  Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict
ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming
at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We
define an assignment to be feasible if it satisfies all quotas and assume such
an assignment always exists. The Probabilistic Serial (PS) and Random Priority
(RP) mechanisms are generalised based on the same intuitive idea: Allow agents
to consume their most preferred available object until the total mass of agents
yet to be allocated is exactly equal to the remaining amount of unfilled lower
quotas; in this case, we restrict agents' menus to objects which are yet to
fill their minimum quotas. We show the mechanisms satisfy the same criteria as
their classical counterparts: PS is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly
strategy-proof; RP is strategy-proof, weakly envy-free but not ordinally
efficient.
