Assertion: concept | /r/HasProperty | mental entities
Facets:
value: in a language of thought
type: OTHER
value: for objects
type: TRANSITIVE-OBJECT
value: in a physicalist theory of mind
type: LOCATION
value: for events
type: TRANSITIVE-OBJECT
value: for ideas
type: PURPOSE
Source sentences:
text: Or are concepts not mental entities at all?
text: Concepts are mental categories for objects, events, or ideas that have a common set of features” (Exploring Psychology retrieved, 17:17, 15 September 2006 (MEST))
text: In a physicalist theory of mind, a concept is a mental representation, which the brain uses to denote a class of things in the world.
text: Concepts are mental representations that allow us to draw appropriate inferences about the type of entities we encounter in our everyday lives.
text: According to the abilities view, it’s wrong to maintain that concepts are mental particulars—concepts are neither mental images nor word-like entities in a language of thought.
text: According to the abilities view, it’s wrong to maintain that concepts are mental particulars—concepts are neither mental images nor word-like entities in a language of thought.
text: Conceptualist views also include imagism, the view (dating from Locke and others) that concepts are a sort of mental image.
text: Conceptualism with respect to concepts holds that concepts are mental entities, being either immanent in the mind itself as a sort of idea, as constituents of complete thoughts, or somehow dependent on the mind for their existence (perhaps by being possessed by an agent or by being possessible by an agent).
text: More simply put, concepts are the mental categories that help us classify objects, events, or ideas, building on the understanding that each object, event, or idea has a set of common relevant features.
text: If we accept that a thinker’s possession of a concept must be realized by some subpersonal state involving a mental representation, why not say simply that the concept is the mental representation?
text: For instance, one might maintain that concepts are mental representations that are typed in terms of the Fregean senses they express (see Margolis & Laurence 2007 for discussion).