trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Board Games
by rocurley — 2016-11-28T19:45:08.356Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Board Games

WHEN:
28 November 2016 06:15:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
1769 15th St, San Francisco, CA

For Board Games meetup:

We’ll be meeting to play board (and other) games!

I have Dominion, Suburbia, and standard playing cards. Please feel free to bring other games you’d like to play.

For help getting into the building, please call (or text, with a likely-somewhat-slower response rate): 301-458-0764.

Format:

We meet and start hanging out at 6:15, but don’t officially start doing the meetup topic until 6:45-7 to accommodate stragglers. Usually there is a food order that goes out before we start the meetup topic.

About these meetups:

The mission of the SF LessWrong meetup is to provide a fun, low-key social space with some structured interaction, where new and non-new community members can mingle and have interesting conversations. Everyone is welcome.

We explicitly encourage people to split off from the main conversation or diverge from the topic if that would be more fun for them (moving side conversations into a separate part of the space if appropriate). Meetup topics are here as a tool to facilitate fun interaction, and we certainly don’t want them to inhibit it.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Board Games
Using a Spreadsheet to Make Good Decisions: Five Examples
by Peter Wildeford — 2016-11-28T17:10:21.949Z

I've been told that LessWrong is coming back now, so I'm cross-posting this rationality post of interest from the Effective Altruism forum.

-

We all make decisions every day. Some of these decisions are pretty inconsequential, such as what to have for an afternoon snack. Some of these decisions are quite consequential, such as where to live or what to dedicate the next year of your life to. Finding a way to make these decisions better is important.

The folks at Charity Science Health and I have been using the same method to make many of our major decisions for the past for years -- everything from where to live to even deciding to create Charity Science Health. The method isn’t particularly novel, but we definitely think the method is quite underused.

Here it is, as a ten step process:

Come up with a well-defined goal.

Brainstorm many plausible solutions to achieve that goal.

Create criteria through which you will evaluate those solutions.

Create custom weights for the criteria.

Quickly use intuition to prioritize the solutions on the criteria so far (e.g., high, medium, and low)

Come up with research questions that would help you determine how well each solution fits the criteria

Use the research questions to do shallow research into the top ideas (you can review more ideas depending on how long the research takes per idea, how important the decision is, and/or how confident you are in your intuitions)

Use research to rerate and rerank the solutions

Pick the top ideas worth testing and do deeper research or MVP testing, as is applicable

Repeat steps 8 and 9 until sufficiently confident in a decision.

Which charity should I start?

The definitive example for this process was the Charity Entrepreneurship project, where our team decided which charity would be the best possible charity to create.

Come up with a well-defined goal: I want to start an effective global poverty charity, where effective is taken to mean a low cost per life saved comparable to current GiveWell top charities.

Brainstorm many plausible solutions to achieve that goal: For this, we decided to start by looking at the intervention level. Since there are thousands of potential interventions, we placed a lot of emphasis on plausibly highly effectve, and chose to look at GiveWell’s priority programs plus a few that we thought were worthy additions.

Creat

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Crowd sourcing a novel.
by Arithine — 2016-11-28T10:55:42.113Z

Hello all. I know I have not been an active member of this community but I am currently working my way through from AI to zombies (having been brought over from HPMOR).

I am writing a novel set post Singularity and think that it would be a great idea to collaborate with some of the folks here. It might be useful to try and imagine a friendly AI to work through some of the challenges.

If any one is interested here is the very beginnings of a rough draft.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1vl5lK4EZOfRnnSF7IZWQ2zGvsv-hoCdpnk7dPH2RsIw/edit?usp=drive_web

... I hope I didn't embarace myself too much.
Open thread, Nov. 28 - Dec. 04, 2016
by MrMind — 2016-11-28T07:40:42.202Z

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post, then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.

4. Unflag the two options "Notify me of new top level comments on this article" and "Make this post available under..." before submitting.
Predicting HCH using expert advice
by jessicata — 2016-11-28T03:38:05.000Z

Summary: in approximating a scheme like HCH , we would like some notion of "the best the prediction can be given available AI capabilities". There's a natural notion of "the best prediction of a human we should expect to get". In general this doesn't yield good predictions of HCH, but it does yield an HCH-like computation model that seems useful.

(thanks to Ryan Carey, Paul Christiano, and some people at the November veteran's workshop for helping me work through these ideas)

Suppose we would like an AI system to predict what HCH would do. The AI system is limited; it doesn't have a perfect prediction of a human. What's the best we should expect it to do?

As a simpler sub-question, we can ask what the best prediction for a single query to a human is. Let H:String→ΔString be the "true human": a stochastic function mapping a question to a distribution over answers (say, over quantum uncertainty). How "good" of a prediction function ^H:String→ΔString should we expect to get?

The short answer is that we should expect that, for any question x, ^H(x) should be within ϵ of some pretty good prediction of H(x).

Why within ϵ?

(feel free to skip this section if you're willing to buy the previous paragraph)

We will create an online prediction system that on each iteration i takes in a question Xi:String and outputs either a distribution over answers Qi:ΔString, or ⊥ to indicate ambiguity. If outputting ⊥, the prediction system observes Yi∼H(Xi). We will construct this online prediction system from a bunch of untrusted experts P1,...,PK:Δ(String→ΔString), each of whom is a probability distribution over the human H.

Suppose one expert is "correct" in that in fact H∼Pk for some k. Then KWIK learning will succeed in creating an online prediction system such that, with high probability, for each i in which Qi (and not ⊥) is output,
∥Qi−Pk(Yi|the data known at time i)∥1<ϵ. That is, the predictions Qi will be close to the "correct predictions" that Pk makes by total variation distance. Furthermore, ⊥ must be output only ˜O(K/ϵ2) times; this measures the amount of training data required.\

For the rest of this post we should assume that, after setting up the KWIK learner, we do active learning (finding inputs x on which the learner outputs ⊥) until the KWIK learner no longer outputs ⊥, then getting ^H using the current state of the KWIK learner. If we didn't do this, th

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Meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (X)
by steven0461 — 2016-11-28T02:46:20.651Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (X)

WHEN:
04 December 2016 03:00:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
438 Coleman Ave, San Jose, CA 95110

You're invited to bring whatever you'd like to see at Park Day - balls, frisbees, food, etc. (Also, consider taking measures against the sun.) We'll carry a green blanket so you can recognize us. The idea is to gather outside near the listed address at the park entrance first, but probably walk elsewhere soon. If you can't find us or there's something else, please call me (Steven) at 510-6844565.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (X)
ALBA requires incremental design of good long-term memory systems
by jessicata — 2016-11-28T02:10:53.000Z

Summary: ALBA is an approach to training aligned AGI. One problem with implementing ALBA is that some actions that must be overseen involve storing information that will be used in future episodes. To oversee these actions, it is necessary for the operators to know which information is worth storing.

(thanks to Ryan for helping me work through some of these ideas)

Recommended before reading this post: Not just learning

ALBA requires the operator to oversee a learning system's performance in each episode (say, by assigning a score). Usually, the operator would like information to be stored between episodes; for example, they might want to store a photo from the robot's sensors, or they might want to run a large computation that takes more than one episode to perform. Under ALBA, the operator must be able to provide good feedback about how useful a certain piece of information is to store.

In the case of physical observations (e.g. photos), it usually seems fine to just store everything. But in the case of "logical" information such as the results of computations, it isn't possible to store everything, since that would require running all computations. So the operators will need some idea of which logical information is most useful to store (i.e. which computations are most useful to run now and cache the result of).

How much is long-term memory tied to cognitive architecture?

One would hope that this is possible for the operators to do without essentially already understanding how to program an aligned AGI. Perhaps humans can make pretty good guesses about which information is useful to store without knowing much about the underlying learning system.

In the worst case, though, the optimal logical information for an AGI system to store in the long term strongly depends on its cognitive architecture. For example, if two different humans are studying for the same test, they will probably read different material and do different cognitive work in the process of studying; if one human somehow had access to the other's cognitive work, it probably wouldn't be that useful since it would consist of memories in a "different mental language". At the same time, it seems like humans are able to come up with pretty good collective memories over the long time (e.g. in the form of books), although books are substantially less efficient than personal notes because they

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Increase Your Child’s Working Memory
by James_Miller — 2016-11-27T21:57:12.930Z

I continually train my son’s working memory, and I urge parents of other young children to do likewise. While I have succeeded in at least temporarily improving his working memory, I accept that this change might not be permanent and could end a few months after he stops training. But I also believe that while his working memory is boosted so too is his learning capacity.

I have a horrible working memory that greatly hindered my academic achievement. I was so bad at spelling that they stopped counting it against me in school. In technical classes I had trouble remembering what variables stood for. My son, in contrast, has a fantastic memory and even twice won his school’s spelling bee.

My son and I had been learning different programming languages through Codecademy. While I struggle to remember the required syntax of different languages, he quickly gets this and can focus on higher level understanding. When we do math learning together his strong working memory lets him concentrate on higher order issues rather than having to worry about remembering the details of the problems and the various relevant formulas.

You can easily train a child’s working memory. It requires just a few minutes a day, can be done low tech or on a computer, can be optimized for your child to get him in flow, and easily lends itself to a reward system. Here are some of the training techniques I have used:

I write down a sequence and have him repeat it. I say a sequence and have him repeat it. He repeats a sequence backwards. He repeats the sequence with slight changes such as adding one to each number and “subtracting” one from each letter (e.g. C becomes B). He repeats a sequence while doing some task like touching his head every time he says an even number and his knee every time he says an odd one. Before repeating a memorized sequence, he must play repeat after me where I say a random string. I draw a picture and have him redraw it. He plays N-back games. He does mental math requiring keeping track of numbers (e.g. 42 times 37). I assign numerical values to letters and ask him math operation questions (e.g. A*B+C). I write down words, numbers, and phrases on index cards, place the index cards in different places in a room, have ...
Stand-up comedy as a way to improve rationality skills
by Andy_McKenzie — 2016-11-27T21:52:33.989Z

Epistemic status: Believed, but hard to know how much to adjust for opportunity costs

I'm wondering whether stand-up comedy would be a good way to expand and test one's "rationality skills" and/or just general interaction skills. One thing I like about it is that you get immediate feedback: the audience either laughs at your joke, or they don't.

Prominent existential risk researcher Nick Bostrom used to be a stand-up comedian:

For my postgraduate work, I went to London, where I studied physics and neuroscience at King's College, and obtained a PhD from the London School of Economics. For a while I did a little bit stand-up comedy on the vibrant London pub and theatre circuit.

It was also mentioned at the London LW meetup in June 2011:

Comedy as Anti-Compartmentalization - Another pet theory of mine. I was puzzled by the amount of atheist comedians out there, who people pay to see tell them that their religion is absurd. (Yes, Christian comedians exist too. Search YouTube. I dare you.) So my theory is that humour serves as a space where patterns and data from different fields are allowed to be superimposed on one another. Think of it as an anti-compartmentalization habit. Due to our brain design, compartmentalization is the default, so humour may be a hack to counter that. And we reward those who do it well with high status because it's valuable. Maybe we should have transhumanist/rationalist stand-up comedians? We sure have a lot of inconsistencies to point out.

Diego Caliero thinks that there would be good material to draw upon from the rationalist community.

Does anyone have any experience trying this and/or have thoughts on whether it would be useful? Also, does anyone in NYC want to try it out?
Remembering school math fondly
by  — 2016-11-27T18:00:44.335Z

This is what I think about the recently linked article about kids not distinguishing 'math' problems where the actual question has nothing to do with anything else, as a bewildered learner and not a resigned tutor. Epistemic status - talkative.

Most math beyond arithmetic in our school was absolutely unrequited to understand most other subjects - even in physics, it was a taxi from A to B, with the implied idea that the end state was determined completely by the initial conditions. Math didn't animate, it just let us obtain answers in a gradeable way. The idea of a pattern inalienable from sense, of efficiency and precision belonged to the domain of poetry: in math, precision did not matter, you were either wrong or right. At some point, we began studying materiel that didn't serve any purpose even in imagining situations in physics, it simply was, and for people like me - hungry teenage girls with disillusioned math teachers, affable language teachers and brilliant biology teachers - that was when it died and was dutifully buried. I still have a tiny feeling of 'setting affairs aside to execute social duties' when I have to solve something.

But on occasion, very rarely, I come across a description that makes those long-forgotten mental muscles twitch. I collect them, to offer to my own son when he grows enough, and would appreciate if you shared your examples, if you have any.

Here are some of mine.

1. The sharp change in the steepness of steps leading down to our cellar - that one time when my husband had to re-apply Pythagorean theorem.

2. This place in Jerome K. Jerome's Three Men in a Boat:

I knew a young man once, he was a most conscientious fellow, and, when he took to fly-fishing, he determined never to exaggerate his hauls by more than twenty-five per cent.

“When I have caught forty fish,” said he, “then I will tell people that I have caught fifty, and so on. But I will not lie any more than that, because it is sinful to lie.”

But the twenty-five per cent. plan did not work well at all. He never was able to use it. The greatest number of fish he ever caught in one day was three, and you can’t add twenty-five per cent. to three—at least, not in fish.

So he increased his percentage to thirty-three-and-a-third; but that, again, was awkward, when he had only caught one or two; so, to simplify matters, he mad...
On the importance of Less Wrong, or another single conversational locus
by AnnaSalamon — 2016-11-27T17:13:08.956Z

Epistemic status: My actual best bet. But I used to think differently; and I don't know how to fully explicate the updating I did (I'm not sure what fully formed argument I could give my past self, that would cause her to update), so you should probably be somewhat suspicious of this until explicated. And/or you should help me explicate it.

It seems to me that:

The world is locked right now in a deadly puzzle, and needs something like a miracle of good thought if it is to have the survival odds one might wish the world to have.

Despite all priors and appearances, our little community (the "aspiring rationality" community; the "effective altruist" project; efforts to create an existential win; etc.) has a shot at seriously helping with this puzzle. This sounds like hubris, but it is at this point at least partially a matter of track record.[1]

To aid in solving this puzzle, we must probably find a way to think together, accumulatively. We need to think about technical problems in AI safety, but also about the full surrounding context -- everything to do with understanding what the heck kind of a place the world is, such that that kind of place may contain cheat codes and trap doors toward achieving an existential win. We probably also need to think about "ways of thinking" -- both the individual thinking skills, and the community conversational norms, that can cause our puzzle-solving to work better. [2]

One feature that is pretty helpful here, is if we somehow maintain a single "conversation", rather than a bunch of people separately having thoughts and sometimes taking inspiration from one another. By "a conversation", I mean a space where people can e.g. reply to one another; rely on shared jargon/shorthand/concepts; build on arguments that have been established in common as probably-valid; point out apparent errors and then have that pointing-out be actually taken into account or else replied-to).

One feature that really helps things be "a conversation" in this way, is if there is a single Schelling set of posts/etc. that people (in the relevant community/conversation) are supposed to read, and can be assumed to have read. Less Wrong used to be a such place; right now there is no such place; it seems to me highly desirable to form a new such place if we can.

We have lately ceased to have a "single conversation"

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A Return to Discussion
by sarahconstantin — 2016-11-27T13:59:10.604Z

Epistemic Status: Casual

It’s taken me a long time to fully acknowledge this, but people who “come from the internet” are no longer a minority subculture. Senators tweet and suburban moms post Minion memes. Which means that talking about trends in how people socialize on the internet is not a frivolous subject; it’s relevant to how people interact, period.

There seems to have been an overall drift towards social networks over blogs and forums in general, and in particular things like:

the drift of commentary from personal blogs to “media” aggregators like The Atlantic, Vox, and Breitbart

the migration of fandom from LiveJournal to Tumblr

Facebook and Twitter as the places where links and discussions go

At the moment I’m not empirically tracking any trends like this, and I’m not confident in what exactly the major trends are — maybe in future I’ll start looking into this more seriously. Right now, I have a sense of things from impression and hearsay.

But one thing I have noticed personally is that people have gotten intimidatedby more formal and public kinds of online conversation. I know quite a few people who used to keep a “real blog” and have become afraid to touch it, preferring instead to chat on social media. It’s a weird kind of perfectionism — nobody ever imagined that blogs were meant to be masterpieces. But I do see people fleeing towards more ephemeral, more stream-of-consciousness types of communication, or communication that involves no words at all (reblogging, image-sharing, etc.) There seems to be a fear of becoming too visible as a distinctive writing voice.

For one rather public and hilarious example, witness Scott Alexander’s flight from LessWrong to LiveJournal to a personal blog to Twitter and Tumblr, in hopes that somewhere he can find a place isolated enough that nobody will notice his insight and humor. (It hasn’t been working.)

What might be going on here?

Of course, there are pragmatic concerns about reputation and preserving anonymity. People don’t want their writing to be found by judgmental bosses or family members. But that’s always been true — and, at any rate, social networking sites are often ...