trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Book trades with open-minded theists - recommendations?
by Morendil — 2011-08-29T05:23:19.638Z

In an Open Thread comment beriukay mentioned that he's reading C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity. I've been reading it too, for interesting reasons.

In my case it so happened that I started discussing faith with a long-time online friend whose spiritual views I didn't yet know, and he turned out to be a Christian with a high regard for the Bible, who also has an interest in science. As our discussion turned to our readings on spirituality, I acknowledged (I think it was me) that I probably spent more time on books that reinforce my point of view than on books that challenge it, perhaps a case of confirmation bias. (I've been exposed to many poor arguments for Christianity, and dismissed them; but possibly that was largely a function of having started out with that bottom line already written and picking arguments I wouldn't have much trouble refuting.)

In the spirit of experiment we agreed to a "trade" - he would read (thoughtfully and with an open mind) a book of my choosing on reasons to doubt faith, and I'd do the same with a book he chose on Christianity.

So the idea here is to pick a book that's the "best argument from the other side" (as in quote 3 here).

I recommended The God Delusion - I'm not sure if that's the best choice given the above intent, but it's what came to mind on the spot.

Would you make a different choice? If so, what?
[SEQ RERUN] Why I'm Blooking
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-29T03:35:02.344Z

Today's post, Why I'm Blooking was originally published on 15 September 2007. A summary:

Now that Eliezer had posted over 100 blog posts, he created this post to lay out why exactly he was writing this series of posts. Understanding what he was trying to do can assist in understanding what became the sequences.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Doublethink (Choosing to be Biased), and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
How you will change the world
by KatjaGrace — 2011-08-29T02:31:33.000Z

Hopefully this is obvious to many people, but it seems some smart ones at least don’t really think about it.

Suppose you have some grand goal, that many people fail at. For instance you want to revolutionise your field or start the social movement that stops poverty or build a flight search application that isn’t frustrating.

Before you think you have a perceptible hope of achieving it, you will need:

Some idea of what it is that everyone else gets wrong

Some strategy for avoiding that

Ok, so far so good, you may think: nobody else tries hard enough, and you will try hard enough.

Not so fast! You will also need:

For the failure and the strategy to correspond with how the world actually works, rather than being things you ‘believe in’ or would like to identify with, or just interesting or novel ideas which are fun to chat about.

A meta idea of why it is that nobody else has come up with your strategy for solving it. ‘Be more passionate than any one else’ seems to be a popular intended solution for instance, but it causes difficulties at this point because chances are every other idealistic youth has thought of it before. If they still failed, then you don’t yet have any reason to suppose you will do better.

Of course you don’t need all this stuff to try blindly, you just have to accept that your chances of success are very low. I think you will also often do better by directly trying to answer these questions before you start.
Meetup : West LA Meetup 09-06-2011
by  — 2011-08-28T21:56:42.067Z

Discussion article for the meetup : West LA Meetup 09-06-2011

WHEN:
06 September 2011 07:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
10800 West Pico Blvd, Suite 312, Los Angeles, CA 90064

When: 7pm - 9pm September 6th

Where: The Westside Pavillion - on the bridge, which connects Nordstrom 3rd floor with Barnes & Noble / Landmark Theatres 3rd floor.

Parking is free for 3 hours.

Whether you're a regular reader or totally new, here for the theoretical musings or the practical things, come by and say hello! The conversation is largely unstructured, and the people are awesome.

There will be snacks. I will bring a whiteboard with Bayes' Theorem written on it.

See also: West LA Biweekly Meetups

Discussion article for the meetup : West LA Meetup 09-06-2011
Public Donation List or Putting Peer Pressure to Good Use
by drethelin — 2011-08-28T20:36:07.644Z

The recent top level post encouraging people to donate in support of Luke had a lot of a comments saying that it helped remind them to donate at all, simply by bringing it to their attention. I think this is a useful function, and the more people that publicly state that they are donating the stronger the peer pressure on people to donate. I have a recurring monthly donation of 500 dollars, and recently donated 2000 in support of lukeprog and because it is currently getting doubled. Please, if you are willing, comment on this post with donation amounts! Any amount is useful to talk about, even if you think it's less than what other people are donating, because for every person that can donate a large amount there is a large amount of people that can donate a small amount. We should encourage and reinforce donation behavior at all levels.
Polyhacking
by Alicorn — 2011-08-28T08:35:29.887Z

This is a post about applied luminosity in action: how I hacked myself to become polyamorous over (admittedly weak) natural monogamous inclinations. It is a case history about me and, given the specific topic, my love life, which means gooey self-disclosure ahoy. As with the last time I did that, skip the post if it's not a thing you desire to read about. Named partners of mine have given permission to be named.

1. In Which Motivation is Acquired

When one is monogamous, one can only date monogamous people. When one is poly, one can only date poly people.1 Therefore, if one should find oneself with one's top romantic priority being to secure a relationship with a specific individual, it is only practical to adapt to the style of said individual, presuming that's something one can do. I found myself in such a position when MBlume, then my ex, asked me from three time zones away if I might want to get back together. Since the breakup he had become polyamorous and had a different girlfriend, who herself juggled multiple partners; I'd moved, twice, and on the way dated a handful of people to no satisfactory clicking/sparking/other sound effects associated with successful romances. So the idea was appealing, if only I could get around the annoying fact that I was not, at that time, wired to be poly.

Everything went according to plan: I can now comfortably describe myself and the primary relationship I have with MBlume as poly. <bragging>Since moving back to the Bay Area I've been out with four other people too, one of whom he's also seeing; I've been in my primary's presence while he kissed one girl, and when he asked another for her phone number; I've gossiped with a secondary about other persons of romantic interest and accepted his offer to hint to a guy I like that this is the case; I hit on someone at a party right in front of my primary. I haven't suffered a hiccup of drama or a twinge of jealousy to speak of and all evidence (including verbal confirmation) indicates that I've been managing my primary's feelings satisfactorily too.</bragging> Does this sort of thing appeal to you? Cross your fingers and hope your brain works enough like mine that you can swipe my procedure.

2. In Which I Vivisect a Specimen of Monogamy

It's easier to get several small things out of the way, or route aro...
List of Donors, Fall 2011
by Mass_Driver — 2011-08-28T07:45:10.649Z

This discussion-level article is a handy place for people to share info about their recent donations, especially donations to unusually efficient or effective charities. Feel free to post your one-time donations, your recurring donations, and/or any interesting changes in your donation habits. Gratitude and appreciation for other people's donations is also very welcome.
[SEQ RERUN] Doublethink (Choosing to be Biased)
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-28T03:24:54.594Z

Today's post, Doublethink (Choosing to be Biased) was originally published on 14 September 2007. A summary :

George Orwell wrote about what he called "doublethink", where a person was able to hold two contradictory thoughts in their mind simultaneously. While some argue that self deception can make you happier, doublethink will actually lead only to problems.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Human Evil and Muddled Thinking, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
In defence of ignorant thinking
by KatjaGrace — 2011-08-28T02:00:31.000Z

Suppose you want to contribute to the understanding of some subject, but you are presently ignorant about it. Should you do something closer to (a) read everything that’s been written so far, then join in, or (b) think about it yourself a lot before you even look at the basics of what others have come up with?

My guess is closer to (b), though I’m not confident. I’ll tell you why, then you can tell me why I’m wrong if you care to.

Any given topic has many ways to frame it; different assumptions to assume, axioms to emphasise, evidence to notice, questions to ask of it, and aspects to cut out or leave in or smooth out in the abstraction process. Some varieties of each of these things are much more useful than others for making progress, and even the useful ones may help with progress in different directions. When different people approach the same topic, they will do it with a different set of all of these things, because they have different intuitions about it and are familiar with different approaches and other topics. I don’t know of a better, more formal way to try out such things. Once you have understood something complex in the terms set of abstractions etc, it becomes harder to see it in other ways I think, particularly if you have to make up those other ways yourself. So if you start by reading what everyone else has said, you miss out on an opportunity to make a new way to think about it.

Most ways to think about a problem are probably unsuccessful in creating anything new of value. So you might think it’s a tragedy of the commons – it’s better for progress on a subject if each person joining it spends a bit of time at the start trying their own approach before they are familiar with the old work, but it is better for each individual if they just get on with the old work since their own approach probably won’t be any good. But if you do come up with a successful approach, I assume you are duly recompensed with status and glee and that sort of thing.

If eventually we have a perfect general understanding of how to best conceptualise topics, and how to ask the most productive questions and make the best assumptions and so on, then (a). Until then, I’m in favour of a bit of ignorant thinking. What do you think? (assuming your answer is b, or you are an expert on this topic).
How much is karma worth, after all?
by  — 2011-08-27T21:23:23.095Z

It's been a couple days since the funding plea, so I thought I'd like to take this chance to compare self-reported donations to short-term karma gains. Naturally, I voted on none of these comments. Note that after posting this, the karma on these posts will almost definitely change; the values here are for 27/8/11 at around 9:00 GMT.

So, the data:

Kaj_Sotala ~172USD, 5 karma

Rain 12000USD, 25 karma

Nisan 100USD, 16 karma

pengvado 10000USD, 36 karma

JGWeissman 2000USD, 24 karma

Benquo 1000USD, 18 karma

AlexMennen 285USD, 7 karma; and 30USD, 2 karma

wmorgan 1000USD, 13 karma

Note: two people (Kaj_Sotala and Rain) reported monthly commitments, but as far as I understand only the yearly pledge is matched, so for the purposes of this informal study I treat them as reporting X*12 USD donations, instead of X/month.

There's not enough data for an honest causal analysis (I tried), but there are a few observations one can make. Intuitively one expects karma to be determined by the donation amount, the duration of time since the posting, and some unknown error.

First observation: the users with the best USD/karma exchange rate made modest contributions early. Nisan came out best, with $6.25/karma — though some of this karma may be due also to the fantastic signal, on their part, that they overcame a rational hazard to make this donation. (Also, EY responded afterward, confounding the karmic flow with his wake.)

In this spirit, we now name "doing the least restrictive, obviously acceptable thing, instead of doing nothing while contemplating alternatives" Nisan's razor, (ニサンの剃刀, perhaps) unless it happens to have a better, previously-existing name.

Second observation: Hyperbolic discounting is alive and well. Those reporting monthly donations have karma below comparable one-shot donations, though both monthly data points did come slightly later than their one-shot counterparts.

Third observation: Large donations are really inefficient at netting karma. pengvado paid $277.48/karma; no one above 1000USD paid less than $50/karma.

Naturally, there's little point to this analysis. If anyone is trying to maximize net karma by donating to SIAI, something is probably wrong with their priorities.
Meetup : Vancouver Less Wrong Meetup
by Arkanj3l — 2011-08-27T21:02:05.105Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Vancouver Less Wrong Meetup

WHEN:
29 August 2011 02:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Waves Coffee House, 100-900 Howe St. Vancouver, BC V6Z 2M4

The Vancouver Rationalists (Google Group) have skipped a weekend; hopefully we'll pick up the pace once again and continue to build the community. The meetup is at the usual locale, Waves Coffee House. Look into one of the meeting rooms near the back.

Currently the prompt for discussion is the following:

If reverse stupidity is not correlated with intelligence, then what does it have to do with increasing intelligence?

... but, as always, it is a guide and not a rule. Intellectual tangents welcome. One possible avenue of discussion could be new places for activity, possible outside as the summer still gives its due (potluck? Stanley Park?).

Come one, come all: bring yourself, friends, and loved ones interested in rationality.

Discussion article for the meetup : Vancouver Less Wrong Meetup
Decision Theory Paradox: PD with Three Implies Chaos?
by orthonormal — 2011-08-27T19:22:15.046Z

Prerequisites: Familiarity with decision theories (in particular, Eliezer's Timeless Decision Theory) and of course the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Summary: I show an apparent paradox in a three-agent variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma: despite full knowledge of each others' source codes, TDT agents allow themselves to be exploited by CDT, and lose completely to another simple decision theory. Please read the post and think for yourself about the Exercises and the Problem below before reading the comments; this is an opportunity to become a stronger expert at and on decision theory!

We all know that in a world of one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas with read-access to the other player's source code, it's good to be Timeless Decision Theory. A TDT agent in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma will correctly defect against an agent that always cooperates (call this CooperateBot) or always defects (call this DefectBot, and note that CDT trivially reduces to this agent), and it will cooperate against another TDT agent (or any other type of agent whose decision depends on TDT's decision in the appropriate way). In fact, if we run an evolutionary contest as Robert Axelrod famously did for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and again allow players to read the other players' source codes, TDT will annihilate both DefectBot and CooperateBot over the long run, and it beats or ties any other decision theory.1 But something interesting happens when we take players in threes...

Consider a population of agents in a simulated world. Omega, being the trickster from outside the Matrix that ze is, decides to spend a couple of eons playing the following game with these agents: ze selects three of them at random (call them X, Y and Z), wipes their memories,2 gives them each others' source codes, and privately asks each whether they cooperate or defect. If X defects, then Omega will create 2 "children" of X (distinct near-copies of X, with the same decision theory as X) and return them to the simulation. If X cooperates, then Omega will return 3 "children" of Y and 3 "children" of Z to the simulation. Simultaneously, Y and Z make the analogous decisions.

(Just to reiterate: cooperating gives +3 to each other player, nothing to oneself; defecting gives +2 to oneself, nothing to anyone else. The analogy to the Prisoner's Dilemma should be obvious.)

Assume maximal selfishness: each agent is motivated solely to ...
[SEQ RERUN] Human Evil and Muddled Thinking
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-27T03:43:16.172Z

Today's post, Human Evil and Muddled Thinking was originally published on 13 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

It's easy to think that rationality and seeking truth is an intellectual exercise, but this ignores the lessons of history. Cognitive biases and muddled thinking allow people to hide from their own mistakes and allow evil to take root. Spreading the truth makes a real difference in defeating evil.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Rationality and the English Language, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Why we love unimportant things
by KatjaGrace — 2011-08-27T02:12:54.000Z

Consider all the things humans have ever invented. On average, the ones that have been adopted by the most people should be the most useful ones. This seems to be roughly what has happened.

Now consider the ones we get really excited about, and identify with, and celebrate. These are the ones that are not widely adopted. Chairs have been adopted by everyone, because they are great. Nobody ever mentions this. You might think they are just taken for granted because they are old. But consider skis. Skis have been around forever. But they are more controversial than chairs: they have never caught on with some people. Now notice that people who do like skis actually rave about them, and think about them, and consider themselves skiing enthusiasts.

Here are some more unpopular and raved about innovations: drying fruit in the sun, dancing, the iphone, the gin and tonic, the internet, Christianity, watercolour painting, eating a larger meal at lunch time than in the evening, sexual promiscuity, tea

Here are popular uncelebrated innovations: the escalator, the hat, the mobile phone (this was on the other list back when they were rare), the phillips head screwdriver, the computer, queues, tv, bread, floors

Here are the closest things I can think of to counterexamples: the internet (really fits in the first category, but many people who love it must rarely contact with those who don’t and vice versa. Then again people who rave about it often mean to support quite extreme and unorthodox use of it), anti-racism (virtually everyone seems to think they like it, but the ones who rave about it do at least seem to think that others do not), people rave about anything they consciously want at that moment (e.g. they have been standing for ages and they find a chair, or someone brings them a big cake) though they still don’t tend to speak up that item in general or identify with it, sex.

So it seems that we largely celebrate the things that are least important to our actual wellbeing. It even looks to me like the less consensus there is on the value of something, the more impassioned are its fans. At the extreme, when people make up their very own theory or cheesecake or whatever they can often become quite obsessed.

I take all this as a sign that we basically celebrate stuff to draw attention to our identities, not because it’s important.
Rational Home Buying
by Scott Alexander — 2011-08-27T00:15:39.695Z

My parents are considering moving house. I've had a front-seat window to their decision process as they compare alternatives, and sometimes it isn't pretty.
A new house is one of the most important purchases most people will make. Because of the sums involved, the usual pitfalls of decision-making gain new importance, and it becomes especially important to make sure you're thinking rationally. Research in a couple of fields, most importantly positive psychology, offers some potentially helpful tips.

LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION
People so consistently under-count the pain of commuting when making choices that the problem has its own name: Commuter's Paradox. The paradox is that, although rational choice theory predicts people should balance commuting against other goods and costs, so that one person might have a longer commute but a nicer (or cheaper) house and so be just as happy overall, this doesn't happen: people who have long commutes are miserable, full stop. A separate survey by Kahneman and Krueger found that commuting was the least enjoyable of nineteen daily activities mentioned, and other studies have found relations between long commutes and poor social lives, poor health, high stress, and various other problems.
Psychologists aren't entirely sure why people so consistently under-count the pain of commuting. Maybe it's because it's viewed as "in-between" time rather than as an activity on its own; maybe it's because it comes in relatively short and individually bearable chunks repeated over many years, instead of as a single entity. In any case, unless you are mentally atypical you will probably have a tendency to undercount commute time when buying a new home, and may want to adjust for that tendency.
HOUSES COST A LOT OF MONEY
One of Kahneman and Tversky's famous bias experiments went like this: imagine you're buying a new shirt. It costs $40 at a nearby store, and it costs $20 at a store that's fifteen minutes away. Do you drive the fifteen minutes to save twenty bucks? Most people would.
Now imagine you're buying a new TV which costs $2020 at a nearby store, and $2000 at a store that's fifteen minutes away. Do you drive the fifteen minutes to save twenty bucks? Most people wouldn't.
In both cases, the tradeoff is the same - drive fifteen minutes to save twenty bucks - but people were much more willing to do it for the cheap item, because $20 was a hig...