  In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule has attracted wide attention as an
effective strategy updating rule, and voluntary participation is proposed by
introducing a third strategy in Prisoner's dilemma game. Some researches show
that combining Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule with voluntary participation could
promote cooperation more significantly under moderate temptation values,
however, cooperators' survival under high aspiration levels and high temptation
values is still a challenging problem. In this paper, inspired by Achievement
Motivation Theory, a Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule with voluntary
participation is investigated, where a dynamic aspiration process is introduced
to describe the co-evolution of individuals' strategies and aspirations. It is
found that cooperation is extremely promoted and defection is almost extinct in
our model, even when the initial aspiration levels and temptation values are
high. The combination of dynamic aspiration and voluntary participation plays
an active role since loners could survive under high initial aspiration levels
and they will expand stably because of their fixed payoffs. The robustness of
our model is also discussed and some adverse structures are found which should
be alerted in the evolutionary process. Our work provides a more realistic
model and shows that cooperators may prevail defectors in an unfavorable
initial environment.
