Assertion: concept | /r/HasProperty | distinct
Facets:
value: qualitatively
type: DEGREE
value: in this scheme
type: OTHER
value: by being quality of emphasis
type: CAUSE
value: according to some theorists
type: OTHER
value: -quantitatively
type: DEGREE
value: from their instances
type: OTHER
value: if
type: DEGREE
Source sentences:
text: Realism about concepts is the view that concepts are distinct from their instances, and nominalism is the view that concepts are nothing over and above, or distinct from, their instances.
text: For example, if two predicate expressions differ in their possible-worlds extension, then the concepts expressed by those predicates must be distinct.
text: The point is illustrated most perspicuously with two concepts known to be distinct, and yet share some necessary conditions.
text: In this scheme, the concept of relevance and the concept of admissibility are distinct: indeed, admissibility rules presuppose the relevance of the evidence to which they apply.
text: In this scheme, the concept of relevance and the concept of admissibility are distinct: indeed, admissibility rules presuppose the relevance of the evidence to which they apply.
text: While these are the same units as heat capacity, the two concepts are distinct.
text: According to some theorists two concepts are qualitatively distinct if, and only if, all instantiations of the first concept share a property which no instantiation of the second concept shares (Steiner 2002; Garrard 1999, 2002; Russell, 2007).
text: Todd Calder (2013) disputes this understanding of what it is for two concepts to be qualitatively distinct, arguing instead that two concepts are qualitatively distinct provided they do not share all of their essential properties.
text: Importantly, if Liberto and Harrington are right that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct by being quality of emphasis distinct, then Calder is wrong to think that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct only if they do not share all of their essential properties.
text: Hallie Liberto and Fred Harrington go even further than Calder in arguing that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct even though instantiations of the two concepts share properties (Liberto and Harrington 2016).
text: Importantly, if Liberto and Harrington are right that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct by being quality of emphasis distinct, then Calder is wrong to think that two concepts can be non-quantitatively distinct only if they do not share all of their essential properties.