Assertion: liar | /r/HasProperty | paradox
Facets:
Source sentences:
text: Is the Liar Paradox importantly different if one considers it to be about statements or propositions rather than sentences?
text: The brief answer is that Tarski’s sentence with the supposedly uncontroversial assumptions above can be used to produce the Liar Paradox.
text: If we adopt the metaphor of a paradox as being an argument which starts from the home of seemingly true assumptions and which travels down the garden path of seemingly valid steps into the den of a contradiction, then a solution to the Liar Paradox has to find something wrong with the home, find something wrong with the garden path, or find a way to live within the den.
text: Strawson has argued that the proper way out of the Liar Paradox is to carefully re-examine how the term truth is really used by speakers.
text: An Ideal Solution to the Liar Paradox
text: To summarize, an important goal for the best solution, or solutions, to the Liar Paradox is to offer us a deeper understanding of how our semantic concepts and principles worked to produce the Paradox in the first place, especially if a solution to the Paradox requires changing them.
text: We want to understand the concepts of truth, reference, and negation that are involved in the Liar Paradox.
text: From the future resulting theory which solves those problems, one could hope to deduce a solution to the Liar Paradox.
text: There have been many systematic proposals for ways out of the Liar Paradox.
text: His solution to the Liar Paradox has the drawback that it places so many subscript restrictions on what can refer to what.
text: Reflection on the Liar Paradox suggests that either informal English (or any other natural language) is not semantically closed or, if it is semantically closed as it appears to be, then it is inconsistent—assuming for the moment that it does make sense to apply the term inconsistent to a natural language with a vague structure.
text: One virtue of Tarski’s way out of the Liar Paradox is that it does permit the concept of truth to be applied to sentences that involve the concept of truth, provided we apply level subscripts to the concept of truth and follow the semantic rule that any subscript inside a pair of quotation marks must always be smaller than the subscript outside but still within the sentence; any violation of this rule produces a meaningless, ungrammatical formal sentence.
text: Tarski allows some self-reference, but not the self-reference involved in the Liar Paradox.
text: Some Liar Paradoxes begin with a chain of sentences, no one of which is self-referential, although the chain as a whole is self-referential or circular:
text: Finally, it would be instructive to learn how the Liar Paradoxes are related to all the other paradoxes.