trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Updating on hypotheticals
by casebash — 2015-11-06T11:49:03.800Z

This post is based on a discussion with ChristianKl on Less Wrong Chat. Thanks!

Many people disagreed with my previous writings on hypotheticals on Less Wrong (link1, link2). For those who still aren’t convinced, I’ll provide another argument on why you should take hypotheticals seriously. Suppose you are discussing the issue of whether it’d be okay to flick the switch if a train was about to collide with and destroy an entire world as a way to try to sell someone on utilitarian ethics (see trolley problem). The other person objects that this is an unrealistic situation and so there is no point wasting time on this discussion.

This may seem unreasonable, but I suppose a person who believes that their time is very valuable may not feel that it is actually worth their time indulging in the hypothetical that A->B unless the other person is willing to explain to them why this result would relate to how we should act in the real world. This might be especially likely to be true if they have had similar discussion before and so they have a low prior that the other person will be able to relate it to the real world.

However, at this stage, they almost certainly have to update, in the sense that if you are following the rule of updating on new evidence, you have most likely already received new evidence. The argument is as follows: As soon as you have heard A->B (if it would save a world, I would flick a switch), your brain has already performed a surface level evaluation on that argument. Realistically, the thinker in the situation probably knows that it is really tough to make the argument that we should allow an entire world to be destroyed instead of ending one life. Now, the fact that it is tough to argue against something doesn’t mean that it should be accepted. For example, many philosophical proofs or halves of mathematical paradoxes seem very hard to argue against at first, but we may have an intuitive sense that there is a flaw there to be found if we are smart enough and look hard enough.

However, even if we aren’t confident in the logic we still have to update our priors, once we know that there is an argument for it that at least appears to check out. Obviously we will update to a much lesser degree than if we were confident in the logic, but we still have to update to some extent, even if we think...
LINK: An example of the Pink Flamingo, the obvious-yet-overlooked cousin of the Black Swan
by polymathwannabe — 2015-11-05T16:55:13.165Z

India vs. Pakistan: the nuclear option is dangerously close, and nobody seems to want to prevent it

http://qz.com/541502/a-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-is-a-very-real-possibility/
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Fun and Games
by rocurley — 2015-11-05T07:49:10.108Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Fun and Games

WHEN:
09 November 2015 06:15:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
1597 Howard St. San Francisco, CA

We'll be meeting to hang out and play games! Please bring your own games: I have Dominion, Ticket to Ride, and Avalon. You can call 301-458-0764 to be let in.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Fun and Games
Rationality Merchandise - First Set
by Gleb_Tsipursky — 2015-11-05T06:12:50.943Z

As part of my broader project of promoting rationality to a wide audience, we developed clothing with rationality-themed slogans. This apparel is suited for aspiring rationalists to wear to show their affiliation with rationality, to remind themselves and other aspiring rationalists to improve, and to spread positive memes broadly.

My gratitude to all those who gave suggestions about and voted on these slogans, both on LW itself and the LW Facebook group. This is the first set of seven slogans that had the most popular support from Less Wrongers, and more will be coming soon.

The apparel is pretty affordable, starting at under $15. All profits will go to funding nonprofit work dedicated to spreading rationality to a broad audience.

Links to Clothing with Slogans:

1) Less Wrong Every Day

This slogan conveys a key aspiration of every aspiring rationalist - to grow less wrong every day and have a clearer map of the territory. This is not only a positive meme, but also a clear sign of affiliation with rationality and the Less Wrong community in particular.

2) Growing Mentally Stronger

This slogan conveys the broad goal of rationality, namely for its participants to grow mentally stronger. This shirt helps prime the wearer and those around the wearer to focus on growing more rational, both epistemically and instrumentally. It is more broadly accessible than something like "Less Wrong Every Day."

3) Living On Purpose

This slogan conveys the intentional nature of how aspiring rationalists live their life, with a clear set of terminal goals and strategies to reach those goals.

4) Please Provide An Example

This slogan and its variants received a lot of support from aspiring rationalists tired of discussions and debates with people who talked in broad abstract terms and failed to provide examples. It automatically reminds those who you are talking with, both aspiring rationalists and non-rationalists, to be concrete and specific in their engagement with you, and minimizes wasted airtime and inefficient discussions.

5) I Notice I'm Confused

This slogan reminds the wearer and those around the wearer of the vital skill of noticing confusion for growing aware of gaps between one's map and the reality of the territory. Moreover, in field testing this design, this slogan proved especially fruitful for prompting conversations about rationality fr...
Meetup : Seattle Rationality Reading Group: 109-114
by SeekingEternity — 2015-11-05T03:09:59.808Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Seattle Rationality Reading Group: 109-114

WHEN:
09 November 2015 06:30:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
Paul G. Allen Center, 185 Stevens Way, Seattle, Washington

This is a weekly meetup in the Seattle area, currently reading Yudkowski's Rationality: From AI to Zombies. We are currently in the "Death Spirals and the Cult Attractor" sequence of "How to Actually Change Your Mind". See the Facebook event here: https://www.facebook.com/events/520808021411665/

The meetings involve discussions of the recent readings and related topics. They are typically around 2 - 2.5 hours long. Bringing snacks is welcome but by no means expected. We usually go for dinner on the Ave after the meetup. We are typically located in room 503.

It's not necessary to have read the material leading up to this week's readings (either in the book Rationality, or in the Sequences here on LW), but it may help. The items for this week are:

\109. Evaporative Cooling of Group Beliefs

\110. When None Dare Urge Restraint

\111. The Robbers Cave Experiment

\112. Every Cause Wants to Be a Cult

\113. Guardians of the Truth

\114. Guardians of the Gene Pool

Discussion article for the meetup : Seattle Rationality Reading Group: 109-114
Rationality Reading Group: Part M: Fragile Purposes
by Gram_Stone — 2015-11-05T02:08:05.693Z

This is part of a semi-monthly reading group on Eliezer Yudkowsky's ebook, Rationality: From AI to Zombies. For more information about the group, see the announcement post.

Welcome to the Rationality reading group. This fortnight we discuss Part M: Fragile Purposes (pp. 617-674). This post summarizes each article of the sequence, linking to the original LessWrong post where available.

M. Fragile Purposes

143. Belief in Intelligence - What does a belief that an agent is intelligent look like? What predictions does it make?

144. Humans in Funny Suits - It's really hard to imagine aliens that are fundamentally different from human beings.

145. Optimization and the Intelligence Explosion - An introduction to optimization processes and why Yudkowsky thinks that an intelligence explosion would be far more powerful than calculations based on human progress would suggest.

146. Ghosts in the Machine - There is a way of thinking about programming a computer that conforms well to human intuitions: telling the computer what to do. The problem is that the computer isn't going to understand you, unless you program the computer to understand. If you are programming an AI, you are not giving instructions to a ghost in the machine; you are creating the ghost.

147. Artificial Addition - If you imagine a world where people are stuck on the "artifical addition" (i.e. machine calculator) problem, the way people currently are stuck on artificial intelligence, and you saw them trying the same popular approaches taken today toward AI, it would become clear how silly they are. Contrary to popular wisdom (in that world or ours), the solution is not to "evolve" an artificial adder, or invoke the need for special physics, or build a huge database of solutions, etc. -- because all of these methods dodge the crucial task of understanding what addition involves, and instead try to dance around it. Moreover, the history of AI research shows the problems of believing assertions one cannot re-generate from one's own knowledge.

148. Terminal Values and Instrumental Values - Proposes a formalism for a discussion of the relationship between terminal and instrumental values. Terminal values are world states that we assign some sort of positive or negative worth ...
Meetup : Warsaw November Meetup
by mkf — 2015-11-04T18:41:54.044Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Warsaw November Meetup

WHEN:
14 November 2015 04:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Jabeerwocky Craft Beer Pub, ul. Nowogrodzka 12, 00-511 Warszawa

Fb event: https://www.facebook.com/events/628259367316877/

Discussion article for the meetup : Warsaw November Meetup
Meetup : FallacyMania game in Kocherga club
by Alexander230 — 2015-11-04T18:29:16.684Z

Discussion article for the meetup : FallacyMania game in Kocherga club

WHEN:
25 November 2015 07:30:00PM (+0300)

WHERE:
Moscow, B.Dorogomilovskaya, 5-2

Welcome to FallacyMania: it is a game where you guess logical fallacies in arguments, or practise using logical fallacies yourself (depending on team in which you will be).

Details about the game are here: https://lesswrong-ru.hackpad.com/Fallacymania--neGfMe9MFjH

Come to antikafe "Kocherga", ul.B.Dorogomilovskaya, 5-2. The map is here: http://kocherga-club.ru/#contacts . Nearest metro station is Kievskaya. If you are lost, call Sasha at +7-905-527-30-82.

The game begins at 19:30, the length is 1-1.5 hours.

Discussion article for the meetup : FallacyMania game in Kocherga club
Superrationality in arbitrary games
by Vanessa Kosoy — 2015-11-04T18:20:41.000Z

This post is an informal summary of ideas that Scott and I discussed on my recent visit to Los Angeles, meant to serve as a temporary "savepoint" and reference. The approach outlined here, albeit very promising in my opinion, requires a more work to become mature.

Abstract

We introduce a new type of game theoretic equilibrium, which is a candidate game theoretic desideratum for decision theory. This can be regarded as a generalization of Hofstadter's superrationality to arbitrary games. This equilibrium can be interpreted as the outcome of games between transparent agents running CDT with restricted self-modification but also as the outcome of games between transparent agents employing a certain type of logical counterfactuals. We suggest it should be possible to use the formalism of optimal predictors to rigorously construct a logical decision theory which implements the latter interpretation.

Introduction

It is commonly assumed that two agents running the correct decision theory would cooperate in a transparent Prisoner's dilemma, that is, in a game of prisoner's dilemma in which each player knows the source code of the other player1. It is possible to argue this behavior will indeed arise in UDT, at least for sufficiently similar players, but the argument is unrigorous since an agreed upon formalisation of UDT is lacking. It is also possible to formally prove this behavior for certain set-ups of proof-based decision theory. However, it is not presently clear what is the correct desideratum for decision theory in arbitrary games, especially games that are asymmetric.

The correct decision theory is likely to use logical counterfactuals but current understanding of logical counterfactuals is poor. On the other hand, it is much easier to model causal counterfactuals. Although CDT often leads to bad outcomes (and in particular defects in prisoner's dilemma) it is reflectively unstable and given the chance is expected to self-modify into some kind of better decision theory2. We will now see that a naive formalisation of this idea fails to achieve satisfactory game-theoretic properties. This failure is later amended by restricting the "self-modification" to only produce programs of a certain form, arriving at what we hope is the correct desideratum.

Self-modifying CDT

Fix a universal Turing machine to be used for representing Turing machines as words (

...
Using the Copernican mediocrity principle to estimate the timing of AI arrival
by turchin — 2015-11-04T11:42:44.952Z

Gott famously estimated the future time duration of the Berlin wall's existence:

“Gott first thought of his "Copernicus method" of lifetime estimation in 1969 when stopping at the Berlin Wall and wondering how long it would stand. Gott postulated that the Copernican principle is applicable in cases where nothing is known; unless there was something special about his visit (which he didn't think there was) this gave a 75% chance that he was seeing the wall after the first quarter of its life. Based on its age in 1969 (8 years), Gott left the wall with 75% confidence that it wouldn't be there in 1993 (1961 + (8/0.25)). In fact, the wall was brought down in 1989, and 1993 was the year in which Gott applied his "Copernicus method" to the lifetime of the human race”. “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Richard_Gott

The most interesting unknown in the future is the time of creation of Strong AI. Our priors are insufficient to predict it because it is such a unique task. So it is reasonable to apply Gott’s method.

AI research began in 1950, and so is now 65 years old. If we are currently in a random moment during AI research then it could be estimated that there is a 50% probability of AI being created in the next 65 years, i.e. by 2080. Not very optimistic. Further, we can say that the probability of its creation within the next 1300 years is 95 per cent. So we get a rather vague prediction that AI will almost certainly be created within the next 1000 years, and few people would disagree with that.

But if we include the exponential growth of AI research in this reasoning (the same way as we do in Doomsday argument where we use birth rank instead of time, and thus update the density of population) we get a much earlier predicted date.

We can get data on AI research growth from Luke’s post:

“According to MAS, the number of publications in AI grew by 100+% every 5 years between 1965 and 1995, but between 1995 and 2010 it has been growing by about 50% every 5 years. One sees a similar trend in machine learning and pattern recognition.”

From this we could conclude that doubling time in AI research is five to ten years (update by adding the recent boom in neural networks which is again five years)

This means that during the next five years more AI research will be conducted than ...
Newcomb, Bostrom, Calvin: Credence and the strange path to a finite afterlife
by crmflynn — 2015-11-02T23:03:50.582Z

This is a bit rough, but I think that it is an interesting and potentially compelling idea. To keep this short, and accordingly increase the number of eyes over it, I have only sketched the bare bones of the idea.

1) Empirically, people have varying intuitions and beliefs about causality, particularly in Newcomb-like problems (http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Newcomb's_problem, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irresistible_grace).

2) Also, as an empirical matter, some people believe in taking actions after the fact, such as one-boxing, or Calvinist “irresistible grace”, to try to ensure or conform with a seemingly already determined outcome. This might be out of a sense of retrocausality, performance, moral honesty, etc. What matters is that we know that they will act it out, despite it violating common sense causality. There has been some great work on decision theory on LW about trying to thread this needle well.

3) The second disjunct of the simulation argument (http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Simulation_argument) shows that the decision making of humanity is evidentially relevant in what our subjective credence should be that we are in a simulation. That is to say, if we are actively headed toward making simulations, we should increase our credence of being in a simulation, if we are actively headed away from making simulations, through either existential risk or law/policy against it, we should decrease our credence.

4) Many, if not most, people would like for there to be a pleasant afterlife after death, especially if we could be reunited with loved ones.

5) There is no reason to believe that simulations which are otherwise nearly identical copies of our world, could not contain, after the simulated bodily death of the participants, an extremely long-duration, though finite, "heaven"-like afterlife shared by simulation participants.

6) Our heading towards creating such simulations, especially if they were capable of nesting simulations, should increase credence that we exist in such a simulation and should perhaps

...
Meetup : Washington, D.C.: Book Swap
by RobinZ — 2015-11-02T21:12:09.654Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Book Swap

WHEN:
08 November 2015 03:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
National Portrait Gallery

Note: as there is an event in the courtyard and upstairs at the Luce Center, we are headed to the Navy Memorial.

Question: Would you come to a meetup on November 29th (Thanksgiving weekend)? We haven't decided yet whether to schedule one.

Crossposted from mailing list. Meeting in courtyard, gathering from 3:00 to 3:30 to start at 3:30.
We'll be meeting to bring books, talk about books, and lend books, as desired.

As with prior book swap meetups, please note:

There is no obligation to lend, borrow, or return books at book swap meetups. You are not required to bring any given book, or any books at all; you are not required to lend the books that you do bring; if you wish to lend out a given book, you are not required to lend it out to the first person to ask (or to the next person to ask, or to anyone at all); you are not required to borrow a book that is offered to you; and if you have already borrowed a book, you are not required to return it at this meetup. This is a Schelling point for book swaps, nothing more.

Books belong to their owners - keep any book you borrow in good condition, and return it in a timely fashion when you finish reading it or when the owner asks for it back.

In the past, the owners of some books have given permission for borrowers to lend them directly to anyone at the meetup who is interested. If you do not have permission from the owner of the book, do not do this.

Naturally, side conversations are allowed and encouraged.

Upcoming meetups:

Nov. 15: Why Ad Hominem Works

Nov. 22: Fun & Games

Nov. 29: TBA

Dec. 6: Create & Complete

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Book Swap
Solstice 2015: What Memes May Come? (Part I)
by Raemon — 2015-11-02T17:13:12.547Z

Winter is coming, and so is Solstice season. There'll be large rationality-centric-or-adjaecent events in NYC, the Bay Area, and Seattle (and possibly other places - if you're interested in running a Solstice event or learning what that involves, send me a PM). In NYC, there'll be a general megameetup throughout the weekend, for people who want to stay through Sunday afternoon, and if you're interested in shared housing you can fill out this form.

The NYC Solstice isn't running a kickstarter this year, but I'll need to pay for the venue by November 19th ($6125). So if you are planning on coming it's helpful to purchase tickets sooner rather than later. (Or preorder the next album or 2016 Book of Traditions, if you can't attend but want to support the event).

-

I've been thinking for the past couple years about the Solstice as a memetic payload.

The Secular Solstice is a (largely Less Wrong inspired) winter holiday, celebrating how humanity faced the darkest season and transformed it into a festival of light. It celebrates science and civilization. It honors the past, revels in the present and promises to carry our torch forward into the future.
For the first 2-3 years, I had a fair amount of influences over the Solstices held in Boston and San Francisco, as well as the one I run in NYC. Even then, the holiday has evolved in ways I didn't quite predict. This has happened both because different communities took them in somewhat different directions, and because (even in the events I run myself), factors come into play that shaped it. Which musicians are available to perform, and how does their stage presence affect the event? Which people from which communities will want to attend, and how will their energy affect things? Which jokes will they laugh at? What will they find poignant?
On top of that, I'm deliberately trying to spread the Solstice to a larger audience. Within a couple years, if I succeed, more of the Solstice will be outside of my control than within it.

Is it possible to steer a cultural artifact into the future, even after you let go of the reins? How? Would you want to?

In this post, I lay out my current thoughts on this matter. I am interested in feedback, collaboration and criticism.

Lessons from History?

(Epistemic status: I have not really fact checked this. I wouldn't be surprised if the example turned out to be false, but I think it i...
Rationality Quotes Thread November 2015
by elharo — 2015-11-02T12:30:33.213Z

Another month, another rationality quotes thread. The rules are:

Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be upvoted or downvoted separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)

Do not quote yourself.

Do not quote from Less Wrong itself, HPMoR, Eliezer Yudkowsky, or Robin Hanson. If you'd like to revive an old quote from one of those sources, please do so here.

No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.

Provide sufficient information (URL, title, date, page number, etc.) to enable a reader to find the place where you read the quote, or its original source if available. Do not quote with only a name.
Open thread, Nov. 02 - Nov. 08, 2015
by MrMind — 2015-11-02T10:07:16.681Z

If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.

Notes for future OT posters:

1. Please add the 'open_thread' tag.

2. Check if there is an active Open Thread before posting a new one. (Immediately before; refresh the list-of-threads page before posting.)

3. Open Threads should be posted in Discussion, and not Main.

4. Open Threads should start on Monday, and end on Sunday.
Meetup : San Antonio Meetup
by Bryan-san — 2015-11-02T03:36:58.692Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Antonio Meetup

WHEN:
08 November 2015 12:30:00PM (-0600)

WHERE:
12651 Vance Jackson Rd #118, San Antonio, TX 78230

Bubble tea, frozen yogurt, and discussion at Yumi Berry! All are welcome!

New Meetup to discuss rationality and all things LessWrong and meet the local community. Look for the sign that says Less Wrong!

Discussion article for the meetup : San Antonio Meetup