  A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to
improve their bids, known as a Best and Final Offer (BAFO) stage. This final
bid can depend on new information provided about either the asset or the
competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding
competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should
provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy
profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each
bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the
item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of
bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of
bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different
information settings. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders
when less additional information is made available to the bidders regarding the
competition. It follows that when the number of bidders is a priori unknown,
there are some advantages to the auctioneer to not reveal information.
