  The concepts of blameworthiness and wrongness are of fundamental importance
in human moral life. But to what extent are humans disposed to blame
artificially intelligent agents, and to what extent will they judge their
actions to be morally wrong? To make progress on these questions, we adopted
two novel strategies. First, we break down attributions of blame and wrongness
into more basic judgments about the epistemic and conative state of the agent,
and the consequences of the agent's actions. In this way, we are able to
examine any differences between the way participants treat artificial agents in
terms of differences in these more basic judgments. our second strategy is to
compare attributions of blame and wrongness across human, artificial, and group
agents (corporations). Others have compared attributions of blame and wrongness
between human and artificial agents, but the addition of group agents is
significant because these agents seem to provide a clear middle-ground between
human agents (for whom the notions of blame and wrongness were created) and
artificial agents (for whom the question remains open).
