trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
The World as Phenomena
by Gordon Seidoh Worley — 2017-12-05T23:21:11.291Z
Link: https://mapandterritory.org/the-world-as-phenomena-47d27d593016

NB: Originally posted to Map and Territory on Medium, so some of the internal series links go there.

NB: I made some mistakes in this post about my use of academic philosophy terms in ways that I would no longer endorse. I've let it stand for historical purposes, but of particular import is to note that "existential phenomenology" fails to capture all of my perspective well, and my understanding of idealism in this post is rather poor, since my perspective is well described, in part, by idealism, specifically phenomenalism.

My introduction to axiological alignment is just that — an introduction. Out of necessity it covers the philosophical foundations of my thinking on AI alignment, but it doesn’t explore those foundations in much detail. I could just keep writing about axiological (now noematological) alignment and AI, but I suspect I would lose everyone, so first I’m going to go back and explicate the background theory as thoroughly as seems necessary. We’ll begin at the beginning, employ examples and metaphors, and explore, in order, the foundations of phenomenology, phenomenological methods, the phenomenological reduction, feedback, qualia, and finally noematology.

I think of phenomenology as the philosophy of the adept beginner. By this I mean it is the philosophy of the person skilled in all the techniques of philosophy from logic to observation to intuition who nevertheless chooses to approach philosophy as if they were a beginner so that, rather than trying to explain anything, they rest on the questions until they answer themselves. Phenomenologists are not the first to try this — Socrates, Zhuangzi, Nagarjuna, Descartes, and Hegel are among our predecessors — but we have the advantage of standing on their shoulders. Let’s see how far we can see!

Consider the fundamental question of philosophy, “why?”.

“Okay, why?”

“Why” what?

“Why is anything?”

What is this “anything” you refer to?

“The world. Why does the world exist?”

Does it? How do you know?

“I’m in it!”

Oh, so why are you in the world?

“I…I don’t know. I just am.”

It’s from not knowing why “I am” that we start because if we follow any line of questioning far enough we’ll eventually need to know what this “I” is to give a complete answer. Even if any particular answer doesn’t seem to depend on “I”, answers are given and understood by an “I”, and we can always ask of any answer “Why do I think that?”, so we h...
Updates from Boston
by evolution-is-just-a-theorem — 2017-12-05T17:22:18.735Z

There isn't enough sharing of positive and negative results within the rationality community1. I suspect this results in a fair amount of wasted effort as people explore the same dead ends, and a fair amount of lost potential when more effective tools don't get shared2.

So, here are some things Boston has tried (not everything though):

Successes

Bureaucracy Day

Everyone shows up for a few hours with the intention of taking care of whatever bureaucratic tasks they've been putting off (doctor's appointments, getting a passport, taking care of personal finance tasks, etc.). Various supplies (printer, staplers, envelopes, etc.) are available.

I record how long each attempted task had been put off for, whether or not it was completed, and (optionally) what the task was. I use "old tasks get accomplished" as a proxy for the impact of the intervention, since I assume that if someone has been putting something off for six months they weren't going to do it in the counterfactual world where Bureaucracy Day doesn't exist.

Overall it's been way more successful than I expected. It's not uncommon for tasks that are years old to get finished.

I expect efficacy to drop over time as all the oldest tasks get accomplished, but so far that's been counteracted by new people participating.

Sprint Day

My attempt to use Hackathon mindset for something actually productive. People show up and work for ten hours. No social media, no non-essential conversations, and only one project is allowed. Food is ordered or cooked the night before.

There aren't any common metrics, because I don't want to disrupt workflow by imposing recording procedures. Using my own metrics (number of github issues resolved and time spent working) I'm about an order of magnitude more productive on sprint days than on normal Saturdays. Not enough data to tell if I'm just redistributing my productivity to sprint days, but the data do not suggest this. Other participants report excellent results (that sprint days are at least 90th percentile productivity).

However participation has been very low (and I suspect this hurts individual efficacy). I'm not sure if this is because people don't want to give up their Saturdays, don't have a project to work on, or something else.

Backthumb

A conversational norm that anyone can say "backthumb&q... ,,,,
Thinking as the Crow Flies: Part 1 - Introduction
by Anthony Hart — 2017-12-05T15:55:45.756Z

Preamble

I've wanted to write a series of posts here on logic and the foundations of mathematics for a while now. There's been some recent discussion about the ontology of numbers and the existence of mathematical entities, so this seems as good a time as any to start.

Many of the discussed philosophical problems, as far as I can tell, stem from the assumption of formalism. That is, many people seem to think that mathematics is, at some level, a formal logic, or at least that the activity of mathematics has to be founded on some formal logic, especially a classical one. Beyond that being an untenable position since Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, it also doesn't make a whole lot of intuitive sense since mathematics was clearly done before the invention of formal logic. By abandoning this assumption, and taking a more constructivist approach, we get a much clearer view of mathematics and logic as a whole.

This first post is mostly informal philosophizing, attempting to describe exactly what logic and mathematics is about. My second post will be a more technical discussion accounting for the basic notions of logic.

Intuitions and Sensations

To begin, I'd like to point out a fact which most would find obvious but has, in the past, lead to difficult philosophical problems. It is clear that we don't have direct access to the real world. Instead, we have senses which feed information, even if dishonestly, to our mind. These senses may be predictable, may be potentially modeled by a pattern which mimics our stream of senses. At some level, we have direct access to a sensory signal. This signal is not a pure, unfiltered lens on the world, but it is a signal, independent of, but directly accessible by, us.

We also have access to our intuitions, the part of our thoughts which we may label "ideas". We may not have total access to all our faculties. Much of our mental processing is done outside the view of our awareness. If I asked you to name a random city, eventually you'd come up with one. You'd, however, be hard-pressed to produce a trace of how that city's name came to your awareness. Perhaps you could offer background information, explaining why you'd name that city, among all the possibilities. Regardless of such accounts, we'd still lack a trace of the signal sent by your consciousness ("I want th... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Stub: Information Theoretic Ontology 
by DragonGod — 2017-12-05T08:32:31.683Z

Disclaimers

This is a stub. I am having exams right now and do not have the time to write the full article. I'll update (not any time soon) after I've resolved the problems in this article.

The original post was supposed to be part of my "Meditations in Ontology" sequence (I planned on starting the sequence next year at earliest, probably later). I'll probably write a few other stubs to address the recent discussion about existence and truth.

I have learned neither computability theory nor information theory; if I make a mistake somewhere, please correct me.

There has been recent discussion about what it means to "exist". I realised that I have an answer to that question, and decided to briefly explain it here.

Useful Concepts

Object

For the purposes of this post it is sufficient to understand an object as "anything".

Structural Equivalence

Two systems are structurally equivalent if they are composed of the same components.

Functional Equivalence

Two systems are functionally equivalent if they have the same domain, the same range and the same image for all inputs.

Two structurally equivalent systems are functionally equivalent, yet two systems can be functionally equivalent and structurally similar. Sometimes, the semantic content of a concept refers to its function (e.g a clock). At other times, the semantic content might refer to its structure (e.g an atom). Yet still, some concepts may be defined according to both form and structure (e.g a gold watch).

Simulation

When we say that one object X simulates another object Y, we say that X (or a specific output of X (if X is a computational system) is a perfect fidelity model of Y. That is, in all ontologies X (or said output of X) and Y are indistinguishable and interchangeable.

A Note on Computation

The output of a computation has no inherent meaning. There is no global semantic content to the output of a given computation. When I run a program, the stream of binary code sent to the output devices have no meaning. Only after they have passed the output device, and have been translated from binary to a language I understand, can I "read" the information therein. If I thought in binary, perhaps my monitor would just display the binary stream directly.

Observer

For a given computational process, the semantic content of the output is defined relative to an obser... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
Show LW: Diaspora Project Map and Preregistration Database
by namespace — 2017-12-05T06:02:51.822Z

Hi everyone,

I and a handful of other folks have been compiling a list of different LessWrong Diaspora projects. I started it after someone asked me how they could volunteer for LessWrong and I didn't have a good answer for them.

It's optimized for people who are researching what sort of things have already been done in the community, or are looking for a place where they can help. The basic criteria for eligibility are:

Being something I'm sure is a 'real' Diaspora project. i.e, started by a credible person who is a member of the Diaspora. (Membership is of course a little fuzzy, err on the side of inclusion.)
Either a web presence or contact information.

Suggestions for additions should go in the comment box on that page. (I'll also accept them in this thread, but understand I'll probably only check back on it for the first three days or so.)

We've also put together a preregistration database. A preregistration database solicits plans for projects and experiments before their results are known. It helps with the problem where no one wants to talk about something that didn't work. Ideally it becomes part of a framework for helping people put together solid projects.

Right now that framework includes a Project Litmus Test that's meant to help people who want to do something not fail from the outset through poor planning. The current question set is based on what we think are common failure modes for Diaspora projects, but over time I'd like to refactor it based on empirical interaction with peoples real ideas. In the best case scenario a workshop would be developed that helps people go from concept to execution.

My hope is that such a framework could put a real dent in the chronic lack of coordination that you've already been told about a thousand times.

The Map

The Preregistation Database
What if we’re right?
by Jacob Falkovich — 2017-12-05T04:00:00.679Z

Does the median American worry about climate change too much or not enough? It’s a simple enough question, and yet the distribution of answers to it looks something like this: This distribution doesn’t strike most people as unusual. But isn’t there something missing here? Let’s try to figure out if Americans worry about climate change … Continue reading What if we’re right?
The Basic Object Model and Definition by Interface
by Chris_Leong — 2017-12-05T00:07:46.863Z

What does it mean to say that something "exists"? Why do we say that both objects in the world, such as chairs, and logical entities, such as the number 9, both exist? I believe that the key insight is that both "things" can be adapted to what I call the Basic Object Model. Further, by using this specific example, I can demonstrate what I call Definition by Interface. This post responds to Philosopher Corner: Numbers.

Update: After further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that this is only part of the story. Fitting the object modle is a key part of "existence", but we also need to have a divide between "existence" and "non-existence" to fully explain why we are tempted to use the same term for both kinds of "objects". I hope to develop this in a future post.

The Basic Object Model

Informally: any "collection" of "things" is adapted to the object model if we can say the following:

Any "thing" in this "collection" has properties. For example, a table may have the properties of size, number of legs or general color. Number may have the properties of being odd or even, postitive or negative, prime or composite.
There exist relations between the "things" in the "collection". For example, a table may be larger or smaller than another, to the left or to the right of a couch or darker or lighter than the blinds. Numbers may be smaller or larger, have more factors or less factors, have the same sign or different signs.
Any "thing" has a type and all objects of this type will have certain properties and relations. For example, all tables have a size and a bigger than/smaller than relation to other tables. Some objects of the same type may have additional relations.
If a "thing" X and a "thing" Y have the same identity, then they are the same type and all properties and relations are the same. So if X and Y are tables with the same identity, then the have the same size, number of legs and general color; as well as having the same size relation and positional relation to a couch.

"Exists" is a lingustic construct and a major factor in lingustic constructs is convenience. Since both physical objects and logical objects fit the Basic Object Model it is convenient to say that they both "exist". On the...
Towards a Rigorous Model of Virtue-Signalling
by SilentCal — 2017-12-04T19:08:06.041Z

The concept of "virtue signalling" has been a bit polarizing. Some people find it seems to explain a lot of the world; others find its lack of precision makes it almost an empty insult against others' behavior.

The model I'm about to propose doesn't capture everything people mean by "virtue signalling"; I'm not sure it even captures the heart of it. But it does demonstrate a rigorous basis for something that deserves the name "virtue signalling".

Suppose a pool of 100 players are assigned to play iterated Prisoner's Dilemma-like games, with the following properties:

0) We will relabel 'cooperate' and 'defect' actions as 'unselfish' and 'selfish', to better reflect the varying payoff matrices.

1) A match consists of 100 games.

2) 99 of the games are Deadlock, in which both players playing selfish is optimal for both players. Payoff matrix [[(1, 1), (3, 0)], [(0, 3), (2, 2)]]

3) One game, sprinkled in at random, is a Prisoner's Dilemma, with very high-magnitude payoffs, and in particular very negative ones if the other player plays selfish. Payoff matrix [[(0, 0)(100, -1500)], [(-1500, 100), (-1400, -1400)]

4) Playing a match with someone who will play selfish on a Prisoner's Dilemma is negative expected value, regardless of your play or their play on Deadlocks.

4) Playing a match with someone who plays unselfish on PD is positive expected value if you both play unselfish on Deadlocks, but of course even more positive if you both play selfish on Deadlocks.

Now suppose that the players face one another in a Round Robin structure, but get to accept or decline each match after the first. To inform their decision, they can see limited information on the other player: specifically, whether or not they have ever made a selfish play.

Now let us consider this tournament as a measure of a group's coordination ability. The least coordinated possible group would play straight selfish ...
Book review: The Upside of Your Dark Side: Why Being Your Whole Self–Not Just Your “Good” Self–Drives Success and Fulfillment
by Kaj_Sotala — 2017-12-04T13:10:06.995Z

The Upside of Your Dark Side: Why Being Your Whole Self–Not Just Your “Good” Self–Drives Success and Fulfillment. By Todd Kashdan & Robert Biswas-Diener. Avery, 2014.

This book was written by a pair of psychologists who thought that the excessive focus on good and positive feelings in positive psychology was a little overblown, and that the value of so-called “negative” feelings or aspects of personality was being neglected. They do think that it’s good for us to be happy most of the time, but that it will be even better for us if we have a flexibility that allows us to switch to non-happy states of mind when it’s beneficial. They suggest an 80:20 ratio as a rough rule of thumb: be happy 80% of the time and non-happy 20% of the time. They call this philosophy “wholeness”: a person is whole if they are able to flexibly tap into all aspects of their being when it’s warranted.

The authors offer a number of examples about the value of so-called negative states. Too much comfort makes us oversensitive to inevitable discomfort. Anger motivates us to act, fix injustices, and defend ourselves and our loved ones; guilt tells us when we’ve screwed up and motivates us to improve our behavior; anxiety helps us catch mistakes and take safeguards against risks. Happy people are less persuasive, can be too trusting, and are lazier thinkers. Intentionally trying to become happy easily backfires and makes us less happy; and there are situations where happiness feels inappropriate and will make others respond worse to you. Sometimes it’s better to act on instinct or engage in mind-wandering than to always be mindful and think things through consciously. The “dark triad” traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy are all useful in moderation and provide benefits such as fearlessness and self-assuredness.

The following paragraph from the final chapter is a pretty good summary of the book’s message:

The basic idea is that psychological states are instrumental. That is, they are useful for a specific purpose, such as finding your car keys, being physically safe in a parking garage, negotiating a business deal, or arguing with your child’s teacher. Rather than viewing your thoughts and feelings as reactions to external events, we argue that you ought to view these states a...
Convincing the world to build something
by  — 2017-12-03T22:11:50.044Z

I didn’t think I would write this post. It came out of trying to plan what to do next. Probably needs more thought.

If you want to convince the world to build something, you can go about it a number of ways. Or at least there is an ordering of who you try and convince when.

Yourself: Do you really want to build it? Is the current idea about the thing the right idea? You may or may not convince yourself totally before moving on to other people. As you will probably learn a lot while you try and convince other people.
The gatekeepers: If there is a regulatory body you need to convince them, from the get go, that they should not interfere with what you are trying to do. It is worth spending a fair bit of time with them as you need to understand them. But you needn’t convince them fully, just enough that you know your position with them and have an idea of how to communicate with them and what might be expected from you. It is good if they have some warning that something is coming down the pipe so they can get used to the idea.
The builders: To convince the builders to work on something for a bit your need two things. A stable stress free environment and an interesting demo. Heading off the gatekeepers is needed for the first condition. If you want builders to put lots of effort into something, the thing they are building must coincide with their core values. Money helps, but throwing money at the problem won’t get you the right team. You want to get people who care about the thing not the money.
The organizers: Highly valuable, but you need some building process for them to organize. They are also useful on the boundary between the world and the process of building. Builders mistrust organizers a bit, so you don’t want to be organizer heavy.
The act of a few people building a thing will attract thinkers and money people, looking for insight and profit respectively. Make what use of them that you can to keep on the right track.
Ordinary People: Do what you can to convert them into builders, so that they can own the thing being built as well.

Cross-posted from my blog
Bayes, Backwards
by ec429 — 2017-12-03T18:17:10.735Z

[Epistemic status: QED.]

Recently someone posed an oddly-constructed exercise on Bayes' Theorem, where instead of the usual given information P(A|B),P(A|¬B),P(B) they gave P(A|B),P(A|¬B),P(A). I won't link to the source, because they intended to pose a problem in the usual form and I don't want to draw attention to their mistake. But the problem itself is an interesting one, and it does have a solution (in most cases) which turns out to be quite neat.

Problem Statement

Given P(A|B)=x,P(A|¬B)=y,P(A)=a, find P(B|A),P(B|¬A).

Why is this interesting?

(Putting this section here to separate the problem statement from my solution, since I don't know of a way to spoiler in MarkDown.)

Suppose you want to evaluate the performance of a heuristic, B, for determining the underlying A, which is accurately determined later. You know the base rate of A since it is (say) recorded in public statistics, and you know how common B -errors in either direction are, because the same statistics report P(A|B) and P(A|¬B) for their obvious use in decisionmaking.

But you are interested not just in the general case, but in some subcategory C. In the absence of further information your default prior hypothesis is that P(B|A∧C)=P(B|A) and similarly P(B|¬A∧C)=P(B|¬A) (i.e., the heuristic's reliability is independent of C), but you know that within C the base rate of A, P(A|C), is some value different from P(A).

Now under that hypothesis, knowing P(B|A),P(B|¬A) would allow you to determine your prior for P(A|B∧C) and P(A|¬B∧C) by an ordinary application of Bayes' Theorem. If you then have a small sample drawn from C, you could for instance denote those priors as p and q and take as your prior distributions that P(A|B∧C)∼β(p,1−p) and P(A|¬B∧C)∼β(q,1−q), which you then update from your sample. (I don't know whether this places the 'right' amount of credence in P(B|A∧C)=P(B|A) etc.; one could just as easily take β(2p,2(1−p)) to treat the ¬C results as more 'relevant'.)

But we don't have P(B|A), we just have P(A|B). Hence the problem-as-stated.

Solution

We first expand P(A|B) and P(¬A|B) using Bayes' Theorem:

P(A|B)=P(A∧B)P(B)P(¬A|B)=P(¬A∧B)P(B)

Now we can re-arrange these into two expressions for P(B), and set them equal:

P(A∧B)P(A|B)=P(B)=P(¬A∧B)P(¬A|B)

Cross-multiplying and substituting in our given x=P(A|B),

(1−x)P(A∧B)=xP(¬A∧B)xP(¬A

... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,