  While it is known that unconditionally secure position-based cryptography is
impossible both in the classical and the quantum setting, it has been shown
that some quantum protocols for position verification are secure against
attackers which share a quantum state of bounded dimension. In this work, we
consider the security of the qubit routing protocol. The protocol has the
advantage that an honest prover only has to manipulate a single qubit and a
classical string of length $2n$. We show that the protocol is secure if each of
the attackers holds at most $n/2 - 3$ qubits. With this, we show for the first
time that there exists a quantum position verification protocol where the ratio
between the quantum resources an honest prover needs and the quantum resources
the attackers need to break the protocol is unbounded. The verifiers need only
increase the amount of classical resources to force the attackers to use more
quantum resources. Finally, we show that the qubit routing protocol is robust
with respect to noise, making it appealing for applications.
