trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Meetup : Rationality Dojo & Picnic in the park
by Chriswaterguy — 2016-01-07T12:32:08.430Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Rationality Dojo & Picnic in the park

WHEN:
10 January 2016 03:30:00PM (+1100)

WHERE:
Flagstaff Gardens, Melbourne, VIC Australia

NOTE THE NON-STANDARD VENUE (Flagstaff Gardens instead of our usual location.)

3:30pm arrival, 4:00pm start, Sunday 10 January.

This month's Less Wrong Melbourne Rationality Dojo is in the park, more chilled than usual and a week later. Learnt something recently? Give a lightning talk! Our Dojos normally until about 6:30pm - in this case, we may just continue on with a picnic dinner, so you may wish to bring something to share (food or drink) or buy some takeaway.

WHERE: The William St side of Flagstaff Gardens. We'll be roughly opposite the Radison Hotel (cnr Willam and A'Beckett St. If you have any trouble finding us, call one of us, e.g. Chris on 0439 471 632.

Catch you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : Rationality Dojo & Picnic in the park
Consciousness and Sleep
by casebash — 2016-01-07T12:04:32.572Z

This will be a short article. I've been seeing a lot of dubious reasoning about consciousness and sleep. One famous problem is the problem of personal identity with a destructive teleporter. In this problem, we imagine that you are cloned perfectly in an alternate location and then your body is destroyed. The question asked is whether this clone is the same person as you.

One really bad argument that I've seen around this is the notion that the fact that we sleep every night means that we experience this teleporter every day.

The reason why this is a very bad argument is that it equivocates with two different meanings of consciousness:

Consciousness as opposed to being asleep or unconscious, where certain brain functions are inactive

Consciousness as opposed to being non-sentient, like a rock or bacteria, where you lack the ability to have experiences

You can still have experiences while you are asleep, these are internal experiences and they are called dreams. Your sensory system is still running, but in a kind of reduced power mode. If someone shouts or prods you or it gets too hot, then you wake up. You aren't like a rock.

Perhaps some people would like to talk about what kind of waves we do or do not see while you are asleep. What I would like to point out is that we still have very little understanding of the brain. Just because we don't see one particular wave or another doesn't mean much given our incredibly limited understanding of what consciousness is. Perhaps in the future, we will have this knowledge, but anything at the moment is merely speculation.

I'm not arguing either way on personal identity. I haven't done enough reading yet to comment. But this is one particularly bad argument that needs to be done away with.
Meetup : Portland meetup - Dojo style.
by Elo — 2016-01-07T02:32:07.000Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Portland meetup - Dojo style.

WHEN:
12 January 2016 06:00:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
2945 NE 64th Ave, Portland

Casa Soule-Reeves aka the crow's nest
2945 NE 64th Ave
around the corner from Cafe Ohana on Sandy
AKA the regular place.
Take your pick of:
* remembering name
* new years resolutions
* organisation systems
* time management
* other cfar methods, (trigger action planning, focussed grit, goal interrogation)
or just general hanging out...
cross posted here, facebook and on the google group.
also: https://web.facebook.com/groups/581711345245383/
and: https://web.facebook.com/events/1534314410212033/

Discussion article for the meetup : Portland meetup - Dojo style.
Guns And States
by Scott Alexander — 2016-01-07T02:29:05.000Z

[Epistemic status: I think I probably wrung the right conclusions out of this evidence, but this isn’t the only line of evidence bearing on the broader gun control issue and all I can say is what it’s consistent with. Content warning for discussion of suicide, murder, and race]

I.

From a Vox article on America’s Gun Problem, Explained: “On Wednesday, it happened again: There was a mass shooting — this time, in San Bernardino, California. And once again on Sunday, President Barack Obama called for measures that make it harder for would-be shooters to buy deadly firearms.”

Then it goes on to say that “more guns mean more gun deaths, period. The research on this is overwhelmingly clear. No matter how you look at the data, more guns mean more gun deaths.” It cites the following chart:

…then uses the graph as a lead in to talk about active shooter situations, gun-homicide relationships, and outrage over gun massacres.

Did you notice that the axis of this graph says “gun deaths”, and that this is a totally different thing from gun murders?

(this isn’t an isolated incident: Vox does the same thing here and here)

Gun deaths are a combined measure of gun homicides and gun suicides. Here is a graph of guns vs. gun homicides:

And here is a graph of guns vs. gun suicides:

The relationship between gun ownership and homicide is weak (and appears negative), the relationship between gun ownership and suicide is strong and positive. The entire effect Vox highlights in their graph is due to gun suicides, but they are using it to imply conclusions about gun homicides. This is why you shouldn’t make a category combining two unlike things.

II.

I am not the first person to notice this. The Washington Examiner makes the same criticism of Vox’s statistics that I do. And Robert VerBruggen of National Review does the same analysis decomposing gun deaths into suicides and homicides, and like me finds no correlation with homicides.

German Lopez of Vox responds here. He argues that VerBruggen can’t just do a raw uncontrolled correlation of state gun ownership with state murder rates without adjusting for confounders. This is true, although given that Vox has done this time and time again for months on end and all VerBruggen is doing is correctly pointing out a flaw in their methods, it feels kind of like an isolated...
Logical counterfactuals for random algorithms
by Vanessa Kosoy — 2016-01-06T13:29:52.000Z

Updateless decision theory was informally defined by Wei Dai in terms of logical conditional expected utility, where the condition corresponds to an algorithm (the agent) producing a given output (action or policy). This kind of conditional expected values can be formalised by optimal predictors. However, since optimal predictor systems which are required to apply optimal predictors to decision theory generally have random advice, we need counterfactuals well-defined for random algorithms i.e. algorithms that produce different outputs with different probabilities depending on internal coin tosses. We propose to define these counterfactuals by a generalization of the notion of conditional expected utility which amounts to linear regression of utility with respect to the probabilities of different outputs in the space of "impossible possible worlds." We formalise this idea by introducing "relative optimal predictors," prove the analogue of the conditional probability formula (which takes matrix form) and uniqueness theorems.

Motivation

We start by explaining the analogous construction in classical probability theory and proceed to defining the logical counterpart in the Results section.

Consider ζ a probability measure on some space, a random variable u representing utility, a finite set A representing possible actions and another random variable p taking values in [0,1]A and satisfying ∑a∈Apa=1 representing the probabilities of taking different actions. For a deterministic algorithm, p takes values {0,1}A allowing defining conditional expected utility as

ua:=Eζ[u∣pa=1]=Eζ[upa]Eζ[pa]

In the general case, it is tempting to consider

Eζ⋉p[u∣a]=Eζ[upa]Eζ[pa]

where ζ⋉p stands for the semidirect product of ζ with p, the latter regarded as a Markov kernel with target A. However, this would lead to behavior similar to EDT since conditioning by a is meaningful even for a single "world" (i.e. completely deterministic u and p). Instead, we select u∗∈RA that minimizes Eζ[(u−ptu∗)2] (we regard elements of RA as column vectors so pt is a row vector). This means u∗ has to satisfy the matrix equation

Eζ[ppt]u∗=Eζ[up]

The solution to this equation is only unique when Eζ[ppt] is non-degenerate. This corresponds to requiring positive probability of the condition for usual conditional expected values. In case p takes values in {0,1}A, u∗ is the usual conditional exp

...
Your transhuman copy is of questionable value to your meat self.
by Usul — 2016-01-06T09:03:30.949Z

I feel safe saying that nearly everyone reading this will agree that, given sufficient technology, a perfect replica or simulation could be made of the structure and function of a human brain, producing an exact copy of an individual mind including a consciousness. Upon coming into existence, this consciousness will have a separate but baseline-identical subjective experience to the consciousness from which it was copied, as it was at the moment of copying. The original consciousness will continue its own existence/ subjective experience. If the brain containing the original consciousness is destroyed, the consciousness within ceases to be. The existence or non- of a copy is irrelevant to this fact.

With this in mind, I fail to see the attraction of the many transhuman options for extra-meat existence, and I see no meaningful immortality therein, if that's what you came for.

Consciousness is notoriously difficult to define and analyze and I am far from an expert in it's study. I define it as an awareness: the sense organ which perceives the activity of the mind. It is not thought. It is not memory or emotion. It is the thing that experiences or senses these things. Memories will be gained and lost, thoughts and emotions come and go, the sense of self remains even as the self changes. There exists a system of anatomical structures in your brain which, by means of electrochemical activity, produces the experience of consciousness. If a brain injury wiped out major cognitive functions but left those structures involved in the sense of consciousness unharmed, you would, I believe, have the same central awareness of Self as Self, despite perhaps lacking all language or even the ability to form thoughts or understand to world around you. Consciousness, this awareness, is, I believe, the most accurate definition of Self, Me, You. I realize this sort of terminology has the potential to sound like mystical woo. I believe this is due to the twin effects of the inherent difficulty in defining and discussing consciousness, and of our socialization wherein these sorts of discussions are more often than not heard from Buddhists or Sufis, whose philosophical traditions have looked into the matter with greater rigor for a longer time than Western philosophy, and Hippies and Druggies who intr...
[Link] Huffington Post article about dual process theory
by Gleb_Tsipursky — 2016-01-06T01:44:31.078Z

Published a piece in The Huffington Post popularizing dual-process theory in layman's language.

P.S. I know some don't like using terms like Autopilot and Intentional to describe System 1 and System 2, but I find from long experience that these terms resonate well with a broad audience. Also, I know dual process theory is criticized by some, but we have to start somewhere, and just explaining dual process theory is a way to start bridging the inference gap to higher meta-cognition.
[Stub] The problem with Chesterton's Fence
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2016-01-05T17:10:31.503Z

Chesterton's meta-fence: "in our current system (democratic market economies with large governments) the common practice of taking down Chesterton fences is a process which seems well established and has a decent track record, and should not be unduly interfered with (unless you fully understand it)".
Meetup : Washington, D.C.: Fun & Games
by RobinZ — 2016-01-04T16:11:09.606Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Fun & Games

WHEN:
10 January 2016 03:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
Reynolds Center

x-posted from list. Gathering in courtyard from 3:00pm, hard start 3:30pm - until closing (7:00 pm).

We'll be hanging out to play games and engage in fun conversation.

Upcoming meetups:

Jan. 17: Economics Discussion

Jan. 24: Game Design

Jan. 31: Fun & Games

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Fun & Games
Open Thread, January 4-10, 2016
by polymathwannabe — 2016-01-04T13:06:58.608Z

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.
A note about calibration of confidence
by jbay — 2016-01-04T06:57:08.297Z

Background

In a recent Slate Star Codex Post (http://slatestarcodex.com/2016/01/02/2015-predictions-calibration-results/), Scott Alexander made a number of predictions and presented associated confidence levels, and then at the end of the year, scored his predictions in order to determine how well-calibrated he is. In the comments, however, there arose a controversy over how to deal with 50% confidence predictions. As an example, Scott has these predictions at 50% confidence, among his others:

Proposition

Scott's Prior

Result

A

Jeb Bush will be the top-polling Republican candidate

P(A) = 50%

A is False

B

Oil will end the year greater than $60 a barrel

P(B) = 50%

B is False

C

Scott will not get any new girlfriends

P(C) = 50%

C is False

D

At least one SSC post in the second half of 2015 will get > 100,000 hits: 70%

P(D) = 70%

D is False

E

Ebola will kill fewer people in second half of 2015 than the in first half

P(E) = 95%

E is True

Scott goes on to score himself as having made 0/3 correct predictions at the 50% confidence interval, which looks like significant overconfidence. He addresses this by noting that with only 3 data points it’s not much data to go by, and could easily have been correct if any of those results had turned out differently. His resulting calibration curve is this:

However, the commenters had other objections about the anomaly at 50%. After all, P(A) = 50% implies P(~A) = 50%, so the choice of “I will not get any new girlfriends: 50% confidence” is logically equivalent to “I will get at least 1 new girlfriend: 50% confidence”, except that one results as true and the other false. Therefore, the question seems sensitive only to the particular phrasing chosen, independent of the outcome.

One commenter suggests that close to perfect calibration at 50% confidence can be achieved by choosing whether to represent propositions as positive or negative statements by flipping a fair coin. Another suggests replacing 50% confidence with 50.1% or some other number arbitrarily close to 50%, but not equa

...
Active learning for opaque predictors
by paulfchristiano — 2016-01-03T21:15:28.000Z

Summary: I propose a simple open question that is directly relevant to the feasibility of my recent AI control proposals.

I've recently written a lot about AI control schemes based on counterfactual oversight, which are directed by predicted human behavior. A good example is described in this post, by Nisan.

Even assuming that some scheme in this family would work with perfect predictions (which is itself an open question), we would need to study how well they cope with prediction errors. Even if we had the ideal prediction algorithm, there would still be errors (since in general a sequence of observations does not uniquely determine the next observation). I want to focus on understanding the robustness of the scheme to even a minimal set of prediction errors.

A simple though exotic class of errors occur when a predictor is uncertain about whether observations are coming from a world where everything-is-as-it-appears, or whether they are produced by a simulation. This is an especially troubling kind of error because it may actually be adversarial (if the simulation is controlled by some consequentialist process).

Even setting aside such exotic errors, trying to prove worst case guarantees seems like good idea.

The problem

There seem to be two qualitatively distinct reasons that prediction errors might cause big trouble:

The system may continuously make bad predictions, in hypothetical situations that are never or only very rarely actually explored (so that the errors are never or only very rarely corrected).

Making a small number of bad predictions might have catastrophic consequences.

Both problems are potentially troubling. I think that error #1 is much more important and also more fundamental, so I'll focus on that one. We can move on to problem #2 if we manage to fix problem #1.

Ideally we would elicit human feedback in the situations that are most informative. This could potentially address problem #1, by ensuring that we quickly explore situations where our system may be making serious or consistent errors. In the long run it might also address problem #2, if the same techniques could be used to synthesize potentially problematic queries before failures would be catastrophic.

The question is: how can we do this?

I describe the problem in more detail here. Summarizing for this audience: assume that we have very good predictors (say, given by reflective orac

...
Polling Thread January 2016
by Gunnar_Zarncke — 2016-01-03T17:43:17.911Z

The next installment of the Polling Thread.

This is your chance to ask your multiple choice question you always wanted to throw in. Get qualified numeric feedback to your comments. Post fun polls.

These are the rules:

Each poll goes into its own top level comment and may be commented there.

You must at least vote all polls that were posted earlier than you own. This ensures participation in all polls and also limits the total number of polls. You may of course vote without posting a poll.

Your poll should include a 'don't know' option (to avoid conflict with 2). I don't know whether we need to add a troll catch option here but we will see.

If you don't know how to make a poll in a comment look at the Poll Markup Help.

This is a somewhat regular thread. If it is successful I may post again. Or you may. In that case do the following :

Use "Polling Thread" in the title.

Copy the rules.

Add the tag "poll".

Link to this Thread or a previous Thread.

Create a top-level comment saying 'Discussion of this thread goes here; all other top-level comments should be polls or similar'

Add a second top-level comment with an initial poll to start participation.
Meetup : Palo Alto Meetup: Introduction to Causal Inference
by Anders_H — 2016-01-03T02:22:37.793Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Palo Alto Meetup: Introduction to Causal Inference

WHEN:
19 January 2016 06:30:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
3911 Grove Avenue, Palo Alto

Anders Huitfeldt will give an introductory talk about causal reasoning and the distinction between causal inference and statistical inference

The meetup is at 6:30pm on Tuesday Jan 19th at the group house Tesseract in Palo Alto. Allergen notes: Cats and Dogs

Discussion article for the meetup : Palo Alto Meetup: Introduction to Causal Inference
Meetup : Palo Alto Meetup:  The Economics of AI
by Anders_H — 2016-01-03T02:20:41.540Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Palo Alto Meetup: The Economics of AI

WHEN:
05 January 2016 06:30:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
3911 Grove Avenue, Palo Alto

Edward will give a talk about the Economics of AI and its implications for the Singularity Hypothesis

The meetup is at 6:30pm on Tuesday Jan 5th at the group house Tesseract in Palo Alto. Allergen notes: Cats and Dogs

Discussion article for the meetup : Palo Alto Meetup: The Economics of AI
The art of response
by So8res — 2016-01-03T02:00:00.000Z
Link: https://mindingourway.com/the-art-of-response/

Imagine two different software engineers in job interviews. Both are asked for an algorithm that solves some programming puzzle, such as "identify all palindromes in a string of characters."

The first candidate, Alice, reflexively enters problem-solving mode upon hearing the problem. She pauses for a few seconds as she internalizes the problem, and then quickly thinks up a very inefficient algorithm that finds the answer by brute force. She decides to sketch this algorithm first (as a warm up) and then turn her mind to finding a more efficient path to the answer.

The second candidate, Bob, responds very differently to the same problem. He reflexively predicts that he won't be able to solve the problem. He struggles to quiet that voice in his head while he waits for a solution to present itself, but no solution is forthcoming. He struggles to focus as the seconds pass, until a part of his brain points out that he's been quiet for an uncomfortably long time, and the interviewer probably already thinks he's stupid. From then on, his thoughts are stuck on the situation, despite his attempts to wrest them back to the task at hand.

Part of what makes the difference between Alice and Bob might be skill: Alice might have more experience that lets her solve programming puzzles with less concerted effort, which helps her get to a solution before self-doubt creeps in. Self-confidence may also be a factor: perhaps Alice is simply less prone to self-doubt, and therefore less prone to this type of self-sabotage.

A third difference between Alice and Bob is their response pattern. Bob begins by waiting blankly for a solution to present itself; Alice begins by checking whether she can solve a simple version of the problem ("can I solve it by brute force?"). Bob is more liable to panic when no answer comes ("I have been quiet for too long"), Alice is more liable to break the problem down further if no solution presents itself ("Can I divide and conquer?").

This difference is also explained in part by experience: a more seasoned software engineer is more likely to reflexively notice that a problem can be solved with a simple recursion, and know which data structures to apply where. I don't think it's only experience, though. Imagine Alice and Bob both faced with a second problem, outside their usual comfort zone — say, a friend asks them for advice about how to handle a major life-...