  Remote attestation is one of the ways to verify the state of an untrusted
device. Earlier research has attempted remote verification of a devices' state
using hardware, software, or hybrid approaches. Majority of them have used
Attestation Key as a hardware root of trust, which does not detect hardware
modification or counterfeit issues. In addition, they do not have a secure
communication channel between verifier and prover, which makes them susceptible
to modern security attacks. This paper presents SEDAT, a novel methodology for
remote attestation of the device via a security enhanced communication channel.
SEDAT performs hardware, firmware, and software attestation. SEDAT enhances the
communication protocol security between verifier and prover by using the Single
Packet Authorization (SPA) technique, which provides replay and Denial of
Service (DoS) protection. SEDAT provides a way for verifier to get on-demand
device integrity and authenticity status via a secure channel. It also enables
the verifier to detect counterfeit hardware, change in firmware, and software
code on the device. SEDAT validates the manufacturers` root CA certificate,
platform certificate, endorsement certificate (EK), and attributes certificates
to perform platform hardware attestation. SEDAT is the first known tool that
represents firmware, and Integrity Measurement Authority (IMA) event logs in
the Canonical Event Logs (CEL) format (recommended by Trusted Computing Group).
SEDAT is the first implementation, to the best of our knowledge, that showcases
end to end hardware, firmware, and software remote attestation using Trusted
Platform Module (TPM2.0) which is resilient to DoS and replay attacks. SEDAT is
the first remote verifier that is capable of retrieving a TPM2.0 quote from
prover and validate it after regeneration, using a software TPM2.0 quote check.
