trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
On Defecting On Yourself
by David Udell — 2022-03-18T02:21:01.572Z

Sometimes I get into an anxious frame of mind where I try to prep for something as if my memory, my past self, cannot be trusted. This feels like an epistemically virtuous way to prepare for the world: double-checking all your past work and preparations as if they were made by someone you don't fully trust sure feels like it'll make all the difference in catching sloppy errors. If you have something to protect, then this is good, no? Doing without a second- or third-pass seems reckless or epistemically immodest, as anyone can make mistakes, and plenty of people do.

Fooling Yourself

One time my brother was telling me about his mindset running track. He mentioned that one of his track tricks is to get himself into a frame of mind where he swears that he'll stop running … as soon as he gets to that lamppost over there. He pushes through the pain, knowing that the end is in sight … and then finds himself thinking that, "Well, I can stop after I get to the next nice round stopping-point." Rinse and repeat until his run is completed.

This didn't feel right to me then. My inarticulate thought at the time was something like, "But you have to be able to trust your past self. Only with that intertemporal trust can you expect to get anything done."

In George Ainslie's Breakdown of Will, Ainslie tries to explain the thought process of a sober alcoholic about to relapse, weighing his alternatives. On the one hand, he desperately wants to never touch that stuff again, and would much prefer a future where he never touches the sauce again to one where he does. On the other hand, there is always a looming local temptation: an even better future would be one where he has one final binge today and cleans up beginning tomorrow. This would harvest just about all the value of getting clean while still letting him have a non-miserable time now. The trouble is that once he defects on his future self by binging now, the thought that his future self will clean up tomorrow becomes less plausible. Your future self will behave more or less like you. And that thought becomes all the less likely when he drinks despite being at a natural stopping point; if he started drinking again early in the new year and threw away the fresh start the year had granted him, what're the odds that he'll successfully stop drinking on just any old Tuesday? The only equilibria are to swear off the sauce forevermo...
Phase transitions and AGI
by Ege Erdil — 2022-03-17T17:22:06.518Z
Link: https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/10286/phase-transitions-and-agi/

Take a look at the following graph, from Robin Hanson's Long-Term Growth As a Sequence of Exponential Modes:

Here, "world product" is roughly the gross world product divided by the level of income necessary for one person to live at a subsistence level. It measures the total production of the human species in units of "how many people could live at a subsistence level on that much production?"

The yellow marks are historical estimates of world product that Hanson gathered from a variety of sources, and he's fit three different models to this data. What's notable is the good fit that the "sum of exponentials" type models have with this data. It looks like the world economy goes through different phases which are characterized by different rates of growth: in the first phase world product doubled every ∼100,000 years, in the second phase it doubled every ∼1000 years, and in the third phase it doubled every ∼10 years, where we can give or take a factor of 2 from these estimates - they are meant only to convey the order of magnitude differences.

We also see that transitions to subsequent phases are relatively fast. The transition from the first phase to the second phase took ∼1000 years, much less than the doubling time of 100,000 years characterizing this phase, and the transition from the second phase to the third took on the order of ∼200 years, still smaller than the 1000 years of doubling time typical of the second phase. We can also observe that the timing of these events roughly matches the First Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, so we might tentatively label the phases as corresponding to "foraging", "farming" and "industry" respectively.

The study of these past transitions is important because they are the only reference class we have for dramatic changes in the nature of the world economy and in how the human species is organized and how we coordinate our activities. Since we have two transitions to examine, we might also get a rudimentary sense of the variance of outcomes: two is the minimal value we need in order to do that.

Unfortunately, many details about the foraging phase are shrouded in mystery. There's still no consensus on the world product estimates for this phase even today: it could be that this phase was actually ten times shorter than we think it is, and it might only date back to around 200,000 BCE rather than 2,000,000 ...
Covid 3/17/22: The Rise of BA.2
by Zvi — 2022-03-17T16:20:00.906Z

Omicron has made its way through every major country except one – China. Its time seems to have come. As I noted on Monday, China had already locked down 60 million people amid rapidly rising case counts. Unlike previous rounds where China was able to fully take extreme measures only it could take but that held the promise of physically working, this round’s efforts seem like the exact kind of hope that is not a strategy. They’ll help to slow things down, sure, absolutely, but I can’t find a physical model where they are enough. Things will get out to the rest of China, and locking down over a billion people Chinese-style is simply not an option for any length of time. The resources are not there.

Meanwhile, Europe and the United States are dealing with the rise of BA.2, which is overtaking BA.1. My estimate is it is 25% more infectious than BA.1, which means its raw numbers should indeed be increasing for now, putting as at risk for an additional wave. I do not expect anything that needs to be disruptive, and I expect little appetite for renewed restrictions, but we have indeed done stupider things many times.

So it’s not the best time to notice that it looks like the administration really is out of money for Covid-related things. The standalone bill to provide the funding seems unlikely to pass the Senate. We might actually soon be in a situation where the federal government can spend no money on either vaccine research, other pandemic preparedness or even things like testing and treating the uninsured. Alas, the restrictions that do harm are not the interventions the government will find itself unable to fund.

Executive Summary

BA.2 is taking over for BA.1, perhaps resulting in a small new wave.
China is probably about to be forced out of its Zero Covid policy.
A new highly promising therapeutic has been announced.

Let’s run the numbers.

The Numbers

Predictions

Prediction from last week: 170k cases (-25%) and 7,050 deaths (-22%).

Results: 190k cases (-16%) and 8,609 deaths (-6%).

Prediction for next week: 180k cases (-5%) and 6,300 deaths (-10%).

Note: Deaths excludes a -4,096 count in MA, and excludes 2,300 backlog deaths from SC.

After predicting too many cases for a few weeks running now I predicted too few. Part of that is the rise of BA.2, but the other half is adjustments from previous results causing me to doubt that our behaviors wer...
Is Grabby Aliens built on good anthropic reasoning?
by Steven Byrnes — 2022-03-17T14:12:05.909Z

An underlying assumption of the Grabby Aliens paper by Robin Hanson et al., if I understand it, is the following:

We should expect to find ourselves as a member of a uniformly-randomly-selected civilization out of all civilizations in the history of the universe.

In other words, if there’s a master list of every civilization in the universe’s past, present, and future, our prior should be that our human civilization should be uniformly-randomly selected from that list. If you accept that assumption, then you’re obligated to perform a Bayesian update towards hypotheses-about-the-universe that predict a master-list-of-all-civilizations with the property that human civilization looks like a “typical” civilization on the list. My impression is that this assumption (and corresponding Bayesian update) is the foundation upon which the whole Grabby Aliens paper is built. (Well, that plus the assumption that there are no other Bayesian updates that need to be taken into account, which I think is dubious, but let’s leave that aside.)

If that’s right, I’m confused where this assumption comes from. When I skim discussions of anthropic reasoning (e.g. in Nick Bostrom's book, and on lesswrong, and on Joe Carlsmith's blog, etc.), I see lots of discussion about “SIA” and “SSA” and “UDASSA” and so on. But the Grabby Aliens assumption above seems to be none of those things—in fact, it seems to require strongly rejecting all of them! (E.g., note how the Grabby Aliens assumption does not weight civilizations by their population.)

I feel like I’m missing something. I feel like there are a bunch of people who have spent a bunch of time thinking about anthropics (I’m not one of them), and who endorse some “standard” anthropic reasoning framework like SIA or SSA or UDASSA or whatever. Do all those people think that the Grabby Aliens paper is a bunch of baloney? If so, have they written about that anywhere? Or am I wrong that they’re contradictory? (Or conversely, has anyone tried to spell out in detail why the Grabby Aliens anthropic assumption above is a good assumption?)
Maximize in a limited domain. Hope for the future.
by Dacyn — 2022-03-17T14:05:47.960Z

Four years ago I attempted twice to explain what I saw as the conceptual problems with utilitarianism. Upon reflection, I was right that there are conceptual problems with utilitarianism, but wrong about what are the best pointers of how to explain this to the outside world. So here is my attempt to explain my worldview again.

Utilitarianism is defined as "maximizing the expected utility of consequences". I will attack this definition first by exploring the definitions of "consequences" and "utility", before finally settling on "maximize" as the part that most needs correction.

The "consequences" of an action are not the future of an action, but rather what that future would hypothetically be if you took that action (or if the algorithm you use advertized to take that action, the distinction is not important at this point). So the concept of consequences depends on the concept of a hypothetical, which in turn depends on the concept of a model. In other words, the consequences are no more than you imagine them to be. So when we reach the limits of our imagination, we reach the limits of consequences.

(It's worth distinguishing a possible motivated cognition that might occur to one when he hears "the consequences are no more than you imagine them to be": stop imagining things, so that there stop being more consequences. This not what I intend, and it is a mistake, because it misunderstands the role that imagining consequences plays in the ecosystem of the mind. Imagining or not imagining consequences is not meant to prevent bad consequences, but to more perfectly fulfill the role of "a thinker who neither motivatedly stops nor motivatedly continues". We will have all of the Singularity to argue about what exactly this role entails, but for now I advise taking each individual word at face value.)

What are the limits of our imagination? Well, other minds, in particular those other minds that are smarter than us. That's why it's called the Singularity -- we can't predict what's past it.

But we notice now that most of the utility is beyond the Singularity, beyond the limit of consequences. The part of our brain that tries to win is looking for a loophole now, a way that it can create consequences beyond the singularity. This is an important effort, but it is ultimately futile. It's impossible to win against a mind that is smarter than you, and once we realize that, we ...
Is there a link between Immigration Policy and Inflation?
by hawkebia — 2022-03-17T11:26:46.167Z

Inflation theories tend to cause a lot of debate, and the few responses I've gotten from economists on this question have been variations of "probably not". Hoping people here have access to good quality heterodox research and studies that give a slightly better answer one way or another. My Google efforts have failed so far.

The conventional position on rising inflation as I understand it is:

Something causes Aggregate Demand to rise, or Aggregate Supply to drop, or both, for some sustained period, causing an increase in prices.

This "something" could be increased money supply or some policy which raises consumption, and therefore Aggregate Demand. If production cannot keep up with this increased demand, prices rise.

Similarly, production costs could go up because of supply-chain issues or higher wage demands, causing Aggregate Supply to drop. If consumer demand doesn't cool off simultaneously, prices rise.

Alternatively, the Monetarist view is that an increase in money supply must be matched by a simultaneous increase in productivity. Unless the economy is able to produce more with less (via technology, efficiency, labor output etc.), the value backed by each currency unit goes down, and prices rise.

Further, higher prices, or even expectations that they will stay high, can result in an inflation spiral:

Higher prices create higher wage demands to cover higher cost of living
Higher wages result in higher costs of production
Higher costs of production result in increased prices
Go to Step 1.

The current tool to arrest this, at least in the U.S, is to raise interest rates. Which results in some combination of reducing money supply and lowering Aggregate Demand to bring prices back under control. But this often has the side affect of a recession - reducing new investment and spending (borrowing is expensive) and thereby reducing job and economic growth.

Whether or not this perfectly represents the views (I'm not an economist), there are a few variables which stand out regardless: higher wage demands and insufficient productivity.

Immigration Policy

Were there a steady influx of immigrants increasing labor supply, would it counter this increase in wage demands? Additionally if one agrees with the premise that immigrants tend to contribute across the skill spectrum and are a source of innovation, does greater immigration result in higher long-term productivity?

And ther...
Using GPT-3 for preventing conflict during messaging — a pitch for an app
by Eli_ — 2022-03-17T11:02:00.213Z

I'm going to pitch an idea for an app, which I would love to see happen, but don't have time to build myself. My hope is that other people will steal and improve this idea because I believe it has the potential to help a lot of people including myself.

The problem

I love non-violent communication, but in practice I tend to forget it when it is most needed. For those of you that aren't familiar with non-violent communication (NVC), it is a method for translating what you want to say in a way that is actually helpful to the situation. You can translate your own words, but non-violent communication also stretches to listening in a non-violent way. Both really help with de-escalating a situation and improve overall communication.

An example might be your daughter saying: "I hate you! You suck as a father".

And hearing it in a non-violent way would be: "I feel frustrated when you cancel our plans. I need quality time with you. Can we please spend some time together tomorrow?"

The underlying idea is that we leave out the judgements and replace them with observations (you cancelled our plan), feelings (I feel frustrated), needs (I need some quality time with my father[1]), and a clear request (can we spend some time together tomorrow?).

Easy-peasy in theory, but very hard in practice.

The app

How great would it be if, whenever you receive a message on your phone, containing a message that might cause conflict, your phone would offer a translation into non-violent communication?

So you might receive the following message: "I don't want you to come home! You cheated on me you stupid asshole!”

And it would be translated to: "I feel betrayed that you would cheat on me. I need some time to process this. I would appreciate it if you would not come home until I have had a chance to sort through my feelings."

Or when you want to send something that would cause conflict: "Michael, stop arriving late to work! Do you want me to fire you?"

To something more palatable: "Michael, when you arrive late to work, I feel frustrated because I need punctuality from my employees. Can you please try to arrive on time from now on?"

Now, we can't expect the app to translate everything perfectly. But a reminder, with a rough translation, could do a world of good. My relationships for instance have suffered from the way I have texted with people in ways that were probably av...
What is the equivalent of the "do" operator for finite factored sets?
by Chris van Merwijk — 2022-03-17T08:05:28.634Z

I have put roughly 0 thought into answering this question, or whether it even makes sense within Scott's framework:

Finite factored sets are presented in some sense as an alternative/refinement to Pearlian causal graphs.
In Pearlian causal graphs we can make the distinction between conditioning P(X | Y=y ) and intervention P(X | do(Y=y) ). What is the equivalent of P(X | do(Y=y) ) in the context of finite factored sets, if there is any? If not, how do we make an analogous distinction in FFS, or achieve the analogous thing that do is meant to achieve?
The One Who Says, "Enough"
by Sable — 2022-03-17T06:17:37.161Z

Epistemic Status: Very speculative. Attempting to put vague notions into words.

Disclaimer: I'm no expert on geopolitics, nor am I particularly well versed in military matters. That being said, I have some thoughts on current events. My aim is to keep this mostly apolitical, focusing on the organizational challenges of this era of economic, social, and cultural warfare, particularly on the notion of whose responsibility it is to declare victory, and the consequences of lacking such an individual.

I. On The Word 'War'

War, huh, yeah
What is it good for?
Absolutely nothing

War (What is it good for) by Edwin Starr

Russia is now at war with Ukraine.[1]

This is, at the risk of understating things, Very Bad. I won't belabor the point further - consider this to be my general Statement of Moral Condemnation, if we need such a thing. The Ukrainian people are absolutely in the right to defend their homeland, and what I'm discussing doesn't compare to their struggle and suffering.

As an American, I have to ask: hasn't America been waging the War on Terror for the past 20 years?

Even putting aside America's actions in the Middle East, haven't we been having a War on Drugs for, apparently, a very long time?

There's also:

The War on Crime
The War on Poverty
The War on Cancer
The War on Homelessness[2]

I could probably find more if I looked. Apparently we Americans really like declaring war on things.

And yet, when I look up the definition of war online, most of the results define it as some kind of armed conflict between groups.

The War on Cancer is not an armed conflict between groups.[3]

The word 'war' is used metaphorically in the above; this is rhetoric, not fact. But as the US and many other western countries impose sanctions and other sorts of penalties to the Russian government and people, I'd like to point out that if we can have a War on Poverty that doesn't involve armed conflict between the government and the poor, it follows that we can have a War on Russia without firing a shot.

To be clear, none of my arguments here depend on the word "war", but I will use it as a shorthand in the spirit of the rhetorical uses above.

II. Economic, Social, And Cultural Warfare

The word processor is mightier than the particle beam weapon.

George Carlin

Economic sanctions are nothing new, and have been one of the primary means that the west has res...
Why a No-Fly-Zone would be the biggest gift to Putin, and why Zelenskyy keeps asking for it [Linkpost and commentary]
by Dojan — 2022-03-17T03:13:53.405Z

[Epistemic status: My best analysis from purely public sources on a constantly changing conflict in an actively adversarial epistemic environment. I have no special knowledge or expertise.]

This is a linkpost for this post by Justin Bronk, a research fellow at RUSI, a British conflict analysis think-tank. ~7 minute read. It is some of the most clearheaded and enlightening analysis I have seen so far of the current geopolitical situation in regards to Ukraine and the line the West is walking. The first part talks about the military arguments, and is more detailed but mostly in line with the mainstream commentary; it's the second part, on the political arguments, that is really insightful. The article was also summarized nicely by Justin in this interview, starting at 40:27, running about 9 minutes. The first part of the interview is great too.

"A NFZ [No-Fly-Zone] would gift Putin with a retroactive justification for the invasion by giving him the ‘NATO intervention’ which Kremlin propaganda has consistently sought to claim it was pre-empting by invading Ukraine. It would give the Russian Army a military opponent that could more credibly be used to explain away its heavy losses and lacklustre performance against its far smaller neighbour. It would also generate a rally-behind-the-flag effect which would stifle domestic protests, provide an excuse for even greater repressive brutality in Russia and thereby prolong the Russian state’s ability to continue active hostilities. In short, an NFZ could save Putin’s regime from a disaster that currently threatens to end it."

Everyone wants to help Ukraine. No one wants WW3. As a practical military matter an NFZ is simply a euphemism for war with Russia, both Biden and Stoltenberg and Putin have consistently been crystal clear on this, which makes it self-fulfilling. If NATO/US decides to enter the war, it might as well just do it properly, rather than hobbling itself to only engage air-targets. But as things are currently going, this isn't even the greatest threat to Ukraine. Russia doesn't have air-superiority. Most of the heavy weapons we are seeing are rockets and artillery, not from aircraft. The Russian forces have proved unable to coordinate close-air-support for it's ground forces. Yet enforcing an NFZ would require a massive, aggressive operation, including taking out SAM installations far into Russian and Belaru...
Formal epistemiology for extracting truth from news sources
by Enigma — 2022-03-17T02:06:48.645Z

Disclaimer: I'm a long-time HPMoR/Sequences fan and ocassional lurker here at LessWrong. This is my very first post. English is not my first language.
I'm also Russian, and as you probably know Russia is in a bit difficult geopolitical situation right now. I'm againt war, I think that this is both immoral and strategic blunder by our government. But some of my friends and family members disagree with some/all of those, for various reasons. Also, sometimes we can't even agree about basic facts - for example, my brother recently told me that Zelensky left Kyiv quite some time ago, all the while European delegation was coming TO Kyiv to meet him. All the while they are mostly smart people (knowledge jobs, high IQ).
I tend to trust reputable Western sources (Guardian, BBC, Reuters), especially if they agree with each other. I also mostly trust Wikipedia (I check sources when questioned). They think those are Western propaganda. They don't really watch our television, instead getting info from Telegram channels and image boards (as far as I can tell). I think their sources are terrible, but it's somewhat hard to argue.
I'm interested if there were any attempts at formal rules of transforming media feed into world model. Preferably with Bayesian interference and cool math. So I can try to discuss these with my friends and maybe even update my own model.