trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
[SEQ RERUN] Fake Justification
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-13T02:59:32.491Z

Today's post, Fake Justification was originally published on 01 November 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

We should be suspicious of our tendency to justify our decisions with arguments that were not actually the deciding factor. Whatever process you use to make your decisions is what determines your effectiveness.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was A Case Study of Motivated Continuation, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[LINK] Why did Steve Jobs choose not to effectively treat his cancer?
by  — 2011-10-12T23:37:29.663Z

From Quora:

"Now Mr. Jobs always was a free thinker, a strong believer in spirituality, a vegetarian and a known skeptic of conventional medicine. He chose to reject conventional medicine altogether. He's not alone in that. We come across many people like this and we all know someone in our midst that uses homeopathy or has this known fear of anything "chemical" (to those I always say that everything is chemical, if you think dihydrogen oxide sounds scary you should stop drinking water). Individual freedom of thought and choice is a cornerstone of our modern society and the medical world makes no exception."
Meetup : UMD Calibration Games
by atucker — 2011-10-12T18:40:25.631Z

Discussion article for the meetup : UMD Calibration Games

WHEN:
13 October 2011 05:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
STAMP, University of Maryland

We're in Terrapin Room A in the Student Involvement Suite, meeting at 5 PM.

We plan to play some calibration games.

Discussion article for the meetup : UMD Calibration Games
[SEQ RERUN] A Case Study of Motivated Continuation
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-12T03:48:06.620Z

Today's post, A Case Study of Motivated Continuation was originally published on 31 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

When you find yourself considering a problem in which all visible options are uncomfortable, making a choice is difficult. Grit your teeth and choose anyways.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Torture vs. Dust Specks, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Improving My Writing Style
by orthonormal — 2011-10-11T16:14:40.907Z

I've written quite a lot here since Less Wrong started up, but I've started to suspect that my writing style is holding me back. Most recently, I wrote two sequences that seemed to garner widespread agreement on content/significance/originality but didn't really seem to excite anyone, which is a pretty clear signal that my style has been hobbling my ideas. So, as I'd promised to do (albeit a few weeks later than I'd expected), I'm trying to improve myself as a writer, and I need your help.

I'm declaring Crocker's Rules on the subject, and I'd like help with both diagnosis and treatment. Let me know, as precisely as you can, what's problematic in my writing, or what you think the root causes might be, or what you think might help me to fix my issues. I'll list what I've thought of so far in a comment below (so that you can make your own suggestions without anchoring issues).

Links to my recent major posts:

Consequentialism Need Not Be Nearsighted

Qualia sequence: Part I, Part II, Part III

And now an odd counterexample: I wrote this post quickly for Discussion, without thinking too much or editing at all, and then it got promoted and was received enthusiastically. That may just be the subject matter, or it may signify that the time I spend editing posts makes them worse...
The self-unfooling problem
by Richard_Kennaway — 2011-10-11T08:36:36.811Z

Inspired by PuyaSharif's conundrum, I find myself continually faced with the opposite problem, which is identical to the original except in the bold-faced sentences:

You are given the following information:

Your task is to hide a coin in your house (or any familiar finite environment).

After you've hidden the coin your memory will be erased and restored to a state just before you receiving this information.

Then you will be told about the task (i.e that you have hidden a coin), and asked to try to find the coin.

If you find it you win. The faster you find it, the better you win.

Where do you leave the coin so that when you have no memory of where you put it, you can lay your hands on it at once?

For just one coin, you might think up some suitable Schelling point, but now multiply the task a thousandfold, for all of your possessions. (I am not a minimalist; of books alone I have 3500.) How do you arrange all your stuff, all your life, in such a way that everything is exactly where you would first think of looking for it?
[SEQ RERUN] Torture vs. Dust Specks
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-11T03:58:43.371Z

Today's post, Torture vs. Dust Specks was originally published on 30 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

If you had to choose between torturing one person horribly for 50 years, or putting a single dust speck into the eyes of 3^^^3 people, what would you do?

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Motivated Stopping and Motivated Continuation, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
The self-fooling problem.
by PuyaSharif — 2011-10-10T22:26:48.947Z

I formulated a little problem. Care to solve it?

You are given the following information:

Your task is to hide a coin in your house (or any familiar finite environment).
After you've hidden the coin your memory will be erased and restored to a state just before you receiving this information.
Then you will be told about the task (i.e that you have hidden a coin), and asked to try to find the coin.
If you find it you'll lose, but you will be convinced that if you find it you win.

So now you're faced with finding an optimal strategy to minimize the probability of finding the coin within a finite time-frame.
Bear in mind that any chain of reasoning leading up to a decision of location can be generated by you while trying to find the coin.

You might come to the conclusion that there cant exist an optimal strategy other than randomizing. But if you randomize, then you have the risk of placing the coin at a location where it can be easily found, like on a table or on the floor. You could eliminate those risky locations by excluding them as alternatives in your randomization process, but that would mean including a chain of reasoning!
Just a reminder, for everyone that signed up for the intro to AI class, it's started.
by Psy-Kosh — 2011-10-10T19:07:27.820Z

Here you go: http://www.ai-class.com/

They're still working out kinks in the site, and no homework is up yet, but the initial set of lectures (really really basic "what is AI/welcome to the first day of class" type stuff is up), so if you signed up, then sign in and hopefully the site will work for you.
Interesting article about optimism
by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg)  — 2011-10-10T18:54:52.420Z

According to this brain-imaging study, volunteers presented with negative scenarios (i.e. car crashes, cancer), and asked to estimate the probability of these scenarios happening to them, would only update their beliefs if the actual rate of ocurrence in the population, given to them afterwards, was lower, i.e. more optimistic, than what they had guessed. The more "optimistic" the subjects were, according to a personality test, the less likely they were to update their belief based on more negative information, and the less activity they showed their frontal lobes, indicating that they weren't "paying attention" to the new information.

Sounds like confirmation bias, except that interestingly enough, it's unidirectional in this case. I wonder if very pessimistic people would have the opposite bias, only updating their estimate if the actual probability was higher, or more negative.

Link to article on kurzweilai.

Link to abstract in Nature journal. I can't access the full text.
A Rational Approach to Fashion
by lionhearted (Sebastian Marshall) — 2011-10-10T18:53:00.594Z

Related to: Humans are not automatically strategic, Rationalists should win

Fashion isn't prioritized in many hyper-analytical circles. Many in these communities write it off as frill and unnecessary. They say they "just dress comfortably" and leave it at that.

To me, that seems like a huge blind spot. It misses a fundamental point -

A piece of clothing is fundamentally a tool.

Definitions are important so everyone is on the same page. I feel like Wikipedia's first sentence on "tool" accurately describes it -

A tool is a device that can be used to produce an item or achieve a task, but that is not consumed in the process.

Clothing clearly fits that definition of a tool.

Appropriately chosen clothing can keep you from freezing in the winter, from getting sunburnt in the summer, and can keep you dry in a rainstorm.

It can also help you achieve things involving other people. I think it's fair to draw a distinction between "clothing" and "fashion" based on whether your objectives involve interpersonal skills. If you're wearing clothing in relation to the environment and without other people, that's using clothing as a tool.

But clothing clearly can affect other people's opinions of you, willingness to accept your arguments, willing to hire or contract you, even their desire to associate with you. All of that is changed by clothing - or more specifically, your "fashion."

While most rationalists would happily and quickly plan out the best hiking boots to wear to not get blisters on a hike, or research the best shoes for bicycling or swimsuit for swimming, anecdotally many seem hesitant or even hostile to the idea of using fashion as a tool to achieve their objectives.

That's possibly a mistake.

The thing fashion can do best and most fundamentally is affect a person's initial first impression of you. Fashion is less important if you're in a context where you're guaranteed to get to know someone over a longer period of time, and is more important if you're going to get filtered quickly.

I propose that the most rational usage of fashion is this -

1. Ask yourself what your goals are in the situation you're about to go into.

2. Ask yourself what first impression would help you reach your goals.

3. Pick out and wear clothing that helps communicate that first impression.

The process is important. In isolation, there's no "good fashion" - it depends on your objectives.

In some cir...
LW October WebDiplomacy
by Vaniver — 2011-10-10T17:43:22.541Z

A month ago we tried to start up two WebDiplomacy games with LW users; only one of them got off the ground, and just finished the 1905 turn. This month, we're trying again, and since the method I used to try and extract time preferences didn't work as well as I hoped last time, I'll try something new.

If you would like to get in on a Diplomacy game with other LW users, please respond with a comment expressing your desire (between 1 and 0) to play in a game based on its turn length: 24, 36, 48, or 72 hours. (You don't need to make 0s explicit.) For example, if you can't play in a 24 hour game, could play in a 36 hour game or 72 hour game, but really want to play in a 48 hour game, then you might comment with something like "(0, .8, 1, .6)" or "24: 1; 36: .8; 72: .6". Please express your interest by midnight on 10/15 so we can get any games started on the 16th.

If October isn't a good month for you, but you'd like to make sure I make another Diplomacy thread in November, leave a comment to that effect.
Meetup : Austin, TX
by Vaniver — 2011-10-10T17:23:15.460Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Austin, TX

WHEN:
15 October 2011 01:30:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
2222B Guadalupe St Austin, Texas 78705

The Austin meetup careens towards the present from the future, and all you can do is prepare to be there. (Or be square.)

I have finally gotten into the habit of checking the football calendar: there will be a game at 2:30 against Oklahoma State. Those driving in may want to plan accordingly.

Discussion article for the meetup : Austin, TX
[SEQ RERUN] Motivated Stopping and Motivated Continuation
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-10T14:59:49.758Z

Today's post, Motivated Stopping and Motivated Continuation was originally published on 28 October 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

When the evidence we've seen points towards a conclusion that we like or dislike, there is a temptation to stop the search for evidence prematurely, or to insist that more evidence is needed.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Why Are Individual IQ Differences OK?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[link] Relative angels and absolute demons
by  — 2011-10-10T11:52:20.864Z

I wanted to bring attention to two posts from Razib Khan's Discover magazine gene expression blog (some of you may have been readers of the still active original gnxp) on the polemic surrounding Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature.

Faced with the ceaseless stream of news about war, crime, and terrorism, one could easily think we live in the most violent age ever seen. Yet as New York Times bestselling author Steven Pinker shows in this startling and engaging new work, just the opposite is true: violence has been diminishing for millennia and we may be living in the most peaceful time in our species's existence. For most of history, war, slavery, infanticide, child abuse, assassinations, pogroms, gruesome punishments, deadly quarrels, and genocide were ordinary features of life. But today, Pinker shows (with the help of more than a hundred graphs and maps) all these forms of violence have dwindled and are widely condemned. How has this happened?

This groundbreaking book continues Pinker's exploration of the essence of human nature, mixing psychology and history to provide a remarkable picture of an increasingly nonviolent world. The key, he explains, is to understand our intrinsic motives- the inner demons that incline us toward violence and the better angels that steer us away-and how changing circumstances have allowed our better angels to prevail. Exploding fatalist myths about humankind's inherent violence and the curse of modernity, this ambitious and provocative book is sure to be hotly debated in living rooms and the Pentagon alike, and will challenge and change the way we think about our society.

Relative Angels and absolute Demons (and the related But peace does reign! )

There are two separate points to note here; a specific and a general. I suspect Steven Pinker knows more history than Elizabeth Kolbert. I’ve talked to Pinker once at length, and just as in his books he comes across as very widely knowledgeable. I’ll be frank and say that I don’t feel many people I talk to are widely knowledgeable, and when it comes to something like history I’m in a position to judge. Ironically Kolbert is repeating the Anglo-Protestant Black Legend about the Spaniards, rooted in the rivalries and sectarianism of the 16th and 18th centuries, but persisting down amongst English speaking secular intellectuals. The reality is that t

...
Meetup : Talk on Singularity scenarios and optimal philanthropy, followed by informal meet-up
by AnnaSalamon — 2011-10-10T04:26:09.284Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Talk on Singularity scenarios and optimal philanthropy, followed by informal meet-up

WHEN:
12 October 2011 06:18:06PM (-0400)

WHERE:
3 Seminary Pl, New Brunswick, Middlesex, New Jersey 08901

I'll be giving a 35-minute talk to some folks from Rutgers philosophy and Giving What We Can, followed by Q and A, informal discussion, and hopefully conversation that continues over pizza or something. Come meet me, Carl Shulman (another SingInst research fellow; also, by husband:)), me, and other LW-ers, discuss some ideas, and have fun! * * * The abstract that was sent out to Rutgers folk: In 1965, I.J. Good proposed that machines would one day be smart enough to make themselves smarter. Having made themselves smarter, they would spot still further opportunities for improvement, quickly leaving human intelligence far behind. He called this the "intelligence explosion". I review the argument for an intelligence explosion, and how one might seek to influence its outcome, and reduce the odds of catastrophe, should such an event occur. I also try, very briefly, to situate such interventions in relation to other paths for doing good, such as third world poverty interventions and interventions to reduce nuclear risk.

Discussion article for the meetup : Talk on Singularity scenarios and optimal philanthropy, followed by informal meet-up
Thinking in Bayes: Light
by atucker — 2011-10-10T04:08:11.573Z

There are a lot of explanations of Bayes' Theorem, so I won't get into the technicalities. I will get into why it should change how you think. This post is pretty introductory, so free to totally skip it if you don't feel like there's anything about Bayes' Theorem that you don't understand.

For a while I was reading LessWrong and not seeing what the big deal about Bayes' Theorem was. Sure, probability is in the mind and all, but I didn't see why it was so important to insist on bayesian methods. For me they were a tool, rather than a way of thinking. This summary also helped someone in the DC group.

After using the Anki deck, a thought occurred to me:

Bayes theorem means that when seeing how likely a hypothesis is after an event, not only do I need to think about how likely the hypothesis said the event is, I need to consider everything else that could have possibly made that event more likely.

To illustrate:

pretty clearly shows how you need to consider P(e|H), but that's slightly more obvious than the rest of it.

If you write it out the way that you would compute it you get...

where h is an element of the hypothesis space.

This means that every way that e could have happened is important, on top of (or should I say under?) just how much probability the hypothesis assigned to e.

This is because P(e) comes from every hypothesis that contributes to e happening, or more mathilyeX P(e) is the sum over all possible hypotheses of the probability of the event and that hypothesis, computed by the probability of the hypothesis times the probability of the event given the hypothesis.

In LaTeX:

where h is an element of the hypothesis space.
Anti-akrasia tool: like stickK.com for data nerds
by dreeves — 2011-10-10T02:09:57.297Z

In 2009 I first described here on LessWrong a tool that Bethany Soule and I made to force ourselves to do things that otherwise fell victim to akrasia ("How a pathological procrastinator can lose weight"). We got an outpouring of encouragement and enthusiasm from the LessWrong community, which helped inspire us to quit our day jobs and turn this into a real startup: Beeminder (the me-binder!).

We've added everyone who got on the waitlist with invite code LESSWRONG and we're getting close to public launch so I wanted to invite any other LessWrong folks to get a beta account first: http://beeminder.com/secretsignup (no wait this time!)

(UPDATE: Beeminder is open to the public.)

It's definitely not for everyone since a big part of it is commitment contracts. But if you like the concept of stickK.com (forcing yourself to reach a goal via a monetary commitment contract) then we think you'll adore Beeminder.

StickK is just about the contracts -- Beeminder links it to your data. That has some big advantages:

1. You don't have to know what you're committing to when you commit, which sounds completely (oxy)moronic but what we mean is that you're committing to keeping your datapoints on a "yellow brick road" which you have control over as you go. You commit to something general like "work out more" or "lose weight" and then decide as you go what that means based on your data.

2. You have the flexibility to change your contract in light of new information (like, 40 hours of actual focused work per week is damn hard!). That also sounds like it defeats the point of a commitment contract, but the key is that you can only make changes starting a week in the future. (Details at blog.beeminder.com/dial which describes the interface of the "road dial" for adjusting the steepness of your yellow brick road.) The point is that akrasia (dynamic inconsistency, hyperbolic discounting) means over-weighting immediate consequences, so to beat akrasia you only need to bind yourself for whatever the horizon on "immediate" is. Based on a study of grocery-buying habits -- when buying groceries online for delivery tomorrow people buy a lot more ice cream and a lot fewer vegetables than when they're ordering for delivery next week -- and raw guesswork (so far), we're taking that Akrasia Horizon to be one week.

So Beeminder as an anti-akrasia tool means co...