trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Meetup : MelbLW Social Meetup - May 2015
by Maelin — 2015-05-11T12:49:04.287Z

Discussion article for the meetup : MelbLW Social Meetup - May 2015

WHEN:
15 May 2015 06:30:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
Bull & Bear Tavern, 347 Flinders Lane, Melbourne VIC 3000

The Melbourne LessWrong social meetup is on again as scheduled!

Our social meetups happen on the third Friday of every month. They are informal events where we get together to chat and sometimes play some games. The start and finish times are very loose, so feel free to arrive late or leave early or both - drop by for whatever time you like.

Where? The Bull & Bear Tavern, 347 Flinders Ln, Melbourne VIC 3000

When? From 6:30pm until late, Friday May 15th

Contact? If you have any questions, just text or call Richard on 0421231789

Dinner? The Bull & Bear serves regular pub food, kitchens close at about 9pm, and you are welcome to get some dinner while we're there. We have a tradition of going to Stalactites (24hr Greek restaurant) for a late-night souvlaki after the meetup if you would like to wait!

Hope to see you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : MelbLW Social Meetup - May 2015
Meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - Intuitive Bayes
by luminosity — 2015-05-11T10:53:17.790Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - Intuitive Bayes

WHEN:
07 June 2015 04:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
Humanist House, 10 Shepherd St Chippendale

This month's dojo will involve running through exercises aiming to help you gain an intuitive sense of rough bayesian updates. Afterwards, we will have the usual group dinner for those who can make it.

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - Intuitive Bayes
MIRIx Stanford report
by jessicata — 2015-05-11T06:11:26.000Z

This is a report from the second MIRIx at Stanford, which happened on Saturday May 9, 2015. The participants were Jessica Taylor, Alex Richard, Nate Thomas, James Cook, Helen Jiang, and Greg Nisbet.

We started by going over the reflective oracles/game theory paper. Then we tried to find useful ways to apply game theory concepts to reflective oracles. Specificially, we looked at various game theory equilibria other than Nash equilibria and tried to see what they corresponded with in the setting of reflective oracles.

Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

Trembling hand perfect equilibrium is a variant of Nash equilibrium that forbids certain equilibria. Roughly, one could imagine that each player has a tiny chance
of taking a random action, and require players' actions to be rational even in this hypothetical. More formally,
a Nash equilibrium is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium if there is a sequence of perturbed games
(variants of the original game where each strategy must be played with at least ϵ probability)
converging to the original game whose Nash equilibria converge to the original Nash equilibrium.
It is very straightforward to define the same notion for reflective oracles: we can define a
sequence of "perturbed programs" that add a small amount of noise to oracle calls, with reflective
oracles for each perturbed program converging to a trembling hand reflective oracle.

Evidential game theory

It is possible to define evidential game theory as a natural extension of evidential decision theory to game theory. Given n players and a distribution Ω over pure strategy profiles,
let ω∼Ω and define the utility for player i taking action a as E[Ui(ω)|ωi=a].

Let Ω be considered an ϵ-evidential equilibrium when, for each player,
E[Ui(ω)]+ϵ≥maxaE[Ui(ω)|ωi=a].

We can say that Ω is an evidential equilibrium if there is a sequence of ϵ-evidential equilibria
converging to Ω as ϵ converges to 0. The use of ϵ is necessary to avoid 0/0 in conditional
probabilities.

Mutual cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma is actually a valid evidential equilibrium. To see why this is true,
let Ωi be a distribution that assigns 1/i probability to mutual defection and (i−1)/i probability
to mutual cooperation. Since the expected utility given that you cooperate is higher than the expected utility
given that you defect, cooperating is the optimal action. We assign higher proba

...
Open Thread, May 11 - May 17, 2015
by Gondolinian — 2015-05-11T00:16:56.473Z

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.
Bragging Thread May 2015
by Morendil — 2015-05-10T13:25:04.716Z

Your job, should you choose to accept it, is to comment on this thread explaining the most awesome thing you've done this month. You may be as blatantly proud of yourself as you feel. You may unabashedly consider yourself the coolest freaking person ever because of that awesome thing you're dying to tell everyone about. This is the place to do just that.

Remember, however, that this isn't any kind of progress thread. Nor is it any kind of proposal thread. This thread is solely for people to talk about the awesome things they have done. Not "will do". Not "are working on". Have already done. This is to cultivate an environment of object level productivity rather than meta-productivity methods.

So, what's the coolest thing you've done this month?

(Previous Bragging Thread)
Looking to restart Madison LW meetups, in need of regulars
by wobster109 — 2015-05-10T03:20:45.248Z

Hi everyone,

We haven't been having regular meetups in Madison, WI for a while (as far as I'm aware), so I'd love to get those going again! Organizing is actually terrifying for me: what if only one person comes, and that person is disappointed? So I'm looking for regulars. All you have to do is commit to attending one or two events a month, things like nature hikes, study halls, and brunches. I'll provide food, drink, optional cats for petting, and transportation with enough advance notice. Please email me if you're interested (wobster0109@gmail.com).

Thanks a bunch, have a fun weekend!
Caring about something larger than yourself
by So8res — 2015-05-10T03:00:00.000Z
Link: https://mindingourway.com/caring-about-some/

In my last post, I said that in order to address the listless guilt, step zero is believing that you can care about something, and step one is finding something to care about. This post is about step one.

There are many different ways to care passionately about one thing or another. Parents in particular are usually good at step one, and often care strongly about the welfare of their children. Others care strongly about their family, or the environment, or what-have-you. Many others claim to care about all humanity or about all sentient life.

On the other hand, some people have significantly more trouble caring about big things. They don't have any children to die for and they don't see the point in caring about everyone, and yet many of them still possess the listless guilt. When I suggest to such a person that they address their guilt by searching their motivations and finding something to care about, the response, more often than not, is simply "Why?"

This post is for them.

In order to answer, I'm going to talk about my answer to this "why?". Before we continue, I stress that my answer is not the only one, that my cause is not the only one, and that I endorse anyone's desires to pursue whatever it is they care deeply about, regardless of their cause. As with previous posts, don't treat this as a sermon about why you should care about things that are larger than yourself; treat it as a reminder that you can, if you want to.

I often encounter people who don't care much about humanity at large (or the future of sentient life), but seem vaguely curious as to why somebody would. When I suggest that it is possible for them, too, to care about things greater than themselves, the most common response by far, is "sure, but why would I want to do that?"

Why fight for humans? Why care about the fate of the Earth, or the fate of people we will never meet? Why care about the callous species that invented war and torture? Why care for people at large, when most of them are stupid or annoying or members of the wrong political party or possessing of incorrect beliefs? Most humans are annoying, so why would you possibly want to care about them?

I have encountered many people who claim that they only care for their immediate friend group.

Now, if you actually only care about your immediate friend group, then be it not upon me to change your preferences. Yet, in my experience, peop...
The Mr. Hyde of Oxytocin 
by theowl — 2015-05-10T00:42:37.610Z

What comes to mind when you hear the word ‘oxytocin?’ Is it ‘love’, ‘cuddle hormone’, ‘bliss?’ If so, you may be more aware of the Dr. Jekyll of oxytocin rather than the Mr. Hyde. Oxytocin, just like almost every biochemical molecule, is hormetic. It confers positive effects in one context, but negative in another. In the case of oxytocin, a person with a secure attachment style interacting with a familiar group of people that he/she likes, will experience the positive effects of oxytocin. However, someone with an anxious attachment style interacting with a group of people that he/she does not yet fully feel trusting and familiar with will experience the negative effects of oxytocin. Why does the same molecule produce pro-social effects for one person, yet anti-social for another?

Oxytocin redirects more attentional resources towards noticing social stimuli. This increase in the salience of social information enhances the ability to detect expressions, recognize faces, and other social cues. The effect of increased social cognitive abilities is constrained by personality traits and situational context, resulting in either anti-social or pro-social behavior.

Oxytocin also promotes more interest in social cues by increasing affiliative motivation, a desire to get along with others. The increase in affiliative motivation results in pro-social behavior if the person already tends towards having an interest in bonding with people outside their close friend circle. However, an increase in affiliative motivation for those with anxious attachment styles results in a stronger pursuit to feel closer to only the person he/she is attached to.

A couple, Tom and Mary, have just moved to a new town and are attending their first service at a new church. Tom has a secure attachment style and isn’t prone to social anxieties. Tom is optimistic, has a positive bias, is generally content, and sees people as good, trusting, and friendly. Mary has an anxious attachment style, a negative bias, social anxiety, baseline mood neutral, and sees people as potential threats, competitors, untrustworthy, selfish, and egotistical. During the service, Tom and Mary’s oxytocin levels increase by being in a community. As a result of their different dispositions, Tom exhibits the Dr. Jekyll of oxytocin, whereas Mary exhibits the Mr...
Concept Safety: World-models as tools
by Kaj_Sotala — 2015-05-09T12:07:20.736Z

The AI in the quantum box

In the previous post, I discussed the example of an AI whose concept space and goals were defined in terms of classical physics, which then learned about quantum mechanics. Let's elaborate on that scenario a little more.

I wish to zoom in on a certain assumption that I've noticed in previous discussions of these kinds of examples. Although I couldn't track down an exact citation right now, I'm pretty confident that I've heard the QM scenario framed as something like "the AI previously thought in terms of classical mechanics, but then it finds out that the world actually runs on quantum mechanics". The key assumption being that quantum mechanics is in some sense more real than classical mechanics.

This kind of an assumption is a natural one to make if someone is operating on an AIXI-inspired model of AI. Although AIXI considers an infinite amount of world-models, there's a sense in which AIXI always strives to only have one world-model. It's always looking for the simplest possible Turing machine that would produce all of the observations that it has seen so far, while ignoring the computational cost of actually running that machine. AIXI, upon finding out about quantum mechanics, would attempt to update its world-model into one that only contained QM primitives and to derive all macro-scale events right from first principles.

No sane design for a real-world AI would try to do this. Instead, a real-world AI would take advantage of scale separation. This refers to the fact that physical systems can be modeled on a variety of different scales, and it is in many cases sufficient to model them in terms of concepts that are defined in terms of higher-scale phenomena. In practice, the AI would have a number of different world-models, each of them being applied in different situations and for different purposes.

Here we get back to the view of concepts as tools, which I discussed in the previous post. An AI that was doing something akin to reinforcement learning would come to learn the kinds of world-models that gave it the highest rewards, and to selectively employ different world-models based on what was the best thing to do in each situation.

As a toy example, consider an AI that can choose to run a low-resolution or a high-resolution psychological model of someone it's interacting with, in order to predict their responses ...
Meetup : Boston: How to Beat Perfectionism
by Anders_H — 2015-05-08T17:42:02.809Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Boston: How to Beat Perfectionism

WHEN:
17 May 2015 03:30:04PM (-0400)

WHERE:
98 Elm Street, Somerville

How to Beat Perfectionism (or at least reduce it)

Are you a perfectionist? Do you want to be? Do you want to not be?
Jesse Galef will talk on this matter, and his slides will be flawless.

Join us at the Citadel for the talk and discussion!

Cambridge/Boston-area Less Wrong meetups start at 3:30pm on the first and third Sunday of every month.

The default location is at the Citadel Rationalist House in Porter Sq, at 98 Elm St, apt 1, Somerville (Occasionally, meetups take place at other locations, such as MIT or Harvard. This will be specified as needed)

Our default schedule is as follows:

—Phase 1: Arrival, greetings, unstructured conversation.

—Phase 2: The headline event. This starts promptly at 4pm, and lasts 30-60 minutes.

—Phase 3: Further discussion. We'll explore the ideas raised in phase 2, often in smaller groups.

—Phase 4: Dinner.

Discussion article for the meetup : Boston: How to Beat Perfectionism
The File Drawer Effect and Conformity Bias (Election Edition)
by Salemicus — 2015-05-08T16:51:05.462Z

As many of you may be aware, the UK general election took place yesterday, resulting in a surprising victory for the Conservative Party. The pre-election opinion polls predicted that the Conservatives and Labour would be roughly equal in terms of votes cast, with perhaps a small Conservative advantage leading to a hung parliament; instead the Conservatives got 36.9% of the vote to Labour's 30.4%, and won the election outright.

There has already been a lot of discussion about why the polls were wrong, from methodological problems to incorrect adjustments. But perhaps more interesting is the possibility that the polls were right! For example, Survation did a poll on the evening before the election, which predicted the correct result (Conservatives 37%, Labour 31%). However, that poll was never published because the results seemed "out of line." Survation didn't want to look silly by breaking with the herd, so they just kept quiet about their results. Naturally this makes me wonder about the existence of other unpublished polls with similar readings.

This seems to be a case of two well know problems colliding with devastating effect. Conformity bias caused Survation to ignore the data and go with what they "knew" to be the case (for which they have now paid dearly). And then the file drawer effect meant that the generally available data was skewed, misleading third parties. The scientific thing to do is to publish all data, including "outliers," both so that information can change over time rather than be anchored, and to avoid artificially compressing the variance. Interestingly, the exit poll, which had a methodology agreed beforehand and was previously committed to be published, was basically right.

This is now the third time in living memory that opinion polls have been embarrassingly wrong about the UK general election. Each time this has lead to big changes in the polling industry. I would suggest that one important scientific improvement is for polling companies to announce the methodology of a poll and any adjustments to be made before the poll takes place, and commit to publishing all polls they carry out. Once this became the norm, data from any polling company that didn't follow this practice would be rightly seen as unreliable by comparison.
New LW Meetup: Dublin
by FrankAdamek — 2015-05-08T15:37:47.682Z

This summary was posted to LW Main on May 1st. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Dublin: 09 May 2015 02:00PM

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

Australian Less Wrong Mega Meetup #2: 17 July 2015 07:00PM
Australia-wide Mega-Camp!: 17 July 2015 07:00PM
European Community Weekend 2015: 12 June 2015 12:00PM
[Munich] May Meetup: 16 May 2015 03:00PM

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Austin, TX - Caffe Medici - Fun and Games: 02 May 2015 01:30PM
Canberra: Putting Induction Into Practice: 09 May 2015 06:00PM
[Melbourne] Sunday Rationality Dojos - Thinking More Creatively: 03 April 2016 03:00PM
[Seattle] MIRI paper reading group: 03 April 2016 12:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - Planning and Debugging: 03 May 2015 04:00PM
[Vienna] Rationality Meetup Vienna: 09 May 2015 02:00PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Cambridge UK, Canberra, Columbus, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, Mountain View, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview is posted on the front page every Friday. These are an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in upcoming weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts are moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feature, you need to post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!

If you check Less Wrong irregularly, consider subscribing to one or more city-specific mailing list in ...
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks
by rocurley — 2015-05-08T06:11:32.132Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks

WHEN:
11 May 2015 06:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
1061 Market St #4, San Francisco, CA 94103

We'll be meeting to give/listen to short talks. Planning isn't necessary: these are not expected to be polished.

I can be reached at 301-458-0764 if you need help getting in. As always, feel free to show up late.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Short Talks
LIST: I can't vote Karma on some people, some contexts.
by buybuydandavis — 2015-05-08T03:06:03.009Z

What's up with that?

In a discussion thread, I can karma vote on anyone.

But if I select a person to see all their posts, for some people, karma is disabled while looking at them, and for others, it's not disabled. Same thing if I look at their posts under the list of all my posts.
Meetup : Washington, D.C.: xkcd Discussion
by RobinZ — 2015-05-08T02:26:30.071Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: xkcd Discussion

WHEN:
10 May 2015 03:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Reynolds Center

We will be meeting in the Kogod Courtyard of the Donald W. Reynolds Center for American Art and Portraiture (8th and F Sts or 8th and G Sts NW, go straight past the information desk from either entrance) to discuss the webcomic xkcd and pages thereof. We plan to congregate between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m., to begin at 3:30.

As is almost too obvious to state, the webcomic xkcd is quite popular among Less Wrong types. While it is often alluded to at meetups, this meetup is intended as a Schelling point for more and longer conversations about and inspired by the strip. As always, attendees are allowed and encouraged to start and join side conversations as they choose.

The WMATA major track work schedule on the Green Line has been postponed; weekend service adjustments include reduced service and single-tracking on the Orange, Blue, and Yellow Lines. The Verizon Center calendar for May 10 includes a possible Washington Capitals game beginning at 7:00 p.m. (doors 6:00).

Upcoming meetups:

May 17: (Outdoor) Fun & Games (bring games, play games, converse, socialize, or any combination thereof)

May 24: MIRIx Q&A (discussion of MIRIx - what it is, why it exists, what it does, etc.)

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: xkcd Discussion
Opinions on having a stronger preference or an open preference
by Elo — 2015-05-07T21:06:19.692Z

I am wondering; and the answer seems unclear to me.

All day; every day of our lives we are presented with choice moments; What to eat; which way to turn; which clock to look at to best tell the time, what colour clothing to wear, where to walk; what to say, which words to say it with; how to respond.

Is it better to have an "established specific preference" or a more "open preference"? Why? Or which places is one better than the other and vice versa?

some factors might include:

Mental energy: Mental energy is exerted by having to make choices regularly; but with existing preferences you can simplify indecisive moments, save time; save mental energy; which can lead to bad choices and akrasia-like habits. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_fatigue

Lost opportunity: When walking well worn pathways; you are unlikely to encounter as many new opportunities as you might have otherwise encountered if exploring new experiences or trying new choices.

Establishing stability: From a scientific standpoint; establishing stable norms could allow you to better measure variations and their cause/effect on your life, (i.e. food eaten and your mood). As many of us are growing, measuring and observing the world around us and our relationship with it; perhaps its better to establish stable choice for more areas.

I assume that once a choice is established; it would take an amount of activation energy to justify changing that choice, so would be partially fixed. (not to mention all the biases which would convince you that it was a good choice)

If the choice was made: Imagine if someone else made the choice for you. Would it be easier? Is this a good measure as to whether this choice should be pre-decided?

Would it be a productive exercise to make a list of daily choices and make pre-defined decisions for yourself so that you don't have to make them as they come up; but rather look at an existing choice list? Would this help with decisions? For example dieting should be easier when you have your dietary choice already established. Of course in the real world decisions can change; as life moves rapidly; but maybe it can help to have an existing default.

Is there a place in your life that you find having a pre-defined choice to be effective/ineffective? One example might be a shopping list; where you can shop fas...