Assertion: reason | /r/HasProperty | coherent
Facets:
value: instrumentally
type: MANNER
value: on every particular occasion
type: TEMPORAL
Source sentences:
text: First, (§3.1) we might say that there isn’t any requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such, but whenever one is instrumentally incoherent, one violates some independent requirement of reason.
text: Second, (§3.2) we might say that there is a requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
text: The source of the problem, according to this answer, is not that when one is instrumentally incoherent, one violates some requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
text: One might instead suggest a weaker view: we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
text: Of course, the weaker view—that we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such—could be true even though it fails to explain the Violation and Satisfaction Claims.
text: There are other challenges facing the view that the Violation and Satisfaction Claims are explained by a requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
text: And so pointing to a reason to be disposed to be coherent wouldn’t yield a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such.
text: Since our agency isn’t at risk with every instance of instrumental incoherence, this account won’t yield a reason to be instrumentally coherent on every particular occasion; it would only provide a reason to do so when one’s incoherence is extreme enough to threaten one’s status as an agent.)
text: And Michael Bratman (2009c) has recently suggested that we have a reason to be instrumentally coherent as such because doing so is a necessary, constitutive component of self-governance, and we have an intrinsic reason to govern ourselves.
text: Let’s suppose that there is a requirement of reason to be instrumentally coherent.