trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
A Medical Mystery: Thyroid Hormones, Chronic Fatigue and Fibromyalgia
by johnlawrenceaspden — 2016-02-14T13:14:01.258Z

Summary:

Chronic Fatigue and Fibromyalgia look very like Hypothyroidism.
Thyroid Patients aren't happy with either the diagnosis or treatment of Hypothyroidism.
It is possible that lots of FMS/CFS cases are 'something wrong with the thyroid system that doesn't show up on laboratory hormone level tests'.
It's possible that it's not too difficult to fix these CFS/FMS cases with thyroid hormones.
I believe that there may have been a stupendous cock-up that's hurt millions.
Less Wrong should be interested, because it could be a real example of how bad inference can cause the sciences to come to false conclusions, as well as a good practice problem for the things we really care about.

Edit:

I found a possible answer here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nbm/thyroid_hormones_chronic_fatigue_and_fibromyalgia/
I do not believe it, because I do not understand it, but contemplation of it seems to be enlightening. In particular, the problem is much broader than I originally thought.

A summary of the argument in the first two posts, together with links to lots of evidence in the literature:

http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/nef/the_thyroid_madness_core_argument_evidence/

And this is pretty much proof, I think:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/nhs/the_thyroid_madness_two_apparently_contradictory/

At this point, I think I'm as confident as I can be without some sort of formal trial (so 25% maybe?)

But certainly, if you're suffering from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome/Fibromyalgia/Major Depression/Irritable Bowel Syndrome, or any of the many similar disorders which just seem to be different names for 'hypothyroidism with normal TSH', I reckon this is worth trying!

I have done, and it worked for me. For about four months now...

Original Post:

I believe that I've come across a genuine puzzle, and I wonder if you can help me solve it. This problem is complicated, and subtle, and has confounded and defeated good people for forty years. And yet there are huge and obvious clues. No-one seems to have conducted the simple experiments which the clues suggest, even though many clever people have thought hard about it, and the answer to the problem would be very valuable. And so I wonder what it is that I am missing.

I am going to tell a story which rather extravagantly privileges a hypothesis that I have concocted from many different sources, but a large part of it is from the work of the late Doctor John C Lowe, a...
Does Kolmogorov complexity imply a bound on self-improving AI?
by contravariant — 2016-02-14T08:38:26.832Z

The Kolmogorov complexity ("K") of a string ("S") specifies the size of the smallest Turing machine that can output that string. If a Turing machine (equivalently, by the Church-Turing thesis, any AI) has size smaller than K, it can rewrite its code as much as it wants to, it won't be able to output S. To be specific, of course it can output S by enumerating all possible strings, but it won't be able to decide on S and output it exclusively among the options available. Now suppose that S is the source code for an intelligence strictly better than all those with complexity <K. Now, we are left with 3 options:

The space of all maximally intelligent minds has an upper bound on complexity, and we have already reached it.

The universe contains new information that can be used to build minds of greater complexity, or:

There are levels of intelligence that are impossible for us to reach.

Now, this isn't meant to be a practical argument against AI being useful. I have no doubt that from just applying the principles humanity has shown we can apply already, at the speed of integrated circuits, we can rise many orders of magnitude in intellectual and productive ability. But it's a serious wake-up call to anyone who thinks that a self-improving AI will achieve anything that can possibly be achieved.
Group Rationality Diary, February 2016
by NoSignalNoNoise — 2016-02-14T01:55:15.553Z

This is the public group rationality diary for February, 2016. It's a place to record and chat about it if you have done, or are actively doing, things like:

Established a useful new habit

Obtained new evidence that made you change your mind about some belief

Decided to behave in a different way in some set of situations

Optimized some part of a common routine or cached behavior

Consciously changed your emotions or affect with respect to something

Consciously pursued new valuable information about something that could make a big difference in your life

Learned something new about your beliefs, behavior, or life that surprised you

Tried doing any of the above and failed

Or anything else interesting which you want to share, so that other people can think about it, and perhaps be inspired to take action themselves. Try to include enough details so that everyone can use each other's experiences to learn about what tends to work out, and what doesn't tend to work out.
Cheerful one-liners and disjointed anecdotes
by  — 2016-02-13T19:40:22.911Z

It would be good to have a way of telling people what they should expect from jobs - especially "intellectual" jobs - they consider taking. NOT how easy or lousy the work is going to turn out, just what might happen and approximately what do they have to do, so that they will decide if they want this.

When people ask for job-related advice, like "how does one become a programmer?", they are often told short and generally useful things, like "learn to code". And maybe also "it is really easy [if you aren't bad at math]". On the other hand, there are all these un-generalized stories of failures which are always just a bit different from the asker's own situation and prospects. There are a lot of them, but they are not actionable; and indeed what can you conclude from them - "it's not easy and don't learn to code"?

Were anyone to ask me "how does one become a plant population biologist?", I'd say "let's walk and have a look at what grows around here and you will tell me what you see". I don't think that "remember species of interest" will cover it. And then, if the person leans down, looks hard and keeps paying attention to the small details, I would share with them some stuff that has happened to me in the field (featuring Dogs, Tourists, Gatherers, Drunks, Heathens, Homeless people, Boars, an Elk, and the most dreaded beasts - the Landowners).

Now, from the point of view of my second supervisor, plant population biology is easy. She began as a geobotanist and then turned to more or less taxonomy, and it takes... work. LOTS of work. Once I brought her my orchid counts, and she said something like "a kid in the Seventh Form can do this; it's not science", and I was deeply offended and upset but didn't disagree. Because technically, if one trained a kid in the Seventh Form to write some Latin, survey rigorously, and a couple other tricks, yes, it was possible that he would have obtained the same data. Perhaps even better data, if his eyes were sharper, for example.

I've just never met a kid actually doing that, during the five snowless seasons when I browsed the countryside. Because however safe and simple it is, there needs to be a level of autonomy and self-sufficiency one has to attain before anybody would let a kid out on her own. The implicit assumption is that she won't fall down with sunstroke miles away from "civilisation", without a phone, a map, or even a...
Defiance
by So8res — 2016-02-13T08:00:00.000Z
Link: https://mindingourway.com/defiance/

The third dubious virtue is defiance. As with the other dubious virtues, it can get you into trouble. Remember the law of equal and opposite advice. Used correctly, it can play a key role in a healthy guilt-free motivation system.

I used to tell people that I'm roughly 90% defiance-fueled. The most common response was "ha ha I guess you can be manipulated by reverse psychology, then"; which led me to realize that I didn't yet know how to convey what I meant by "defiance fuel," so I stopped saying it. Today, we see whether I can convey what I mean by "defiance fuel" yet.

Most people I talk to about defiance think of it as a mental stance adopted against some authority figure. Perhaps they imagine a parental figure saying "finish your broccoli," and a child who hates broccoli with their jaw set and smolder in their eyes, who proceeds to eat with as much petulance as they can muster, plotting their revenge. The feeling we imagine in that child is perhaps the standard central example of "defiance."

I claim that that child does possess defiance-the-virtue, but not in their petulance, and not in their opposition to an authority figure. Defiance-the-action is in the child chewing with their mouth open in an open refusal to submit; defiance-the-virtue is in the mental actions they make before they start chewing with their mouth open. It's in the internal steeling they do when deciding not to be ordered around. It's in their decision to be self-reliant, it's in their refusal to take orders lying down. If these automatic and subconscious mental motions were verbalized, they might be written "I am my own person; and not beholden to your whims," or "if you push me, I push back." But they aren't verbalized, because they aren't conscious. They're reflexive.

Defiance-the-virtue is about encountering a badness that's brewing in the world, and reflexively doing everything you can to throw a wrench in the works, to twist things in your favor. Defiance-the-virtue is about taking nothing lying down, and refusing to let badnesses in the universe slide.

Defiance isn't about acting petulantly without hesitation: A defiant child might bide their time, knowing that if they act rashly there will be harsh consequences. Defiance is about resisting the default state of affairs without hesitation: A defiant child might weigh their options and bide their time, but at no point do they wonder wh...
On 'Why Global Poverty?' and Arguments from Unobservable Impacts
by Gram_Stone — 2016-02-13T06:04:02.979Z

Related: Is Molecular Nanotechnology "Scientific"?

For context, Jeff Kaufman delivered a speech on effective altruism and cause prioritization at EA Global 2015 entitled 'Why Global Poverty?', which he has transcribed and made available here. It's certainly worth reading.

I was dissatisfied with this speech in some ways. For the sake of transparency and charity, I will say that Kaufman has written a disclaimer explaining that, because of a miscommunication, he wrote this speech in the span of two hours immediately before he delivered it (instead of eating lunch, I would like to add), and that even after writing the text version, he is not entirely satisfied with the result.

I'm not that familiar with the EA community, but I predict that debates about cause prioritization, especially when existential risk mitigation is among the causes being discussed, can become mind-killed extremely quickly. And I don't mean to convey that in the tone of a wise outsider. It makes sense, considering the stakes at hand and the eschatological undertones of existential risk. (That is to say that the phrase 'save the world' can be sobering or gross, depending on the individual.) So, as is always implicit, but is sometimes worth making explicit, I'm criticizing some arguments as I understand them, not any person. I write this precisely because rationality is a common interest of many causes. I'll be focusing on the part about existential risk, as well as the parts that it is dependent upon. Lastly, I'd be interested in knowing if anyone else has criticized this speech in writing or come to conclusions similar to mine. Without further ado:

Jeff Kaufman's explanation of EA and why it makes sense is boilerplate; I agree with it, naturally. I also agree with the idea that certain existential risk mitigation strategies are comparatively less neglected by national governments and thus that risks like these are considerably less likely to be where one can make one's most valuable marginal donation. E.g., there are people who are paid to record and predict the trajectories of celestial objects, celestial mechanics is well-understood, and an impact event in the next two centuries is, with high meta-confidence, far less probable than many other risks. You probably shouldn't donate to asteroid impact risk mitigation organizations if you have to choose a cause from the catego...
Weekly LW Meetups
by FrankAdamek — 2016-02-12T16:41:33.952Z

This summary was posted to LW Main on February 5th. The following week's summary is here.

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

Australia Online Hangout: 06 February 2016 07:30PM
European Community Weekend: 02 September 2016 03:35PM
San Antonio Meetup Discussion (Topic: Pre-Hindsight): 07 February 2016 02:00PM
San Francisco Meetup: Fun and Games: 08 February 2016 06:15PM

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Austin, TX - Quack's - MiniTalks: 06 February 2016 01:30PM
[Canberra] Rationality Dojo: Habits: 14 February 2016 03:00PM
London Rationalish meetup, 7/2/16: 07 February 2016 02:00PM
Melbourne Rationality Dojo. Including: "Critical Thoughts on Nutritional Recommendations": 06 February 2016 02:30PM
[Moscow] Role playing game based on HPMOR in Moscow: 13 February 2016 02:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - February 2016: 07 February 2016 04:00PM
Vienna: 13 February 2016 03:00PM
Washington, D.C.: Fermi Estimates: 07 February 2016 03:00PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, Mountain View, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview is posted on the front page every Friday. These are an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in upcoming weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts are moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feat...
Where does our community disagree about meaningful issues?
by ChristianKl — 2016-02-12T11:34:37.075Z

Yesterday at our LW Berlin Dojo we talked about areas where we disagree. We got 4 issues:
1) AI risk is important
2) Everybody should be vegan.
3) It's good to make being an aspiring rationalist part of your identity.
4) Being conscious of privacy is important
Can you think of other meaningful issues where you think our community disagrees? At best issues that actually matter for our day to day decisions?
Meetup : Washington, D.C.: National Portrait Gallery/American Art Museum
by RobinZ — 2016-02-11T19:17:15.517Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: National Portrait Gallery/American Art Museum

WHEN:
14 February 2016 03:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
Reynolds Center

x-posted from list. Gathering in courtyard from 3:00pm, hard start 3:30pm - until closing (7:00 pm).

This week, we will be looking at exhibits in the National Portrait Gallery and American Art Museum.

As always, side conversations are allowed and encouraged.

Upcoming meetups:

Feb. 21: Fun & Games

Feb. 28: Mini Talks

Mar. 6: Game Design

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: National Portrait Gallery/American Art Museum
Things that can go wrong with decomposed modules
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2016-02-11T12:29:04.000Z

Some thoughts on what could go wrong with the decomposed modules that Eric Drexler is currently analysing:

There are systems that are unsafe if:

a) Every module is a superintelligent agent.
b) One module is a superintelligent agent.
c) No modules are superintelligent agents, but their input-output behaviour is not fully understood.
d) No modules are superintelligent agents, but their input-output behaviour are fully understood.

Now, d) seems unrealistic; my main objections are relevant to b), but they can shade into c) too.

Consider a system withe at least two modules, module P which produces plans for bridges, and module C which checks these plans. Because of imperfections in P, it is not only motivated to produce the best bridge plans it can, but it's also motivated to have C accept the plans.

Except that C is on a timer, and, if it can't check the plans within a set time, it rejects them. The complicated plans that P is motivated to produce are likely to be rejected on these grounds. Therefore P is not only motivated to produce complicated plans, but to "phrase" them in ways that C can quickly parse. Maybe including executive summaries, or pre-computing part of what C needs to do, and so on.

How would it acquire the ability to do so? Well, if we assume b), then P is already a superintetelligent agent, so that's easy. If not, it might acquire knowledge of C through testing some plans with it. Or there might be a module C' in the system, that also checks plans, but in a way that P doesn't care about. If P has access to C', it can rapidly test a lot of plans with it, and pass those on to C.

And, of course, there is but one step from "making your plans much easier to check" to "fooling the checker into accepting an imperfect plan".

A last element that relevant to this is that modules may come to realise the capabilities of other modules, and thus gain them by passing that message on. If module A can demonstrate to module B that a certain message came from module C, then module A effectively has the capabilities of C, and the fact that C and B are not connected ceases to matter.
Meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - March
by luminosity — 2016-02-11T09:24:34.214Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - March

WHEN:
06 March 2016 04:00:00PM (+1100)

WHERE:
10 Shepherd Street, Chippendale

After a great session working on our values in February, we'll be following up to ensure we're working on goals that fulfill them, and that excite us. If you didn't make it last time, don't worry, there'll be plenty of opportunity to catch up! The usual group dinner will happen afterwards.

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - March
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Projects
by rocurley — 2016-02-11T06:13:40.270Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Projects

WHEN:
15 February 2016 06:15:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
1597 Howard St. San Francisco, CA

We'll be meeting to work on projects!

A few things are different this time. We're going to try doing solo pomodoros, interspersed with updating each other on what we're doing/breaks.
Also, we're going to try starting the meetup proper (in this case working on projects) at 6:45, with the half hour beforehand dedicated to hanging out and maybe coordinating food.

As always, call me at 301-458-0764 to be let in.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Projects
Meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup
by leohmarruda — 2016-02-11T01:39:45.748Z

Discussion article for the meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup

WHEN:
13 February 2016 02:00:00PM (-0200)

WHERE:
Rua Antonio Carlos, 452, São Paulo - SP, Brazil

Encontro mensal de LessWrongers em SP no café Vanilla.
Como sempre, novatos são bem vindos!

Discussion article for the meetup : LessWrong Sao Paulo monthly meetup
Meetup : Ann Arbor Meetup, 2/19/16
by Bound_up — 2016-02-11T00:28:05.769Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Ann Arbor Meetup, 2/19/16

WHEN:
19 February 2016 07:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
611 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI 48104

I'm new here. If any of you know a good place to meet and would like to mention it in the comments, it'd be much appreciated.
If there's a better time, too, that can be changed, too.
Otherwise, we'll meet at the central campus library, Friday, February 19th, at 7 PM

Discussion article for the meetup : Ann Arbor Meetup, 2/19/16
Rationality Reading Group: Part T: Science and Rationality
by Gram_Stone — 2016-02-10T23:40:55.390Z

This is part of a semi-monthly reading group on Eliezer Yudkowsky's ebook, Rationality: From AI to Zombies. For more information about the group, see the announcement post.

Welcome to the Rationality reading group. This fortnight we discuss Part T: Science and Rationality (pp. 1187-1265) and Interlude: A Technical Explanation of Technical Explanation (pp. 1267-1314). This post summarizes each article of the sequence, linking to the original LessWrong post where available.

T. Science and Rationality

243. The Failures of Eld Science - A short story set in the same world as "Initiation Ceremony". Future physics students look back on the cautionary tale of quantum physics.

244. The Dilemma: Science or Bayes? - The failure of first-half-of-20th-century-physics was not due to straying from the scientific method. Science and rationality - that is, Science and Bayesianism - aren't the same thing, and sometimes they give different answers.

245. Science Doesn't Trust Your Rationality - The reason Science doesn't always agree with the exact, Bayesian, rational answer, is that Science doesn't trust you to be rational. It wants you to go out and gather overwhelming experimental evidence.

246. When Science Can't Help - If you have an idea, Science tells you to test it experimentally. If you spend 10 years testing the idea and the result comes out negative, Science slaps you on the back and says, "Better luck next time." If you want to spend 10 years testing a hypothesis that will actually turn out to be right, you'll have to try to do the thing that Science doesn't trust you to do: think rationally, and figure out the answer before you get clubbed over the head with it.

247. Science Isn't Strict Enough - Science lets you believe any damn stupid idea that hasn't been refuted by experiment. Bayesianism says there is always an exactly rational degree of belief given your current evidence, and this does not shift a nanometer to the left or to the right depending on your whims. Science is a social freedom - we let people test whatever hypotheses they like, because we don't trust the village elders to decide in advance - but you shouldn't confuse that with an individual standard of rationality.

248. Do Scientists Already Know This Stu...