  We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and
compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples are validation or
governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving agents,
but since voting is costly, they may want to abstain or delegate their vote to
other agents. Misbehaving agents always vote. We compare conventional voting
allowing for abstention with vote delegation. Preferences of voters are private
information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving voters win. We
provide three insights: First, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by
#X, is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. Second, if
#X is moderate, conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote
delegation fails with probability one. Third, if #X is low, delegation delivers
a positive outcome with a higher probability than conventional voting. Finally,
our results allow us assessing the performance of vote delegation which is
known as "liquid democracy".
