trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Action and habit
by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg)  — 2011-06-02T14:59:00.325Z

I remember a poster that hung on the wall of my seventh grade classroom. It went like this:

Watch your thoughts, for they become words.
Watch your words, for they become actions.
Watch your actions, for they become habits.
Watch your habits, for they become your character.
Watch your character, for it becomes your destiny.

It was as a competitive swimmer that these words were the most meaningful to me. Most sports are ultimately about the practice, about repeating an action over and over and over again, so that actions become habits and habits become character. The fleeting thought that I really hate getting up at 5:00 am for swim practice is just that: a fleeting thought. But if I justified it with words, speaking it aloud to my parents or siblings or friends, it became a fact that others knew about me, much realer than just a wispy thought. The action of forgetting-on-purpose to set my alarm, or faking sick, was a logical next step. And one missed practice might not be huge, in the long run, but it led easily to a habit of missing practice, say, once a week. A year of this, and I would start to think of myself as the kind of person who missed practice once a week, because after all, isn’t it silly of anyone to expect a twelve-year-old to get up at 5:00 three times a week? And that attitude could very easily have led, over a couple of years, to quitting the team.

As a matter of fact, none of this happened. As a child I had a large measure of Conscientiousness, and putting long-term goals, like getting best times and earning my coach’s approval, ahead of short-term goals like sleeping another three hours, came to me without too much difficulty. The cycle went the other way. My habitual response to the brief temptation to sleep in, namely screw sleep, this is how you’re going to get faster, my verbal statements to just about everyone that I loved swimming, and the action of getting up three times a week and trekking to the pool after school another three times all reinforced the habit of working hard...which, over the five or so years that I competed, did become a fairly permanent character trait that generalized to things like school and work.

Of course, the quote doesn’t only apply to hard work. It applies to being generous or to being thrifty, to kindness or anger. A thought that happens once leaves a small trail. If it happe...
[link] Reasoning Under Uncertainty Videos
by Dr_Manhattan — 2011-06-02T13:20:09.041Z

I just stumbled across this youtube "lecture series" by Trond Reitan which looks as a promising intro to Bayesian statistics http://www.youtube.com/trondreitan. Curious what others here think, could be a good resource to refer people to. Look for the "reasoning under uncertainty" playlist on the right. As an aside the guy seems to fall well into the LW rationalist cluster based on the videos and home page http://folk.uio.no/trondr/research.html
[SEQ RERUN] Consolidated Nature of Morality Thread
by badger — 2011-06-02T11:39:24.484Z

Today's post, Consolidated Nature of Morality Thread was originally published on April 15, 2007. A summary (from the LW wiki):

Disputes about the nature of morality tend to overwhelm other discussions, so this post was intended to be a home for those tangential thoughts.
Examples of questions to be discussed here include: What is the difference between "is" and "ought" statements? Why do some preferences seem voluntary? Do children believe God can choose what is moral? Is there a systematic direction to the development of moral beliefs in history, and, if so, what is the causal explanation of this? Does Tarski's definition of truth extend to moral statements? If you were physically altered to prefer killing, would "killing is good" become true? If the truth value of a moral claim cannot be changed by any physical act, does this make the claim stronger or weaker than other claims? What are the referents of moral claims, or are they empty of content? Are there "pure" ought-statements, or do they all have is-statements mixed into them? Are there pure aesthetic judgments or preferences?

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments of the original post).
This post is part of a series rerunning Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts so those interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Your Rationality is My Business, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki, or creating exercises. Go here for more details, or to discuss the Sequence Reruns.
Tricksy probability problem
by  — 2011-06-02T10:08:00.643Z

I came up with this problem the other day. I don't have nearly enough math to solve it. Do any of you wise folk have insight?

Imagine a sequence of randomly generated 0s and 1s. I start from nothing and generate this sequence one term at a time. I stop when I'm at the end of a streak of 1s which is at least one half the length of the total sequence.

For example:

01

0010110101101011111111111111

010110111111 -EDIT: Obviously, this is wrong, because it would terminate at 01. Sorry.

What is the average length of such sequences?

I know that all of these sequences will eventually terminate. I just don't know if the length diverges, and I'm not sure how to deal with the problem.
Brief question about Conway's Game of LIfe and AI
by  — 2011-06-02T02:51:20.589Z

Conway’s Game of Life is Turing-complete. Therefore, it is possible to create an AI in it. If you created a 3^^3 by 3^^3 Life board, setting the initial state at random, presumably somewhere an AI would be created. Would this AI somehow take over the whole game board, if given enough time?

Would this be visible from the top, as it were?

EDIT: I probably meant 3^^^3, sorry. Also, by generating at random, I meant 50% chance on. But any other chance would work too, I suspect.
DC Meetup June 5th, 1 PM
by atucker — 2011-06-02T01:33:26.292Z

Sunday June 5th
Core hours: 1 PM - 3PM
Chipotle Mexican Grill
7600 Old Georgetown Road
Bethesda, MD 20814

Notes:
Core hours are 1-3, but many people are willing to stay around longer than that.

Directions:
The Chipotle is near the Bethesda Metro station, just follow these directions. Go out of the station and walk down Old Georgetown Road. The Chipotle is next to the waterfall fountain, and outdoor seating area.
We will be sitting towards the back of the restaurant (basically, keep going in the direction you've been walking to get to the Chipotle), in the corner with a wraparound bench.
See us also at lesswrong-dc@googlegroups.com
(Philosophical) Disagreements are not Rational
by gwern — 2011-06-02T00:10:01.205Z

This is a combination news-announcement and begging for someone with academic subscriptions to maybe jailbreak a PDF for us.

"Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense" (emphasis added):

"Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate—as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge—does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed."

Linked from http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2011/06/failure-of-the-expertise-defense-persistent-bias-in-expert-intuitions-.html which elaborates:

"For example, our research suggests that heritable personality traits predict bias in some fundamental philosophically relevant intuitions (Feltz & Cokely 2008, 2009; Cokely & Feltz, 2009; Feltz, Perez, & Harris, in press; Feltz, Harris, & Perez, 2010). In response to these findings, “philosophical expertise” has been used to shield some parts of standard philosophical practice from the worries presented by experimental philosophers (e.g., Ludwig, 2007; Kauppinen 2007; Horvarth, 2010; Sosa, 2010; Williamson, 2007, 2011). One important part of the “Expertise Defense” is that philosophers are assumed to be relevantly different from the folk (e.g., as a result of their years of training) and consequently philosophers' intuitions shouldn’t display the same (or similar) biases.

But more recently, there have been serious concerns raised by experimental philosophers about the Exp

...
[Link] Enhanced Autodidacticism for the Chronically Lazy and Hyperactive
by MBlume — 2011-06-01T23:40:28.052Z

Takeaway seems to be: stay light on your feet; keep everything in the short term, but build habits that will serve you in the long term; make sure you're always doing something that holds your interest.

http://somebeautifulplace.tumblr.com/post/6074297771/enhanced-autodidactism-for-the-chronically-lazy-and
What is/are the definition(s) of "Should"?
by Will_Sawin — 2011-06-01T17:55:42.229Z

My Model

Consider an AI. This AI goes out into the world, observing things and doing things. This is a special AI, though. In converting observations into actions, it first transforms them into beliefs in some kind of propositional language. This may or may not be the optimal way to build an AI. Regardless, that's how it works.

The AI has a database, filled with propositions. The AI also has some code.

It has code for turning propositions into logically equivalent propositions.

It has code for turning observations about the world into propositions about these observations, like "The pixel at location 343, 429 of image #8765 is red"

It has code for turning propositions about observations into propositions about the state of the world, like "The apple in front of my camera is red."

It has code for turning those propositions into propositions that express prediction, like "There will still be a red apple there until someone moves it."

It has code for turning those propositions into propositions about shouldness, like "I should tell the scientists about that apple."

It has code for turning propositions about shouldness into actions.

What is special about this code is that it can't be expressed as propositions. Just as one can't argue morality into a rock, the AI doesn't function if it doesn't have this code, no matter what propositions are stored in its memory. The classic example of this would be the Tortoise, from What the Tortoise said to Achilles.

Axioms - Assumptions and Definitions

When we, however, observe the AI, we can put everything into words. We can express its starting state, both the propositions and the code, as a set of axioms. We can then watch as it logically draws conclusions from these axioms, ending on a decision of what action to take.

The important thing, therefore, is to check that its initial axioms are correct. There is a key distinction here, because it seems like there are two kinds of axioms going on. Consider two from Euclid:

First, his definition of a point, which I believe is "a point is that which has no part". It does not seem like this could be wrong. If it turns out that nothing has no part, then that just means that there aren't any points.

Second, one of the postulates, like the parallel postulate. This one could be wrong. Because of General Relativity, when applied to th

...
The Landmark Forum — a rationalist's first impression
by Nisan — 2011-06-01T15:55:37.121Z

Last week I attended an introductory seminar to the Landmark Forum. Landmark is the modern form of est, a seminar series started by Werner Erhard in the 1970s. Like the Less Wrong community, this is an organization which claims to empower people and enable them to achieve their goals. I heard people recount how Landmark had enabled them to become a responsible adult, to build a relationship with their estranged son, to repair their relationship with their wife, to decide to quit their job and become funded as a grad student.

It's quite successful in attracting members (more than 1 million participants), so you may be interested to know how it works. Note that I only attended one session; this is a first impression. If you have more experience with Landmark, please tell us about it in the comments.

Also, a word of warning: Landmark Education is a for-profit employee-owned company. If you go to one of these things, beware the Dark Arts. The purpose of the free introductory session is to persuade you to sign up for the weekend-long Forum retreat, which costs around $500. And after that retreat, there are more advanced seminars to sign up for. Forum graduates, who are universally enthusiastic about the positive change Landmark has effected in their lives, are encouraged to recruit their friends. (By the way, this is a really good way to recruit people.) I had precommitted to not make any purchasing decisions while at the seminar.

An optimistic worldview

The seminar was mostly a lecture conveying an empowering, optimistic worldview. The message was that you can achieve anything, basically. Or, put more charitably, the message is that you can construct a personal narrative in which your actions are guided by goals and possibilities, rather than being limited by constraints. The speaker evoked laughter in some of the veterans — not humorous laughter, but the kind of giggle that comes from feeling all warm and fuzzy inside. The speaker was pretty good, admittedly. But her words and ideas were fuzzy, blunt, imprecise. Aspiring rationalists could do much better.

The exercises

Religions are also good at conveying a comforting worldview in lectures. But unlike in the religions I'm familiar with, every participant in the Landmark Forum is promised personal growth or rebirth. To be sure, the realization of this promise is facilitated by a placebo effect — everyo...
[SEQ RERUN] Your Rationality is My Business
by badger — 2011-06-01T14:04:57.022Z

Today's post, Your Rationality is My Business was originally published on April 15, 2007. A summary (from the LW wiki):

As humans, we have an interest in the future of human civilization, including the human pursuit of truth. That makes your rationality my business. However, calling out others as wrong can be a dangerous action. Some turn to relativism to avoid it, but this is too extreme. Disagreements should be met with experiments and arguments, not ignored or met with violence and edicts.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments of the original post).
This post is part of a series rerunning Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts so those interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was New Improved Lottery, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki, or creating exercises. Go here for more details, or to discuss the Sequence Reruns.
Rationality Quotes: June 2011
by Oscar_Cunningham — 2011-06-01T08:17:07.695Z

Y'all know the rules:

Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)

Do not quote yourself.

Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB.

No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
Heuristics for Deciding What to Work On
by John_Maxwell — 2011-06-01T07:31:17.482Z

If you're like me, you have way more ideas for things to do than time, energy, and willpower to do them with. (And if you're not like me, you might very well become like me if you just kept track of all the times you or someone else said "Hey, that might be a worthwhile project.") To give you an idea of what I'm talking about, here are some entries on my things-to-possibly-do list: give speed reading another shot; improve the Less Wrong codebase and add a feature that helps users find old, good posts they haven't read; experiment with online freelancing work; try my hand at e-commerce; work as a salesperson to build social skills.

One of the things I've learned from keeping a things-to-possibly-do list is that doing stuff inevitably takes longer than I intuitively think it will. For example, the main thing I did during the past 3-day weekend was write 36 Anki cards and 220 lines of Python to program myself and my computer to help me keep a resolution. In past years, I might have gotten demoralized halfway through, thinking things were taking too long, but I've gradually gotten used to things taking longer than I expect.

Given that things take such a long time to get done, it seems worthwhile to spend a decent amount of time deciding what to work on. But the standard objective of doing whatever has the highest expected utility is often computationally intractable in practice. For example, what's the expected utility of building social skills?

Given this, I'm working on a list of heuristics for the computationally intractable problem of what to work on. Here's my current list; feel free to suggest additions in the comments.

Watch for investments that pay for themselves. For example, I have two close-to-identical keys that I use multiple times daily. About a week ago I taped some paper to one of them. I wouldn't be surprised if this time investment will have paid itself back within a few weeks, and start generating value from then on.

Find things that separate those who succeed from those who fail, and focus on getting those right. For example, I've observed that men who have succeeded in business seem more likely than regular people to display high-status behavioral cues.

Find things that will give you a lot of new information in an important domain even if their immediate expected value

...
Bitcoin Bounty: Advice Requested
by lsparrish — 2011-06-01T03:52:04.379Z

About a month ago, I started a prize for Cryonics promotional videos published to Youtube during the month of May. There was a fair bit of interest, but nobody actually submitted anything. So the 14.75 bitcoins are thus far unclaimed.

I want to use this money (worth ~$125) to start another contest, but I thought that this time it would be a good idea to solicit some feedback on how best to do so.

What is the best medium to use?

It may be that few less wrongers are comfortable with videos

Other media might be just as effective or more so

Youtube may not be the best site

What is the best way of judging?

Likes on youtube or some other site

Karma votes here on LW

A panel of judges

What is the best timeframe?

Long, 6-month projects (more money needed?)

Quick projects 15-30 minutes (less money? specific amounts?)

Repeating prizes (monthly, weekly, annually, etc.)

Is regular cash a better prize than bitcoin?

May vary from person to person

People already know what cash is worth

Bitcoin might have novelty value or geek appeal

Bitcoin is ridiculously easy to transfer without the hassle of fees

Is cryonics really the best topic?

Maybe we would get more creative output from other topics

Other prize funds could be started for other topics

So anyways, I'd love to hear some opinions. I think making the contest more fun will probably get more results, so basically what I want to know is, what would be the most fun?
(Possibly Bayesian) Statistics Question
by b1shop — 2011-06-01T03:00:55.221Z

This question exists in the awkward space between "things undergrads google for homework" and "things on the cutting edge," so google isn't being super helpful.

I have a number I want a computer to estimate. Right now I have two regression models and an insider methodology. The former can be used to create two normal curves. The latter creates a point estimate only, but I can back into a confidence interval/normal curve with an acceptable amount of arbitrary hand-waving. If necessary, this could be conceived of as a prior.

How can I automatically weight the three curves into a single point estimate? I vaguely remember something from an econometrics class about weighting forecasts in a way that minimized total standard error, but I tried to work the math out myself and I didn’t know how to deal with the covariances of the forecasts. Can I simply assume the forecast covariances are zero?

This seems like a good place to use Bayes’ law, but I don't know how to formally set it up.

Edit to Add: Bayesian statistics is still new to me, so forgive me for being a bit dense. Here's my understanding of the methodology right now.

What exactly is D in this scenario?
Pluralistic Moral Reductionism
by lukeprog — 2011-06-01T00:59:30.115Z

Part of the sequence: No-Nonsense Metaethics

Disputes over the definition of morality... are disputes over words which raise no really significant issues. [Of course,] lack of clarity about the meaning of words is an important source of error… My complaint is that what should be regarded as something to be got out of the way in the introduction to a work of moral philosophy has become the subject matter of almost the whole of moral philosophy...

Peter Singer

If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound? If by 'sound' you mean 'acoustic vibrations in the air', the answer is 'Yes.' But if by 'sound' you mean an auditory experience in the brain, the answer is 'No.'

We might call this straightforward solution pluralistic sound reductionism. If people use the word 'sound' to mean different things, and people have different intuitions about the meaning of the word 'sound', then we needn't endlessly debate which definition is 'correct'.1 We can be pluralists about the meanings of 'sound'.

To facilitate communication, we can taboo and reduce: we can replace the symbol with the substance and talk about facts and anticipations, not definitions. We can avoid using the word 'sound' and instead talk about 'acoustic vibrations' or 'auditory brain experiences.'

Still, some definitions can be wrong:

Alex: If a tree falls in the forest, and no one hears it, does it make a sound?

Austere MetaAcousticist: Tell me what you mean by 'sound', and I will tell you the answer.

Alex: By 'sound' I mean 'acoustic messenger fairies flying through the ether'.

Austere MetaAcousticist: There's no such thing. Now, if you had asked me about this other definition of 'sound'...

There are other ways for words to be wrong, too. But once we admit to multiple potentially useful reductions of 'sound', it is not hard to see how we could admit to multiple useful reductions of moral terms.

Many Moral Reductionisms

Moral terms are used in a greater variety of ways than sound terms are. There is little hope of arriving at the One True Theory of Morality by analyzing common usage or by triangulating from the platitudes of folk moral discourse. But we can use stipulation, and we can taboo and reduce. We can use pl...