trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Missing magic
by KatjaGrace — 2011-05-15T02:31:25.000Z

Image by ArcheiaMuriel via Flickr

Many people believe they can fix the human body using magic of some sort. Many also claim to magically fix emotional or psychological problems or to fix other animals or even plants.

Yet there are many things nobody seems to claim they have magic to fix. Why is there no magic economics or magic organisation theory? Why do faith healers not come forward to fix the recession, or to strengthen failing businesses? Why no magic international trade? Or magic phone repairs?

And why do so many more people look for healers to fix their bodies than to fix their operating systems?

You might say there is no uncertainty in how a computer works in which to imagine a ‘god of the gaps’. But most people don’t know much more about how their computer works than how their body does.

Another possibility is that since magic doesn’t actually do anything, it’s hard to get away with claiming to fix something less subjective than the wellbeing of a body or mind. But it’s not obviously easier to pin down the exact wellbeing of a business is than it is a body.

Perhaps humans are especially easy things to practice magic on because they get better from most things pretty reliably on their own, but without any exact time schedule. And what’s more they experience placebo effects and feel better just from getting attention. But then shouldn’t there be more office management magic for instance? People get better at what they are doing naturally, and the *hawthorne effect seems to make them get even better if you do something to them.

The pattern seems to be something like ‘living things vs. non-living things’. Some people claim to be able to heal dead people, but they are talking about the living part of them which is supposedly off somewhere else. However a company is a living thing. It’s not a single organism, but it is a group of them.

Why is most purported magical fixing directed at individual creatures, mostly human?
People who want to save the world
by Giles — 2011-05-15T00:44:18.347Z

atucker wants to save the world.
ciphergoth wants to save the world.
Dorikka wants to save the world.
Eliezer_Yudkowsky wants to save the world.
I want to save the world.
Kaj_Sotala wants to save the world.
lincolnquirk wants to save the world.
Louie wants to save the world.
paulfchristiano wants to save the world.
Psy-Kosh wants to save the world.

Clearly the list I've given is incomplete. I imagine most members of the Singularity Institute belong here; otherwise their motives are pretty baffling. But equally clearly, the list will not include everyone.

What's my point? My point is that these people should be cooperating. But we can't cooperate unless we know who we are. If you feel your name belongs on this list then add a top-level comment to this thread, and feel free to add any information about what this means to you personally or what plans you have. Or it's enough just to say, "I want to save the world".

This time, no-one's signing up for anything. I'm just doing this to let you know that you're not alone. But maybe some of us can find somewhere to talk that's a little quieter.
Southern California Meetup May 21, Weekly Irvine Meetups on Wednesdays
by JGWeissman — 2011-05-14T16:55:28.275Z

Southern California is about to have a lot more meetups. To get the ramp up started, there will be a meet up at this IHOP across the street from John Wayne Airport in Irvine, on Saturday May 21 from 2:00 to 8:00. We will likely be at the upstairs table, but just tell them you are with the Less Wrong meetup and they will point you in the right direction. This should become a monthly meetup, hopefully one of several monthly meetups held on different weekends of the month in different cities in Southern California.

We are also starting weekly meetups in Irvine. These will be Wednesday evenings from 6:00 to 8:00, starting May 18, at the outdoor food court near the UCI Campus, at Campus and Bridge. Look for me with sign showing a diagram of a naive neural classifier of bleggs and rubes.
Analysis of transistion costs for changing habits
by NancyLebovitz — 2011-05-14T15:32:55.978Z

http://logicalwholesomehealth.blogspot.com/2011/05/how-easy-is-it-to-change-your-diet-or.html#comment-form

The article is from the angle of not blaming people who haven't made changes you think should be easy, but it also looks like a good way of allowing yourself appropriate slack for the process of making changes.
[SEQ RERUN] Useless Medical Disclaimers
by badger — 2011-05-14T13:51:11.091Z

Today's post, Useless Medical Disclaimers was originally published on March 19, 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Medical disclaimers without probabilities are hard to use, and if probabilities aren't there because some people can't handle having there, maybe we ought to tax those people.
(alternate summary:)
Eliezer complains about a disclaimer he had to sign before getting toe surgery because it didn't give numerical probabilities for the possible negative outcomes it described. He guesses this is because of people afflicted with "innumeracy" who would over-interpret small numbers. He proposes a tax wherein folks are asked if they are innumerate and asked to pay in proportion to their innumeracy. This tax is revealed in the comments to be a state-sponsored lottery.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Superstimuli and the Collapse of Western Civilization, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Victoria BC meetup Monday May 23rd 5pm
by Owen_Richardson — 2011-05-14T06:57:05.540Z

This little town doesn't seem to have much in the way of a lesswronger presence (search turns up me and one other user who hasn't been active since 2009), but damnit I'm here right now and I may as well give it a try!

Therefore I'll be at the Starbucks near the Market on Yates on Monday May 23rd from 5 pm to at least 6 pm.

I'll be reading a copy of "Theory of Instruction: Principles and Applications". Or writing on my laptop I guess. Actually, let's make this easy: Whatever I'm doing, I'll be wearing a black tricorn hat with gold piping and a giant white plume.

I'll be there anyway, but if any Victorianites out there are reading this, please, please do contact me, especially if you want to come but need a different time and/or location.

All right, here's hoping to see you there, all my hypothetical Victoria lesswrong homies!
Victoria BC meet-up Monday May 23rd 5pm
by Owen_Richardson — 2011-05-14T05:57:20.502Z

This little town doesn't seem to have much in the way of a lesswronger presence (search turns up me and one other user who hasn't been active since 2009), but damnit I'm here right now and I may as well give it a try!

Therefore I'll be at the Starbucks near the Market on Yates on Monday May 23rd from 5 pm to at least 6 pm.

I'll be reading a copy of "Theory of Instruction: Principles and Applications". Or writing on my laptop I guess. Actually, let's make this easy: Whatever I'm doing, I'll be wearing a black tricorn hat with gold piping and a giant white plume.

I'll be there anyway, but if any Victorianites out there are reading this, please, please do contact me, especially if you want to come but need a different time and/or location.

All right, here's hoping to see you there, all my hypothetical Victoria lesswrong homies!
Reference Classes in the Doomsday Argument
by Caerbannog — 2011-05-14T02:50:58.200Z

I accidentally deleted my article titled "Reference Classes in the Doomsday Argument." There were some really thoughtful replies, and I sincerely apologize to everyone who commented. I'm new here and new to web forums in general, and I thought that I was deleting my saved draft. Aargh!

For those who were involved in the discussion, here is the permalink to the topic.

Edit: Renamed title to make the discussion easier to find (per nickernst's suggestion).
Grigori Perelman refused prize because he knows "how to control the universe"
by Hul-Gil — 2011-05-13T23:39:45.771Z

Grigori Perelman was that reclusive Russian mathematician who proved the Poincaré conjecture, and refused the $1,000,000 prize. He has reportedly said that he refused the reward because he knows "how to control the universe" (full quote below; article linked at end).

When asked why he refused from the prize of one million dollars, Perelman responded: "I know how to control the Universe. Why would I run to get a million, tell me?"

My immediate thought is that he refers to the fact that understanding of the world means control of the world, to the extent of your understanding and limit of possibility. Thus the saying "knowledge is power" (which, oddly, the public doesn't really think seems to apply to science). I also see the point of refusing to communicate with the media, which manifestly does not care about science but rather about celebrity (I'm not guilty! this post is just about his ideas, dammit!). But his other comments - about the "boundless", for instance - sound more wild-eyed and vague, so maybe he's thinking of something else.

Also, what is this nonsense at the end? I think it's probably a misinterpretation by a reporter. Or wild exaggerations by Perelman. Or are we all doomed to be folded?

The scientist has learned some super-knowledge which helps realize creation. Special services need to know whether Perelman and his knowledge may pose a threat to humanity. With his knowledge he can fold the Universe into a spot and then unfold it again. Will mankind survive after this fantastic process? Do we need to control the Universe at all?

http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/28-04-2011/117727-Grigori_Perelman-0/
Buenos Aires meetup: Saturday, May 14th, 3pm
by Pablo — 2011-05-13T21:15:01.081Z

When: Saturday, May 14th, 3pm.

Where: Starbucks Coffe, Florida 1, upstairs. (A copy of Greg Egan's book Diaspora will be displayed on our table.)

This will be the first Buenos Aires LessWrong meetup. Our nominal discussion topic will be cognitive biases, though we'll keep things flexible so that the conversation can move naturally towards other topics of interest and relevance. If you read and like this blog. and live in BA or just happen to be visiting the city, do join us. It will be a great opportunity to meet like-minded folks in the area.
Minneapolis Meetup: Saturday May 14, 3:00PM
by JustinShovelain — 2011-05-13T21:14:45.113Z

Saturday May 14th, 3PM

Starbucks

Coffman Memorial Union

300 Washington Avenue SE,

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455

Goals:

To meet and network with likeminded Minnesotans.

I'll do my best to answer any questions people have about SIAI, rationality, x-risk strategy, and intelligence amplification (I spent about 2 years as a fellow).

To better figure out what our personal supergoals are. I'll build and print out a goal system investigation worksheet.

Directions:

The Minneapolis meetup will take place this Saturday the 14th at 3:00 PM in Coffman Memorial Union at the University of Minnesota. We'll be meeting inside at Starbucks, next to the northwest entrance to the bookstore, and underneath the northwest entrance to the Union. That entrance is a separate glass-sided structure right next to Washington Avenue, not the multistory brick building, but you can get to Starbucks from either entrance; it's on level 2.

RSVP and I'll keep an eye out for you. You can contact me at jshovelainsiai@gmail.com.
Ottawa meetup, Saturday May 14 6pm
by XFrequentist — 2011-05-13T21:14:30.252Z

Saturday May 14th, 18:00 - Late

Social: My house (Little Italy, Ottawa - PM me for address)

Games night: Poker @ Casino de Hull

Goals:

Continue getting to know each other and new members, continue getting more awesome, and discuss how to implement the various self-improvement/world optimizing schemes that are ongoing.

Test your rationality by playing some poker at the casino (I can drive myself plus four). I'm happy to give a brief tutorial beforehand.

Directions:

I live near Pub Italia, the Carling O-Train stop, and the corner of Preston & Carling. PM me for my address and/or cell number.

I'll post a more detailed invite to the google group.

Come one, come all!
Ediburgh LW Meetup Sunday 15th May, 2pm
by sark — 2011-05-13T21:14:11.399Z

Location: Delhi Cafe, 67 Nicolson Street

Map: http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?ie=UTF8&t=h&cid=1874860554950886070

I will be there with the Oxford Book of Aphorisms (for no particular reason)

Also check out: http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=161542077233135. Since we touched on Richard Wiseman last week.

Note: Sunday, not Saturday! (simply because I have an exam on Saturday...)
London meetup, Sunday 2011-05-15 14:00, near London Bridge
by Paul Crowley — 2011-05-13T20:54:32.138Z

The meetup on 1 May was another great success, and participants felt we could definitely benefit from meeting up more frequently, so we've schedule another one for next Sunday, 15 May, at 2pm in The George near London Bridge station. This is a change of venue, to mix things up and in case we get nice weather.

The George Inn, 77 Borough High Street, London, SE1 1NH

Official page

Map

Street view

Wikipedia page

beerintheevening

As always, we'll have a big picture of a paperclip on the table so you can find us; I look like this. Hope to see lots of you there. New people always welcome!
DC Meetup: Sunday May 15th, 3:30 PM
by atucker — 2011-05-13T20:53:48.623Z

Sunday May 15th, 3:30 PM - 8:30 PM
Chipotle Mexican Grill
7600 Old Georgetown Road
Bethesda, MD 20814

Hello again! Our first meetup had a great turnout, and we're hoping to get even more this time.

Goals:
Continue getting to know each other and new members, figuring out how to schedule future meetups and pick a more optimal location, and have fun, interesting conversations. Be on the lookout for interesting ideas during the week.

Directions:
The Chipotle is near the Bethesda Metro station, just follow these directions. Go out of the station and walk down Old Georgetown Road. The Chipotle is next to the waterfall fountain, and outdoor seating area.
We will be sitting towards the back of the restaurant (basically, keep going in the direction you've been walking to get to the Chipotle), in the corner with a wraparound bench. Look for the person with curly red hair, or the LW sign.
See us also at lesswrong-dc@googlegroups.com
Upcoming meet-ups: Buenos Aires, Minneapolis, Ottawa, Edinburgh, Cambridge, London, DC
by AnnaSalamon — 2011-05-13T20:49:59.007Z

There are upcoming Less Wrong meetups in:

Buenos Aires: Saturday May 14th, 3pm;

Minneapolis: Saturday May 14th, 3pm;

Ottawa: Saturday May 14th, 6pm;

Edinburgh: Sunday May 15th, 2pm;

London: Sunday May 15th, 2pm;

DC: Sunday May 15th, 3:30pm;

Southern California / Irvine: Saturday May 21, 2pm;

Triangle NC: May 20, 6pm;

Houston: May 22, 5pm;

Cities with regularly scheduled meetups: New York, Berkeley, Mountain View, Cambridge, MA, Toronto, Seattle, San Francisco, Irvine.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, and have fun!

To reduce front page clutter, the new plan is for meetups to be initially posted in the Discussion section, and for me to make a promoted post "upcoming meetups" post every Friday that links to every meet-up that has been planned for the next two weeks. [HT: Carl Shulman.] Please let me know if I omit your meetup.

Please note that for people to see your meetup announcement, you should post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!
Breaking the Procrastination Equation
by Alex_Altair — 2011-05-13T17:13:19.737Z

Recently, LessWrong user LukeProg wrote an article summarizing the scientific research on procrastination, in How to Beat Procrastination. The result was the Procrastination Equation:

This equation quantifies the motivation of people, on average. The rest of the article, and the book that much of it came from, was spent on ways to adjust your situation so that your motivation came out right. This can be helpful, but I think it is important to consider another goal.

I want to change myself so that I no longer follow the procrastination equation.

I am confident that there are people in the world that don't follow the procrastination equation.
Ask LessWrong: Design a degree in Rationality.
by XFrequentist — 2011-05-13T15:51:21.628Z

You are a tenured professor at a medium-sized public university. The Interdisciplinary Gods have smiled upon you, and you have been handed an operating grant, office space, and broad design powers to create an advanced interdisciplinary degree1 in "Rationality" (you suspect your department head reads LessWrong). Your students will come from a broad range of disciplines, and you cannot assume that they will posses any particular prior knowledge.

Candidates in your program could take courses in any department, as long as you have personally approved a course as eligible for credits. [ETA] All admitted students will be awarded tuition wavers and living wages. A compelling ROI calculation was a requirement for admission, and all students have demonstrated some impressive real-world accomplishments.

You thumb through your University's course register2, seeing a long list of courses in a variety of disciplines: Anthropology to Writing and Humanistic Studies. Without some constraints, you think, this degree will be incoherent.

Which do you include?

[1] To avoid tangential conversation, don't worry about what sort of degree. This could be the course load for a PhD/MBA/MA/etc.

[2] If it helps you think this through, use the MIT OCW listings to make suggestions. HT: nerzhin
Reference Classes in the Doomsday Argument
by Caerbannog — 2011-05-13T04:53:11.894Z

I've seen the Doomsday Argument discussed here, and I wanted to address some aspects that I have difficulty accepting.
Overview of Doomsday Argument
Nick Bostrom introduces the Doomsday Argument (DA) by asking you to imagine a universe of 100 numbered cubicles. You are told that a coin was flipped and one of the following happened:
A) 100 people were created and placed individually in cubicles 1-100 (if the coin came up heads)
B) 10 people were created and placed individually in cubicles 1-10 (if the coin came up tails)
Now, suppose you see that your own cubicle number (n) is 7, then you can deduce the relative likelihood of the above two scenarios by Bayesian reasoning:
Suppose that there were 200 such universes starting at the coin flip and in the ideal case there are 100 heads and 100 tails:
p(n<=10 | heads) = 10% (or 10 out of 100 such trials)
p(n<=10 | tails) = 100% (or 100 out of 100 such trials)
Relatively speaking, then, the likelihood that tails came up in this scenario is 100/(10+100) = 0.91 = 91%, even though the prior probability was equal for each outcome.
The DA says that based on reasoning similar to the above, it is possible to assign upper and lower bounds to the total number of humans that will ever be born, using birth order in place of the cubicle number.
For example (using my own math now), if human birth order is assigned randomly, then you have 95% confidence that your birth is within the middle 95% of all humans who will ever be born (i.e. between 2.5% and 97.5%). You can then calculate with 95% confidence the upper and lower bounds of the number of humans that will ever be born if you assume that your birth order is 100 billionth (this is close to the current consensus of approximately how many humans have ever been born):
upper limit: 100 billion / 0.025 = 4 Trillion
lower limit: 100 billion / 0.975 = 102.6 Billion
therefore p(102.6 Billion < Total Humans ever to be Born < 4 Trillion) = 95%
You can choose your desired confidence level and derive the upper and lower bounds accordingly.
Alternatively, you can also choose to determine only the upper limit by saying that you have 95% confidence that you are not among the first 5% of humans born:
upper limit: 100 billion / 0.05 = 2 Trillion
therefore p(Total Humans Born < 2 Trillion) = 95%
Discussion
The cubicle part of the argument is well-defined because there is a logical and discrete refe...
Rationality Exercise: My Little Pony
by magfrump — 2011-05-13T02:13:39.781Z

Recently I started watching My Little Pony: Friendship as Magic on the recommendation of numerous friends. It has been entertaining for the most part, but in episode 15, I hit a problem.

The main character, Twilight Sparkle, is an avid intellectual, who is constantly reading and learning about the magic of the world. In episode 15, a friend of hers, Pinkie Pie, reveals a strange talent for divination: When something is about to fall, her tail twitches. Various other manifestations also exist, in excruciating detail.

Twilight Sparkle is very unhappy with this "unscientific" state of affairs. She attempts (to my delight) to do Science to Pinkie Pie, however her attempts to do Science are frustratingly foiled; in large part because her experiments ignore the nature of the phenomenon.

After watching and being frustrated by this episode, I decided that it would be more fun to come up with better experiments that would cut to the core of the issue and really investigate the subject.

My first idea was, if Pinkie Pie's tail twitches when something falls, place Pinkie Pie in a room. In a room next to her, drop things, and have someone else record her responses and timing.

Once you can reliably predict and cause tail twitches, try holding her tail still. See if, say, the rest of her body starts shaking, or the thing stops falling. See if the twitches return if she is asleep. See how far away you can make something fall and still get a reaction.

The list could continue forever! What ideas do you have? You're welcome to seek out and watch the episode, and give experiments that would apply well to Pinkie Pie in particular, or just consider the idea that someone claims that their arm twitches noticeably when something is about to fall, and has used their twitchy arm to accurately predict several falling objects for you, in an uncontrolled setting. How would you Do Science to them (assuming their full cooperation)?

EDIT: it occurred to me immediately after submitting that "Experimental design" would have been a better title beginning that "Rationality exercise," but assuming the RSS issues are unresolved I will not change it.
Young Cryonicists Conference 2011
by Alex_Altair — 2011-05-13T00:19:14.885Z

Next week I'll be attending the second annual Young Cryonicists conference, which Eliezer attended before writing Normal Cryonics. I expected there to be discussion about it on lesswrong, but there hasn't been, so here it is.

Who else is going? Is EY going?

What do you expect to get out of it?

How can we use it to maximize winning?

Reference;

The most official thing I can find about the conference. (PDF)

Normal Cryonics by Eliezer Yudkowsky on Less Wrong