  Large-scale institutional changes require strong commitment and involvement
of all stakeholders. We use the standard framework of cooperative game theory
developed by Ichiishi (1983, pp. 78-149) to: (i) establish analytically the
difference between policy maker and political leader; (ii) formally study
interactions between a policy maker and his followers; (iii) examine the role
of leadership in the implementation of structural reforms. We show that a
policy maker can be both partisan and non-partisan, while a political leader
can only be non-partisan. Following this distinction, we derive the probability
of success of an institutional change, as well as the nature of the gain that
such a change would generate on the beneficiary population. Based on the
restrictions of this simple mathematical model and using some evidence from the
Congolese experience between 2012 and 2016, we show that institutional changes
can indeed benefit the majority of the population, when policy makers are truly
partisan.
