trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
P: 0 <= P <= 1
by DragonGod — 2017-08-27T21:57:22.619Z

Part of The Contrarian Sequences.

Reply to infinite certainty and 0 and 1 are not probabilities.

Introduction

In infinite certainty, Eliezer makes the argument that you can't ever be absolutely sure of a proposition. That is an argument I disagreed with for a long time, but due to Akrasia acedia, I never got around to writing it. I think I have a more coherent counter argument now, and would present it below. Because the post I am replying to and infinite certainty are linked, I address both of them in this post.

This doesn't mean, though, that I have absolute confidence that 2 + 2 = 4. See the previous discussion on how to convince me that 2 + 2 = 3, which could be done using much the same sort of evidence that convinced me that 2 + 2 = 4 in the first place. I could have hallucinated all that previous evidence, or I could be misremembering it. In the annals of neurology there are stranger brain dysfunctions than this.

This is true. That a statement is true does not mean that you have absolute confidence in the veracity of the statement. It is possible that you may have hallucinated everything.

Suppose you say that you're 99.99% confident that 2 + 2 = 4. Then you have just asserted that you could make 10,000 independent statements, in which you repose equal confidence, and be wrong, on average, around once.

I am not so sure of this. If I have X% confidence in a belief, and I am well calibrated, then if there were K statements for which I said I have X% confidence in, then you expect that ((100-X)/100)*K of those statements would be wrong, and the remainder would be right. It does not follow that if I have X% confidence in a belief that I can make K statements in which I repose equal confidence, and be wrong only ((100-X)/100)*K times.

It's something like X% confidence (implies) if you made K statements then ((100-X)/100)*K of those statements would be wrong.

A well calibrated agent does not have to be able to make K with only ((100-X)/100)*K wrong those statements for them to possess X% confidence in the proposition. It only indicates that in a hypothetical world in which they did make K statements, if they were well calibrated, only ((100-X)/100)*K of those statements w...
The Contrarian Sequences
by DragonGod — 2017-08-27T19:33:21.938Z

A series of posts wherein I outline my disagreements with Shishou (Eliezer Yudkowsky).

When I discovered the sequences was my second epiphany (the first was when I became atheist, and my world was turned upside down). Eliezer's charisma, his arrogance, the force of his personality, and his eloquence all combined to make a deadly drug. I was hooked, and seized with a fervour greater than when I first gave my life to Jesus Christ. Eliezer became my new Jesus, and I was drinking the koolaid pretty badly. Some months later (in light of criticism from both friend and foe), I realised I was a cultist, and began trying to sanitise myself. Due to the Halo effect, I accepted everything Eliezer said unconditionally, and never bothered trying to ascertain for myself the veracity of his claims.

I am stronger now than I was then, and aspiring higher still. This is a project in raising my epistemic hygiene. I will only react to posts that I feel were wrong in the overarching thesis, and develop my counterarguments in them. I expect I should write counter posts for at least 1% of all posts (if I don't reach the target, I'm probably not being critical enough), and at most 5% (if I exceed that, then I've probably just biased myself in the opposite direction, and/or I'm getting a kick out of disagreeing with Eliezer). Posts in the contrarian sequences would be in chronological order of how I wrote them, and not in the order of how they appear in the sequences, or in any ontological order.

Table of Contents

The Reality of Emergence

P: 0 <= P <= 1
Rational Feed
by sapphire — 2017-08-27T03:49:15.774Z

===Highly Recommended Articles:

What Is Rationalist Berkleys Community Culture by Zvi Moshowitz - The original rationalist community mission was to save the world, not to be nice to each other. Sarah recently suggested the later is currently the actual goal. Zvi reinterprets this as sounding an alarm. The rationalists should not become just another Berkeley community of bohemians and weirdos.

Cthugha The Living Flame by Exploring Egregores - Rationalists as worshippers of an Eldritch Star God. Valuing knowledge and ideas above all else. Bonobos and transhumanists. Yudkowsky's argument about distributed vs concentrated intellect. The AI box experiment. Nerds as the true extraverts. "What do you think the singularity will actually look like?" The site maps eight other Eldritch Gods to different philosophical dispositions.

Internet Explorers Not Exploiters by Nostalgebraist - Exploit vs explore tradeoffs. Attention spans. How long should you try a math problem before you give up? Exploring new options can be uncomfortable since it might lead nowhere. Addictive games and the internet. Academic research.

Diversity And Team Performance What The Research Says by Eukaryote - Opens with several links about diversity and inclusion in EA. The pros and cons of different types of diversity in terms of group cohesion and information processing. Practical ways to minimize the costs of diversity and magnify the benefits. Lots of references.

The Market Power Story by Noah Smith - Many issues in the American economy are blamed on the increasing market power of a small number of firms. Analysis: Monopolistic competition. Profits. Market Concentration. Output restriction. Three updates. Lots of citations and references to papers.

The Anti Slip Slope by samuelthefifth (Status 451) - An analogy between workplace noise and workplace sexism. How efforts to stamp out 'workplace noise' can get out of control.

Dota 2 by Open Ai - Open AI codes a 1v1 Dota-2 bot that defeaated top players. The bots actions per minute were comparable to many humans. The bot learned the game from scratch by self-play, and does not use imitation learning or tree search. The game involves hidden information and the bot's strategies were complicated.

Stop Caring So Much About Technical Problems by Particular Virtue - Links to an article describing what attributes actua...
Escaping the Premium Mediocre
by Jacob Falkovich — 2017-08-27T00:47:35.000Z

Out of the last 12 hours, I have spent one hour thinking about soccer and another thinking about Korean chicken. The other 10 hours I spent thinking about The Premium Mediocre Life of Maya Millenial.

Like all essays by Venkat, this one is optimized for getting you to think about it. Venkat achieves it by precisely crafting his writing to be 60% true, 30% wrong and 10% nonsensical. But the true 60% of Premium Mediocre is deeply and importantly true, and also really fun to read. It’s a long essay and I’ll quote liberally from it, but if you are only going to read my post or the original, go read the original.

The wrong 30% is there to be interestingly wrong, and also to focus the attention on the true parts. If 5% of an argument is wrong, readers will nitpick that 5% to death. This has always been a huge source of frustration on LessWrong. If an argument is 30% wrong but 100% inspiring, no one cares about nitpicking errors.

And yet, I’m going to mostly focus on the 30% that Venkat missed so that those who read both essays can understand better the core reality of premium mediocrity.

If you’re curious, Putanumonit is 75% true and 25% stupid. This ratio is the result of my writing about topics at the edge of my expertise. For example, I know a lot about financial regulation and a little about economic inequality. I’m only going to write about the latter, because writing about the former would be too boring.

Welcome to the Premium Mediocre

Premium mediocrity is right at the edge of my expertise. I am around it, but not really of it. Before I explain why I’m not really it, I’ll let Venkat describe what it is:

Premium mediocre is the finest bottle of wine at Olive Garden. Premium mediocre is cupcakes and froyo. Premium mediocre is “truffle” oil on anything (no actual truffles are harmed in the making of “truffle” oil), and extra-leg-room seats in Economy. Premium mediocre is cruise ships, artisan pizza, Game of Thrones, and The Bellagio.

Premium mediocre is food that Instagrams better than it tastes. […]

The best banana, any piece of dragon fruit, fancy lettuce, David Brooks’ idea of a gourmet sandwich. […]

The entire idea of the country that is France is kinda premium mediocre (K-Pop is a big hit there, not coincidentally). The fact that Americans equate “French” with “classy” is proof of its premium mediocrity (Swit

...
Play in Hard Mode
by Zvi — 2017-08-26T19:00:00.000Z

Epistemic Status: Love the player, love the game

Also consider: Playing on Easy Mode

Raymond Arnold asked me, why do you insist on playing in hard mode?

Hard mode is harder. The reason to Play in Hard Mode is because it is the only known way to become stronger, and to defend against Goodhart’s Law.

Strategies that work in Easy Mode won’t work in Hard Mode.

The key idea of Hard Mode is to keep your eyes on the prize. You know exactly what you want. You can’t munchkin your way to getting it. Once you start aiming to make a number go up, or get a check in the right box, you have lost sight of the thing you actually want. Proxy measures lead to failure; your value is fragile. That number correlates to what you want, but only insofar as you’re aiming for the goal and not the number. If you break the spirit of the exercise, all is lost. Your values have been hijacked. If you fail to develop skills along the way, you have missed the point, because the game has no end.

I

Consider playing guitar in Rock Band. You must choose whether to play in Hard Mode. If you do, you will fail a lot. You will play the same songs over and over again. Tricks that rely on there only being so many notes, or going at a relaxed pace, collapse. Eventually, you learn new techniques. You get better. You play on expert, your fingers get sore and you smile as you sing along.

II

You have a test in a week. You ignore it. You’ve asked questions based on your curiosity, to resolve your confusion. You study what is interesting to you, and what you feel would help you in the future.You focus on learning key principles, knowing you can derive what details you need later on. When the test comes, you work to figure out the answers. When you get the test back, you know how much you have learned. A year later, you remember everything, and build upon it.

III

You prepare for a tournament. You seek out the toughest opponents to help you prepare. You stop to criticize each other’s technique and point out every little mistake, no matter how irrelevant to the ultimate outcome of the practice match. You ask why and how you made that mistake. You do the same when you learn something new in a surprising way. You focus on the fundamentals, and don’t worry too much about exactly who you are up against this week. During the matches, you remember every tough decision and every mistake, so you can train again next week.

IV

You st

...
Play in Easy Mode
by Zvi — 2017-08-26T18:57:56.000Z

Epistemic Status: Love the player, love the game

Also consider: Playing on Hard Mode

Raymond Arnold asked me, why not play in easy mode?

Easy Mode is easier. The reason to Play in Easy Mode is because it is the best known way to achieve your explicit measurable goal and get to the victory screen.

Strategies that work in Easy Mode won’t work in Hard Mode.

The key idea of Easy Mode is to keep your eyes on the prize. You know exactly what you want. You will munchkin your way to getting it. As long as you get a high enough number, or a check in the right box, you have what you want. That number isn’t just a proxy for victory. It is victory. If you break the spirit of the exercise, nothing is lost. Your values are safe. You are not here to develop skills, because the game ends here.

I

Consider playing guitar in Rock Band. You must choose whether to play in Easy Mode. If you do, you won’t fail. You won’t need to play the same songs over and over again. You can use tricks that rely on there only being so many notes, or going at a relaxed pace. You get to enjoy playing what you want, enjoying all the modes, advancing your band, right away. You get treated better. You play on medium, your fingers don’t hurt, and you smile as you sing along.

II

You have a test in a week. You cram for it. You’ve asked questions based on your desire to know what will be on the test, to resolve your confusion. You figure out what questions will be asked, what will help you in the exam. You focus on memorizing key facts, phrases and techniques, knowing you can guess the teacher’s password. When the test comes, you give back the answers. When you get the test back, you know you have passed and never have to think about that class again. A year later, you have forgotten everything, but you have a degree to build on.

III

You prepare for a tournament. You seek out representative opponents to help you prepare. You look for mistakes you can exploit, and ask what won or lost you each practice match. You ask how you can turn those events in your favor. You don’t worry about surprising things unless you expect them to be common. You focus on what wins matches, and don’t worry too much about little things that are unlikely to make a big enough difference this week. During the matches, you do everything you can to win, then train against next week.

IV

You sta...
Could the Maxipok rule have catastrophic consequences? (I argue yes.)
by philosophytorres — 2017-08-25T10:00:52.097Z

Here I argue that following the Maxipok rule could have truly catastrophic consequences.

Here I provide a comprehensive list of actual humans who expressed, often with great intensity, omnicidal urges. I also discuss the worrisome phenomenon of "latent agential risks."

And finally, here I argue that a superintelligence singleton constitutes the only mechanism that could neutralize the "threat of universal unilateralism" and the consequent breakdown of the social contract, resulting in a Hobbesian state of constant war among Earthians.

I would genuinely welcome feedback on any of these papers! The first one seems especially relevant to the good denizens of this website. :-)
When "I'm here" means nothing
by squidious — 2017-08-25T07:00:00.000Z

When a good friend expresses that they are facing tough times, we may feel an impulse to reach out and help. However, unless this is someone you are particularly close to, you may not know how. So if you tell them that you want to support them, then they'll just reach out whenever they need support, right?
Well, not exactly. A person who is struggling isn't necessarily going to reach out, and those who do are more likely to reach out to those closest to them -- a partner or best friend. A generic offer of help doesn't often do much because it doesn't let the person know how you want to help. You could be imagining yourself as a shoulder to cry on for a recent divorcee, while what they may really need is a place to stay or help moving. They may choose to not ask for help if they fear rejection, or may ask you to help with one of those things, only to result in an awkward conversation due to differences in expectation. So how do you ensure you actually get to help your friend?
One way of doing this is by saying specifically how you're willing to help. The more specific, the better! Even "I'm here if you need to talk" could result in misunderstanding if they want to vent and you think they want to problem solve. If you know more about your friend and their failure modes, you can find ways to help that are specific to them. For example, offering to spend time supporting them as they answer old emails, or message them with encouraging thoughts when they're about to step into a date or job interview. A particularly social friend may see something as simple as planning to spend time together as a way of showing you care, while some may think the same of starting a text or online conversation. If you can't think of specific ways to help someone, initiating contact may be a good place to start.
Some people are liable to forget what thing you offered to do, especially if their life tends towards the more stressful. Asking someone how they're doing can be a good move here, particularly for friends with more stressful lives. This can be an easy way to transition into a venting or problem solving conversation if that is your preferred way of helping, or you can discuss other ways they could use your help. Even if your friend doesn't need help in that moment, they will feel good about the fact that you reached out.
Caring for someone doesn't just have to be for times of

...
Paranoia testing
by Elo — 2017-08-25T04:41:15.186Z

Original post: http://bearlamp.com.au/paranoia-testing/

Because I live on the internet I sometimes meet some interesting characters. On this particular occasion I found myself in a conversation with someone who suggested, “I don't know if I'm paranoid or not”. The full story had some drug use and what I can only describe as peculiar circumstances (if they were in fact being accurately reported, but I have no reason not to believe the reports).

Intrigued by this puzzle and I was not entirely sure what the best course of action to do with a potential mentally unwell person - Should I discourage the stories, should I indulge the stories? If I say something that causes my friend to drop into a state of greater paranoia I would be liable to try to help them out again. After a short while of talking I figured that I would just try and get the person to think and feel about the "edges" of what it means to have paranoia.

Which is how I came up with the idea to run some simple thought experiment tests that might give you a hint as to whether you have paranoia or not. I didn't know if I could be trusted by this person so I was always very careful to suggest ideas and not insist on any ideas. It's not necessary for me to insist someone seek treatment.

As a brain living inside the conditions like paranoia it's difficult to have an objective test because any scientific test that can be done on faulty equipment is going to come up with faulty results the equivalent to the fault. A camera with a dust speck on it's lens will always take a photo of the dust spec. Unfortunately paranoia is a more complicated fault to test.

Any experiment that you might try, could run into multiple errors at the same time or multiple errors in the one experiment. Could paranoia machinery change at different times of day? Different amounts of stress? If you were to try and design a normal experiment knowing that your equipment was faulty you'll be trying to aim for reliability, validity and accuracy.

Repeating the experiment for reliability - which is to say that if you were shooting an arrow and you always land in the direction of the target you know you have at least the reliability to shoot an arrow. If you regularly hit one foot to the left of the bullseye you have the accuracy to get close to the target, ...
Social Insight: Status Exchange: When an Insult Is a Compliment, When a Compliment Is an Insult
by Bound_up — 2017-08-25T03:57:03.908Z

Some rough synonyms for status include respect, prestige, and "coolness."

Conceptually, the idea I sometimes think of when I try to describe "status" in its constituent parts is that to have status is to have people feel that they owe you something, to feel like they would if you had just given them a gift. The balance of give-and-take in the encounter is tilted in your favor. Picture a king among subjects, being given gifts and praises. Every brush of his hand is itself a gift, every glance of his eyes a praise to the recipient. The give-and-take in a relationship is never exactly equal, and high status people have it tilted strongly in their favor.

With the people you know, you'll have implicitly established an individual give-and-take relationship with each of them, and if one of you fails to give as much as that balance (or imbalance) requires, you'll be asked to apologize. So, if you have a 60-40 relationship (your way) with someone, and they only give you 50, you'll feel offended and ask for the apology. An apology is essentially a recognition of failure to give somebody as much as is expected, and a promise to give them more from now on/take less from now on. In other words, to shift the actual give-and-take favorably in their direction. This is why asking for an apology is essentially a re-negotiation of power/a request for submission.

(You'll note that you can feel offended for being treated fairly if that's not what your give-and-take has been in the past, just like someone can apologize for acting fairly if more than that is expected of them. This is why apologies can be purposefully sought and extracted with the intention of gaining status/re-negotiating the give-and-take of the relationship. Ammunition will be noted, stored, and prepared in advance and the encounter will be initiated at a strategically opportune time. Ammunition includes anything that can make someone feel sorry, and sometimes you can win without ammunition by continuing to act or feel like you've been wronged even without being able to give a justification for it.)

With people you don't know, general status determines how much they "owe" you and you them. If you are high status, people will feel like they owe you even before you've had any give and take. They will treat you much the same way as they would if you had just done them a great favor and they wanted to show y...
What is Rational?
by DragonGod — 2017-08-24T22:35:25.787Z

Eliezer defines rationality as such:

Instrumental rationality: systematically achieving your values.

....

Instrumental rationality, on the other hand, is about steering reality— sending the future where you want it to go. It’s the art of choosing actions that lead to outcomes ranked higher in your preferences. I sometimes call this “winning.”

Extrapolating from the above definition, we can conclude that an act is rational, if it causes you to achieve your goals/win. The issue with this definition is that we cannot evaluate the rationality of an act, until after observing the consequences of that action. We cannot determine if an act is rational without first carrying out the act. This is not a very useful definition, as one may want to use the rationality of an act as a guide.

Another definition of rationality is the one used in AI when talking about rational agents:

For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge the agent has.

A precept sequence is basically the sequence of all perceptions the agent as had from inception to the moment of action. The above definition is useful, but I don't think it is without issue; what is rational for two different agents A and B, with the exact same goals, in the exact same circumstances differs. Suppose A intends to cross a road, and A checks both sides of the road, ensures it's clear and then attempts to cross. However, a meteorite strikes at that exact moment, and A is killed. A is not irrational for attempting to cross the road, giving that t hey did not know of the meteorite (and thus could not have accounted for it). Suppose B has more knowledge than A, and thus knows that there is substantial delay between meteor strikes in the vicinity, and then crosses after A and safely crosses. We cannot reasonably say B is more rational than A.

The above scenario doesn't break our intuitions of what is rational, but what about in other scenarios? What about the gambler who knows not of the gambler's fallacy, and believes that because the die hasn't rolled an odd number for the past n turns, that it would ...