trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Meetup : Comfort Zone Expansion outing - London
by philh — 2013-08-23T13:59:04.896Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Comfort Zone Expansion outing - London

WHEN:
01 September 2013 11:00:00AM (+0100)

WHERE:
Westfield Shopping Center, Shepherds Bush, London

LW London will be running a Comfort Zone Expansion (CoZE) outing on 1st September.

A lot of things seem scarier than, on reflection, they should do. CoZE is a technique to recalibrate our fears, especially related to social situations. The way to expand one's comfort zone is to do things that are just on the edge of it, so that's what we'll be doing. In an imitation of part of the CFAR workshops, we'll be heading to a mall to split up, do slightly scary things, and then meet back together to debrief and discuss.

Prior to the mall, we'll be meeting somewhere to discuss CoZE in more depth: what we're trying to do, why we're trying to do it, some things we're absolutely not trying to do, etc. Safety briefing.

We'll meet at 11am, but I haven't yet worked out exactly where that will be; if anyone has suggestions for a somewhat-private space near the mall we can go to, please let me know. (Basically we want to be able to discuss things that make us uncomfortable, and the fewer people nearby, the better. For people who've been coming to the social meetups, somewhere like the dungeons in the Old Star would probably be fine. If the weather's nice then Shepherds Bush Common might work, but I can't rely on that.) I'll work somewhere out this week and update before the day of the outing.

[Update: The weather for tomorrow looks good, so we'll meet somewhere on Shepherds Bush Common: map. If we're not easy to find, give me a call and I can be more specific.

In the event that the weather does fail, we'll meet in the Defector's Weld, which is right on the north-west corner of the common.]

After that, hopefully we'll be able to play some improv games as a warm-up. This depends on time and whether or not we're likely to annoy lots of people if we play.

In any case, we'll head to the mall no later than 1.30pm. (Probably sooner; I'm keeping times flexible because I don't really know how long the discussion will take.) Then we'll split up for the outing itself. We'll meet back up after an hour and a half, and head somewhere else to debrief: success stories, things that didn't work, anything that seems relevant.

Please bring a mobile phon

...
Lesswrong Philosophy and Personal Identity
by Carinthium — 2013-08-23T13:15:56.214Z

Although Elizier has dealt with personal identity questions (in terms of ruling out the body theory), he has not actually, as far as I know, "solved" the problem of Personal Identity as it is understood in philosophy. Nor, as far as I know, has any thinker (Robin Hanson, Yvain, etc) broadly in the same school of thought.

Why do I think it worth solving? One- Lesswrong has a tradition of trying to solve all of philosophy through thinking better than philosophers do. Even when I don't agree with it, the result is often enlightening. Two- What counts as 'same person' could easily have significant implications for large numbers of ethical dilemnas, and thus for Lesswrongian ethics.

Three- most importantly of all, the correct theory has practical implications for cryonics. I don't know enough to assert any theory as actually true, but if, say, Identity as Continuity of Form rather than of Matter were the true theory it would mean that preserving only the mental data would not be enough. What kind of preservation is necessary also varies somewhat- the difference in requirement based on a Continuity of Consciousness v.s a Continuity of Psyche theory, for example should be obvious.

I'm curious what people here think. What is the correct answer? No-self theory? Psyche theory? Derek Parfit's theory in some manner? Or if there is a correct way to dissolve the question, what is that correct way?
Rationalist households: What can London learn from its predecessors?
by KnaveOfAllTrades — 2013-08-23T07:56:28.490Z

At our most recent meetup, the London LessWrongers began discussion of setting up one or more houses in the capital. This thread is intended for discussion and advice on planning ‘rationalist households’ and on making them thrive. You can also register your interest in being part of a London, UK rationalist house here.
Those who currently live in or have previously lived in rationalist households, or who have relevant experience, are particularly encouraged to share their experiences, and any data on house setups is most welcome. It would be great if we could get case studies of several rationalist households, to compare approaches and aid other organizers.
We’re considering having a room for visitors and people who are only in the city for part of the year, with an Airbnb-type arrangement for that room at other times. Therefore, we are seeking advice from Airbnb hosts on setting this up, as well as on its advantages and disadvantages.
We would also like to hear about the common pitfalls of group living in order to avoid making basic errors.
Meetup : Philadelphia - Humans are not automatically strategic
by mare-of-night — 2013-08-23T00:41:46.330Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Philadelphia - Humans are not automatically strategic

WHEN:
25 August 2013 04:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
1515 Chestnut St, Philadelphia, PA

We will be meeting at Giovani Pizza at 4 PM on Sunday to discuss the article Humans Are Not Automatically Strategic. If you don't have time to read the article, come out anyway. We welcome your thoughts on the subject regardless. See you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : Philadelphia - Humans are not automatically strategic
Another Anki deck for Less Wrong content
by MondSemmel — 2013-08-22T19:31:09.513Z

Anki decks of Less Wrong content have been shared here before. However, they felt a bit huge (one deck was >1500 cards) and/or not helpful to me. As I go through the sequences, I create Anki cards, and I've decided they are at a point where I can share them. Maybe someone else will benefit from them.

Current content: The deck currently consists of 186 Anki cards (82 Q&A, 104 cloze deletion), covering the following Less Wrong sequences: The Map and the Territory, Mysterious Answers to Mysterious Questions, How to Actually Change Your Mind, A Human's Guide to Words, and Reductionism.
All cards contain an extra field for their source, usually 1-2 Less Wrong posts, rarely a link to Wikipedia. Some mathy cards use LaTeX. I don't know what happens if you don't have LateX installed. Though if this is a problem, I think I can convert the LaTeX code to images with an Anki plugin.

Important caveats:

My cards tend to have more context than those I've seen in most other decks, to the point that one might consider them overloaded with information. That's partly due to personal preference, and partly because I need as much context as possible so I memorize more than just a teacher's password.

In contrast to previously shared Anki decks of Less Wrong content, I do not aim to make this deck comprehensive. Rather, I create cards for content which I understood and which seems suitable for memorization and which seemed particularly useful to me. Conversely, I did not create cards when I couldn't think of a way to memorize something, or when I did not understand (the usefulness of) something. (For instance, Original Seeing and Priming and Contamination did not work for me.)

I've tried a few shared decks so far, and everybody seems to create cards differently. So I'm not sure to which extent this deck can be useful to anyone who isn't me.

Open question: I'm still not sure to which extent I'm memorizing internalized and understood knowledge with these cards, and to which extent they are just fake explanations or attempts to guess at passwords.

And a final disclaimer: The content is mostly taken verbatim from Yudkowsky's sequences, though I've often edited the text so it fit better as an Anki card. I checked the cards thoroughly before making the deck public, but any remaining errors are mine.

I'm thankful for suggestions and other feedback.
Simple investing for a complete beginner? (Just… developing world index funds?)
by Owen_Richardson — 2013-08-22T07:15:54.919Z

[EDIT: Through conversation with Rolf Andreassen below, it has been brought to my attention that I am simply completely and irretrievably insane.

Sane and well-measured advice is therefore wasted on me, and I just wanted to edit in this notice here so that other well-meaning folks don't get tricked into wasting their time trying to talk sense into a total nutcase like me. :)

(I appreciate all y'all, though. ^^ ) ]

So my dad set up a trust fund for me when I was a kid, and I've got 13k (CAD) now, which I am going to be taking direct control of.

Now, I have no interest in making a deep study of investment. I have a life to live and dealing with money is boring.

The only thing more boring than dealing with money, is dealing with a lack of money, and so I want to optimize the time and thought I spend avoiding that down to a minimum.

Four things occur to me:

1) Taking the naive and sparse knowledge I have of this area, basically just stuff I‘ve randomly osmosis’d up, this is my train of thought:

Markets are essentially random walks with an upward trend?

“Index funds” are magic boxes that you put money in and your money will grow at the same rate of the market that the fund “indexes”?

“Developing world” economies generally grow a lot quicker than those in the “developed world”?

(This makes sense to me. Places like the US, Canada Europe, etc, already have mature transportation and communication infrastructure. You can't get much economic growth out of doing basic stuff like building a new highway here, but in, like, some African region that has previously been served by, I dunno, jungle-donkeys, it makes a proportionally much bigger difference.)

There are a few countries where “developing” is a euphemism for “totally messed up”, but in general it really does mean “growing”?

And there are enough of these places over the world, and they're independent enough, that natural disasters/political trouble/etc in a few of them still leave a consistent and high rate of average growth?

So shouldn't I just put all my money in a fund that “indexes” all these "developing" economies together?

2) My dad set up this trust fund with a bank that has a bunch of big expensive physical buildings for some reason. I recently read a letter from them saying that they will charge

...
Use Your Identity Carefully
by Ben_LandauTaylor — 2013-08-22T01:14:45.109Z

In Keep Your Identity Small, Paul Graham argues against associating yourself with labels (i.e. “libertarian,” “feminist,” “gamer,” “American”) because labels constrain what you’ll let yourself believe. It’s a wonderful essay that’s led me to make concrete changes in my life. That said, it’s only about 90% correct. I have two issues with Graham’s argument; one is a semantic quibble, but it leads into the bigger issue, which is a tactic I’ve used to become a better person.

Graham talks about the importance of identity in determining beliefs. This isn’t quite the right framework. I’m a fanatical consequentialist, so I care what actions people take. Beliefs can constrain actions, but identity can also constrain actions directly.

To give a trivial example from the past week in which beliefs didn’t matter: I had a self-image as someone who didn’t wear jeans or t-shirts. As it happens, there are times when wearing jeans is completely fine, and when other people wore jeans in casual settings, I knew it was appropriate. Nevertheless, I wasn’t able to act on this belief because of my identity. (I finally realized this was silly, consciously discarded that useless bit of identity, and made a point of wearing jeans to a social event.)

Why is this distinction important? If we’re looking at identify from an action-centered framework, this recommends a different approach from Graham’s.

Do you want to constrain your beliefs? No; you want to go wherever the evidence pushes you. “If X is true, I desire to believe that X is true. If X is not true, I desire to believe that X is not true.” Identity will only get in the way.

Do you want to constrain your actions? Yes! Ten thousand times yes! Akrasia exists. Commitment devices are useful. Beeminder is successful. Identity is one of the most effective tools for the job, if you wield it deliberately.

I’ve cultivated an identity as a person who makes events happen. It took months to instill, but now, when I think “I wish people were doing X,” I instinctively start putting together a group to do X. This manifests in minor ways, like the tree-climbing expedition I put together at the Effective Altruism Summit, and in big ways, like the megameetup we held in Boston. If I hadn’t...
Meetup : VA Callibration/Biased games meetup
by rocurley — 2013-08-21T22:06:32.148Z

Discussion article for the meetup : VA Callibration/Biased games meetup

WHEN:
25 August 2013 03:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
4238 Wilson Boulevard, Ballston Common Mall, Arlington, VA 22203, USA

We'll be meeting in the food court to play calibration games and and biased boardgames.

Please note that this is NOT THE NORMAL LOCATION: we're experimenting with a different place to see how attendance fares in VA.

Discussion article for the meetup : VA Callibration/Biased games meetup
Meetup : Helsinki Meetup
by mikko — 2013-08-21T19:10:01.886Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Helsinki Meetup

WHEN:
08 September 2013 03:00:00PM (+0300)

WHERE:
Jämeräntaival 3, 02150 Espoo, Finland

We’ll be trying a new location this time: Takkakabinetti in Otaniemi.

In this meetup, Pyry will give us a brief introduction to Lojban, which has been described as "the constructed language with the most complete grammar – a language created to reflect the principles of logic”.

We’ll also try personal problem solving in smaller groups. Get your problems solved, or help others!

Various board games will be available as well.

Discussion article for the meetup : Helsinki Meetup
Meetup : Durham NC/Triangle Area: Cognitive Biases and Where to Find Them + games!
by therufs — 2013-08-21T15:20:31.875Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham NC/Triangle Area: Cognitive Biases and Where to Find Them + games!

WHEN:
29 August 2013 07:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
420 West Geer St., Durham NC 27701

We'll do a minidiscussion on cognitive biases, then follow with The Hypothesis Testing Game Sometimes Known As Zendo.

7:00 gather, chat, coffee

7:30 discussion

8:30? Pyramids o'clock!

9:30ish Adjourn (probably to Fullsteam for beers.)

To be notified about other upcoming meetups & events, join the RTLW mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/rtlw !

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham NC/Triangle Area: Cognitive Biases and Where to Find Them + games!
Meetup : [Boston] Estimation Experiment & Discussion
by Ben_LandauTaylor — 2013-08-21T15:16:20.469Z

WHEN: 25 August 2013 02:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE: 25 Ames St, Cambridge, MA

Meetup event page

We're running a test of an estimation method to see whether it helps form accurate beliefs. Afterwards, we'll talk about the method and its implications. This experiment was designed with input from the Center for Applied Rationality, and they're eager to see the outcome. Please come if you're able; the bigger our sample size, the better our data will be.

Cambridge/Boston-area Less Wrong meetups are every Sunday at 2pm in MIT's building 66 at 25 Ames St, room 156. Room number subject to change based on availability; signs will be posted with the actual room number.

Our default schedule is as follows:

—Phase 1: Arrival, greetings, unstructured conversation.

—Phase 2: The headline event. This starts promptly at 2:30, and lasts 30-60 minutes.

—Phase 3: Further discussion. We'll explore the ideas raised in phase 2, often in smaller groups.

—Phase 4: Dinner. It's about a ten minute walk to the usual restaurant.
Meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 82-85
by therufs — 2013-08-21T15:05:08.440Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 82-85

WHEN:
24 August 2013 12:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
726 Rigsbee Avenue, Durham NC, 27701

Meet at Fullsteam for discussion of HPMoR 82-85!

Bring a question, observation, or topic for discussion -- anything you found particularly interesting in the reading.

No time to read or reread? No worries; come hang out anyway.

12:00 gather food and coffee

12:30 discussion begins

2:00 beers, SpaceTeam, or other antics

To be notified about other upcoming meetups & events, join the RTLW mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/rtlw !

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 82-85
[LINK] "Preventing Human Extinction" by Nick Beckstead, Peter Singer, and Matt Wage
by Peter Wildeford — 2013-08-21T11:14:41.588Z

Fortunately, the odds of an extinction-sized asteroid hitting the earth this century are low, on the order of one in a million. Unfortunately, asteroids aren’t the only threats to humanity’s survival. Other potential threats stem from bio-engineered diseases, nuclear war, extreme climate change, and dangerous future technologies.

Given that there is some risk of humanity going extinct over the next couple of centuries, the next question is whether we can do anything about it. We will first explain what we can do about it, and then ask the deeper ethical question: how bad would human extinction be?

Read more at "Preventing Human Extinction" at the Effective Altruist blog.
Internal and external criticism
by Kaj_Sotala — 2013-08-21T06:35:45.478Z

I notice that if you want to persuade me away from a position, it sometimes works to have me talk with two kinds of people: 1) people who have good reasons for disagreeing with my position, and 2) people who agree with my position for similar reasons and hold it even more strongly than I do.
In both cases, the difference in opinion forces me to re-examine my reasons for believing in something, but the direction of the examination is different. Case 1 makes me think "are these criticisms valid, or do I (should I) support this position because of some reason that the criticisms do not take into account?". Case 2 makes me think "this person believes in this thing for basically the same reasons that I do, so why haven't those reasons pushed me to a similar extreme? Do I actually have unacknowledged reasons for doubting the validity of those reasons, which would deserve further consideration?"
In case 1, I am being presented with criticisms that came from outside my own thought process. In case 2, I am searching my own thought process for criticisms that have been generated within it. So the source of the criticism is either external or internal, respectively. A combination of both may prove decisive in situations where just one isn't enough.
Now the question is, are there reliable ways for inducing one of the cases in situations where only the other is present, and I have reason to suspect that I'm being overconfident about something?
[LINK] Cochrane on Existential Risk
by Salemicus — 2013-08-20T22:42:06.583Z

The finance professor John Cochrane recently posted an interesting blog post. The piece is about existential risk in the context of global warming, but it is really a discussion of existential risk generally; many of his points are highly relevant to AI risk.

If we [respond strongly to all low-probability threats], we spend 10 times GDP.

It's a interesting case of framing bias. If you worry only about climate, it seems sensible to pay a pretty stiff price to avoid a small uncertain catastrophe. But if you worry about small uncertain catastrophes, you spend all you have and more, and it's not clear that climate is the highest on the list...

All in all, I'm not convinced our political system is ready to do a very good job of prioritizing outsize expenditures on small ambiguous-probability events.

He also points out that the threat from global warming has a negative beta - i.e. higher future growth rates are likely to be associated with greater risk of global warming, but also the richer our descendants will be. This means both that they will be more able to cope with the threat, and that the damage is less important from a utilitarian point of view. Attempting to stop global warming therefore has positive beta, and therefore requires higher rates of return than simple time-discounting.

It strikes me that this argument applies equally to AI risk, as fruitful artificial intelligence research is likely to be associated with higher economic growth. Moreover:

The economic case for cutting carbon emissions now is that by paying a bit now, we will make our descendants better off in 100 years.

Once stated this way, carbon taxes are just an investment. But is investing in carbon reduction the most profitable way to transfer wealth to our descendants? Instead of spending say $1 trillion in carbon abatement costs, why don't we invest $1 trillion in stocks? If the 100 year rate of return on stocks is higher than the 100 year rate of return on carbon abatement -- likely -- they come out better off. With a gazillion dollars or so, they can rebuild Manhattan on higher ground. They can afford whatever carbon capture or geoengineering technology crops up to clean up our messes.

So should we close down MIRI and invest the funds in an index tracker?

The full post can be found here.
Torture vs Dust Specks Yet Again
by sentientplatypus — 2013-08-20T12:06:57.000Z

The first time I read Torture vs. Specks about a year ago I didn't read a single comment because I assumed the article was making a point that simply multiplying can sometimes get you the wrong answer to a problem. I seem to have had a different "obvious answer" in mind.

And don't get me wrong, I generally agree with the idea that math can do better than moral intuition in deciding questions of ethics. Take this example from Eliezer’s post Circular Altruism which made me realize that I had assumed wrong:

Suppose that a disease, or a monster, or a war, or something, is killing people. And suppose you only have enough resources to implement one of the following two options:
1. Save 400 lives, with certainty.
2. Save 500 lives, with 90% probability; save no lives, 10% probability.

I agree completely that you pick number 2. For me that was just manifestly obvious, of course the math trumps the feeling that you shouldn't gamble with people’s lives…but then we get to torture vs. dust specks and that just did not compute. So I've read most every argument I could find in favor of torture(there are a great deal and I might have missed something critical), but...while I totally understand the argument (I think) I'm still horrified that people would choose torture over dust specks.

I feel that the way that math predominates intuition begins to fall apart when you the problem compares trivial individual suffering with massive individual suffering, in a way very much analogous to the way in which Pascal’s Mugging stops working when you make the credibility really low but the threat really high. Like this. Except I find the answer to torture vs. dust specks to be much easier...

Let me give some examples to illustrate my point.

Can you imagine Harry killing Hermione because Voldemort threatened to plague all sentient life with one barely noticed dust speck each day for the rest of time? Can you imagine killing your own best friend/significant other/loved one to stop the powers of the Matrix from hitting 3^^^3 sentient beings with nearly inconsquential dust specks? Of course not. No. Snap decision.

Eliezer, would you seriously, given the choice by Alpha, the Alien superintelligence that always carries out its threats, give up all your work, and horribly torture some innocent person, all day for fifty years in the face of the threat of a 3^^^3 ins...