Assertion: concept | /r/HasProperty | abstract objects
Facets:
Source sentences:
text: Concepts as Fregean senses (see sense and reference), where concepts are abstract objects, as opposed to mental objects and mental states
text: The first such dimension defines whether the concept is empirical, abstract, or theoretical--a construct.
text: As mentioned earlier, if concepts are abstract Platonistic entities, and not internal mental representations that are “in the head,” then the classical view might escape some of the objections raised by prototype theorists.
text: There are two main views of the ontology of concepts: (1) Concepts are abstract objects, and (2) concepts are mental representations.
text: The semantic view of concepts suggests that concepts are abstract objects.
text: This type of view has most prominently been associated with the view that concepts are Fregean senses (e.g., Peacocke 1992, Zalta 2001), so it is this version of the view that concepts are abstract objects that we will focus on here.
text: If one adopts the view that concepts are abstract objects, the corresponding question might be whether a pre-linguistic or non-linguistic agent can stand in the concept possession relation to concepts understood as abstract objects of a certain type.