trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Meetup : West LA—R:AZ Part B, Fake Beliefs
by OpenThreadGuy — 2015-03-27T08:28:20.336Z

Discussion article for the meetup : West LA—R:AZ Part B, Fake Beliefs

WHEN:
01 April 2015 07:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
11066 Santa Monica Blvd, Los Angeles, CA

How to Find Us: Go into this Del Taco. We will be in the back room if possible.

Parking is free in the lot out front or on the street nearby.

Discussion: We will be discussing Part B of Rationality: From AI to Zombies. You are welcome to join us even if you have not done the reading. However, the reading is very good, and it is free, and you should read it. We will be discussing roughly one part per week for a total of 26 weeks.

Recommended Reading:

Part B: Fake Beliefs (pages 43-77, Kindle locations 1163-1639)

Improper belief

Are Beliefs Like Clothing?

Meet the Groovies

No prior exposure to Less Wrong is required, nor yet is the reading required, only strongly recommended. This meetup is not an April Fools' joke. It will actually happen. No, seriously.

Discussion article for the meetup : West LA—R:AZ Part B, Fake Beliefs
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks
by rocurley — 2015-03-27T06:43:58.051Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks

WHEN:
30 March 2015 06:15:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
1061 Market St #4, San Francisco, CA 94103

Please not the location, since we've been bouncing between two locations.

We'll be meeting to give/listen to short talks. Planning isn't necessary: these are not expected to be polished.

I can be reached at 301-458-0764 if you need help getting in. As always, feel free to show up late.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks
Negative visualization, radical acceptance and stoicism
by Vika — 2015-03-27T03:51:49.635Z

In anxious, frustrating or aversive situations, I find it helpful to visualize the worst case that I fear might happen, and try to accept it. I call this “radical acceptance”, since the imagined worst case is usually an unrealistic scenario that would be extremely unlikely to happen, e.g. “suppose I get absolutely nothing done in the next month”. This is essentially the negative visualization component of stoicism. There are many benefits to visualizing the worst case:

Feeling better about the present situation by contrast.

Turning attention to the good things that would still be in my life even if everything went wrong in one particular domain.

Weakening anxiety using humor (by imagining an exaggerated “doomsday” scenario).

Being more prepared for failure, and making contingency plans (pre-hindsight).

Helping make more accurate predictions about the future by reducing the “X isn’t allowed to happen” effect (or, as Anna Salamon once put it, “putting X into the realm of the thinkable”).

Reducing the effect of ugh fields / aversions, which thrive on the “X isn’t allowed to happen” flinch.

Weakening unhelpful identities like “person who is always productive” or “person who doesn’t make stupid mistakes”.

Let’s say I have an aversion around meetings with my advisor, because I expect him to be disappointed with my research progress. When I notice myself worrying about the next meeting or finding excuses to postpone it so that I have more time to make progress, I can imagine the worst imaginable outcome a meeting with my advisor could have - perhaps he might yell at me or even decide to expel me from grad school (neither of these have actually happened so far). If the scenario is starting to sound silly, that’s a good sign. I can then imagine how this plays out in great detail, from the disappointed faces and words of the rest of the department to the official letter of dismissal in my hands, and consider what I might do in that case, like applying for industry jobs. While building up these layers of detail in my mind, I breathe deeply, which I associate with meditative acceptance of reality. (I use the word “acceptance” to mean “acknowledgement” rather than “resignation”.)

I am trying to use this techni...
Reflective oracles and the procrastination paradox
by jessicata — 2015-03-26T22:18:15.000Z

The procrastination paradox relates to the following problem:

There are infinite time steps (one for each natural number).

For each time step, there is an agent.

Each agent may press the button or not.

Each agent will get utility 1 if and only if it or a later agent presses the button.

The paradox is that the following reasoning process leads to the button never getting pressed:

My rule (and the rule for all future agents) is that, if I can prove that the button will be pressed in the future, then I will not press the button, and otherwise I will. This rule (appears to) maximizes utility.

The next agent uses this rule, so the next agent will only fail to press the button if it can prove that the button will be pressed by some later agent.

I trust the next agent's proof system.

Therefore, whether or not I press the button, the next agent or an agent after that will press the button.

Therefore, if I don't press the button, my utility is 1.

Therefore, my rule says I will not press the button.

But the same reasoning can be used for every time step! No agent will press the button, and all will trust that some future agent will. The flaw here is that we constructed a sequence of logical systems
(one for each agent), each of which considers the next one sound.

We can formalize the procrastination paradox using reflective oracles instead of logic. Suppose each agent
is a reflective CDT agent. Define a machine AOi() to represent whether agent i presses the
button (for some natural number i), and define a machine BOi() to represent whether
agent i or a later agent presses the button:

AOi()=1−O(Bi+1,0)
BOi()=protectO(Ai∨Bi+1)

The first line states that the agent must press the button if
P(BOi+1()<1), and may do anything otherwise. In the
second line, (Ai∨Bi+1)O()=AOi()∨BOi+1(),
and protectO(Q) is a way of sampling
a bit with the same distribution QO(), as defined
in this post:

So we call our oracle on the pair (⌈Q⌉,0.5), and throw a fair coin.

If the coin comes up heads and the oracle says “false” (the probability of Q returning 1 is smaller than 0.5), we output a zero.

If the coin lands heads and the oracle says “true”, we output a one.

If the coin lands tails and the oracle says “false”, we call our oracle on (⌈Q⌉,0.25) and repeat the process; if the coin lands tails and the oracle says “true”, we call the oracle on (⌈Q⌉,0.75) and repeat.

Observe that a

...
Defeating the Villain
by Zubon — 2015-03-26T21:43:03.702Z

We have a recurring theme in the greater Less Wrong community that life should be more like a high fantasy novel. Maybe that is to be expected when a quarter of the community came here via Harry Potter fanfiction, and we also have rationalist group houses named after fantasy locations, descriptions of community members in terms of character archetypes and PCs versus NPCs, semi-serious development of the new atheist gods, and feel free to contribute your favorites in the comments.

A failure mode common to high fantasy novels as well as politics is solving all our problems by defeating the villain. Actually, this is a common narrative structure for our entire storytelling species, and it works well as a narrative structure. The story needs conflict, so we pit a sympathetic protagonist against a compelling antagonist, and we reach a satisfying climax when the two come into direct conflict, good conquers evil, and we live happily ever after.

This isn't an article about whether your opponent really is a villain. Let's make the (large) assumption that you have legitimately identified a villain who is doing evil things. They certainly exist in the world. Defeating this villain is a legitimate goal.

And then what?

Defeating the villain is rarely enough. Building is harder than destroying, and it is very unlikely that something good will spontaneously fill the void when something evil is taken away. It is also insufficient to speak in vague generalities about the ideals to which the post-[whatever] society will adhere. How are you going to avoid the problems caused by whatever you are eliminating, and how are you going to successfully transition from evil to good?

In fantasy novels, this is rarely an issue. The story ends shortly after the climax, either with good ascending or time-skipping to a society made perfect off-camera. Sauron has been vanquished, the rightful king has been restored, cue epilogue(s). And then what? Has the Chosen One shown skill in diplomacy and economics, solving problems not involving swords? What was Aragorn's tax policy? Sauron managed to feed his armies from a wasteland; what kind of agricultural techniques do you have? And indeed, if the book/series needs a sequel, we find that a problem at least as bad as the original fills in the void.

Reality often follows that pattern. Marx explicitly had no plan for what happened after you smashed capita...
Postdoctoral research positions at CSER (Cambridge, UK)
by Sean_o_h — 2015-03-26T17:59:53.828Z

[To be cross-posted at Effective Altruism Forum, FLI news page]

I'm delighted to announce that the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk has had considerable recent success in grantwriting and fundraising, among other activities (full update coming shortly). As a result, we are now in a position to advance to CSER's next stage of development: full research operations. Over the course of this year, we will be recruiting for a full team of postdoctoral researchers to work on a combination of general methodologies for extreme technological (and existential) risk analysis and mitigation, alongside specific technology/risk-specific projects.

Our first round of recruitment has just opened - we will be aiming to hire up to 4 postdoctoral researchers; details below. A second recruitment round will take place in the Autumn. We have a slightly unusual opportunity in that we get to cast our net reasonably wide. We have a number of planned research projects (listed below) that we hope to recruit for. However, we also have the flexibility to hire one or more postdoctoral researchers to work on additional projects relevant to CSER's aims. Information about CSER's aims and core research areas is available on our website. We request that as part of the application process potential postholders send us a research proposal of no more than 1500 words, explaining what your research skills could contribute to CSER. At this point in time, we are looking for people who will have obtained a doctorate in a relevant discipline by their start date.

We would also humbly ask that the LessWrong community aid us in spreading the word far and wide about these positions. There are many brilliant people working within the existential risk community. However, there are academic disciplines and communities that have had less exposure to existential risk as a research priority than others (due to founder effect and other factors), but where there may be people with very relevant skills and great insights. With new centres and new positions becoming available, we have a wonderful opportunity to grow the field, and to embed existential risk as a crucial consideration in all relevant fields and disciplines.

Thanks very much,

Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh (Executive Director, CSER)

"The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (University of Cambridge, UK) is recruiting for to four fu...
Where can I go to exploit social influence to fight akrasia?
by  — 2015-03-26T15:39:55.995Z

Briefly: I'm looking for a person (or group) with whom I can mutually discuss self improvement and personal goals (and nothing else) on a regular basis.

Also, note, this post is an example of asking a personally important question on LW. The following idea is not meant as a general mindhack, but just as something I want to try out myself.

We are unconsciously motivated by those around us. The Milgram experiment and the Asch conformity experiment are the two best examples of social influence that come to my mind, though I'm sure there are plenty more (if you haven't heard of them, I really suggest spending a minute).

I've tended to see this drive to conform to the expectations of others as a weakness of the human mind, and yes, it can be destructive. However, as long as its there, I should exploit it. Specifically, I want to exploit it to fight akrasia.

Utilizing positive social influence is a pretty common tactic for fighting drug addictions (like in AA), but I haven't really heard of it being used to fight unproductivity. Sharing your personal work/improvement goals with someone in the same position as yourself, along with reflecting on previous attempts, could potentially be powerful. Humans simply feel more responsible for the things they tell other people about, and less responsible for the things they bottle up and don't tell anyone (like all of my productivity strategies).

The setup that I envision would be something like this:

On a chat room, or some system like skype.1

Meet weekly at a very specific time for a set amount of time.

Your partner has a list of the productivity goals you set during the previous session. They ask you about your performance, forcing you to explain either your success or your failure.

Your partner tries to articulate what went wrong or what went right from your explanation (giving you a second perspective).

Once both parties have shared and evaluated, you set your new goals in light of your new experience (and with your partner's input, hopefully being more effective).

The partnership continues as long as it is useful for all parties.

I've tried doing something similar to this with my friends, but it just didn't work. We already knew each other too well, and there wasn't that air of dispassionate professionality. We were friends, but not partners (in this sense of the word).

If something close to what I describe already exists, ...
Meetup : Moscow meetup: communication practice and three short talks
by Slava Matyukhin — 2015-03-26T14:27:55.722Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Moscow meetup: communication practice and three short talks

WHEN:
29 March 2015 02:00:00PM (+0300)

WHERE:
Russia, Moscow, ulitsa L'va Tolstogo 16

This Sunday, we'll have our usual meetup, consisting of three talks and one large practice session.

Talks (1h total):

Eugene on power effects on cognition.

Denis on two modes of time perception.

Slava (me) on comparative advantage in economics (and life lessons following from it).

Communication practice session:

Pion will continue to organize the communication techniques practice. We will repeat the exercise from the last session, and try the new one.

Schedule details are in hackpad.

Info for the newcomers: We gather in the Yandex office, first revolving door is on the right from the archway, entrance 8.1. Here is a guide how to get to Yandex: http://company.yandex.ru/contacts/redrose/. If you're late, send me (Slava) an SMS at +7(926)313-96-42; you'll have to wait until I'm free to go down and meet you (which might take a while, I'm often busy with coordinating other stuff at the meetup). Expected duration of the meetup is 4 hours, plus a few hours of afterparty if you're willing to stay a bit longer.

If you're not the member of our Moscow community yet, you might want to check out https://lesswrong-ru.hackpad.com/, there's a lot of content about what's been going on for the last two years. Also, please subscribe to our mailing list.

Discussion article for the meetup : Moscow meetup: communication practice and three short talks
Values at compile time
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2015-03-26T12:25:28.090Z

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

This is a simple extension of the model-as-definition and the intelligence module ideas. General structure of these extensions: even an unfriendly AI, in the course of being unfriendly, will need to calculate certain estimates that would be of great positive value if we could but see them, shorn from the rest of the AI's infrastructure.

It's almost trivially simple. Have the AI construct a module that models humans and models human understanding (including natural language understanding). This is the kind of thing that any AI would want to do, whatever its goals were.

Then take that module (using corrigibility) into another AI, and use it as part of the definition of the new AI's motivation. The new AI will then use this module to follow instruction humans give it in natural language.

Too easy?...

This approach essentially solves the whole friendly AI problem, loading it onto the AI in a way that avoids the whole "defining goals (or meta-goals, or meta-meta-goals) in machine code" or the "grounding everything in code" problems. As such it is extremely seductive, and will sound better, and easier, than it likely is.

I expect this approach to fail. For it to have any chance of success, we need to be sure that both model-as-definition and the intelligence module idea are rigorously defined. Then we have to have a good understanding of the various ways how the approach might fail, before we can even begin to talk about how it might succeed.

The first issue that springs to mind is when multiple definitions fit the AI's model of human intentions and understanding. We might want the AI to try and accomplish all the things it is asked to do, according to all the definitions. Therefore, similarly to this post, we want to phrase the instructions carefully so that a "bad instantiation" simply means the AI does something pointless, rather than something negative. Eg "Give humans something nice" seems much safer than "give humans what they really want".

And then of course there's those orders where humans really don't understand what they themselves want...

I'd want a lot more issues like that discussed and solved, before I'd recommend using this approach to getting a safe FAI.
What I mean...
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2015-03-26T11:59:04.660Z

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

This is a simple extension of the model-as-definition and the intelligence module ideas. General structure of these extensions: even an unfriendly AI, in the course of being unfriendly, will need to calculate certain estimates that would be of great positive value if we could but see them, shorn from the rest of the AI's infrastructure.

The challenge is to get the AI to answer a question as accurately as possible, using the human definition of accuracy.

First, imagine an AI with some goal is going to answer a question, such as Q="What would happen if...?" The AI is under no compulsion to answer it honestly.

What would the AI do? Well, if it is sufficiently intelligent, it will model humans. It will use this model to understand what they meant by Q, and why they were asking. Then it will ponder various outcomes, and various answers it could give, and what the human understanding of those answers would be. This is what any sufficiently smart AI (friendly or not) would do.

Then the basic idea is to use modular design and corrigibility to extract the relevant pieces (possibly feeding them to another, differently motivated AI). What needs to be pieced together is: AI understanding of what human understanding of Q is, actual answer to Q (given this understanding), human understanding of various AI's answers (using model of human understanding), and minimum divergence between human understanding of answer and actual answer.

All these pieces are there, and if they can be safely extracted, the minimum divergence can be calculated and the actual answer calculated.
Revisiting Non-centrality
by casebash — 2015-03-26T01:49:07.710Z

I recently read this article by Yvain where he discusses what he calls the worst argument in the world or the "non-centrality fallacy". If you haven't read the article, he describes it by first beginning a hypothetical objection to a proposal to build a statue for Martin Luther King. He imagine that someone objects based on Martin Luther King being a "criminal", which would technically be true as some of his protests were technically not legal. Yvain notes that while the typical response would be to argue that he isn't a criminal, a more intellectually robust approach would be to argue that he is actually "the good kind of criminal". However, this would result in you looking silly. The non-centrality fallacy gets its name because someone is trying to convince us to treat an unusual member of a class (ie. Martin Luther King with the class of "criminals") with the members of a class we first think of (thieves, drug dealers, ect.).

I think that this is a very valuable line of analysis, but unfortunately, labelling something as a "fallacy" is very black and white given that different people will consider different items to be central or non-central. I think that a much better approach is to identify the ways in which a particular example is either typical or non-typical. I will us + for similarities and - for differences, and ~ for things that aren't necessarily non-typical of the class, but worth separating out anyway. I will use "arguably" in front of all statements that aren't definite matters of fact.

Martin Luther King and criminals

+ Technically broke the law

~ Non-violent

- Arguably, non-selfish motivations

- Arguably, attempting to challenge unjust laws

Abortion and murder

+ Destroys a human/human-like entity

- Complete absence/major differences in cognitive abilities

- No relationships with friends and family

- Doesn't create a fear of being killed within society

- Society hasn't invested significantly in raising the entity

Capital punishment and murder

+ Kills a human

- Arguably, decreases crime

- Arguably, helps the family move on

- Arguably, deserved as a punishment

Affirmative action and racism

+ Treats people differently based on race

+ Arguably increases tensions between races

+ Arguably, provides some individuals with undeserved opportunities

- Arguably, ensures equality of opportunity

- Arguably, reduces racism

Taxation and thef...