis . During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software. We then observed the threat actors interact with the compromised host using the ScreenConnect software, executing the following commands. Another instance of SharpChisel with different settings is executed, this time using PowerShell using the following command line: This time, traffic will be forwarded to the server over port 443. The use of the following command provides additional evidence to support our assumption: The command connects to the C&C server, downloads procdump64.exe, and saves the file in the C:\programdata directory. The following PowerShell command was used for this: The command downloads out1.exe and saves the file in the C:\users\public\ directory. This is unexpected since we believe this attack is connected to the MuddyWater threat actors — and in other connected campaigns, the attackers have shown higher levels of technical skill. sXpIBdPeKzI9PC2p0SWMpUSM2NSxWzPyXTMLlbXmYa0R20xk . This website uses cookies for website functionality, traffic analytics, personalization, social media functionality and advertising. OFF ON Keyboard Navigation (Motor) Use website with the keyboard This profile enables motor-impaired persons to operate the website using the keyboard Tab, Shift+Tab, and the Enter keys. 2) Keyboard navigation optimization: The background process also adjusts the website’s HTML and adds various behaviors using JavaScript code to make the website operable by the keyboard. If you wish to contact the website’s owner, please use the website's form . Hide Accessibility Interface	['T1090.002']
+The zipped file contains malicious JavaScript, masquerading as a browser update. A second JavaScript file is then executed by wscript.exe. This JavaScript first profiles the computer using commands such as whoami, net user, and net group, then uses PowerShell to download additional discovery related PowerShell scripts	['T1059.007']
+In requesting commands, sending execution results of OS commands or collected authentication information, Flagpro accesses a C&C server with specific URL paths and queries. It encodes data with Base64 and sends to the C&C server. Following table shows relations between Flagpro’s activities and the URL paths and queries	['T1132.001']
+Based on our observation, we strongly believe that there are more targeted devices from other vendors. This malware is modular in nature and it is likely that each vendor has different modules and architectures that were thought out well by the Cyclops Blink actors. But what is evident is that Cyclops Blink is an advanced piece of malware that focuses on persistence and the ability to survive domain sinkhole attempts and the takedown of its infrastructure. The APT group behind this malware has learned from its VPNFilter campaigns and continues to attack IoT devices such as routers	['T1105']
+After entering their credentials into the fake login page, victims were redirected to the legitimate website where they were automatically logged into a valid session or were prompted to enter their credentials again. Numerous spoofed domains referenced the targeted universities' online library systems, indicating the threat actors' intent to gain access to these resources	['T1598.003']
+In addition, the malware automatically saves all incoming files from the attacker to its own folder. By this means, attackers can push additional malicious tools to an infected computer	['T1105']
+192 file extensions Comparing file extension. The wiper will overwrite the content of each file with 1MB worth of 0xCC bytes and rename them by appending each filename with a random four-byte extension. Wiping the file. Finally, it attempts to flush all file buffers to disk and stop all running processes (including itself) by calling ExitWindowsEx Windows API with EWX_SHUTDOWN flag	['T1485']
+Current builds of Ryuk no longer contain persistence functionality. Previously, to remain persistent on the host, Ryuk created a registry entry under the Run key using Windows cmd.exe shell. The following command line was used to write to the Registry Run Key name svchos to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value being the path to the Ryuk executable	['T1106', 'T1059.003', 'T1547.001']
+Change file modes or Access Control Lists. Generally used by malware in order to give executable permissions to an executable payload retrieved remotely from a C2	['T1222.002']
+CactusPete (also known as Karma Panda or Tonto Team) is an APT group that has been publicly known since at least 2013. Historically, their activity has been focused on military, diplomatic and infrastructure targets in Asia and Eastern Europe	['T1203']
+COBALT GYPSY has used spearphishing to target telecommunications, government, defense, oil, and financial services organizations based in or affiliated with the MENA region, identifying individual victims through social media sites	['T1566.003']
+Konni Infection chain consists of multiple stages and utilizes living-off-the-land binaries in its operation from the use of certutil.exe to download additional files and decode their content to sc.exe and reg.exe for persistence	['T1059.003']
+In March, we came across an email with a malware attachment that used the Gamaredon group’s tactics. Some of the emails used the coronavirus pandemic as a topic to lure victims into opening emails and attachments	['T1566.001']
+The backdoor’s communication with the C&C server (sarmsoftware[.]com) is HTTP based on port 443 with port 80 as fallback	['T1071.001', 'T1008']
+After verifying the user is an admin, the threat actor gathers information about the domain controllers and their IP addresses using an additional Base64-encoded and compressed PowerShell command	['T1482']
+BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration. HOMEFRY: a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with AIRBREAK and BADFLICK backdoors	['T1070.004']
+At the moment we are receiving many inquiries about how to check systems for a Flame infection. Of course the simplest answer, for us, is to advise to use Kaspersky Lab Antivirus or Internet Security. We successfully detect and delete all possible modifications of the main module and extra components of Flame	['T1518.001']
+Blue Mockingbird is the name we’ve given to a cluster of similar activity we’ve observed involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. Gaining entry . In at least two incident response (IR) engagements, Blue Mockingbird has exploited public-facing web applications (T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application) that implemented Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX. The exploitation of this CVE is not unique to Blue Mockingbird, but it has been a common point of entry. In telemetry, investigators will notice w3wp.exe writing the DLLs to disk and then immediately loading them into memory afterward. Execution and evasion . The primary payload distributed by Blue Mockingbird is a version of XMRIG packaged as a DLL. Come for the exploit, stay for the mining . Blue Mockingbird leveraged multiple techniques for persistence during incidents. It executed the following command: Since COR_PROFILER was configured, every process that loaded the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime would execute the command above, re-establishing persistence. In at least one engagement, we observed Blue Mockingbird seemingly experimenting with different tools to create SOCKS proxies (T1090: Proxy) for pivoting. These were accompanied by cleartext references to command-line options common to XMRIG: The final piece of evidence came from a text log written to disk by some versions of the miner DLL. So far, we’ve identified two wallet addresses used by Blue Mockingbird that are in active circulation	['T1569.002']
+Compared to other adversary groups, C0d0so0 has shown the use of more sophisticated tactics and tools and has been linked to leveraging zero-day exploits on numerous occasions in combination with watering hole and spear phishing attacks	['T1189']
+The message box distracts the user as TrickBot’s payload is downloaded, stored in the %TEMP% folder, and executed. A new process injects the TrickBot payload into a svchost.exe process	['T1055.012']
+Zirconium is using what are referred to as web bugs, or web beacons, tied to a domain they purchased and populated with content. The actor then sends the associated URL in either email text or an attachment to a targeted account. Although the domain itself may not have malicious content, the web bug allows Zirconium to check if a user attempted to access the site. For nation-state actors, this is a simple way to perform reconnaissance on targeted accounts to determine if the account is valid or the user is active	['T1583.001']
+iSIGHT Partners has been monitoring the Sandworm Team’s activities from late 2013 and throughout 2014 – the genesis of this team appears to be around 2009. The team prefers the use of spear-phishing with malicious document attachments to target victims. The team has recently used multiple exploit methods to trap its targets including the use of BlackEnergy crimeware, exploitation of as many as two known vulnerabilities simultaneously, and this newly observed Microsoft Windows zero-day	['T1566.001']
+The first spam run on August 31 used a Rich Text Format (RTF) document laden with malicious macros. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster	['T1059.005']
+The loader processes them one by one. Then, it fetches the relocation offset (AND EAX,0xFFF), gets the pointed address and performs calculation – by removing old ImageBase (it’s value is hardcoded) and applying the new base – offset to the dynamically allocated memory where the unpacked code was copied	['T1055.012']
+computer name - username - operating system version and bitness - whether Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia (an application, popular in Brazil, to protect access to online banking) is installed - list of installed security products	['T1562.004', 'T1518.001', 'T1518.001']
+This variant of TrickBot employs a new, unique ability to steal passwords from KeePass, a free, open- source password manager. TrickBot's KeePass stealing capabilities seem to be inspired (or even partially copy-pasted) from a publicly available tool dubbed PoshKPBrute, a script that performs a dictionary attack against KeePass .kdbx files. Once it finds the dictionary key, it dumps all passwords as an output and sends the attackers the master password	['T1552.001', 'T1555.005']
+The developer decided to remove the MFC library and put almost all the code in a unique function. The number of functions is divided by three. If the target would have a proxy, the malware would not be able to communicate outside. The attacker retrieves the proxy configuration in the registry: The network communication is divided in two parts. The first part uses the Microsoft Windows Wininet library. The purpose is to send reconnaissance information to the attackers. The malware sent to the operator the following information: the campaign ID (named Flag by the developer), the hostname of the compromised system, the IP address, the OS version, the proxy server of the system and if the system is running on VMware. To get this information, the attacker the VMXh-Magic-Value (0x0a). The second part of the communication is dedicated to the orders and the exfiltration. You can see in the screenshot 0x4E3 (1251 - Cyrillic Russian) and 0x362 (866 - DOS Cyrillic Russian): Sha256: 43606116e03672d5c2bca7d072caa573d3fc2463795427d6f5abfa25403bd280 C2 for the orders: dnsdns1[.]PassAs[.]us C2 URL for reconnaissance: hxxp://fund[.]cmc[.]or[.]kr/UploadFile/fame/x/o0.asp	['T1012']
+In addition to its own information stealing capabilities, the Astaroth Trojan campaign also uses an external feature NetPass. NetPass is one of the downloaded payload files renamed to lrdsnhrxxferyb.jpg	['T1555', 'T1552']
+These two families share multiple code similarities and have been developed and operated by Kimsuky at least since 2017	['T1587.001']
+Attempts to remain hidden from cybersecurity analysis by explicitly checking its environment for signs of debugging. Leverages existing Windows registry key that is enabled by default in Windows 10 to store configuration data. Employs polymorphic code, changing its runtime footprint during code execution to thwart memory analysis and evade signaturing. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools	['T1497.003']
+The Bazar loader gives the attacker its initial foothold in the environment, while the Bazar backdoor establishes persistence. The Bazar backdoor can lead to disrupted business continuity, data loss, and full compromise, undermining trust in an organization	['T1105']
+The Darkhotel APT will relentlessly spearphish specific targets in order to successfully compromise systems. Some targets are spearphished repeatedly with much the same social-engineering schemes. For example, the attachment “schedule(2.11~16).rar” could be sent on February 10th, with Darkhotel returning to the same targets in late May for a second attempt with attachment “schedule(6.1~6).rar	['T1204.002', 'T1566.001']
+After confirming an active Internet connection, the Komplex payload begins carrying out its main functionality. The Komplex payload uses an 11-byte XOR algorithm to decrypt strings used for configuration and within C2 communications, including the C2 domains themselves. Figure 8 shows a screenshot of Komplex’s custom string decryption algorithm, along with the XOR key used to decrypt strings within the payload	['T1573.001']
+The payload communicates with its C2 server laceibagrafica[.]com by issuing HTTP POST requests with base64 encoded and encrypted messages in the data section. We had not seen any previous explanation of this C2 channel, so we will provide an overview of the back and forth communications between the payload and C2 server to show how this payload uses the names in Table 4. To do this analysis, we created a C2 server to interact with the Spark payload to issue commands, so all of the HTTP responses in this section are from the C2 server we created and not an actor developed C2 software. Figure 6 shows an initial beacon sent from the payload to its C2 server. However, all of the outbound requests from the payload to the C2 will look similar visually, as they all use HTTP POST requests to the same URL with encoded and encrypted messages	['T1132.001', 'T1071.001']
+The BeagleBoyz have used a variety of techniques, such as spearphishing and watering holes, to enable initial access into targeted financial institutions	['T1189']
+At the end of the Main function, it creates another thread whose function is to collect credentials from a variety of software on the victim’s machine. It can collect user credentials from the system registry, local profile files, SQLite database files, and so on. Once it has captured the credentials of one the software packages it is looking for, it immediately sends it to the C&C server. One HTTP packet contains the credentials of one software package	['T1082']
+The second portion of EnvyScout is a modified version of the open-source tool FileSaver, which is intended to assist in the writing of files to disk via JavaScript. The code is borrowed directly from the publicly available variants with minor alterations, including whitespace removal, conversion of hex parameters to decimal, and renamed variables. By combining this code with components #3 and #4 detailed below, NOBELIUM effectively implements a methodology known as HTML smuggling	['T1027.006']
+Notable Differences The OopsIE Trojan delivered in this attack had functional code that was very similar to the OopsIE variant discussed in our previous blog. The main similarities include the use of a scheduled task to persistently execute on the system, as well as the same general process to communicate with its C2 server. For instance, this Trojan uses the InternetExplorer application object much like the previous OopsIE Trojan and a very similar sequence of requests to obtain commands. Also, this version of the Trojan inspects HTTP responses from the C2 server for the tags <pre> and </pre> and will parse that data for commands. However, there are many differences introduced to this version of OopsIE from the previously discussed variant. The following code snippet was used to decode strings within OopsIE	['T1059.003', 'T1027']
+In order to deploy an implant for the final payload, ScarCruft uses a multi-stage binary infection scheme. This malware uses the public privilege escalation exploit code CVE-2018-8120 or UACME which is normally used by legitimate red teams. The downloader malware uses the configuration file and connects to the C2 server to fetch the next payload. In order to evade network level detection, the downloader uses steganography. The downloaded payload is an image file, but it contains an appended malicious payload to be decrypted	['T1102.002']
+While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are	['T1074.001']
+The infrastructure behind the malware attacks showed good compartmentalization of identities. We rarely found the same (fake) registration information used for more than one C2 domain. Stealth Falcon operators also appear to have deleted one of their attack domains, adhostingcache.com when they realized their attempt to target Donaghy had failed. We also noted that the (self-signed) SSL certificates on the C2 domains were changed several times as we monitored the infrastructure, perhaps in an attempt to thwart fingerprinting of their infrastructure via SSL certificates	['T1573.001']
+In this step, the attacker is using the publicly available requestbin.net DNS tunneling service, in order to get updates about the macros infection progress	['T1071.004']
+pa – Instructions for malicious framework to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token and inject itself into a new “svchost.exe -k netsvcs” process	['T1055.004']
+OSX/Keydnap uses a Tor2Web proxy for command and control. As noted by ESET, the main backdoor component (icloudsyncd) uses this proxy for communication purposes: “Keydnap is using the onion.to Tor2Web proxy over HTTPS to report back to its C&C server	['T1071.001', 'T1090.003']
+"The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. Finally, the archive is encoded before being sent to the C2. Afterward, the module will delete old ""sft"" files assuming they were already exfiltrated. After a pause of 6,500 milliseconds, it will start its search for the targeted files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp"	['T1560.003']
+As noted, Apple (quickly-ish) revoked the Developer code-signing certificate(s) that were used to sign the malicious payloads	['T1059.004']
+In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack	['T1203']
+Many MFA providers allow for users to accept a phone app push notification or to receive a phone call and press a key as a second factor. The threat actor took advantage of this and issued multiple MFA requests to the end user’s legitimate device until the user accepted the authentication, allowing the threat actor to eventually gain access to the account	['T1621']
+While the QuietSieve malware family is primarily geared towards the exfiltration of data from the compromised host, it can also receive and execute a remote payload from the operator. These payloads are written to the user’s Application Data folder with a random alphanumeric name and are executed in a hidden window	['T1113', 'T1564.003']
+The developer rewrote a large part of the code however the workflow is the same as previously and some features are copy/paste. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. The code is not exactly the same but the workflow and some constants are similar	['T1027']
+Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past. This campaign hides the ObliqueRAT payload in seemingly benign image files hosted on compromised websites	['T1204.001']
+Pre-2018 variants use the registry for persistence and create the following entry: Key: HKCU\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Value: MSBuild Data: %APPDATA%\MSConsole\MSBuild.exe	['T1547.001']
+Javali targets Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries, active since November 2017 and primarily focusing on the customers of financial institutions located in Brazil and Mexico. Javali uses multistage malware and distributes its initial payload via phishing emails, as an attachment or link to a website	['T1105', 'T1566.002', 'T1218.007', 'T1059.005', 'T1204.002']
+Inside the “��main_request_session_key” routine, SUNSHUTTLE constructs an HTTPS request to its configured C2. Upon an HTTP 200 response from the request, the response data from the C2 is expected to not contain the following string for the sample analyzed	['T1071.001']
+Intro The Ryuk threat actors went from a phishing email to domain wide ransomware in 5 hours. They escalated privileges using Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472), less than 2 hours after the initial phish. They used tools such as Cobalt Strike, AdFind, WMI, and PowerShell to accomplish their objective. Ryuk has been one	['T1018']
+This time the malware was marketed and distributed by a legitimate-looking company called CoinGoTrade on their website coingotrade[.]com (Acquire Infrastructure: Domain [T1583.001	['T1583.001']
+1) Gathered system info from WMI 2) Gathered the ARP table 3) Gathered a list of running processes 4) Materialized a file “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” to disk. This file gathers passwords and web browser data from a variety of sources: Windows Credential Vault, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Outlook. some Internet Explorer password gathering code appears to be lifted from the GPLv3-licensed QuasarRAT88) 5) Executed “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” 6) Deleted “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” 7) Gathered a list of running processes again	['T1555.003', 'T1057', 'T1555.004', 'T1555']
+Turla exploited the signed VirtualBox driver, VBoxDrv.sys v1.6.2, to deactivate DSE and load its unsigned payload drivers afterward	['T1068', 'T1553.006']
+The FROMNET routine sends a request to the server using the WinINet API as well and returns the data from the response. To get an updated configuration and override the hardcoded values, the ransomware sends HTTP GET requests using the same headers as before, to	['T1071.001']
+This saves screenshots as c:\system\screenshot.bmp and sends it to the C2 server at 46.166.165.254 every 60 minutes	['T1113']
+The tool was primarily used by the attackers to move laterally on the victim’s network. PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. WinSCP: Open source FTP client used to exfiltrate data from targeted organizations. LogMeIn: Cloud-based remote access software. It’s unclear whether the attackers gained unauthorized access to the victim’s LogMeIn accounts or whether they created their own	['T1219']
+"That code, Carmakal says, is signed with stolen certificates that make it look more legitimate. LockerGoga then rapidly encrypts the computer's files. On an average system within a few minutes, it is toast,"" wrote Kevin Beaumont, a UK security researcher, in an analysis of the Norsk Hydro attack"	['T1553.002']
+Enabling these features gives the threat actor a remote control channel to persistently access the victim's environment without using malicious software that could be detected	['T1021.006']
+Password from successful login to the infected server: Whenever someone logs in a system infected with Linux/Ebury, the sshd daemon will save the password and send it to the exfiltration server. Any password login attempt to the infected server: Even if the attempt is unsuccessful, the username and password used will be sent to the operators. Password on successful login from the infected server: When someone uses the ssh client on an infected server, Linux/Ebury will intercept the password and sent it to its exfiltration server. Private key passphrase: When the ssh client on an infected server prompts the user for an private key passphrase, the passphrase will be sent to the remote exfiltration server. Unencrypted private key: When a private key is used to authenticate to a remote server, the unencrypted version is intercepted by the malware. Unlike passwords, it will not send the key to the exfiltration server. Instead, it will store it memory and wait for the operators to fetch the key with the Xcat command. Private keys added to the OpenSSH agent with ssh-add: The keys added to an OpenSSH agent are also intercepted by the malware. Both the unencrypted key itself and the passphrase typed by the user will be logged	['T1556']
+Once executed, NavRAT will immediately leverage cmd.exe to perform a systeminfo and a tasklist check on the system it is running on while writing the output to a TMP file, once again attempting to hide within an AhnLab folder	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+The Windows version of the malicious cryptocurrency application is an MSI Installer. The installer looks legitimate and has a valid digital signature from Sectigo (Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates [T1588.004]). The signature was signed with a code signing certificate purchased by the same user as the SSL certificate for jmttrading[.]org (Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates [T1588.003]). The MSI Installer asks the victim for administrative privileges to run (User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002	['T1204.002']
+"Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. In order to compromise their victims, the threat actors sent the trojanized Microsoft Word documents, probably via email. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named ""MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx"", that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan. Once the victim opens the document, it fetches a remove template from the actor-controlled website, hxxp://droobox[.]online:80/luncher.doc. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine"	['T1221', 'T1059.005', 'T1204.002']
+In situations where the primary C2 server does not return a response to the HTTP POST request described in the previous section, the malware fails back to using a DGA algorithm. The algorithm used by this malware is time-based and can be calculated using the values of year and month. A list of DGA domains is below: Figure 8: 12 Month DGA Genearation The malware will initiate DNS lookups for each domain generated by the DGA algorithm. The malware will perform a DNS query of the active DGA domain and expects that two IP addresses will be returned from the name server managing the DGA domain's namespace. The malware will then compute a secondary C2 server by performing a series of bit operations on the returned IP address values and combine them to determine the actual fallback C2 server address to use for subsequent C2 operations	['T1568.002']
+Beginning in January 2021, Mandiant Managed Defense observed multiple instances of abuse of Microsoft Exchange Server within at least one client environment. Our investigation revealed that the files created on the Exchange servers were owned by the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, a privileged local account on the Windows operating system. Furthermore, the process that created the web shell was UMWorkerProcess.exe, the process responsible for Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging Service. In subsequent investigations, we observed malicious files created by w3wp.exe, the process responsible for the Exchange Server web front-end	['T1078.003']
+Is important to highlight that among Retro’s documented techniques, it leverages malicious instances of msfte.dll, oci.dll and lame_enc.dll, and via Phantom DLL Hijacking. As previously documented, Ramsay also uses this technique in some of its versions also using msfte.dll and oci.dll	['T1574.001']
+In 2019, the actor behind Bisonal used a new way to deploy the machine on the target's systems. So next time the user opens an Office application, the malware will be loaded and executed. The purpose of the malware is to deploy Bisonal on the infected system ($tmp$\tmplogon.exe) and to create a Run registry key in order to execute Bisonal at the next reboot of the system. If you look at the report after executing the malicious document, you only see one action: the .wll file creation. The user also needs to open an Office application and finally a reboot is needed in order to execute the real payload: Bisonal	['T1204.002']
+The scheduled task will then run every five minutes, which provides persistent execution of the downloader script. The task itself is fairly simple, calling the VBScript file which contains a PowerShell one-liner as an argument to run the QUADAGENT payload (ex	['T1053.005', 'T1053.005']
+Communications between Cyclops Blink clients and servers are protected under Transport Layer Security (TLS) (T1071.001), using individually generated keys and certificates. Sandworm manages Cyclops Blink by connecting to the C2 layer through the Tor network	['T1090.003']
+It calls the following series of API calls to inject itself on the remote process before it exits	['T1106']
+After uploading these files, take advantage of the pre-built queries within BloodHound. These queries are a great way to start obtaining important information about your environment. Queries include: viewing all domain administrators; viewing users with the most local administrator rights; or viewing computers with the most administrative user access. One of these queries gives you the ability to map domain trusts, as shown in Figure 3	['T1087.002']
+Once the environment is checked, the backdoor will check for network connectivity by sending an HTTP GET request to hxxp://www.w3[.]org/1999/XSL/Format, ensuring the response is “This is another XSL namespace\n	['T1016.001']
+BazarLoader (aka Kegtap) consists of a loader and a backdoor component. The loader is responsible for installing and executing the backdoor element. The latest version of the loader contains a large amount of string and code obfuscation, and it has been observed utilizing a novel technique of mimicking legitimate software for persistence. CrowdStrike technical analysis has specifically revealed the loader mimicking communications software such as Softphone	['T1036.005']
+The victims of the new variant of the Bisonal backdoor, according to our telemetry, were from financial and military sectors located in Eastern Europe. Our research started from only one sample, but by using the Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE) we found 300+ almost identical samples. The target location forced the group to use a hardcoded Cyrillic codepage during string manipulations. This is important, for example, during remote shell functionality, to correctly handle the Cyrillic output from executed commands	['T1059.003']
+After establishing a session key, GoldMax reaches out to its C2 server to receive, decrypt (AES-256), parse, and execute commands. To retrieve an encrypted C2 command from its C2 server, GoldMax sends an HTTP GET request. This HTTP GET request only contains a single Cookie value, which matches the Cookie value used during the session key establishment process (the User-Agent and Connection headers and values are hardcoded, as before	['T1071.001']
+As with the spearphishing email, the lure documents' content attempts to convince the victim to click on another malicious URL and download a .ZIP file	['T1204.002']
+"If the victim clicks the ""Enable Content"" button, thinking it will make the image visible, a malicious macro is executed"	['T1204.002']
+It uses the following part of the script to determine the environment it is running on so that it can set the DLL version to use	['T1082']
+The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them	['T1205']
+"PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with ""X-"" (e.g. X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords. Hunter usage"	['T1046']
+The link leads to an executable file which is a downloader for a previously unknown malware family that we now know as Tomiris	['T1105']
+Trickbot (detected by Trend Micro as TSPY_TRICKBOT.THOIBEAI) now has a password grabber module that steals access from several applications and browsers	['T1552.001']
+Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. In observed instances the DLL is downloaded to C:\windows\system32\drivers\, renamed with a .sys extension, and then executed by rundll32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script. This simplistic implementation allows for a low footprint for the actor, as they can download and run new code without changes to the compromised endpoint by just updating the hosted DLL. The compromised website used to host the DLL is different for every compromised network and includes websites of medical device manufacturers and IT service providers	['T1218.011', 'T1036.005', 'T1102']
+The use of script-based backdoors is a common technique used by the OilRig group as we have previously documented. QUADAGENT is the 12th custom built tool that Unit 42 has documented the OilRig group using for their attacks. In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The use of malicious macro delivery documents is a tactic we have observed the OilRig group use repeatedly over the three years we’ve been tracking them. The document also contained a lure image, similar to ones commonly found in malicious macro documents which ask the user to click on “Enable Content” as seen in Figure 2. We captured the commands we ran in Invoke-Obfuscation in the animation in Figure 3 below, which visualizes the steps the threat actor may have taken to create the payload delivered in this attack. While we do not have data supporting targeting information or telemetry, we know the document was created in January 2018 and likely used in an attack around that time frame. This IP and msoffice-cdn[.]com were both previously referenced in our first report on an OilRig attack using the ThreeDollars delivery document	['T1204.002']
+Once installed on a victim’s computer, Oldrea gathers system information, along with lists of files, programs installed, and root of available drives. It will also extract data from the computer’s Outlook address book and VPN configuration files. This data is then written to a temporary file in an encrypted format before being sent to a remote command-and-control (C&C) server controlled by the attackers	['T1560', 'T1083']
+MuddyWater operators use a series of compromised websites that act as proxies in order to conceal the real address of the C2 server. Infected endpoints connect randomly to one of the proxy servers, which in turn relays the information to the C2. Operators use the C2 to dispatch commands and receive exfiltrated data	['T1041', 'T1090.002']
+In this campaign, Earth Vetala threat actors used spearphishing emails and lure documents against organizations within the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Azerbaijan. The phishing emails and lure documents contain embedded URLs linking to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute archives containing the ScreenConnect remote administrator tool. ScreenConnect is a legitimate application that allows systems administrators to manage their enterprise systems remotely	['T1219']
+1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. 19: Check if a mouse is present. 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 2) 1: Get the name of the environment in which Microsoft Excel is running, as text, followed by the environment’s version number. 3) 19: Check if a mouse is present. 4) 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. Microsoft’s command line licensing tool slmgr.vbs is also able to provide similar results. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt	['T1120']
+This new variant of FakeM shared the same functional code as its predecessors, but again the communications with the C2 dramatically differed from the other variants. Communications between this variant and the C2 server leverage what Unit 42 believes is modified SSL code, as the code is very similar to the FakeM SSL variant. The code appears to use Diffie-Hellman for key exchange and the RC4 algorithm like FakeM SSL; however, the initial packet sent to the C2 server did not contain a “client hello” message, which is required to initiate an SSL handshake. Instead, the initial packet sent data as seen in Figure 13	['T1041', 'T1041']
+In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities. The custom-developed malware is fully featured an includes these capabilities	['T1105', 'T1120']
+Next, the malware enumerates all .exe programs in the %System% folder and looks for an original signed Windows binary that imports from at least one KnownDll and from a library that is not in the KnownDll directory. At the time of writing, the dropper supports aepic.dll, sspisrv.dll, ftllib.dll, and userenv.dll to host the malicious FinFisher payload. Finally, a new Windows service is created with the service path pointing to the candidate .exe located in this new directory together with the freshly created, benign-looking DLL	['T1543.003']
+In the above decompiled code, we see that the pisloader is generating the following string, which eventually is called to set the Run registry key	['T1059.003']
+While investigating the Confucius threat actor, we found a recent spear phishing campaign that utilizes Pegasus spyware-related lures to entice victims into opening a malicious document downloading a file stealer	['T1204.001']
+Once the user opens the “.lnk” file, the embedded HTA file will be executed via “mshta.exe”, it then writes a PowerShell script name “3.ps1” in the “%TEMP%” directory. The PowerShell script is then executed using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) in a hidden window via WMI Tasks	['T1047', 'T1059.003']
+It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The malware moves each located document into the AppData folder, inserts malicious Word or Excel macros into it using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object, and then moves the document back into its original folder. In the samples we analyzed, the injected macros were simple downloaders	['T1559.001']
+The contents above use the DDE functionality in Microsoft Word to run a PowerShell script to download the Koadic payload from a remote server, save it as an executable file on the system and then execute the payload	['T1559.002', 'T1059.001', 'T1218.011']
+Dragos identified PARISITE activity targeting ICS-related entities using known virtual private network (VPN) vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities affect Fortinet, PulseSecure, and Palo Alto Networks VPN appliances. PARISITE’s current focus of targeting vulnerable VPN appliances indicates an interest in initial access to enterprise networks, including industrial networks	['T1190']
+All of them include dependencies needed to run QEMU in installerdata.dmg from which all files are copied over to /usr/local/bin and have appropriate permissions set along the way. Persistence is achieved by adding plist files in /Library/LaunchDaemons with RunAtLoad set to true. They also have KeepAlive set to true, ensuring the process will be restarted if stopped	['T1543.004']
+The first testing activity we observed began with an initial sample created on June 13, 2016 with 17 subsequent files created for testing purposes that the actor created in a two-hour period on June 15, 2016. Table 1shows the samples we observed associated with the June 2016 testing activity, including the iteration, the last modified timestamp, the hash, the filename, and the antivirus detection rate of the newly created file. The first “ttt.xls” file and the files with incrementing filenames have the same decoy contents, which is the reason we initially included this sample with this group despite the difference in naming. Also, the filename “ttt.xls” contains the acronym for “to the top”, which is common usage in Internet forums and could depict the actor starting testing activities	['T1027.005']
+We found four different trojaned binaries in use since July 2019. The 5kplayer, driver pack and Firefox trojanized software use a service to achieve persistence. The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. The setup deploys three files which are part of the toolset: rmaserv.exe, winprint32.exe and mssqldbserv.xml	['T1059.001']
+This function returns Office 365 instances and information when the latest changes have been made (e.g	['T1526']
+32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly	['T1547.001']
+This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server. It uses the Dropbox API with a hardcoded bearer access token and has the ability to download, upload, and execute files	['T1102.002']
+We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report	['T1082']
+To operate correctly, it needs elevated administrative privileges which it attempts to obtain using the standard UAC prompt	['T1548.002']
+In this case, after the payload is delivered via an exploit the threat actor places files (named upload.bat, upload.rar, and period.txt, download.txt or silent.txt) in a directory on a Dropbox account. The malware beacons to this directory using the hardcoded API token and attempts to download these files (which are deleted from the Dropbox account after the download	['T1083']
+Many of these domains use valid SSL certificates, likely to make the spoofed pages appear authentic. The overwhelming majority of the certificates observed in 2019 were issued by Let's Encrypt, a nonprofit organization that programmatically issues free certificates. However, past campaigns used certificates issued by the Comodo certificate authority	['T1588.004']
+In the most recent variants of Linux/Ebury, strings are obfuscated with a simple XOR encryption with a static key. After unpacking, the malware loads various functions it requires using multiple calls to the dlsym function. Linux/Ebury then discovers the original executable address space by calling dlopen(NULL, RTLD_NOW) and passing the returned handle to dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, …). This will work even if ASLR is enabled on a system. This behaviour gives Linux/Ebury the ability to walk the import table of an ELF executable and replace the original imported function address in memory. The result is that when the programsssh, sshd or ssh-add call one of the hooked function, it will be redirected to the malicious libkeyutils.so implementation that can replace the original behaviour	['T1027']
+This investigation allowed us to create strong ties between multiple campaigns that Lazarus has conducted, reinforcing our attribution. In this campaign the Lazarus group demonstrated its sophistication level and ability to circumvent the security measures they face during their attacks, such as network segmentation. We assess that Lazarus is a highly prolific group, conducting several campaigns using different strategies. They shared tools and infrastructure among these campaigns to accomplish their goals	['T1105', 'T1588.002']
+The ZxShell driver starts by acquiring some kernel information and then hooking “ObReferenceObjectByHandle” API. Finally it spawns 2 system threads	['T1056.004']
+Orangeworm likely uses this information to determine whether the system is used by a researcher or if the victim is a high-value target. Once Orangeworm determines that a potential victim is of interest, it proceeds to aggressively copy the backdoor across open network shares to infect other computers	['T1021.002']
+The binary used the same string obfuscation technique - - Malicious document VBA code similarities with what’s shown in the screenshots - Digital signature signer name EGIS CO	['T1059.005']
+A new feature implemented in the WinHttp channel is a Domain Generation algorithm (DGA) for fallback domains. Unlike the usual DGA that retrieves its seed from pseudo-random numbers, this one gets a given seed (probably generated at compilation) for a given sample. The way that domains are generated is as follows	['T1568.002']
+This sample included a novel C2 channel that used the Exchange Web Services (EWS) API to send and receive emails containing steganographic images as attachments. This novel C2 channel supplemented the HTTP and DNS tunneling C2 channels seen in other RDAT samples, all of which we will discuss in detail in the upcoming sections	['T1041']
+GALLIUM does not typically use a traditional first stage installer for their malware. Instead, the group relies heavily on web shells as a first method of persistence in a victim network following successful exploitation. Subsequent malware is then delivered through existing web shell access	['T1505.003']
+The dropper installs the Bisonal EXE file and decoy PDF file. These files are not encrypted and the offset to the EXE and PDF file in the dropper is appended at the end of the dropper file. The file name of the decoy file is based on the dropper file name. The dropper code creates a PDF at the same directory, give the same name with itself to the decoy file, removes .exe and adds .pdf in the code. The dropper also creates two VBS scripts in the %Temp% directory with a random 4 digits hexadecimal name. One of them opens the decoy PDF file. The other deletes the dropper and the VBS script itself	['T1059.005']
+Usually TLS operates in simple mode, which only requires a server to carry out authentication. Mutual TLS means the malware has a trusted SSL certificate hardcoded in its binary that it uses to check the certificate provided by the C2; the malware also forwards its own hardcoded certificate to the C2 that the C2 checks. So long as both the C2 and the malware accept the provided certificates then communications will be encrypted using TLS, otherwise the connection will be rejected and the malware will not be able to communicate with the C2	['T1587.003', 'T1573.002']
+This is a legitimate file, AVDump32.exe, digitally signed by “AVAST Software” as shown in figure 8	['T1553.002']
+Most of the important API calls resolve dynamically during the run time using “string_decryptor” function. 288 API calls have been resolved dynamically	['T1106']
+Five days after data was exfiltrated from a victim environment the actor copied a MAZE ransomware binary to 15 hosts within the victim environment and successfully executed it on a portion of these systems. Attackers employed batch scripts and a series to txt files containing host names to distribute and execute MAZE ransomware on many servers and workstations across the victim environment. An actor deployed MAZE ransomware to tens of hosts, explicitly logging into each system using a domain administrator account created earlier in the intrusion. Immediately following the exfiltration of sensitive data, the actors began deployment of MAZE ransomware to hosts across the network. The encryption process proceeded as follows: A batch script named start.bat was used to execute a series of secondary batch scripts with names such as xaa3x.bat or xab3x.bat. A batch script named start.bat was used to execute a series of secondary batch scripts with names such as xaa3x.bat or xab3x.bat	['T1059.003']
+Messages sent from a client mimic the HTTP protocol, but note the invalid “HIDE” HTTP verb in the example in Figure 7	['T1001.003']
+Read more . BUSINESS INSIGHTS . Deep dive into a FIN8 attack – A forensic investigation . During a recent investigation, our researchers encountered a new version of the BADHATCH malware used by the well-known threat actor, FIN8. We previously reported that FIN8 was working on a new version of the BADHATCH malware - and this recent attack supports our findings and conclusions. The objective of this blog post is to provide insights into an attempted attack by FIN8 on one of our customers, and how we worked with the customer to thwart the attack before it could fully develop. They engaged in lateral movement by using the WMIC utility for remote code execution (a built-in Windows tool). WMIC (wmic.exe) was used to create a remote command prompt instance (cmd.exe), which then executed the PowerShell code. The PowerShell command created two variables and attempted to download and execute the payload from one of FIN8’s Command and Control (C&C) servers. While this service is legitimate and widely used, the malware abused it in an attempt at evading detection when connecting to C&C servers. To achieve persistency, they used WMI Event Subscription with a few different WMI objects. The decrypted script is used to select a .NET binary based on the architecture type (x86 or x64), create WMI objects used for persistence (described later) and create a WMI event trigger. The first object (root\cimv2\Win32_Base64Class) has a property Prop that contains the code of the payload. This is used to store the payload in the WMI object	['T1047']
+After the first shellcode creates the RegAsm process and injects a second shellcode into it, it will execute the API call NtResumeThread to activate the second shellcode within the RegAsm memory	['T1055']
+Responsible for changing passwords of all user accounts in the system - Drops .cmd scripts, which are responsible for deleting volume shadow copies, logging off the user, wiping deleted data and adding registry entries for ransom contact information - Responsible for the malware’s typical ransomware payload routines	['T1112', 'T1531']
+"The data in ""shinu"" parameter is a combination of the system's tickcount, local IP address, operating system version, keyboard layout and the contents of %WINDOWS%\inf\netimm173.pnf. The C2 server can respond to this HTTP request with one of the following two commands"	['T1082']
+Smoke Loaded adds its current sample and all other downloaded executables to the Windows registry. Names of the keys are randomly chosen among the names of existing entries	['T1547.001']
+Figure 11: Using Wireshark to find 58 kB of encoded data returned from the C2 server at 185.141.61[.]246	['T1102.001']
+Both Cloud Atlas and RedOctober malware implants rely on a similar construct, with a loader and the final payload that is stored encrypted and compressed in an external file. There are some important differences though, especially in the encryption algorithms used – RC4 in RedOctober vs AES in Cloud Atlas	['T1027']
+launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/filename.plist > /dev/nul or launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ filename.plist > /dev/nul will then command the operating system to start the dropped backdoor file at login. The dropper will delete itself at the end of the process	['T1070.004']
+the malware used by the attacker pretends to be the xmlprov Network Provisioning Service. This service manages XML configuration files on a domain basis for automatic network provisioning	['T1036.004']
+cmd /c pull <filename>: Adds filename to temp.zip, Base64 encodes, and uploads to control server - cmd /c chip <string>: Deletes current ipnet.ini config file. cmd /c put <new_file_name> <existing_file_name>: Copies existing file to new file name. Deletes existing file. user <parameters>: Executes downloaded file with parameters specified using CreateProcessAsUser - cmd /c <command>: Executes command on infected endpoint	['T1546.009']
+The initial backdoor is deployed using a decoy document containing a macro. Here are some examples of the content delivered to the victims: The observed content has some common characteristics like the attempt to impersonate National entities; the four documents mimics	['T1204.002']
+The embedded configuration is encrypted and the payload decrypts it by first using a custom rolling XOR algorithm to decrypt a key and a buffer of ciphertext, resulting in a key and ciphertext that appears encoded with base64. It will then generate the SHA256 hash of the base64 encoded key and use the fourth through the 28th bytes of the resulting hash as the final key. The payload will base64 decode the ciphertext and use the final key to decrypt the decoded ciphertext using Triple DES (3DES), which results in a configuration that is structured in JSON	['T1140']
+The threat actors manipulated LNK files, commonly known as a Microsoft Window’s shortcut file, to repeatedly gather user credentials. The threat actors exploited this built-in Windows functionality by setting the icon path to a remote server controller by the actors. When the user browses to the directory, Windows attempts to load the icon and initiate an SMB authentication session. During this process, the active user’s credentials are passed through the attempted SMB connection	['T1547.009']
+Computer name and network adapters information - Disk space information for disks C: through Z: including total memory in bytes, total available memory in bytes, etc. Current memory status including total physical memory in bytes, total available memory, etc. Domain name and usernames based on current remote sessions	['T1082', 'T1016']
+"The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""File Uploaded"")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""< File Not Found >"")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data"	['T1560.001']
+"The dropper then attempts to open the service manager on each remote system to start the RemoteRegistry service, which it will connect to using RegConnectRegistryW. Once connected, the dropper attempts to disable UAC (User Access Control) remote restrictions by setting the following registry key to a value of ""1"	['T1548.002', 'T1112']
+To increase its level of stealth, the malware protects itself from the eyes of administrators and analysts by encrypting its strings, internal files, configuration data and network communication. While the RC2FM module uses a handful of custom ciphers, the wrapper DLL and the RC2CL module share one particular routine for all purposes, especially for decrypting other malware modules embedded in the wrapper DLL	['T1027']
+NOBELIUM has been observed modifying Azure AD to enable long-term persistence and access to sensitive information. This can include the creation of users, consent of Azure AD applications, granting of roles to users and applications, creation of additional service principal credentials, and more. In one incident, MSTIC observed the use of Azure RunCommand, paired with Azure admin-on-behalf-of (AOBO), as a technique to gain access to virtual machines and shift access from cloud to on-premise. NOBELIUM has demonstrated an ongoing interest in targeting privileged users, including Global Administrators	['T1090.003']
+Both use SSL to communicate with their C2 servers, and it appears they share common code to carry out the Diffie Hellman key exchange	['T1095']
+Brave Prince is a Korean-language implant that contains similar code and behavior to the Gold Dragon variants, specifically the system profiling and control server communication mechanism. The malware gathers detailed logs about the victim’s configuration, contents of the hard drive, registry, scheduled tasks, running processes, and more. Brave Prince was first observed in the wild December 13, 2017, sending logs to the attacker via South Korea’s Daum email service	['T1082']
+It allows the attacker to not only see the active screen of the infected user but also be able to take control of the mouse and keyboard, using it as though they were sitting in front of the system itself	['T1021.001']
+"PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with ""X-"" (e.g. X-Session: 0""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. ChinaChopper web shell. shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords"	['T1059.003']
+In an attempt to hide the contents of the stolen data, the threat actor used winrar to compress and password-protect it. The winrar binaries and compressed data were found mostly in the Recycle Bin folder, a TTP that was previously observed in APT10-related attacks, as well as others. This threat actor is known to stage the data in multi-part archives before exfiltration	['T1560.001', 'T1074.001']
+FoggyWeb is stored in the encrypted file Windows.Data.TimeZones.zh-PH.pri, while the malicious file version.dll can be described as its loader	['T1083']
+"PsExec is a light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software. PsExec's most powerful uses include launching interactive command-prompts on remote systems and remote-enabling tools like IpConfig that otherwise do not have the ability to show information about remote systems. Note: some anti-virus scanners report that one or more of the tools are infected with a ""remote admin"" virus. Using PsExec . See the July 2004 issue of Windows IT Pro Magazine for Mark's article that covers advanced usage of PsExec. Runs on: Recommended content . - Autologon - Windows Sysinternals Bypass password screen during logon. BgInfo - Windows Sysinternals This fully-configurable program automatically generates desktop backgrounds that include important information about the system. PsTools - Windows Sysinternals Command-line utilities for listing the processes running on local or remote computers, running processes, rebooting computers, and more. SDelete - Windows Sysinternals Securely overwrite your sensitive files and cleanse your free space of previously deleted files using this DoD-compliant secure delete program. Sysmon - Windows Sysinternals Monitors and reports key system activity via the Windows event log. Remotely edit the registry - Windows Server Describes how to remotely edit the registry of a client computer from a host computer after you use Remote Recover to connect the host computer to the client computer"	['T1569.002']
+KPortScan – a GUI-based portscanner - PsExec – a tool to remotely execute commands on Windows systems - Batch files for enabling RDP and bypassing firewall rules - Procdump – a tool to dump process memory, along with a batch file to dump the lsass process for password extraction - Mimikatz – a tool to dump passwords and hashes - The Eternal suite of exploits, along with batch files for rapid scanning and exploitation - Nirsoft Mail PassView – a tool to dump saved mail passwords - Nirsoft Network Password Recovery – a tool to dump saved Windows password - Nirsoft Remote Desktop PassView – a tool to dump saved RDP passwords - Nirsoft SniffPass – a tool to sniff the network for passwords sent over insecure protocols - Nirsoft WebBrowserPassView – a tool to dump passwords stored in a variety of browsers	['T1040']
+This is the detection for the infected .EXE and .PDF files related to the URSNIF variant that steals information. The said information-stealing infector (detected as PE_URSNIF.A-O) has affected countries such as US and UK	['T1105']
+The final payload is a .NET DLL file designed to steal documents and images with the following extensions	['T1119']
+Whitefly first infects its victims using a dropper in the form of a malicious .exe or .dll file that is disguised as a document or image. These files frequently purport to offer information on job openings or appear to be documents sent from another organization operating in the same industry as the victim. Given the nature of disguise, it’s highly likely that they are sent to the victim using spear-phishing emails	['T1204.002']
+Malware Analysis Malware Dropper The dropper executable file in the Russian attack hides the encrypted Bisonal DLL file and non-malicious decoy file at the end of its body. Once executed, the dropper decrypts the data blob using the RC4 cipher with the key, “34123412”, saves them in the path shown below and executes them	['T1027']
+"We saw a Waterbear loader named ""ociw32.dll"" inside one of the folders in the %PATH% environmental variable. mtxoci.dll” first tries to query the registry key ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI"" to see if the value ""OracleOciLib"" exists. If the value doesn't exist, “mtxoci.dll” tries to load ""ociw32.dll"" instead. During our investigation, we noticed that the value ""OracleOciLib"" was deleted from the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 2"	['T1012']
+Mustang Panda is a well-known APT with a long history of targeting non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It utilizes shared malware like Poison Ivy, PlugX and Cobalt Strike payloads in order to gather intelligence. Since 2008, PlugX as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware family has been used as a backdoor to control the victim’s machine fully. Once the device is infected, an attacker can remotely execute several kinds of commands on the affected system to retrieve machine information, capture the screen, manage services, and manage processes	['T1082']
+"The file destruction algorithm is composed of two stages: a first stage to overwrite files and another to destroy the physical disk layout and the partition tables along with it. For the file destruction, it takes ownership of the files by modifying their ACL entries after it has obtained the 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'. A file found will then simply be overwritten with zeros. The wiper will then move on to the next drive on the system beginning with the ""D"" drive. It will recursively gain rights to files on a drive and overwrite them with zeros. This is done for the next 23 drives alphabetically (through ""Z:\""). On the second stage, the wiper attempts to set the drive layout of all the physical drives on the system numbered 9 to 0. This will wipe out all extended information about the physical drive's partitions including MBR, GPT and partition entries"	['T1485']
+OFF ON Vision Impaired Profile Enhances website's visuals This profile adjusts the website, so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements.Note: This profile prompts automatically for keyboard users. We utilize an accessibility interface that allows persons with specific disabilities to adjust the website’s UI (user interface) and design it to their personal needs. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments. Vision Impaired Profile: this profile adjusts the website so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Cognitive Disability Profile: this profile provides various assistive features to help users with cognitive disabilities such as Autism, Dyslexia, CVA, and others, to focus on the essential elements more easily. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements. 7) Additional functions – we allow users to change cursor color and size, use a printing mode, enable a virtual keyboard, and many other functions. If you wish to contact the website’s owner, please use the website's form . Hide Accessibility Interface. Please note: If you choose to hide the accessibility interface, you won't be able to see it anymore, unless you clear your browsing history and data	['T1014']
+We believe that the threat actors behind the Frankenstein campaign are moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful. The actors' preference for open-source solutions appears to be part of a broader trend in which adversaries are increasingly using publicly available solutions, possibly to improve operational security. These obfuscation techniques will require network defenders to modify their posture and procedures to detect this threat. This report outlines the various anti-detection techniques used throughout the Frankenstein campaign. Some of these techniques included checking to see if any analysis tools, such as Process Explorer, were running in the background and determining whether the sample was inside of a virtual machine. The threat actors also took additional steps to only respond to GET requests that contained predefined fields, such as a non-existent user-agent string, a session cookie, and a particular directory on the domain. The threat actors also used different types of encryption in order to protect data in transit	['T1518.001']
+The malware is typically spread via malspam campaigns containing a URL that directs recipients to an infection zone. The first stage of infection is a loader component. Our team located a number of loaders used by Grandoreiro attackers masked as invoice files with a .msi extension and placed into an easily accessible GitHub repository. The second stage of the infection fetches the Grandoreiro payload via a hardcoded URL within the loader’s code. Grandoreiro is executed and infects the device	['T1105']
+"First, the ""packager trick"" is leveraged in order to embed the initial QuasarRAT dropper (qrat.exe) in the malicious RTF document. Its called the ""packager trick"" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious ""scriptlet"" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial ""qrat.exe"" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory"	['T1036.005']
+For the first execution of the malware, it creates the file set.txt with {System_Parametrs = 10} inside and creates the Windows registry entry	['T1547.001']
+As we can see, this particular sample is configured with a single command and control (C2) server, however, we have seen other samples with multiple host and port combinations. We can also identify a communication key in it, which is crucial when discussing network communications	['T1008']
+TA505 has been using Excel file, Word document, or .WIZ files as its attack entry point. However, as mentioned earlier, the group has also started to attach an HTML link in emails to trick users into opening the Excel file	['T1069', 'T1204.001']
+T1610 Deploy Container—Payload is delivered via an ISO file which is mounted on target computers. T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link—Cobalt Strike Beacon payload is executed via a malicious link (LNK) file	['T1566.002']
+CTU analysis of one of GOLD KINGSWOOD's campaign using SpicyOmelette (DOC2018.js) exposed additional sophisticated methods to compromise targets. Depending on the security profile of the victim's system, a pop-up notification may have warned about running external content	['T1059.007']
+Phishing emails continued to use links to external ZIP or RAR archives, which ultimately contained an executable with the extension SCR. SPEAR identified the following URLs were used in phishing attempts	['T1566.002']
+This method collects additional data from the infected machine, such as its public IP address, computer name, and the installed Windows version	['T1016']
+Secondly, the CPU temperature check seen in this payload was previously used by GravityRAT, as discussed earlier this year by security researchers at Talos. They noted that while virtual machines were detected by this technique, some physical systems were also detected as virtual machines because they did not support the WMI query. This suggests that other WMI-based VM detection techniques may also detect certain physical systems if those systems do not support the specific WMI query. The last technique that was particularly interesting is the time zone check, as the Trojan will not execute its functional code if the system does not have a specific time zone set. The fact that the Trojan will not operate on systems that are not configured with these time zones suggests that this is a highly targeted attack focused on a specific subset of target nations	['T1124']
+The macro passes a Base64-encoded command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One PowerShell Command	['T1082', 'T1047']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. Windows Credential Editor (WCE) — This tool obtains passwords from memory. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1548.002']
+Clop ransomware shows some characteristics that enterprises are its intended targets instead of end consumers. The authors displayed some creative technical solutions, to detect the victim’s language settings and installed programs. On the other hand, we also noticed some weird decisions when it came to coding certain functionalities in the ransomware. Unfortunately, it is not the first time that criminals will make money with badly programmed malware	['T1614.001']
+The malware arrives via an email disguised as a tax incentive notification from a major financial services company. This email includes a macro enabled (XLSM) Microsoft Excel spreadsheet attachment (detected as Trojan.W97M.MERETAM.A) that purportedly contains the details of the tax incentive. However, as these attachments usually go, this macro is malicious and will download and deploy Trickbot on the user’s machine once activated	['T1059.003', 'T1566.001']
+"The adversary has changed their deployment methodology and now they use a loader mechanism called ""runner"" to execute the payload. Upon execution, the loader will search for files with the extension .stubbin in its execution directory, this file contains the SamSam encrypted .NET Assembly payload. Upon reading the file, the loader decrypts the payload with the password supplied as the first argument and executes it, passing the remaining arguments. Comparing both the Initialization Vector (IV) and the code structure it seems like it may have been derived from an example posted on the Codeproject.com website. As you can seen in the images below, the IV used for the Rijndael encryption is the same in both implementations (posted code in hexadecimal, reversed code in decimal due to decompiler implementation"	['T1027']
+"For the first time, the ROKRAT sample used during the ""North Korean Human Rights"" contained a browser credentials stealer. The malware is able to extract the stored passwords from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox. For Chrome and Firefox, the malware queries the sqlite database containing the URL, username and password: Additionally, they support the Microsoft Vault mechanism. Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer. Here is the initialization of the Vault APIs: On the left, we have the ROKRAT sample and on the right the FreeMilk sample"	['T1555.003']
+9, 2020, CARBON SPIDER attempted to run the Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe. This filename may reflect an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable with the same name	['T1036.005']
+AppLocker works well for executables and over time it has also been improved to control various script types, including JScript, PowerShell and VBScript. This has significantly reduced the attack surface and forced attackers, including more sophisticated groups, to find new methods of launching executable code. A number of legitimate Windows executables that are not blocked by the default AppLocker policies has been discovered and various proof of concept AppLocker bypass code became publicly available. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. A malicious INF file can be supplied as a parameter to download and execute remote code. Example malicious INF file to load a remote SCT file Cmstp may also be used to load and execute COM scriptlets (SCT files) from remote servers. Example of malicious scriptlet file used to drop a malicious DLL dropper for the next stage Microsoft allows developers to create COM+ objects in script code stored in an XML document, a so-called scriptlet file. To bypass AppLocker and launching script code within a scriptlet, the attacker includes the malicious code within an XML script tag placed within the registration tag of the scriptlet file and calls cmstp with appropriate parameters. For example: Here, the attackers randomize the scriptlet name and use a .txt filename extension, likely in an attempt to bypass fundamental protection mechanisms that attempt to block file types based on the filename extension. Payload dropper in an XSL file Another executable used to attempt bypass of the AppLocker feature is msxsl.exe, a Windows utility used to run XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) transformations	['T1218.003']
+"Listening for Commands We analyzed RGDoor samples and found that the ""RegisterModule"" function does very little other than calling the IHttpModuleRegistrationInfo::SetRequestNotifications method. If present, the code uses the two-bytes immediately following the ""RGSESSIONID="" string as a decryption key, specifically treating the two character bytes as a single hexadecimal byte. The key is followed by a Base64 encoded string that contains ciphertext. The custom algorithm iterates through the ciphertext using the 'pxor' instruction to XOR each byte of ciphertext with the single-byte hexadecimal value from the two-byte character key provided in the cookie field. The code will parse the cleartext looking for one of three commands: “cmd$”, “upload$” and “download$”. The code treats the string immediately following the command as the command’s argument"	['T1140']
+Active since 2012, it has so far targeted Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services. Some of the cloud storage accounts used to deliver PLEAD are also used as drop off points for exfiltrated documents stolen by DRIGO	['T1566.002']
+The two-stage malware overwrites the Master Boot Record (MBR) on victim systems with a ransom note (Stage 1). The MBR is the part of a hard drive that tells the computer how to load its operating system. The ransom note contains a Bitcoin wallet and Tox ID (a unique account identifier used in the Tox encrypted messaging protocol) that have not been previously observed by MSTIC	['T1542.003']
+1) Persistence via PowerShell 2) Persistence via the Run registry key 3) Persistence via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory	['T1547.009', 'T1547.001']
+This is just what has been happening for the past few months, where a group using two well-known backdoors — Buhtrap and RTM — as well as ransomware and cryptocurrency stealers, has targeted organizations, mainly in Russia. Yandex.Direct is its online advertising network	['T1189']
+After connecting to a C2 server, the malware uses a custom encrypted protocol over TCP port 80 through the Tor circuit to transmit encryption keys, to allow victims to communicate with the operators, and to check payment status	['T1573.002']
+Once installed, BLINDINGCAN will collect user and system information before sending it to a command and control server using HTTP POST requests. By default, BLINDINGCAN is able to	['T1041']
+Once executed, the ransomware follows the typical routine of encrypting files and appending them with the suffix .seth, before dropping a ransom note	['T1486']
+Before the malware starts interacting with the command and control server, it ensures that any other related files produced by a previous instance of the loader will not cause any issues. As a result the loader appends the string ‘_lyrt’ to its current file path and deletes any file with this name. Next, the loader searches for the parameter ‘-p’ in the command line and if found, it deletes the scheduled task ‘StartDT’. The loader creates this scheduled task later for persistence during execution. The loader also attempts to execute hijacked shortcut files, which will eventually execute an instance of Team9 loader	['T1070']
+After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services. The malware masquerades its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol and stores reconnaissance results within legitimate plugin configuration files allowing it to blend in with legitimate SolarWinds activity	['T1001.003']
+SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download the UltraVNC application renamed as winvnc.exe, and a configuration file named UltraVNC.ini, shown in Figure 8. These files were saved to the %APPDATA%\Chrome\ directory. The UltraVNC.ini file allowed UltraVNC to connect to port 6300 on the loopback address specified by the parameter AllowLoopback=1	['T1105']
+mshlpweb.dll utilize a set of standard windows API calls to duplicate the token of wusa.exe and use it to spawn high integrity instance of cmd.exe	['T1548.002']
+The winupdate.ps1 script (SHA256: 36862f654c3356d2177b5d35a410c78ff9803d1d7d20da0b82e3d69d640e856e) is the main payload of this attack that we call RogueRobin. Its developer used the open source Invoke-Obfuscation tool to obfuscate this PowerShell script, specifically using the COMPRESS technique offered by Invoke-Obfuscation. Before carrying out any of its functionality the payload checks to see if it is executing in a sandbox. The payload uses WMI queries and checks running processes for evidence that the script may be executing within an analysis environment	['T1027']
+The macro executes this payload in a rather interesting way by loading the dropped ~temp.docm document and calling a function within its embedded macro to run the payload. We believe the creator of this delivery document chose to run the payload from the dropped file as an evasion technique. Also, the fact the initial macro uses this dropped document for the execution of the payload may also explain why the document did not contain any decoy contents	['T1059.003']
+The Bazar loader files are dual-extension executable files (such as PreviewReport.DOC.exe) signed with fake certificates such as VB CORPORATE PTY. This is consistent with the Trickbot group, which notoriously abuses the trust of certificate authorities by using signed loaders and malware to evade security product detection. Signed malware was seen in Trickbot-Anchor infections and will continue to play a role in future campaigns due to the ease of obtaining code-signing certificates and their effectiveness in evading security products	['T1553.002']
+While these two Trojans share code, we consider Emissary and Elise separate tools since their configuration structure, command handler and C2 communications channel differ. The Emissary Trojan delivered in this attack contains the components listed in Table 1. At a high level, Emissary has an initial loader DLL that extracts a configuration file and a second DLL containing Emissary’s functional code that it injects into Internet Explorer	['T1055.001']
+The Gamaredon group has been active since at least 2013. Outlook VBA module . The Gamaredon group uses a package that includes a custom Microsoft Outlook Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) project. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors. C# compiler module . This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript. It also has the ability to download and execute arbitrary code from its C&C server. C# backdoor thread creation routine . Batch file/VBScript . This version comprises several scripts, written in both batch file form and VBScript. Network infrastructure . The Gamaredon group uses many different domains, both free and paid, for its C&C servers. Quality of execution . We were able to collect numerous different samples of malicious scripts, executables and documents used by the Gamaredon group throughout their campaigns. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . 11 Jun 2020 - 11:30AM . Newsletter . Newsletter . Similar Articles . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies – it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Some URL shortener services distribute Android malware, including banking or SMS trojans . Discussion . - Home - About Us - Contact Us - Sitemap - Our Experts - ESET - Research - How To - Categories - RSS Configurator - News Widget	['T1059.003']
+Aside from finding the malicious documents, the Advanced Threat Research team discovered a Win32-based executable dropper. This dropper uses a stolen digital signature from Adobe Systems. This certificate is also used by another Korean-language malware compiled January 16 (hash: 35904f482d37f5ce6034d6042bae207418e450f4) with an interesting program database (PDB) path	['T1553.002']
+Analysis of several backdoors identified in this recent operation revealed that Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin. Additionally, one analyzed sample of Kazuar is configured for commands sent through likely internal nodes in the government's network, while others use the more traditional method of external C&C nodes. Varying the C&C ensures multiple avenues of recovery into the network if some of the group’s accesses are found and remediated against by network defenders	['T1090.001']
+At first, this command runs vssadmin.exe to delete all volume shadow copies on the system to prevent recovery (Inhibit System Recovery, ATT&CK T1490) vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet - Then, it uses bcdedit.exe twice to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data (Inhibit System Recovery, ATT&CK T1490) bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures	['T1059.003', 'T1490']
+In the case of 32-bit systems, the malware may attempt a known UAC bypass by launching printui.exe system process and using token manipulation with NtFilterToken as described in this blog post	['T1134.001']
+Egregor will only begin encrypting files once a command is sent by it's operators, presumably when they are satisfied with the information it has extracted. All non-system files are then encrypted using a hybrid AES-RSA implementation, before a ransom note is dropped on the desktop. Some Egregor variants will also attempt to display the ransom note on connected peripherals such as screens or printers	['T1486']
+The malicious Word file is the beginning of the infection chain and acts as a dropper for two DLL files. The Word file contains malicious Visual Basic macro code that runs when the document is opened in Word using the Document_Open() autoload function. The word file also contains a Base64-encoded file (encoded with a custom key) in it that is read, decoded, and dropped to the disk by the macro	['T1140']
+In these campaigns, the most common infection vector is via Microsoft Word documents embedded with malicious macro code. The contents of the documents are in English and German depending on the target	['T1204.002']
+First, the malware checks for the existence of a Mutex value, “EKANS”, on the victim. Primary functionality on victim systems is achieved via Windows Management Interface (WMI) calls, which begins executing encryption operations and removes Volume Shadow Copy backups on the victim	['T1490']
+The command line is then parsed to extract individual arguments, and SUNSPOT looks for the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution	['T1083']
+Each backdoor has a different token that is encrypted in the registry. If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command. In the version that we’ve analyzed, the installer writes the token in the registry key. We can’t trigger the backdoor without a current token, which makes the backdoor more difficult to find and analyze	['T1112', 'T1205']
+The threat group monitors its Dropbox account for responses from compromised computers. Once the LOWBALL malware calls back to the Dropbox account, the attackers will create a file called “[COMPUTER_NAME]_upload.bat” which contains commands to be executed on the compromised computer. This batch file is then executed on the target computer, with the results uploaded to the attackers’ Dropbox account in a file named “[COMPUTER_NAME]_download	['T1059.003']
+In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. Attack Overview . The attack starts with Microsoft Word documents containing a malicious VBA macro being attached to spear phishing emails. Figure 2: Macro to display lure document . The initial Word documents were password protected, likely in an effort to bypass detection. Once the password (delivered in the body of the email) is entered, the users are presented with a document that will request users to enable the malicious macro, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Lure document . Figure 4 shows what happens when the malicious macro is executed. The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe with the following commands (certutil.exe is a legitimate built-in command-line program to manage certificates in Windows): 3. The version used here is version 4.1 digitally signed by Notepad++, as shown in Figure 5. The macro deletes the initially dropped .txt files using Windows esentutl.exe and changes the document text to an embedded message. However, in the latest version, the keys are hard-coded uniquely for each C2 address and use the C2’s calculated MD5 hash to determine which key to use, as shown in Figure 10. To mitigate the threat, users are advised to disable Office macros in their settings and not to open documents from unknown sources	['T1059.003', 'T1059.003']
+The group also uses the all.bat batch script to collect all files stored on a specific user's desktop. CTU researchers observed RCSession and Cobalt Strike on systems that BRONZE PRESIDENT targeted for data theft. Either of these tools could have been used to exfiltrate the archived data	['T1074.001']
+REvil checks the Software\recfg registry key for the presence of the rnd_ext value. This value contains the random extension generated at runtime that is appended to encrypted files. If this registry value does not exist, the malware generates a random string of lowercase letters (a-z) and numbers (0-9) ranging from five to ten characters in length (inclusive) and preceded by a period (e.g. 9781xsd4). This string is assigned to the rnd_ext value within the recfg registry subkey	['T1012']
+PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader, existing in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, that can obtain additional code over HTTPS. This downloader was used by the threat actor to interact with compromised systems and move laterally across victim environments	['T1071.001']
+Confucius has a miscellany of backdoors: sctrls, ByeBye Shell, remote-access-c3, and sip_telephone, to name a few. One of its file stealers, swissknife2, abuses a cloud storage service as a repository of exfiltrated files. At the time of research, there were around 60 victims whose data were uploaded to Confucius-owned cloud storage account. There were also a few thousand files in the account that were later deleted	['T1583.006']
+The data theft procedure lists all files stored on the device and copies those with an extension matching a predefined list	['T1083']
+Leveraging Hyperhost VPS and Proton VPN exit nodes to access webshells on internet-facing systems. Receiving C2 instructions from user profiles created by the adversary on legitimate websites/forums such as Github and Microsoft's TechNet portal	['T1102.003']
+It is worth noting that the RC2FM module uses a number of encryption methods (variations of a simple XOR encryption routine), unlike the other InvisiMole parts	['T1573.001']
+The initial VBScript will then create a scheduled task (T1053) to persistently run the secondary VBScript every minute by running the following command	['T1053.005']
+We identified new MSIL components deployed by Zebrocy. While recent Zebrocy versioning was 7.1, some of the related Zebrocy modules that drop file-stealing MSIL modules we call Covfacy were v7.0. For example, one sent out to a handful of countries identifies network drives when they are added to target systems, and then RC4-like-encrypts and writes certain file metadata and contents to a local path for later exfiltration	['T1135']
+The dropped executable mpsvc.dll, although containing a large quantity of unique code, was genetically similar to exile-RAT and keyboy; both are RATs Pirate Panda deploys. It is likely that the threat actors modified and developed the code since it was last used. The dll has a compilation date of 22 April 2020, which is two days after the c2 domain was registered, and the phishing email was sent on 27 April 2020. exile-RAT has been observed using the same DLL Sideloading technique, using a legitimate security product to load a malicious dll. In this instance, Windows Defender is being used	['T1574.002']
+"The ""jmpUrlList"" provides the initial C&C servers, which are used to determine the secondary C&C server as well as additional commands to execute. We have observed attacker-controlled web servers, compromised victim web servers, and Technet and Pastebin web pages used for the initial C&C"	['T1102.002']
+The VBA macro code in the XLS file be3f12b. differed somewhat from that of the samples of the previous years. Once the font colour was changed, the “setup” batch code component as per previous variants, and the new Visual Basic Script (VBS) downloader component were revealed in columns AA and AB, respectively, as shown in figure 5 below	['T1137.001']
+Overwrite file with garbage data (used in this version and the samples we analyzed) - Overwrite with a file (used in Shamoon Versions 1 and 2) - Encrypt the files and master boot record (not used in this version	['T1485']
+After attempting to bypass the UAC, the third-stage DLL will check if `AutoRunKeyFlag` is set. For this DLL, it is not set. It will then jump to code that decrypts the Lokibot executable using decryption keys from the configuration structure. The first two layers are decrypted using `DecryptionKeyA` and `DecryptionKeyB`, and reverses all the data. After that, the final layer is decrypted using the same decryption method used to decrypt resource data at the start of the third stage.The DLL contains multiple ways to execute a PE file. The shellcode will create a suspended process using the third parameter as a command line command and injects Lokibot into it using process hollowing	['T1140']
+"For this campaign, the threat actors registered at least 20 new domains targeting over 60 universities in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, and Switzerland. These domains were registered using the Freenom domain provider, which administers the following free top-level domains (TLDs) unless the domain is considered ""special"	['T1583.001']
+The remote XSL script downloads twelve files from the C2 server that masquerade themselves as JPEG, GIF, and extensionless files. The r1.log file stores information for exfiltration. A thorough explanation of what information is collected can be found in a breakdown by Cofense from late 2018	['T1041']
+The SP variable is a string containing the victim's username. When the malicious ISAPI filter captures a username matching this variable, it knows to handle the incoming HTTP request as a command to the web shell	['T1071.001']
+The code receives a binary blob official M.E.Doc server, decrypts it using the Triple DES algorithm, and, afterwards, decompresses it using GZip. This remote control feature makes the backdoor a fully-featured cyberespionage and cybersabotage platform at the same time	['T1140']
+We have seen how the attackers are implementing different techniques to bypass two-factor authentication with smartcard/PIN to access protected resources on the victimʼs network. By capturing the PIN for the smartcard and binding the certificate, malware can silently use the card to authenticate to secure resources, so long as the card remains physically present in the card reader	['T1111']
+"Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. AppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch\User Pinned\Taskbar"". - Get the bitness of the Operating System : ""x86"" or ""x64"". - Get Username, OS name and version,. NET Framework version. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1"	['T1007']
+The main purpose of this utility is to retrieve the RPC configuration of a process that has registered an interface. Once this PID is found, this utility reads the remote process’ memory and tries to retrieve the registered RPC interface	['T1057', 'T1016']
+It is worth noting that the administrators could connect both to the corporate and the restricted network segments to maintain systems and provide users with technical support in both zones. As a result, by gaining control of administrator workstations the attackers were able to access the restricted network segment	['T1078']
+This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. It contains in its body the base64-encoded source code of a downloader. It decodes that source code and compiles it directly on the system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class. As can be seen in Figure 6, the decoded source code still has comments in it, illustrating the apparent sloppiness of Gamaredon’s operators	['T1140', 'T1027.004']
+One of the distribution method of Bad Rabbit is via drive-by download. Some popular websites are compromised and have JavaScript injected in their HTML body or in one of their .js files	['T1189']
+First, until it is clear that it no longer poses a risk, block updates for MEDoc, the Ukrainian accounting software which has exploded into the public consciousness in the past two days as the likely source of infection. Specifically, the domain upd . me-doc . com . ua and its associated IP address 92 . 60 . 184 . 55, have been identified as the distribution point for MEDoc software updates	['T1195.002']
+RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker’s command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we’ll get to this later	['T1071.001']
+For non-email accounts, the operator validated credentials no matter how trivial seeming the website may have been. The operators appear to have been meticulously gathering trivial social information about the individuals. In total, the operator attempted to validate credentials for at least 75 different websites across the two individuals	['T1589.001']
+The connection to one of the hosts is then started over raw TCP on port 9999	['T1571']
+This bundle of malicious code starts out with a VBScript that first kills the Outlook process if it is running, and then removes security around VBA macro execution in Outlook by changing registry values. It also saves to disk the malicious OTM file (Outlook VBA project) that contains a macro, the malicious email attachment and, in some cases, a list of recipients that the emails should be sent to	['T1112']
+Display and manipulate extended attributes. Used by malware and threat actors as a means to bypass Gatekeeper and Notarization checks on macOS. Incredibly, any process or user can remove the file attribute that is required for these checks to proceed without admin rights	['T1553.001']
+HOLMIUM has likely been running cloud-based attacks with Ruler since 2018, but a notable wave of such attacks was observed in the first half of 2019. These attacks combined the outcome of continuous password spray activities against multiple organizations, followed by successful compromise of Office 365 accounts and the use of Ruler in short sequences to gain control of endpoints. This wave of attacks was the subject of a warning from US Cybercom in July 2019	['T1078.004']
+In observed traffic, the C2 server employs steganography to hide data within HTTP response bodies and attempts to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies. Command data is spread across many GUID and hexadecimal strings	['T1001.002']
+If running as non-root, it persists as a launch agent: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.questd.plist. Below we dump that arguments passed to the install_daemon …first, when the malware is installing itself as a launch agent	['T1543.004']
+SpeakUp uses POST and GET requests over HTTP to communicate with its main C&C which is the compromised website of speakupomaha[.]com. The first POST packet sends a victim ID and more introductory information such as the current version of the installed script. Afterwards, the Trojan posts “full information” about the machine by executing the following LINUX commands	['T1071.001']
+The malware also configures the system to load coinmining software on the system. This software is made to look like an XMRig-type coinminer, which is used to mine Monero. In fact, though, it loads a coinminer that mines Koto, a lesser-known cryptocurrency that is associated with Japan	['T1496']
+This will extract the files to %APPDATA%\\Drivers and then run the Windows Batch file 34679.cmd in a hidden console. The use of the hidcon (hidden console) prefix followed by a four-five digit filename with a cmd extension is observed in the majority of our tracked samples during this time period	['T1564.003']
+One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands	['T1102.002']
+Sowbug frequently maintains a long-term presence on the networks of targeted organizations, sometimes remaining inside a victim environment for up to six months. One of the tactics it uses to avoid drawing attention to itself is impersonating commonly used software packages such as Windows or Adobe Reader. It has never attempted to compromise the software itself. Rather, it gives its tools file names similar to those used by the software and places them in directory trees that could be mistaken for those used by the legitimate software	['T1036.005']
+RAR) included deleted items in Accessed Files STEALTHYATTACKER FUN FACT: Now it’s built-in. All rights reserved.24 Our Response: Increased PowerShell Visibility • Upgraded the environment to PowerShell 3.0 and enabled logging • Logging captured input/output, variable initialization, etc. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30. All rights reserved.32 BONUS SLIDE: TOR backdoor (just because it’s cool) 33) 34) 34	['T1090.003']
+When the copied file gets executed, it creates the Imminent directory in the %AppData% directory to save the encrypted log, network information and system information. The file will be uploaded to C2 when related command is received	['T1041']
+The payload does not have a command handler. Rather, it will process the JSON object within the C2’s response for applications to open and/or command line commands to run by calling the CreateProcessW API function. For instance, the decrypted response in Figure 9 contains a JSON object would instruct the payload to run “c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe” using the command line argument “/c whoami”, which effectively runs the “whoami” command	['T1033']
+The next step in the execution cycle involves establishing a secure session key between GoldMax and its C2 server. GoldMax first requests a session key from its C2 server by sending an HTTP GET request that contains a custom HTTP Cookie value that is unique to each implant. The Cookie value is comprised of the following dynamically generated and hardcoded values	['T1071.001']
+This adversary starts with obtaining usernames and passwords of their victim from previous breaches. These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services. After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim. Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account. As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges. With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised. With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero. From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control	['T1110.004', 'T1110.003']
+Spreading across the network: Conti is not satisfied with causing damage to just the infected machines. Instead, it spreads in the network via SMB and encrypts files on remote machines as well	['T1080']
+Visitors to sites exploited by Emissary Panda are directed by code embedded in the sites to a malicious webpage, which screens their IP address. If the address falls within ranges that the attackers are interested in, the malicious site waits for their next page view to drop an exploit on the desirable target's PC. There has also been at least one victim targeted by a spear-phishing attack. A variety of malware, including the PlugX tool, was shared with other known Chinese threat groups	['T1608.004']
+"It then uses the ""offset_toPayload"" value as an offset that it will read 283160 (45218h) bytes from the XLS file. The shellcode then enters a decryption loop to convert the embedded payload from ciphertext to cleartext. The algorithm uses the length of the ciphertext negated as the initial encryption key, which it bit rotates right by 1 to adjust the key for each of decryption. It will use this key to decrypt four bytes of the ciphertext with the XOR operation until all the ciphertext is decrypted. During each iteration of the decryption process, the algorithm will check to make sure the four bytes of ciphertext are not equal to the key or equal to zero before decrypting the ciphertext. The following table contains the first five rounds of the algorithm to explain the decryption process"	['T1140']
+The files have names that resemble legitimate Windows file and directory names, once again demonstrating how the attackers attempted to blend in the environment and hide in plain sight	['T1036.005', 'T1036.005']
+Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use archiving software to collect files in a password-protected archive. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity	['T1070.004']
+SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. We are tracking the trojanized version of this SolarWinds Orion plug-in as SUNBURST	['T1553.002', 'T1071.001']
+The executable dispci.exe appears to be derived from the code base of the legitimate utility DiskCryptor. It acts as the disk encryption module which also installs the modified bootloader and prevents the normal boot-up process of the infected machine	['T1495']
+The script will send the specified number of DNS queries using the following format, each of which the C2 will respond with an IPv6 address that the script will treat as a string of data: www. The data field within the message is a string of custom base64 encoded data that the malware decodes using the same custom base64 routine mentioned earlier and decrypts it using AES and the pre-shared key. Also, the x command will delete the generated registry key and the Office365DCOMCheck/SystemDiskClean scheduled task	['T1140']
+In terms of communication between victims and C&Cs, TrickBot update responses seem to have been digitally signed using bcrypt, potentially in an effort to impede future takedowns. This particular improvement ensures that each new update for TrickBot is legitimate. This particular behavior was observed for the 2000016 version, but not for the 100003 version	['T1573.001']
+The first, prefixed with a file:// protocol handler, is indicative of an attempt to coax the operating system to send sensitive NTLMv2 material to the specified actor-controlled IP address over port 445	['T1187']
+1) Web Shells 2) A modified version of the China Chopper web shell was used for initial compromise. 3) Custom-built web shells were used for later phases of the attack. 7) WMI and PowerShell commands were used for various tasks. 8) RAT 9) PoisonIvy was used to maintain access across the compromised assets. 10) PlugX was used in some of the instances that we're aware of. 11) Credential Dumpers 12) A modified version of Mimikatz was used to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. 13) A PowerShell-based Mimikatz was also used to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. 14) Lateral movement 15) WMI was used for lateral movement. 16) PsExec was also used for lateral movement. 19) Compression tool 20) Winrar was used to compress and password-protect stolen data	['T1059.001']
+OverWatch threat hunters observed the threat actor performing multiple connectivity checks via DNS lookups for a subdomain under dns[.]1433[.]eu[.]org, executed under the Apache Tomcat service running on the VMware Horizon instance	['T1595.002']
+"1) It uses the application programming interface (API) CreateFileA to \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 to retrieve the handle of the hard disk. 2) It overwrites the first sector of the disk (512 bytes) with ""0x00"". The first sector is the disk’s MBR. 3) It will try to perform the routines above (steps 1-2) on \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE1, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE2, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE3, and so on, as long as a hard disk is available. 4) It will then force the machine to shut down via the API ExitWindows"	['T1106']
+Process name, service name, and driver path listings are obtained, and each value is hashed via the FNV-1a + XOR algorithm as described previously and checked against hardcoded blocklists. Some of these hashes have been brute force reversed as part of this analysis, showing that these routines are scanning for analysis tools and antivirus engine components. Blocklisted services are stopped by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name>\Start registry entries to value 4 for disabled. Some entries in the service list if found on the system may affect the DGA algorithms behavior in terms of the values generated. The list of stopped services is then bit-packed into the ReportWatcherPostpone key of the appSettings entry for the samples’ config file. If any service was transitioned to disabled the Update method exits and retries later. The sample retrieves a driver listing via the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver	['T1007']
+For the Neoichor family, the malware checks for internet connectivity by contacting bing.com with the request format bing.com	['T1016.001']
+If a message is larger than 150 bytes, it is compressed with an unidentified algorithm. If a message is larger than 4096 bytes, it is broken into compressed chunks	['T1030']
+In this campaign, Lazarus conducted spear phishing attacks weaponized with malicious documents that use their known job opportunities theme. We identified two decoy documents masquerading as American global security and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin	['T1083']
+The ROKRAT author implements several techniques typically seen to frustrate human analysts and avoid sandbox execution. First, the malware does not run on Windows XP systems. It uses the GetVersion() API to get the OS version. The code used to perform this task: The malware checks the process names in use on the victim machine. It compares if the executed process name matches a partial name hardcoded in the sample	['T1082']
+Execute a binary on the system using cmd.exe and log the results into a temp file, which is then read and the logged results are sent to the control server. The command line	['T1059.003']
+"192 file extensions Comparing file extension. The wiper will overwrite the content of each file with 1MB worth of 0xCC bytes and rename them by appending each filename with a random four-byte extension. Wiping the file. After the wiping process completes, it performs a delayed command execution using Ping to delete ""InstallerUtil.exe"" from the %TEMP% directory. Finally, it attempts to flush all file buffers to disk and stop all running processes (including itself) by calling ExitWindowsEx Windows API with EWX_SHUTDOWN flag"	['T1106']
+Confucius has a miscellany of backdoors: sctrls, ByeBye Shell, remote-access-c3, and sip_telephone, to name a few. One of its file stealers, swissknife2, abuses a cloud storage service as a repository of exfiltrated files. At the time of research, there were around 60 victims whose data were uploaded to Confucius-owned cloud storage account	['T1567.002']
+Code signing certificates issued to fake companies, disabling security software, taking over domain controllers and living-off-the-land (LotL) tactics — MegaCortex targets company networks and continues to evolve its code to adapt	['T1588.003']
+"It then calls a function called ""SetLog2"", which sets variables for the system's IP address, MAC address and hostname. The code will gather some information about the system, specifically the local IP address, MAC address, and the external IP address of the system. The code obtains the external IP address via an HTTP request using to “http://checkip.dyndns.org/” and uses a regular expression to locate an IP address from the HTTP response"	['T1016']
+After the installation routine, Cardinal RAT will inject itself into a newly spawned process. It will attempt to use one of the following installed executables for the newly spawned process	['T1055']
+Among these variables we can spot the credentials of a user named ‘sftp’, including its hardcoded password. This user seems to be created as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised system	['T1136.001']
+The “3.exe” is a legitimate executable and it is signed by “ESET, spol. and it is being abused for DLL hijacking technique to execute http_dll.dll which decodes and loads the malicious payload http_dll.dat	['T1574.002']
+The threat actor made some modifications to the original source code of hTran. Many strings, including the debug messages, were intentionally changed and obfuscated in an attempt to evade detection and thwart efforts to identify the malware by antivirus and researchers	['T1027']
+"After the beginning of the first while loop, the backdoor registers itself at the C2 server. It is going through the list of C2 servers stored in its registry configuration parameter until it finds one responding. The hosts are stored in the aforementioned ""Hosts"" registry key in the format <IP Address Host1> <TcpPort> <IP Address Host2> <TcpPort> <IP Address Host3> <TcpPort>, etc"	['T1008']
+MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. Once installed, the malware checks for the existence of two files: keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt and attempts to read the configuration files every 30 seconds. If either exist, the contents are read and XOR decoded with the string	['T1140', 'T1083']
+Xbash hard-coded a bunch of domain names as its C2 servers. It also fetches a webpage hosted on Pastebin (listed in the IOCs) to update the C2 domain list. Some of these C2 domains are reused from previous Windows coinminers attributed to Iron cybercrime group	['T1102.001']
+GoldMax is equipped with a decoy network traffic generation feature that allows it to surround its malicious network traffic with seemingly benign traffic. This feature is meant to make distinguishing between malicious and benign traffic more challenging. If the decoy network traffic feature is enabled (set to ‘1’ in the configuration data), GoldMax issues a pseudo-random number of decoy HTTP GET requests (up to four) for URLs pointing to a mixture of legitimate and C2 domain names and/or IP addresses	['T1001.001']
+These binaries also exhibit features that rely on data from the compromised host to inform encryption of the next stage. PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. In the following code snippet, the VolumeSerialNumber of the host serves as the basis for a multibyte XOR key. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity	['T1480.001']
+1) Federation TrustsMicrosoft has observed the actor adding new federation trusts to an existing tenant or modifying the properties of an existing federation trust to accept tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. 2) Microsoft has observed the actor adding new federation trusts to an existing tenant or modifying the properties of an existing federation trust to accept tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. Examples include mail archiving applications. Permissions are usually, but not always, AppOnly.The actor may use their administrator privileges to grant additional permissions to the target Application or Service Principal (e.g. Examples include mail archiving applications. Permissions are usually, but not always, AppOnly. 5) The actor may use their administrator privileges to grant additional permissions to the target Application or Service Principal (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite	['T1098.002']
+Doki is a backdoor for Linux which function is to execute code received from its operators. The malware utilizes the DynDNS service and a unique Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) based on the Dogecoin cryptocurrency blockchain in order to find the domain of its C2 in real time	['T1568.002']
+The macros in the documents convert an embedded executable from hexadecimal and write it to the “Public” folder as “update.exe”. Afterwards, the payload gets copied to the “Startup” directory under the name “svehost.exe” to ensure it automatically runs when the system is started	['T1547.001']
+Until the end of 2016, PlugX payloads were delivered as RAR SFX archives and used one of the usual sideload executables such as fsguidll.exe. ZeroT sets up the persistence for these samples, adding a new service to run PlugX during system startup (Fig 17	['T1543.003']
+When the AD FS server receives an HTTP POST request containing the URI pattern /adfs/services/trust/2005/samlmixed/upload, the backdoor treats the obfuscated and compressed POST data as either .NET assembly or source code. If assembly, the backdoor executes the assembly in the execution context of the AD FS process. If source code, the backdoor dynamically compiles the source code and proceeds to execute the resulting memory-resident assembly in the execution context of the AD FS process	['T1552.004', 'T1027.004']
+Conti has been under active development throughout WIZARD SPIDER’s deployment of the ransomware in BGH campaigns. In August 2020, Conti’s technique shifted from fully encrypting files with AES-256 to a more strategic and efficient approach of selectively encrypting files with the ChaCha stream cipher. Conti’s host discovery and network share targeting functionality has also continued to evolve and is now comparable to that of Ryuk’s	['T1486']
+During our tracking, we identified several malicious documents submitted from this actor on VirusTotal for testing purposes. They tested the detection on macros (by modifying them, or by executing the calc instead of the malicious payload) and the developers tried dynamic data exchange (DDE) execution in the Office document. This is abusing the DDE protocol which exists within Microsoft Office documents. The developer crafted Office Word and Excel documents to see the detection in VirusTotal. The authors tried to hide the DDE object in a different part of the document — in the main object and the header, for example. The DDE object simply executes Microsoft calc in the detected sample	['T1027.005']
+The plugin is designed to retrieve information about all active network sessions on the infected server. For each session, the host address from which the connection is made can be retrieved, along with the name of the user initiating the connection	['T1049']
+The server response is a PowerShell command that decodes and materializes an invocation of a Base64-encoded PowerShell command to disk as IEWebCache.vbs, and creates a scheduled task entitled “IE Web Cache” that executes the file hourly (full script available in Appendix B: Stage Two PowerShell Command	['T1053.005']
+The communication traffic between the BCS-server tool and the C&C server is base64 encoded and encapsulated in HTML tags	['T1132.001']
+If the current integrity level is local_system It will call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with system privilege as shown in Figure 20. It will call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with system privilege as shown in Figure 20	['T1134.002']
+Casbaneiro can also try to steal victim’s cryptocurrency. It does so by monitoring the content of the clipboard and if the data seem to be a cryptocurrency wallet, it replaces them with the attacker’s own. This technique is not new; it has been used by other malware in the past – even the infamous BackSwap banking trojan implemented it in its earliest stages	['T1115']
+Execute a binary on the system using cmd.exe and log the results into a temp file, which is then read and the logged results are sent to the control server	['T1059.003']
+The malicious Visual Basic script uses a unique key (custom alphabet) to encode data. This key was also used in the Honeybee campaign and appears to have been used since August 2017	['T1059.005']
+The payload’s install function makes a call to SetWindowsHookEx with a thread ID of 0, resulting in the function being injected into every GUI process running on the victim machine. This particular process is referenced in this forum post	['T1056.004']
+After detecting the removable USB volume drive, the PlugX variant creates a hidden folder with name “RECYCLE.BIN” and copies the EXE file, the loader DLL, and encrypted DAT file. Then, it hides all of the folders in the root directory and creates LNK for each one in order to deceive the victim to click on the LNK files	['T1564.001']
+The third module allows the operators to take a screenshot of the remote system. The script executes an open-source .NET class used for taking a screenshot. The resulting screenshot is saved at “%TMP%/image.png”, sent back to the attackers by the GRIFFON implant and then deleted	['T1113']
+Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under system privileges, so an adversary can also use a service to escalate privileges from Administrator to System. 29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly	['T1505.003']
+The main payload of the attack is an executable named msapp.exe, and its purpose is to take the victim machine out of service by locking it and wiping its contents. Upon execution, the malware hides this executable’s console window to decrease the suspicion of vigilant victims	['T1564.003']
+Process Watcher The Process Watcher feature spawns a separate daemon to watch the main Imminent Monitor Client in case the client ever crashes or gets closed	['T1057']
+Waterbug’s most recent campaigns have involved a swath of new tools including custom malware, modified versions of publicly available hacking tools, and legitimate administration tools. The group has also followed the current shift towards “living off the land,” making use of PowerShell scripts and PsExec, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes on other systems	['T1059.001']
+Every 6 seconds the malware iterates through running processes and updates its list for it to capture later on	['T1057']
+After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. This exception invokes the exception handler containing the HTTP communication code, allowing it to run. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake. The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request's cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request	['T1012']
+Before encryption, both variants of BitPaymer attempt to remove the backup shadow files from the host, making it impossible to restore encrypted files. This is achieved by launching the vssadmin.exe process with the following command vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet	['T1490']
+A combination of NTWDBLIB.dll and cliconfg.exe are used to bypass UAC protections; this is a familiar attack on Windows. UAC bypass via DLL hijacking requires	['T1548.002']
+While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are	['T1027']
+If the ransomware is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later, it will attempt to elevate its privileges. In short, WastedLocker uses a well-documented UAC bypass method [1] [2]. It chooses a random file (EXE/DLL) from the Windows system32 folder and copies it to the %APPDATA% location under a different hidden filename. Next, it creates an alternate data stream (ADS) into the file named bin and copies the ransomware into it. WastedLocker then copies winsat.exe and winmm.dll into a newly created folder located in the Windows temporary folder. Once loaded, the hijacked DLL (winmm.dll) is patched to execute the aforementioned ADS	['T1548.002']
+For Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge browsers, the plugin retrieves user credentials using functions from the vaultcli.dll library that implements the functions of the vaultcmd.exe utility	['T1555.004']
+Before launching the attack, the group studied publicly available information about the targeted organization and identified email addresses belonging to various departments of the company	['T1591']
+Next, it relaunches Outlook with a special option, /altvba <OTM filename>, which loads the Gamaredon VBA project. The malicious code is executed once the Application.Startup event is received. They have been using this module in three different ways to send malicious email to	['T1137']
+The decoded BabyShark VB script first enables all future macros for Microsoft Word and Excel by adding the following registry keys	['T1547.001']
+The TMP files were then staged for exfiltration on Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with the China Chopper web shell. From those servers the threat actor could use a web shell to retrieve the encrypted archives	['T1074.002']
+After locating one of the target processes, the malware uses Process Hollowing (MITRE Technique T1093) to evasively create a new process from a legitimate source. This new process is in a suspended state so the malware can unmap its memory and write its contents to the new, allocated space. Once this is complete, it will resume the suspended process. By using this technique, the malware is able to leverage itself from a signed and verified legitimate Windows OS process, or, alternatively, if aswrundll.exe or unins000.exe exists, a signed and verified security product process	['T1055.012']
+"As happens so many times, it contains a Visual Basic script that will execute the malicious activities. This one, however, appears to be more innovative. It starts by loading its own document into memory. Afterward, it copies 7,074,638 bytes from the end of the file and writes the remaining bytes back to the disk. This ZIP file contains a Python interpreter and Python script that is actually the RAT. The Word macro will unzip and execute the main script called ""launcher.py. The launcher script is responsible for checking the environment that the doc is currently being opened in. It assumes that all sandboxes will have hard drives smaller than 62GB. If it's in a sandbox environment, it will overwrite the malware scripts with the contents of the file ""License.txt"" and exit, thus deleting itself. Anti-sandbox code If it determines that it is not running in a sandbox environment, it will generate a unique ID, that is then replaced directly with the Python source code of the main scripts before executing it"	['T1497.001']
+The main module can also change the communication channel: once every 360 C&C loops, it can retrieve a new domain from the actors’ S3 bucket	['T1008']
+"OwaAuth web shell — A web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers. Captured credentials are DES-encrypted using the password ""12345678"" and are written to the log.txt file in the root directory. Like the ChinaChopper web shell, the OwaAuth web shell requires a password. However, the OwaAuth web shell password contains the victim organization's name. More information about the OwaAuth web shell is available in Appendix C. ASPXTool — A modified version of the ASPXSpy web shell (see Figure 6). It is deployed to internally accessible servers running Internet Information Services (IIS). Figure 6. ASPXTool web shell"	['T1505.003']
+It’s worth noting that Blue Mockingbird’s initial access does not provide the privileges needed to establish the many persistence mechanisms used. In one engagement we observed, the adversary using a JuicyPotato exploit to escalate privileges from an IIS Application Pool Identity virtual account to the NT Authority\SYSTEM account. JuicyPotato allows an attacker to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege and Windows DCOM to move from an unprivileged account to the highest level of privilege on a system (T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation). During this engagement, the attacker abused a DCOM class and leveraged the IIS Application Pool Identity’s SeImpersonate privilege to perform the escalation	['T1134']
+The threat actors retrieved the NTDS.dit file from the volume shadow copy. NTDS.dit contains Active Directory data, including password hashes for all users on a domain. Extracting hashes from the NTDS.dit file requires access to the SYSTEM file in the system registry	['T1003.003']
+For each drive targeted, the malware recursively iterates through all files and directories. For each file, the name and path are compared against a list of excluded filenames and two lists of excluded directory names. These exclusion lists are composed of regular expression type strings that are located in the encrypted strings table. If the file name and path do not match any regular expressions in the exclusion lists, the file is encrypted	['T1480']
+In other cases, threat actors placed web shells on externally accessible servers, sometimes behind a reverse proxy, to execute commands on the compromised system. TG-3390 actors have deployed the OwaAuth web shell to Exchange servers, disguising it as an ISAPI filter. The IIS w3wp.exe process loads the malicious DLL, which CTU researchers have observed in the Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Bin directory	['T1505.004']
+In this example, a scheduled task named “Windows Scheduled Maintenance” was created to run Casey Smith’s “Squiblydoo” App Whitelisting bypass every 30 minutes. While all payloads can be dynamically updated, at the time of delivery, this task launched a COM scriptlet (“.sct” file extension) that downloaded and executed Meterpreter hosted on images.chinabytes[.]info. Meterpreter then loaded Cobalt Strike BEACON, configured to communicate with 80.255.3[.]87 using the Safebrowsing malleable C2 profile to further blend in with network traffic. A second scheduled task named “Scheduled Defrags” was created by loading the raw task XML with a backdated task creation timestamp of June 2, 2016	['T1070.006']
+Micropsia is able to perform a recursive directory listing on-demand for all volume drives available on the victim’s machine. It checks whether a volume drive exists by simply iterating all possible letters (from A to Z) and testing whether this directory exists. Malware operators are also able to fetch specific files from victim file system by their path	['T1083']
+BOOSTWRITE is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications which load the legitimate ‘Dwrite.dll’ provided by the Microsoft DirectX Typography Services	['T1574.001']
+DEATHRANSOM performs language ID and keyboard layout checks. If either of these match Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar it exits. Neither HELLOKITTY or FIVEHANDS perform language ID or keyboard checks	['T1614.001']
+The case we found arrived through a targeted email that contained a document file (in docx format). Opening document starts a template injection technique for loading the document template from the internet. The downloaded document template contains the malicious macro codes, which executes a VBScript (VBS). We found a mechanism for decrypting, executing, and downloading an additional payload from the C&C server. During the time of the analysis however, the C&C server was not accessible, which made us unable to get additional payloads	['T1221']
+Essentially, “thumb.dd” is a container for data which is saved on the flash drive, unless it can be sent directly over the Internet to the C&C server	['T1052.001']
+There are two types of Ryuk binaries: a dropper (which is not commonly observed) and the Ryuk executable payload. Recovery of Ryuk droppers are rare, due to the Ryuk executable payload deleting the dropper when executed. Upon execution, the dropper constructs an installation folder path. The folder path is created by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. This is used to create a string that contains the drive letter path. If the host operating system is Windows XP or earlier, the string Documents and Settings\Default User\ is appended to the drive letter path. If the host is Windows Vista or newer, the string users\Public\ is appended to the drive letter path. For Windows XP, an example folder path would be C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\, and for Window Vista or higher, the path would be C:\Users\Public	['T1036.005']
+For the second path, the attackers create their own SAML signing certificate outside of the organization’s environment. With Azure AD administrative permissions, they then add the new certificate as a trusted object. As these are rare actions, we advise verifying that any instances identified are the result of legitimate administrative activity	['T1484.002']
+After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the server. It uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP. Finally, the malware parses and extracts SMS message data from the network traffic	['T1040']