  We study the strategic interaction among vehicles in a non-cooperative
platoon coordination game. Vehicles have predefined routes in a transportation
network with a set of hubs where vehicles can wait for other vehicles to form
platoons. Vehicles decide on their waiting times at hubs and the utility
function of each vehicle includes both the benefit from platooning and the cost
of waiting. We show that the platoon coordination game is a potential game when
the travel times are either deterministic or stochastic, and the vehicles
decide on their waiting times at the beginning of their journeys. We also
propose two feedback solutions for the coordination problem when the travel
times are stochastic and vehicles are allowed to update their strategies along
their routes. The solutions are evaluated in a simulation study over the
Swedish road network. It is shown that uncertainty in travel times affects the
total benefit of platooning drastically and the benefit from platooning in the
system increases significantly when utilizing feedback solutions.
