trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
LINK: Google research chief: 'Emergent artificial intelligence? Hogwash!'
by Shmi — 2013-05-17T19:45:45.739Z

The Register talks to Google's Alfred Spector:

Google's approach toward artificial intelligence embodies a new way of designing and running complex systems. Rather than create a monolithic entity with its own modules for reasoning about certain inputs and developing hypotheses that let it bootstrap its own intelligence into higher and higher abstractions away from base inputs, as other AI researchers did through much of the 60s and 70s, Google has instead taken a modular approach.

"We have the knowledge graph, [the] ability to parse natural language, neural network tech [and] enormous opportunities to gain feedback from users," Spector said in an earlier speech at Google IO. "If we combine all these things together with humans in the loop continually providing feedback our systems become ... intelligent."

Spector calls this his "combination hypothesis", and though Google is not there yet – SkyNet does not exist – you can see the first green buds of systems that have the appearance of independent intelligence via some of the company's user-predictive technologies such as Google Now, the new Maps and, of course, the way it filters search results according to individual identity.

(Emphasis mine.) I don't have a transcript, but there are videos online. Spector is clearly smart, and apparently he expects an AI to appear in a completely different way than Eliezer does. And he has all the resources and financing he wants, probably 3-4 orders of magnitude over MIRI's. His approach, if workable, also appears safe: it requires human feedback in the loop. What do you guys think?
Meetup : [Cambridge] Sunk Cost Kata
by ModusPonies — 2013-05-17T17:57:27.518Z

Discussion article for the meetup : [Cambridge] Sunk Cost Kata

WHEN:
19 May 2013 02:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
21 Ames St, Cambridge, MA

We'll present the Center for Applied Rationality's material on sunk costs and go over their exercises on how to apply this knowledge in daily life.

Cambridge/Boston-area Less Wrong meetups are on the first and third Sunday of every month at 2pm in the MIT Whitaker Building (21 Ames St, Bldg 56), room 180. Room number subject to change based on availability. Signs will be posted with the actual room number. The side doors are sometimes locked; if so, you can get in through the main door at 25 Ames St.

Discussion article for the meetup : [Cambridge] Sunk Cost Kata
Meetup : First Bristol meetup
by Benya — 2013-05-17T16:52:53.105Z

Discussion article for the meetup : First Bristol meetup

WHEN:
25 May 2013 03:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Friska Queens Road (on the Clifton triangle), Bristol

Back in 2010, Bristol had 4000+ unique LW visitors, but we've never had a meetup -- let's try and see what happens! I'll be in the Friska on Queens Road (on the Clifton triangle, right next to the university campus) on Saturday the 25th at 3pm, with a LessWrong sign and a paperback of HPMOR. Anyone going to join me? :-)

Discussion article for the meetup : First Bristol meetup
Education control?
by PhilGoetz — 2013-05-17T16:32:55.717Z

I'm reading Nurture Shock by Po Bronson & Ashley Merryman. Several things in the book, esp. the chapter on "Tools of the Mind", an intriguing education program, suggest that our education of young children not only isn't very good even when evaluated using tests that the curriculum was designed for, it's worse than just letting kids play. (My analogy and interpretation—don't blame this on the Tools people—is that conventional education may be like a Soviet five-year plan, trying to force children to acquire skills & knowledge that they would have been motivated to learn on their own if there weren't a school, and that early education shouldn't focus entirely on teaching specific facts, but also on teaching how to think, form abstractions, and control impulses.)

Say they're going to play fireman. The Tools teacher teaches the kids about what firemen do and what happens in a fire, and gives the kids different roles to play, then lets them play. They teach facts not because the facts are important, but to make the play session longer and more complicated. Tools does well in increasing test scores, but even better at reducing disruptive behavior. [1]

Tools has a variety of computer games that are designed to get kids to exercise particular cognitive skills, like focusing on something while being aware of background events. But the games often sound like more-boring ways of teaching kids the same things that video-games teach them.

Tools did no better than the existing curriculum on certain metrics in a recent larger study. But it didn't perform worse, either.

The first study you do with any biological intervention is to compare the intervention to a control group that has no intervention. But in education, AFAIK no one has ever done this. Everyone uses the existing curriculum as the control.

Whatever country you're in, what metrics do you use, and what evidence do you have that your schools are better than nothing at all?

There may be some things that you need to sit kids down and force them to learn—say, arithmetic, math, and typing—but I kinda doubt it's more than 20% of the grade school curriculum. I spent a lot of time practicing penmanship, futilely trying to memorizing the capitals and chief exports of all fifty states, and studying the history of Thanksgiving and the American Revolution over and over again.[2] We could have...
Morality should be Moral
by OrphanWilde — 2013-05-17T15:26:03.583Z

This article is just some major questions concerning morality, then broken up into sub-questions to try to assist somebody in answering the major question; it's not a criticism of any morality in particular, but rather what I hope is a useful way to consider any moral system, and hopefully to help people challenge their own assumptions about their own moral systems. I don't expect responses to try to answer these questions; indeed, I'd prefer you don't. My preferred responses would be changes, additions, clarifications, or challenges to the questions or to the objective of this article.

First major question: Could you morally advocate other people adopt your moral system?

This isn't as trivial a question as it seems on its face. Take a strawman hedonism, for a very simple example. Is a hedonist's pleasure maximized by encouraging other people to pursue -their- pleasure? Or would it be better served by convincing them to pursue other people's (a class of people of which our strawman hedonist is a member) pleasure?

It's not merely selfish moralities which suffer meta-moral problems. I've encountered a few near-Comtean altruists who will readily admit their morality makes them miserable; the idea that other people are worse off than them fills them with a deep guilt which they cannot resolve. If their goal is truly the happiness of others, spreading their moral system is a short-term evil. (It may be a long-term good, depending on how they do their accounting, but non-moral altruism isn't actually a rare quality, so I think an honest accounting would suggest their moral system doesn't add much additional altruism to the system, only a lot of guilt about the fact that not much altruistic action is taking place.)

Note: I use the word "altruism" here in its modern, non-Comtean sense. Altruism is that which benefits others.

Does your moral system make you unhappy, on the whole? Does it, like most moral systems, place a value on happiness? Would it make the average person less or more happy, if they and they alone adopted it? Are your expectations of the moral value of your moral system predicated on an unrealistic scenario of universal acceptance? Maybe your moral system isn't itself very moral.

Second: Do you think your moral system makes you a more moral pe...
Weekly LW Meetups: Atlanta, Austin, Moscow, Ottawa, Vancouver
by FrankAdamek — 2013-05-17T14:53:14.046Z

This summary was posted to LW main on May 10th. The following week's summary is here.

There are upcoming irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups in:

London Special Guests: Jaan Tallinn and Michael Vassar of MetaMed : 11 May 2013 01:00PM
Vancouver Microeconomics: Fungibility: 11 May 2013 03:00PM
Moscow, Rationality and Media: 12 May 2013 04:00PM
LessWrong Ottawa: 13 May 2013 07:30PM
Atlanta Lesswrong's May Meetup: The Rationality of Social Relationships, Friendship, Love, and Family.: 17 May 2013 07:00PM
Brussels meetup: 18 May 2013 01:00PM
Bratislava lesswrong meetup III: 20 May 2013 06:30PM
Berlin Social Meetup: 15 June 2013 05:00PM

The following meetups take place in cities with regularly scheduled meetups, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Austin, TX: 11 May 2019 01:30PM
Vienna meetup #3: 18 May 2013 04:00PM
Seattle-Vancouver Kilomeetup: 18 May 2013 11:54AM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge UK, Madison WI, Melbourne, Mountain View, New York, Ohio, Portland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Toronto, Vienna, Waterloo, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview will continue to be posted on the front page every Friday. These will be an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in the next weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll now also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts will be moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feature, you need to post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!

If you check Less Wrong irregularly, consider subscribing to one or more city-specific mailing list in order to be notified when an irregular meetup is happening: Atlanta, Berlin, Chicago, Helsinki, London, Marin CA, Ottawa, Pittsburgh...
The flawed Turing test: language, understanding, and partial p-zombies
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2013-05-17T14:02:48.808Z

There is a problem with the Turing test, practically and philosophically, and I would be willing to bet that the first entity to pass the test will not be conscious, or intelligent, or have whatever spark or quality the test is supposed to measure. And I hold this position while fully embracing materialism, and rejecting p-zombies or epiphenomenalism.

The problem is Campbell's law (or Goodhart's law):

The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor."

This applies to more than social indicators. To illustrate, imagine that you were a school inspector, tasked with assessing the all-round education of a group of 14-year old students. You engage them on the French revolution and they respond with pertinent contrasts between the Montagnards and Girondins. Your quizzes about the properties of prime numbers are answered with impressive speed, and, when asked, they can all play quite passable pieces from "Die Zauberflöte".

You feel tempted to give them the seal of approval... but they you learn that the principal had been expecting your questions (you don't vary them much), and that, in fact, the whole school has spent the last three years doing nothing but studying 18th century France, number theory and Mozart operas - day after day after day. Now you're less impressed. You can still conclude that the students have some technical ability, but you can't assess their all-round level of education.

The Turing test functions in the same way. Imagine no-one had heard of the test, and someone created a putative AI, designing it to, say, track rats efficiently across the city. You sit this anti-rat-AI down and give it a Turing test - and, to your astonishment, it passes. You could now conclude that it was (very likely) a genuinely conscious or intelligent entity.

But this is not the case: nearly everyone's heard of the Turing test. So the first machines to pass will be dedicated systems, specifically designed to get through the test. Their whole setup will be constructed to maximise "passing the test", not to "being intelligent" or whatever we want the test to measure (the fact we have difficulty stating what exactly the test should be measuring shows the di...
The Unselfish Trolley Problem
by elharo — 2013-05-17T10:51:56.068Z

By now the Trolley Problem is well known amongst moral philosophers and LessWrong readers. In brief, there's a trolley hurtling down the tracks. The dastardly villain Snidely Whiplash has tied five people to the tracks. You have only seconds to act. You can save the five people by throwing a switch and transferring the trolley to another track. However the evil villain has tied a sixth person to the alternate track. Should you throw the switch?

When first presented with this problem, almost everyone answers yes. Sacrifice the one to save five. It's not a very hard choice.

Now comes the hard question. There is no switch or alternate track. The trolley is still coming down the tracks, and there are still five people tied to it. You are instead standing on a bridge over the tracks. Next to you is a fat man. If you push the man onto the tracks, the trolley car will hit him and derail, saving the five people; but the fat man will die. Do you push him?

This is a really hard problem. Most people say no, they don't push. But really what is the difference here? In both scenarios you are choosing to take one life in order to save five. It's a net gain of four lives. Especially if you call yourself a utilitarian, as many folks here do, how can you not push? If you do push, how will you feel about that choice afterwards?

Try not to Kobayashi Maru this question, at least not yet. I know you can criticize the scenario and find it unrealistic. For instance, you may say you won't push because the man might fight back, and you'd both fall but not till after the trolley had passed so everyone dies. So imagine the fat man in a wheelchair, so he can be lightly rolled off the bridge. And if you're too socially constrained to consider hurting a handicapped person, maybe the five people tied to the tracks are also in wheelchairs. If you think that being pushed off a bridge is more terrifying than being hit by a train, suppose the fat man is thoroughly anesthetized. Yes, this is an unrealistic thought experiment; but please play along for now.

Have your answer? Good. Now comes the third, final, and hardest question; especially for anybody who said they'd push the fat man. There is still no switch or alternate track. The trolley is still coming down the tracks, and there are still five people tied to it. You are still standing on a bridge over the tracks. But this time you're alone and ...
To Inspire People to Give, Be Public About Your Giving
by Peter Wildeford — 2013-05-17T06:58:09.711Z

Many people think it would be nicer if people were to give more money to non-profits, especially effective ones. However, for most people, it doesn't even occur to them that they giving a large share of their salary to charity is something that people actually can do, or that people are doing on a regular basis.

Being public with one's pledge to donate not only spreads information about how easy it is to fight global poverty with a serious commitment, but that such commitments are the kind of thing that people can actually take. By being public with these pledges, we can actually inspire people to give, where they otherwise wouldn't.

But how did people get stuck in a rut? Why doesn't giving money come naturally? And how would public declarations help dig people out of this rut?

The Bystander Effect and The Assumption of Self-Interest

First, to understand how to get people to give we have to understand why they currently do not. There are a number of reasons, but one of the most prevalent is what's called the bystander effect. While this effect is widely known in groups failing to respond to disasters right in front of their faces, it's magnified when the disaster is global poverty a continent or two away. We think that because other people around us are not giving, it must also not be our responsibility, and we sure wouldn't want to be suckered into helping when no one else is doing their fair share.

Ever since Thomas Hobbes's The Leviathan, seeing human nature in terms of selfishness has been common, and persists to this day[1,2] as a strong and occasionally self-reinforcing belief[3,4]. People think of monetary incentives as being the most effective incentive for encouraging blood donations[5], even when this turns out to not be the case[6]. People greatly over-estimate the amount people will support a policy that favors them over other people[5]. As noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835, "Americans enjoy explaining almost every act of their lives on the principle of self-interest"[7].

This leads us to a natural assumption that donating to charity is irrational... or, at least, other people aren't doing it, so neither should I. However, this norm of self-interest is largely a myth, and people seem to do better than most people expect.

Challenging the Self-Interest Norm

This means th...
10-Step Anti-Procrastination Checklist
by JesseGalef — 2013-05-17T01:59:51.360Z

Despite recent strides in my productivity habits, I still catch myself procrastinating at work more often than I'd like. It's not that I make a conscious decision to put off a project; it just feels as though I wake up 20 minutes later and realize that nothing got accomplished. (Or, to avoid the passive voice and take much-deserved responsibility, I "realize that I haven't accomplished anything".)

I've been looking for techniques to improve, and got a lot out of LukeProg's articles on How to Beat Procrastination and My Algorithm for Beating Procrastination, based on Piers Steel's The Procrastination Equation.

But I also wanted a way to put the principles to use with the lowest activation cost possible. I can't expect unmotivated future-me to be too cooperative; I need to provide him with an easy path to get in flow.

So! I developed a 10-Step Productivity Checklist, pulling the concepts from Luke's articles and adding a couple points that are important for me. Now whenever I notice myself being unproductive I have a much easier time following the steps one by one until I get back in a good mindset to work.

Productivity Checklist:

What is the task? Make sure you're going to focus on one thing at a time.

Do you have something to drink? Get yourself some tea, coffee, or water.

Are distractions closed? Shut the door, quit Tweetdeck, close the Facebook and Gmail tabs, and set skype to "Do not disturb."

What music will you listen to inspire yourself to be productive or get in flow? Put on a good instrumental playlist! (I love video game soundtracks, further notes in comments.)

Why are you doing this task? Trace the value until you feel the benefit.

What are the parts to this task? Break things down as much as you can, until they're physical actions if possible.

What are some ways to gamify the task? Try to have fun with it!

What are some rewards you can offer yourself for completing sections of the task? Smiling, throwing your arms up in the air and proclaiming victory, or M&M's all count.

What's an achievable goal for this sitting? Set a reasonable expectation for yourself.

How long will you work until you take a break? Set a timer and commit to focusing.

Get into flow!

I'd love to hear from you:

Whether these are useful

Any ideas for good ways to enact these steps

Steps that should be added/remove

...
Meetup : Tel Aviv, Israel Meetup - Goal Clarification with special guest Cat from CFAR
by SoftFlare — 2013-05-16T16:04:31.681Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Tel Aviv, Israel Meetup - Goal Clarification with special guest Cat from CFAR

WHEN:
23 May 2013 07:00:00PM (+0300)

WHERE:
TBA, In central Tel Aviv

For the first time in something like forever there will be a rationality meetup in Tel Aviv, Israel. It'll be a great chance to meet your fellow LWers from Israel.

We will be joined by very special guest Cat from CFAR who will talk about Goal Clarification - a useful technique for increasing productivity.

Please email me @ hochbergg@gmail.com about your RSVP.

If you are a LWer from Israel who'd would have liked to come, but can't due to scheduling constraints, please email me as well so we can stay in touch :)

Gal Hochberg

Discussion article for the meetup : Tel Aviv, Israel Meetup - Goal Clarification with special guest Cat from CFAR
Meetup : London Meetup - 26th May
by sixes_and_sevens — 2013-05-16T10:51:46.043Z

Discussion article for the meetup : London Meetup: 26th May

WHEN: 26 May 2013 02:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE: Holborn, London, WC2B 6BG

One of our fortnightly meetups. This will be held in the Shakespeare's Head by Holborn tube station. Turn left out of the station exit, and it's <100m on your left.

We're in the process of changing the format of meetups, so they alternate between designated "social" and "practical" gatherings. This will be the last undesignated meetup.

One of our number will have recently returned from the May CFAR Rationality Minicamp, and has volunteered to provide an AMA-style discussion on the experience.

We have a Google Group. Why not join it?

Discussion article for the meetup : London Meetup: 26th May
Meetup :  Bielefeld Meetup May 22nd
by Just_existing — 2013-05-16T09:50:19.214Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Bielefeld Meetup May 22nd

WHEN:
22 May 2013 07:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Grill/Bar Verve, Klosterplatz 13, Bielefeld

We are meeting once again in Bielefeld.

The topics of this evening are not yet determined, but will be in the next days, or develop during the meetup. Highly interesting talk can be expected.

If you live in the area consider dropping by :)

Discussion article for the meetup : Bielefeld Meetup May 22nd
Meetup : [Moscow] Belief cleaning
by Yuu — 2013-05-16T06:09:03.401Z

Discussion article for the meetup : [Moscow] Belief cleaning

WHEN:
26 May 2013 04:00:00PM (+0400)

WHERE:
Russia, Moscow, ulitsa L'va Tolstogo 16

Please use the following guide to get to the meetup: link. You need the second revolving door with the sign “Yandex Money” in Russian. We will meet you at 15:45 MSK with “LW” sign. And we will also check the entrance at 16:00 and 16:10, so please do not be late.

Main topics:

Epistemic Spring Cleaning: we will do exercise to find and change old unnecessary beliefs.

Prediction markets. We will have another round of predictions, you can find the discussion and bets table on the Russian forum.

Game session: the Resistance. You can find rules here, in Russian.

If you are going for the first time, you can fill this one minute form (in Russian), to share your contact information. You can also use personal messages here, or drop a message at lw@lesswrong.ru to contact me for any reason.

Reports from previous sessions can be found here, in Russian, now with photos

Discussion article for the meetup : [Moscow] Belief cleaning
Meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 65-68
by therufs — 2013-05-16T04:27:12.185Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 65-68

WHEN:
18 May 2013 12:30:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
726 Rigsbee Avenue, Durham NC 27701

Meet at Fullsteam (address above) for discussion of HPMoR chapters 65-68!

We may be recognizeable by our large spiral-bound tome, but the likely absence of other groups will probably make us easy to spot.

Bring coffee and/or food as you are inclined; tell the list if you'd like a ride: http://groups.google.com/group/rtlw

See you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : Durham/RTLW HPMoR discussion, ch. 65-68