Assertion: atom's property | /r/HasProperty | intrinsic
Facets:
value: to an object iff
type: TRANSITIVE-OBJECT
value: implicitly
type: DEGREE
value: for any \(x\
type: OTHER
value: surely
type: DEGREE
value: necessarily
type: DEGREE
Source sentences:
text: We will also assume that properties like being made of tin, and having a mass of 500kg are intrinsic.)
text: So any property that an object can change must be extrinsic, so nothing undergoes real change.
text: (2) The property of being \(F\) is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), the state of affairs of \(x\) being \(F\) is intrinsically about \(x\).
text: This seems to be a mistake since many properties seem to be both be relational and intrinsic.
text: In addition to the “global” concept of a property being intrinsic, there is a “local” concept of something having a property in an intrinsic fashion (see Humberstone 1996, p. 206).
text: For example, the property of having a proper part is surely intrinsic, but it also appears to be a relational property.
text: Lewis holds a further principle that may not be obvious from the above quote: that any property with respect to which duplicates never differ is intrinsic.
text: For example, unless we already know somehow which properties have proper parts and which properties do not have proper parts, (15) will be useless in helping us to determine which properties are intrinsic and which properties are non-intrinsic.
text: For example, unless we already know somehow which properties have proper parts and which properties do not have proper parts, (15) will be useless in helping us to determine which properties are intrinsic and which properties are non-intrinsic.
text: First, it follows that every fundamental property is intrinsic (since it being non-intrinsic cannot be revealed by analysis in terms of more fundamental properties and relations.
text: Secondly, and even more importantly, it follows that whether a property is intrinsic should be analysable in terms of how that property can be analysed in terms of the fundamental properties and relations.
text: Lewis’s account rests heavily on the claim that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and, implicitly, that the perfectly natural properties and relations are sufficient to characterise the world completely.
text: The first assumption that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic has been rejected by Weatherson (2006).
text: (See also Yablo 1999 who holds that, even if every perfectly natural property is intrinsic, this fact is at best a lucky accident, and that this renders Lewis’s account unsuccessful as a philosophical account of intrinsicality.)
text: As with Lewis’s original account, Marshall’s account assumes that each perfectly natural property is intrinsic and that the perfectly natural properties and relations are able to completely describe every possible world.
text: In short, a property is intrinsic to an object iff removing the rest of the world doesn’t change whether the object has the property.
text: As a result, it follows from the third characterisation that each piece of tin has the property of being either made of tin or married in an intrinsic fashion, despite this property being extrinsic.
text: A property is intrinsic iff it never differs between duplicates.