Assertion: mind's state | /r/HasAspect | property
Facets:
Source sentences:
text: Just as my experience of movement has a property that makes it a p-awareness of movement, perhaps my belief (i.e., my f-awareness) that some object, o, is moving is, likewise, an internal state having a property, B (not itself movement), a property the having of which makes an internal state into a conceptual representation or depiction (i.e., an f-awareness) of movement.
text: Just as we conceived of visual experiences as internal states having the property of being awarenesses of P (for some P of an external o), why can't hunger be similarly conceived of as an internal experience (a p-awareness) of the properties of an internal o?
text: Perceptual experiences are being identified with internal states having properties (e.g., P ) that make them p-awarenesses, experiences, of the properties (e.g., P) that external objects have.