# setpriv

## NAME



           setpriv - run a program with different Linux privilege settings
    


## SYNOPSIS



           **setpriv**[options] _program_ [_arguments_]
    


## DESCRIPTION



           Sets or queries various Linux privilege settings that are
           inherited across execve(2).
    
           In comparison to su(1) and runuser(1), **setpriv** neither uses PAM,
           nor does it prompt for a password. It is a simple, non-set-user-ID
           wrapper around execve(2), and can be used to drop privileges in
           the same way as **setuidgid**(8) from **daemontools** , **chpst**(8) from
           **runit** , or similar tools shipped by other service managers.
    


## OPTIONS



           **--clear-groups**
               Clear supplementary groups.
    
           **-d** , **--dump**
               Dump the current privilege state. This option can be specified
               more than once to show extra, mostly useless, information.
               Incompatible with all other options.
    
           **--groups** _group_...
               Set supplementary groups. The argument is a comma-separated
               list of GIDs or names.
    
           **--inh-caps**(**+** |**-**)_cap_..., **--ambient-caps**(**+** |**-**)_cap_..., **--bounding-set**
           (**+** |**-**)_cap_...
               Set the inheritable capabilities, ambient capabilities or the
               capability bounding set. See capabilities(7). The argument is
               a comma-separated list of **+**_cap_ and **-**_cap_ entries, which add or
               remove an entry respectively. _cap_ can either be a
               human-readable name as seen in capabilities(7) without the
               _cap__ prefix or of the format **cap_N** , where _N_ is the internal
               capability index used by Linux. **+all** and **-all** can be used to
               add or remove all caps.
    
               The set of capabilities starts out as the current inheritable
               set for **--inh-caps** , the current ambient set for **--ambient-caps**
               and the current bounding set for **--bounding-set**.
    
               Note the following restrictions (detailed in capabilities(7))
               regarding modifications to these capability sets:
    
               •   A capability can be added to the inheritable set only if
                   it is currently present in the bounding set.
    
               •   A capability can be added to the ambient set only if it is
                   currently present in both the permitted and inheritable
                   sets.
    
               •   Notwithstanding the syntax offered by **setpriv** , the kernel
                   does not permit capabilities to be added to the bounding
                   set.
    
               If you drop a capability from the bounding set without also
               dropping it from the inheritable set, you are likely to become
               confused. Do not do that.
    
           **--keep-groups**
               Preserve supplementary groups. Only useful in conjunction with
               **--rgid** , **--egid** , or **--regid**.
    
           **--init-groups**
               Initialize supplementary groups using initgroups3. Only useful
               in conjunction with **--ruid** or **--reuid**.
    
           **--list-caps**
               List all known capabilities. This option must be specified
               alone.
    
           **--no-new-privs**
               Set the _no_new_privs_ bit. With this bit set, execve(2) will
               not grant new privileges. For example, the set-user-ID and
               set-group-ID bits as well as file capabilities will be
               disabled. (Executing binaries with these bits set will still
               work, but they will not gain privileges. Certain LSMs,
               especially AppArmor, may result in failures to execute certain
               programs.) This bit is inherited by child processes and cannot
               be unset. See prctl(2) and
               _Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt_ in the Linux kernel
               source.
    
               The _no_new_privs_ bit is supported since Linux 3.5.
    
           **--rgid** _gid_ , **--egid** _gid_ , **--regid** _gid_
               Set the real, effective, or both GIDs. The _gid_ argument can be
               given as a textual group name.
    
               For safety, you must specify one of **--clear-groups** , **--groups** ,
               **--keep-groups** , or **--init-groups** if you set any primary _gid_.
    
           **--ruid** _uid_ , **--euid** _uid_ , **--reuid** _uid_
               Set the real, effective, or both UIDs. The _uid_ argument can be
               given as a textual login name.
    
               Setting a _uid_ or _gid_ does not change capabilities, although
               the exec call at the end might change capabilities. This means
               that, if you are root, you probably want to do something like:
    
               **setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --inh-caps=-all**
    
           **--securebits**(**+** |**-**)_securebit_...
               Set or clear securebits. The argument is a comma-separated
               list. The valid securebits are _noroot_ , _noroot_locked_ ,
               _no_setuid_fixup_ , _no_setuid_fixup_locked_ , and _keep_caps_locked_.
               _keep_caps_ is cleared by execve(2) and is therefore not
               allowed.
    
           **--pdeathsig keep** |**clear** |**< signal>**
               Keep, clear or set the parent death signal. Some LSMs, most
               notably SELinux and AppArmor, clear the signal when the
               process' credentials change. Using **--pdeathsig keep** will
               restore the parent death signal after changing credentials to
               remedy that situation.
    
           **--ptracer** _pid_ |**any** |**none**
               When Yama’s restricted ptrace mode is in effect (that is, when
               _/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope_ is set to 1), allow being
               traced via ptrace(2) by the process with the specified PID, or
               any process, or no process. See PR_SET_PTRACER(2const). (Note
               that this is not inherited by child processes, though it is
               preserved across execve(2).) This option has no effect when
               Yama is not enabled or is in a mode other than restricted
               ptrace.
    
           **--selinux-label** _label_
               Request a particular SELinux transition (using a transition on
               exec, not dyntrans). This will fail and cause **setpriv** to abort
               if SELinux is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or
               cause execve(2) to fail at SELinux’s whim. (In particular,
               this is unlikely to work in conjunction with _no_new_privs_.)
               This is similar to runcon(1).
    
           **--apparmor-profile** _profile_
               Request a particular AppArmor profile (using a transition on
               exec). This will fail and cause **setpriv** to abort if AppArmor
               is not in use, and the transition may be ignored or cause
               execve(2) to fail at AppArmor’s whim.
    
           **--landlock-access** _access_
               Enable landlock restrictions for a specific set of system
               accesses. To allow specific subgroups of accesses use
               **--landlock-rule**.
    
               Block all filesystem access:
    
               **setpriv --landlock-access fs**
    
               Block all file deletions and directory creations:
    
               **setpriv --landlock-access fs:remove-file,make-dir**
    
               For a complete set of supported access categories use **setpriv**
               **--help**.
    
               The generic placeholder "fs" are subject to change and maybe
               be extened in future versoions to support new access types.
    
           **--landlock-rule** _rule_
               Allow one specific access from the categories blocked by
               **--landlock-access**.
    
               The syntax is as follows:
    
               **--landlock-rule $ruletype:$access:$rulearg**
    
               For example grant file read access to everything under **/boot** :
    
               **--landlock-rule path-beneath:read-file:/boot**
    
           **--seccomp-filter** _file_
               Load raw BPF seccomp filter code from a file.
    
               Filters can for example be created with **enosys**.
    
           **--reset-env**
    
               •   clears all the environment variables except **TERM**
                   environment variable
    
               •   initializes the environment variables **HOME** , **SHELL** , **USER** ,
                   **LOGNAME** according to the user’s passwd entry
    
               •   the environment variable **SHELL** defaults to **/bin/sh** if none
                   is given in the user’s passwd entry.
    
               •   resets **PATH** senvironment variable according to setting in
                   _/etc/login.defs_ (**ENV_PATH** , **ENV_SUPATH** or **ENV_ROOTPATH**
                   variables), or defaults to _/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin_
                   for a regular user and to
                   _/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin_
                   for root.
    
                   The environment variable **PATH** may be different on systems
                   where _/bin_ and _/sbin_ are merged into _/usr_.
    
           **-h** , **--help**
               Display help text and exit.
    
           **-V** , **--version**
               Display version and exit.
    


## NOTES



           If applying any specified option fails, _program_ will not be run
           and **setpriv** will return with exit status 127.
    
           Be careful with this tool — it may have unexpected security
           consequences. For example, setting _no_new_privs_ and then execing a
           program that is SELinux-confined (as this tool would do) may
           prevent the SELinux restrictions from taking effect.
    


## EXAMPLES



           If you’re looking for behavior similar to su(1)/runuser(1), or
           sudo(8) (without the **-g** option), try something like:
    
           **setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --init-groups**
    
           If you want to mimic daemontools' **setuid**(8), try:
    
           **setpriv --reuid=1000 --regid=1000 --clear-groups**
    


## AVAILABILITY



           The **setpriv** command is part of the util-linux package which can be
           downloaded from Linux Kernel Archive
           <https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/>. This page is
           part of the _util-linux_ (a random collection of Linux utilities)
           project. Information about the project can be found at 
           ⟨https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/⟩. If you have a
           bug report for this manual page, send it to
           util-linux@vger.kernel.org. This page was obtained from the
           project's upstream Git repository
           ⟨git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/util-linux/util-linux.git⟩ on
           2025-08-11. (At that time, the date of the most recent commit that
           was found in the repository was 2025-08-05.) If you discover any
           rendering problems in this HTML version of the page, or you
           believe there is a better or more up-to-date source for the page,
           or you have corrections or improvements to the information in this
           COLOPHON (which is _not_ part of the original manual page), send a
           mail to man-pages@man7.org
    
    util-linux 2.42-start-521-ec46  2025-08-09                     _SETPRIV_(1)
    


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