trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Houston Hackerspace Meetup: Sunday June 12, 3:00PM
by Cog — 2011-06-08T06:04:03.603Z

Saturday June 4, 2:00PM

TX/RX Labs Hackerspace

2010 Commerce St

Houston, TX 77002

The fourth meeting of the Houston Less Wrong meetup group will be happening on Sunday, the 12th of June. We will be addressing the first chapter in Jayne's "The Logic of Science", and play a round or two of paranoid debating. Last week we had 8 people in total, so hopefully we can replicate that type of success again. It was a good meet and greet, and set us up for future connections with other people around the Texas area. As the meetings go on, I suspect we will get more focused.

Pizza or prepared food are a possibility, if people show up hungry. We also have a full kitchen in the hackerspace.

Directions

A pictoral view

This is the set of buildings that the hackerspace is in. It's difficult to see our front from this angle - unfortunately google maps decided to map everything but our little section of commerce street. It's near where the white truck and red motorcycle are. Currently, there is an old military vehicle and generator in front. We will have a Less Wrong sign posted on the generator.

And this is the empty lot that you can park in if all the nearby marked spots are taken.

For more reference:

http://maps.google.com/maps?client=ubuntu&channel=fs&q=2010+Commerce+St.+Houston,+Tx+77002&oe=utf-8&um=1&ie=UTF-8&hq=&hnear=0x8640bed8ed95625d:0x4c9af214d2032035,2010+Commerce+St,+Houston,+TX+77002&gl=us&ei=C9LRTYHvE8fL0QGu8OjlCw&sa=X&oi=geocode_result&ct=title&resnum=1&ved=0CBkQ8gEwAA
Cambridge Less Wrong Group Planning Meetup, Tuesday 14 June 7pm
by jimrandomh — 2011-06-08T03:41:41.375Z

Visiting the rationality minicamp and hearing about the amazing things NYC's meetup group is doing, and comparing them to what Cambridge's group is doing, has made me realize that much more is possible. Let's meet and discuss future directions - activities, locations, and dates - for the Cambridge group.

Let's meet at Legal Seafoods near Kendall Square on June 14 at 7pm. The first thing on the agenda is, we need a good room for giving presentations. Several members have projectors they can bring, but a restaurant or coffee shop doesn't really work. Ideal would be if an MIT student could reserve us a room, but no one has agreed to take on that task yet. I have nonspecific plans to give presentations based on those that were given at the rationality minicamp. We'll also be copying some of the exercises and worksheets given there. Any other ideas for presentations, activities, and locations are welcome.
St. Petersburg Mugging Implies You Have Bounded Utility
by TimFreeman — 2011-06-07T15:06:55.021Z

This post describes an infinite gamble that, under some reasonable assumptions, will motivate people who act to maximize an unbounded utility function to send me all their money. In other words, if you understand this post and it doesn't motivate you to send me all your money, then you have a bounded utility function, or perhaps even upon reflection you are not choosing your actions to maximize expected utility, or perhaps you found a flaw in this post.

Briefly, we do this with The St. Petersburg Paradox, converted to a mugging along the lines of Pascal's Mugging. I then tweaked it to extract all of the money instead of just a fixed sum.

I have always wondered if any actual payments have resulted from Pascal's Mugging, so I intend to track payments received for this variation. If anyone does have unbounded utility and wants to prove me wrong by sending money, send it with Paypal to tim at fungible dot com. Annotate the transfer with the phrase "St. Petersburg Mugging", and I'll edit this article periodically to say how much money I received. In order to avoid confusing the experiment, and to exercise my spite, I promise I will not spend the money on anything you will find especially valuable. SIAI would be better charity, if you want to do charity, but don't send that money to me.

Here's the hypothetical (that is, false) offer to persons with unbounded utility:

Let's call your utility function "UTILITY". We assume it takes a state of the universe as an argument.

Define DUT to be UTILITY(the present situation plus you receiving $1000)-UTILITY(the present situation). Here DUT stands for Difference in UTility. We assume DUT is positive.

You have unbounded utility, so for each nonnegative N there is a universe UN(N) such that UTILITY(UN(N)) is at least DUT * 2**N. Here UN stands for "universe".

The phrase "I am a god" is defined to mean that I am able to change the universe to any state I choose. I may not be a god after I make the change.

The offer is: For every dollar you send me, I will flip a coin. If it comes out Tails, or I am not a god, I will do nothing. If it comes out Heads and I am a god, I will flip the coin repeatedly until I see it come up Heads again. Let T be the number of times it was Tails. I will then change the universe to UN(T).

If I am lying and the offer is real, and I am a god, what utility will you receive from sending me a dollar? W...
Emotional installation of concepts
by NancyLebovitz — 2011-06-07T13:06:32.705Z

This is a theory I find plausible-- I don't know if formal work has been done in the area.

I used to read discussions of the definition of science fiction until I came to the conclusion that there was no point. People have strongly felt intuitions about what science fiction really is, and seem to have no way of knowing that everyone doesn't agree until they bump up against other people's definitions.

But why would one have a strong attachment to a definition of science fiction?

I suggest that people invent such definitions from a few early, emotionally charged experiences.

I still find it hard to believe that Delany and Zelazny really wrote New Wave science fiction, when their vivid and enjoyable stories were so different (for me) from the likes of Malzberg (dreary) and Aldiss (mostly boring).

I suspect matters are more extreme in visionary politics. One's ideas of a drastically better society are (usually?) derived from an unconscious mix of what seems better and possible, and if the vision is strong enough to lead to action, then it's got to be strongly felt. The unconscious mix is idiosyncratic, and it can be shocking to find out how different the visions are for people who group themselves under the same political label.

The only thing I can think to do with this theory is to hold a little lightly to definitions rather than look for the one true definition, and to ask people about their prototypes for concepts rather than definitions.
Emotional installation of concepts
by NancyLebovitz — 2011-06-07T12:54:36.129Z

This is a plausible theory I've got-- I don't know if formal work has been done in the area.

I used to read discussions of the definition of science fiction until I came to the conclusion that there was no point. People have strongly felt intuitions about what science fiction really is, and seem to have no way of knowing that everyone doesn't agree until they bump up against other people's definitions.

But why would one have a strong attachment to a definition of science fiction?

I suggest that people invent such definitions from a few early, emotionally charged experiences.

I still find it hard to believe that Delany and Zelazny really wrote http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Wave_science_fiction
[SEQ RERUN] Beware the Unsurprised
by badger — 2011-06-07T12:35:44.560Z

Today's post, Beware the Unsurprised was originally published on May 3, 2007. A summary (from the LW wiki):

If reality consistently surprises you, then your model needs revision. But beware those who act unsurprised by surprising data. Maybe their model was too vague to be contradicted. Maybe they haven't emotionally grasped the implications of the data. Or maybe they are trying to appear poised in front of others. Respond to surprise by revising your model, not by suppressing your surprise.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments of the original post).
This post is part of a series rerunning Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts so those interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Think like Reality, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki, or creating exercises. Go here for more details, or to discuss the Sequence Reruns.
Paris Meetup Saturday June 25 
by Emile — 2011-06-07T07:49:50.095Z

Following [last Paris meetup](http://lesswrong.com/lw/5eg/paris_meetup_saturday_april_30th_2pm/), next one will be Satuday, June 25th, probably around 2PM, but we can use this thread to settle on the details.

Anybody have any suggestions for a better place than some random Café?

(I had the impression that announcing meetups too early was not advised, as people would just forget ...)
[prize] Spaced Repetition literature review
by jsalvatier — 2011-06-07T03:28:55.842Z

EDIT: I am canceling this contest because I feel that the structure of the incentives were poorly thought out (see gwern's comments). I will be posting a new better structured contest in the near future (now posted). If you feel this is unfair or otherwise feel slighted, please contact me at my username at gmail.com.

I'm interested in making projects happen on Less Wrong. In order to find out what works and to inspire others to try things too, I'm sponsoring the following small project:

Spaced Repetition is often mentioned on on Less Wrong as a technique for remembering things. I've started using Anki and it certainly seems to be useful. However, I haven't seen a good summary of evidence on Spaced Repetition.

I hereby offer a prize to the first person to submit a good summary of the evidence on Spaced Repetition to the main page. The winner will get the prize, currently: $265 + 40 to charity (see comments)

The summary should address at least the following questions:

What spacing is best?

How much does spaced repetition actually help memory?

Does spaced repetition have hidden benefits or costs?

Does the effectiveness vary across domains? How much?

Is there research on the kinds of questions that work best?

What questions do researchers think are most important?

Is there any interesting ongoing research? If so, what is it on?

What, if any, questions do researchers think it is important to answer? Are there other unanswered questions that would jump out at a smart person?

What does spaced repetition not do that people might expect it to?

The post should summarize the state of current evidence and provide citations to back up the claims in the article.

If you think you would benefit from the result of this project, please add to the prize! You can contribute to the prize on the ChipIn page.

Whether the summary is 'good' will be judged by me. If there is a serious dispute, I'll agree to dispute resolution by any uninvolved party with more than 5k karma.

If you have suggestions, questions or comments, please leave them in the comments.

If you would like to work on this project, please say so in the comments below. Collaboration is encouraged.

This project is tagged with the 'project' tag and listed on the Projects wiki page.
Temporal allies and spatial rivals
by KatjaGrace — 2011-06-07T01:20:28.000Z

(This post co-authored by Robin Hanson and Katja Grace.)

In the Battlestar Galactica TV series, religious rituals often repeated the phrase, “All this has happened before, and all this will happen again.” It was apparently comforting to imagine being part of a grand cycle of time. It seems less comforting to say “Similar conflicts happen out there now in distant galaxies.” Why?

Consider two possible civilizations, stretched either across time or space:

Time: A mere hundred thousand people live sustainably for a billion generations before finally going extinct.

Space: A trillion people spread across a thousand planets live for only a hundred generations, then go extinct.

Even though both civilizations support the same total number of lives, most observers probably find the time-stretched civilization more admirable and morally worthy. It is “sustainable,” and in “harmony” with its environment. The space-stretched civilization, in contrast, seems “aggressively” expanding and risks being an obese “repugnant conclusion” scenario. Why?

Finally, consider that people who think they are smart are often jealous to hear a contemporary described as “very smart,” but are much happier to praise the genius of a Newton, Einstein, etc. We are far less jealous of richer descendants than of richer contemporaries. And there is far more sibling rivalry than rivalry with grandparents or grandkids. Why?

There seems an obvious evolutionary reason – sibling rivalry makes a lot more evolutionary sense. We compete genetically with siblings and contemporaries far more than with grandparents or grandkids. It seems that humans naturally evolved to see their distant descendants and ancestors as allies, while seeing their contemporaries more as competitors. So a time-stretched world seems choc-full of allies, while a space-stretched one seems instead full of potential rivals, making the first world seem far more comforting.

Having identified a common human instinct about what to admire, and a plausible evolutionary origin for it, we now face the hard question: do we embrace this instinct as revealing a deep moral truth, or do we reject it as a morally irrelevant accident of our origins? The two of us (Robin and Katja) are inclined more to reject it, but your mileage may vary.

(This is cross-posted at Overcoming Bias.)
Fort Collins, Colorado Meetup Wedneday 7pm
by EvelynM — 2011-06-06T19:03:15.024Z

Dates: 7pm Wednesday June 8, 15, 22 and 29

Venue: The Bean Cycle, upstairs at the back if it's open. Look for the Less Wrong sign.

As these are the first few sessions of the meetup, there will be no formal agenda. I'll bring a few games to give us something to do while we get acquainted.

http://groups.google.com/group/less-wrong-fort-collins-co
[SEQ RERUN] Think Like Reality
by badger — 2011-06-06T13:28:26.484Z

Today's post, Think Like Reality was originally published on May 2, 2007. A summary (from the LW wiki):

"Quantum physics is not "weird". You are weird. You have the absolutely bizarre idea that reality ought to consist of little billiard balls bopping around, when in fact reality is a perfectly normal cloud of complex amplitude in configuration space. This is your problem, not reality's, and you are the one who needs to change."

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments of the original post).
This post is part of a series rerunning Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts so those interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Universal Law, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki, or creating exercises. Go here for more details, or to discuss the Sequence Reruns.
Friendly AI - Being good vs. having great sex
by XiXiDu — 2011-06-06T11:27:27.010Z

[...] I think an LW post is important and interesting in proportion to how much it helps construct a Friendly AI, how much it gets people to participate in the human project [...]

-- Eliezer Yudkowsky

I’m not going to wait for philosophers to cover this issue correctly, or for use in FAI design.

-- Luke Muehlhauser

The above quotes hint at the possibility that some of the content that can be found on lesswrong.com has been written in support of friendly AI research.

My question, of what importance is ethics when it comes to friendly AI research? If a friendly AI is one that does protect and cultivate human values, how does ethics help to achieve this?

Let's assume that there exist some sort of objective right, no matter what that actually means. If humans desire to be right, isn't it the sort of human value that a friendly AI would seek to protect and cultivate?

What difference is there between wanting to be good and wanting to have a lot of great sex? Both seem to be values that humans might desire, therefore both values have to be taken into account by a friendly AI.

If a friendly AI has to be able to extrapolate the coherent volition of humanity, without any hard-coded knowledge of human values, why doesn't this extent to ethics as well?

If we have to solve ethics before being able to design friendly AI, if we have to hard-code what it means to be good, how doesn't this apply to what it means to have great sex as well (or what it means to have sex anyway)?

If a friendly AI is going to figure out what humans desire, by extrapolating their volition, might it conclude that our volition is immoral and therefore undesirable?
Emotional Installation of Software
by  — 2011-06-06T06:20:25.185Z

I have recently been thinking about this question, "what is it exactly that helps install religious software so deeply and dogmatically into the brain?" Often those who are strongly religious fall into a few categories: (1) They were trained to believe in specific aspects of religion as children; (2) They entered into a very destitute part of their lives (i.e. severe depression, midlife crisis, loss of a job, death in the family, cancer, alcoholism, or other existential problems).
What strikes me about these situations is that emotion generally dominates the decision-making process. I remember when I was a child and attended church camp at the encouragement of my family I was heavily pressured by the camp counselors to "accept Christ" and I saw that there was a positive correlation between my willingness to accept Christ, memorize Bible verses, and say certain statements about behavior in the context of Christian morals and the way that the camp counselors, my extended family, and other adults would treat me. As a result, it was not until many years later that my preference for rationalism and science was able to fully crack that emotionally-founded religious belief installed in me as a child. I know many people for whom a similar narrative is true regarding experiences with alcohol, etc., though it seems to be rare for someone to completely dismiss deeply and emotionally held beliefs from their youth.
Emotion is something we have evolved to utilize. Generally speaking, we need emotion because we have to make split-second decisions sometimes in life and we don't have the opportunity to integrate our decision process on data. If someone attacks me I will become angry because anger will raise my adrenaline levels, temporarily reduce other biological needs like hunger or waste removal, and enable me to fight for survival. Essentially emotion is just a recorded previous decision that works on stereotypical data, or in probabilistic terms it is like basing a quick decision on solely the first moment of a bunch of previously experienced data. The first moment might not be the best descriptor of the data... but if you're in a computational bind you might not be able to do a whole lot better and you'll be biologically penalized for spending your CPU time trying to compute better descriptors of the data. But it is undeniable that decisions we all make based upon emoti...
Meanings of Mathematical Truths
by prase — 2011-06-05T22:59:47.038Z

Related Sequence posts: Math is Subjunctively Objective, How to Convince Me That 2+2=3

Discussions whether mathematical theorems can be possibly disproved by observations have been relatively frequent on LessWrong. The last instance which motivated me to write this post was the discussion here. In fact these discussions are closely related to philosophical disputes about contingent and necessary truths. Many standard philosophical disputes are considered solved on LessWrong and there is usually some reference post which dissolves the issue. I don't know of any post that conclusively summarises this problem, although it doesn't seem particularly controversial.

To be concrete, let's take a single statement of arithmetic, say "5324 + 2326 = 7650". Most people will gladly agree that the statement is true. No matter how proficient the debaters are in intellectual sophistry (with the possible exception of postmodern philosophers), they will not dispute that 5324 + 2326 indeed equals to 7650. But the agreement is lost when it comes to the meaning of the discussed simple sentence. What does it refer to? Is it a necessary truth, or can it be empirically tested?

One opinion states that statements about addition refer to counting apples, pigs, megabytes of data or whatever stuff one needs to count. Sets of these objects, either material or abstract, are the referents of those statements. If I take two groups of apples which happen to contain 5324 and 2326 items and put them together, the compound group will consist of 7650 apples. It is not self-evident (as any illiterate tribesman from New Guinea would confirm) that the result will be 7650 and not, for example, 7494. Therefore each putting of apples together counts as a test of the respective proposition about arithmetic. Of course, the number of apples in the compound group must be determined by a method different from counting the two subgroups separately and then adding the numbers on the paper — that would defeat the idea of testing. Also, some people may say that "5324 + 2326" is a definition of "7650"; not that we regularly encounter such opinions when speaking about numbers of this magnitude, but that "1 + 1" is a definition of "2" I have heard countless times. So we have to be careful to create a dictionary which translates "1" as "S0" and "2" as "SS0" and "7650" as something which I am not going to write h...
What are you working on? June 2011
by jsalvatier — 2011-06-05T20:31:00.250Z

This is the third What Are You Working On? thread. Click on the 'waywo' tag to see previous threads. I'm going to do these every two months instead of every month from now on. So here's the question:

What are you working on?

Here are some guidelines

Focus on projects that you have recently made progress on, not projects that you're thinking about doing but haven't started, those are for a different thread.

Why this project and not others? Mention reasons why you're doing the project and/or why others should contribute to your project (if applicable).

Talk about your goals for the project.

Any kind of project is fair game: personal improvement, research project, art project, whatever.

Link to your work if it's linkable
Ottawa LW meetup, June 9, 7pm; two Bayesian Conspiracy sessions
by Cyan — 2011-06-05T19:40:02.077Z

Less Wrong meeting:

Date: Thursday June 9, 7:00pm 'til whenever.

Venue: Fox and Feather, upstairs, possibly in back room #1 if it's free. Look for the LW sign.

Bayes study group: Anyone in the region interested in learning how to do Bayesian statistics is welcome to join us. We'll be using the statistical package R (http://cran.r-project.org/) as a platform, so bring your laptop if you have one.

Date: Thursday June 9, 9:00am to 10:30am. NB: 9 in the morning.

Venue: Jeanne Mance Building, Tunney's Pasture. Meet me in the lobby.

Bayes study group: This session will run in parallel (but slightly delayed relative) to the sessions at Tunney's Pasture.

Date: Tuesday June 7, 9:30pm

Venue: wmiles's house; join the Google group for the address.