trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
The best you can
by So8res — 2015-11-10T02:00:00.000Z
Link: https://mindingourway.com/best-you-can/

In fiction, protagonists narrow their focus until the difference between success and failure on their specific task seems like the difference between victory and defeat. Batman attempts to solve the mystery while ensuring that nobody dies; meanwhile, children in Africa suffer from Malaria. The crew in The Martian spends billions of dollars worth of capital to save one man; capital that could have been spent curing diseases.

Real people run a risk of duplicating this error, if they try to find the very best action available.

It's easy to paralyze yourself if you try to do the "right thing." There's always more uncertainty to be had. There's always more information you could gather. It's hard to become confident that you're doing the right thing. This can lead to paralysis, and persistent inaction.

It's much easier, I think, to stop asking "is this action the right action to take?" and instead ask "what's the best action I can identify at the moment?"

Sometimes, the best action you can identify is "search for more alternatives." Sometimes, it's "study more" or "learn more." Sometimes, it's a specific action. The nice thing is that "what's the best action I can find in the next five minutes?" always has a concrete answer. If you search for that, instead, you won't get paralyzed.

Spoiler alert: you can't find the "actually best" action. Insofar as there is an "actually best" sequence of motor outputs your brain could produce, it's a mad convoluted dance that leverages butterfly effects to reforge the world overnight. You're not going to find the "best action." And the best action you can find is exactly what it sounds like — the best action you're able to find.

You never have enough information to make a fully informed choice. You never have enough time to consider all the possibilities, or weigh all the evidence. You are always biased; your brain is compromised. The problem before you is too hard, and no matter what you do, a billion more people are going to die.

No matter what gambles you take, no matter how risky or cautious you are, you're trading off some possible futures against other ones. You can't save them all.

All you can do is look at your actions, and take the best one you can find.

It's easy for humans to zoom in to the game we think we're playing, and try to win completely, to solve the mystery without letting anyone die.

It's easier to remember to pick the...
Meetup : Seattle Solstice
by agilecaveman — 2015-11-09T22:17:13.963Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Seattle Solstice

WHEN:
19 December 2015 05:00:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
Seattle, WA

Seattle Solstice Celebration, which will feature, compassionate communication, ceremony of songs, candle lighting and speeches.
Facebook Event: https://www.facebook.com/events/1694434594123474/

Discussion article for the meetup : Seattle Solstice
Utility, probability and false beliefs
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2015-11-09T21:43:13.420Z

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

This is part of the process of rigourising and formalising past ideas.

Paul Christiano recently asked why I used utility changes, rather than probability changes, to have an AI believe (or act as if it believed) false things. While investigating that, I developed several different methods for achieving the belief changes that we desired. This post analyses these methods.

Different models of forced beliefs

Let x and ¬x refer to the future outcome of a binary random variable X (write P(x) as a shorthand for P(X=x), and so on). Assume that we want P(x):P(¬x) to be in the 1:λ ratio for some λ (since the ratio is all that matters, λ=∞ is valid, meaning P(x)=0). Assume that we have an agent, who has utility u, has seen past evidence e, and wishes to assess the expected utility of their action a.

Typically, for expected utility, we sum over the possible worlds. In practice, we almost always sum over sets of possible worlds, the sets determined by some key features of interest. In assessing the quality of health interventions, for instance, we do not carefully and separately treat each possible position of atoms in the sun. Thus let V be the set of variables or values we can about, and v a possible value vector V can take. As usual, we'll be writing P(v) as a shorthand for P(V=v). The utility function u assigns utilities to possible v's.

One of the advantages of this approach is that it can avoid many issues of conditionals like P(A|B) when P(B)=0.

The first obvious idea is to condition on x and ¬x:

(1) Σv u(v)(P(v|x,e,a)+λP(v|¬x,e,a))

The second one is to use intersections rather than conditionals (as in this post):

(2) Σv u(v)(P(v,x|e,a)+λP(v,¬x|e,a))

Finally, imagine that we have a set of variables H, that "screen off" the effects of e and a, up until X. Let h be a set of values H can take. Thus P(x|h,e,a)=P(x|h). One could see H as the full set of possible pre-X histories, but it could be much smaller - maybe just the local environment around X. This gives a third definition:

(3) Σv Σh u(v)(P(v|h,x,e,a)+λP(v|h,¬x,e,a))P(h|,e,a)

Changing and unchangeable P(x)

An important thing to note is that all three definitions are equivalent for fixed P(x), up to changes of λ. The eq...
Meetup : Game Night in Tel Aviv
by Squark — 2015-11-09T19:14:46.430Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Game Night in Tel Aviv

WHEN:
10 November 2015 07:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Yigal Alon St 98, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel

Game night in LessWrong Tel Aviv! Meeting at Electra Tower floor 29 as always. We are going to play board games and socialize. We might also do some impro theater. Bring your games and a good mood. Feel free to come late but we'll probably finish around 22-23.

Facebook event: https://www.facebook.com/events/500002670160746/

If you have trouble finding the place, feel free to call me (Vadim) at 0542600919

Discussion article for the meetup : Game Night in Tel Aviv
“Be A Superdonor!”: Promoting Effective Altruism by Appealing to the Heart
by Gleb_Tsipursky — 2015-11-09T18:20:56.586Z

(Cross-posted on The Life You Can Save blog, the Intentional Insights blog, and the Effective Altruism Forum).

This will be mainly of interest to Effective Altruists

Effective Altruism does a terrific job of appealing to the head. There is no finer example than GiveWell’s meticulously researched and carefully detailed reports laying out the impact per dollar on giving to various charities. As a movement, we are at the cutting edge of what we can currently evaluate about the effectiveness of how we optimize QALYs, although of course much work remains to be done.

However, as seen in Tom Davidson’s recent piece, "EA's Image Problem," and my “Making Effective Altruism More Emotionally Appealing,” we currently do not do a very good job of appealing to the heart. We tend to forget Peter Singer’s famous quote that Effective Altruism “combines both the heart and the head.” When we try to pitch the EA movement to non-EAs, we focus on the head, not the heart.

Now, I can really empathize with this perspective. I am much more analytically oriented than the baseline, and I find this to be the case for EAs in general. Yet if we want to expand the EA movement, we can't fall into typical mind fallacy and assume that what worked to convince us will convince others who are less analytical and more emotionally oriented thinkers.

Otherwise, we leave huge sums of money on the table that otherwise could have gone to effective charities. For this reason, I and several others have started a nonprofit organization, Intentional Insights, dedicated to spreading rational thinking and effective altruism to a wide audience using effective marketing techniques. Exploring the field of EA organizations, I saw that The Life You Can Save already has some efforts to reach out to a broad audience, through its Charity Impact Calculator and its Giving Games, and actively promoted its efforts.

I was excited when Jon Behar, the COO & Director of Philanthropy Education at TLYCS, reached out to me and suggested collaborating on promoting EA to a broad audience using contemporary marketing methods t

...
Open thread, Nov. 09 - Nov. 15, 2015
by MrMind — 2015-11-09T08:07:19.775Z

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.
Less Wrong Study Hall: Now With 100% Less Tinychat
by MalcolmOcean — 2015-11-09T00:25:39.534Z

Eight months ago, I announced that the Less Wrong Study Hall, a virtual coworking space where people do pomodoros together, has moved to Complice. Complice is a software system I made to help people achieve their goals. About 20% of rationalists who've tried it have started using it full-time, which by my math gives signing up positive expected value. Anyway...

What follows is a brief history of the LWSH's development thus far. If you just wanna try it, click here: complice.co/room/lesswrong

By embedding the original tinychat window within a larger page, I let users see what the pomodoro timer was up to as soon as they joined, and the page also doesn't let breaks run overtime because the timer just keeps ticking. Also, users could now show a persistent status of what they're working on.

But there were issues with this. First of all, tinychat. This flash-based chatroom was a huge pain, with 20% of users reporting that they hated it with the fury of a thousand burning suns[source]. It didn't work at some offices, or on mobile, and it couldn't readily scale to more than 8-10 users. But even if we'd had the best embedded chat system ever, it still would have been an issue, because you'd still have to log into it again, after already loading the Complice room. And it would still not integrate with the rest of the page.

It was easy to build a replacement for the text chat part, but one of the core contributions to the character of the LW Study Hall was the video component. By working with video on and audio off, we could have a sense of a social vibe without it being too distracting. Video has numerous benefits:

gives new joiners an immediate sense of "there are people here"

lets us be friendly and silly during the breaks, in a way that text just can't quite manage

helps people get a sense of each others' personalities, so that you have a sense of who you're coworking with even if you've never met in person

if/when you finally do meet in person, you already recognize each other!

the sense of other people watching you encourages you to be productive

makes being in the room alone less sad, because you know that at any moment someone could show up and see you there

And probably one or two others I haven't thought of. So we needed video. But video's a pain! After pulling my hair out trying to get it working this summer, I finally bit the bullet and just paid someone $50...
Meetup : Reviving Cambridge Meetups 
by Salokin — 2015-11-08T23:44:27.750Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Reviving Cambridge Meetups

WHEN:
15 November 2015 05:00:00PM (+0000)

WHERE:
JCR Trinity College, Cambridge, UK

First Cambridge meetup in a long time! Hopefully of many. Come to Trinity's JCR at 17 next sunday and get to know all the other aspiring rationalists around and have a good time! (Place and time are only provisional, they might change depending on your availability so comment here to see how we can arrange it properly)

Discussion article for the meetup : Reviving Cambridge Meetups
Solstice 2015: What Memes May Come (Part II - Atheism, Rationality and Death)
by Raemon — 2015-11-07T22:23:54.736Z

Winter is coming, and so is Solstice season. There'll be large rationality-centric-or-adjaecent events in NYC, the Bay Area, and Seattle(and possibly other places - if you're interested in running a Solstice event or learning what that involves, send me a PM). In NYC, there'll be a general megameetup throughout the weekend, for people who want to stay through Sunday afternoon, and if you're interested in shared housing you can fill out this form.

The NYC Solstice isn't running a kickstarter this year, but I'll need to pay for the venue by November 19th ($6125). So if you are planning on coming it's helpful to purchase tickets sooner rather than later. (Or preorder the next album or 2016 Book of Traditions, if you can't attend but want to support the event).

-

This is the second post in the Solstice 2015 sequence, discussing plans and musings on the potential cultural impact of the Solstice. The first post was here.
This explores the Solstice's relationship with Atheism, Rationality, and Death.

Atheism

Some may be surprised that I don't consider atheism particularly core to the Solstice.

This probably will remain a part of it for the forseeable future. Atheists happen to be the demographic most hungry for some kind of meaningful winter traditions. And Beyond the Reach of God, a powerful essay that (often) plays an important role in the holiday, happens to frame it's argument around the non-existence of God.

But this doesn't actually seem especially inevitable or necessary. Beyond the Reach of God *isn't* about God, per se (at least, I don't see it that way). It's about the absolute, unforgiving neutrality of the laws of physics. It's about all the other sacred things that even atheists believe in, which they may make excuses for.
I think it's *currently* useful for there to a moment where we acknowledge that there is no God to bail us out, and that this is really important. But this may not always be the case. I would be pretty happy if, in 50 years, all references to God were gone from the Solstice (because the question of God was no longer one that preoccupied our society in the first place), but those crucial points were made in other ways. It can be a holiday for atheists without being about that in any specific way.

Rationality

It's common throughout the secular world to ...
Meetup : Lund Meetup
by kotrfa — 2015-11-07T21:35:07.598Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Lund Meetup

WHEN:
12 November 2015 12:15:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Scheelevägen 15,223 63 Lund, Sweden

Hello,

we are two to three LessWrongers here and we decided to meet up a bit more regularly during the following weeks, most probably on Thursdays.

Don't hesitate to leave a personal message here (I promise I will take a look at it before every Thursday) so we can eventually update you with informations.

Bye,
Daniel

Discussion article for the meetup : Lund Meetup
Meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup
by leohmarruda — 2015-11-07T21:10:15.748Z

Discussion article for the meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup

WHEN:
08 November 2015 02:30:00PM (-0200)

WHERE:
IERFH, São Paulo, Brazil

Newcomers are welcome.

Address is available on demand.
leohmarruda..at..gmail.com

Discussion article for the meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup
How do you choose areas of scientific research?
by  — 2015-11-07T01:15:49.344Z

I've been thinking lately about what is the optimal way to organize scientific research both for individuals and for groups. My first idea: research should have a long-term goal. If you don't have a long-term goal, you will end up wasting a lot of time on useless pursuits. For instance, my rough thought process of the goal of economics is that it should be “how do we maximize the productive output of society and distribute this is in an equitable manner without preventing the individual from being unproductive if they so choose?”, the goal of political science should be “how do we maximize the government's abilities to provide the resources we want while allowing individuals the freedom to pursue their goals without constraint toward other individuals?”, and the goal of psychology should be “how do we maximize the ability of individuals to make the decisions they would choose if their understanding of the problems they encounter was perfect?” These are rough, as I said, but I think they go further than the way most researchers seem to think about such problems.

Political science seems to do the worst in this area in my opinion. Very little research seems to have anything to do with what causes governments to make correct decisions, and when they do research of this type, their evaluation of correct decision making often is based on a very poor metric such as corruption. I think this is a major contributor to why governments are so awful, and yet very few political scientists seem to have well-developed theories grounded in empirical research on ways to significantly improve the government. Yes, they have ideas on how to improve government, but they're frequently not grounded in robust scientific evidence.

Another area I've been considering is search parameters of moving through research topics. An assumption I have is that the overwhelming majority of possible theories are wrong such that only a minority of areas of research will result in something other than a null outcome. Another assumption is that correct theories are generally clustered. If you get a correct result in one place, there will be a lot more correct results in a related area than for any randomly chosen theory. There seems like two major methods for searching through the landscape of possibilities. One method is to choose an area where yo...
Modified Demski Prior Problem: Revision
by abramdemski — 2015-11-06T21:45:04.000Z

The argument in A Problem with the Modified Demski Prior does not work as stated. The argument which I gave seems to make sense in the case where the random bits are added as axioms, but fails in the more natural case where we update on them in a Bayesian manner.

To re-articulate the problem: suppose we have a boolean sequence Sn which we would like to predict, encoded in the language of PA plus a special predicate P(n) which represents the value Sn. Values of Sn are coming from a biased coin in reality. We can update the modified Demski prior on the values we observe for Sn in two ways: by adding them as axioms, or by Bayesian updating.

Adding them as axioms, we run into the problem which I described. Sampled programs are required to be consistent with the axioms so far. Programs which make guesses on every P(n) will decrease in mass quickly as we add more P(n), even if they guess with the true frequencies. Programs which make guesses very rarely will not. Within the set of programs which guess frequently, the next guess will quickly approach the correct frequency. Within programs which guess rarely, however, this will not happen. Despite only rarely making guesses, the overall mass from these uninformed guessers will come to dominate the probability of new P(n), because the loss in mass of frequent guessers is exponential in n, while the mass of infrequent-guessers which guess at a given n is roughly the algorithmic probability of n.

If we do a Bayesian update, however, then infrequent-guessers are treated as enumerating some far-out n and then filling in the remaining cases by sampling more frequent-guessers. The hypothesis represented by the infrequent-guesser is, therefore, still losing probability mass at about the rate of everything else. There's no problem.

The original problem came up when our MIRIx group was thinking about things like irreducible patterns, where the sequence actually follows from our existing axioms; so, it was reasonable to think as we did. (The actual set-up to formulate this case would have to be more in the style of asymptotic logical uncertainty, not the simpler add-P(n)-axioms which I discussed above.) However, my formulation when I wrote the forum post got it wrong.
New LW Meetup: Zurich
by FrankAdamek — 2015-11-06T15:46:40.371Z

This summary was posted to LW Main on October 30th. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

First meetup of Rationality Zürich: 01 November 2015 03:00PM

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

Reading UK Picnic: 31 October 2015 11:00AM

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Austin, TX - Caffe Medici - Holidays: 31 October 2015 01:30PM
Moscow meetup: science research issues, global risks, fallacymania: 01 November 2015 02:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - November: 01 November 2015 04:00PM
Tel Aviv: Black Holes after Jacob Bekenstein: 24 November 2015 08:00AM
Vienna: 21 November 2015 04:00PM
[Vienna] Five Worlds Collide - Vienna: 04 December 2015 08:00PM
Washington, D.C.: Fun & Games: 01 November 2015 04:00PM
West LA: Futarchy: 04 November 2015 08:00PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, Mountain View, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview is posted on the front page every Friday. These are an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in upcoming weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts are moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feature, you need to post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!

If you check Less Wrong irregularly, conside...