Assertion: mind's property | /r/HasProperty | physical
Facets:
value: by second-order realization physicalism
type: OTHER
value: like having a certain
type: OTHER
Source sentences:
text: [Some properties] are physical, like having a certain mass or temperature, being 1 meter long, and being heavier than.
text: A property is physical iff it either is the sort of property that physical theory tells us about or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property that physical theory tells us about.
text: Moreover, most functionalists who are physicalists require that the properties that are quantified over in functional definitions be physical properties.
text: But then by second-order realization physicalism, these properties themselves will be either physical or realized by physical properties.
text: The reason is that whether a physical theory is true or not is a function of the contingent facts; but whether a property is physical or not is not a function of the contingent facts.
text: For if a property is mental and physical, then, given the Via Negativa, it will be both mental and non-mental which (of course) it can't be!
text: A better way would be to require of any spelling out the notion of the physical, either the object-based account or the theory-based account, that it respect that fact that some ( uninstantiated) mental properties are non-physical.
text: This sentence also is neutral as to whether the properties of the sensation are physical or whether some of them are irreducibly psychical.
text: A property is physical iff: it either is the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents or else is a property which metaphysically (or logically) supervenes on the sort of property required by a complete account of the intrinsic nature of paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents.