trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
In favour of a selective CEV initial dynamic
by  — 2011-10-21T17:33:37.485Z

Note: I appreciate that at this point CEV is just a sketch. However, it’s an interesting topic and I don’t see that there’s any harm in discussing certain details of the concept as it stands.

1. Summary of CEV

Eliezer Yudkowsky describes CEV - Coherent Extrapolated Volition – here. Superintelligent AI is a powerful genie, and genies can’t be trusted; Friendly AI requires the AI to take as input the entire value computation of at least one human brain, because the failure to take into consideration a relatively small element of the human value set, even whilst optimising in several other respects, is likely to be a disaster. CEV is Yudkowsky’s attempt at outlining a Friendly AI volition-extrapolating dynamic: a process in which the AI takes human brainstates, combines this with its own vast knowledge, and outputs suitable actions to benefit humans.

Note that extrapolating volition is not some esoteric invention of Eliezer’s; it is a normal human behaviour. To use his example: we are extrapolating Fred’s volition (albeit with short distance) if given two boxes A and B only one of which contains a diamond that Fred desires, we give him box B when he has asked us to give him box A, on the basis that he incorrectly believes that box A contains the diamond whereas we know that in fact it is in box B.

Yudkowsky roughly defines certain quantities that are likely to be relevant to the functioning of the CEV dynamic:

Spread describes the case in which the extrapolated volition is unpredictable. Quantum randomness or other computational problems may make it difficult to say with strong confidence (for example) whether person A would like to be given object X tomorrow – if the probability computed is 30%, rather than 0.001%, there is significant spread in this case.

Muddle is a measure of inconsistency. For example person A might resent being given object Y tomorrow, but also resent not being given object Y if it isn’t given to him tomorrow.

Distance measures the degree of separation between one’s current self and the extrapolated self, i.e. how easy it would be to explain a given instance of extrapolated volition to someone. In the case of Fred and the diamond the distance is very short, but superintelligent AI could potentially compute Fred’s extrapolated volition to such a distance that it seems incomp...
Satisficers want to become maximisers
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2011-10-21T16:27:21.566Z

(with thanks to Daniel Dewey, Owain Evans, Nick Bostrom, Toby Ord and BruceyB)

In theory, a satisficing agent has a lot to recommend it. Unlike a maximiser, that will attempt to squeeze the universe to every drop of utility that it can, a satisficer will be content when it reaches a certain level expected utility (a satisficer that is content with a certain level of utility is simply a maximiser with a bounded utility function). For instance a satisficer with a utility linear in paperclips and a target level of 9, will be content once it's 90% sure that it's built ten paperclips, and not try to optimize the universe to either build more paperclips (unbounded utility), or obsessively count the ones it has already (bounded utility).

Unfortunately, a self-improving satisficer has an extremely easy way to reach its satisficing goal: to transform itself into a maximiser. This is because, in general, if E denotes expectation,

E(U(there exists an agent A maximising U)) ≥ E(U(there exists an agent A satisficing U))

How is this true (apart from the special case when other agents penalise you specifically for being a maximiser)? Well, agent A will have to make decisions, and if it is a maximiser, will always make the decision that maximises expected utility. If it is a satisficer, it will sometimes not make the same decision, leading to lower expected utility in that case.

So hence if there were a satisficing agent for U, and it had some strategy S to accomplish its goal, then another way to accomplish this would be to transform itself into a maximising agent and let that agent implement S. If S is complicated, and transforming itself is simple (which would be the case for a self-improving agent), then self-transforming into a maximiser is the easier way to go.

So unless we have exceedingly well programmed criteria banning the satisficer from using any variant of this technique, we should assume satisficers are as likely to be as dangerous as maximisers.

Edited to clarify the argument for why a maximiser maximises better than a satisficer.

Edit: See BruceyB's comment for an example where a (non-timeless) satisficer would find rewriting itself as a maximiser to be the only good strategy. Hence timeless satisficers would behave as maximisers anyway (in many situations). Furthermore, a timeless satisficer with bounded rationality may find that rewriting...
Link: 50% effective malaria vaccine developed
by MixedNuts — 2011-10-21T10:01:26.566Z

A study on over 15000 children in 7 African countries shows GlaxoSmithKline's anti-malaria vaccine halves the risk of contracting malaria. The trials were run on children between 6 and 12 weeks old, and between 5 and 17 months old.

Guardian article: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2011/oct/18/malaria-vaccine-save-millions-children

Full paper: http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1102287

From skimming the paper, this looks sound. GlaxoSmithKline both developed the vaccine and paid for the study, but that's standard. The disclosure forms don't show anything fishier.

There are ways this could go wrong. GlaxoSmithKline says they'll make it cheap (probably for PR) but this is not sufficient to ensure availability. This could also increase total risk by replacing bed nets, or by making other diseases worse.

Thoughts on the research? Comments on effects? Plans for wild celebration?
Meetup : Melbourne practical rationality meetup
by matt — 2011-10-21T06:04:37.594Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne practical rationality meetup

WHEN:
04 November 2011 07:00:00PM (+1100)

WHERE:
55 Walsh St, West Melbourne VIC 3003, Australia

Practical rationality, as distinct from socialising and rationality outreach. Look for a social meetup on the 3rd Friday of each month, and a rationality outreach meetup TBD.

Discussion:

http://groups.google.com/group/melbourne-less-wrong
http://www.google.com/moderator/#16/e=6a317

This meetup repeats on the 1st Friday of each month.

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne practical rationality meetup
[SEQ RERUN] Fake Morality
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-21T03:22:26.188Z

Today's post, Fake Morality was originally published on 08 November 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Many people provide fake reasons for their own moral reasoning. Religious people claim that the only reason people don't murder each other is because of God. Selfish-ists provide altruistic justifications for selfishness. Altruists provide selfish justifications for altruism. If you want to know how moral someone is, don't look at their reasons. Look at what they actually do.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Fake Selfishness, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Pittsburgh Meetup: Big Gaming Fun!
by Kenoubi — 2011-10-20T16:51:16.096Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Pittsburgh Meetup: Big Gaming Fun!

WHEN:
25 October 2011 06:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
1324 Wightman St., Pittsburgh, PA 15217

Welcome to the third Pittsburgh meetup of the semester, apparently!

I can't go anywhere next week because I'm on call, but I'd love to have you come over to my house and play some board games. I only have 4 games (Bohnanza, Citadels, Acquire, and Hacker), so please bring anything you'd like to play. We can order food and go more or less as late as we'd like. If I get paged I may have to deal with an emergency (from home, using my laptop), but if that doesn't bother you, it doesn't bother me.

Allergy warning: I have a cat. I can put her upstairs, but if you have a cat allergy you might want to take some meds. If you decide not to come because you have a severe cat allergy, please tell me, as this will factor into how appropriate a venue I consider my house to be in the future.

RSVP here or by sending me a private message (but don't not show up because you didn't RSVP, I just want a rough idea of the number of attendees). Ring the bell, knock, or call or text (412) 657-1395 to get in when you get there.

Discussion article for the meetup : Pittsburgh Meetup: Big Gaming Fun!
Meetup : Madison Monday Meetup
by fiddlemath — 2011-10-20T16:24:04.538Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Madison Monday Meetup

WHEN:
24 October 2011 06:30:00AM (-0500)

WHERE:
1831 Monroe St, Madison, WI 53711

Again, let's meet up at the Barriques on Monroe St.

Among other discussions and games, I intend to run through the "alternatives procedure", one of my favorite tricks from the minicamp last summer. It is a simple way to clarify your goals and motivations while seeking ways to be more strategic.

If you're in Madison, sign up on our mailing list.

Discussion article for the meetup : Madison Monday Meetup
Amanda Knox: post mortem
by gwern — 2011-10-20T16:10:07.553Z

Continuing my interest in tracking real-world predictions, I notice that the recent acquittal of Knox & Sollecito offers an interesting opportunity - specifically, many LessWrongers gave probabilities for guilt back in 2009 in komponisto’s 2 articles:

“You Be the Jury: Survey on a Current Event”

“The Amanda Knox Test: How an Hour on the Internet Beats a Year in the Courtroom”

Both were interesting exercises, and it’s time to do a followup. Specifically, there are at least 3 new pieces of evidence to consider:

the failure of any damning or especially relevant evidence to surface in the ~2 years since (see also: the hope function)

the independent experts’ report on the DNA evidence

the freeing of Knox & Sollecito, and continued imprisonment of Rudy Guede (with reduced sentence)

Point 2 particularly struck me (the press attributes much of the acquittal to the expert report, an acquittal I had not expected to succeed), but other people may find the other 2 points or unmentioned news more weighty.

2 Probabilities

I was curious how the consensus has changed, and so, in some spare time, I summoned all the Conscientiousness I could and compiled the following list of 54 entries based on those 2 articles’ comments (sometimes inferring specific probabilities and possibly missing probabilities given in hidden subthreads), where people listed probabilities for Knox’s guilt, Sollecito’s guilt, and Guede’s guilt:

Knox	Sollecito	Guede	LWer

.20
.20
.70
badger

.05
.10
.90
mattnewport

.20
.25
.90
AngryParsley

.05
.05
.95
tut

.05
.05
.95
bentarm

.85
.60
.20
bgrah449

.01
.01
.99
kodos96

.01
.01
.99
Daniel_Burfoot

.40
.40
.90
nerzhin

.45
.45
.60
Matt_Simpson

.33
.33
.90
Cyan

.50
.50
.95
jimmy

.05
.05
.99
Psychohistorian

.40
.40
.90
Threads

.50
.50
.80
Morendil

.15
—
—
Eliezer_Yudkowsky

.20
.35
.98
LauraABJ

.10
.10
.90
curious

.20
.20
.96
jpet

.06
.06
.70
saliency

.80
.60
.95
Mario

.20
.20
.95
Yvain

.70
—
—
Shalmanese

.05
.05
.95
gelisam

.05
.05
.90
Mononofu

.90
.90
.90
lordweiner27 (changed mind)

.50
.50
.99
GreenRoot

.99
.99
.99
dilaudid

.13
.15
.97
Jack

.05
.05
.90
wedrifid

.01
.01
.90
Nanani

.35
.35
.95
imaxwell

.01
.01
.99
jenmarie

.25
.25
.75
Jawaka

.41
.38
.99
magfrump

.40
.20
.60
gwern

.08
.10

...
Social status & testosterone
by gwern — 2011-10-20T14:05:44.192Z

We’ve discussed signaling and status endlessly on LW; I think this is right up our vein: a 2011 review of research on the connections between famous male hormone testosterone and various forms of social interaction and especially social status, Eisenegger et al’s “The role of testosterone in social interaction”. (I grabbed this PDF in the short time Elsevier left full-text available, but only now, with some modafinil-powered spare time, have gotten around to excerpting it for you guys.)

1 Abstract

Although animal researchers established the role of testosterone as a ‘social hormone’ decades ago, the investigation of its causal influence on human social behaviors has only recently begun. Here, we review and discuss recent studies showing the causal effects of testosterone on social interactions in animals and humans, and outline the basic neurobiological mechanisms that might underlie these effects. Based on these recent findings, we argue that the role of testosterone in human social behavior might be best understood in terms of the search for, and maintenance of, social status.

2 Excerpts

Is testosterone simply aggression promoting (a sort of ‘roid rage’)?

Early evidence for the role of testosterone in social behavior suggested that it facilitates overt physical aggression (see Glossary) in social contexts. For instance, castrated rodents, which have little, if any, testosterone circulating in their blood, show a near-complete absence of physical fights; however, fights can be fully restored by providing testosterone supplementation to these animals [03]…high testosterone levels in male prisoners have been linked to having a history of rape, murder and armed robbery, and relatively lower levels to a history of theft and drug abuse [08]. A similar pattern was observed in a study of female prison inmates [9]. However, the causality in these studies remains unclear

Probably not:

the existing evidence for a link between aggression and testosterone in humans is relatively weak, but positive [12]. Even if one accepts the fact that reactive aggression can be measured in a controlled laboratory environment, results are similarly inconclusive: recent studies found a positive relationship between baseline testosterone levels and laboratory measures of reactive aggression (reviewed in [11]), but others also

...
Some conditional independence (Bayes Network) exercises from ai-class.com
by Jonathan_Graehl — 2011-10-20T05:09:59.345Z

If you'd like to see some visual representations of conditional independence is neither necessary or sufficient for independence, confounding causes, explaining away, etc. you should be able to view these videos from ai-class.com.

Working the exercises gave me a better understanding than the "I understand this and so don't need to actually apply it" feeling that almost satisfied me.
Greg Linster on the beauty of death
by Jonathan_Graehl — 2011-10-20T04:47:24.711Z

Without death we cannot truly have life. As such, what a travesty of life it would be to achieve a machine-like immortality!

Gray writes the following chilling lines: “If you understand that in wanting to live for ever you are trying to preserve a lifeless image of yourself, you may not want to be resurrected or to survive in a post-mortem paradise. What could be more deadly than being unable to die?” (my emphasis)

via.

Sounds like sour grapes. I'd heard of people holding such sentiments; this is the first time I've actually seen them expressed myself.
Meetup : Cambridge (MA) Saturday meetup
by jimrandomh — 2011-10-20T03:54:28.892Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Cambridge (MA) Saturday meetup

WHEN:
22 October 2011 02:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Cosi Restaurant 290 Main Street, Cambridge, MA

EDIT: Moved from Sunday to Saturday We'll meet at Cosi this time, and migrate to another location after an hour or so. Topics for this meetup: * Mind/motivation hacking techniques * Last week's Singularity Summit I was at the summit last week, and apparently there was a mixup about the location while I was away. Sorry about that! We're definitely at Cosi this time.

Discussion article for the meetup : Cambridge (MA) Saturday meetup
[SEQ RERUN] Fake Selfishness
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-20T03:18:32.873Z

Today's post, Fake Selfishness was originally published on 08 November 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Many people who espouse a philosophy of selfishness aren't really selfish. If they were selfish, there are a lot more productive things to do with their time than espouse selfishness, for instance. Instead, individuals who proclaim themselves selfish do whatever it is they actually want, including altruism, but can always find some sort of self-interest rationalization for their behavior.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The Tragedy of Group Selectionism, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[SEQ RERUN] The Tragedy of Group Selectionism
by MinibearRex — 2011-10-19T04:08:25.167Z

Today's post, The Tragedy of Group Selectionism was originally published on 07 November 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Describes a key case where some pre-1960s evolutionary biologists went wrong by anthropomorphizing evolution - in particular, Wynne-Edwards, Allee, and Brereton among others believed that predators would voluntarily restrain their breeding to avoid overpopulating their habitat. Since evolution does not usually do this sort of thing, their rationale was group selection - populations that did this would survive better. But group selection is extremely difficult to make work mathematically, and an experiment under sufficiently extreme conditions to permit group selection, had rather different results.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Beware Stephen J. Gould, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Rational toy buying
by  — 2011-10-19T03:36:47.810Z

I have an 8-year-old sister who is very interested in science. The school she attends (in rural Indiana) takes the mantra of "teaching to the test" to a whole new level; my sister has already come home from school many days crying and stressed over fear that she won't pass her state's proficiency tests (which are 5+ months away). They are underfunded and the science curriculum is what most of the (overtly religious) teachers are undertrained in, and so science is essentially not addressed. My sister has about an order of magnitude more homework on cursive writing than on anything related to science.
I want to purchase a gift for her for the holidays this year (the occasion doesn't matter, but it's a time when I'll actually be home so I can give her the gift and play with her / explain how to use it / hopefully help her start thinking about some things). I'm willing to consider age-appropriate ideas across several price ranges, but I want to think of something that will deliver a lot of utility: i.e. it should be compelling enough that an 8-year-old will actually like using it and there should be at least some evidence that she will benefit from it.
I've considered things like the EDUbuntu computers that come with lots of educational software, but actually buying one seems to be not straightforward. Is the best thing to buy a cheap netbook at then install EDUbuntu myself? Is a netbook too much for an 8-year-old? I'm mostly focused on things that will help her be proficient with computers and potentially help her develop a more sophisticated interest in them as she grows up. The Lego Mindstorm robotics stuff also crossed my mind.
Does anyone have experience with this / know of resources for making a good investment? Or am I way over-thinking this and just some regular Legos or art supplies are going to do essentially just as much good?

Added 02/25/2012

Much of the advice was very helpful. I ultimately found out that my young sister was interested in "mixing chemicals together because it looked cool." An item that I found which looked like a good way to bridge the gap between her more girly interests and her interest in chemistry was Perfume Science from Thames and Kosmos. I also purchased a variety kit from Snap Circuits. She loved both items and we spent a good bit of time playing with them during my trip home to see my family. We made several different kind...
Occupy Wall Street: Predictions, Speculations
by byrnema — 2011-10-19T00:44:27.239Z

On reddit today I read 'the-Gandhi-quote' on a post about the Wall Street Occupation Protest:

"First they ignore you. Then they laugh at you.."

I'm transitioning, possibly, from the laughing stage and am beginning to feel the tiniest bit excited that perhaps some actual change is in order. On the one hand, I feel sufficiently skeptical about the probability of a 'revolution'. On the other hand, given how fast the world has been changing (the internet, gloablization), maybe change is inevitable and this is the way it happens now.

I know this is a rationality site, not a current affairs site, but when something tweaks my interest I like to know what "Less Wrong" thinks...waiting for a spontaneous post could take forever and finding a 'rationality-spin' would be disingenuous so I'll just ask:

What is possible and what is likely?

What factors are important?
Resetting my perception of something
by cousin_it — 2011-10-18T23:24:55.439Z

The guy who taught me how to eat sushi a couple months ago explained that I should get a slice of ginger before trying a different kind of sushi in order to "reset my taste buds" (probably broscience) and feel the taste anew (it works). That's also the exact problem that programmers face when trying to design user interfaces: after looking at the thing for a long time, they grow blind to its shortcomings. A visual reset would come in handy. I imagine that resets could help in other areas too. Does anything like that exist? Cogsci majors, help!