trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
The Useful Idea of Truth
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2012-10-02T18:16:12.303Z

(This is the first post of a new Sequence,

Highly Advanced Epistemology 101 for Beginners,

setting up the Sequence

Open Problems in Friendly AI.

For experienced readers, this first post may seem somewhat elementary; but it serves as a basis for what follows. And though it may be conventional in standard philosophy, the world at large does not know it, and it is useful to know a compact explanation. Kudos to Alex Altair for helping in the production and editing of this post and Sequence!)

I remember this paper I wrote on existentialism. My teacher gave it back with an F. She’d underlined true and truth wherever it appeared in the essay, probably about twenty times, with a question mark beside each. She wanted to know what I meant by truth.
-- Danielle Egan

I understand what it means for a hypothesis to be elegant, or falsifiable, or compatible with the evidence. It sounds to me like calling a belief ‘true’ or ‘real’ or ‘actual’ is merely the difference between saying you believe something, and saying you really really believe something.
-- Dale Carrico

What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding.
-- Friedrich Nietzche

The Sally-Anne False-Belief task is an experiment used to tell whether a child understands the difference between belief and reality. It goes as follows:

The child sees Sally hide a marble inside a covered basket, as Anne looks on.

Sally leaves the room, and Anne takes the marble out of the basket and hides it inside a lidded box.

Anne leaves the room, and Sally returns.

The experimenter asks the child where Sally will look for her marble.

Children under the age of four say that Sally will look for her marble inside the box. Children over the age of four say that Sally will look for her marble inside the basket.

(Attributed to: Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, L. and Frith, U. (1985) ‘Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?’, Cognition, vol. 21, pp. 37–46.)

Human children over the age of (typically) four, first begin to understand what it means for Sally to lose her marbles - for Sally's beliefs to stop corresponding to reality. A three-year-old has a model only of where the marble is...
Meetup : Fort Collins, Colorado Meetup Thursday 7pm *New Place*
by EvelynM — 2012-10-02T14:56:15.094Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Collins, Colorado Meetup Thursday 7pm *New Place*

WHEN:
04 October 2012 07:00:00AM (-0600)

WHERE:
144 North College Avenue, Fort Collins, CO 80524

And we're back to the Bean Cycle on Thursday, because of the reality of more choices of restaurants.

What was the last experiment you did?

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Collins, Colorado Meetup Thursday 7pm *New Place*
Meetup : Bielefeld Meetup, October 9th 
by Just_existing — 2012-10-02T11:09:21.661Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Bielefeld Meetup, October 9th

WHEN:
09 October 2012 06:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Grill/Bar Verve, Klosterplatz 13, Bielefeld

The first meetup in this area ever.

There is lots of rationality stuff to talk about, and I will prepare one or two activities in addition.

I will have a sign.

Everybody is welcome!

Discussion article for the meetup : Bielefeld Meetup, October 9th
Group rationality diary, 10/1/12
by cata — 2012-10-02T09:15:30.156Z

This is the public group instrumental rationality diary for the week of October 1st. It's a place to record and chat about it if you have done, or are actively doing, things like:

Established a useful new habit

Obtained new evidence that made you change your mind about some belief

Decided to behave in a different way in some set of situations

Optimized some part of a common routine or cached behavior

Consciously changed your emotions or affect with respect to something

Consciously pursued new valuable information about something that could make a big difference in your life

Learned something new about your beliefs, behavior, or life that surprised you

Tried doing any of the above and failed

Or anything else interesting which you want to share, so that other people can think about it, and perhaps be inspired to take action themselves. Try to include enough details so that everyone can use each other's experiences to learn about what tends to work out, and what doesn't tend to work out.

Thanks to everyone who contributes!

Previous diary; archive of prior diaries.
[SEQ RERUN] Which Parts Are "Me"?
by MinibearRex — 2012-10-02T03:49:35.424Z

Today's post, Which Parts Are "Me"? was originally published on 22 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Everything you are, is inside your brain. But not everything inside your brain is you. You can draw mental separation lines, which can make you more reflective.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Ethics Notes, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[LINK] Higher intelligence correlates with greater cooperation
by RolfAndreassen — 2012-10-01T18:14:44.970Z

The result is from 2008, but it's new to me. Abstract:

A meta-study of repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments run at numerous universities suggests that students cooperate 5% to 8% more often for every 100 point increase in the school’s average SAT score.

Some obvious points from my first five minutes of thinking about it:

Meta-study or not, the sample still only covers humans. No implications for Friendly AI or intelligent aliens, which don't have our motivations.

Even among humans the sample is WEIRD, and a subset of WEIRD at that; although there is obviously variation between universities, it's smaller than what you'd get if you extended the sample down into the working class. I also wonder what would happen if the PD was played between students and non-students.

Probably a point in favour of the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, in that we see those of higher intelligence doing better on a social problem.

Presumably this implies that your best move, whatever your level of intelligence, is to surround yourself with the smartest people you can find, and then cooperate to ensure they don't throw you out.

I'd like to know some details: Does intelligence also correlate with effective retaliation? With probing for suckers? What about cooperation in single games? (The study mentions one, in a footnote, which apparently did find higher intelligence correlated with greater cooperation even in one-shot games; but there's no metastudy.)
October 2012 Media Thread
by RobertLumley — 2012-10-01T15:16:36.161Z

This is the monthly thread for posting media of various types that you've found that you enjoy. I find that exposure to LW ideas makes me less likely to enjoy some entertainment media that is otherwise quite popular, and finding media recommended by LWers is a good way to mitigate this. Post what you're reading, listening to, watching, and your opinion of it. Post recommendations to blogs. Post whatever media you feel like discussing! To see previous recommendations, check out the older threads.

Rules:

Please avoid downvoting recommendations just because you don't personally like the recommended material; remember that liking is a two-place word. If you can point out a specific flaw in a person's recommendation, consider posting a comment to that effect.

If you want to post something that (you know) has been recommended before, but have another recommendation to add, please link to the original, so that the reader has both recommendations.

Please use the comment trees for genres. There is a meta thread for comments about future threads.

If you have a thread to add, such as a video game thread or an Anime thread, please post it to the Other Media thread for now, and add a poll to the Meta thread asking if it should be a thread every month.
[SEQ RERUN] Ethics Notes
by MinibearRex — 2012-10-01T04:32:43.023Z

Today's post, Ethics Notes was originally published on 21 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Some responses to comments about the idea of Ethical Injunctions.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Prices or Bindings?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Urbana-Champaign, IL
by  — 2012-10-01T01:44:31.169Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Urbana-Champaign, IL

WHEN: 07 October 2012 02:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE: The Starbucks by Green and 5th (503 Green St., Champaign, IL)

We'll be getting to know each other! The goal is to decide what we want to do in the next meetups. Bring ideas for projects, discussion topics, anything you'd like to see going forward. Also, Manfred will be there with a fun improv game! We should all leave knowing some specifics for what we plan to do the next weekend. I will be there a bit early with an "LW" sign.

As we are still just getting started, please post to this thread or to the google group if you plan on coming.

Discussion article for the meetup : Urbana-Champaign, IL
Meetup : DC Meetup: Boardgames
by rocurley — 2012-09-30T23:01:20.260Z

Discussion article for the meetup : DC Meetup: Boardgames

WHEN:
07 October 2012 03:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
National Portrait Gallery Courtyard

We'll be meeting to play boardgames! Please post here or email the list if you can bring games, and hope to see you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : DC Meetup: Boardgames
Meetup : NYC Humanist Open Mic (New Location, people under 21 now allowed)
by Raemon — 2012-09-30T21:33:50.919Z

Discussion article for the meetup : NYC Humanist Open Mic (New Location, people under 21 now allowed)

WHEN:
03 October 2012 07:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
138 West Houston St. New York, NY 10012

Third meetup of the Open Mind Open Mic, co-hosted by New York Center for Inquiry.

The Open Mic is an opportunity for rationally-minded people to share performance art related to things they value. Have a piece to share about rationality, science, ethics or human achievement? It can be a song, story, poem, comedy act... anything that excites you. Covers of existing songs that you find appropriate are also encouraged.

If you haven't performed before and aren't sure you're ready, you might consider bringing a short poem you like (last time we had a few people who originally came, intending to just listen but ended up finding a short work online to share).

And of course, if you just want to come and listen, that's great too.

We're at a new venue now, the Ivy Bakery at 138 West Houston St. New York, NY 10012. (Previously we were at a bar and unfortunately had to turn away people under 21, this is no longer the case). 7:00 PM.

Discussion article for the meetup : NYC Humanist Open Mic (New Location, people under 21 now allowed)
Morale management for entrepreneurs
by John_Maxwell — 2012-09-30T05:35:05.221Z

One of the odd things about the procrastination equation is that part of it resembles an expected value calculation: value * expectancy. Why does the equation's numerator present a problem at all then, if it's just the expected value of what you're trying to do? Shouldn't that be the main factor in your motivation anyway?

One answer: In lukeprog's post, he conflates the "value" that task presents intrinsically (how much you enjoy doing it), and possible extrinsic motivators (some reward you hope to achieve after the task is completed). So part of the reason your motivation system is miscalibrated is because not all valuable tasks are proportionately enjoyable.

But today I thought of another answer: Your subconscious expected value calculation may be falling prey to biases that aren't affecting your conscious expected value calculation. Thus you correctly assign the task a high value consciously, but subconsciously, a particular bias may be bringing your estimate off.

Paul Graham writes:

Morale is tremendously important to a startup—so important that morale alone is almost enough to determine success. Startups are often described as emotional roller-coasters. One minute you're going to take over the world, and the next you're doomed. The problem with feeling you're doomed is not just that it makes you unhappy, but that it makes you stop working.

Let's pretend that we were running a betting market for your startup's chance of success. If you and your cofounders are the only people in the market, you could picture the value of a contract in this market fluctuating up and down wildly. But if you let others play in the market, there's an obvious money-making strategy: take the average of recent fluctuations. Whenever the price fluctuates below that average, buy. Whenever it fluctuates above that average, sell. You and your cofounders can expect to lose a lot of money playing this market, at least early on in your startup's life.

The point I'm trying to make here is that this "emotional roller coaster" represents a kind of irrationality on the part of entrepreneurs. And fixing this irrationality, especially in a way that hooks in to your motivation system and changes the numerator of your internal procrastination equation, could be very valuable for them.

One idea for a bias that contributes to this ef...
Female Test Subject - Convince Me To Get Cryo
by Epiphany — 2012-09-30T05:13:00.302Z

I heard that women are difficult to convince when it comes to signing up for cryo. In mentioning cryonics to a dying person, there seems to be a consensus that it's not going to happen. I encountered a post: Years saved: Cryonics vs VillageReach, which addressed my main objection (that the amount of money spent on cryo may be better spent on saving starving children, especially considering that you could save multiple children for that amount of money with high probability whereas you save only one life with low probability by paying for cryo). Now I'm open to being persuaded.

My first instinct was to go read a lot about cryo, but it dawned on me that there are a lot of people here who will want to convince family members, some of them female, to sign up - and these people may appreciate the opportunity to practice on somebody. It has been argued that "Brilliant and creative minds have explored the argument territory quite thoroughly." but if we already know all of the objections and have working rebuttals for each, why is it still thought of as extra difficult to get through to women? If there were a solution to this, it would not be seen as difficult. There must be something that pro-cryo people need for persuading women that they either haven't figured out or aren't good enough at yet.

So, I decided to offer myself for experiments in attempting to convince a woman to sign up for cryo and took a poll in an open thread to see whether there was interest. I don't claim to be perfectly representative of the female population, but I assume that I will have at least some objections in common with them and that persuading me would still be good practice for anyone planning to convince family members in the future. Having a study on persuading women would be more scientific but how do you come up with hypotheses to test for such a study if you have no actual experience persuading women?

So, here is your opportunity to try whatever methods of persuasion you feel like with no guilt, explore my full list of objections without worrying about it being socially awkward, (I will even share cached religious thoughts, as annoyed as I am that I still have them.), and I will document as many of my impressions and objections as I can before I forget them.

I am putting each objection / impression into a new comment for organization. ...
[SEQ RERUN] Prices or Bindings?
by MinibearRex — 2012-09-30T05:07:14.754Z

Today's post, Prices or Bindings? was originally published on 21 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Are ethical rules simply actions that have a high cost associated with them? Or are they bindings, expected to hold in all situations, no matter the cost otherwise?

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Ethical Injunctions, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Introduction to Connectionist Modelling of Cognitive Processes: a chapter by chapter review 
by Kaj_Sotala — 2012-09-30T04:24:44.098Z

This chapter by chapter review was inspired by Vaniver's recent chapter by chapter review of Causality. Like with that review, the intention is not so much to summarize but to help readers determine whether or not they should read the book. Reading the review is in no way a substitute for reading the book.

I first read Introduction to Connectionist Modelling of Cognitive Processes (ICMCP) as part of an undergraduate course on cognitive modelling. We were assigned one half of the book to read: I ended up reading every page. Recently I felt like I should read it again, so I bought a used copy off Amazon. That was money well spent: the book was just as good as I remembered.

By their nature, artificial neural networks (referred to as connectionist networks in the book) are a very mathy topic, and it would be easy to write a textbook that was nothing but formulas and very hard to understand. And while ICMCP also spends a lot of time talking about the math behind the various kinds of neural nets, it does its best to explain things as intuitively as possible, sticking to elementary mathematics and elaborating on the reasons of why the equations are what they are. At this, it succeeds – it can be easily understood by someone knowing only high school math. I haven't personally studied ANNs at a more advanced level, but I would imagine that anybody who intended to do so would greatly benefit from the strong conceptual and historical understanding ICMCP provided.

The book also comes with a floppy disk containing a tlearn simulator which can be used to run various exercises given in the book. I haven't tried using this program, so I won't comment on it, nor on the exercises.

The book has 15 chapters, and it is divided into two sections: principles and applications.

Principles

1: ”The basics of connectionist information processing” provides a general overview of how ANNs work. The chapter begins by providing a verbal summary of five assumptions of connectionist modelling: that 1) neurons integrate information, 2) neurons pass information about the level of their input, 3) brain structure is layered, 4) the influence of one neuron on another depends on the strength of the connection between them, and 5) learning is achieved by changing the strengths of connections between neurons. After this verbal introduction, the basic symbols and equations relating to ANNs...
Nozick's proposed rules for extrapolating your preferences
by lukeprog — 2012-09-29T23:14:04.329Z

You have desires. You also have desires about your desires: perhaps you desire cake but you also desire that you didn't desire cake. You also have desires about the processes which produce your desires: perhaps you desire X and Y but only because of a weird evolutionary turn and you wish the processes which created your desires weren't so far beyond your own control.

But what should you do, when these different kinds of desires are in conflict with each other? If you could reflect upon and then rewrite your own desires, how should you choose to resolve those conflicts?

Nozick (1993) proposes 23 constraints on rational preferences, which one could also interpret as 23 constraints on the process of resolving conflicts among one's preferences. I reproduce this passage below, for those who are interested:

Let me emphasize that my purpose is not to endorse the particular conditions I shall put forward or to defend their particular details. Rather, I hope to show what promising room there is for conditions of the sort that I discuss...

Some of these conditions are justified by instrumental considerations, such as the “money pump” argument that preferences be transitive, while others are presented as normatively appealing on their face. (Unless these latter can be given an instrumental justification also, isn’t this already a step beyond instrumental rationality?) Contemporary decision theory takes this one step beyond Hume: group of them together can be. Let us suppose that there are normative principles specifying the structure of several preferences together and that these principles are conditions of rationality. (The literature contains putative counterexamples and objections to some of the Von Neumann–Morgenstern conditions; the point here is not to use those particular ones but some such appropriate set of conditions.)

I. The person satisfies the Von Neumann–Morgenstern or some other specified appropriate set of conditions upon preferences and their relations to probabilities.

This suggests at least one further condition that a person’s preferences must satisfy in order to be rational, namely, that she must prefer satisfying the normative conditions to not satisfying them. Indeed, for any valid structural condition C of ra

...
MIT Challenge complete
by komponisto — 2012-09-29T15:54:16.358Z

Followup to: MIT Challenge: blogger to attempt CS curriculum on own

A year after he announced it, productivity blogger Scott Young has successfully completed his "MIT Challenge", an attempt to work through that institution's undergraduate computer science curriculum independently, using the large selection of online material that it has made available.

His three pieces of advice for independent learners are worth noting:

Create an exciting, but specific, mission. I couldn’t have learned the content of this challenge if I hadn’t wrapped it into a compelling mission. Even calling it the “MIT Challenge” helped me make the goal more specific and real. Too many self-education quests begin as vague ideas and fall apart without any constraints.

Build a curriculum or find one. For small projects, taking an individual course will do. For bigger ones, try creating an actual curriculum. MIT (and other universities) offer many free courses, and also have outlines of their undergraduate and graduate programs. Having a preexisting curriculum forced me to be consistent and not avoid topics just because they were hard.

Be public in your quest. Self-ed has a harder time obtaining legitimacy, in part, because nobody holds you accountable to that. Being public about my challenge made me accountable and gave me discipline I wouldn’t have had in a private quest. Consider starting a blog about your mission, even if you do it anonymously.