Assertion: approval voting | /r/CapableOf | elect a condorcet loser
Facets:
value: in some cases
type: TEMPORAL
value: sincerely
type: DEGREE
value: usually
type: DEGREE
value: in practice
type: TEMPORAL
Source sentences:
text: In some cases, approval voting can sincerely elect any one of the candidates, including a Condorcet winner and a Condorcet loser, without the voter preferences changing.
text: While in the modern era there have been relatively few competitive approval voting elections where tactical voting is more likely, Brams argues that approval voting usually elects Condorcet winners in practice.
text: In some cases, approval voting can sincerely elect any one of the candidates, including a Condorcet winner and a Condorcet loser, without the voter preferences changing.
text: Optimal strategic approval voting fails to satisfy the Condorcet criterion and can elect a Condorcet loser.