  Philosophers now seem to agree that frequentism is an untenable strategy to
explain the meaning of probabilities. Nevertheless, I want to revive
frequentism, and I will do so by grounding probabilities on typicality in the
same way as the thermodynamic arrow of time can be grounded on typicality
within statistical mechanics. This account, which I will call typicality
frequentism, will evade the major criticisms raised against previous forms of
frequentism. In this theory, probabilities arise within a physical theory from
statistical behavior of almost all initial conditions. The main advantage of
typicality frequentism is that it shows which kinds of probabilities (that also
have empirical relevance) can be derived from physics. Although one cannot
recover all probability talk in this account, this is rather a virtue than a
vice, because it shows which types of probabilities can in fact arise from
physics and which types need to be explained in different ways, thereby opening
the path for a pluralistic account of probabilities.
