Xi Jinping

[[File:Xi Jinping Sept. 19, 2012.jpg|right|thumb|165px|
Winnie the Pooh
. Like butter wouldn’t melt in his mouth.]]{{ChinesePolitics}}{{bronze}}
{{cquote|The Chinese people have no recourse to anything like an independent judiciary. The Communist Party decides if you’re guilty or innocent. The conviction rate stands in excess of 98 per cent. [[Torture]] and forced confessions are commonplace. Xi has lately embarked on a vicious campaign of harassment and intimidation of workers’ rights activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and feminists. Scores of human rights lawyers have been rounded up and jailed.|||Terry Glavin, ''MacLean's''<ref>[https://www.macleans.ca/politics/china-is-no-friend-to-canada China is no friend to Canada] by Terry Glavin (April 7, 2017) ''MacLean's''</ref>}}
'''Xi Jinping''' (习近平) {{lived|1953}} has been the [[Dictator|paramount leader]] of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] and the [[People's Republic of China]] since late 2012, replacing [[Hu Jintao]]. To give you an idea of the magnitude of his authority, Xi is the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) — the head of the party and ''de facto'' leader, President of the People's Republic (''de jure'' head of state) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (commander-in-chief of armed forces), making him the most powerful man in China since Chairman [[Mao Zedong]]. He has also managed to abolish term limits, effectively making him paramount leader for life.<ref>https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-approves-plan-to-abolish-presidential-term-limits-clearing-way-for-xi-to-stay-on/2018/03/11/973c7ab2-24f0-11e8-a589-763893265565_story.html?utm_term=.036391425cf3</ref> Xi has racked up a list of 12 separate leadership titles as of 2021.<ref>[https://qz.com/892208/chinas-president-xi-jinping-now-has-a-dozen-titles-and-counting/ China’s president Xi Jinping now has a dozen titles, and counting] by Zheping Huang (January 22, 201) ''Quartz''.</ref> All of this has given rise to a [[personality cult]] that could possibly rival the cult of Mao (being the most powerful man and longest serving leader in China since Mao).<ref>{{wpa|Xi Jinping's cult of personality}}</ref><ref>[https://www.insideover.com/politics/the-rise-of-the-personality-cult-of-chairman-xi-jinping.html The Rise of the Personality Cult of Chairman Xi Jinping] by Barry Ellsworth (24 February 2020) ''Inside Over''.</ref>

Xi Jinping is sometimes nicknamed "Winnie the Pooh" or "Xinnie the Pooh", after images comparing him to the oddly pantsless bear were censored on Chinese social media.<ref>[https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-40627855 Why China censors banned Winnie the Pooh] by Stephen McDonell (July 17, 2017) ''BBC''</ref>

==Early career==
Born the son of an important [[revolution]]ary leader, Xi is a "Princeling", an opportunistic Chinese politician who rose through the ranks by [[Nepotism|riding on the coattails of his father]]. He quickly became Vice President under his predecessor, touring the world to maintain the appearance of [[diplomacy]]. Though called a Princeling, both his father and he himself suffered during the Cultural Revolution.

Something of a recluse, Xi burst out into the Chinese public almost at random, largely preferring to work behind the scenes, apart from a few token speeches and overseas meetings. His ascension to paramount leader was based on a last-minute compromise between party factions, as he was thought to be the one most likely to uphold the interests of the party while calming inter-party tensions. 

Upon assuming power, he's called for a renewed campaign against political corruption, even creating a video game where players can zap corrupt politicians,<ref>[https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-25812175 China: Computer game hopes to zap corruption] BBC</ref> continued assertion of Chinese hegemony and comprehensive [[Nationalism|national renewal]] at a time where Chinese society is unsure of its future despite being the most productive and successful in decades.

==More like Mao?==
Xi's priority is to guarantee the ruling position of the party, but unlike his predecessor, he is far more hands-on (and more clearly [[autocracy|autocratic]]) in his attempt to unify the party and sustain support for the government.<ref>[http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/just-how-secure-is-xi-jinping-really/ Just How Secure Is Xi Jinping, Really?], ''The Diplomat''</ref> His first initiative was to promote a "thorough cleanup" of the party (consolidation of power), cracking down on the noisier members who had undercut the party's popularity. To restore faith and trust in the government, he's spearheading a campaign meant to reconnect with the public via [[Astroturf|grassroots]] and the "Chinese Dream" (see below). He's called for the rest of the government to "purify" themselves of [[greed]], extravagance, laziness and hedonism by… taking baths.

His hard-on for Mao manifests in how he's [[Censorship|suppressing]] any overt criticism of the man, from turning once-activist schools into [[propaganda]] outlets to calling for the party to promote and adhere to [[Maoism]].<ref>[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/state-media-promoting-chinas-leader-xi-with-intensity-unseen-since-mao-era/2014/07/24/f5517d88-1247-11e4-8936-26932bcfd6ed_story.html State media promoting China’s leader Xi with intensity unseen since Mao era], ''Washington Post''</ref> National newspapers picture Xi as a "low-profile, amiable and practical" man who knows how the people act, and what they want and think, because he happened to eat steamed buns with ordinary folk when he worked as a local-level party secretary in Hebei province in the early 1980s. He also said that he used old clothes to patch his worn mattress. This casts Xi as both a follower and a successor to Mao, in the sense that he wants to be seen as a man [[Populism|connected with the public]].<ref group=note>He wrings his hands over the neck of opposition a bit differently, however. Investigations were opened into the state-owned PetroChina, meant to rein in a powerful interest group that's largely filled with proteges of former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who had crossed Xi during a factional power struggle in 2012. No points for guessing how many times corruption charges have been levied against Xi himself.</ref>
<!--(Not particularly new.) Now, this is where things turn "blegh." Xi launched a crackdown on what passes as freedoms of speech afforded by social media in a preemptive strike on dissent. Popular bloggers and businessmen have been arrested, forced into televised (and humiliating) confessions occur in ways that carry faint echoes of Mao's old form of justice. He's instructed officials throughout China to ban discussion of universal values, freedom of speech and civil rights, seeing them as "dangerous Western influences." Journalists and university professors are being discouraged from speaking to foreign media, on top of more efforts to censor their work.-->

The [[irony]] is that Jinping is the son of Xi Zhongxun, who was imprisoned ''under Mao''. Rehabilitated under Deng Xiaoping, Zhongxun helped champion the economic liberalization that began in southern China in 1979, but he was sidelined again after he was thought to have opposed the use of force to break up the [[Tiananmen Square Massacre|1989 Tiananmen Square protests]].<ref>{{wpa|Xi Zhongxun}}</ref> Jinping himself also suffered directly during the Cultural Revolution: his education was summarily terminated at age 15, he was sent to the countryside during the {{wpl|Down to the Countryside Movement,}} he was arrested for desertion from his post, and then sentenced to dig ditches.<ref>[https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/02/14/chinas_political_star_xi_jinping_is_a_study_in_contrasts.html China's political star Xi Jinping is a study in contrasts] by Barbara Demick & David Pierson (Feb. 14, 2012) ''Los Angeles Times'' via ''Toronto Star''.</ref> Rather than learn the lessons of the evils of [[totalitarianism]] like his father apparently did, Jinping apparently took notes on how to consolidate power and run an autocracy.

===Document Number 9===
In the summer of 2013, a confidential internal document circulated throughout the CCP listed six "dangerous" [[West]]ern values (although general coverage is not allowed): Western constitutional [[democracy]], pro-market [[neoliberalism]], universal values of [[human rights]], [[media]] independence, civil society, and "[[nihilist]]" criticisms of past errors of the party. The document was leaked by the public newspaper of the Liaoyuan municipal government. Without doubt, this was meant to forestall opposition to needed economic reforms, so as to avoid the split which resulted in the [[Soviet Union]] during [[Gorbachev]]'s reform efforts.<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html?ref=global-home China Takes Aim at Western Ideas], ''The New York Times''</ref>

The fact that this ''needed'' to be circulated should tell you something about the current state of China.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20150415025456/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/sites/default/files/global/docs/mhc_chengli.pdf "Despite tremendous efforts by the Chinese authorities to control the media and the Internet, the commercialization of the media and the unprecedented telecommunications revolution are making the flow of information easier and faster, bringing new perspectives to the Chinese public."] Eventually, something's gotta give.</ref>

===Power is paramount===
His anti-corruption campaign, if you hadn't already figured it out, targets primarily (if not exclusively) anyone he feels is a threat to his power. The reason he is the most powerful in China since Deng Xiaoping can be traced directly to his pseudo-[[Cultural Revolution]] (except in this case, it's directed within the party and no annihilation of culture). 

As a brief summary of the power struggle, you have two major factions within the CCP, one led by Jiang Zemin (known as the Shanghai Clique) and the other led by [[Hu Jintao]] (known as the Beijing Clique). The differences come not from any substantial policy differences, mind you, but from those who are seen as relatively more populist (Hu Jintao) and considerably more elitist (Jiang Zemin). Jiang first rose to prominence by advocating for a crackdown on a student protest in Tianamen Square, and he gained considerable power through his persecution of [[Falun Gong]]; for the sake of so-called national defense, he consolidated his power within the party by stacking the Politburo Standing Committee with his men and creating the 610 Office (which directs the security forces). Even when Hu was officially the leader of China, Jiang and his clique retained more influence; Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao had next to no power. Hu's clique disapproved of the idea of executing a very expensive crackdown on 100 million Chinese citizens who followed the Falun Gong exercises, let alone the teachings of the movement, which split the party between those two factions.

Xi Jinping was chosen as a compromise leader, as a way for the party to "clean" themselves of their differences. Xi responded by cracking down on all associates, corporate giants, government bureaucracies, and various other associates of Jiang Zemin, which consequently marginalized Hu Jintao's clique while empowering those who happen to grab Xi's coat tails. The most notable bureaucrats hit with anti-corruption charges are former Commerce Minister Bo Xilai, once a rising star in the party who got his start by shutting Falun Gong and other political prisoners into prison camps without [[due process]]. Falun Gong practitioners kept bringing lawsuits against Bo as a result of his mistreatment of them, leading to Hu and Wen finding Bo to be too much of a liability to become Vice Premier. His police chief was Wang Lijun, who allegedly took part in live organ harvesting of several thousand prisoners<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20150819120122/http://voicesinbioethics.org/2013/10/15/prisoner-organ-harvest/ "Transplant Tourists": Unwitting Beneficiaries of Prisoner Organ Harvest] by Maya Duani (October 15, 2013) ''Voices In Bioethics'' (archived from August 19, 2015).</ref> and wiretapped Hu's phone calls. Wang, fearing for his life at the impending purge, fled to the United States.

The highest ranking official purged by Xi's crusade was Zhou Yongkang, the fourth most powerful man in China under Jiang and Hu. His security apparatus, which included paramilitary police and secret police, had a bigger budget and more manpower than the ''army''. Just like Bo and Jiang, Zhou partly owes his success to persecuting Falun Gong, and he is rumored to have murdered his first wife in order to marry Jiang's niece.<ref>[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11000444/Did-Zhou-Yongkang-murder-his-first-wife.html Did Zhou Yongkang murder his first wife? After one of China's most powerful men is put under investigation, the Chinese media begins to hint darkly at the fate of his first wife] by Malcolm Moore (31 July 2014 • 08:30 am) ''The Telegraph''.</ref> He was hand-selected by Jiang to chair the Ministry of Public Security, joined the Politburo Standing Committee, and controlled the entire legal system plus the 610 Office. He was also seen as the man behind [[Kim Jong-un]] in [[North Korea]]; he was the only foreigner on the stadium behind Kim and the other North Korean generals in addition to being Kim's godfather.{{fact}}

Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang were the two most powerful and well-known associates of Jiang Zemin. Bo and Zhou heavily expanded the labor camp system, as well as the organ harvesting of live prisoners.{{fact}} Bo and Zhou are rumored to have planned ''two'' [[coup]] attempts on Xi Jinping. As you'd expect, both were purged, with Bo receiving a life sentence for corruption and abuse of power. Meanwhile, Xi reduced the power of Zhou's former position, ended the labor camp system expanded by Zhou, investigated Zhou's crooked cronies in the [[Fossil fuel|oil industry]], evicted Zhou from the party, and set up an official trial for the former security czar. That went quite well, right? Well, not really, because the corruption charges do not mention how they came into power, because that would make the Party look bad, and both men serve as convenient [[scapegoat]]s to placate the concerns of the Chinese public over the party while empowering Xi's own reputation. Don't hold your breath for allowing Falun Gong to practice their beliefs either, because the Party never makes mistakes.

Even the ever-opportunistic Western companies are being hit. Along others, [[Microsoft]], JP Morgan Chase, GlaxoSmithKline, General Motors, Volkswagen Audi, and through subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz, were hit with anti-monopoly charges including pricing violations and market dominance. This is particularly interesting, because it perfectly shows the mindset of Xi Jinping. These anti-monopoly charges help control prices in politically sensitive industries and empower domestic Chinese firms in order to use these regulatory tools that are common in other countries to control markets to their advantage in China. 

This is how it helps the Party, but how does it help Xi Jinping? Many of these foreign companies had close ties to — wait for it — Jiang Zemin, when he was himself the leader of China in the 1990s. Jiang himself first rose up the ladder in the state-owned First Auto Works Group; a grand total of fifty executives have been investigated under Xi. Jiang's son chaired the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation, which has joint ventures with General Motors, Volkswagen Audi, and Mercedes-Benz. Zhou Yongkang, Jiang's top ally, chaired the state-run Petroleum Corporation which used Microsoft's email service exclusively before being switched to a more domestic (read: party-approved) one in 2014. Jiang's son even got into Microsoft, as the owner of 50% of MSM China's website through his Shanghai Alliance Investment company. [[Bill Gates]]' venture into China was largely due to Jiang Zemin wanting it, and currently, Xi wants none of that while he remains paramount leader.

Even the departments in charge of the anti-monopoly campaign are being targeted. The Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) are the three agencies responsible for the investigations of foreign companies who made pals with Jiang. The Ministry of Commerce and NDRC were once the guardians of the wealth of Jiang's faction under so-called "financial gatekeeper" Liu Tienan (sentenced to life in prison for bribery);<ref>{{wpa|Liu Tienan}}</ref> both agencies were purged just before the anti-monopoly campaign began. The Party abolished presidential term limits, which effectively made Xi ruler for life.<ref>[https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely China Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Xi Jinping To Rule Indefinitely (March 11, 20187:42 AM ET) ''NPR''.</ref>

==Authoritarian social policies==
By late 2021, Xi Jinping decided to crack down on any scintilla of a percent of resistance to his rule. Touting his "national rejuvenation" policy, Xi's government took multiple new steps to crack down on cultural, business, and social mores, first by cracking down on video game usage. He restricted children (described as anyone under 18) from playing video games, except on Fridays, weekends, and holidays, and only for one hour, and only from 8pm to 9pm local time on those days.{{efn|This move earned them praise from [[Tucker Carlson]], by the way.<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYeiHLNtluk Tucker: China is doing a few things right] YouTube</ref>}} While the idea is to combat "youth video game addiction," this is a form of social engineering that removes even basic pleasures for younger Chinese, while completely disregarding streamers who play games for a career. This was done after reports showed children were using adult IDs to circumvent previous restrictions on video game usage. In truth, this is mainly a way for Xi to stop people from bypassing his government's overall internet and social media restrictions, to prevent them from being radicalized online as well as offline.<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/30/china-cuts-amount-of-time-minors-can-spend-playing-video-games "China cuts amount of time minors can spend playing online video games," Vincent Ni, The Guardian]</ref> His rule is totalitarian, state capitalist, socially conservative, and ultranationalistic; the PRC under his rule is said to be similar to [[fascism]] than [[communism]], like [[Russia]] under [[Putin]]’s rule.<ref>[https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POUV_169_0117--xi-jinping-s-china-marching-toward-a.htm Xi Jinping’s China: Marching toward a Chinese fascism?]</ref> Xi's traditionalist cultural policies were deeply influenced by [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s far-right {{wpl|New Life Movement}};<ref>{{Cite news |last=Zi |first=Yang |date=6 July 2016 |title=Xi Jinping and China's Traditionalist Restoration |work=The Jamestown Foundation |url=https://jamestown.org/program/xi-jinping-chinas-traditionalist-restoration/ |access-date=22 June 2024}}</ref> it is also commonly referred to as "[[Confucian]] fascism".<ref>Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. (1997). "A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism." ''The China Quarterly'' 150: 395–432.</ref>

On top of that, Xi's party sought to further crush online dissent by "bringing in tougher controls of social media and instant messaging tools," specifically saying the party wants to "regulate the orderly dissemination of information." At a time when Chinese youth and dissidents are using the internet to circumvent the so-called Great Firewall, people using such avenues as microblogs (namely Weibo) which bypass government censorship and government control has repeatedly and reportedly given Beijing a cold sweat. The party wants to promote values consistent with what the party holds dear, and in a way to promote further nationalism, the party sees anything originating from Western media (such as Hollywood movies) as "encouraging dissent and grassroots activism." Xi used the death of a toddler, who was struck by a vehicle and left for dead by passersby, as another excuse to reignite national "soul-searching." On Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, pictures of a high-speed train crash that killed 40 people were posted everywhere, an embarrassment for the party which prides itself on efficient governance. News of the new social crackdown prompted Weibo users to publicly criticize the party, saying “How can a government say it represents you if it wants to control how many times a day you watch entertainment on TV?”<ref>[https://www.irishtimes.com/news/china-reins-in-social-media-and-tv-shows-that-are-too-entertaining-1.632388 "China reins in social media and TV shows that are 'too entertaining'," Clifford Coonan, Irish Times]</ref>

Xi's government also took aim at TV broadcasting, first by banning TV broadcasters from showing historical dramas deemed "too entertaining" and not patriotic enough, specifically citing period or idol dramas as "vulgar" entertainment. Programs dealing with "marital troubles and matchmaking, talent, game shows, talk shows and reality programming" are all seen as "vulgar TV" which the party "sees as unhealthy attention to celebrities and certain distracting activities." All those programs will be replaced by news channels and "cultural programming" that the party deems preferable to anything they find to be Western cultural influences. The order also "bans viewership surveys" and the use of ratings "as the sole criteria for whether to broadcast a particular show." Most bizarrely, the party decided to ban "effeminate men" from television broadcasting, as China TV regulators called for TV programs to "resolutely put an end to sissy men and other abnormal esthetics," because they are part of a celebrity culture that promotes "admiration of wealth and celebrity" in the eyes of the party. Young men who "display gentle personalities" and "act in boys’ love dramas" have amassed large fan bases mostly comprising women, a Chinese parallel to K-Pop stars in Korea, and many of them, like Xiao Zhan and Wang Yibo, are China’s top-earning celebrities. There is inside the Chinese government a large strain of politicians that disparages and ridicules nontraditional men, gender-neutral aesthetics, and see femininity as a weakness unbecoming of a "real" man. There is also a very eerie parallel to homophobic segments in Western society, as the Ministry of Education pledged to promote sports education in response to a Chinese party lawmaker wanting to "prevent men from becoming too feminine." Days before the order was issued, a commentary published by a Communist Party mouthpiece called the popularity of "sissy pants" a "social problem" that would "distort the taste of the Chinese youth."<ref>[https://deadline.com/2021/09/china-bans-effeminate-men-tv-in-cultural-crackdown-1234826648/ "China Bans “Effeminate Men” From TV As Part Of Cultural Crackdown," Bruce Haring, Deadline]</ref><ref>[https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-tv-show-ban-drama-historical-president-xi-a9033266.html "China bans TV shows that are too entertaining," Independent]</ref>

China under the Xi Jinping administration has a cultural imperialist attitude toward Korea based on Chinese nationalism. China excessively censors Korean culture, but Chinese culture has been indiscriminately introduced into South Korea, sparking controversy over cultural invasion.<ref>https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20210326500039</ref><ref>[https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/the-korean-waves-rocky-road-in-china/ "The Korean Wave's Rocky Road in China"]. The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2023-03-12. Retrieved 2023-03-12.</ref> China has a colonialist attitude toward North Korea, with even its official ally North Korean leader Kim Jong-un fearing that their country might become like [[Tibet]] or [[Uyghur genocide|Xinjiang]].<ref>https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20230125000676</ref>

As explained by queer Chinese, masculinity is associated with nationalism and the party believes "the effeminate male image could mislead young people, hinder the nation’s rejuvenation, and weaken the country’s ability in fighting with others." By reinforcing gender norms, Xi and his party feel they are resisting Western gender values, which is why "sissy pants" and "sissy boys" are ridiculed by the party. Many feminist Chinese women balked at the implication that traits associated with women are inferior. Official rejection of "sissy men," Weibo users fear, will "encourage the kind of toxic masculinity that leads to violence against women, sexual minorities as well as men who do not fit into the traditional macho image." This is also in response to young Chinese embracing gender-neutral entertainment figures as a way to challenge the party's culture of toxic masculinity. Even explicitly homosexual characters are not allowed on Chinese television. Platforms have previously "blurred male stars’ earrings and ponytails" because of their "ostensible association with rebellion and counterculture."<ref>[https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgx3nn/china-masculinity-sissy-stars "‘Sissy Pants’ Celebrities Banned in China," Viola Zhou, Vice]</ref>

===Anti LGBT crackdowns===
{{cquote|No television drama shall show abnormal sexual relationships and behaviours, such as incest, same-sex relationships, sexual perversion, sexual assault, sexual abuse, sexual violence, and so on.|||The “General Regulations on Television Content Production” announcement via China Television Drama Production Industry Association and the TV Production Committee of the China Alliance of Radio, Film and Television. <ref>[https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/china-is-censoring-gay-characters-from-tv-shows-and-online-d "You Can Say Good-Bye To Gay Characters In China's TV Shows,"] by J. Lester Feder and Beimeng Fu, March 3, 2016, ''BuzzFeed''</ref>}}

Xi and his party have also shown their [[hypocrisy|progressive views]] with their ideology of masculine projection, seeing gay and trans people as threatening the vision of manhood, and justifying his crackdowns (mirroring Putin’s and Russia's anti-LGBT policies).<ref>https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-bans-effeminate-men-from-media-state-sponsored-homophobia-by-nina-l-khrushcheva-2021-09</ref><ref>https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-beijing-lgbt-center-rcna85528</ref> On 2016, under Xi's authority, China's government banned ''all'' (explicit) depictions of gay people on television, as part of a cultural crackdown on "vulgar, immoral and unhealthy content." Content that "exaggerates the dark side of society" is no longer allowed to be depicted on broadcast television, and that now includes homosexuality, extramarital affairs, one night stands, and underage relationships as illegal on screen. <ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2016/mar/04/china-bans-gay-people-television-clampdown-xi-jinping-censorship "China bans depictions of gay people on television," Hannah Ellis-Petersen, The Guardian]</ref> This even includes China's television regulators censoring LGBT symbols - such as the rainbow flag - during Eurovision. <ref>[https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-44066237 "Chinese broadcaster censors LGBT symbols at Eurovision," BBC]</ref>

Under Xi's government, local police forces have forced the shutdown of LGBT bars,<ref>[https://www.economist.com/china/2024/06/27/roxie-one-of-chinas-few-lesbian-bars-closes-its-doors "Roxie, one of China’s few lesbian bars, closes its doors," The Economist]</ref> increased mass surveillance against people his government deems undesirable (including - of course - gay rights activists), <ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/25/world/asia/china-surveillance-xi.html "Xi Jinping's Recipe for Total Control: An Army of Eyes and Ears," New York Times]</ref> and detained women who write and publish gay erotica. <ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/world/asia/china-boys-love-women.html "Chinese Police Detain Dozens of Writers Over Gay Erotic Online Novels," New York Times]</ref> In fact, authors of boys' love - whom are mostly young women - are routinely arrested and criminally prosecuted for the [[Bullshit|great civilization-destroying crime]] of writing gay fanfiction. <ref>[https://www.economist.com/china/2025/06/26/chinese-cops-are-cuffing-erotica "Chinese cops are cuffing erotica," The Economist]</ref> Li Ying, an openly lesbian Chinese athlete, took a photo of herself with her girlfriend in 2021, and while she did receive support, she also faced so much homophobic abuse that she deleted the photo. <ref>[https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/09/china/china-pride-month-lgbt-weibo-intl-mic-hnk/index.html "China’s LGBTQ community is fading from rainbow to gray," Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, CNN]</ref> In February 2016, the popular Chinese gay web series Addicted (Heroin) was banned from being broadcast online. Makers of the series uploaded the remaining episodes on YouTube instead.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20160228034810/https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/02/24/chinas-censors-take-another-gay-themed-web-drama-offline/ "China’s Censors Take Another Gay-Themed Web Drama Offline," Wall Street Journal, retrieved via Internet Archive]</ref>

==Ethnic cleansing==
{{main|1=Uighur genocide|3=Ethnic cleansing}}
In response to the Urumqi Riots of 2009 and a series of terrorist attacks carried out by advocates for Xinjiang's independence against Han Chinese within the last decade,<ref>[https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-05/china-xinjiang-urumqi-riots-10th-anniversary-uyghur-muslims/11270320/ How China's mass detention of Uyghur Muslims stemmed from the 2009 Urumqi riots] by Eric Handley (July 4th, 2019) ''ABC News''. </ref> Uyghurs (a predominantly [[Muslim]] ethnic group that mostly lives in Xinjiang Province) have been forced into reeducation camps to indoctrinate them with the CCP's party line.<ref>[https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/28/a-summer-vacation-in-chinas-muslim-gulag/ A Summer Vacation in China’s Muslim Gulag: How one university student was almost buried by the "people's war on terror."] (28, 2018, 1:35 PM) ''Foreign Policy''.</ref> In 2019, it was discovered that China has been systematically razing mosques, Islamic cemeteries and other religious sites from Xinjiang Province.<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/03/china-every-day-is-kristallnacht/ In China, every day is Kristallnacht] by Fred Hiatt (November 3, 2019) ''The Washington Post''.</ref><ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20191109035038/https://uhrp.org/press-release/demolishing-faith-destruction-and-desecration-uyghur-mosques-and-shrines.html Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines] (10/28/2019 - 14:00) ''Uyghur Human Rights Project''.</ref> The forced Sinicization of Uyghurs, indoctrination, and razing of religious sites amounts to ethnic cleansing.<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/what-congress-can-do-now-to-combat-chinas-mass-ethnic-cleansing-of-uighurs/2019/05/23/fe906c68-7d6a-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html What Congress can do now to combat China’s mass ethnic cleansing of Uighurs] (May 23, 2019 at 4:06 p.m. PDT) ''The Washington Post''.</ref>

The re-education camps, cooperative surveillance systems, and widespread policing and general profiling that is seen in Xinjiang were first developed and implemented in Tibet.<ref>[https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/ Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang.] by Adrian Zenz & James Leibold (September 21st, 2017) ''The Jamestown Foundation''. </ref> The current Party Secretary of Xinjiang, appointed by Xi Jinping himself, was formerly the Party Secretary of Tibet, Chen Quanguo (who headed the ethnic cleansing program and indoctrination in Tibet).

==Chinese Dream==
As a way to encapsulate his ideology (and corresponding administrative policy) to the public, Xi announced — and continues to promote — the so-called "'''Chinese Dream'''" (中国梦). While he did not create the term,<ref group=note> It's another example of why [[Thomas Friedman]] needs to shut the fuck up. [http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/05/chinese-dream-0]</ref>  he popularized the phrase to such an extent that "Chinese Dream" has become an integral part of Chinese social lingo and common thought. 

There's a lot of intrigue about the idea of ''what'' the Chinese Dream really is. Xi champions it as "rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening." Others say it's related to sustainable development (like tackling [[pollution]] or providing food safety). A more [[skeptical]] view is that Xi is using the Chinese Dream to reclaim public support for the party in a time where people are very much aware that it's not all sunshine and rainbows with the government, in order to drum up a sense of [[nationalism]] within the populace as the state of China attempts to compete with the [[US]] for influence.

While individualistic (Xi himself had "seen the [[American Dream]] up close" while touring [[New York]]), it's still about collectivism, as a successful individual is the first step towards a prosperous community (at least, in the eyes of the CCP). In particular, it emphasizes the ''[[Zhonghua minzu]]'' ("Chinese nation" or "Chinese ethnicity"), China's unique ethno-nationalist identity that unites various ethnic groups existing in Chinese territory. This is quite different from the "American Dream" for all immigrants across ethnic groups and races. In other words, the American dream is a [classical] liberal concept related to 'immigration', while the Chinese dream is a nationalist concept related to the 'native'.

A large part of this is due to how the Chinese middle class, which barely existed a decade before Xi came to power, has grown exponentially over the past 30 years. On the flip side, this has led to rising wages, making it more difficult for China to carry on with its export-oriented economy and to continue its miraculous economic growth.

Xi has also a strong, very well-known aversion to any social spending, endorsing a live-to-work philosophy. In 2021, he deried the the strong social security that exists in some countries of [[Latin America]] as "welfarism", claiming that these policies made the people of the region "lazy".<ref>{{Cite web |title=China’s Top Policy Group Encourages Economic Opening, but on Political Terms {{!}} Asia Society |url=https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/chinas-top-policy-group-encourages-economic-opening-political-terms |access-date=2025-02-02 |website=asiasociety.org |language=en}}</ref> During the [[Covid-19 pandemic]], when the US government spent trillions to help consumers, China went for [[trickle-down economics]] instead.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-08-30 |title=China: Xi Jinping’s Live-to-Work Ideology Alienates Youth - Bloomberg |url=https://archive.ph/Lq208#selection-4937.124-4937.232 |access-date=2025-02-02 |website=archive.ph}}</ref> According to Xi, even the fact that China is now a middle-income country, and can afford some social security for the poor, is not enough reason to build a stronger [[welfare state]], arguing that it would create a "idleness-breeding trap".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-08-24 |title=China’s Property Crisis: Why It’s So Hard for Beijing to Fix - The Ne… |url=https://archive.ph/SD7Wz |access-date=2025-02-02 |website=archive.ph}}</ref>

==Belt and Road Initiative==
Beyond just cultural posturing and rhetorical pomp (see Chinese Dream above), Xi does have a vision for the future of his country, and it's a vision where China overtakes the [[United States]] as the world's superpower. In 2013, he announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes called the New Silk Road, which is perhaps the most ambitious global infrastructure plan in history. With the goal of expanding Chinese soft power and turning more countries away from the [[United States]], the BRI consists of six urban development land corridors linked by road, rail, energy, ports, and digital infrastructure. It is a centerpiece of Xi's foreign policy, and many critics argue that the BRI is a "debt" trap for many countries. Despite the belief being popular, it is highly disputed by various think tanks and organizations. <ref>[https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/ New data on the debt-trap question.]</ref> <ref>[https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy Debunking the myth of "debt-trap diplomacy".]</ref> It was also found that China often provided debt relief to many loans to participants of the BRI project. <ref>[https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf Examining the debt in the BRI projects in various countries.]</ref> 

Those roads are paved by the Chinese, those bridges are owned by the Chinese, that debt is owed to the Chinese, and many feel like the BRI is little more than soft imperialism at work on the part of Beijing. <ref>[https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative "China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative," James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, CFR]</ref> <ref>[https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-pushes-maritime-silk-road-in-south-southeast-asia/ "China Pushes ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in South, Southeast Asia," Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat]</ref> "Belt" refers to the proposed overland routes for road and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia along the famed historical trade routes of the Western Regions; "road" refers to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – the Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. <ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer "What is China's Belt and Road Initiative?" by Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda at The Guardian]</ref> With nearly 2000 projects in development as of 2019, the BRI is slated to finish by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the People's Republic of China. <ref>[https://www.pr.com/press-release/780645 "CrowdReviews Partnered with Strategic Marketing & Exhibitions to Announce: One Belt, One Road Forum," archived via Press Release]</ref> One such negative consequence of the BRI is its effect on Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. The Chinese government is interested in expanding the BRI to Xinjiang, which would allow for the Sinofication of the region and the further cultural elimination of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, which itself means "frontier" in Mandarin. <ref>[https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/1668516/xinjiang-crackdown-at-the-heart-of-chinas-belt-and-road "Xinjiang crackdown at the heart of China's Belt and Road," Bangkok Post]</ref> <ref>[https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism-watch_chinas-plan-xinjiang-seen-key-factor-uighur-crackdown/6181503.html "China's Plan in Xinjiang Seen as Key Factor in Uighur Crackdown," VoaNews]</ref> <ref>[https://www.hoover.org/research/xinjiang-bridge-or-barrier-xi-jinpings-belt-and-road-initiative "Xinjiang: Bridge Or Barrier To Xi Jinping’s Belt And Road Initiative?" by Hoover Institution]</ref> China has already invested billions of dollars in several South Asian countries like Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan to improve their basic infrastructure, utilizing "digital projects, cultural exchange, and educational initiatives" to "project influence" while maintaining "strategic ambiguity" in regions like the Gulf.<ref>Zhang, Chuchu (28 January 2025). China’s Changing Role in the Middle East: Filling a Power Vacuum? (1 ed.).</ref>

===Environmental impact===
Approximately 54% of the BRI's energy projects are in clean energy or alternative energy sectors. <ref>Jiang, Ting (2024). "Belt and Road by the Sea: 21st Century Maritime Silk Road". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment.</ref> But the BRI poses significant risks to the environment nonetheless, particularly overuse of natural resources, the disruption of ecosystems, and the continued (and in some cases increased) emission of pollutants. Coal-fired power stations, such as Emba Hunutlu power station in Turkey, are being built as part of BRI, thus increasing greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. <ref>[https://e360.yale.edu/digest/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-could-drive-warming-to-2-7-degrees "China’s Belt and Road Initiative Could Drive Warming to 2.7 Degrees," Yale]</ref> Many critics even within China's sphere of influence have noted several problems, particularly during the BRI's first decade of operation: glacier melting as a result of excess greenhouse gas emissions, endangered species preservation, desertification and soil erosion as a result of overgrazing and over farming, mining practices, water resource management, and air and water pollution as a result of poorly planned infrastructure projects are some of the ongoing concerns as they relate to Central Asian nation. <ref>Hughes, Geoff, ed. (2019). Greening the Belt and Road Projects in Central Asia: A Visual Synthesis (PDF). Switzerland: Zoi Environment Network.</ref> In [[Serbia]], for instance, where pollution-related deaths already top Europe, the presence of Chinese-owned coal-powered plants have resulted in an augmentation in the country's dependency on coal, as well as air and soil pollution in some towns. <ref>[https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/16/serbia-china-bri-coal-copper-dirty-energy-dumping-ground/ "How Serbia Became China’s Dirty-Energy Dumping Ground," Foreign Policy]</ref> <ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/25/belt-and-road-forum-chinas-project-of-the-century-hits-tough-times "Belt and Road forum: China's 'project of the century' hits tough times," The Guardian circa 2019]</ref>

====Clean energy revolution====
But we will give credit where it's due. The BRI has allowed China to become the world's leader in electric vehicle production and distribution, even surpassing the United States by a wide margin. China now holds over three-quarters of the world’s battery production capacity. The battery is among the most important components of an EV and accounts for 40 percent of the vehicle’s total price. Moreover, China houses more than half of the world’s processing and refining capacity for lithium, cobalt, and graphite, "which are essential materials for making EV batteries." Specifically, China "boasts 70 percent of the global production capacity for cathodes and 85 percent for anodes." Decarbonization has become a major goal for the BRI since the 2020s. <ref>[https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-electric-vehicle-supply-chain-and-its-future-prospects/ "China’s Electric Vehicle Supply Chain and Its Future Prospects," China Briefing]</ref>

Here's a sense of scale. In 2000, the state of Chinese R&D on lithium ion batteries (LIBs) and electric drive systems was "about 10 years behind Japan, "considering both technology performance and cost. Over the next five years, China closed this gap to less than two years, "primarily due to the 863 Program," the nation’s rise in consumer electronics, and the "emergence of BYD Company Ltd.," a "successful battery maker for consumer products" that entered the auto sector as a privately owned company in 2003. They achieved this in four ways: first, Xi's government "requested" foreign automakers working in joint ventures with Chinese automakers to share their PEV technology with the Chinese companies. Second, the central government, as well as provincial and city governments, made subsidies available only to companies assembling vehicles in China, which favored Chinese automakers. Third, Chinese automakers had to use an approved Chinese supplier of LIBs to qualify for PEV subsidies. Japanese and Korean battery producers, even though they were investing in Chinese facilities, were "effectively excluded from the Chinese market for several years." Finally, Chinese banks helped Chinese suppliers gain access to raw materials for producing LIBs and electric motors. China possesses some, but not all, of those key raw materials (e.g., lithium, cobalt, and neodymium), which limited their capacity at first; this was a major reason why they were so far behind their competitors by the 21st Century. How did they change this? Chinese banks, working closely with the central government, enabled Chinese suppliers to acquire ownership interests in mines and processing facilities in Africa, Australia, Europe, North America, and South America. China has thus "developed a vast network of influence over the most challenging links in the PEV supply chain, a distinctive advantage over lagging American and European competitors." <ref>[https://issues.org/china-us-electric-vehicles-batteries/ "How China Beat the US in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing<" Issues.org]</ref>

At a time when [[Donald Trump]] is actively destroying the green energy industry in America, China under Xi has invested $47 billion in solar panel manufacturing, leads the world in the construction of nuclear power plants, and sells more electric vehicles than the rest of the world combined. According to the IEA, China now has "one-third of the world’s wind power, four of the top ten wind-turbine makers, six of the top ten solar-panel manufacturers, and a quarter of the world’s solar capacity." Even the US-based Brookings Institution reported that China could generate ''80 percent'' of its energy from renewables by 2050, becoming the world's first clean energy superpower. <ref>[https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-poised-to-transform-the-clean-energy-industry/ "China’s Belt and Road Initiative is poised to transform the clean energy industry," Brookings]</ref> <ref>[https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/Decarbonization-now-drives-China-s-Belt-and-Road-push "Decarbonization now drives China's Belt and Road push," Asia Nikkei]</ref>

On a concerning note, undocumented communication devices were found on Chinese-manufactured inverters and batteries. This is problematic considering that China supplied more than half the world's demand for solar inverters in 2024. The amount of affected power inverters & batteries globally is unknown, though the European Solar Manufacturing Council estimates that 200GW of Europes solar power uses Chinese inverters. <ref>[https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/ghost-machine-rogue-communication-devices-found-chinese-inverters-2025-05-14/ “Rogue communication devices found on solar power inverters from China”]</ref> <ref>[https://www.pv-magazine.com/2025/07/11/huawei-leads-global-inverter-market-as-shipments-hit-589-gw-in-2024/ “Huawei leads global inverter market”]</ref>
This has serious national security implications for all countries whom look to adopt green technologies.

===Corruption and organized crime===
Scholars have recognized an increase in Chinese organized crime syndicate activity in some BRI countries. Their activities include online fraud (including pyramid schemes), online gambling, human trafficking (for slavery and prostitution), animal or animal parts trafficking (for use in traditional Chinese medicine), and money laundering (of the proceeds of crime from the PRC). The most notable locations are [[Cambodia]], [[Malaysia]], [[Myanmar]], and the [[Philippines]], all of which have sizable Chinese populations in their own right. The BRI inadvertently turned Chinese crime syndicates into a regional problem which they're still dealing with to this day. The People’s Bank of China itself even estimated that as much as CNY 1 trillion (a staggering $150 billion) in illicit proceeds flows out of China annually due to illegal betting. Per the Ministry of Public Security, Chinese police "investigated 17,000 cross-border gambling and related cases, arrested 110,000 suspects, and took action against 3,400 online gambling platforms and over 2,800 illegal payment platforms and underground banks." <ref>Baikady, Rajendra (2 October 2022). "Organized crime and corruption across borders: Exploring the belt and road initiative.</ref> <ref>[https://jamestown.org/program/organized-crime-on-the-belt-and-road/ "Organized Crime on the Belt and Road," JamesTown]</ref> <ref>[https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/bri-crime/ "China’s New Silk Road: Navigating the organized crime risk," Global Initiative Analysis]</ref> A 2021 analysis by AidData at the College of William & Mary found that [[Pakistan]], [[Indonesia]], [[Malaysia]], [[Vietnam]], [[Kenya]], [[Kyrgyzstan]], [[Papua New Guinea]], [[Cambodia]], [[Mozambique]], and [[Belarus]] were the top countries for reported corruption scandals involving BRI projects, with many public officials either getting caught for money laundering or take outright bribes to fund local pet projects. <ref>[https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road "Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects," AID Data]</ref>

===Labour abuses and human rights violations===
According to a report by American NGO China Labor Watch, there are "widespread human rights violations" concerning Chinese migrant workers sent abroad. The Chinese companies allegedly "commit forced labor" and usually "confiscate the workers' passports" once they arrive in another country, make them apply for illegal business visas and "threaten to report their illegal status if they refuse to comply," refuse to give adequate medical care and rest, restrict workers' personal freedom and freedom of speech, force workers to overwork, cancel vacations, delay the payment of wages, publish deceptive advertisements and promises, browbeat workers with high amount of damages if they intend to leave, provide bad working and living conditions, punish workers who lead protests and so on. <ref>[https://chinalaborwatch.org/silent-victims-of-labor-trafficking-chinas-belt-and-road-workers-stranded-overseas-amid-covid-19-pandemic/ "Silent Victims of Labor Trafficking: China’s Belt and Road workers stranded overseas amid Covid-19 pandemic," China Labor Watch]</ref>

===Made in China 2025===
As for domestic issues, Xi unveiled the "Made in China 2025" program meant to develop China's manufacturing sector. Unveiled in 2017, China aims to move away from being the "world's factory," meaning a producer of cheap low-tech goods facilitated by lower labour costs. The industrial policy aims to "upgrade the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese industries," growing from labor-intensive workshops into "a more technology-intensive" powerhouse. To help achieve independence from foreign suppliers, the initiative encourages increased production in high-tech products and services, with its semiconductor industry central to the industrial plan, partly because advances in chip technology may "lead to breakthroughs in other areas of technology, handing the advantage to whoever has the best chips – an advantage that currently is out of Beijing’s reach." Industries integral to MIC 2025 include aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced rail, electric vehicles, electrical equipment, new materials, biomedicine, agricultural machinery and equipment, pharmaceuticals, and robotics manufacturing, many of which have been dominated by foreign companies. <ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20180725113438/https://gbtimes.com/made-china-2025-plan-unveiled-boost-manufacturing "“Made in China 2025” plan unveiled to boost manufacturing," GB Times, Archived via Wayback Machine]</ref> <ref>[https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2165575/made-china-2025-how-new-technologies-could-help-beijing-achieve-its-dream "'Made in China 2025’: how new technologies could help Beijing achieve its dream of becoming a semiconductor giant," SCMP]</ref> Predictably, the Americans consider this a threat to their status as the world's leading technological hub, but ironically, every time the Americans have tried to impede, obstruct, or stall Xi's tech policy, they've only served to increase global support for Made in China 2025, especially after [[Donald Trump]] implemented tariffs worldwide. <ref>[https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-us-china-containment/?sref=okvcQ9hW&leadSource=uverify%20wall&embedded-checkout=true "US Efforts to Contain Xi's Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering," Bloomberg]</ref> <ref>[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-30/the-us-drive-to-stem-china-s-tech-rise-is-stalling "The US Drive to Stem China’s Tech Rise Is Stalling," Bloomberg]</ref> <ref>[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-30/us-china-tensions-latest-dc-is-struggling-to-contain-beijing-s-tech-rise :The US Is Failing to Contain China’s Push for Tech Supremacy," Bloomberg]</ref>

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note}}

==References==
{{reflist|2|80%}}

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