Assertion: mind's state | /r/HasProperty | physical
Facets:
value: despite appearances to the contrary
type: OTHER
value: in both cases
type: TEMPORAL
value: for the behaviour of others
type: TRANSITIVE-OBJECT
Source sentences:
text: Non-reductive physicalism is the idea that while mental states are physical they are not reducible to physical properties, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter.
text: Non-reductionist philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind–body relations: 1) Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states, but 2)
text: But if epiphenomenalism is true, my mental states do not explain my behaviour and there is a physical explanation for the behaviour of others.
text: Physicalism claims that states and events are physical, but those physical states and events are only imperfectly characterized.
text: Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa?
text: In both cases the internal states can be physical states.
text: Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states.