trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Project Ideas for the London Hackday
by Alexandros — 2011-03-20T22:44:30.679Z

So, the London community is arranging a Hackday where some of us will get together and code. In order to ensure we work on the awesomest idea(s) possible, we decided to ask LessWrong to add to our list of candidates. So here is the question:

What could a few developers do in a day or less worth of coding that will be awesome? Also, as a way of checking calibration, you can give your estimate for how long such a thing would take to build.

Note: While we will take ideas and voting here into account, there is no guarantee that we will actually end up choosing one or more of them.
Trip from Ottawa, Canada to NYC on weekend of April 2
by Cyan — 2011-03-20T21:21:35.021Z

I'm contemplating I've decided to make a trip from Ottawa, Canada to New York City on the weekend of April 2-3 specifically in the hopes of meeting some members of the LW NYC Chapter (and EY as well, if I can manage it). Since I don't know anyone in the city, I'm hoping this discussion post will generate interest in having some kind of get-together on that weekend.

Anyone in the national capital region is welcome to contact me in comments or by PM to get in on the action. (I've already canvassed XFrequentist and received a positive reply.) Cosmos has offered to let me crash at his place, but I haven't asked him about extra space for other folk.
Less Wrong Rationality and Mainstream Philosophy
by lukeprog — 2011-03-20T20:28:05.119Z

Part of the sequence: Rationality and Philosophy

Despite Yudkowsky's distaste for mainstream philosophy, Less Wrong is largely a philosophy blog. Major topics include epistemology, philosophy of language, free will, metaphysics, metaethics, normative ethics, machine ethics, axiology, philosophy of mind, and more.

Moreover, standard Less Wrong positions on philosophical matters have been standard positions in a movement within mainstream philosophy for half a century. That movement is sometimes called "Quinean naturalism" after Harvard's W.V. Quine, who articulated the Less Wrong approach to philosophy in the 1960s. Quine was one of the most influential philosophers of the last 200 years, so I'm not talking about an obscure movement in philosophy.

Let us survey the connections. Quine thought that philosophy was continuous with science - and where it wasn't, it was bad philosophy. He embraced empiricism and reductionism. He rejected the notion of libertarian free will. He regarded postmodernism as sophistry. Like Wittgenstein and Yudkowsky, Quine didn't try to straightforwardly solve traditional Big Questions as much as he either dissolved those questions or reframed them such that they could be solved. He dismissed endless semantic arguments about the meaning of vague terms like knowledge. He rejected a priori knowledge. He rejected the notion of privileged philosophical insight: knowledge comes from ordinary knowledge, as best refined by science. Eliezer once said that philosophy should be about cognitive science, and Quine would agree. Quine famously wrote:

The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world. Why not just see how this construction really proceeds? Why not settle for psychology?

But isn't this using science to justify science? Isn't that circular? Not quite, say Quine and Yudkowsky. It is merely "reflecting on your mind's degree of trustworthiness, using your current mind as opposed to something else." Luckily, the brain is the lens that sees its flaws. And thus, says Quine:

Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science.

Yudkowsky once wrote, "If there's any centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive ph...
26 March 2011 Southern California Meetup
by jimmy — 2011-03-20T18:29:16.231Z

We're having another SoCal LessWrong meetup this Saturday, the 26th. It'll be held in the upstairs meeting area at this IHOP in Irvine. It will start at 2PM and probably run until 7 or so.

The format for past meetups has varied based on the number of attendees and their interests, at various points we have tried: paranoid debating, small group "dinner party conversations", structured rationality exercises, large discussions with people sharing personal experiences with sleep and "nutraceutical" interventions for intelligence augmentation, and specialized subprojects to develop tools for quantitatively estimating the value of things like cryonics or existential risk interventions.

If you need or can offer a ride, post in the comments.
What are Arguments, from an Agorics point of view?
by Johnicholas — 2011-03-20T17:35:26.543Z

Background on Agorics:

The idea of software agents cooperating in an open market or "agora". Described by Mark Miller and Eric Drexler here: http://e-drexler.com/d/09/00/AgoricsPapers/agoricpapers.html Depicted by Greg Egan in his novel "Diaspora", exerpt here: http://gregegan.customer.netspace.net.au/DIASPORA/01/Orphanogenesis.html

Background on Argument: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument

Let's start by supposing that an argument is a variety of persuasive message. If Bob trusts Alice though, Bob could be persuaded by simply recieving a claim from Alice. That is a kind of persuasive message, but it's not an argument. If Bob is insecure, then Bob's mind could be hacked and therefore changed. However, that's not an argument either. (The "Buffer Overflow Fallacy"?)

Possibly arguments are witnesses (or "certificates"), as used in computational complexity. Alice could spend exp-time to solve an instance of an NP-complete problem, then send a small witness to B, who can then spend poly-time to verify it. The witness would be an argument.

I'm not sure if that's a definition, but we have an overgeneral category (persuasive messages) that is, a superset of arguments, two subcategories of persuasive messages that are specifically excluded, and one subcategory that is specifically included, which seems like enough to go on with.

We know what witnesses to SAT problems look like - they look like satisfying assignments. That is, if Bob were considering a SAT problem, and Alice sent Bob a putative satisfying assignment, and Bob verified it, then Bob ought (rationally) to be convinced that the problem is satisfiable.

What do other kinds of witnesses look like? What about probabilistic computation? What if Alice and Bob may have different priors?
A few minor comparisons of the results of Genetic egineering and Natural selection 
by  — 2011-03-20T10:36:59.000Z

[feel free to tldr the intro]

Intro

The title should have been longer to be more accurate and perhaps less misleading but I hope the community will forgive that for sake of brevity as:

A few minor comparisons of the [probable] results of [relatively conservative] Genetic engineering and natural selection [as it acted in the ancestral environment and to a lesser extent today in a purely speculative manner, publicized only to clear and debug my own thinking as well as hear new ideas on the subject from trusted sources]

seemed a bit much.

First off I would like to pre-empt a comment launching a debate that some might find interesting and others tedious, I wish to emphasise that genetic engineering and all human activity is naturally well ... natural (so one could say that natural selection is a bit of a misnomer). By saying that I also hope I implicitly clear up what is meant when I speak of "selective pressures".

Much like Robin Hanson's highly modified very economical sustenance level living ems, any analysis focusing on the intelligence enhancement aspect of genetic engineering will tend towards a similar shining "result" that might overshadow smaller insights. The only real appreciable difference seems to be the time-scales involved (the length of a human generations is on completely different orders of magnitude than say just copying ems). Both scenarios could be understood as a prophecy of ultimate victory of natural selection over any human attempt to limit its outcome according to most of the sets of values in valuspace that generally humans occupy (valuing survival and only survival, with survival defined as a specific kind of continuity, is of course a obvious exception, but few humans I think truly ascribe to it). The transition period to a neomalthusian world has some interesting dynamics but I'm not going to talk about that too much because it seems a classical accelerating returns event.

In addition for similar reasons (much like Eliezer's story) this "impossible world" is going to ignore or more accuratley not touch the effects of AI and cybernetic IA. Sans the narrative I am basically making a story to flesh out how the new balance of selective pressures that are likley to exist in the early phases of genetic engineering may look like. This is done because:

I wish to see if any new factors, that haven't been discussed yet or I haven't thought of yet

...
"How to Have a Rational Discussion"
by jschulter — 2011-03-20T10:22:22.521Z

I have a feeling that most of the people reading this site already understand everything in this article, but it's a useful synopsis of common issues faced when trying to have a reasonable discussion with laypeople, and might be good to point them to if necessary.

http://thoughtcatalog.com/2011/how-to-have-a-rational-discussion/

I also want to mention how much I wish someone had shown me something like this as a teenager- I was very prone to lecture others against their will- as it might have saved me a lot of grief. I'm curious to see if these tendencies might have been common among members of this community growing up, so please comment to tell me if so (actually, please tell me even if not-no reason to encourage my own confirmation bias)!
Rationality vs. intelligence
by PlaidX — 2011-03-20T05:16:26.330Z

This site often speaks of rationality and intelligence as though they were the same thing, and that someone, by becoming more rational, becomes more intelligent for practical purposes.

Certainly it seems to me that this must be to some extent the case, but what is the exchange rate? If a person has an IQ of 100, and then they spend a year on lesswrong, reading all the sequences and taking the advice to heart, training their skills and identifying their biases and all that, at the end of it, presumably their raw IQ score is still 100, but if we measure how they do on correlated indicators regarding their lifestyle or something, should we expect to see them, in some way, living the life of a smarter person? How much smarter?

How many points of IQ would you be willing to give up to retain what you have learned from this site?

Personally I would answer "less than one". It seems like it SHOULD be useful, but it doesn't really feel like it is.
What is wrong with mathematics education?
by Perplexed — 2011-03-20T02:40:15.406Z

This guy says that the problem is that high-school math education is structured to prepare people to learn calculus in their freshman year of college. But only a small minority of students ever takes calculus, and an even smaller minority ever uses it. And not many people ever make much use of pre-calc subjects like algebra, trig, or analytic geometry.

Instead, high-school math should be structured to prepare people to learn statistics. Probability and basic statistics, he argues, are not only more generally useful than calculus, they are also more fun.

I have to agree with him. What do the people here think?
A Rationalist's Account of Objectification?
by lukeprog — 2011-03-19T23:10:19.086Z

I'm seeking some feminist consciousness-raising, and I'm hoping some LWers (Alicorn?) can help.

Specifically, I've never understood why "objectification" is wrong.

I'm a tall white American male, so sometimes it takes a bit of work for me to understand what it's like to be a member of a suppressed group. I still need regular training in avoiding sexist language, etc.

First: my background. When I was 10ish I encountered the word "feminism" for the first time. I asked my mom what the word meant.

She said, "It's the idea that women should have the same rights and privileges as men do."

And I thought, "They have a word for that?" It seemed too obvious to deserve its own word. It felt like having a special word for the idea that left-handers and right-handers should have the same rights and privileges.

So I've always thought of myself as a feminist.

Of course, some activists (the word has positive connotations to me, BTW) pushed too far, as is the case in all large movements. At some times and places (1980s academia, I think), it was common to assert that there are almost no (average) significant differences between men and women that aren't caused by enculturation, except for genitalia. That is of course false. Hormones matter, especially during development.

Such overreaches made it psychologically easier for some non-feminists to dismiss legitimate feminist demands and resist thousands of much-needed feminist advances (which are still ongoing).

Now, on this matter of objectification. I've never understood it. I've tried to get people to explain it to me before, but they were (apparently) not well-trained in rationality. I'm hoping a rationalist can explain it to me.

Here's my confusion about objectification. Depending on what you mean by "objectification," it seems to be either something that (1) is very often perfectly acceptable, or that (2) means something very narrow and is usually not being exemplified when there is an accusation of it being exemplified.

Let me explain.

Earlier, when I tried to figure out what "objectification" was and why it was wrong, the leading article on the topic seemed to be one by philosopher Martha Nussbaum. She lays out the goal of her paper like this:

I shall argue that there are at least seven distinct ways of behaving introduced by the term, none of which implies any of the others, though there are many complex connections amon

...
Happiness Engineering
by PhilGoetz — 2011-03-19T21:44:14.913Z

On the same day that Lukeprog posted How to be happy, Scott Adams made a similar post on the Dilbert Blog, Happiness Engineering.

I'm always skeptical when receiving life advice from successful people, because their advice is biased towards taking too much risk, because successful people are selected for having been lucky. But Scott's list doesn't raise any red flags with me, and is admirably concise.
Omega and self-fulfilling prophecies
by Richard_Kennaway — 2011-03-19T17:23:09.303Z

Omega appears to you in a puff of logic, and presents you with a closed box. "If you open this box you will find either nothing or a million dollars," Omega tells you, "and the contents will be yours to keep." "Great," you say, taking the box, "sounds like I can't lose!" "Not so fast," says Omega, "to get that possible million dollars you have to be in the right frame of mind. If you are at least 99% confident that there's a million dollars in the box, there will be. If you're less confident than that, it will be empty. I'm not predicting the state of your mind in advance this time, I'm reading it directly and teleporting the money in only if you have enough faith that it will be there. Take as long as you like."

Assume you believe Omega. Can you believe the million dollars will be there, strongly enough that it will be?
Anki on Mac in 60 seconds
by lukeprog — 2011-03-19T06:53:59.699Z

Spaced repetition - like the 'Anki' program does - is one of the most efficient ways to learn new things. (For research citations, see 'Study methods', here.)

I previously explained how to get up and running with Anki on an Android phone. Here's the guide for using Anki on a Mac:

Go here and click 'Download Latest Release' (or here if you're on PowerPC).

Open the downloaded .dmg file, drag the Anki icon into your Applications folder in the dock, and then run the Anki application. (Click 'Open' when warned that the application was downloaded.)

Click 'Download' and search the list of decks for 'Less Wrong'. Download the 'Less Wrong Sequences' deck.

Set your review options as desired, then click 'Review.'

That's it!

(This full process will take longer than 60 seconds because of download speed, but will probably require only 60 seconds of interaction with the phone.)
Can we stop using the word "rationalism"?
by  — 2011-03-19T02:45:13.428Z

You see, I've seen the word "rationalism" used to mean all five of these things at different times:

The belief that we should come to know the world through reason and experimentation, shunning intuition.

The belief that we should come to know the world through reason and intuition, shunning experimentation.

The belief that we should come to know the world through knowledge of (and correction for) cognitive biases, and knowledge of (and correct use of) probability theory.

Being effective at believing things that are true and not things that are false.

Being effective at doing things that are good and not things that are bad.

In most of the mainstream philosophy I've read, the word "rationalism" has been used, without qualification, to mean the second of these, even though that type of rationalism strongly contradicts the stuff we call rationalism! One of my friends has freely used the word "rationalism" in conversation, referring to "our" rationalism, completely unaware that, to most people, the word means something completely different. Another of my friends said that he "hates rationalism with a passion"—and I have no idea which of these five things is the one he hates!

Given that "rationalism" to most people (or, at least, most philosophers) means something utterly unlike what it means to us, perhaps calling our philosophy "rationalism" is about as wise as developing a political philosophy, based on socialism but with nationalist influences, and calling it "national socialism".

I suggest that we use the word "sensibilism" instead, since nobody else is using it, it seems unobjectionable, and I think it captures what we're all about.

Edited to remove a proposed solution.

Edited to reinstate that proposed solution, since this discussion is presumably finished.
Effective Rationality Outreach
by paulfchristiano — 2011-03-19T00:16:35.376Z

I believe that the number of smart rationalists has a profound influence on the quality of the future, so I would like to spread rationality at the maximum possible rate. In fact I believe this is the most important problem which I can work on right now. This post describes some of my beliefs about rationality outreach. The purpose of this post is threefold. First, by exposing my beliefs to criticism I hope to improve them. Second, by communicating my beliefs I hope to help others with similar goals. Third, by engaging in more concrete discussion of rationality outreach I hope to increase the probability that others will work seriously on the problem.

What Should be Taught?

"Spread rationality" is a rather vague and unhelpful goal. Here are three behaviors / habits of mind which I believe would make the world a much better place if they caught on among smart people.
1. Desire for accurate beliefs. Many people don't feel that improving the quality of their beliefs is worthwhile. This is a combination of a failure to recognize exactly how wrong many of their beliefs are and a general perception that it doesn't matter anyway. Society as a whole is assumed to be "basically right," even by people who verbally acknowledge rather serious failures of humanity's collective rationality. This is related to the perception that there is no free lunch: as humans we resist the suggestion that we can get anything for free, and acting intelligently seems to be considered too easy. The other side of this bias is a reluctance to believe that incorrect beliefs can really do any damage.
2. Mindful living. Many people direct incredible intelligence towards solving problems they encounter in their work, but fail to apply that intelligence to understanding the sources of their own beliefs/emotions, clarifying/refining their goals, or considering how to direct their resources to obtain those goals.
3. Initiative and confidence. It is very easy to believe that the world is a crazy place but that an individual has no power to change it. Regardless of how true that may be (my experience suggests not very), the world would probably be a better place if more really intelligent people internalized the belief that their actions change the world. Believing that your life is high stakes--that the potential upside is large--seems to be well correlated with doing great good.
Why Would People Liste...
Melbourne meetup
by  — 2011-03-18T22:28:58.497Z

Note: There has been some discussion of a chance of venue. I suggest we leave it the same at this stage as some people might not realise these discussions have been happening. However, we could then consider moving onto Trike if that seemed suitable? I'm happy to give people my mobile no if they message me if it helps for co-ordinating (especially if they're likely to be late - just in case we've moved venue).

Melbourne (Australia) meetup.

Date: Saturday, April 2nd at 1pm

Where: Don Tojo

What: I've never been to a meetup before but others seem to feel that discussion topics work well?

Possible topics (open for debate but as there's no discussion in the comments about this I thought I'd better come up with some structure for the meetup):

1. Sequence discussion - everyone chooses a post from the sequence they think is interesting and we discuss each in turn.

2. Paranoid debating - As a group we discuss what we think the answer is to a quantifiable question (the example given is, "How much maize is produced in Mexico annually?") except some people have been assigned the role of deceiver. The group comes up with a final answer and are scored according to how close it is except for the deceiver, who is scored based on how far away it is).

3. Talk on a topic - Any group member who feels comfortable doing so gives a brief speech on a topic they're knowledgeable about. It can be related to Less Wrong themes - rationality, psychology, biases, AI, Bayesianism, instrumental rationality - or alternatively can be on another topic if the person is more comfortable with that.

Let me know below if you're interested.

People interested so far:

Me

Waveman

Nshepperd

SharePhoenix

Luminosity

Jayzee

A masque of Reason