trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
A Protocol for Optimizing Affection
by  — 2012-05-30T00:38:51.839Z

If Eliezer's art of solving confusing questions is the basic punch of rationality, and fighting akrasia and becoming personally effective is the basic front kick, I would like to master the loving hug. Here is a simple protocol to help us build stronger relationships and stronger communities:

In the spirit of Crocker's rules, I give you Nyan's rules: I hereby declare that you are allowed to love me. I will not judge you or hate you or stop talking to you. I will recieve and return your affection happily and gently let you know if you push my limits.

What's this all about? Here is the story:

I have strong feels of love and friendship for some of you that I met at minicamp, and some of you that I know from my meetup. On reflection, I see that I want to be deeply in (reciprocal) love with as many people as possible. I look forward to a future when I am smart enough to be in wonderful friendly love with all N billion of us.

I don't just want more feels, I want to be able to express them, too. I want to be able to tell you all that I love you and hold your hands and hug and cuddle and generally be nice without anyone feeling awkward or creeped out or conflicted.

Happiness research and personal experience suggests that more affection and closer relationships are generally a good thing. Mammals seem to like curling up together. Unwelcome affection is no good tho; the utility of affection seems to drop off past some point where people start to feel uncomfortable or unsafe. I think if we tried, we would find that there is tremendous value in finding the right level of affection in our relationships. The problem at this point is how quickly the utility of affection drops off, and how unwilling people are to be explicit about their preferences here.

Currently, I feel like if I tell my friend that I love him or try to hold his hand, and he is not interested, this at best creates an awkward situation, and at worst irrevocably damages the friendship. It is a violation of fun theory to have a misstep that is this expensive. The usual method prescribed to deal with this is to be able to work up the curve slowly and get a feel for when you are reaching the limit. The location of the optimum also moves up, so building rapport like this is a pretty i...
Mory Buckman: a case study of modeling yourself as multiple agents
by Vaniver — 2012-05-29T20:40:00.077Z

Hat tip to cata.

Mory Buckman is eight people: the explorer, the worker, the gamer, the musician, the programmer, the thinker, the addict, and the person. (He's also not neurotypical.) It looks like a fascinating case study of Hansonian "model yourself as multiple agents and make deals between them," especially because he's been doing it for over a year, he writes quite a bit of notes, scores himself, and has regular conferences between the personalities that are posted to the blog. I haven't read enough to provide any intelligent commentary, but wanted to raise it to the attention interested in that sort of modeling.

He wrote Gamer Mom, an adventure game about convincing your family to share an experience with you, which is a design masterpiece (but also fairly depressing, so don't get too involved unless you're willing to take an emotional hit).
Review: Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids
by jsalvatier — 2012-05-29T18:00:02.945Z

This is a review of Bryan Caplan’s book Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids. Co-written with Walid.

Summary

Adoption studies indicate that differences in parenting styles have mostly small impacts on long term life outcomes of children, such as happiness, income, intelligence, health, etc.. This means that parents can put less effort into parenting without hurting their children’s futures. If you think kids are neat, then you should consider having more.

Review

Note: We think this is a pretty useful book, and it has changed our minds on how many children we want to have, though neither one us has any children yet. Also, neither of us are experts on twin or adoption studies.

Caplan argues that parents drastically overestimate their ability to improve the adult lives of their children. His argument is driven by adoption studies, which suggest that there is very little that parents can do beyond techniques employed by the average parent that would get them better results with their children. Specifically, the following areas are identified as areas where differences in parenting don’t seem to matter:

No effect on life expectancy, overall health (as measured by the presence/absence of particular health problems and self reported health), height, weight or dental health.

No effect on intelligence.

No effect on various measures of personality: conscientiousness, agreeableness or openness (not certain about extroversion or neuroticism).

Little or no effect on marriage, marriage satisfaction, divorce, or child bearing.

But that is not to say that styles outside of the average do not matter at all -- there are a few areas where parenting differences do seem to have an effect:

A small effect on adult drinking, smoking and drug problems.

A small effect on educational attainment, but no effect on grades in school or on income.

A large effect on political and religious labels, such as whether you call yourself democrat or republican or Christian or Muslim but small effects on actual political and religious attitudes or behavior.

A moderate effect on when girls start having sex (but not boys), but no effect on teen pregnancy or adult sexual behaviors.

Possibly a small effect on sexual orientation.

A moderate effect on how children remember and perceive their parents.

So how do adoption studies lead to these conclusions?

Adoption studies (If y...
Problematic Problems for TDT
by drnickbone — 2012-05-29T15:41:37.964Z

A key goal of Less Wrong's "advanced" decision theories (like TDT, UDT and ADT) is that they should out-perform standard decision theories (such as CDT) in contexts where another agent has access to the decider's code, or can otherwise predict the decider's behaviour. In particular, agents who run these theories will one-box on Newcomb's problem, and so generally make more money than agents which two-box. Slightly surprisingly, they may well continue to one-box even if the boxes are transparent, and even if the predictor Omega makes occasional errors (a problem due to Gary Drescher, which Eliezer has described as equivalent to "counterfactual mugging"). More generally, these agents behave like a CDT agent will wish it had pre-committed itself to behaving before being faced with the problem.

However, I've recently thought of a class of Omega problems where TDT (and related theories) appears to under-perform compared to CDT. Importantly, these are problems which are "fair" - at least as fair as the original Newcomb problem - because the reward is a function of the agent's actual choices in the problem (namely which box or boxes get picked) and independent of the method that the agent uses to choose, or of its choices on any other problems. This contrasts with clearly "unfair" problems like the following:

Discrimination: Omega presents the usual two boxes. Box A always contains $1000. Box B contains nothing if Omega detects that the agent is running TDT; otherwise it contains $1 million.

So what are some fair "problematic problems"?

Problem 1: Omega (who experience has shown is always truthful) presents the usual two boxes A and B and announces the following. "Before you entered the room, I ran a simulation of this problem as presented to an agent running TDT. I won't tell you what the agent decided, but I will tell you that if the agent two-boxed then I put nothing in Box B, whereas if the agent one-boxed then I put $1 million in Box B. Regardless of how the simulated agent decided, I put $1000 in Box A. Now please choose your box or boxes."

Analysis: Any agent who is themselves running TDT will reason as in the standard Newcomb problem. They'll prove that their decision is linked to the simulated agent's, so that if they two-box they'll only win $1000, whereas if they one-box they will win $1 million. So the agent...
Computer Science and Programming: Links and Resources
by XiXiDu — 2012-05-29T13:17:53.156Z

Updated Version @ LW Wiki: wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Programming_resources

Contents

How Computers Work

An Overview of Computer Programming

Computer Science and Computation

Supplementary Resources: Mathematics and Algorithms

Practice

Python

Haskell

Common Lisp

R

How Computers Work

1. CODE The Hidden Language of Computer Hardware and Software

The book intends to show a layman the basic mechanical principles of how computers work, instead of merely summarizing how the different parts relate. He starts with basic principles of language and logic and then demonstrates how they can be embodied by electrical circuits, and these principles give him an opening to describe in principle how computers work mechanically without requiring very much technical knowledge. Although it is not possible in a medium sized book for layman to describe the entire technical summary of a computer, he describes how and why it is possible that elaborate electronics can act in the ways computers do. In the introduction, he contrasts his own work with those books which "include pictures of trains full of 1s and 0s."

2. The Elements of Computing Systems: Building a Modern Computer from First Principles

Indeed, the best way to understand how computers work is to build one from scratch, and this textbook leads students through twelve chapters and projects that gradually build a basic hardware platform and a modern software hierarchy from the ground up. In the process, the students gain hands-on knowledge of hardware architecture, operating systems, programming languages, compilers, data structures, algorithms, and software engineering. Using this constructive approach, the book exposes a significant body of computer science knowledge and demonstrates how theoretical and applied techniques taught in other courses fit into the overall picture.

3. The Write Great Code Series (A Solid Foundation in Software Engineering for Programmers)

Write Great Code Volume I: Understanding the Machine

This, the first of four volumes, teaches important concepts of machine organization in a language-independent fashion, giving programmers what they need to know to write great code in any language, without the usual overhead of learning assembly language to master this topic. The Write Great Code series will help programmers make wiser choices with respect to programming statements and data typ

...
Group rationality diary, 5/28/12
by cata — 2012-05-29T04:10:25.364Z

This is the public group instrumental rationality diary for the week of May 28th. It's a place to record and chat about it if you have done, or are actively doing, things like:

Established a useful new habit

Obtained new evidence that made you change your mind about some belief

Decided to behave in a different way in some set of situations

Optimized some part of a common routine or cached behavior

Consciously changed your emotions or affect with respect to something

Consciously pursued new valuable information about something that could make a big difference in your life

Learned something new about your beliefs, behavior, or life that surprised you

Tried doing any of the above and failed

Or anything else interesting which you want to share, so that other people can think about it, and perhaps be inspired to take action themselves. Try to include enough details so that everyone can use each other's experiences to learn about what tends to work out, and what doesn't tend to work out.

Thanks to everyone who contributes!

(Previously: 5/14/12, 5/21/12)
[SEQ RERUN] Thou Art Physics
by MinibearRex — 2012-05-29T02:50:49.168Z

Today's post, Thou Art Physics was originally published on 06 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

If the laws of physics control everything we do, then how can our choices be meaningful? Because you are physics. You aren't competing with physics for control of the universe, you are within physics. Anything you control is necessarily controlled by physics.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Living in Many Worlds, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Big Berkeley meetup
by Nisan — 2012-05-28T21:25:58.312Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Big Berkeley meetup

WHEN: 30 May 2012 07:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE: 2128 oxford street, berkeley, ca

The next Big Berkeley meetup is this Wednesday. Let's meet at 7pm in the Starbucks at 2128 Oxford St. as usual, and then decide where to go from there. I hear that there's considerable demand for a board games night; EDIT: There are definitely places to play games, like Games of Berkeley; or, better yet, Biryani House. So expect to play games! Bring your favorite game. As a backup I will "bring" some rationality exercises/games that Eliezer presented at this months minicamp, including Rationalist Taboo.

Discussion article for the meetup : Big Berkeley meetup
[SEQ RERUN] Living in Many Worlds
by MinibearRex — 2012-05-28T19:03:19.664Z

Today's post, Living in Many Worlds was originally published on 05 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

The many worlds of quantum mechanics are not some strange, alien universe into which you have been thrust. They are where you have always lived. Egan's Law: "It all adds up to normality." Then why care about quantum physics at all? Because there's still the question of what adds up to normality, and the answer to this question turns out to be, "Quantum physics." If you're thinking of building any strange philosophies around many-worlds, you probably shouldn't - that's not what it's for.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Why Quantum?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
SotW: Avoid Motivated Cognition
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2012-05-28T15:57:55.813Z

(The Exercise Prize series of posts is the Center for Applied Rationality asking for help inventing exercises that can teach cognitive skills. The difficulty is coming up with exercises interesting enough, with a high enough hedonic return, that people actually do them and remember them; this often involves standing up and performing actions, or interacting with other people, not just working alone with an exercise booklet and a pencil. We offer prizes of $50 for any suggestion we decide to test, and $500 for any suggestion we decide to adopt. This prize also extends to LW meetup activities and good ideas for verifying that a skill has been acquired. See here for details.)

The following awards have been made: $550 to Palladias, $550 to Stefie_K, $50 to lincolnquirk, and $50 to John_Maxwell_IV. See the bottom for details. If you've earned a prize, please PM StephenCole to claim it. (If you strongly believe that one of your suggestions Really Would Have Worked, consider trying it at your local Less Wrong meetup. If it works there, send us some participant comments; this may make us update enough to test it.)

Lucy and Marvin are walking down the street one day, when they pass a shop showing a large chocolate cake in the window.

"Hm," says Lucy, "I think I'll buy and eat that chocolate cake."

"What, the whole thing?" says Marvin. "Now?"

"Yes," says Lucy, "I want to support the sugar industry."

There is a slight pause.

"I don't suppose that your liking chocolate cake has anything to do with your decision?" says Marvin.

"Well," says Lucy, "I suppose it could have played a role in suggesting that I eat a whole chocolate cake, but the reason why I decided to do it was to support the sugar industry. Lots of people have jobs in the sugar industry, and they've been having some trouble lately."

Motivated cognition is the way (all? most?) brains generate false landscapes of justification in the presence of attachments and flinches. It's not enough for the human brain to attach to the sunk cost of a PhD program, so that we are impelled in our actions to stay - no, that attachment can also go off and spin a justificational landscape to convince the other parts of ourselves, even the part that knows about consequentialism and the sunk cost fallacy, to stay in the PhD program.

We're almost c...
More convergent instrumental goals
by KatjaGrace — 2012-05-28T06:57:13.000Z

Nick Bostrom follows Steve Omohundro in exploring the types of instrumental goals that intelligences with arbitrary ultimate goals might converge on. This is important for two reasons. First, it means predicting the behavior of arbitrary intelligences might be a tiny bit easier than you’d think. Second, because it draws attention to the difficulty of creating a creature that doesn’t want to get mixed up in taking resources and seeking longevity and that sort of thing.

Between Nick and Steve we have these convergent instrumental goals:

Self-preservation

Preserve your values

self-improvement

rationality

other cognitive enhancement

technological perfection

get resources

Avoid counterfeit utility

I think acquiring information is included in cognitive enhancement here, though to me it seems big and different enough that I’d put it by itself.

I’d like to add three more, incidentally all to do with interacting with other intelligences. So not relevant if you are the one all powerful singleton, but handy if there are a number of AIs which are of a similar enough level that they might be useful to one another (like sheep and humans are, or humans and humans are). Here’s my list:

Spread your values

This can be achieved by making other entities which have at least some of the same values, or more traditionally by buying advertising space, exercising social influence, or having children. This makes sense for the same reason that ensuring that you maintain your values in the future does. If you think of yourself as just your values (as Bostrom mentions might be appropriate for some kinds of intelligences), spreading values can come under the heading of self-preservation perhaps (or reproduction). But usually we don’t think like this. If I convince you that Bach is pretty good, we don’t think of this as me replacing part of you with part of me. So I think it’s worth having a different category.

Social influence

If you can’t get others to have your values, the next best thing is to get them to do what you want anyway. This can be done in many ways, e.g. deceit, deals, forming relationships with useful people, sending good signals, being likable. Perhaps manipulating others comes under perfection of technology: making friends is in a way like better programming your computer to do what you type in. Both can be seen as inv...
Funding Good Research
by lukeprog — 2012-05-27T06:41:56.183Z

Series: How to Purchase AI Risk Reduction

I recently explained that one major project undergoing cost-benefit analysis at the Singularity Institute is that of a scholarly AI risk wiki. The proposal is exciting to many, but as Kaj Sotala points out:

This idea sounds promising, but I find it hard to say anything about "should this be funded" without knowing what the alternative uses for the money are. Almost any use of money can be made to sound attractive with some effort, but the crucial question in budgeting is not "would this be useful" but "would this be the most useful thing".

Indeed. So here is another thing that donations to SI could purchase: good research papers by skilled academics.

Our recent grant of $20,000 to Rachael Briggs (for an introductory paper on TDT) provides an example of how this works:

SI thinks of a paper it wants to exist but doesn't have the resources to write itself (e.g. a clearer presentation of TDT).

SI looks for a few productive academics well-suited to write the paper we have in mind, and approaches them directly with the grant proposal. (Briggs is an excellent choice for the TDT paper because she is a good explainer and has had two of her past decision theory papers selected as among the 10 best papers of the year by The Philosopher's Annual.)

Hopefully, one of these academics says "yes." We award them the grant in return for a certain kind of paper published in one of a pre-specified set of journals. (In the case of the TDT grant to Rachael Briggs, we specified that the final paper must be published in one of the following journals: Philosopher's Imprint, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, Erkenntnis, Theoria, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Nous, The Philosophical Review, or Theory and Decision.)

SI gives regular feedback on outline drafts and article drafts prepared by the article author.

Paper gets submitted, revised, and published!

For example, SI could award grants for the following papers:

"Objections to CEV," by somebody like David Sobel (his "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being" remains the most significant unanswered attack on ideal-preference theories like CEV).

"Counterfactual Mugging," by somebody like Rachael Briggs (here is the original post by Vladimir Nesov).

"CEV as a Computational Meta-Ethics," by somebody like Gert-Jan Lokh

...
[SEQ RERUN] Why Quantum?
by MinibearRex — 2012-05-27T05:00:38.350Z

Today's post, Why Quantum? was originally published on 04 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Why do a series on quantum mechanics? Some of the many morals that are best illustrated by the tale of quantum mechanics and its misinterpretation.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Timeless Identity, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.