Diversionary war

[[File:The empire strikes back newsweek.jpg|thumb|180px|Falklands War is a classic case of a diversionary war.]]
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{{cquote|Therefore, my Harry, / Be it thy course to busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels, that action, hence borne out, / May waste the memory of the former days.|||King Henry IV to his son (from "{{wpl|Henry IV, Part 2||"}} by [[William Shakespeare]])<ref>Shakespeare, William. King Henry IV, Part 2. Ed. René Weis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Act 4, Scene 5, lines 213–216.</ref>}}
A '''diversionary war''' is a [[war|military conflict]] that ''[[the powers that be]]'' (usually a major [[political]] figure like the ''head of state'' and/or the ''head of government'')  initiates or escalates primarily to [[Red herring|divert attention away]] from domestic problems, rather than to achieve major foreign policy goals. More specifically; the leading figure(s) may use external conflict to rally public support, increase [[nationalism]], or unite citizens against a [[The Other|common enemy]]. The goal is generally to reduce internal pressure caused by issues such as [[economic]] downturns, political scandals, social unrest, or declining popularity.<ref>J Tyson Chatagnier, The effect of trust in government on rallies ’round the flag, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 49, Issue 5, September 2012, Pages 631–645, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312440808</ref> The diversionary war is also related to the concept of {{wpl|Wag the dog|'''"wag the dog"'''||,}} which is a situation where leaders manipulate or [[Deceit|fabricate]] a conflict (particularly the scale of it) to distract the public&nbsp;— in contrast to diversionary war, which is a full-on albeit short conflict.

The theory behind this idea is known as '''diversionary war theory''', which is closely related to the concept of {{wpl|Rally 'round the flag effect|“rally-around-the-flag” effects.}} However, this very theory is a source of considerable debate among scholars. Support for the theory is largely [[anecdotal]], as it is difficult to {{wpl|Quantitative research|test quantitatively|,}} with [[empirical]] studies producing mixed results, leading to no definitive consensus. Critics argue that leaders may be more likely to engage in international conflicts when domestic approval is high, rather than low, as they have greater political leverage during periods of popular support. Additionally, the assumption that an external threat unites a population has been questioned, as sociological studies of small-group cohesion may not directly apply to large, diverse nation-states. Historical examples suggest that external conflicts can sometimes exacerbate domestic divisions; for instance, [[World War I]] contributed to internal unrest in [[Russia]], ultimately leading to the [[Bolshevik Revolution]]. Furthermore, at least in [[Democracy|democracies]] where public opinion matters more, governments cannot simply provoke international conflicts at will, as not all disputes are sufficient to justify military action, and overreaction may provoke domestic criticism. These factors contribute to ongoing criticism and skepticism regarding the theory.<ref name="Fravel2010"/><ref>Murray, S.  (2017, June 28). The “Rally-'Round-the-Flag” Phenomenon and the Diversionary Use of Force. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 16 Dec. 2025, from https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-518.</ref><ref>Tir, J. (2010). Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict. The Journal of Politics, 72(2), 413–425. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381609990879</ref>

==What is and what isn't a diversionary war==
The classic characteristics of a diversionary war are the following:<ref>Hagan, J.  (2017, October 26). Diversionary Theory of War in Foreign Policy Analysis. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 16 Dec. 2025, from https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-412.</ref><ref>Jung, Sung Chul (2019). Diversionary Theory of War. obo in International Relations. doi: 10.1093/obo/9780199743292-0265</ref>
* '''Domestic Motivation''': The main driver is internal politics, such as economic crises, scandals, or declining approval ratings.
* '''Short-term Gains''': Leaders hope for a quick, symbolic victory or show of strength.
* '''Limited Strategic Necessity''': The conflict may have little to do with national security or territorial ambitions.
* '''Risk of Miscalculation''': Because the goal is political rather than strategic, such wars can escalate unexpectedly.
For example, analysts have suggested that the [[Falklands War]] had diversionary elements for the [[British]] government, as it temporarily boosted Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]’s popularity amid economic difficulties.

What diversionary war '''isn’t''' is:<ref name="Fravel2010">Fravel, M. T. (2010). The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict. Security Studies, 19(2), 307–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636411003795731</ref><ref>Jaroslav Tir & Michael Jasinski, 2008. "Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(5), pages 641-664, October. </ref>
* A war fought for genuine defense or security reasons (e.g., responding to an invasion).
* Conflicts with long-term strategic goals, such as controlling territory, resources, or regional influence.
* Wars initiated for ideological reasons (e.g., [[revolution]], independence movements, or preemptive strikes based on security threats).
Obvious example of something that's not a diversionary war is [[World War II]], which was a complex conflict since about all of the nations involved were driven by territorial ambitions, ideology, and security concerns, not simply to distract populations from domestic problems.

==Examples of diversionary wars==
{{hatnote|Pure diversionary wars are rare, as most conflicts involve mixed motives (such as security, ideology, misperception, and domestic politics.) Also, leaders are more likely to use limited force or crises, not full wars, for diversion.}}
===Invasion of Algiers (1830)===
Some scholars believe that the {{wpl|Invasion of Algiers (1830)|French invasion of Algiers}} happened because {{wpl|Charles X of France|King Charles X}} was dealing with a lot of opposition at home and his authority was becoming weaker, as the invasion occurred amid political crisis and preceded the 1830 [[France#July Revolution|July Revolution]]. The argument is that the war was meant to boost nationalist support and distract from domestic unrest, though it was ultimately fruitless, as the war failed to save Charles X's regime.<ref> Sessions, Jennifer E., 'A Tale of Two Despots: The Invasion of Algeria and the Revolution of 1830', By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria (Ithaca, NY, 2011; online edn, Cornell Scholarship Online, 18 Aug. 2016), https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9780801449758.003.0002, accessed 16 Dec. 2025.</ref><ref>DE LANGE, ERIK. “THE CONGRESS SYSTEM AND THE FRENCH INVASION OF ALGIERS, 1827–1830.” The Historical Journal 64, no. 4 (2021): 940–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X2000062X.</ref>

===Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871)===
The Franco-Prussian war is cited as an example of an diversionary war, since {{wpl|Napoleon III}} faced various political issues -- namely declining popularity, parliamentary opposition and regime legitimacy problems. While Napoleon had long-term geopolitical rivalry with Prussia, there is case to be made that he started the war to rally national support and strengthen the Second Empire.<ref>Vasquez, John A., and Andrew P. Owsiak. “The Franco-Prussian War.” Chapter. In Crises, War, and Diplomacy: Lessons for World Politics, 85–108. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025.</ref>

===Spanish-American War (1898)===
The [[Spanish-American War]] is frequently discussed in the political science literature as a classic example of a diversionary war, particularly in regards to [[Spain]]. At the time, Spain faced severe domestic challenges, including political instability, economic stagnation, declining imperial prestige, and mounting social unrest. The ongoing [[Cuba]]n [[Spanish-American_War#Cuban_War_of_Independence|War of Independence]] placed the Spanish government in a difficult position, as concessions or withdrawal risked undermining the legitimacy of the Restoration monarchy and provoking internal opposition from the military and [[conservative]] elites. In this context, continued military engagement in Cuba and eventual war with the United States served as a means of mobilizing nationalism and rallying domestic support, even though Spanish leaders underestimated the likelihood and consequences of defeat.<ref>Kapcia, Antoni. (2015). Spanish–American War of 1898. 10.1002/9781118663202.wberen272.</ref><ref>[https://guides.loc.gov/world-of-1898/spain-overview The Spanish-American War of 1898: a Spanish View] by Jaime de Ojeda, ''Library of Congress''.</ref>

For the [[United States]], the diversionary interpretation is more contested. While the country was not experiencing regime-threatening instability, domestic economic anxiety, political polarization, and intense public pressure amplified by [[yellow journalism]] and the explosion of the [[USS Maine]] made war politically advantageous and increasingly difficult to avoid. As a result, many scholars characterize the U.S. role as an instance of opportunistic or partial diversion rather than a fully diversionary war.<ref>John L. Offner, Presidential Studies Quarterly , Mar., 2004, Vol. 34, No. 1, Going to War (Mar., 2004), pp. 50-61, Wiley (on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress) https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552563</ref><ref>Hilton, S. "The Spanish-American War of 1898: Queries into the Relationship between the Press, Public Opinion and Politics.".</ref><ref>Burge, D. J. (2023). A Delayed Revenge: “Yellow Journalism” and the Long Quest for Cuba, 1851–1898. The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 22(3), 243–259. doi:10.1017/S1537781423000038</ref>

===Invasion of Iran / escalation into Iran-Iraq war (1980)===
Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran, while not fitting the definition of a diversionary war 1:1, does bear slight overlap with common diversionary war motives, as well as being a case where such attempt spirals out of control into a bloodier war; in this case, the [[Iraq-Iran War]].

In late 1970s, [[Iraq]] under [[Saddam Hussein]] was facing internal problems, including economic difficulties and political instability. Furthermore, the [[Iran#Iranian_Revolution|Iranian Revolution of 1979]] had overthrown the [[Shah]] and replaced him with the Islamic Republic under [[Ayatollah Khomeini]], created uncertainty in the region, particularly in regards to spread of [[Shia]] revolutionary ideology. Hussein's decision to invade Khomeini's [[Iran]] was motivated by a combination of territorial ambitions, strategic calculations, and to contain the spread of Shia ideology. With some analysts arguing that the invasion had diversionary elements, as Saddam sought to rally domestic support and distract from the domestic issues.<ref>Gause, F. G. (2002). Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990. Middle East Journal, 56(1), 47–70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329720</ref>

Hussein likely hoped the invasion would rally Iraqi nationalism, distract from internal political and economic issues, and consolidate his regime’s authority -- a textbook diversionary motive. But Iraq had underestimated Iran - with assumption that they would secure quick victory over the newly revolutionary and internally unstable Iran - being proven wrong. But instead of serving as a short-term distraction, conflict quickly stalled and  escalated into an eight-year, attritional war -- with hundreds of thousands of casualties, enormous economic costs, and regional destabilization.

===Lebanon War (1982)===
The {{wpl|1982 Lebanon War|Israel-Lebanon War of 1982}} (aka ''Second Israeli invasion of Lebanon'' and/or ''Operation Peace for Galilee'') took place within the {{wpl|Lebanese Civil War}} and stemmed from [[Israel]]'s opposition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in southern Lebanon, where attacks against Israel originated. Although triggered by an attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador to the UK (carried out by a group not affiliated with the PLO) Israel cited security concerns as justification. Officially, the goal was to push PLO forces 40 kilometers from the border, but the operation quickly expanded into a major advance toward Beirut.

Domestic political and strategic factors strongly influenced the war. Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government faced internal pressures, while Defense Minister Ariel Sharon promoted a broader campaign to eliminate the PLO, reduce Syrian influence, and support a pro-Israeli Christian government in Lebanon. Evidence for diversionary motives include ''scope creep'' (the operation rapidly expanded far beyond the publicly stated goals), ''secrecy'' (The cabinet was not fully informed of Sharon’s long-term plans), ''timing'' (the war occurred amid domestic economic strain and political fragmentation) and the ''national unity effect'' (early military success created a rally-around-the-flag effect). Evidence against diversionary intent comes in regards to Israel's long-standing security concerns in southern Lebanon, with PLO presence being real and widely seen as unacceptable by much of the Israeli public. Preparations for war predated the worst domestic political pressures.<ref>Schulze, K.E. (1998). Israeli Crisis Decision-Making in the Lebanon War: Group Madness or Individual Ambition?Israel Studies 3(2), 215-237. https://dx.doi.org/10.2979/isr.1998.3.2.215.</ref>

Initial public support in Israel declined during the prolonged siege of Beirut and following international criticism, particularly after the Sabra and Shatila massacre. A subsequent inquiry found Sharon indirectly responsible, leading to his resignation. While the war expelled the PLO leadership, it failed to bring lasting stability, contributed to Israel’s prolonged presence in southern Lebanon, and facilitated Hezbollah’s rise, deepening political divisions within Israel.

===Falklands War (1982)===
Many historians argue the Falklands War had diversionary elements for ''both'' [[Argentina]] and the [[UK]] - even though the case is considered stronger for Argentinian side than for Britain.

Most scholars agree the Argentine military junta used the Falklands invasion partly as a diversion from severe domestic crises. In 1982, the military dictatorship facing an economic collapse (hyperinflation, debt crisis), rising unemployment, growing public protests and strikes and loss of legitimacy after years of repression ("{{wpl|Dirty War||”}}). The attack on the Falklands helped politically - at first - since the the islands (Malvinas) were a powerful nationalist symbol and the invasion triggered massive patriotic rallies. The regime expected a quick victory and "limited or no" British military response. However, the outcome would only serve as a short-term rally-around-the-flag effect -- since British ''did'' respond and this resulted in their defeat. Afterwards, the junta collapsed rapidly and the country's transition to [[democracy]] followed in 1983.<ref>Oakes, Amy. (2006). Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands. Security Studies. 15. 431-463. 10.1080/09636410601028354.</ref>

In regards to England, the idea that Britain fought a diversionary war is much more debated. Arguments ''for'' diversionary motives stem from [[Margaret Thatcher]]’s unpopularity in early 1982 (due to high unemployment and recession), with the victory in the conflict boosting Thatcher’s popularity and helped set up the 1983 election win -- which is the outcome that's often expected from a diversionary war. Arguments ''against'' the diversionary thesis generally come to the fact that the Argentina junta initiated the war, not the Brits. Additionally, the loss of the Falklands would have (further) damaged British credibility as a state, with there being a significant military and political risk for Thatcher, and failure for proper response and/or defeat would have killed Thatcher's career right there. As a result, there is no clear consensus about Britain's part being a diversionary war, as while domestic political gains existed, the war is better understood as a defensive response to invasion rather than a deliberately diversionary strategy.<ref>Grandpierron, Matthieu. (2022). The British use of domestic political situations during the Falklands War. The Round Table. 111. 56-68. 10.1080/00358533.2022.2037234.</ref>

===Serbia and the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1999)===
In political science and international relations, [[Serbia]]’s involvement in the [[Yugoslav Wars]] of the 1990s is sometimes analyzed through the concept of diversionary war, which suggests leaders may initiate external conflict to divert attention from domestic crises. Though the applicability of this theory to Serbia remains debated. By the late 1980s, [[Yugoslavia]] faced severe economic decline, rising unemployment, inflation, and mounting debt, alongside weakening communist authority and increased political competition. In Serbia, these pressures challenged the ruling elite.<ref>Dragovic-Soso, Jasna. (2007). Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?: an Overview of Contending Explanations. 10.2307/j.ctt6wq21x.6.</ref>

Under [[Slobodan Milošević]], political discourse increasingly emphasized ethnic nationalism and the protection of Serbs outside Serbia, [[Framing|reframing]] domestic grievances as existential national threats. Between 1991 and 1999, Serbia was directly or indirectly involved in wars in [[Croatia]], [[Bosnia and Herzegovina]], and [[Kosovo]], which were presented domestically as defensive actions. Scholars applying diversionary theory argue these conflicts helped consolidate political support, maintain elite cohesion, and delay accountability during internal crises. State-controlled media reinforced this narrative by highlighting threats to Serbs while downplaying economic hardship and dissent. However, this interpretation is contested. Critics emphasize genuine ethnic tensions, constitutional disputes, and security dilemmas within the collapsing federation. Most scholars conclude that diversionary motives, where present, operated alongside other causes. While conflict initially supported regime stability, prolonged war, sanctions, and military defeat ultimately contributed to Milošević’s fall in 2000.<ref>Gagnon, V. P. (1994). Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia. International Security, 19(3), 130–166. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539081</ref><ref>Siyue Tang, Invented Wars: An analysis of the causal role of Serbian ethnic nationalism on the Yugoslav Wars, Political Thought and Intellectual History, Michaelmas Term, 2024, Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 70-78 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14289034.</ref>

===Second Chechen War (1999-2009)===
The {{wpl|Second Chechen War}} is frequently discussed in the academic literature as a case consistent with diversionary war or elite-level political consolidation. The conflict began amid severe domestic instability in [[Russia]] following the {{wpl|1998 Russian financial crisis|1998 financial crisis,}} widespread public dissatisfaction with President [[Boris Yeltsin]], and uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession. After incursions by Chechen militants into Dagestan and a series of apartment bombings in Russian cities in 1999, the Russian government launched a large-scale military campaign in Chechnya.<ref name="Tsatsos2014"> Tsatsos, Aristidis, Second Chechen War: Causes, Dynamics and Termination - A Civil War between Risk and Opportunity? (November 3, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2518687 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2518687 </ref><ref name="PK2010">Pickering, Jeffrey & Kisangani, Emizet. (2010). Diversionary Despots? Comparing Autocracies' Propensities to Use and to Benefit from Military Force. American Journal of Political Science. 54. 477 - 493. 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00442.x.</ref>

The war was framed by state authorities as a counter-terrorism operation aimed at restoring territorial integrity and public order. The campaign coincided with the rise of [[Vladimir Putin]], then newly appointed prime minister, whose public approval ratings increased sharply during the early stages of the conflict. Scholars argue that while genuine security concerns existed, the timing, scale, and political use of the war contributed to a rally-round-the-flag effect that strengthened central authority, facilitated Putin’s succession to the presidency, and aided the consolidation of a more centralized and authoritarian political system.<ref> Bacon, Edwin, Bettina Renz, and Julian Cooper, 'The Chechen conflict', Securitising Russia: The Domestic Politics of Vladimir Putin (Manchester, 2006; online edn, Manchester Scholarship Online, 19 July 2012), https://doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9780719072246.003.0004, accessed 18 Dec. 2025.</ref><ref name="Tsatsos2014"/><ref name="PK2010"/>

===Kargil Conflict with Pakistan (1999)===
The Kargil Conflict was a limited war fought between [[India]] and [[Pakistan]] from May to July 1999 in the Kargil-Dras sector of Kashmir. Pakistani forces, including elements of the Northern Light Infantry, crossed the Line of Control and occupied strategic high-altitude positions, prompting an Indian military response. While scholars have suggested that the conflict occurred against a backdrop of domestic economic and political pressures in Pakistan, it deviates from classic diversionary formula in that the conflict was primarily initiated by the military rather than civilian leadership, and there was no immediate mass unrest to distract from.

===Iraq War / Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)===
[[File:Mission Accomplished banner on the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) (1).jpg|thumb|200px|right|SPOILERS: It wasn't really.]]
The [[Operation Iraqi Freedom|2003 Iraq War]] has been discussed by some scholars and analysts in the context of a diversionary war. Proponents of this view argue that the [[Dubya]] administration may have benefited domestically from rallying support in the aftermath of the [[September 11 attacks]], using post-9/11 nationalism and the perceived threat of [[Saddam Hussein]] to consolidate political support. Additionally, U.S.'s {{wpl|Shock and awe|shock-and-awe campaign}} implies a goal of gaining a swift victory (accompanied by that premature {{wpl|Mission Accomplished speech|"Mission accomplished"}} proclamation) indicating classic diversionary war elements.<ref name="Lieberfeld2005">Lieberfeld, D. (2005). THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND THE IRAQ WAR. International Journal of Peace Studies, 10(2), 1–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41852927</ref><ref>Jonny Hall, The War on Terror and the Victory Trap, Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 20, Issue 3, July 2024, orae012, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orae012 </ref>

The usual counterpoint being the contested claims being that the war was primarily driven by security concerns, including the alleged presence of [[weapons of mass destruction]] (WMDs) in Iraq and potential links to terrorism. However, the more commonly agreed motive - such as influence over regional power dynamics and [[oil]] resources - imply more long-term strategic interests in the [[Middle East]], therefore not fully coinciding with the criteria of a diversionary war.<ref>Harvey, F. P. (2011). Introduction. In Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence (pp. 1–22). introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>{{cite web |last= Yetiv|first=  Steve A. |date=January 1, 2016 |title= Misperceiving U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf: Raising the Hidden Costs of U.S. Dependence on Oil |url= https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/news/misperceiving-us-foreign-policy-gulf-raising-hidden-costs-us-dependence-oil|website=Journal of International Affairs - Columbia University |access-date=December 18, 2025}}</ref><ref name="Lieberfeld2005"/>

While some scholars suggest that domestic political considerations may have reinforced the decision to go to war, most agree that it is an oversimplification to characterize the Iraq War as ''purely'' diversionary, as the conflict resulted from a combination of security, strategic, and political factors.

===Crimea Annexation (2014)===
The {{wpl|2014 annexation of Crimea}} by the Russian Federation has been interpreted by many scholars as an example of a diversionary foreign policy aimed at consolidating domestic support. Prior to the annexation, Russia faced economic stagnation, declining oil revenues, and rising political dissatisfaction, including {{wpl|2011–2013 Russian protests|protests in 2011-2013}} that challenged [[Vladimir Putin]]’s legitimacy. The ousting of [[Ukrainian]] President (and Putin ally) {{wpl|Viktor Yanukovych}} during the [[Euromaidan|Euromaidan protests]] created both a perceived geopolitical threat and an opportunity to bolster nationalist sentiment at home.<ref name="Hale2022">HALE, H. E. (2022). Authoritarian Rallying as Reputational Cascade? Evidence from Putin’s Popularity Surge after Crimea. American Political Science Review, 116(2), 580–594. doi:10.1017/S0003055421001052</ref><ref name="Marandici2022">Ion Marandici, "Loss Aversion, Neoimperial Frames and Territorial Expansion: Using Prospect Theory to Examine the Annexation of Crimea" Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2022</ref>

In response, Russian forces swiftly occupied [[Crimea]], and a controversial referendum led to the region’s formal annexation. The move produced an immediate surge in Putin’s approval ratings, from approximately 60% to over 80%, and strengthened his domestic legitimacy while suppressing opposition activity. While the annexation also served strategic objectives, such as securing the Black Sea Fleet and protecting ethnic Russian populations, political scientists frequently cite it as a case of “rally-around-the-flag” nationalism, demonstrating how authoritarian leaders can employ foreign interventions to distract from domestic problems and consolidate elite support.<ref name="Hale2022"/><ref name="Marandici2022"/>

===Iran–Israel war (2025)===
It's been suggested that the 12-day {{wpl|Iran–Israel war}} was diversionary war. Arguments ''for'' this having been a diversionary war being that Israeli military action deflected global attention from other issues, such as the [[Gaza|Gaza conflict]] or international pressure on [[Benjamin Netanyahu]]. Other commentators - reflected in various media and social commentary - portray the conflict as politically timed or leveraged by Netanyahu to strengthen deterrence or domestic standing. Arguments ''against'' deem that the war’s roots lie in long‑standing strategic hostility between Iran and Israel, including shadow conflicts, proxy engagements, and nuclear tensions -- not simply immediate political distraction.<ref>{{cite web |last= Neumann  |first=Sarah |date=July 28, 2025 |title= Gaza, Iran, and the Two Men Who Made It About Themselves|url= https://intpolicydigest.org/gaza-iran-and-the-two-men-who-made-it-about-themselves/|website=International Policy Digest|access-date=December 16, 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1= Richard Falk |author2= Daniel Falcone|date=June 19, 2025 |title=Iran, Israel, and the Crisis of Legitimacy |url=https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-israel-war-nuclear-power-2/ |website=The Nation |access-date=December 19, 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last= Krämer  |first=Tania |date= June 26, 2025|title=Israel-Iran war: A political lifeline for Netanyahu?  |url=https://www.dw.com/en/israel-iran-war-a-political-lifeline-for-netanyahu/a-73051182 |website=DW (English Edition) |access-date=December 19, 2025}}</ref>

==Wag the dog==
Related to diversionary war, term '''"Wag the dog"''' refers to the use of conspicuous foreign policy actions - often but not necessarily military - to distract public attention away from domestic political problems or scandals. Unlike diversionary war theory (which focuses specifically on leaders initiating genuine interstate conflict for domestic political gain), ''wag-the-dog'' is broader and emphasizes political manipulation and agenda-setting rather than the scale or intensity of the action. As a result, it may involve limited strikes, symbolic crises, threats, or highly publicized diplomatic confrontations rather than a full-scale war.<ref>[https://politicaldictionary.com/words/wag-the-dog/ Political Dictionary: "Wag the Dog"] (retrieved December 21, 2025)</ref><ref name="Fravel2010"/><ref name="Rees2021">Rees, Morgan T., '‘Wag the Dog’: Terrorism in the 1990s', Ideas and the Use of Force in American Foreign Policy: Presidential Decision-Making in a Post-Cold War World (Bristol, 2021; online edn, Policy Press Scholarship Online, 19 May 2022), https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529215908.003.0004, accessed 21 Dec. 2025.</ref>

===Bill Clinton's 1998-1999 missile strikes===
During [[Bill Clinton]]'s presidency, several U.S. military actions were controversially characterized by some commentators as examples of ''"wag the dog"''-tactics. Notably, ''Operation Infinite Reach'' in August 1998, which involved cruise missile strikes on [[al-Qaeda]] targets in [[Afghanistan]] and a pharmaceutical plant in [[Sudan]], occurred shortly after Clinton testified before a grand jury regarding the ''Monica Lewinsky scandal''. Critics suggested the timing was intended to divert public attention, though official reviews cited national security motives.<ref>{{cite web |last= Dallek|first=Robert |date=August 21, 1998 |title=Are Clinton’s Bombs Wagging the Dog? |url= https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-aug-21-me-15131-story.html|website=Los Angeles Times |access-date=December 19, 2025}}</ref><ref name="Rees2021"/>

Similarly, ''Operation Desert Fox'', a bombing campaign against [[Iraq]] occurred in December 1998 during Clinton’s impeachment proceedings, and the 1999 NATO bombing of [[Yugoslavia]] following his Senate acquittal, were also cited by some observers as potential distraction tactics. These allegations - combined with release of 1997 political satire film ''{{wpl|Wag the Dog}}'' - received widespread media attention and contributed to the popularization of the term ''"wag the dog"'' in political discourse. Though some historians and officials rebuke this claims, emphasizing that strategic and humanitarian considerations were the primary drivers of these military actions.<ref>{{cite web |author1= Elaine Sciolino |author2=Ethan Bronner |date=April 18, 1999 |title= How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War|url=https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/041899kosovo-recap1.html |website=New York Times|url-status= |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210131002435/https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/041899kosovo-recap1.html|archive-date=January 31, 2021}}</ref>

===Donald Trump's usage===
During both of his terms, [[Donald Trump]] would use military actions - amongst other things - to try divert attention away from his misuses of power and failures as an ineffective leader. And since he ''is'' prone to fucking up so consistently, he has resorted in ''"wagging the dog"'' [[understatement|quite a few times]].

During his first term, the bombings of [[ISIS]] targets circa 2017-2019 coincided with Trump's domestic shortcomings, with the famous {{wpl|GBU-43/B MOAB|"Mother of All Bombs" (MOAB)}} {{wpl|2017 Nangarhar airstrike|Nangarhar airstrike}} in Afghanistan in April 2017 coinciding with legislative failures and fallout from Trump’s first months in office. Commentators deem that spectacle and unprecedented nature of the weapon drew massive media attention.<ref>Rajah, Jothie. “The Mother of All Bombs.” Chapter. In Discounting Life: Necropolitical Law, Culture, and the Long War on Terror, 216–67. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022.</ref><ref>{{cite web |last= McCauley|first=Lauren |date= May 5, 2017|title=Fresh Questions Raised About Impact of Trump's "Mother of All Bombs" Moment  |url= https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/05/05/fresh-questions-raised-about-impact-trumps-mother-all-bombs-moment|website= Common Dreams|access-date=December 15, 2025}}</ref> Later, the [[Syria]] Missile Strikes (April 2017 & April 2018) coincided with the then-ongoing [[Trump-Russia connection|Russia investigation]] and questions about Trump’s legitimacy and early presidency [[chaos]], with the commentators suggesting that strikes shifted headlines overnight from domestic scandal to presidential decisiveness. The escalation with Iran and the killing of [[Qasem Soleimani]] in January 2020 also coincided with [[Impeachment#Ukraine scandal|Trump’s first impeachment]], as well as heightened scrutiny over Ukraine and abuse-of-power allegations&nbsp;— not to mention the incoming election in November that year. The strike dominated news cycles, with Trump-friendly mass media reframing him as a "wartime commander".<ref>{{cite web |author1=Martin Pengelly |author2= Edward Helmore|date=January 5, 2020 |title=Impeachment: Warren accuses Trump of 'wag the dog' strike on Suleimani |url= https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/05/impeachment-warren-trump-wag-the-dog-qassem-suleimani-iran|website= TheGuardian|access-date=December 18, 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1= Brian Bennett |author2= Tessa Berenson Rogers |date= January 3, 2020|url=https://time.com/5757107/trump-iran-strike/ |title=How Qasem Soleimani’s Assassination in Iraq Comes at a Fraught Moment for Trump |website= TIME |access-date=December 18, 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last= Haberkorn|first= Jennifer |date=January 3, 2020 |title=Wag the dog? Not yet. Democrats so far keep Trump’s Iran attack out of impeachment debate |url= https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-01-03/killing-iranian-suleimani-american-political-debate|website= Los Angeles Times |url-status= |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200104165521/https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-01-03/killing-iranian-suleimani-american-political-debate|archive-date=January 4, 2020}}</ref>

Besides military action, his trade war [[rhetoric]] & tariff announcements during political pressure also lean towards ''"wag the dog"''-tactics, since most of these announcements coinciding with news about Trump's negative polling and damaging testimony in investigations. Since markets and media reacted immediately from economic complications, this shifted coverage away from his scandals. Additionally, the "immigration caravan" focus before 2018 midterms being another such example, as the issue dominated media coverage just before elections. and helped mobilize his political base amid [[GOP]] vulnerability.

The trend continued during Trump’s second term. On June 23, 2025, he confirmed the U.S. had struck three Iranian nuclear facilities&nbsp;— Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan&nbsp;— claiming they were “totally destroyed,” though experts questioned the damage. Critics labeled the strikes as being a ''"wag the dog"'' tactic and suggested that they aimed to divert attention from domestic controversies such as the {{wpl|2025 shootings of Minnesota legislators|shootings of Minnesota legislators}} and the {{wpl|June 2025 Los Angeles protests against mass deportation#June 9|deployment of National Guard (and Marine Corps) in Los Angeles|.}} Trump insisted the strikes were "necessary to protect Israel and halt Iran’s [[nuclear weapons]] program", but analysts noted that such actions were designed to trigger a “rally around the flag” effect, bolstering the president politically.<ref>{{cite web |author1=Mariana Alfaro |author2= Azi Paybarah|author3=Theodoric Meyer|date=June 22, 2025 |title=Democrats, and some Republicans, question Trump’s unilateral attack |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/06/22/us-iran-strikes-congress/ |website= The Washington Post  |access-date=December 18, 2025}}</ref>

Later that year several high-profile actions involving [[Venezuela]] drew attention and were noted by commentators as potential “wag the dog”-style events. In December 2025, {{wpl|United States seizure of the oil tanker Skipper|U.S. forces seized the Venezuelan-linked oil tanker ''Skipper''}} off the Venezuelan coast, citing sanctions enforcement, an action that generated widespread international media coverage. Earlier in 2025, the U.S. conducted air and naval strikes on vessels alleged to be involved in drug trafficking and narco-terrorism in the Caribbean, alongside a sustained naval and aerial presence near Venezuelan waters. Critics argued that these actions, while framed by the administration as enforcement of national security and anti-narcotics measures, coincided with periods of domestic political scrutiny and thus functioned to shift media focus away from internal controversies. The actions are believed by military lawyers to be [[war crimes]] or murder, i.e., the killing of unarmed or at most lightly armed non-combatants without warning.<ref>[https://archive.ph/VkbHX#selection-249.14-249.18 Hegseth order on first Caribbean boat strike, officials say: Kill them all. As two men clung to a stricken, burning ship targeted by SEAL Team 6, the Joint Special Operations commander followed the defense secretary’s order to leave no survivors.] by  Alex Horton & Ellen Nakashima (November 28, 2025) ''The Washington Post'' (archived from 10 Dec 2025 02:31:33 UTC).</ref><ref>[https://www.execfunctions.org/p/a-dishonorable-strike A Dishonorable Strike: Indulging all assumptions in favor of the administration’s boat strikes, killing helpless men is murder] by Jack Goldsmith (Nov 28, 2025) ''Executive Functions''.</ref>

==See also==
* [[Democratic peace theory]]
* [[Fake news]]
* [[Military-industrial complex]]
* [[Noble lie]]
* [[Propaganda]]

==References==
{{reflist|2|80%}}

[[Category:Culture wars]]
[[Category:Conservatism]]
[[Category:Crimes against humanity]]
[[Category:Government incompetence]]
[[Category:Imperialism]]
[[Category:Machismo]]
[[Category:Media hysteria]]
[[Category:Nationalism]]
[[Category:Political strategery]]
[[Category:United States politics]]
[[Category:War]]
[[Category:War crimes]]
[[Category:We're on a mission from God]]

Categories: Culture wars, Conservatism, Crimes against humanity, Government incompetence, Imperialism, Machismo, Media hysteria, Nationalism, Political strategery, United States politics, War, War crimes, We're on a mission from God