Assertion: categorical imperative's action | /r/HasAspect | moral worth
Facets:
value: in the purpose
type: PURPOSE
value: in the maxim
type: OTHER
value: for kant
type: OTHER
value: only then
type: TEMPORAL
Source sentences:
text: I am thinking here, in particular, of the claims that the only thing good 'without qualification' is a good will and that only an action which one had no desire to do could ever have any moral worth.
text: "An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined.
text: Assuming an action has moral worth only if it expresses a good will, such actions have no genuine “moral worth.
text: Only then would the action have moral worth.
text: The first proposition of morality is that for an action to have moral worth, it must be done because of duty, which is to say that actions commanded by inclinations are not of moral worth.
text: Kant believes only actions performed from duty have moral worth.
text: So, actions having moral worth cannot be fortuitous or inadvertent.
text: Actions have moral worth if they align with duty.
text: Kant believes only actions performed for the sake of duty have moral worth.
text: Since to have moral worth an action must be done on principle, and to see that a certain principle applies to a particular action requires the exercise of reason, only rational beings can be said to behave morally.
text: Again, for Kant, only those actions that are done for the sake of duty have moral worth.
text: If one performs an action by inclination, then that action has no moral worth
text: If one performs an action by inclination, then that action has no moral worth
text: 2) Kant claims that an action that is not done from the motive of duty has no moral worth.
text: I agree with Kant’s claim that an action that is not done from the motive of duty has no moral worth since everyone should consider their duty as an individual.
text: Kant claims that an action that is not done from the motive of duty has no moral worth.
text: The second proposition is: an action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which it is resolved upon, and thus it does not depend on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of willing according to which - regardless of any object of the desiderative faculty - the action is done.
text: An action from duty has its moral worth in the maxim (subjective principle of the willing), not in the purpose.