Social degeneration

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[[File:Cole Thomas The Course of Empire Destruction 1836.jpg|thumb|''Destruction'', the fourth painting of Thomas Cole's series ''The Course of Empire'']]{{sociology}}
{{cquote|(What kind of work did you do at {{wpl|Vogue (magazine)|Vogue|?}}) I wrote captions. “This little pink dress will win you a beau,” that sort of thing. Funny, they were plain women working at Vogue, not chic. They were decent, nice women—the nicest women I ever met—but they had no business on such a magazine. They wore funny little bonnets and in the pages of their magazine they virginized the models from tough babes into exquisite little loves. Now the editors are what they should be: all divorcees, and chic, a collection of {{wpl|Ilka Chase||s;}} the models are out of the mind of a {{wpl|Bram Stoker||,}} and as for the caption writers—my old job—they’re recommending mink covers at $75 apiece for the wooden ends of golf clubs “—for the friend who has everything.” Civilization is coming to an end, you understand.|||{{wpl|Dorothy Parker}} (1956)<ref>{{cite web |last=Capron |first= Marion|date= Summer 1956|title=Dorothy Parker, The Art of Fiction No. 13|url= https://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/4933/the-art-of-fiction-no-13-dorothy-parker|website= The Paris Review|access-date=December 27, 2025}}</ref>}}
'''Social degeneration''' - alternatively known as '''social decline''', '''cultural degeneration''', '''civilizational decline''' or '''downfall of society''' - is a ''unproven'' [[social science]] concept/umbrella narrative used (mostly in older [[sociology]], [[philosophy]], and [[politics|political thought]]) to describe the idea that a society is declining or deteriorating in its [[moral]], [[cultural]], [[Intelligence|intellectual]], or [[social]] qualities over time. The idea suggests that a society is moving away from what is considered healthy, stable, or virtuous, and toward [[Chaos|disorder]], weakness, or decay.<ref>Pick, D. (1989). Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848–1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.{{isbn|9780511558573}}</ref><ref name="Herman1997">{{cite book |last= Herman |first= Arthur|date=1997 |title=The Idea of Decline in Western History |publisher= Free Press|isbn= 9780684827919}}</ref>{{rp|esp. 1-146}}<ref name="Soloway"/>

The idea mostly exists in two forms; as the [[theory|theoretical]] '''social degeneration theory''' and a [[cognitive bias]] known as '''declinism'''.<ref name=MastroianniGilbert>Mastroianni, A.M., Gilbert, D.T. The illusion of moral decline. Nature 618, 782–789 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06137-x</ref><ref name="FengWildschut SedikidesDang"/> Theoretical degeneration has historically taken ''moral'', ''racial'', ''biological'', or ''civilizational'' forms. What counts as "degeneration" is heavily dependent on the observer’s values and priorities. Consequently, claims of social decline often [[List of cognitive biases#Social biases|reflect]] their [[appeal to fear|personal anxieties]] or [[Ideology|cultural preoccupations]] rather than objective evidence of societal decay.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland">Richard Lachmann, Fiona Rose-Greenland, Why we fell: Declinist writing and theories of imperial failure in the ''longue durée'', Poetics, Volume 50, 2015, Pages 1-19, ISSN 0304-422X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2014.12.005.</ref><ref name=MastroianniGilbert/>

As the [[Roman]], [[Christian]], and [[Jewish]] versions of these ideas were dislodged from the center of Euro-American culture, new [[secular]] versions emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Gaining popularity in [[Europe]], the concept was often linked to [[pseudoscientific]] theories (including early [[social Darwinism]]), with some thinkers applying "degeneration" or "decline" through the lens of [[genetics]], [[race]], or [[disability]]&nbsp;— with these pseudoscientific theories being now recognized as harmful and unscientific. Instead, many behaviors once labeled "[[degenerate]]" (e.g., [[Modern art and architecture#Degenerate art|new art styles]], expanded [[civil rights]], changing [[Family values|family norms]]) are now seen as [[progress]].<ref> Watts, Edward J., "6. Decline, Renewal, and the Invention of Christian Progress", ''The Eternal Decline and Fall of Rome: The History of a Dangerous Idea'' (New York, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 June 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190076719.003.0007, accessed 6 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Arampatzidou, L. (2013). Medicine Reading Literature: the Paradigm of Degeneration. European Review, 21(1), 21–27. doi:10.1017/S1062798712000178</ref><ref name="Sgantzos">Rosiou E, Sgantzos M, Abatzoglou G, Papavramidou N. Bénédict Augustin Morel (1809-1873): The Originator of the Degenerative Theory of the Heredity of Mental Disorders and the Pioneer of the Biological Approach to Psychiatry. Cureus. 2024 Sep 16;16(9):e69523. doi: 10.7759/cureus.69523. PMID: 39416562; PMCID: PMC11482047.</ref><ref name="Soloway"/><ref>O’Connell, J., & Ruse, M. (2021). Social Darwinism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>Vorachek, L. (2009). MESMERISTS AND OTHER MEDDLERS: SOCIAL DARWINISM, DEGENERATION, AND EUGENICS IN TRILBY. Victorian Literature and Culture, 37(1), 197–215. doi:10.1017/S1060150309090123</ref><ref>QUIRICI, M. (2016). Degeneration, Decadence, and Joyce’s Modernist Disability Aesthetics. Joyce Studies Annual, 84–109. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26288839</ref>

Social degeneration as a “moral-cultural” [[rhetorical]] device is more favored by the political right than the left, but narratives of decline do exist across the spectrum, expressed through different causal frameworks and value systems.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref name="ElchardusSpruyt2016">Elchardus, M., & Spruyt, B. (2016). Populism, Persistent Republicanism and Declinism: An Empirical Analysis of Populism as a Thin Ideology. Government and Opposition, 51(1), 111–133. doi:10.1017/gov.2014.27</ref><ref>Schilk, F. The Metapolitics of Crises: How the New Right Weaponises Narratives to Mainstream Far-Right Ideology. Int J Polit Cult Soc (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-025-09519-3</ref>

Although conceptually related, societal degeneration is not the same as {{wpl|societal collapse||.}} Both merely describe downfall of society but differ in pace, severity and tangibility&nbsp;— with ''collapse'' being a well-established descriptive category and ''degeneration'' being a conceptually weak social science. ''Degeneration'' is a gradual, prolonged weakening of institutions, cohesion, and norms in which society continues to function, often with reduced legitimacy. ''Collapse'' meanwhile is a rapid, often irreversible breakdown of social, political, and economic systems; often precipitated or accelerated by shocks, whether external or internal.

==The basics==
[[File:Bust of Hesiod (?)-Ancient Roman busts in the Neues Museum.jpg|thumb|right|125px|Hesiod (active circa 750 and 650 BCE) is the earliest known recorded writer whose surviving work explicitly frames history as a moral decline leading to his own era.]]
===So what is social degeneration?===
Common traits associated with social degeneration (or rather people who use the concept) usually include things like:
* Declining moral standards or shared values
* Breakdown of [[family]] or community structures
* Increased [[crime]], corruption, or social unrest
* Loss of cultural traditions or national identity
* Reduced civic responsibility or social cohesion

===How long has this been going?===
Ideas of social decline and degeneration have a long history, appearing in both [[myth]] and moral reflection. In [[ancient Greece]], {{wpl|Hesiod||'s}} ''Works and Days'' describes successive ages ({{wpl|Ages of Man}})&nbsp;— Golden, Silver, Bronze, and Iron&nbsp;— illustrating a gradual moral and social deterioration. Greek tragedy and philosophy similarly depict decline as arising from hubris, corruption, or poor leadership.<ref name="Smith1980"/> Similarly, the [[Hebrew Bible]], particularly in the stories of [[Cain#Cain_and_Abel|Cain and Abel]], [[the Flood]], and the warnings of the [[prophets]], portrays human decline largely in moral and [[theological]] terms.<ref>Ska, J.-L. (2022). Genesis in the History of Critical Scholarship. In B. T. Arnold (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Genesis (pp. 11–52). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>Hamilton, C. S. (2017). Other Cain/Blood-Flood/Judgment Traditions. In The Death of Jesus in Matthew: Innocent Blood and the End of Exile (pp. 71–129). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>Stewart, A.  (2016, November 22). Moral Agency in the Hebrew Bible. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion. Retrieved 10 Jan. 2026, from https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-92. </ref> Roman authors&nbsp;— such as {{wpl|Juvenal}} and [[Tacitus]]&nbsp;— stressed social and moral decadence, often attributing decline to luxury, vice, or foreign influence (read; [[immigration]]).<ref>Toner, J. (2019). Decadence in Ancient Rome. In J. Desmarais & D. Weir (Eds.), Decadence and Literature (pp. 15–29). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>Wiesen, D. S. (1973). Juvenal and the Intellectuals. Hermes, 101(4), 464–483. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4475809</ref><ref>Ferguson, R. J. (2024). Tacitus and the Roman Empire: The Master of Ironic History. Past and Future.</ref>
 
In the late antiquity/[[medieval]] period, Christian and Jewish thinkers (e.g., [[Augustine of Hippo]]) maintained moral or theological frameworks for interpreting decline, whereas {{wpl|Ibn Khaldun}} (1332-1406) introduced a more systematic approach, analyzing the rise and fall of dynasties in terms of group cohesion, economic factors, and moral decay.<ref name="Murphy2005">Murphy, A. R. (2005). AUGUSTINE AND THE RHETORIC OF ROMAN DECLINE. History of Political Thought, 26(4), 586–606. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26221752</ref><ref name="Stewart2020"> Stewart, Jon, 'Augustine’s City of God', The Emergence of Subjectivity in the Ancient and Medieval World: An Interpretation of Western Civilization (Oxford, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Feb. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854357.003.0013, accessed 10 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref name="Küenzl2023">Küenzl, J. (2023). Ibn Khaldun. In: List, R.A., Anheier, H.K., Toepler, S. (eds) International Encyclopedia of Civil Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99675-2_237-1</ref><ref name="Gierer2001">Gierer, Alfred (2001). Ibn Khaldun on Solidarity (“Asabiyah”)-Modern Science on Cooperativeness and Empathy: a Comparison. Philosophia Naturalis 38 (1):91-104.</ref>

Early modern thinkers&nbsp;— including ''civic [[Humanism#Renaissance humanism|humanists]]'' ([[Machiavelli]], {{wpl|Francesco Guicciardini|Guicciardini}}), ''historians'' ({{wpl|Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet|Bossuet,}} [[Giambattista Vico|Vico]]) and ''proto-demographic/social theorists'' ({{wpl|Montesquieu||,}} [[David Hume|Hume]])&nbsp;— often interpreted social change through narratives of [[Cyclical theory|cyclical rise and decline]], linking corruption and the erosion of civic virtue to political decay.<ref>hankins, james. (2014). Machiavelli, Civic Humanism, and the Humanist Politics of Virtue. Italian Culture. https://doi.org/10.1179/0161462214Z.00000000026</ref><ref>Skinner, Q. (1978). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{isbn|9780511817878}}</ref><ref>Little, Daniel, "Philosophy of History", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2024/entries/history/>.</ref><ref>{{cite book |author= Mark Goldie|date= 1991|editor=James Henderson Burns, Mark Goldie||title=The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Cambridge_History_of_Political_Thoug/TiVKeH-cMPUC|publisher= Cambridge University Press|page=58-65 |isbn= 9780521477727|access-date=January 10, 2026}}</ref> Meanwhile classical sociologists&nbsp;— such as ({{wpl|Alexis de Tocqueville|Tocqueville,}} [[Émile Durkheim|Durkheim]], [[Max Weber|Weber]])&nbsp;— reframed the analysis toward institutional structures, social cohesion, and the dynamics of modernity, treating moral breakdown less as corruption and more as a functional or structural problem.<ref>Carreira da Silva, Filipe & Vieira, Mónica. (2019). Books that Matter. The Case of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Sociological Quarterly. 61. 10.1080/00380253.2019.1711266.</ref><ref>Motoi, G. (2017). Social Change – Between the Classical Sociological Perspectives and the Sociological Theories in the XXTH Century. Anuarul Institutului De Cercetări Socio-Umane „C.S. Nicolăescu-Plopşor.”</ref>

Around the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early-to-mid 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, thinkers such as [[Arthur de Gobineau|de Gobineau]], {{wpl|Bénédict Morel|Morel,}} and {{wpl|Edward Gibbon|Gibbon}} transformed these ideas into racial, biological, or civilizational theories, with social and political decline framed as the [[Historicism|inevitable outcome]] of cultural, hereditary, or institutional decay. Across these periods, explanations of societal decline evolved from mythic and moral narratives to historical, sociological, and pseudoscientific frameworks.<ref name="Mosse 2020"/><ref name="Sechandice2023"/><ref name="Sgantzos"/><ref> BULLEN, J. B., 'The Foundations of Renaissance Historiography in the Eighteenth Century Voltaire and Gibbon', The Myth of the Renaissance in Nineteenth-Century Writing (Oxford, 1994; online edn, Oxford Academic, 3 Oct. 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198128885.003.0002, accessed 10 Jan. 2026.</ref>

===Why does this idea endure?===
[[File:Berthe Worms - Homesick for Naples - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|left|150px|"Homesick for Naples" (Saudades de Nápoles) by Berthe Worms. The title reflects the sentiment of ''saudade'', a deep emotional state of melancholic longing&nbsp;— which is comparable to belief of declinism, as both rely on an idealized version of the past.]]
Social degeneration / the [[belief]] that society, culture, or a nation is in long-term decline from a past "[[golden age]]" survives [[psychological]]ly through a ''trick of the mind'' known as ''declinism'' [[Cognitive bias]]es&nbsp;— such as ''rosy retrospection'', ''availability bias'' and ''negativity bias'' (or combination of them)&nbsp;— make people compare "the best of the past" with "the average of the present."<ref name="FengWildschut SedikidesDang">Feng, Zhuo & Wildschut, Tim & Sedikides, Constantine & Dang, Jianning. (2025). Diverging Paths to the Self: The Distinct Psychological Roles of Nostalgia and Declinism in Personal Growth. Behavioral Sciences. 15. 1388. 10.3390/bs15101388.</ref><ref name="GrossmanWoodward2008">Vaish A, Grossmann T, Woodward A. Not all emotions are created equal: the negativity bias in social-emotional development. Psychol Bull. 2008 May;134(3):383-403. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.3.383. PMID: 18444702; PMCID: PMC3652533.</ref> 

In regards to {{wpl|Theory of generations|generational psychology}}; every generation ages out of cultural dominance with new norms coming off as alien or threatening. Historical records show complaints about "youth decay" going back thousands of years -- evidently since the beginning of {{wpl|written history}} with [[Ancient Greece|Ancient Greeks]].<ref>Reinhold, Meyer, 'The Generation Gap in Antiquity', Studies in Classical History and Society (New York, NY, 2002; online edn, Oxford Academic, 31 Oct. 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195145434.003.0001, accessed 29 Dec. 2025.</ref><ref>Singleton, D. (1972). Juvenal VI. 1–20, and Some Ancient Attitudes to the Golden Age. Greece and Rome, 19(2), 151–165. doi:10.1017/S0017383500019811</ref><ref>{{cite web |author= ArapahoeTim |date=January 8, 2024 |title=Generational Blame: A Brief History |url= https://arapahoelibraries.org/blogs/post/generational-blame-a-brief-history/|website= Arapahoe Libraries|access-date=December 29, 2025}}</ref> ''Status anxiety and power loss'' plays a factor, as decline narratives often come from groups who feel that their social status is eroding -- that their values are no longer central and that their authority is being challenged. As such, decline narratives become a way to moralize discomfort, [[Reactionary|legitimize resistance to change]] and reassert hierarchy.<ref> Mannheim, K. (1952). The Problem of Generations. In P. Kecskemeti (Ed.), Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (pp. 276-320). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. </ref><ref>Timonen V, Conlon C. Beyond Mannheim: Conceptualising how people 'talk' and 'do' generations in contemporary society. Adv Life Course Res. 2015 Jun;24:1-9. doi: 10.1016/j.alcr.2015.03.001. Epub 2015 Apr 17. PMID: 26047985.</ref><ref name="Cohen1972">{{cite book |last= Cohen |first= Stanley|date= 2011|orig-date=1972|title=Folk Devils and Moral Panics |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Folk_Devils_and_Moral_Panics/_mITYS47AU0C |publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn= 9781136807046|access-date=January 10, 2026}}</ref>{{rp|esp. 47–120}}<ref>Critcher, Chas (2008). [https://compass.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00122.x Moral Panic Analysis: Past, Present and Future]. Sociology Compass. 2 (4): 1127–1144. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00122.</ref>

The inverse is also true, as people are inclined to believe in social degeneration because they frequently witness decline in small-scale institutions or families after leadership transitions, and they often generalize these experiences to society as a whole -- sometimes incorrectly. This phenomenon is identified by names of {{wpl|social comparison|''(upward) social comparison'',}} ''{{wpl|status anxiety}}'' and ''generational decline anxiety'' -- with sometimes ''{{wpl|impostor syndrome}}'' being applied, in the sense that individual feels that they don’t deserve their position or success compared to seniors, mentors, or peers.{{efn|Impostor syndrome was originally studied in high-achieving individuals (particularly women) in elite and highly evaluative professional and academic settings, which often involved hierarchical structures.<ref>"An Interpretive Approach to Understanding the Impostor Phenomenon over Time" by Kennedy, Cheryl A. University of Georgia ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,  2021. 28775928.</ref><ref> Al Lawati A, Al-Wahshi A, Al-Mahrouqi T, Al-Mufargi Y, Al Shukaily S, Al Aufi H, Al-Shehhi I, Al Azri A, Al-Sinawi H. The Prevalence of Imposter Syndrome and Its Association with Psychological Distress: A Cross-Sectional Study. Behavioral Sciences. 2025; 15(7):986. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15070986 </ref>}}<ref>Lee JK. The effects of social comparison orientation on psychological well-being in social networking sites: Serial mediation of perceived social support and self-esteem. Curr Psychol. 2022;41(9):6247-6259. doi: 10.1007/s12144-020-01114-3. Epub 2020 Oct 14. PMID: 33078053; PMCID: PMC7556555.</ref><ref>Keshabyan A and Day MV (2020) Concerned Whether You’ll Make It in Life? Status Anxiety Uniquely Explains Job Satisfaction. Front. Psychol. 11:1523. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01523</ref><ref> Jansen MP, Yaffe Y. A Tool for Examining the Role of Social Context: Cross-National Validation of the Impostor Phenomenon Short Scale (IPSS-3). Social Sciences. 2025; 14(10):569. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14100569</ref><ref>Fassl F, Yanagida T, Kollmayer M. Impostors Dare to Compare: Associations Between the Impostor Phenomenon, Gender Typing, and Social Comparison Orientation in University Students. Front Psychol. 2020 Jun 19;11:1225. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01225. PMID: 32636782; PMCID: PMC7318883.</ref>

Decline narratives usually spike during technological revolutions, economic disruption, social liberalization and shifts in gender, family, or power structures. Change is often experienced as loss, even when it brings gains. Such periods of rapid change create anxiety and can make people start [[Nostalgia|idealizing the past]] -- with the decline concept is rhetorically powerful in politics and media.<ref name="Hirschman1991">{{cite book |last= Hirschman |first= Albert O.|date=1991 |title=The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Rhetoric_of_Reaction/NjMIu-vQheYC |publisher= Harvard University Press |page= |isbn=9780674768680 |access-date=}}</ref>{{rp|Ch. 1, pp. 1-10.}}<ref>Patrick H. Hutton; The New History of Nostalgia. European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 2020; 7 (1): 96–104. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2019.1703669</ref><ref>Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak et Nancy Foner, « Introduction: Nativism and nostalgia. Temporalities in the politics of race and ethnicity in Europe and the US », Appartenances & Altérités [En ligne], 2 | 2022, mis en ligne le 01 mars 2022, consulté le 10 janvier 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/alterites/282 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/alterites.282</ref><ref name="vandervelden et al">van der Velden MACG, López Ortega A, Roth DJ, Guldemond P. Populism and Polarization: A Nostalgic Narrative of ‘Us’ and ‘Them.’ Government and Opposition. 2025;60(4):1408-1425. doi:10.1017/gov.2025.10020</ref> Indeed, its [[Oversimplification|narrative simplicity]] makes it easy to exploit, since there is a clear cause (“we abandoned tradition”), clear villains and clear solution (“return to the past”). [[Progress]], by contrast, is uneven, complex, morally ambiguous and scary.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 2, pp. ~11-35.}}

The idea endures due to couple of reasons. One, "[[Intuition|it feels]] [[Appeal to emotion|emotionally true]]"; even if indicators (health, education, violence) improve, people may still feel that they are less secure, more overwhelmed and less socially anchored -- with decline narratives "helping" to explain that feeling.<ref name="GrossmanWoodward2008"/><ref>Peter K Enns, Jacob Harris, John Kenny, Andra Roescu, Will Jennings, Public Responsiveness to Declining Crime Rates in the United States and England and Wales, The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 62, Issue 5, September 2022, Pages 1093–1115, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azac036 </ref><ref>
Cheek, N. N., & Murray, J. (2023). Why Do People Think Individuals in Poverty Are Less Vulnerable to Harm?: Testing the Role of Intuitions About Adaptation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 51(5), 794-807. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231202756 (Original work published 2025)</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=  Jussim|first1=Lee |last2= Honeycutt|first2= Nathan|date=2024 |title= Bias in Psychology: A Critical, Historical and Empirical Review|url=https://swisspsychologyopen.com/articles/10.5334/spo.77 |journal= Swiss Psychology Open|volume= 4|issue=1|pages=5 |doi= 10.5334/spo.77|access-date=January 10, 2026}}</ref> Also [[Anecdotal evidence|anecdotal]] and [[Cherry picking|selective]] evidence (combined with {{wpl|Mean World Syndrome}}) is also a major factor, as since "cultural decline" is hard to ''actually'' measure (the concept is legitimately not {{wpl|Operationalization|operationalizational}} in social sciences) it makes it easy for people to point to things like shocking art, political dysfunction and moral outrage -- despite every era producing such examples.<ref name="GrossmanWoodward2008"/><ref name="Cohen1972"/>{{rp|1, 28}}<ref name="Bennett2001">Bennett, Oliver (2001). Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of Decline in the Postmodern World.</ref><ref>Oliver C.S Tzeng, Michelle M Henderson, Objective and subjective cultural relationships related to industrial modernization and social progress, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Volume 23, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 411-445, ISSN 0147-1767, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767(99)00004-8. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176799000048)</ref>

As alluded prior, decline narratives are a easily exploitable narrative devices, which makes them appealing to institutions/entities trying to gain/maintain power. [[Politicians]] can mobilize fear for approval ratings, the [[media]] thrives on crisis framing and {{wpl|Culture critic|cultural critics}} gain {{wpl|brownie points}} with their doomsday prophecies.<ref>Crispin Thurlow, From Statistical Panic to Moral Panic: The Metadiscursive Construction and Popular Exaggeration of New Media Language in the Print Media, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Volume 11, Issue 3, 1 April 2006, Pages 667–701, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2006.00031.x </ref><ref>Aguerri, J.C., Miró-Llinares, F. & Sampayo, S. Disinformation Linking Migration and Crime in Spain: Classic Moral Panics in a New Digital Ecosystem. Eur J Crim Policy Res 31, 399–419 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09620-5</ref><ref>Latif, Tuba & Rashid, Aniqa & Noor, Nimra & Noor, Huda. (2024). A Critical Analysis of Fear Appeals in Political Discourse: A Corpus-based Linguistic Study of US Presidential Speeches. University of Chitral Journal of Linguistics and Literature. 8. 376-388. 10.63056/jll.008.01.l401.</ref><ref> Oxley, Z.  (2020, May 29). Framing and Political Decision Making: An Overview. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 11 Jan. 2026, from https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1250.</ref><ref>Dennison, J. Narratives: a review of concepts, determinants, effects, and uses in migration research. CMS 9, 50 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-021-00259-9</ref>

While it is true that civilizations can and do experience periods of decline or collapse - empires fall, institutions erode, and societal values shift - it is erroneous to assume that specific historical events, such as the fall of Rome, can be directly applied to contemporary contexts. Such comparisons often overlook critical differences in technology, culture, economic systems, and global interconnectivity. Drawing conclusions based on these superficial parallels constitutes a [[Overgeneralization|faulty historical analogy]], which risks misrepresenting both past and present dynamics.<ref>Bowersock, G. W. (1996). The Vanishing Paradigm of the Fall of Rome. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 49(8), 29–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/3824699</ref><ref>Leader Maynard, J. Comparative Historical Analysis in Political Theory. Res Publica (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-024-09685-9</ref><ref>Wagoner B, Herbig L. Thinking Through Historical Analogies: A Longitudinal Analysis of Sense-Making During the Pandemic. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2025 Oct 21;59(4):68. doi: 10.1007/s12124-025-09942-3. PMID: 41118030; PMCID: PMC12540512.</ref><ref>Ghilani, Djouaria & Luminet, Olivier & Erb, Hans-Peter & Flassbeck, Christine & Rosoux, Valerie & Tames, Ismee & Klein, Olivier. (2017). Looking forward to the past: An interdisciplinary discussion on the use of historical analogies and their effects. Memory Studies. 10. 10.1177/1750698017701609.</ref>

Thing is; ''every era'' has believed it was witnessing moral or social decline — including ones we now view as highly progressive and/or prosperous. Therefore, social degeneration is best understood as a cultural or political narrative, ''not'' a scientific theory. Merely a way of expressing discomfort with change - sometimes signalling that specific problems exist - but not evidence of overall societal decay.<ref name="Bennett2001"/><ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|15, 168}}<ref>Hookway, Nicholas. (2014). Moral decline sociology: Critiquing the legacy of Durkheim. Journal of Sociology. 51. 10.1177/1440783313514644.</ref><ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref name="Brozovic2023">Danilo Brozović, Societal collapse: A literature review, Futures, Volume 145, 2023, 103075, ISSN 0016-3287, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2022.103075. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328722001768)</ref>

==Application==
===Scientific Racism and Eugenics===
[[File:Arthur de Gobineau c.(1865).jpg|thumb|right|125px|[[Arthur de Gobineau]] (photo c. 1865) is to blame for existence of the modern racial declinism.<ref name="Mosse 2020">Mosse, G. L. (2020). Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism. University of Wisconsin Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15tt712</ref><ref name="Sechandice2023">{{cite web |last= Sechandice |first= Aristide|date=2023 |title="Scientific" racism |url= https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/science/scientific-racism|website=EBSCO Knowledge Advantage |access-date=January 6, 2026}}</ref>]]
Social degeneration was a key concept that helped justify and popularize [[scientific racism]] and [[eugenics]] in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It provided a narrative of fear - that society was biologically deteriorating - and a rationale for intervention aimed at controlling reproduction and social behavior.<ref name="Pick1989">Pick, D. (1989). Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c.1848–1918. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= Stepan|first=Nancy |date= 1982|title=Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960 |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/ncKvCwAAQBAJ |chapter=(esp.) 4., 5., 6. |publisher= Palgrave Macmillan UK|isbn= 9781349054527|access-date=December 31, 2025}}</ref><ref>[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_8esnhRxBomMC/mode/2up Kevles, D. J. (1986). In the name of eugenics : genetics and the uses of human heredity.] Harvard University Press {{isbn|0-520-05763-5}}(retrieved December 31, 2025)</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= Paul|first= Diane B.|date=1995 |title= Controlling Human Heredity: 1865 to the Present|url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Controlling_Human_Heredity_1865_to_the_P/tOAnAAAAYAAJ |publisher= Humanities Press|isbn= 9780391039155|page= (esp.) 35, 46|access-date=December 31, 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Rose |first=Nikolas |date=2007 |title=The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Politics_of_Life_Itself/vKmCcHpMiZoC |publisher= Princeton University Press |chapter=(esp.) 1., 3. |isbn= 9780691121918|access-date=December 31, 2025}}</ref>

Scientific racism assumes that humanity was divided into biologically distinct races with some races were naturally superior, others inferior. Thus social problems reflected racial biology, not environment. The degeneration theory enforced this, by interpreting that poverty, crime, and illness were signs of racial degeneration. Scholars framed non-European peoples were as less evolved or “closer to degeneration” and colonized populations were depicted as evidence of what happens when "inferior races" dominate. As a result, racial inequality was presented as "natural and inevitable", rather than historical or political.<ref>Meloni, M. (2017). Scientific Racism (Version 1). Deakin University. https://hdl.handle.net/10779/DRO/DU:27071227.v1</ref><ref>Sussman, Robert Wald, The Myth of Race: The Troubling Persistence of an Unscientific Idea (Harvard University Press, 2014) {{isbn|9780674660038}}</ref><ref>Royal CDM. Science, Society, and Dismantling Racism. Health Equity. 2023 Jan 20;7(1):38-44. doi: 10.1089/heq.2022.29023.cro. PMID: 36744232; PMCID: PMC9892922.</ref>

Eugenics took degeneration theory and turned it into a policy agenda, with the core eugenic claim being that; ''if degeneration is inherited, society must control reproduction to survive''. In practice, "unfit" groups - such as the disabled, mentally ill, the poor, criminals and racial/ethnic minorities - were identified as sources of degeneration. Eugenicists argued that these groups reproduced faster than "the fit", therefore accelerating decline.<ref name="Soloway">Soloway, R. A. (1995). Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth-Century Britain. University of North Carolina Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469611198_soloway</ref><ref>de Melo-Martin, Inmaculada; Goering, Sara, "Eugenics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/eugenics/></ref>

Thus eugenics was marketed as preventive medicine for society. Policies justified by declinism included; {{wpl|forced sterilization||,}} [[Interracial marriage|marriage restrictions]], {{wpl|Immigration restrictionism|immigration limits|,}} {{wpl|Involuntary commitment|institutionalization}} and in extreme cases, [[Genocide|extermination]] (with [[Nazi Germany]] being the most flagrant offender in this regard).<ref>Nourse, V. History of science: When eugenics became law. Nature 530, 418 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/530418a</ref><ref>David McConnell, Shanon Phelan, The devolution of eugenic practices: Sexual and reproductive health and oppression of people with intellectual disability, Social Science & Medicine, Volume 298, 2022, 114877, ISSN 0277-9536, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114877.</ref> All of these atrocities except mass murder were common around the world from roughly the 1930s to the 1970s, such as the {{wpl|White Australia policy}} and Denmark sterilizing Greenland Inuit women and girls without their consent.<ref>[https://www.cfr.org/blog/women-week-denmark-issues-apology-greenland-over-forced-sterilization  Women This Week: Denmark Issues Apology to Greenland Over Forced Sterilization], Linda Robinson and Noël James, ''Council on Foreign Relations'' 12 September 2025</ref>

Regrettably, these ideas were persuasive at the time and resonated because of its [[Technobabble|scientific language]] (statistics, biology, heredity), as well as offering simple explanations for complex social problems. Publicly, it shifted blame away from [[Capitalism|industrial exploitation]], {{wpl|Occupational safety and health|poor working conditions|,}} [[colonialism]] and [[Economic inequality|inequality]]. Meanwhile, it appealed to elites' fears of [[democracy|mass democracy]], [[immigration]] and {{wpl|social mobility||.}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Black |first= Edwin|date=2012|orig-date=2003|title=War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/xzwTEAAAQBAJ |publisher= Dialog Press|chapter= Ch. 2 "Evolutions", Ch. 3 "America’s National Biology", Ch. 5 "Legitimizing Raceology", and Ch. 9 "Mongrelization" |isbn= 9780914153306|access-date=January 11, 2026}}</ref><ref>Leonard, Thomas. (2003). "More Merciful and Not Less Effective": Eugenics and American Economics in the Progressive Era. History of Political Economy. 35. 687-712. 10.1215/00182702-35-4-687.</ref><ref>Lee, Y.-H. (2025), Not Just Against Overpopulation: White Supremacy in Population Control Initiatives. Sociology Compass, 19: e70034. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.70034</ref>

Although it was presented as real science back in the day, modern genetics and sociology have thoroughly discredited them. Environmental and social causes of poverty and illness were ignored under these outdated theories, with many antiquated assumptions having [[Correlation does not imply causation|confused correlation with causation]]. Also, these theories were shaped by pre-existing racial and class prejudice, with data being conveniently cherry-picked to confirm fears of decline.<ref>Lala KN, Feldman MW. Genes, culture, and scientific racism. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2024 Nov 26;121(48):e2322874121. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2322874121. Epub 2024 Nov 18. PMID: 39556747; PMCID: PMC11621800.</ref><ref>Lala, K. N., Brown, G., Twyman, K., & Feldman, M. W. (2025). Impediments to countering racist pseudoscience. Evolutionary Human Sciences, 7, e24. doi:10.1017/ehs.2025.10012</ref><ref name="LewotinRussellKamin1984">{{cite book |author1= Richard C. Lewontin|author2= Steven Peter Russell Rose|author3= Leon J. Kamin|date=1984|title=Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Not_in_Our_Genes/ZK59AAAAMAAJ |publisher= Pantheon Books |chapter= 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 |isbn= 9780394508177|access-date=January 11, 2026}}</ref>

Problem is, that hasn't stopped the dumber members of humanity from continuing this shit. Modern echoes of degeneration theory persist in subtler cultural and political forms, often reframing earlier biological arguments in terms of behavior or societal trends rather than heredity. Stuff like the civilizational decline arguments ("the West is falling" rhetoric often borrows from the same idea of inherited decay), the [[IQ]] or education panic narratives (claims that certain populations are inherently less capable or productive) and moral panics in culture (obsession with "degenerate" entertainment, youth behavior, or social media as signs of moral decline) reflect enduring concerns about "degenerate" influences, demonstrating how the underlying logic of degeneration theory continues to shape perceptions of social change.<ref>García-García, J. (2015). After the Great War: Nationalism, Degenerationism and Mass Psychology. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(1), Article e4847. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.371</ref><ref>Timothy C. Lord, Narratives of Degeneration: Polemical History and the Critique of Modern Philosophy (PhD dissertation, Purdue University)</ref>

===Political Applications===
In politics, declinist narratives portray social, cultural, or economic change as evidence of societal decline. They frame crises - demographic shifts, globalization, or cultural liberalization - as existential threats, thus pleading urgent political action. These narratives often blame "enemy from within" such as minorities, youth, or political opponents, fueling polarization while ignoring structural factors.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref name="vandervelden et al"/><ref>Marie A. Speech Repression and Threat Narratives in Politics: Social Goals and Cognitive Foundations. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2025 Nov;1553(1):75-95. doi: 10.1111/nyas.70089. Epub 2025 Sep 24. PMID: 40991932; PMCID: PMC12645269.</ref><ref> Marino EB, Benitez-Baleato JM, Ribeiro AS. The Polarization Loop: How Emotions Drive Propagation of Disinformation in Online Media—The Case of Conspiracy Theories and Extreme Right Movements in Southern Europe. Social Sciences. 2024; 13(11):603. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13110603 </ref><ref>Enzo Loner; Enemies and friends. The instrumental social construction of populist identity through twitter in Italy at the time of COVID-19. European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 2023; 10 (2): 279–308. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2022.2125421</ref>

Declinist narratives help legitimize hierarchy and authority, portraying equality, pluralism, or democratic participation as weakening society, and framing centralized control and discipline as necessary. [[Nostalgia]] for a (supposed) "[[golden age]]" reinforces this, presenting political goals as restoration rather than innovation. For example; [[Ronald Reagan]]'s rhetoric of returning to American greatness from downward spiral (caused by "the liberals") reinforced nostalgic restoration narratives. Structural issues - economic disruption, crime, or inequality - are moralized as cultural failings, favoring punitive over systemic solutions.<ref name="vandervelden et al"/><ref>Manucci L, Van Hauwaert SM. Authoritarian nostalgia and support for (populist radical) right parties. European Journal of Political Research. 2026;65(1):179-197. doi:10.1017/S1475676525100108</ref><ref>Murphy AR. Longing, Nostalgia, and Golden Age Politics: The American Jeremiad and the Power of the Past. Perspectives on Politics. 2009;7(1):125-141. doi:10.1017/S1537592709090148</ref><ref name="OsborneEtAl2023">Osborne, D., Costello, T.H., Duckitt, J. et al. The psychological causes and societal consequences of authoritarianism. Nat Rev Psychol 2, 220–232 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-023-00161-4</ref><ref>Hill, M., Puschmann, C. Nostalgic for a better democracy? How German right-wing social media commentators (mis)remember the past. Publizistik 70, 181–204 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-025-00891-w</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= Boym|first=S. |date=2008 |orig-date=2001|title=The Future of Nostalgia|publisher=Basic Books |chapter=4., 5. |isbn=9780786724871}}</ref>

Scholars highlight that declinist rhetoric fosters authoritarianism, employs dogwhistles, and is self-reinforcing: improvements are dismissed, setbacks confirm decline, and criticism is interpreted as further degeneration. More than explanation, declinism shapes perception, identity, and political mobilization through fear of societal collapse.<ref name="vandervelden et al"/><ref>Ralston, Robert. (2022). Make Us Great Again: The Causes of Declinism in Major Powers. Security Studies. 31. 10.1080/09636412.2022.2133626.</ref><ref>Alexandra Homolar, Georg Löfflmann, Populism and the Affective Politics of Humiliation Narratives, Global Studies Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2021, ksab002, https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab002 </ref><ref>Helbling, M., Reeskens, T., & Wright, M. (2016). The mobilisation of identities : A study on the relationship between elite rhetoric and public opinion on national identity in developed democracies. Nations and Nationalism, 22, 744-767.</ref><ref>Hernández-Huerta V, Inclán M. Populist Attacks on Academic Freedom: How Populist Leadership Erodes Academic Freedom in Liberal and Electoral Democracies. Perspectives on Politics. Published online 2025:1-17. doi:10.1017/S1537592725102077</ref>

====Accelerationism====
Social degeneration and declinist mindset provided '''{{wpl|accelerationism}}''' with the belief that society is already collapsing, while accelerationism turned that belief into a strategy; ''intensify the collapse rather than resist it''. This logic appears in both right- and left-wing accelerationism, though with different moral conclusions.<ref>avanessian, armen. (2014). #Accelerate. The Accelerationist Reader (ed. together with Robin Mackay).</ref><ref name="Henkin2016-2019">David Henkin, « Accelerationism and Acceleration », Écrire l'histoire [En ligne], 16 | 2016, mis en ligne le 15 septembre 2019, consulté le 13 janvier 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/elh/1121 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/elh.1121</ref><ref name="ADL2019">[https://www.adl.org/resources/article/white-supremacists-embrace-accelerationism Anti-Defamation League. (04.16.2019). White supremacists embrace “accelerationism”] (Retrieved January 14, 2026)</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=<!-- not stated -->  |date=September 20, 2022. |title= Accelerationism|url= https://www.isdglobal.org/explainers/accelerationism/|website= ISD (Institute for Strategic Dialogue)|access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref>

''Right-wing accelerationism'' most clearly inherits degeneration theory. Typical right-wing acceleration reasoning is that liberal democracy only produces cultural decadence, moral relativism and weak institutions -- with attempts at reform only slowing what is an unavoidable collapse. Therefore, the social breakdown needs to be accelerated to allow collapse to expose "false values", thus making space for authoritarian or hierarchical "rebirth". As degeneration is seen as evidence that the system is "terminal" and that proverbial normal politics is pointless, this appeals to certain [[neo-reactionary]] and [[fascist]]-adjacent ideologies, as well as more [[Anarchism|anarchistic]] variety that prefers [[apocalyptic]] political narratives and the "burn it down to rebuild it" mindset.<ref name="ADL2019"/><ref>Luke, T. W. (2021). The dark enlightenment: Readings from the book of third nature. Telos Press Publishing.</ref><ref name="CWI">{{cite web |author=Joel Gladd |date=2024 |title= Artificial Intelligence and Ethics |chapter=22. The Philosophy of Speed: A Genealogy of Accelerationism |url=https://cwi.pressbooks.pub/aiethics/chapter/progress-and-abundance/ |website=College of Western Idaho |access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author1=Brian Hughes|author2=Cynthia Miller-Idriss|date= April/May 2021|title=Uniting for Total Collapse: The January 6 Boost to Accelerationism |url=https://ctc.westpoint.edu/uniting-for-total-collapse-the-january-6-boost-to-accelerationism/ |website= Combating Terrorism Center at West Point|access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |auhtor=Matthew Kriner (on behalf of the ARC Steering Committee)|date= May 9, 2022|title= An Introduction to Militant Accelerationism|url=https://www.counteringextremism.org/analysis/short-analysis/an-introduction-to-militant-accelerationism |website= The Institute for Countering Digital Extremism |access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref>

''Left-wing accelerationism'' uses declinism differently. Instead of moral degeneration, it focuses on the structural exhaustion of capitalism, declining legitimacy of institutions, falling rates of profit and the increasing inequality and alienation. Here, the decline is systemic (not moral) and the degeneration is social and economic, not biological or cultural. The left-wing accelerationist argument being that capitalism’s contradictions should be intensified and that reformism only stabilizes a failing system. Therefore, collapse enables post-capitalist transformation and start of the new socialist age.<ref name="CWI"/><ref name="Henkin2016-2019"/><ref>Williams, Alex & Srnicek, Nick (forthcoming). #Accelerate manifesto for an accelerationist politics. Rhuthmos.</ref>

There is also the ''techno-accelerationism'', which deems that humans are seen as too slow or irrational and that democratic and ethical systems are viewed as decaying restraints. That is, [[society]] is framed as an obstacle to technological evolution. Here, accelerationist endgame is to let machines, markets, or systems outpace human control, with collapse being a side effect -- a "acceptable casualty".<ref name="CWI"/>

===Religion===
In [[religion]], declinist or social degeneration rhetoric is often employed to frame the present era as morally or spiritually inferior compared to an idealized past. It often portrays the present era as corrupt or crisis-ridden, sometimes signaling divine judgment or imminent [[apocalypse]]. This rhetoric serves to mobilize followers, reinforce religious authority, define in-group versus out-group boundaries, and explain societal instability.<ref>{{cite book |author1=John R. Hall|author2= Philip D. Schuyler|author3= Philip Daniel Schuyler|author4= Sylvaine Trinh  |date=2000 |title=Apocalypse Observed: Religious Movements, and Violence in North America, Europe, and Japan |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Apocalypse_Observed/Un6TZNLHQX4C|publisher= Routledge|page= Introduction and Epilogue, pp. 1-14, 189-16|isbn=9780415192767 |access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= Wessinger |first=Catherine |date=2000 |title= Millennialism, Persecution, and Violence: Historical Cases|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Millennialism_Persecution_and_Violence/s8BvgFul4MEC |publisher= Syracuse University Press|page=3-39 |isbn= 9780815628095|access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref>

Religious declinist narratives typically emphasize contrasts between a “golden age” and the present, using fear appeals, apocalyptic imagery, and moral absolutes. Examples include:
* [[Christianity]]: Medieval clergy and modern evangelical movements warn of societal sin and moral decay to promote reform and religious observance.<ref> Braunstein R. The “Right” History: Religion, Race, and Nostalgic Stories of Christian America. Religions. 2021; 12(2):95. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12020095</ref>
* [[Islam]]: {{wpl|Islamic revival|Revivalist movements}} link societal decline to failing adherence to [[Sharia law]], urging a return to piety.<ref>Ruthven, Malise. (2008). Fundamentalism: A Very Short Introduction. 10.1093/actrade/9780199212705.001.0001.</ref>
* [[Judaism]]: Biblical prophets, such as Isaiah and Amos, condemned social and moral corruption as causes for divine punishment. Additionally, the concept ''{{wpl|Yeridat ha-dorot}}'' (decline of generations) from classical and later Jewish thought contains the idea that later generations are inferior spiritually and intellectually to earlier ones, a form of internal declinist narrative used to motivate adherence to tradition.<ref> Eidevall G. Reciprocity and the Risk of Rejection: Debate over Sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible. Religions. 2018; 9(12):422. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9120422</ref><ref>Kellner, M. Menachem Kellner, *Maimonides on the Decline of the Generations and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996).</ref>
* [[:Category:Eastern religions|Eastern religions]]: [[Hinduism]]'s concept of ''[[Yuga]](s)'' and the ''{{wpr|Yuga cycle}}'' -- with ''[[Kali Yuga]]'' depicting "the current age" as one of spiritual and moral decline, motivating ethical conduct.<ref name="Herman1997"/>{{rp|14}}
Across traditions, declinist thought blends moral critique with historical analysis, showing how thinkers interpret societal decline through ethical, religious, or structural lenses.

Christian theology’s emphasis on [[sin]], virtue, and divine judgment, along with its [[eschatological]] focus, fostered declinist thought. Many key thinkers were Christians who framed societal crises as evidence of moral decay. [[Augustine of Hippo]], writing during the [[Roman_Empire#Post-.22Fall.22_Rome|Western Roman Empire's decline]], contrasted the faithful "City of God" with the corrupt "Earthly City", seeing Rome’s fall as human sin rather than Christianity’s failure.<ref>{{cite book |author=<!-- not stated -->|editor-last1=Meconi |editor-first1= David Vincent| |date= 2021|title=The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's City of God |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Cambridge_Companion_to_Augustine_s_C/OxU_EAAAQBAJ  |publisher= Cambridge University Press |page= 1-52|isbn=9781108526388 |access-date=January 14, 2026}}</ref> Others, including {{wpl|Boethius}} and {{wpr|Thomas More}} - as well as [[Reformation]]-era reformers and [[Puritans]] - similarly urged ethical or religious renewal in response to social degeneration.<ref>van Ruler, H. “Bodies, Morals, and Religion: More’s Utopia in Christian Humanist Context,” Eur J Philos 108, no. 3 (2016): 321–352.</ref><ref> Murphy, Andrew R., 'Two Puritan New England and the Foundations of the American Jeremiad', Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11 (New York, 2008; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Jan. 2009), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195321289.003.0002, accessed 14 Jan. 2026. </ref><ref>Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin, Causes and consequences of the Protestant Reformation, Explorations in Economic History, Volume 62, 2016, Pages 1-25, ISSN 0014-4983, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.007. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498316301085)</ref>

Likes of {{wpl|Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet}} used declinist rhetoric to legitimize both absolutist monarchy and Catholic orthodoxy. His arguments, especially in ''Politics Drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture'', framed dissent and heresy as threats, providing justification for the {{wpl|Revocation of the Edict of Nantes}} and the suppression of political opposition.{{efn|While Bossuet likely believed genuinely in moral decay, his rhetoric still effectively enabled religious and political repression.}}<ref>Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne (1990). Politics drawn from the very words of Holy Scripture. New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Patrick Riley.</ref><ref>1. Schröder P. The Struggle for Hegemony and the Erosion of Trust. In: Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598–1713. Ideas in Context. Cambridge University Press; 2017:137-198.</ref>

In Evangelical Protestantism, [[dispensationalism]] formalized declinist rhetoric. Popularized in the 19th and early 20th centuries by {{wpl|John Nelson Darby}} and the [[Scofield Reference Bible]], it (regrettably) remains influential today. Dividing history into "dispensations", it portrays the nebulous present as morally corrupt, preceding the Rapture, Tribulation, and Second Coming. This framework casts society as spiritually degenerate, legitimizes political or social engagement aligned with prophecy, and reinforces group identity and moral authority among believers.<ref> Gribben, Crawford, J.N. Darby and the Roots of Dispensationalism (New York, 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Feb. 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190932343.001.0001, accessed 13 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Crutchfield, Larry V. The Origins of Dispensationalism: The Darby Factor. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991.</ref><ref>Sweetnam, M. (2010). Defining Dispensationalism: A Cultural Studies Perspective. Journal of Religious History.</ref><ref>Reed, R. (2012). Of Prophets and Propaganda: An Exploration of Modern Christian Dispensationalism Using the Work of Martin Riesebrodt. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 51(3), 468–481. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41681806</ref><ref>Phillips, E. (2009). Apocalyptic Theopolitics: Dispensationalism, Israel/Palestine, and Ecclesial Enactments of Eschatology [Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository]. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.36146</ref>

Islamic thinkers also contributed to declinist thought. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), in his seminal ''Muqaddimah'', described cyclical rises and falls of civilizations, linking decline to lost social cohesion (''asabiyya'') and corruption, largely analytically. Al-Farabi (872-950) contrasted ideal and corrupt states, framing decline politically and ethically. Al-Masudi (896-956), in his ''Muruj al-Dhahab'', highlighted the gap between past glory and contemporary decadence, often interpreting it morally or religiously.<ref>Alatas, Syed Farid, '2 Ibn Khaldun and the Science of Society', Ibn Khaldun (Delhi, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 26 Sept. 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198090458.003.0002, accessed 14 Jan. 2026. </ref><ref>Germann, Nadja, "al-Farabi’s Philosophy of Society and Religion", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/al-farabi-soc-rel/>.</ref><ref>Lestari, Rani & Hak, Nurul & Ali, M.. (2023). Al-Mas'udi's Contribution in the Development of Classic Islamic Historiography. JUSPI (Jurnal Sejarah Peradaban Islam). 6. 91. 10.30829/juspi.v6i2.13667.</ref>

===Cultural and Moral Discourse===
[[File:The Ladies' home journal (1948) (14764187131).jpg|thumb|200px|Yeah, let’s all go back to the 1950s, when the "perfect housewife" was ''[[Advertising|just an ad campaign]]''{{efn|This image is literally an ad for {{wpl|Frigidaire}} fridges.}} and most women - especially poor or non-white - were working anyway... and full-time homemaking was a luxury, not a norm.<ref>{{cite book |last= Neuhaus |first=Jessamyn |date= 2011|title=Housework and Housewives in American Advertising: Married to the Mop |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/CcjFAAAAQBAJ|publisher=  Palgrave Macmillan|page= 1-17, 107-173, 215-225)|isbn=9780230337978 |access-date=January 21, 2026}}</ref><ref>Catt, C. (2014). Trapped in the Kitchen: How Advertising Defined Women's Roles in 1950s America.</ref><ref>Higginbotham, E., & Romero, M. (Eds.) (1997). Women and work: Exploring race, ethnicity, and class. (Vols. 1-6). SAGE Publications, Inc., https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483327020</ref>]]
Declinist narratives often frame social change as evidence of societal decay, portraying shifts in youth culture, [[technology]], [[gender]] norms, and [[family]] structures as threats to moral and social order. Historically, [[moral panic]]s over [[Rock music|rock]] [[The Simpsons|and/or roll]] music in the 1950s, "[[Satanic panic|Satanic]]" [[role-playing game]]s like [[D&D]] in the 1980s, and [[social media]] in the 21st century illustrate this pattern, each depicted as accelerating cultural decline.<ref>Hale, Maggie, Grace Marsh, and Salif Sangare. [https://haenfler.sites.grinnell.edu/moral-panic/ “Moral Panic”] in Subcultures and Sociology. Grinnell College. (Retrieved January 6, 2026)</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Mia Belle Frothingham |date= October 10, 2025|title=Moral Panic |url=https://www.simplypsychology.org/folk-devils-and-moral-panics-cohen-1972.html |website= Simple Psychology |access-date=January 6, 2026}}</ref><ref>Redman, Peter (2021). Too much, too young? Social media, moral panics and young people’s mental health. In: Perriam, Jessamy and Carter, Simon eds. Understanding Digital Societies. London: Sage/The Open University, pp. 387–422.</ref>

Contemporary debates over [[feminism]], [[LGBTQ+]] visibility, and nontraditional family arrangements continue this discourse, casting challenges to traditional hierarchies as signs of societal erosion. One classic example is the [[Pronatalism|pronatalist]] narrative that if women stop being stay-home straight, {{wpl|tradwives}} and don't start squeezing out more babies, the Western civilization will collapse like Rome.{{efn|See: [[Demographic Winter]] and [[World Congress of Families]]}} The idea is highly patriarchal, reducing women’s agency merely to a reproductive role and relies on a simplistic historical analogy to Rome. Such narratives are alarmist and misleading, assuming that social change inevitably leads to collapse, while ignoring the complex political, economic, and cultural factors that actually shape societies.<ref> Watts, Edward J., 'Conclusion: Roman Decline and Fall in Contemporary America', The Eternal Decline and Fall of Rome: The History of a Dangerous Idea (New York, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 June 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190076719.003.0019, accessed 21 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Gentry, C E 2017, 'The ‘duel’ meaning of feminisation in International Relations : the rise of women and the interior logics of declinist literature', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 101-124. https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00901007</ref>

[[Antifeminist]] and [[manosphere]] movements amplify these narratives, portraying changing gender roles as both symptoms and drivers of decay. They invoke a mythologized "golden age" in which men held social, economic, and cultural authority, framing modern shifts in equality and family structures as destabilizing forces that threaten masculinity, moral order, and social cohesion.<ref>Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). The Cultural Backlash Theory. In Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (pp. 32–64). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref>Marx, P. (2025). Is There a Backlash Against Identity Politics? Experimental and Focus Group Evidence on the Conflict Over Gender-Neutral Language in Germany. Comparative Political Studies, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140251328038</ref><ref>Franklin-Paddock, B., Platow, M.J. & Ryan, M.K. From Privilege to Threat: Unraveling Psychological Pathways to the Manosphere. Arch Sex Behav 54, 1325–1340 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-025-03114-5</ref> 

Be it right-wing moral crusaders or manosphere communities (including [[incel]], [[MGTOW]], [[Manosphere_glossary#Black_pill|black pill]] and [[pick-up artist]] networks), these entities selectively cite evidence of cultural deterioration, linking broader social changes to perceived threats to male identity and civilization itself. Such declinist framings resonate particularly strongly among individuals who experience modernization as a source of relative status loss, as described in the {{wpl|Modernisation losers thesis|"modernization losers thesis".}} By emphasizing the contrast between an idealized past and contemporary transformations, these movements mobilize adherents around the restoration of traditional norms, reinforcing the enduring appeal of declinist discourse.<ref>Ging, D. (2017). Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere. Men and Masculinities, 22(4), 638-657. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X17706401 (Original work published 2019)</ref><ref>Wright, S., Trott, V., & Jones, C. (2020). ‘The pussy ain’t worth it, bro’: assessing the discourse and structure of MGTOW. Information, Communication & Society, 23(6), 908–925. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1751867</ref><ref>Preston K, Halpin M, Maguire F. The Black Pill: New Technology and the Male Supremacy of Involuntarily Celibate Men. Men Masc. 2021 Dec;24(5):823-841. doi: 10.1177/1097184X211017954. Epub 2021 May 18. PMID: 34803370; PMCID: PMC8600582.</ref><ref>Eefje Steenvoorden & Eelco Harteveld (2017): The appeal of nostalgia: the influence of societal pessimism on support for populist radical right parties, West European Politics, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2017.1334138</ref><ref name="vandervelden et al"/><ref> Nicolai Wendland & Wouter Vermeulen, 2013. "Losers of Modernization: Regional Decline, Selective Migration and the Extreme Right," ERSA conference papers ersa13p1091, European Regional Science Association.</ref><ref>Czada, R. From distributive to cultural struggle and back. Views on Norris’ and Inglehart’s theory of cultural modernization. Z Vgl Polit Wiss 14, 63–69 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-020-00447-4</ref>

===Socioeconomic Interpretations===
Declinist and social degeneration narratives often portray social and economic problems as signs of moral or cultural decline rather than structural issues. [[Poverty]], {{wpl|unemployment||,}} and [[crime]] are framed as evidence of individual or collective failings, shifting responsibility from institutions to people and justifying punitive or moralistic policies over systemic reform. Historically, urban poverty in industrial Europe was described as "degeneration", and contemporary rhetoric sometimes attributes unemployment or welfare dependency to personal shortcomings rather than economic or structural factors. By personalizing societal problems, these narratives simplify complex social dynamics and promote conservative or authoritarian responses.<ref name="Pick1989"/><ref>{{cite book |last= Garland|first=David |date=2001 |title= The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society|url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Culture_of_Control_Crime_and_Social/Ue3lBQAAQBAJ |publisher= OUP Oxford |chapter= 1., 4., 7, 8.|isbn= 9780191018282|access-date=January 15, 2026}}</ref><ref>van Oorschot, Wim & Halman, Loek. (2000). BLAME OR FATE, INDIVIDUAL OR SOCIAL?. European Societies. 2. 1-28. 10.1080/146166900360701.</ref><ref>{{cite book |last= Wacquant|first=Loïc |date=2009 |title=Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Punishing_the_Poor/NkyFsGi2erEC |publisher=Duke University Press |chapter=1-3, 7 |isbn=9780822392255 |access-date=January 15, 2026}}</ref>

===Media and Popular Culture===
Media and storytelling also play a central role in the dissemination of declinist and social degeneration narratives. [[News|News outlets]], [[social media]], [[films]], and [[literature]] often frame societal change as evidence of moral, cultural, or political decline, frequently emphasizing disorder, corruption, or the erosion of traditional values.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref name="Bennett2001"/><ref>Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press.</ref><ref name="Cohen1972"/><ref>Drotner, K. (1999). Dangerous Media? Panic Discourses and Dilemmas of Modernity. Paedagogica Historica: International Journal of the History of Education, 35(3), 593-619.</ref> This tendency is mirrored in the works of numerous authors and filmmakers who explore societal decay: 
* {{wpl|D. H. Lawrence}} dramatizes the tension between industrial modernity and human vitality (''Women in Love'', ''Sons and Lovers'', ''The Rainbow'')<ref>{{cite journal |author= JULIAN COWLEY, DANIEL LEA, PAUL POPLAWSKI, LYNNE HAPGOOD, RICHARD STORER, EDWARD NEILL, MALCOLM PAGE, ALICE ENTWISTLE, JOHN BRANNIGAN |date= January 1, 2001 |title=Modern Literature  |url= https://www.thetedkarchive.com/library/modern-literature |journal= The Year’s Work in English Studies  |volume=80 |issue= 1 |chapter=2. "Pre-1945 Fiction", sec. d "Lawrence" |doi= https://doi.org/10.1093/ywes/mae014|access-date=January 17, 2026}}</ref>
* {{wpl|T. S. Eliot||'s}} poetry, particularly ''The Waste Land'', evokes cultural disintegration and spiritual exhaustion, with ''The Hollow Men'' and ''Ash Wednesday'' following similar themes<ref>
1. Sherry V, ed. Bibliography. In: The Cambridge History of Modernism. Cambridge University Press; 2017:835-884.</ref>
* [[H. P. Lovecraft]] constructs cosmic horrors that reflect societal anxieties about degeneration (''The Call of Cthulhu'', ''At the Mountains of Madness'', ''The Shadow over Innsmouth'')<ref> Machin, James, 2020, Book Section, Lovecraft, decadence, and aestheticism In: Bloom, Clive, (ed.) The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary Gothic:. Gothic Handbook Series, 1 . Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1223-1237. ISBN 978-3030331351</ref>
* {{wpl|F. Scott Fitzgerald}} chronicles the moral and cultural excesses of the [[Roaring Twenties|Jazz Age]], highlighting the fragility of the American Dream (''The Beautiful and Damned'', ''The Great Gatsby'', ''Tender Is the Night'')<ref name="Mavlyanova">Mavlyanova , L. . (2025). THE PROBLEM OF THE “AMERICAN DREAM” IN F. SCOTT FITZGERALD’S THE GREAT GATSBY AND NATHANAEL WEST’S THE DAY OF THE LOCUST. International Journal of Political Sciences and Economics, 1(4), 138–147. Retrieved from https://inlibrary.uz/index.php/ijpse/article/view/125140</ref>
* {{wpl|Nathaniel West}} is frequently regarded as a chronicler of social and moral decline in early twentieth-century America. His novels - including ''Miss Lonelyhearts'' (1933) and ''The Day of the Locust'' (1939) - depict individuals struggling amid spiritual, cultural, and economic disintegration.<ref name="Mavlyanova"/>
* {{wpl|Paul Schrader||'s}} films frequently depict {{wpl|Angry white male|"morally fractured characters"}} navigating urban corruption ''(Taxi Driver'', ''Hardcore'', ''American Gigolo'', ''Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters'', ''First Reformed'')<ref> Vighi, Fabio 2018. Structurally bent on self-destruction: Paul Schrader and the decomposition of contemporary society. Berlin Journal of Critical Theory 2 (1) , pp. 5-31. </ref><ref>Dassanowsky, R. (2020). Paul Schrader's Experiment in Italian Neo-decadence: The Comfort of Strangers and the Sadean System. ReFocus: The Films of Paul Schrader. Eds. Michelle E. Moore and Brian Brems. Edinburgh University Press, 139–154.</ref>
Such narratives may employ {{wpl|Rhetorical_operations#Amplification|selective amplification,}} highlighting extreme events or behaviors while downplaying long-term trends or broader context, and contrasting the present unfavorably with an idealized past. Dystopian and apocalyptic themes are commonly used to portray decline as inevitable, positioning the observer or storyteller as a witness to societal decay. By simplifying complex social, economic, and technological changes into moral or cultural failings, and by appealing to emotions such as fear, anger, and nostalgia, these media and literary narratives reinforce perceptions of societal degeneration and can mobilize public concern or political action.<ref name="Cohen1972"/><ref name="FengWildschut SedikidesDang"/><ref>Gittel, B. Narratives of decline: on contemporary European high-brow fiction’s engagement with cultural critique. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 12, 530 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-04865-1</ref><ref>Kaplan, E. Ann (2015). Climate Trauma: Foreseeing the Future in Dystopian Film and Fiction. Rutgers University Press.</ref><ref>Syvertsen, T. (2017). Evil Media in Dystopian Fiction. In: Media Resistance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-46499-2_3</ref>

==Validity==
Social degeneration or declinism is not an established/proven scientific concept. There is no agreed-upon definition, universal metric, or consistent historical evidence for inevitable or holistic societal decline. While specific institutions and indicators can and do deteriorate, grand narratives of moral, racial, biological, or civilizational degeneration have been widely discredited and are now understood primarily as ideological or rhetorical frameworks rather than empirical theories.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref name="Brozovic2023"/><ref name="BardiEtAl2019">Bardi, U., Falsini, S., & Perissi, I. (2019). Toward a general theory of societal collapse: A biophysical examination of Tainter’s model of the diminishing returns of complexity. BioPhysical Economics and Resource Quality, 4(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41247-018-0049-0</ref><ref>Mason, Paul. (2010). Degeneracy at Multiple Levels of Complexity. Biological Theory. 5. 10.1162/BIOT_a_00041.</ref><ref name="Tainter1988">{{cite book |last= Tainter|first= Joseph A. |date= 1988|title= The Collapse of Complex Societies|url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Collapse_of_Complex_Societies/YdW5wSPJXIoC|publisher= Cambridge University Press |chapter= 1-2., 4-6. |isbn=9780521386739 |access-date=January 18, 2026}}</ref> Other major problems with the concept being:
* '''Subjectivity''': what counts as "degeneration" or "decline" depends on values, culture, religion, or politics. For example, the same change - like declining religious participation or changing family structures - may be seen as decline by some and progress by others.<ref name="LachmannRoseGreenland"/><ref>Iceland, J. Beyond conflict: recovering the sociology of social progress. Theor Soc 54, 911–927 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-025-09653-z</ref><ref>Jim Tomlinson, Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long Twentieth Century, Twentieth Century British History, Volume 20, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 227–251, https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hwp019 </ref>
* '''No agreed-upon baseline''': there is no universally accepted point in history that represents a society’s "healthy" or "ideal" state to compare against.<ref name="Dahms2013">{{cite book |last= Dahms|first=Harry F.  |date=2013 |title=Social Theories of History and Histories of Social Theory |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Social_Theories_of_History_and_Histories/ouJ5AgAAQBAJ |publisher=Emerald Group Publishing Limited|chapter= esp. II. |isbn=9781783502196 |access-date=January 18, 206}}</ref><ref>Borthakur, Dr. (2019). AMARTYA SEN’S CRITIQUE OF THE RAWLSIAN THEORY OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS. Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews. 7. 10-20. 10.18510/hssr.2019.722.</ref><ref>Cesarano, F. Ideal vs. Non-Ideal: Why Normative Theory Often Fails to Target Oppression and How it Might do Better. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-025-10521-z</ref><ref>Federico Brandmayr, Disciplinary identity and the idea of a unified social science: A survey of British academics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 111, 2025, Pages 18-30, ISSN 0039-3681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2025.04.002. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368125000470)</ref>
* '''Toxicity of the concept''': the use of the idea has a poor historical track record, as the concept was often tied to pseudoscience, [[moral panic]]s and racial or class-based [[prejudice]]. Many groups once labeled "degenerate" have been later recognized as having been unfairly stigmatized.<ref name="Soloway"/><ref>RENWICK C. EUGENICS, POPULATION RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL MOBILITY STUDIES IN EARLY AND MID-TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN. The Historical Journal. 2016;59(3):845-867. doi:10.1017/S0018246X1500028X</ref><ref name="LewotinRussellKamin1984"/>
* '''Social change ≠ decline''': [[empirical]] research shows societies change unevenly, not by having all aspects simply going in one direction in unison. Even if there are negative trends (social fragmentation, economic inequality), the society can also experience positive developments at the same time (rising education and life expectancy, greater political rights, technological progress). Change is a complex subject, not some simple rise/fall trend.<ref name="BardiEtAl2019"/><ref name="Dahms2013"/><ref name="Brozovic2023"/><ref>Claes Andersson, Anton Törnberg, Petter Törnberg, Societal systems – Complex or worse?, Futures, Volume 63, 2014, Pages 145-157, ISSN 0016-3287, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2014.07.003. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328714001220)</ref><ref>Hamilton MJ, Walker RS, Buchanan B, Sandeford DS. Scaling human sociopolitical complexity. PLoS One. 2020 Jul 2;15(7):e0234615. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0234615. PMID: 32614836; PMCID: PMC7332085.</ref><ref name="Tainter1988"/><ref>Scott E. Page. 2015. What Sociologists Should Know About Complexity. Annual Review Sociology. 41:21-41. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112230</ref>

===What ''can'' be proven===
While "social degeneration" or "declinism" isn’t proven, researchers do study real, measurable issues, such as:
* Institutional decay (e.g., corruption, weak governance)
* Social trust decline
* Rising inequality
* Crime trends
* Public health crises
* Demographic shifts
These ''are'' specific, {{wpl|Testability|testable}} phenomena, unlike the [[sweeping generalization]]s made under social degeneration theory. These phenomena are usually studied under [[social science]]s by the names of; ''institutional decay'', ''democratic backsliding'', ''social disintegration'', ''state capacity erosion'', ''elite overproduction'' and ''moral or normative breakdown''. "Degeneration" or "social degeneration" itself is not a standard, {{wpl|Operationalization|well-operationalized}} term in modern social science. Researchers focus on specific, measurable indicators of societal change rather than using broad, value-laden concepts like "degeneration".<ref>Little AT, Meng A. Measuring Democratic Backsliding. PS: Political Science & Politics. 2024;57(2):149-161. doi:10.1017/S104909652300063X</ref><ref>Aassve, A., Capezzone, T., Cavalli, N. et al. Social and political trust diverge during a crisis. Sci Rep 14, 331 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-50898-4</ref><ref>Bienstman S, Hense S, Gangl M. Explaining the ‘democratic malaise’ in unequal societies: Inequality, external efficacy and political trust. European Journal of Political Research. 2024;63(1):172-191. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12611</ref><ref>Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A., Şimşek, C. et al. Democratic Backsliding and Endogenous Polarization. Polit Behav (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-025-10094-8</ref><ref>Dietz, S. Trust as foundation and endangerment of democracy. cult.psych. 4, 121–131 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43638-023-00080-4</ref><ref name="Putnam2001"/>{{rp|19-25, 29-130, 134-148, 247-282}}

==Risks of the mindset==
So declinism is a quirk of the mind and social degeneration remains scientifically unproven. But what if we're to tell you that there are also real downsides to believing in social degeneration or declinism -- especially when those beliefs become rigid or totalizing. While not vehemently harmful, the impact really depends on how strongly and how uncritically these beliefs are held.

===Psychological/mental health===
Its been observed that declinism comes with psychological costs, which can manifest as ''chronic pessimism'' (believing society is in inevitable decline can foster anxiety, resentment, or hopelessness), ''loss of agency'' (if decline feels unavoidable, personal or collective action may seem pointless) and ''nostalgia bias'' (people may idealize the past while overlooking its injustices or hardships). Cognitive distortions also play a part, as one will start to more harshly notice the alleged evidence of decay and ignore signs of progress (selective attention / [[confirmation bias]]). Isolated social changes get interpreted as proof of systemic collapse and amplify [[moral panic]]-thinking. Declinism also results in habitual [[overgeneralization]], as local or short-term problems are treated as truths of civilizational scale.<ref name=MastroianniGilbert/><ref name="FengWildschut SedikidesDang"/><ref name="GrossmanWoodward2008"/><ref>Peters, U. What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?. Erkenn 87, 1351–1376 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1</ref><ref>Lawrance, Emma & Jennings, Neil & Kioupi, Vasiliki & Thompson, Rhiannon & Diffey, James & Vercammen, Ans. (2022). Psychological responses, mental health, and sense of agency for the dual challenges of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic in young people in the UK: an online survey study. The Lancet Planetary Health. 6. e726-e738. 10.1016/S2542-5196(22)00172-3.</ref><ref>Willardt, Robin & Schmid, Petra. (2024). The threat of powerlessness: Consequences for affect and (social) cognition. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 111. 104576. 10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104576.</ref><ref>Rodriguez, N., Bollen, J., & Ahn, Y.-Y. (2016). Collective Dynamics of Belief Evolution under Cognitive Coherence and Social Conformity. PLOS ONE, 11(11), e0165910. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0165910</ref>

===Social/political===
There are also social and political risks in declinist thinking. People who believe in declinism lean towards reactionary politics, which at worst, can lead to the believer to justify the acceptance of [[authoritarianism]], exclusion, or [[scapegoat]]ing ("we are doing this, because must restore order"). This also extends to [[The Other|otherizing]] / [[Tribalism|"Us Vs. Them" mentality]], as the blame for "decline" can be directed certain groups - youth, [[Immigration|immigrants]], minorities (be it ethnic or sexual), [[elite]]s - and increase polarization. Declinists may also condition themselves to deject attempts at institutional {{wpl|Reform|reformation|;}} pessimistic angle deems that reformation attempts will fail (or make things worse) and new ideas may be dismissed simply because they are new. Meaning it shouldn't come as a huge surprise if a totally jaded declinist responds to suggestion of reform with the [[Edgelord|edgy]] [[Argumentum ad lapidem|dismissal]] of "[[Oswald_Spengler#Man_and_Technics|optimism is cowardice]]."<ref name="ElchardusSpruyt2016"/><ref name="vandervelden et al"/><ref name="Hirschman1991"/><ref name="OsborneEtAl2023"/><ref>Elgenius, G. (2022). Nationalism and the Politics of Nostalgia. Sociological Forum. https://doi.org/10.1111/SOCF.12836</ref>

===Prospect of self-fulfilling prophecy===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-13774, Adolf Hitler.jpg|thumb|right|125px|"C'mon, its not like ''[[Hitler|I]]'' can make things worse than [[Weimar Republic]] is now!" ([[Germany#Having_fucked_around.2C_Germany_finds_out|He did]].)]]
{{cquote|In good times, pessimism is a luxury; but in bad times, pessimism is a self-fulfilling and fatal prophecy.|||{{wpl|David Brin}} (Existence){{efn|{{wpl|Evelin Lindner}} had also expressed a similar sentiment, with her version going "Pessimism is a luxury of good times. In difficult times, pessimism is a self-fulfilling, self-inflicted death sentence."}}}}
Then there is of course the chance for the [[self-fulfilling prophecy]] part. When widely held, declinist beliefs can influence individual and collective behavior in ways that [[Irony|contribute to the very deterioration they predict]]. Perceptions of inevitable decline may reduce civic engagement, weaken trust in institutions (even when they are acting in public's interest), and encourage disengagement from shared norms, as individuals come to view participation and cooperation as futile.<ref>Snyder, M., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (1978). Behavioral confirmation in social interaction: From social perception to social reality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14(2), 148–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(78)90021-5</ref><ref>{{cite web |last= Mallory|first=Bruce |date= |title= Social, Civic, and Institutional Trust: Necessary Conditions for a Pluralistic Democracy|url=https://carsey.unh.edu/publication/social-civic-institutional-trust-necessary-conditions-pluralistic-democracy |website=University of New Hampshire |access-date=January 11, 2026}}</ref><ref name="Putnam2001">{{cite book |last=Putnam |first= R. D. |date= 2001|orig-date=2000|title= Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Bowling_Alone/rd2ibodep7UC |publisher=  Simon & Schuster|isbn= 9780743203043|access-date=January 11, 2026}}</ref>{{rp|27-30, 63}}<ref name="Frisell2009">Lars Frisell, A theory of self-fulfilling political expectations, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 93, Issues 5–6, 2009, Pages 715-720, ISSN 0047-2727, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.01.004. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272709000036)</ref><ref name="Mierina2014">Inta Mieriņa; The Vicious Circle: Does disappointment with political authorities contribute to political passivity in Latvia?. European Societies 2014; 16 (4): 615–637. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2012.749414</ref><ref>Byoung Joon Kim,Political efficacy, community collective efficacy, trust and extroversion in the information society: Differences between online and offline civic/political activities, Government Information Quarterly,Volume 32, Issue 1,2015,Pages 43-51,ISSN 0740-624X,https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2014.09.006.(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740624X14001622)</ref><ref name="BradyKent2022">{{cite web |author1= Henry E. Brady |author2= Thomas B. Kent |date= 2022|title=Fifty Years of Declining Confidence & Increasing Polarization in Trust in American Institutions |url= https://www.amacad.org/publication/daedalus/fifty-years-declining-confidence-increasing-polarization-trust-american-institutions|website=Daedalus (journal) |access-date=January 11, 2026}}</ref>

This erosion of confidence can undermine institutional legitimacy, increase tolerance for norm-breaking behavior, and accelerate political radicalization, particularly increasing support for [[Trumpism|leaders or policies that promise rapid restoration through extraordinary means]]. Over time, such behavioral changes can degrade institutional performance and social cohesion, thereby reinforcing perceptions of decline and creating a [[Systems_thinking#Feedback_loops|feedback loop]] in which belief in degeneration contributes materially to its realization.<ref>Biggs, Michael. (2009). Self-fulfilling prophecies. The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology. 294-314.</ref><ref name="Frisell2009"/><ref name="BradyKent2022"/><ref>Wolfowicz M, Litmanovitz Y, Weisburd D, Hasisi B. Cognitive and behavioral radicalization: A systematic review of the putative risk and protective factors. Campbell Syst Rev. 2021 Jul 20;17(3):e1174. doi: 10.1002/cl2.1174. PMID: 37133261; PMCID: PMC10121227.</ref>

====Historical precedent====
There ''is'' historical precedent for decline narratives and fatalistic beliefs actively contributing to real collapse or catastrophe. As alluded prior, {{wpl|Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet||'s}} declinist rhetoric indirectly played part in damaging France's prosperity. As {{wpl|Louis XIV||’s}} court preacher, Bossuet emphasized that religious division threatened France’s social order and God's favor. Though he did not call for {{wpl|Edict of Fontainebleau|revoking}} the {{wpl|Edict of Nantes||,}} his insistence on Catholic unity reinforced the moral case for repression. In 1685, Louis XIV ended Huguenot tolerance, sparking persecution, forced conversions, church destruction, and a mass exodus of skilled artisans. This [[brain drain]] weakened France economically while benefiting Protestant nations and drew international condemnation, undermining the very religious and social unity, not to mention economic prosperity, the king sought to secure.<ref> Briggs, Robin, 'Church and State from Henri IV to Louis XIV', Communities of Belief: Cultural and Social Tensions in Early Modern France (Oxford, 1995; online edn, Oxford Academic, 3 Oct. 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206033.003.0006, accessed 14 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Adams, G. (1974). Myths and Misconceptions: The Philosophe View of the Huguenots in the Age of Louis XV. Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques, 1(1), 59–80. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41298646</ref><ref>Diebolt, C., Huesler, J. France’s economic wound: how the Huguenot exodus-shaped regional development. Cliometrica (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-025-00327-5</ref><ref>Scoville, W. C. (1953). The Huguenots in the French Economy, 1650-1750. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67(3), 423–444. https://doi.org/10.2307/1881697</ref>

Maybe the best known example is [[Germany]] in 1920s, as after Germany's loss during [[World War I]], widespread beliefs that the nation was in irreversible moral and political decline contributed to the collapse of the [[Weimar Republic]] and the rise of [[Nazism]].<ref>Dixon, Madeline (2021) "The Weimar Republic and the War of Memory," SMU Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, Article 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25172/jour.6.2.3</ref><ref name="Berman2021">Berman, Sheri, 'The Collapse of the Weimar Republic and the Rise of National Socialism in Germany', Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day (New York, 2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Aug. 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539347.003.0012, accessed 11 Jan. 2026. </ref><ref name="Hanson2010">Hanson, S. E. (2010). The Rise and Fall of the Weimar Republic. In Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (pp. 123–174). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref><ref> Stibbe, Matthew, 'The Weimar Republic and the Rise of National Socialism', in Robert Gellately (ed.), The Oxford History of the Third Reich (Oxford, 2023; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192886835.003.0002, accessed 11 Jan. 2026.</ref> Defeat, economic crises, and the perceived illegitimacy of democratic institutions fostered narratives that Germany had been "betrayed" from within, exemplified by the [[stab-in-the-back myth]].<ref name="Koenig2023">Koenig, C. (2023). Loose Cannons: War Veterans and the Erosion of Democracy in Weimar Germany. The Journal of Economic History, 83(1), 167–202. doi:10.1017/S0022050722000523</ref>It wasn't helped that the two of the most popular thinkers in Germany at the time - [[Oswald Spengler]] and [[H.S. Chamberlain]] - were both declinist thinkers,{{efn|With Spengler being a "nothing can be done anymore" fatalist, while Chamberlain was a [[antisemitic]] [[racialist]] that the [[Völkisch movement]] swore by.}} and their works tapped into the German post-war pessimism and nourished declinist thinking further.<ref>Engels, David, 'Oswald Spengler and the Decline of the West', in Mark Sedgwick (ed.), Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New Threat to Liberal Democracy (New York, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 21 Feb. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190877583.003.0001, accessed 11 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Lewis, Benjamin Joseph (2019) OSWALD SPENGLER AND THE POLITICS OF DECLINE. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.</ref><ref> Johann Chapoutot, “From Humanism to Nazism: Antiquity in the Work of Houston Stewart Chamberlain ”, Miranda [Online], 11 | 2015, Online since 23 July 2015, connection on 11 January 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/miranda/6680; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/miranda.6680</ref><ref>Maleszka, M. (2019). Race in the city: The reflections of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Theodor Fritsch rooted in German Volkism. Zapiski Historyczne. Poświęcone historii Pomorza i krajów bałtyckich, 84(3), 81–99. https://doi.org/10.15762/ZH.2019.27</ref> These decline narratives eroded trust in parliamentary democracy, normalized political violence and rule-breaking, and increased support for extremist movements promising national renewal.<ref name="Koenig2023"/><ref>Przeworski, A. (2019). Crises of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>

In this context, fatalistic perceptions of degeneration did not merely reflect crisis conditions but actively weakened institutional legitimacy, creating a self-fulfilling dynamic that facilitated the Nazi seizure of power. In the end, Nazis ended fucking things up even further -- [[World War II|''much'' further]].<ref name="Berman2021"/><ref>Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (The Disintegration of the Weimar Republic) (De Gruyter).</ref><ref>Anthony McElligott, Review of Rethinking the Weimar Republic: Authority and Authoritarianism, 1916–1936 (Bloomsbury, 2013), Reviews in History, 2014.</ref><ref name="Hanson2010"/>

Other examples of this happening being the late [[Qing dynasty]]{{efn|Widespread narratives of decline portrayed the Qing state as weak and corrupt, fostering a self-fulfilling cycle of decay. Pessimism among officials and the public undermined confidence, hindered reforms, and shaped responses to crises, amplifying existing challenges such as fiscal strain, military weakness, and foreign pressure. While structural problems drove the dynasty’s collapse, declinist discourse played a significant role in accelerating its fall.<ref> Pong, David (2013). The Fall of the Qing, 1840-1912. obo in Chinese Studies. doi: 10.1093/obo/9780199920082-0029 </ref><ref>Orlandi G, Hoyer D, Zhao H, Bennett JS, Benam M, Kohn K, Turchin P. Structural-demographic analysis of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) collapse in China. PLoS One. 2023 Aug 18;18(8):e0289748. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289748. PMID: 37595006; PMCID: PMC10437944.</ref>}} and [[Yugoslavia]] in 1980s and 1990s {{efn|Declinist narratives, especially ethno-nationalist myths and negative portrayals of other groups, fueled Yugoslavia’s breakup by justifying separation, redefining ethnic identities, and supporting nationalist agendas. Combined with economic crises and political paralysis after [[Tito]], these factors culminated in the incredibly horrid [[Yugoslav Wars]].<ref>Siyue Tang, Invented Wars: An analysis of the causal role of Serbian ethnic nationalism on the Yugoslav Wars, Political Thought and Intellectual History, Michaelmas Term, 2024 Cambridge Journal of Political Affairs, 5(2), pp. 70-78 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14289034.</ref><ref>Viachaslau Yarashevich, Yuliya Karneyeva, Economic reasons for the break-up of Yugoslavia, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 46, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 263-273, ISSN 0967-067X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.03.002. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X13000111)</ref>}}, as well as arguably the late [[Roman Republic]].{{efn|While corruption ''was'' rampant in late Republic and [[Augustus]] being great and all, his imperial successors from Julio-Claudian dynasty weren't too hot. [[Roman_emperor#Tiberius_.2814.E2.80.9337_CE.29|Tiberius]] was loathed by non-provincial subjects, with the infamous duo of [[Caligula]] and [[Roman_emperor#Nero_.2854.E2.80.9368.29|Nero]] being only the third and fifth emperors respectively. While [[Roman_emperor#Claudius_.2841.E2.80.9354.29|Claudius]] was decent, he was subjected to [[ableist]] insults during his reign.}}

==The other side of the coin==
{{cquote|What could possibly go wrong?|||{{wpl|Bubsy the Bobcat}}{{efn|Whose creators thought he could rival Mario and Sonic and not create {{wpl|Bubsy 3D|one of the worst games ever}}.<ref>{{cite web |last= Thornburg |first=Vince |date=July 18, 2006  |title=History of: Bubsy |url= https://www.sega-16.com/2006/07/history-of-bubsy/|website=Sega-16 |access-date=January 3, 2026}}</ref>}}}}

So we've gone over those who treat optimism as cowardice, but what about when ''optimism becomes {{wpl|Recklessness (psychology)|rashness?}}''

===Errr... what is it called?===
While declinism and theories of social degeneration have been extensively analyzed across historical, sociological, and political literatures, their optimistic counterpart(s) receive comparatively less sustained attention as a unified phenomenon.<ref>{{cite book |last=  Koselleck|first=Reinhart |translator-last1=Tribe |translator-first1= Keith|date=2004|orig-date=1979 |title=Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time |url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/Futures_Past/q0LVd_t_s3gC |publisher=Columbia University Press |page= 43–57, 218-247|isbn=9780231502047 |access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref><ref name="Hartog2015">{{cite book |last=  Hartog |first= François| translator-last1=Brown |translator-first1= Saskia|date= 2015|title= Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Regimes_of_Historicity/fjMzBQAAQBAJ |publisher=  Columbia University Press|isbn=9780231538763 |access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref>{{rp|3-10, 103-112}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Nisbet |first=Robert A. |date=1980 |title=History of the Idea of Progress |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/History_of_the_Idea_of_Progress/QDRWfZ9Ydw0C |publisher=Transaction Publishers |chapter=1., 6., 9. |isbn=9781412825481 |access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Bury  |first=J. B.  |date= 2023|orig-date=1920|title=The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/eUimEAAAQBAJ |publisher=Outlook Verlag |chapter= VI, IX, XII, XIII-XVI, Epilogue |isbn= 9783368332785|access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref> This asymmetry is not simply a matter of scholarly neglect but reflects a structural difference between pessimistic and optimistic orientations toward social change. Declinism functions less as a coherent theory than as a diagnostic stance or rhetorical mood; the claim that "things are getting worse" can be mobilized across ideological traditions without requiring a precise account of causation, agency, or remedy.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 1-4}}<ref name="Hartog2015"/>{{rp|28-35, 70-82}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Polak |first=Fred |date=1973|orig-date=1960 |title=The Image of the Future  |publisher=Jossey-Bass |chapter=1-2 |isbn= 9780875891521}}</ref><ref name="Roitman2014">{{cite book |last= Roitman|first=Janet |date=2013 |title=Anti-Crisis |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Anti_Crisis/KZzaAgAAQBAJ  |publisher= Duke University Press|isbn=9780822377436 |access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref>{{rp|Introduction, Ch. 1-2}}<ref>{{cite book |last=  Berman |first=Marshall |date=1983|title= All that is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity|url= https://www.google.com/books/edition/All_that_is_Solid_Melts_Into_Air/mox1ywiyhtgC |publisher= Verso|page= 13-54, 98-110, 345|isbn= 9780860917854|access-date=January 20, 2026}}</ref> Its portability and low explanatory burden allow it to cohere as a recognizable posture despite wide variation in content.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 6}}<ref name="Roitman2014"/>{{rp|Ch. 2-3}}

Optimism about social change, by contrast, typically demands specification. Claims that conditions are improving almost invariably raise questions of mechanism ("by what processes?"), scope ("for whom?"), and contingency ("under what conditions?").<ref> James Liszka, “Pragmatism and the Ethic of Meliorism”, European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XIII-2 | 2021, Online since 20 December 2021, connection on 20 January 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2442; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2442</ref><ref> Fiala, A. (2019). Progress and Meliorism: Making Progress in Thinking about Progress. Journal of the Philosophy of History, 15(1), 28-50. https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341419 </ref><ref> Hawkins, Angus, 'Modernisation Theory', Modernity and the Victorians (Oxford, 2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Sept. 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192845474.003.0003, accessed 20 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref> Robson, Jon, 'Optimism and Pessimism', Aesthetic Testimony: An Optimistic Approach (Oxford, 2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 15 Dec. 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192862952.003.0002, accessed 20 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref> Collini, Stefan, 'Whig History and the Mind of England', The Nostalgic Imagination: History in English Criticism (Oxford, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Nov. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198800170.003.0002, accessed 20 Jan. 2026. </ref><ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 6}} The closest candidates considered - yet none quite fitting in the grand scheme of things - being:
* '''[[Progressivism]] / Progress narratives''': Usually one that's addressed (albeit somewhat erroneously) as the opposite of declinism. This being the belief in long-term improvement (moral, technological, institutional), which is found in Enlightenment thought, liberalism, some Marxism. Problem being that its often criticized as naïve, teleological, or Eurocentric - which discourages people from owning the label.
* '''Developmentalism''': not to be confused with {{wpl|Developmentalism|the economic theory of the same name}}, this one's a philosophy which views that societies move through discernible stages of development, and movement along those stages generally corresponds to improvements in capacity, welfare, or complexity. Essentially its technocratic optimism to declinism's cultural pessimism. But its narrow scope and conditional logic prevent it from functioning as a culturally compelling counter-narrative to declinism.
* '''Ascendantism''': mirrors declinism structurally (directional, not absolute) by implying a upward trajectory without specifying an endpoint. Also it avoids [[teleology]] more than "progress". However, this isn't really a established concept and lacks intellectual lineage. Also sounds evaluative without specifying criteria (i.e. what is "upward"?)
* '''[[Utopia]]nism''': Normative opposite - though not analytical counterpart - of declinism. Utopianism articulates positive social alternatives and is both historically influential an explicitly normative. Its incomatible in the sense that utopianism is concerned with ideal endpoints, not trajectories. It's also often detached from empirical assessment and easily dismissed as unrealistic.
* '''{{wpl|Meliorism}} / Conditional progressivism''': the view that things can be improved through human effort, but are not guaranteed to improve. This idea is generally associated with {{wpl|Pragmatism|American pragmatists}} like {{wpl|William James}} and {{wpl|John Dewey||.}} However, its modest, anti-dramatic, and doesn’t mobilize fear or urgency the way declinism does.
* '''{{wpl|Technological optimism}}''': Dominant in Silicon Valley (though not in regards to [[Peter_Thiel#Thielsphere|Thielsphere]]) and modernization theory, meaning improvement driven by innovation and productivity. However, it's narrow in scope and collapses when tech worsens inequality or power asymmetries.
* '''[[Presentism#Whig_history|Whig history]]''': the idea that history trends toward greater liberty and rationality. Problem being that it's viewed pejoratively now, with it also suffering from [[hindsight bias]] (i.e. treats present conditions as justified outcomes.)
* '''Empirical optimism''': Data-driven claims that violence, poverty, disease, etc. are declining. Championed by the likes of [[Steven Pinker]]. Flaw being that this is descriptive, not motivational.
* '''Triumphalism''': Captures narratives of victory and historical success, often appears after wars, revolutions, or ideological “wins”. Like declinism, it has a strong rhetorical and political presence. But it's ultimately retrospective, not diagnostic ("We have already won", not "things are improving"). Also it often suppresses critique (rather than engaging with social conditions) and tends toward complacency.
* '''{{wpl|Exceptionalism}}''':  Strongly present in national narratives (see [[American exceptionalism]]) and often functions as a defense against declinist critique by asserting special immunity from it. But it functions more like a counter-argument than a mirror concept; being not a claim about improvement, but about ''exemption'' (i.e. "declinism can't happen/will not reach state of collapse, because we are so great").
* '''Optimism Bias''': Empirically established cognitive tendency and explains why people expect positive outcomes. But it's a descriptive psychology, not social theory. It also pathologizes optimism and undermines optimism’s epistemic legitimacy. Meaning it explains optimism away rather than grounding it.
* '''Positivity Offset''': Default tendency to interpret ambiguous situations positively. Generally useful for micro-level behavior and motivation. But it operates at an affective baseline, not a societal scale; meaning lacks narrative, history, or causality, and it really can't be politicized or mobilized.
As a result, optimistic interpretations fragment into diverse and often contested frameworks, rather than consolidating under a single banner analogous to declinism. These traditions are theory-laden, conditional, and empirically vulnerable, which limits their rhetorical cohesion and cultural salience.<ref> Dianda, Alexis, 'Hope and Pragmatism', in Anthony Scioli, and Steven C. van den Heuvel (eds), The Oxford Compendium of Hope (New York, 2026; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Dec. 2025), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197618240.003.0013, accessed 20 Jan. 2026. </ref><ref> Larson, Wendy, 'The Theory of Progress and the Embrace of Optimism', Optimism, Literature, and Culture in American Capitalism and Chinese Socialism (Oxford, 2025; online edn, Oxford Academic, 11 Sept. 2025), https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198957959.003.0002, accessed 20 Jan. 2026. </ref>

Consequently, declinism tends to exert disproportionate political and cultural influence, operating as a flexible narrative that can reinforce reactionary, nostalgic, or crisis-oriented tendencies, sometimes exacerbating the very social problems it diagnoses. Optimistic accounts, meanwhile, are more likely to be embedded in technical discourse, policy analysis, or institutional practice, where their complexity and qualifications reduce their capacity for broad symbolic mobilization. In this sense, declinism endures as a powerful rhetorical stance, whereas optimism about social change remains dispersed among specialized, provisional, and frequently contested explanatory frameworks.<ref name="Bennett2001"/><ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 1-6}}<ref name="ElchardusSpruyt2016"/>

===Psychological and societal risks of excessive optimism===
In essence, optimism can be understood in two forms; '''dispositional''' and '''narrative or ideological'''. Dispositional optimism describes an individual tendency to expect favorable personal outcomes and is often linked to resilience and adaptive coping. Narrative optimism, by contrast, consists of shared cultural or political stories that portray social progress as natural, inevitable, or self-correcting.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|149-159}}<ref name="Erthal2021">Erthal, F., Bastos, ., Vilete, L. et al. Unveiling the neural underpinnings of optimism: a systematic review. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 21, 895–916 (2021). https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-021-00931-8</ref><ref name="Sharot2011">Sharot, T., Korn, C. & Dolan, R. How unrealistic optimism is maintained in the face of reality. Nat Neurosci 14, 1475–1479 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2949</ref><ref name="Nielsen2023">{{cite journal |last1= Nielsen|first1=Søren Beck |date= September 29, 2023|title= “There is new technology here that can perform miracles”: The discursive psychology of technological optimism in climate change policy debates|journal= Journal of Language and Politics |volume=22 |issue=6 |pages= 826-845 |doi= https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.23035.nie|access-date=January 21, 2026}}</ref> While the former is typically psychologically beneficial, the latter operates collectively and carries broader social and political implications. Narrative optimism is not inherently harmful. Optimistic visions have often mobilized collective action, sustained social movements, and countered fatalism. When grounded in realism and responsibility, optimism can promote engagement rather than passivity. Problems arise when ''optimism becomes uncritical'', presenting progress as guaranteed rather than contingent.<ref name="Erthal2021"/><ref name="Sharot2011"/><ref name="Nazeef2025">Muhammad Nazeef, Nagina. (2025). Cognitive Biases and Climate Change Decision-Making: Understanding the Role of Optimism and Anchoring in Environmental Choices.</ref>

One such risk is complacency, the underestimation of persistent threats - such as [[climate change]], inequality, or systemic injustice - on the assumption that conditions are improving or will correct themselves.<ref name="Nazeef2025"/><ref>Buehler, Roger & Griffin, Dale & Ross, Michael. (1994). Exploring the “Planning Fallacy”: Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 67. 366-381. 10.1037/0022-3514.67.3.366.</ref> When promised progress fails to materialize, optimism can also produce disillusionment, eroding trust and discouraging participation.<ref name="Sharot2011"/> [[Survivorship bias]] further distorts these narratives by highlighting successes while obscuring failures and marginalized experiences.<ref>Rao, T. (2024). Understanding survivorship bias: Implications for research and decision‑making. Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research (JETIR), 11(6). https://www.jetir.org/papers/JETIR2406276.pdf</ref> This dynamic parallels declinism, as declinist narratives emphasize decay and crisis, often generating fear or urgency, while unmoderated optimism can foster denial, inertia, or depoliticization. ''Both'' oversimplify complex realities when treated as comprehensive explanations rather than partial perspectives.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 1-4, 6}}<ref name="Nielsen2023"/>

Optimistic narratives are also politically instrumental. Selective evidence of progress can legitimize existing institutions or policies despite persistent structural inequities. In some cases, optimism supports [[technocratic]] {{wpl|paternalism}} -- framing expert management, markets, or technology as sufficient guarantees of progress and narrowing democratic scrutiny. In this sense, optimism can function as a subtle form of propaganda by shaping assumptions rather than coercing belief.<ref name="Hirschman1991"/>{{rp|Ch. 1; see also Chs. 3 & 5}}<ref name="Nielsen2023"/>

Culturally, excessive optimism can impose norms of success and positivity that marginalize dissenting experiences. Critical perspectives may be dismissed as pessimistic, suppressing debate and weakening collective self-correction. Because optimistic narratives often depend on specific mechanisms of improvement, they are both persuasive and vulnerable; failed mechanisms invite blame, and specificity makes optimism easier to co-opt for narrow political ends.<ref name="Nielsen2023"/><ref name="Sharot2011"/><ref name="CarverScheier2014">Carver CS, Scheier MF. Dispositional optimism. Trends Cogn Sci. 2014 Jun;18(6):293-9. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.02.003. Epub 2014 Mar 13. PMID: 24630971; PMCID: PMC4061570.</ref>

Excessive optimism, then, is not inherently safer or morally superior to pessimistic or critical frameworks. Its effects are ''often subtler but no less consequential''. Whereas declinism may provoke urgency and polarization, unmoderated optimism can obscure risk, reinforce conformity, and delay necessary action. Optimism ''is'' valuable, but it must rest on realism, pluralism, and the hard truth that progress is uneven and that it depends on collective effort and ''not'' "inevitability".<ref name="Sharot2011"/><ref name="Nazeef2025"/><ref name="CarverScheier2014"/>

==Healthier alternative (to excess pessimism and optimism)==
A more constructive stance is to be ''neither'' naively optimistic nor cynically pessimistic, '''but rather nuanced, evidence-based, and action-oriented'''. Think of it like steering a ship: you don’t just drift toward the shore hoping for calm waters, and you don’t always assume a storm is coming; ''you navigate based on actual conditions''.<ref name="CocciaBellitto2018">Coccia, M., & Bellitto, M. (2018). Critical analysis of human progress. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09550</ref><ref name="Nutley_et_al_2007">Nutley, S., Walter, I., & Davies, H. T. O. (2007). Using Evidence: How Research Can Inform Public Services. Bristol University Press.</ref>

Instead, many scholars prefer "tragic realism" and/or "conditional progress" as frameworks for understanding societal development. From this view, it is healthier to assume that:
* Societies can improve and regress simultaneously<ref name="Lu2023">Catherine Lu, Progress, decolonization and global justice: a tragic view, International Affairs, Volume 99, Issue 1, January 2023, Pages 141–159, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac314</ref>
* Progress is fragile, reversible, and uneven<ref name="CocciaBellitto2018"/><ref name="Jaeggi2018">Jaeggi, R. (2018). Moral Progress. Oxford University Press.</ref>
* Decline is a risk - not a destiny<ref name="Lu2023"/><ref name="Ikenberry2021">Ikenberry, G. J. (2021). Pragmatist realism in international affairs. International Affairs, 101(2), 623–643.</ref>
The argument being that observing negative trends can be constructive if it is grounded in evidence, focused on specific domains such as democratic norms or environmental stability, and paired with a sense of responsibility rather than fatalism.<ref name="Lu2023"/> Historical examples show that awareness of societal challenges can motivate reform, preserve institutions, and trigger moral reflection.<ref name="Jaeggi2018"/> This approach preserves urgency without surrendering agency, encouraging pragmatic, evidence-based engagement with social and cultural issues.<ref name="Ikenberry2021"/><ref name="Nutley_et_al_2007"/>

==Who's who in the subject==
{{hatnote|This is a dynamic list that may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness.}}
===Hard-fatalist (decline cannot be stopped)===
[[File:Oswald Spengler.jpg|right|thumb|150px|[[Oswald Spengler]] (1929) is regarded as the archetypal hard-fatalistic declinist philosopher.]]
* {{wpl|Hesiod}}: often considered the earliest known declinist thinker, since his surviving works are the oldest to explore the theme. His {{wpl|Ages of Man}} from ''{{wpl|Works and Days}}'' depicts human history as five ages - Golden to Iron -showing moral and social decay. His pessimistic view emphasizes the loss of virtue, justice, and divine respect, portraying progressive decline in society.<ref name="Smith1980">Smith, P. (1980). History and the Individual in Hesiod’s Myth of Five Races. The Classical World, 74(3), 145–163. https://doi.org/10.2307/4349275</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=<!-- not stated --> |editor= Ann Langley, Haridimos Tsoukas, Juliane Reinecke, Roy Suddaby|date= 2021|title=Time, Temporality, and History in Process Organization Studies |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Time_Temporality_and_History_in_Process/MZcMEAAAQBAJ |publisher= Oxford University Press |page=264 |isbn= 9780198870715|access-date=January 9, 2026}}</ref>
* [[Augustine of Hippo]]: ''City of God'' argues moral decline is part of human history. With exception to hand of God, everything is predeterminedly fucked.<ref name="Murphy2005"/><ref name="Stewart2020"/>
* {{wpl|Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet}}: French bishop/theologian whose works advocated the [[divine right of kings]] and mourned the decline of moral order. According to him, "divine order" determines rise and fall of countries, ergo decline largely predetermined.
* {{wpl|John Nelson Darby}}: Anglo-Irish theologian and founder of the {{wpl|Plymouth Brethren||,}} who believed that human society was in a state of moral and spiritual decline, a view reflected in his development of [[dispensationalism]], which divides history into distinct periods leading inevitably to the end times. Darby taught that the culmination of history - the Rapture, Tribulation, and Second Coming - was predetermined by divine providence and unavoidable, leaving humanity powerless to alter the final unfolding, from which only faith in Christ could offer escape.
* {{wpl|Henry Adams}}: key figure in American declinism, characterized by his intense pessimism about modern society's spiritual and intellectual decline due to materialism and technology, seeing a loss of moral and cultural vigor despite scientific progress, even predicting world-altering conflicts. He lamented the shift from the perceived stability of the past (like the Middle Ages or the Founding era) to a fragmented, power-driven modern world, viewing his own era as a decline from earlier, more robust ideals.
* {{wpl|Otto Seeck}}: German historian who focused on the decline of the Roman Empire, particularly in his major, influential, but controversial work on the subject, which significantly shaped the historical discourse on Rome's fall. His theories on the ''Untergang der antiken Welt'' (Decline of the Ancient World) book series deeply explored the causes of this decline for a broad audience. The time it was released, the series was considered to be the most comprehensive, source-based presentation of late antiquity in Germany. He's considered a direct influence/predecessor to Spengler.
* [[Arthur de Gobineau]]: French all-around scumbag who is foundational to racialized decline thinking (racialist declinist), with degeneration as a racially-focused mechanism rather than a general social theory. Notorious for his ''"Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races"'', in which he argued that decline stems from [[Miscegenation|racial mixing]] and loss of “[[Aryan]] purity.”
* {{wpl|Bénédict Morel}}: A French psychiatrist who is considered the founder of degeneration theory. Argued that mental illness, crime, poverty, and “immorality” worsened over generations due to heredity and environment. Furthermore introducing the idea that social problems were symptoms of inherited decline. Degeneration seen as progressive across generations, but preventable through moral hygiene, eugenics, and social measures.<ref name="Sgantzos"/>
* {{wpl|Henry Maudsley}}: British psychiatrist who advanced degeneration thinking in criminology and mental illness. He leaned toward fatalism at the individual level - as once degeneration manifests, reversal is limited - but society could protect itself via supervision and education.
* {{wpl|Cesare Lombroso}}: Italian criminologist, linked criminality to hereditary “degeneration.” Deemed that criminal tendencies are inherited, so society can only segregate or manage criminals; complete reversal unlikely.
* {{wpl|Max Nordau}}: French-Hungarian Jewish physician, [[Zionist]]{{efn|He's literally the co-founder of {{wpl|World Zionist Organization}} with {{wpl|Theodor Herzl||.}}}} and cultural critic who popularized degeneration theory in his book 1892 book {{wpl|Degeneration (Nordau)|"Degeneration".}} Applied the theory to art, literature, and modern culture, claiming modern society showed signs of decay. In an ''amazing stroke of irony'' - considering Nordau's religion and Zionist views - his work provided the conceptual framework and terminology the [[Nazis]] later co-opted and twisted to label any art they didn't like as "[[degenerate]]" (''Entartete Kunst'').<ref>[https://www.academia.edu/11653112/Transgressing_the_Boundaries_Max_Nordaus_Entartung_and_the_transfer_of_scientific_language_to_culture_critique Unterholzner, B. Transgressing the Boundaries: Max Nordau's 'Entartung' and the transfer of scientific language to culture critique.] (retrieved January 05, 2026)</ref><ref>Presner, T. S. (2017). Generation, Degeneration, Regeneration: Health, Disease, and the Jewish Body. In M. B. Hart & T. Michels (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Judaism (pp. 559–588). chapter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref>
* {{wpl|Thomas Clouston|Sir Thomas Clouston}}: Scottish psychiatrist, wrote on mental illness and social degeneration. Although Clouston also emphasized holistic care and healthy lifestyles, his scientific worldview was strongly based on the idea of ​​the biological decline of the population and the need to control this development through medical means. He was pessimistic about the prospects of societal reform.
* {{wpl|Richard von Krafft-Ebing}}: German expert in psychiatry/sexual pathology. He saw degeneration as pathological.
* [[Oswald Spengler]]: German {{wpl|Conservative Revolution}} thinker who is one of the most cited declinists in modern thought. In particular, he is known for the ''The Decline of the West'', in which he characterizes cultures as having organic life cycles (birth, flowering, decay), as well as rejecting liberal progressivism (with his later works tying liberalism/socialism/progressivism to decline more directly). Spengler became popular more for his [[Style over substance|style]] and philosophical/psychological impact than for originality or accuracy. Regrettably, he remains popular even to this day, thanks to of his vivid way of writing (as his metaphors are sticky and his narrative style is dramatic), with his framework is reusable for debates about culture, politics, and history. As such, its more about "symbolic utility" than [[intellectual honesty]]; he’s essentially a "one-man cultural meme" that (unfortunately) refuses to die.<ref>Hundert, E. J. (1967). OSWALD SPENGLER: history and metaphor the decline and the west. Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, 1(1), 103–117. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24776835</ref><ref>Farrenkopf, John (2001). Prophet of Decline: Spengler on World History and Politics. LSU Press.</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Sullivan |first=Donald |date=2023 |title=Rise of Cultural Relativism Revises Historiography |url= https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/literature-and-writing/rise-cultural-relativism-revises-historiography|website=EBSCO Knowledge Advantage |access-date=January 5, 2026}}</ref><ref> Hutchinson, Ben, 'Lateness as ‘Decline’: Oswald Spengler, Nicholas Berdyaev, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen', Lateness and Modern European Literature (Oxford, 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Oct. 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198767695.003.0014, accessed 5 Jan. 2026.</ref>
* {{wpl|René Guénon}} alias Abdalwahid Yahia: French writer and metaphysician who converted from Christianity to Islam and applied metaphysics to the study of cultural traditions and the history of religions. He viewed modernity as irreversibly degenerate -- a manifestation of the {{wpl|Kali Yuga}} in which the collective spiritual and traditional order has collapsed. While essentially a hard fatalist, there is a crucial "catch" involved; as individuals can achieve salvation through "metaphysical truths and spiritual practice". His philosophy blends collective pessimism with personal spiritual agency - while ''the world'' is doomed, the awakened ''individual'' can transcend degeneration and connect to the eternal order. (I.E., "hard fatalism for the world, personal transcendence for the individual".)
* {{wpl|F. Scott Fitzgerald}}: American novelist and essayist who tends to be regarded as a declinist. While not a metaphysical/cosmic fatalist, he was very much a social/moral fatalist, especially regarding the [[Roaring Twenties|Jazz Age]]’s decadence and the impossibility of transcending social/cultural constraints. His best known work - ''{{wpl|The Great Gatsby}}'' - critiqued the corrupt [[American Dream]], materialism, and lost ideals. His characters chase wealth and pleasure over integrity, reflecting Jazz Age disillusionment.<ref>Mr. Rohan Chouhan, Dr. Vibha Singh Thakur. (2025). The American Dream and Moral Decay in The Great Gatsby. International Journal of Sciences and Innovation Engineering, 2(7), 323-327. https://doi.org/10.70849/IJSCI</ref><ref>Hodo, Zamira. (2017). The Failure of the American Dream in “The Great Gatsby”- Fitzgerald. European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies. 6. 299. 10.26417/ejms.v6i2.p299-305.</ref>
* [[H.P. Lovecraft]]: his worldview and literary output were deeply influenced by the belief that Western civilization, particularly its Anglo-Saxon heritage, was in a state of terminal biological and cultural decay. His declinist anxieties are major drivers of his horror. Themes of hereditary decay (''The Shadow Over Innsmouth'', ''The Rats in the Walls''), the reemergence of ancient, primitive forces (''The Call of Cthulhu''), and the collapse of human reason when faced with a chaotic universe -- all reflect his fear of inevitable social and biological collapse.<ref>Joshi, S. T. (1991). H. P. Lovecraft: The Decline of the West. Starmont House. {{isbn|9781557422071}}</ref><ref>Steadman, J. L. (2024). Horror as Racism in H. P. Lovecraft: White Fragility in the Weird Tales. Bloomsbury Publishing {{isbn|9798765107713}}</ref><ref>Zeller, B. E. (2020). Altar Call of Cthulhu: Religion and Millennialism in H.P. Lovecraft’s Cthulhu Mythos. Religions, 11(1), 18. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11010018</ref>
* [[Francis Parker Yockey]]: American Nazi sympathizer who explicitly argued that the West was in civilizational decay. He embraced fascist and authoritarian ideas and used "decadence" language tied to culture, liberalism, and [[Alt-right_glossary#Modernity|modernity]]. His framework treated decline as cavernous, [[existential]], and civilizational, not just political. Decline can only be stopped via authoritarian cultural unity.
* [[Julius Evola]]: Italian esoteric traditionalist; he is a radical declinist thinker who framed civilization as in irreversible decline. He believed history follows a cyclical pattern of decline (à la Spengler) from a primordial spiritual [[Golden Age]] to the modern world, which he saw as an era of profound spiritual and cultural collapse. He understood degeneration in metaphysical and spiritual terms, as the loss of transcendence, hierarchy, and traditional authority.
* [[Yukio Mishima]]: Japanese [[Ultranationalism|ultranationalist]] writer with a cultural pessimism streak. He believed that postwar Japan had lost its spiritual center, especially the emperor-centered ethic, honor culture, and classical aesthetics. He criticized materialism, Westernization, consumer comfort, and liberal democracy as hollowing out meaning. His thinking was historical and symbolic and like Spengler, he saw decline as spiritual and cultural, not merely political or economic. His novels and essays often contrast a heroic, disciplined past with what he saw as a soft, disenchanted present. His {{wpl|The Sea of Fertility|''The Sea of Fertility'' tetralogy}} explicitly stages decline as a cycle of reincarnation and exhaustion of meaning.<ref>Verbovszky, J. (2013). "Overcoming Modernity in Yukio Mishima." Discussions, 9(2). Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=797</ref><ref>Wolska-Lenarczyk, J.. (2014). The Buddhist concept of transmigration as a structural trick in Mishima Yukio's "The Sea of Fertility". 188-206.</ref><ref> "Mishima, Yukio (Vol. 2) - Yukio Mishima." Contemporary Literary Criticism, edited by Carolyn Riley, Vol. 2. Gale Cengage, 1974, 5 Jan. 2026 <https://www.enotes.com/topics/yukio-mishima/criticism/mishima-yukio-1925-1970></ref>
* {{wpl|Sam Francis (writer)|Samuel T. Francis}}: American writer and [[Council of Conservative Citizens]] big-shot who combined Burnham-style elite theory with cultural pessimism.<ref>{{cite web |author=<!-- not stated --> |date=January 17, 2025 |title= SPLCenter: Sam Francis|url=https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/sam-francis/ |website= The Southern Poverty Law Center |access-date=December 28, 2025}}</ref> A kind of "friendly-rival" to Pat Buchanan, he used harsh cultural and civilizational language, which was ''even more radical'' than Buchanan's. He argued that the traditional American culture was being displaced and that the managerial elites are undermining social cohesion. That is; the modern liberalism and their elites were responsible for the decline that resulted in the loss of traditional social order.
* {{wpl|Thilo Sarrazin}}: German "neo-degenerationist", formerly with [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] as he was disowned by them. Mainly known from his book ''Germany Abolishes Itself'', Sarrazin argues that  demographic, cultural, and cognitive decline tied to [[immigration]]. Explicitly invokes degeneration-like logic, updated to 21st century.
* {{wpl|Éric Zemmour}}: aka that one far-right ass-fuck not named [[Marine Le Pen]] to {{wpl|2022 French presidential election|run for president of France in 2022,}} as well the {{wpl|Reconquête#Online_controversy|"WikiZedia" campaign}} to rewrite French-language [[Wikipedia]] to make him look good (it didn't). His work focuses on civilizational, demographic, and cultural decline of France/Europe; using the usual moral, demographic, and cultural decay narratives. Very clear descendant of earlier declinist traditions.
* [[Hans-Hermann Hoppe]]: Philosopher and [[Austrian school]] economist. On his book ''A Short History of Man - Progress and Decline'', he argues that the rise of the [[liberal]] [[democratic]] order is systematically worsening governance when compared to [[monarchy|monarchies]], (which he sees as privately-owned governments) due to lower {{wpl|time preference}}, [[plutocracy]] and [[war]]s. According to Hoppe, democracy cannot be reformed, and should be replaced by [[anarcho-capitalism]] (i.e. decline inevitable due to "state intervention").

===Soft-fatalist (decline can only be slowed down but not averted)===
[[File:Muqaddimah Ibnu Khaldun Imam Khairul Annas.JPG|right|thumb|150px|Ibn Khaldun’s ''Muqaddimah'' is a seminal work in the study of structural-cyclical theories of societal rise and decline.]]
* {{wpl|Polybius}}: Early historian, discusses cycles of political decline. Polybius believed decline is ultimately inevitable in the long run, but it can be significantly delayed and managed through good institutions and civic virtue.
* {{wpl|Ovid}}: considered a declinist, especially in regards to his work ''Metamorphoses'', which depicts moral and social decay from the Golden to Iron Age (like Ages of Man by Hesoid). While framed mythologically rather than philosophically, he emphasizes human corruption over time. His elegiac poems, like ''Ars Amatoria'', critique Roman moral looseness with irony, making his declinism primarily literary, blending nostalgia, moral critique, and playfulness.
* {{wpl|Seneca the Younger}}: his works frequently lament the moral and social decay of Rome. He often contrasted his era’s obsession with luxury, greed, and the brutality of gladiatorial games against a lost "Golden Age" of simple virtue. While his Stoic philosophy provided a framework for individual improvement, his broader worldview - particularly in his tragedies - remained deeply pessimistic, portraying a society in an inescapable state of ethical collapse.
* {{wpl|Tacitus}}: historian focused on Roman moral/political decay
* {{wpl|Juvenal}}: Although his work is literary and satirical - rather than strictly historical or analytical - Juvenal is considered a declinist thinker in a moral and social sense. His works often lament the perceived decline of Roman virtue and civic responsibility.
* {{wpl|Ibn Khaldun}}: presents a cyclical, structural theory of political decline in his book {{wpl|Muqaddimah||.}} Dynasties rise through strong "asabiyyah" rooted in kinship and hardship, but inevitably lose this cohesion as they urbanize and institutionalize power. Decline is therefore structural rather than merely moral. While religion and good governance may delay decay, no dynasty can permanently regenerate its original vitality. Political renewal occurs not through reform of ruling elites but through the rise of new groups possessing stronger solidarities. As such, civilization itself may not decline irreversibly; rather, power simply circulates among successive groups.<ref name="Küenzl2023"/><ref name="Gierer2001"/>
* {{wpl|Al-Masudi}}: Focused on dynastic corruption with some of his historiographical reflections observing societal decay. His remedy to decline was moral reform, prudent governance and historical awareness.
* [[Giambattista Vico]]: In his 1725 book ''New Science'', Vico proposed a cyclical view of history with stages of development and decay (''corsi e ricorsi''). Deemed that renewal comes only after collapse and rebirth.
* {{wpl|Edward Gibbon}}: 18th-century British historian best known for his seminal {{wpl|The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire|''The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'',}} one of the most important books in declinism. The book attributes the the fall of Rome primarily to internal decay; emphasizing moral and civic corruption, the erosion of civic virtue, and the impact of Christianity on Roman society as key factors in the empire’s gradual decline. While Gibbon acknowledged periods of renewal and complexity within Roman history, his analysis framed Rome’s collapse as a largely inevitable consequence of weakened institutions and societal decay. However, Gibbon combined careful historical analysis with this perspective, which makes him tad more nuanced than a simple "everything-decays" thinker -- unlike many of his followers in the field.
* {{wpl|Brooks Adams}}: American historian and writer who came up with ideas about how societies go through cycles of rise and fall. He wrote about this in a book called ''{{wpl|The Law of Civilization and Decay}}'' in 1896, with his ideas introduced 20 years before a Spengler. Adams saw growing societies as draining individual creativity. Civilizations rise, stabilize, then decline, with complexity stifling innovation and exhausting mental energy, ultimately diminishing new ideas and the human creative spirit. Only by geopolitical realism could this process be slowed down.
* [[Émile Durkheim]]: French sociologist who analyzed social decline as a result of moral disintegration in industrial societies. He introduced [[anomie]], a state of normlessness caused by rapid social change, weakening shared values and social cohesion, and leading to crime, suicide, and fragmentation as structural issues. He considered decline to be preventable, as social pathologies are fixable via reform.
* {{wpl|Ferdinand Tönnies}}: his sociological framework remains a cornerstone of cultural pessimism, often cited alongside other declinist thinkers who lamented the dehumanizing effects of urban-industrial civilization. While his work is deeply pessimistic about the modern shift from ''Gemeinschaft'' (community) to ''Gesellschaft'' (society), he did not view this decline as an inescapable end to human civilization. Unlike fatalists who see society as a biological organism destined to die, Tönnies saw it as a structure that could be reshaped through collective will and reform. He is one of the uncommon politically-leftist declinists.
* [[Max Weber]]: German sociologist who analyzed the decline of cultural and spiritual life in Western societies, arguing that while rationalization and bureaucratization promote efficiency and formal rules, it also leads to "disenchantment", erosion of traditional authority, and an "iron cage" causing alienation and loss of meaning. Ethical resistance may exist to this decline, but there's no systemic escape for it.<ref>Kim, Sung Ho, "Max Weber", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/weber/>.</ref><ref>Etzrodt, C. Max Weber’s rationalization processes disenchantment, alienation, or anomie?. Theor Soc 53, 653–671 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-024-09554-7</ref>
* {{wpl|Gustave Le Bon}}: French polymath specializing mass psychology and crowd behavior. Seeing masses as irrational, he therefore concluded that civilizations doomed to degeneracy. Only careful guidance and treatment could slow its progression. 
* {{wpl|Pitirim Sorokin}}: Russian-American sociologist, emphasized moral and cultural cycles of societies
* [[H.S. Chamberlain]]: Anglo-German writer who was major ideological proponent of degenerationist thinking, especially in its racial and cultural form. Primarily known for his ''The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century'' that combines degeneration, nationalism, and mysticism; portraying Teutonic influences as generative and Jewish influences as destructive. Played a key role in moving those ideas into extremist political movements in the early 20th century, and was one of the major influences on [[Nazism]]. World will be in a downward spiral as long "Jewish influence" controls history.
* {{wpl|Arnold J. Toynbee}}: English historian best characterized as the "chill-pill Spengler". As a ''theorist of civilizational rise and decline'', Toynbee is best known for the 12-volume ''A Study of History'', in which goes over how civilizations rise and fall according to their ability to respond creatively to challenges. In Toynbee’s view, decline occurs when creative elites become rigid and self-serving, leading to moral and spiritual failure rather than hereditary decay. Although he analyzed patterns of civilizational breakdown, he did not see decline as inevitable and believed that renewal and recovery were possible through ethical and spiritual revitalization. Civilizations will eventually fall when they fail to respond creatively. While he is still guilty of many of the same fallacies as other decline thinkers, Toynbee biggest failing is his own over-reach, as his later volumes increasingly resorted to religious (i.e. [[Goddidit]]) and metaphysical explanations when his sociological framework broke down. Also his dry writing style makes him less appealing to [[sucker]]s who already believe this stupid theory, making Spengler's edgy Lebenshilosophie more palatable to them.
* {{wpl|James Burnham}}: Pessimistic conservative whose work was influential in Cold War realism, Burnham deemed that liberal democracy was failing and being replaced by bureaucratic "managerial elites". His work - such as ''The Managerial Revolution'' and ''Suicide of the West'' - argues Western decline is due to the [[elite]]s' weakness and ideological self-doubt. While he pointed to the early 1960s social/cultural climate signifying a downward trend, his work is more about power, institutions, and geopolitics, not really about moral or biological “degeneration.”
* [[Pat Buchanan]]: American [[paleoconservative]] zealot who generally laid his writings and speeches with degeneration-style language. Argued that the [[United States]] - along with the West - being in decline due to globalization, secularism, and cultural/demographic change. His alarmist ideology frames this within moral-cultural decline. His doomsday prophecy book is called ''The Death of the West''.

===Cautionary (decline can be fully stopped)===
[[File:Titus Livius.png||right|thumb|150px|Roman historian Livy was amongst the earliest ([[PRATT|of untold many]]) to think that [[Machismo|cockmongering]] would magically fix society.]]
* [[Plato]]: often explored degeneration or declinist narratives, such as those of societies, constitutions, and moral order. In works such as ''The Republic'' and ''Laws'', he describes the stepwise decay of political systems - from aristocracy to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and ultimately tyranny - and critiques the erosion of civic virtue and legal norms. In ''Timaeus'', he extended this analysis to a cosmological and historical context, linking societal decline to humanity’s drift from the ideal order of the cosmos and the Forms, suggesting that earlier civilizations were morally and politically purer. While Plato’s works diagnose human and societal decay, they also offer prescriptive solutions, emphasizing the role of philosophy, education, and the rule of the virtuous in restoring harmony. Across his corpus, his thought combines moral, political, and metaphysical dimensions, reflecting a nuanced declinist perspective that is critical yet reformist.<ref> Scott, Dominic, 'Irrationality in Republic VIII–IX: Democracy and Tyranny', Listening to Reason in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Nov. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863328.003.0007, accessed 9 Jan. 2026.</ref><ref>Hitz, Zena (2013). Degenerate Regimes in Plato's Republic. In Mark L. Mcpherran, G. R. F. Ferrari, Rachel Barney, Julia Annas, Rachana Kamtekar & Nicholas D. Smith, Plato's 'Republic': A Critical Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press.</ref>
* {{wpl|Cicero}}: especially ''De Re Publica'' and ''De Legibus'', which both talk about Rome’s moral and political decline. Advocating civic virtue, his works serve as warnings that are meant to guide action.
* {{wpl|Livy}}: best known for ''Ab Urbe Condita'', which centers on the theme of Rome’s moral and social disintegration. In his famous preface, he describes his era as a dark period where Romans can "bear neither our diseases nor their remedies", framing history as a steady slide from ancestral virtue (''mos maiorum'') into greed and luxury. By contrasting the self-discipline of the early Republic with the corruption of his own time, Livy used history as a didactic tool, urging readers to learn from past "[[Machismo|manly virtues]]" to survive the perceived rot of the present. While deeply pessimistic about the current, he was not a complete fatalist; he used history as a tool for potential moral revival, hoping that by studying the past, his readers might find the strength to reverse or slow the "downward plunge".
* [[Al-Farabi]]: Discussed virtuous society vs. corrupt regimes. His work concerned degeneration of imperfect regimes, which could by avoided by moral education and rulership by "virtuous philosophers".
* [[Niccolò Machiavelli]]: focus on political realism and the dangers of corruption.<ref>Shumer, S. M. (1979). Machiavelli: Republican Politics and Its Corruption. Political Theory, 7(1), 5–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/190822</ref>
* {{wpr|Thomas More}}: critically observes the moral and social failings of his contemporary European society, warning of the consequences of greed, corruption, and injustice. In ''Utopia'', he highlights these flaws not to declare society irredeemably doomed, but to provoke reflection and reform. His critique functions as a warning that, if societies continue on a path of self-interest and mismanagement, social ills will worsen. More's writing remains hopeful, as though his depiction of an idealized society (the aforementioned Utopia), he demonstrates that thoughtful, ethical governance and communal values can redirect society toward improvement.
* {{wpl|Francesco Guicciardini}}: Italian political decline. He deemed that human selfishness makes lasting reform impossible; politics can only manage corruption, but never eliminate it.
* {{wpl|Jean Bodin}}: Thoughts on civil order and instability.
* {{wpl|Giovanni Pontano}}: Reflections on moral and political decay in Italy.
* {{wpl|Montesquieu}}: ''The Spirit of the Laws'' touches on societal decay.
* [[Thomas Robert Malthus]]: English clergyman, demographer and economist. He argued that population tends to grow faster than food supply, which, if unchecked, leads to poverty, famine, and social decline. Malthus emphasized moral restraint (e.g., delayed marriage, reduced fertility) as a way to prevent collapse.
* {{wpl|Alexis de Tocqueville}}: French diplomat/political philosopher who analyzed social decline in democratic societies like post-revolutionary [[France]] and the [[United States]], warning that "excessive equality" fosters "soft despotism", weakening civic engagement, social cohesion, and virtue through conformity and apathy rather than sudden collapse.
* {{wpl|T. S. Eliot}}: leading figure in early 20th century English-language Modernist poetry, he is widely regarded as a declinist due to his literary and cultural criticism. His work often portrays modern society as spiritually and intellectually bankrupt; with his ''The Waste Land'' being famously a literary meditation on cultural decay. While Eliot was pessimistic about the trajectory of the modern West, he did not believe decline was strictly inevitable. He advocated for a recovery of tradition through religious discipline - specifically Anglo-Catholicism - and the maintenance of high cultural standards to "shore up" the ruins of civilization
* {{wpl|D. H. Lawrence}}: an English novelist and contemporary of T. S. Eliot, often saw modern civilization as sick—morally, spiritually, and emotionally. He blamed industrialization, mechanization, and over-intellectualization for alienating people from their instincts, emotions, and natural vitality. In novels like ''Sons and Lovers'' and ''Women in Love'', he explored the costs of this alienation and argued for a return to authentic human experience, connection, and the restorative power of nature.
* {{wpl|José Ortega y Gasset}}: Spanish philosopher and essayist, analyzed modern European society. In ''The Revolt of the Masses'' (1930), he warned that the "mass-man" (el hombre-masa) who lacks a sense of responsibility and culture, which he saw as a symptom of societal decline. However, rather than predicting Europe’s fall, he offered a cautionary perspective, urging societal responsibility and engagement, reflecting concern for civilization’s trajectory over fatalism.
* [[Friedrich Hayek]]: [[Austrian school]] economist and philosopher. During the [[Second World War]], Hayek published his book ''The Road to Serfdom'', where he forcefully argued against the dangers of [[totalitarianism]] represented by [[Nazi Germany]] and the [[USSR]]. Hayek nonetheless saw the post-war order as a continuation of the decline of the [[classical liberalism|classical liberal]] principles and institutions that he believed. His later works, such as ''The Constitution of Liberty'' and ''Law, Legislation and Liberty'', would focus on the perceived dangers of [[Keynes|Keynesianism]], [[social democracy]], [[mobocracy]] and [[social justice]], all of which he saw as threats to individual [[liberty]].
* {{wpl|Russell Kirk}}: Influential American cultural conservative, who believed that Western civilization, particularly American society, was at risk of moral and cultural decline, emphasizing the importance of tradition, religion, and hierarchical social structures to maintain order. Kirk viewed decline as a moral and spiritual problem that could be corrected through a "return to enduring values and communal norms".
* {{wpl|Allan Bloom}}: American philosopher and prominent declinist, best known for ''The Closing of the American Mind'', he diagnosed a "profound decline" in American higher education and culture. He attributed this to relativism, the neglect of the "great books", and the erosion of shared values, arguing that these trends produced an impoverished soul and weakened civilization itself. He viewed this crisis as rooted in universities’ failure to foster serious intellectual and moral life -- a perspective that resonated strongly with conservatives and traditionalists. As such he proposed "Greek spirit" could be recreated in university life... whatever that means.
* {{wpl|Christopher Lasch}}: American historian and social critic who critiqued decline, focusing on the decay of community, family, and civic virtue, particularly in ''The Culture of Narcissism'', attributing it to liberalism's cultural failures and elite betrayals, not just economic shifts. While often associated with conservative themes, Lasch remained a leftist, arguing that the New Left's focus on individualism and culture over class led to the very societal malaise he diagnosed, a significant departure from traditional progressive views.
* [[Samuel Huntington]]: American conservative thinker, political scientist and institutionalist declinist. His works - ''Political Order in Changing Societies'', ''The Clash of Civilizations'' and ''Who Are We?'' - consistently warned of the relative decline of the United States and the West, focusing on institutional weakness, elite fragmentation, and cultural cohesion. He argued that decline was contingent and potentially reversible through "stronger institutions and political leadership" (in a conservative realist or Tocquevillian sense).
* [[Roger Scruton]]: English philosopher, writer, and social critic, often writing from a conservative and declinist perspective, lamenting the perceived decay of Western civilization, tradition, and high culture. He championed ancestral institutions and traditional values, defending them against modern vulgarity and radicalism, and viewed his work as a preservation of a threatened cultural heritage.
* {{wpl|Paul Kennedy}}: Some of his works - notably ''The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers'' - focus on structural, economic, and strategic decline (i.e. imperial overstretch). Great powers inevitably face overextension and while strategy can delay decline, it will not eliminate it.
* [[Niall Ferguson]]: Scottish "historian" exploring economic and imperial decline, sometimes tied rhetorically to Spenglerian cycles.
* [[Douglas Murray]]: cultural commentary on European decline, demographic and civilizational.
* {{wpl|Fareed Zakaria}}: Talks about “the rise of the rest", Western relative decline with his work marked by non-moralistic, non-biological, non-civilizational fatalism.
* [[Thomas Friedman]]: often associated with declinism, especially in his analyses of the USA relative to a rising world, though he presents it not as inevitable doom but as a warning that America needs to reform and adapt to a "flat" [[Globalization|globalized]] world, famously detailed in his book ''That Used to Be Us'' with Michael Mandelbaum. He identifies recurring waves of American decline concerns and argues the U.S. must address its education, innovation, and political divisions to stay competitive, contrasting this "constructive declinism" with more dire predictions.
* {{wpl|Edward Luce}}: Institutional analysis who writes about democratic decay and American dysfunction.
* {{wpl|Jared Diamond}}: American scientist/historian/author with a [[Environmental determinism|environmental determinist]] bent. In books like ''Guns, Germs, and Steel'' and especially ''Collapse'', Diamond analyzes why societies fail or succeed, focusing on environmental, geographical, and political factors.  He warns modern societies about repeating historical mistakes, particularly environmental mismanagement, deforestation, and resource overuse. However, he doesn’t claim that societal decline is inevitable, but rather showing that decay is avoidable if lessons are learned, with there being a strong preventive and advisory focus.

===Critics / opponents ("decline" can fuck off)===
[[File:The World as 100 People.png|thumb|Critics of declinism often point out the general improvement of social indicators of the last 200 years.]]
* [[Voltaire]]: Explicitly rejected classical and Christian declinism. He argued that knowledge accumulates, tolerance spreads and institutions can improve. He mocked cyclical and providential decline theories. He acknowledged local corruption and setbacks, but ultimately denied civilizational necessity of decline.
* {{wpl|Matthew Arnold}}: Though often described as concerned with cultural decline, Arnold actually argued that moral and cultural education could counter societal degeneration. He emphasized “culture as a corrective,” rather than treating decline as inevitable.
* {{wpl|Eduard Meyer}}: the German historian of antiquity, was generally critical of simplistic declinist narratives. Unlike some contemporaries who saw civilizations as inevitably rising and falling, Meyer emphasized the complexity, adaptation, and continuity of societies. He focused on structural, economic, and political factors rather than moral or cultural "decay" to explain historical change, therefore rejecting deterministic views of decline and favoring a more nuanced, evidence-based understanding of the past.
* [[Franz Boas]]: Challenged racist degeneration" theories that linked social or cultural traits to biology.
* {{wpl|Norbert Elias}}: His study of the "civilizing process" showed that social behaviors evolve in complex ways, rather than inevitably decline.
* {{wpl|Walter Lippmann}}: Criticized deterministic views of social decay in the United States, advocating informed citizenry and media responsibility instead of moral panic.
* {{wpl|György Lukács}}: was critical of declinism and many of its purveyors. As a [[Marxist]] theorist, Lukács approached history through the lens of [[Communist_glossary#Historical_materialism|historical materialism]], emphasizing that social and cultural change is driven by material conditions and class struggle rather than by a fatalistic notion of decay. In works such as ''History and Class Consciousness'', he critiqued [[bourgeois]] ideology for fostering a sense of inevitability and helplessness, which he saw as characteristic of declinist thinking. In his literary criticism, Lukács emphasized realism as a method to reveal societal contradictions, opposing literature and thought that portrayed society as irredeemably doomed. While not overly optimistic about historical developments, he rejected [[Historical determinism|deterministic interpretations of history]], arguing instead for the potential of [[Communist_glossary#Revolution|revolutionary]] transformation.
* {{wpl|Claude Lévi-Strauss}}: rejected linear views of societal rise and fall. In his ''Tristes Tropiques'', Lévi-Strauss emphasized the complexity of "primitive" societies, portraying cultures as different rather than inferior, and challenging simplistic notions of European superiority or inevitable cultural decline.
* {{wpl|Ashley Montagu}}: Anthropologist who criticized "decline of civilization" narratives rooted in eugenics or biological determinism.
* {{wpl|Fernand Braudel}}: Historian of the Annales School; influential from mid-20th century for emphasizing long-term structures over crisis narratives — scrutinizing the [[Mass hysteria|hysteria]] around societal decay common in "declinist" histories.
* Sir [[Karl Popper]]: although he never addressed it directly, Popper still was effectively a critic of declinism. He rejected the idea that societies are doomed to inevitable decline, emphasizing instead that social progress is possible through critical discussion, as well as trial and error. In ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'', he critiques deterministic views of history (as purveyed by [[Hegel]] and [[Marx]]{{efn|Neither of these two are considered declinists; they saw historical processes as dynamic and [[teleological]]. That said, Popper's work does address declinist figures like Spengler.}}), arguing that societies can learn from mistakes and improve rather than being trapped in decline. Popper's philosophy promotes a emphasized a problem-solving approach, directly opposing the pessimism and nostalgia inherent in declinist thinking.
* {{wpl|Edward Said}}: While primarily a postcolonial theorist, Said critiqued narratives of Western "civilizational decline" and "decadence" as often ideological, deeming that they covertly masked power relations.
* [[Amartya Sen]]: In modern economics and social theory, Sen critiques the narrative that societies are doomed to moral or cultural decay, emphasizing human agency and development.
* {{wpl|Glenn Hubbard (economist)|Glenn Hubbard}}: a conservative economist, Glenn Hubbard wrote on his book ''Balance'' that the US, specifically, faces major challenges, such as [[fiscal responsibility|fiscal irresponsibility]] and political polarization, but he nonetheless strongly rejects the label of declinist. According to Hubbard, while many American institutions might need a major overhaul, the country is far from doomed.
* [[Steven Pinker]]: in his books like ''The Better Angels of Our Nature'' and ''Enlightenment Now'', he presents extensive evidence showing long-term improvements in human well-being, including declines in violence and poverty, and gains in life expectancy, literacy, and prosperity. Pinker argues that despite the negative news we often see, most metrics of human progress have been steadily improving, and he challenges the idea that the past was inherently better than the present. While Pinker presents extensive evidence for long-term human progress, many scholars - historians<ref>The Darker Angels of our Nature: Refuting the Pinker Theory of History and Violence, eds. Philip Dwyer and Mark Micale (Bloomsbury Academic, 2021)</ref>, archaeologists,<ref>R. Brian Ferguson, "Pinker's List: Exaggerating Prehistoric War Mortality," in ''War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views'', ed. by Douglas P. Fry (Oxford University Press, 2013) pp. 112-131 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199858996.003.0007</ref> and statisticians<ref>Pasquale Cirillo and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, [https://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pinker.pdf The Decline of Violent Conflicts: What Do The Data Really Say?] (2016) https://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pinker.pdf</ref> - have criticized his use of evidence. And as such, questions rise whether his data and interpretations fully support his conclusions, making his argument persuasive to some but not universally accepted.
* {{wpl|Deirdre McCloskey}} Libertarian economic historian and political economist. McCloskey lists seven major pessisms since the [[Poverty#The Great Divergence|The Great Divergence]] (which she calls "the Great Enrichment"). As she writes: 
{{quotebox|The old pessimism of 1848 said that the poor were fated by Malthusian logic to stay poor. The pessimism of 1916 said that only Europeans were genetically capable of getting out of $3-a-day poverty. That of 1933 said that anyway the getting out was finished because the final crisis of capitalism was at hand. That of 1945 said that betterment was finished and stagnation was at hand, with excess savings inevitably dragging income down. That of 1968 said that anyway, when we got out of the (nonfinal) crisis and found that technological stagnation didn’t in fact happen, we fell into a consumerism corrupting of our souls.The old pessimism of 1980 said that the consumerism in the core countries, though it had apparently not corrupted or immiserized the proletariat there, depended on an army of exploited people in the Southern periphery. And the not-so-old pessimism of the 1990s—it had been articulated in Britain as early as the 1890s in the face of the 'German [Commercial] Invasion'—said that Old Europe and the (dis)United Sates were doomed to fall down the league table, and Lo, all our pomp of yesterday / Is one with Nineveh and Tyre."}}

All of them proved to be wrong according to her, and most societies around the world keep getting richer against all odds.<ref>{{Cite book |last=McCloskey |first=Deirdre N. |title=Bourgeois equality: how ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world |date=2017 |publisher=The University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-52793-2 |edition=Hardcover edition |location=Chicago London}}</ref>{{rp|626}}

==See also==
*[[Good old days]]
*''[[Idiocracy]]'' — a movie where centuries of [[dysgenics]] and [[consumerism]] caused society to decline.
*[[List of predictions of the end of the world]]
*[[Nationalist pseudohistory]]
*[[Strauss-Howe]]
*[[764]]

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note|2}}

==References==
{{reflist|2|80%}}

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