trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
MIT is working on industrial robots that (attempt to) learn what humans want from them [link]
by Dr_Manhattan — 2012-06-13T15:42:58.015Z

http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/robot-manufacturing-0612.html

"Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) researchers have developed an algorithm that enables a robot to quickly learn an individual's preference for a certain task and adapt accordingly to help complete the task."

It would be interesting to see what kind of issues they will run into. (Granted this is a very restricted environment)
Advices needed for a presentation on rationality
by Worthstream — 2012-06-13T10:41:50.494Z

Hi, next month I'm going to be doing an hour long presentation on rationality to Mensa members. It needs to be rather introductory, since High QI != Rationality and most of them are not familiar with the concepts discussed here.

I'm planning to talk about what rationality is (any good quotes?), what is the difference between the brain and the conscience, why being rational does not mean having a perfect willpower, some common and easily avoided fallacies (sunk cost, scope insensitivity).

I did a search on the site for this kind of introductory posts and have quite a large pool of interesting arguments to touch. Does anyone have any suggestion on which topics should be included, any pointers to interesting posts that should be summarized or used as source material, etc.?
The New Yorker article on cognitive biases
by BlazeOrangeDeer — 2012-06-13T06:14:49.170Z

A New Yorker article on cognitive biases was on the reddit front page in the last day. It seems like a good opportunity to discuss what the article got right, what it didn't, how reddit reacted, and how one might better publicize the topic in the future.

reddit comments(this link doesn't work any more, see VincentYu's comment for links)

article
[SEQ RERUN] The Psychological Unity of Humankind
by MinibearRex — 2012-06-13T04:47:00.563Z

Today's post, The Psychological Unity of Humankind was originally published on 24 June 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Because humans are a sexually reproducing species, human brains are nearly identical. All human beings share similar emotions, tell stories, and employ identical facial expressions. We naively expect all other minds to work like ours, which cause problems when trying to predict the actions of non-human intelligences.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Optimization and the Singularity, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Chicago games at Harold Washington Library (Sun 6/17)
by Unnamed — 2012-06-13T04:25:05.856Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Chicago games at Harold Washington Library (Sun 6/17)

WHEN:
17 June 2012 02:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
400 S State St., Chicago, IL

Instead of our typical Saturday Corner Bakery meetup, we'll be meeting this Sunday (6/17) from 2-4pm at the Harold Washington Library.

We've reserved a group study room in the fifth floor. Meet at the fifth floor desk at 1:55 and we will go to the room from there. (getting up there is slightly convoluted. You'll need to take one set of escalators/elevators to the third floor, then go into the third floor and take another set of elevators/escalators to the fifth floor)

What: various rationality games. See below for descriptions.

How (to get there): The library entrance is on State St. between Van Buren and Congress. The red, blue, green, brown, orange, and pink L lines all stop at the library. For those coming from outside the city, it's a 15 minute walk from union station.

Games: Zendo and the Calibration Game

rules from here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/crs/how_to_run_a_successful_less_wrong_meetup/

Zendo

Zendo, also known as “Science, the game,” involves one player picking rules and creating structures that follow that rule. The other players try to discover the rule by building their own structures and asking whether those structures follow the rule. See Wikipedia for the exact rules.

Calibration Game

The Calibration Game requires a large number of numerical trivia questions and their answers. A couple of examples might be “how many lakes are there in Canada” or “which percentage of the world’s countries are landlocked”. The game Wits & Wagers comes with a large number of such trivia questions and answers.

There are several possible variants of the Calibration game:

Personal Calibration. One person reads the question aloud, and everyone writes down their 50% and 90% confidence intervals. For example, if you’re 50% sure that 20% - 40% of the world’s countries are landlocked, write that down as your 50% confidence interval. After ten questions, the correct answers are revealed. People can now check whether half of their guesses in the 50% confidence interval really were right, and whether they really only got one question out of ten in their 90% confi- dence interval wrong. Alternatively, the correct answer may be revealed as so

...
Neuroscience basics for LessWrongians
by ChrisHallquist — 2012-06-13T04:20:20.047Z

The origins of this article are in my partial transcript of the live June 2011 debate between Robin Hanson and Eliezer Yudkowsky. While I still feel like I don't entirely understand his arguments, a few of his comments about neuroscience made me strongly go, "no, that's not right."

Furthermore, I've noticed that while LessWrong in general seems to be very strong on the psychological or "black box" side of cognitive science, there isn't as much discussion of neuroscience here. This is somewhat understandable. Our current understanding of neuroscience is frustratingly incomplete, and too much journalism on neuroscience is sensationalistic nonsense. However, I think what we do know is worth knowing. (And part of what makes much neuroscience journalism annoying is that it makes a big deal out of things that are totally unsurprising, given what we already know.)

My qualifications to do this: while my degrees are in philosophy, for awhile in undergrad I was a neuroscience major, and ended up taking quite a bit of neuroscience as a result. This means I can assure you that most of what I say here is standard neuroscience which could be found in an introductory textbook like Nichols, Martin, Wallace, & Fuchs' From Neuron to Brain (one of the text books I used as an undergraduate). The only things that might not be totally standard are the conjecture I make about how complex currently-poorly-understood areas of the brain are likely to be, and also some of the points I make in criticism of Eliezer at the end (though I believe these are not a very big jump from current textbook neuroscience.)

One of the main themes of this article will be specialization within the brain. In particular, we know that the brain is divided into specialized areas at the macro level, and we understand some (though not very much) of the micro-level wiring that supports this specialization. It seems likely that each region of the brain has its own micro-level wiring to support its specialized function, and in some regions the wiring is likely to be quite complex.
Meetup : Big Berkeley meetup
by Nisan — 2012-06-13T01:36:01.863Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Big Berkeley meetup

WHEN:
13 June 2012 07:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
2128 Oxford Street, Berkeley ,CA

Tomorrow there will be a Berkeley meetup that counts as a big meetup. We'll meet at 7pm in the Starbucks at 2128 Oxford St., and then decide where to go from there. I will not be able to come myself, but I know for sure that at least one person will be there. (If you also go, there will be at least two people.)

We do not have a discussion topic planned, but please feel free to suggest one!

Discussion article for the meetup : Big Berkeley meetup
The Creating Bob the Jerk problem. Is it a real problem in decision theory?
by Ghatanathoah — 2012-06-12T21:36:43.668Z

I was recently reading about the Transparent Newcomb with your Existence at Stake problem, which, to make a long story short, states that you were created by Prometheus, who foresaw that you would one-box on Newcomb's problem and wouldn't have created you if he had foreseen otherwise. The implication is that you might need to one-box just to exist. It's a disturbing problem, and as I read it another even more disturbing problem started to form in my head. However, I'm not sure it's logically coherent (I'm really hoping it's not) and wanted to know what the rest of you thought. The problem goes:

One day you start thinking about a hypothetical nonexistant person named Bob who is a real jerk. If he existed he would make your life utterly miserable. However, if he existed he would want to make a deal with you. If he ever found himself existing in a universe where you have never existed he would create you, on the condition that if you found yourself existing in a universe where he had never existed you would create him. Hypothetical Bob is very good at predicting the behavior of other people, not quite Omega quality, but pretty darn good. Assume for the sake of the argument that you like your life and enjoy existing.

At first you dismiss the problem because of technical difficulties. Science hasn't advanced to the point where we can make people with such precision. Plus, there is a near-infinite number of far nicer hypothetical people who would make the same deal, when science reaches that point you should give creating them priority.

But then you see Omega drive by in its pickup truck. A large complicated machine falls off the back of the truck as it passes you by. Written on it, in Omega's handwriting, is a note that says "This is the machine that will create Bob the Jerk, a hypothetical person that [insert your name here] has been thinking about recently, if one presses the big red button on the side." You know Omega never lies, not even in notes to itself.

Do Timeless Decision Theory and Updateless Decision Theory say you have a counterfactual obligation to create Bob the Jerk, the same way you have an obligation to pay Omega in the Counterfactual Mugging, and the same way you might (I'm still not sure about this) have an obligation to one-box when dealing...
How to Run a Successful Less Wrong Meetup
by Kaj_Sotala — 2012-06-12T21:32:42.605Z

Always wanted to run a Less Wrong meetup, but been unsure of how? The How to Run a Successful Less Wrong Meetup booklet is here to help you!

The 33-page document draws from consultations with more than a dozen Less Wrong meetup group organizers. Stanislaw Boboryk created the document design. Luke provided direction, feedback, and initial research, and I did almost all the writing.

The booklet starts by providing some motivational suggestions on why you'd want to create a meetup in the first place, and then moves on to the subject of organizing your first one. Basics such as choosing a venue, making an announcement, and finding something to talk about once at the meetup, are all covered. This section also discusses pioneering meetups in foreign cities and restarting inactive meetup groups.

For those who have already established a meetup group, the booklet offers suggestions on things such as attracting new members, maintaining a pleasant atmosphere, and dealing with conflicts within the group. The "How to Build Your Team of Heroes" section explains the roles that are useful for a meetup group to fill, ranging from visionaries to organizers.

If you're unsure of what exactly to do at meetups, the guide describes many options, from different types of discussions to nearly 20 different games and exercises. All the talk and philosophizing in the world won't do much good if you don't actually do things, so the booklet also discusses long-term projects that you can undertake. Some people attend meetups to just have fun and to be social, and others to improve themselves and the world. The booklet has been written to be useful for both kinds of people.

In order to inspire you and let you see what others have done, the booklet also has brief case studies and examples from real meetup groups around the world. You can find these sprinkled throughout the guide.

This is just the first version of the guide. We will continue working on it. If you find mistakes, or think that something is unclear, or would like to see some part expanded, or if you've got good advice you think should be included... please let me know! You can contact me at kaj.sotala@intelligence.org.

A large number of people have helped in various ways, and I hope that I've remembered to mention most of them in the acknowledgements. If you've contributed to the document but don't see your name mentioned, please send...
Do strange scenarios help us ask why not?
by KatjaGrace — 2012-06-12T21:12:09.000Z

People are working on making robot cars communicate, with pedestrians for instance.

Notice that the apparent benefit of having cars communicate with pedestrians doesn’t actually have much to do with robots driving the cars. If having cars signal to pedestrians is useful, probably so is having drivers signal to pedestrians. Yet current cars and driving norms hardly provide for this at all. Many a time I have thought about this when trying to cross a road when there is a car coming toward me that seems to be slowing down, kind of, and whose windscreen I can’t really see through. Is the driver waving to me? Eating a sandwich? Hard to tell, so I won’t take my chances. Ah, now he’s stopped. And he’s annoyed. Or swatting a fly. Does that mean he’s about to go? Hard to tell, maybe I’ll just wait a sec to be sure. Now he’s really annoyed – annoyed enough to give up and drive on?… If only there were some little signal that meant ‘while this signal is on, I see you and am stopping for you’.

This is not my real point, but an example. Thinking about a strange future of robot cars causes us to make predictions and envision potentially valuable additions to it that have little to do with robot cars. Similarly, thinking about future AI development causes people to wonder if sudden leaps in technological capacity could cause a small portion of humanity to get far ahead of the rest, or if human values might be lost in the long run. These issues are not specific to AI. Yet when we look at the world around us we seem less likely to see ways to improve it, or to wonder why no groups of humans do get ahead of the rest technologically, or even notice that technological changes tend to be relatively small, or to ask what is becoming of our values.

In general it seems that thinking about strange scenarios causes people expect things to happen which have little to do with the scenarios. Since they have little to do with the scenarios, it makes sense to ask why they haven’t already happened, or whether we could already benefit from them.

Some men see things as they are and say, why? I dream of things the way they never were and say, why not?

– Robert F. Kennedy, after George Bernard Shaw

Dreaming of the way things never were seems more impressive, difficult, and useful. Perhaps thinking of strange scenari...
Meetup : Berlin Meetup
by blob — 2012-06-12T19:58:47.734Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Berlin Meetup

WHEN:
26 June 2012 07:30:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Susuru, Rosa-Luxemburg-Str. 17, 10178 Berlin

This time we meet in the Japanese noodle bar Susuru. I'll bring a sign.

Discussion article for the meetup : Berlin Meetup
Reply to Holden on 'Tool AI'
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2012-06-12T18:00:51.950Z

I begin by thanking Holden Karnofsky of Givewell for his rare gift of his detailed, engaged, and helpfully-meant critical article Thoughts on the Singularity Institute (SI). In this reply I will engage with only one of the many subjects raised therein, the topic of, as I would term them, non-self-modifying planning Oracles, a.k.a. 'Google Maps AGI' a.k.a. 'tool AI', this being the topic that requires me personally to answer. I hope that my reply will be accepted as addressing the most important central points, though I did not have time to explore every avenue. I certainly do not wish to be logically rude, and if I have failed, please remember with compassion that it's not always obvious to one person what another person will think was the central point.

Luke Mueulhauser and Carl Shulman contributed to this article, but the final edit was my own, likewise any flaws.

Summary:

Holden's concern is that "SI appears to neglect the potentially important distinction between 'tool' and 'agent' AI." His archetypal example is Google Maps:

Google Maps is not an agent, taking actions in order to maximize a utility parameter. It is a tool, generating information and then displaying it in a user-friendly manner for me to consider, use and export or discard as I wish.

The reply breaks down into four heavily interrelated points:

First, Holden seems to think (and Jaan Tallinn doesn't apparently object to, in their exchange) that if a non-self-modifying planning Oracle is indeed the best strategy, then all of SIAI's past and intended future work is wasted. To me it looks like there's a huge amount of overlap in underlying processes in the AI that would have to be built and the insights required to build it, and I would be trying to assemble mostly - though not quite exactly - the same kind of team if I was trying to build a non-self-modifying planning Oracle, with the same initial mix of talents and skills.

Second, a non-self-modifying planning Oracle doesn't sound nearly as safe once you stop saying human-English phrases like "describe the consequences of an action to the user" and start trying to come up with math that says scary dangerous things like (he translated into English) "increase the correspondence between the user's belief about relevant consequences and reality". Hence why the people on the team would have to solve the ...
[Link] The Greek Heliocentric Theory
by  — 2012-06-12T17:18:21.170Z

Summary: The Greeks likely rejected a heliocentric theory because it would conflict with the lack of any visible stellar parallax, not for egotistical, common-sense, or aesthetic reasons.

I had always heard that the Greeks embraced a geocentric universe for common-sense, aesthetic reasons - not scientific ones. But it seems as if the real story is more complicated than that:

From Isomorphismes:

Now this is the kicker in your Popperian dirtsack. The Greeks had the right theory (heliocentric solar system) but discarded it on the basis of experimental evidence! Never preach to me about progress-in-science when all you’ve heard is a one-liner about Popper and the communal acceptance of general relativity. Especially don’t follow it up by saying that science marches toward the Truth whilst religion thwarts its progress. According to Astronomer Lisa, it’s not true that the Greeks simply thought they and their Gods were at the centre of the Universe because they were egotistical. They reasoned to the geocentric conclusion based on quantitative evidence. How? They measured parallax.(Difference in stellar appearance from spring to fall, when we’re on opposite sides of the Sun.) Given the insensitivity of their measurement tools at the time, the stars didn’t change positions at all when the Earth moved to the other side of the Sun. Based on that, they rejected the heliocentric hypothesis. If the Earth actually did move around the Sun, then the stars would logically have to appear different from one time to another. But they remain ever fixed in the same place in the Heavens, therefore the Earth must be still (geocentric).

I dug a little bit deeper, and this seems to be more or less accurate. From The Greek Heliocentric Theory and its Abandonment:

This paper then examines possible reasons for the Greek abandonment of the heliocentric theory and concludes that there is no reason to deplore its abandonment. In developing the heliocentric theory the Greeks had run the gamut of theorizing. We are indebted to the Alexandrians and Hipparchus for turning away from speculation to take up the recording of precise astronomical data. Here was laid the foundation upon which modern astronomy was built.

Let us now suppose that Aristarchus’ theory was widely circulated and that it was given careful consideration by leading

...
Glenn Beck discusses the Singularity, cites SI researchers
by Brihaspati — 2012-06-12T16:45:50.380Z

From the final chapter of his new book Cowards, titled "Adapt or Die: The Coming Intelligence Explosion."

The year is 1678 and you’ve just arrived in England via a time machine. You take out your new iPhone in front of a group of scientists who have gathered to marvel at your arrival.

“Siri,” you say, addressing the phone’s voice-activated artificial intelligence system, “play me some Beethoven.”

Dunh-Dunh-Dunh-Duuunnnhhh! The famous opening notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, stored in your music library, play loudly.

“Siri, call my mother.”

Your mother’s face appears on the screen, a Hawaiian beach behind her. “Hi, Mom!” you say. “How many fingers am I holding up?”

“Three,” she correctly answers. “Why haven’t you called more—”

“Thanks, Mom! Gotta run!” you interrupt, hanging up.

“Now,” you say. “Watch this.”

Your new friends look at the iPhone expectantly.

“Siri, I need to hide a body.”

Without hesitation, Siri asks: “What kind of place are you looking for? Mines, reservoirs, metal foundries, dumps, or swamps?” (I’m not kidding. If you have an iPhone 4S, try it.)

You respond “Swamps,” and Siri pulls up a satellite map showing you nearby swamps.

The scientists are shocked into silence. What is this thing that plays music, instantly teleports video of someone across the globe, helps you get away with murder, and is small enough to fit into a pocket?

At best, your seventeenth-century friends would worship you as a messenger of God. At worst, you’d be burned at the stake for witchcraft. After all, as science fiction author Arthur C. Clarke once said, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”

Now, imagine telling this group that capitalism and representative democracy will take the world by storm, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Imagine telling them their descendants will eradicate smallpox and regularly live seventy-five or more years. Imagine telling them that men will walk on the moon, that planes, flying hundreds of miles an hour, will transport people around the world, or that cities will be filled with buildings reaching thousands of feet into the air.

They’d probably escort you to the madhous

...
Let's all learn stats!
by mstevens — 2012-06-12T15:31:14.543Z

I want to become Stronger!

Udacity are running an Introduction to Statistics course starting on the 25th June 2012.

Many of us could stand to learn some more stats, I certainly could. This seems like a great opportunity!

It is mandatory for all LWers to enroll in this course.

Update: the last line was a joke. Obviously people are not finding it funny. Sorry.