trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
PredictIt, a prediction market out of New Zealand, now in beta.
by Jayson_Virissimo — 2015-03-16T02:02:14.126Z

From their website:

PredictIt is an exciting new, real money site that tests your knowledge of political and financial events by letting you make and trade predictions on the future.

Taking part in PredictIt is simple and easy. Pick an event you know something about and see what other traders believe is the likelihood it will happen. Do you think they have it right? Or do you think you have the knowledge to beat the wisdom of the crowd?

The key to success at PredictIt is timing. Make your predictions when most people disagree with you and the price is low. When it turns out that your view may be right, the value of your predictions will rise. You’ll need to choose the best time to sell!

Keep in mind that, although the stakes are limited, PredictIt involves real money so the consequences of being wrong can be painful. Of course, winning can also be extra sweet.

For detailed instructions on participating in PredictIt, How It Works.

PredictIt is an educational purpose project of Victoria University, Wellington of New Zealand, a not-for-profit university, with support provided by Aristotle International, Inc., a U.S. provider of processing and verification services. Prediction markets, like this one, are attracting a lot of academic and practical interest (see our Research section). So, you get to challenge yourself and also help the experts better understand the wisdom of the crowd.
Meetup : Tel Aviv: Slightly Less Hard Problems of Consciousness
by DanArmak — 2015-03-15T21:07:49.159Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Tel Aviv: Slightly Less Hard Problems of Consciousness

WHEN:
24 March 2015 07:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Google, Electra Tower 29th Floor, Yigal Alon Street 98, Tel Aviv.

There will be a talk about some problems posed by the experience of consciousness, by Daniel Armak (me). It may transform into a round-table discussion, depending on audience participation.

I hope to update this post with an abstract later. I hope to post an abstract later. The title hints that this is not about Chalmers' so-called Hard Problem of Consciousness (there was previously some confusion about this), which isn't that hard a problem, anyway.

We'll meet at the 29th floor of the building. Once everyone arrives, we'll move to a different room. If you arrive and can't find your way around, call Anatoly who is graciously hosting us at 054-245-1060, or Daniel at 054-7576-480.

We'll start the meetup at 19:00, and we'll go on as much as we like to or until Anatoly kicks us out. If you can only come later, that's great too!

The Less Wrong Tel Aviv group holds meetups every second Tuesday, alternating between talks on various subjects of interests (as this time) and game nights. You're invited to join our Facebook group and Google Group.

The Facebook event is here. If you're coming, please RSVP there if you can, so we have a sense of what to expect.

Discussion article for the meetup : Tel Aviv: Slightly Less Hard Problems of Consciousness
2015 Less Wrong Study Hall census is open.
by Error — 2015-03-15T21:02:55.717Z

I forgot about it until after were were past the Hall's birthday, so the survey is late this year and won't run for as long. Nevertheless, for those of you that use the Less Wrong Study Hall, here is this year's census:

2015 LWSH Census and Survey

It will close on April 7th and I'll post the results a few weeks after that. I'll be advertising it during breaks in the Hall; I encourage others to do the same to maximize turnout.
Experimental EA funding [crosspost]
by paulfchristiano — 2015-03-15T19:48:39.371Z

Over the course of 2015, we will be distributing $10,000 to completed projects which we believe will have a significant long-term humanitarian impact.

These awards are being made in exchange for certificates of impact. Here's how it works: you tell us about something good you did. We offer you some money. Rather than considering a complicated counterfactual ("How well will this money be spent if I don't take it?"), we encourage you to accept our offer if and only if you would be willing to undo the humanitarian impact of your project in exchange for the money. For more details, see here.

I originally posted this at the EA forum, but it may also be of interest to people here. We are open to funding writing or research on many perennial LW topics (methodological issues, small experiments, lifehacks, useful futurism, etc.).

Why are we buying certificates instead of making grants? Just as market prices help coordinate and incentivize the efficient production of commercial products, they could also help coordinate and incentivize efficient altruism. We also think that paying for performance after the fact has a number of big advantages. Not convinced yet? See a more complete answer.

Applications will include an asking price, the minimum amount of money that would be enough to compensate you for undoing the humanitarian impact of the project. The actual awards will be determined by combining the asking prices with ourimpact assessments in a (truthful) auction. Instead of buying 100% of your project's impact, we'll buy some a fraction less than 50% (at your discretion).

The awards will be made in ten $1,000 rounds, spread over the course of the year. The deadline for the first round is March 25. We'll post the results of each round as they occur. New proposals can be made in between rounds. Once an application is submitted it will be considered in each round unless it is withdrawn.

If you are interested, submit an application here. The application process is designed to be as straightforward as possible. Learn about the kind of work we are most interested in, and see our other restrictions. If you have other questions or comments, contact us atcontact@impactpurchase.org or discuss the project at the effective altruism forum.

impactpurchase.org contains othe...
In Praise of Maximizing – With Some Caveats
by David Althaus — 2015-03-15T19:40:06.647Z

Most of you are probably familiar with the two contrasting decision making strategies "maximizing" and "satisficing", but a short recap won't hurt (you can skip the first two paragraphs if you get bored): Satisficing means selecting the first option that is good enough, i.e. that meets or exceeds a certain threshold of acceptability. In contrast, maximizing means the tendency to search for so long until the best possible option is found.

Research indicates (Schwartz et al., 2002) that there are individual differences with regard to these two decision making strategies. That is, some individuals – so called ‘maximizers’ – tend to extensively search for the optimal solution. Other people – ‘satisficers’ – settle for good enough1. Satisficers, in contrast to maximizers, tend to accept the status quo and see no need to change their circumstances2.

When the subject is raised, maximizing usually gets a bad rap. For example, Schwartz et al. (2002) found "negative correlations between maximization and happiness, optimism, self-esteem, and life satisfaction, and positive correlations between maximization and depression, perfectionism, and regret."

So should we all try to become satisficers? At least some scientists and the popular press seem to draw this conclusion:

Maximisers miss out on the psychological benefits of commitment, leaving them less satisfied than their more contented counterparts, the satisficers. ...Current research is trying to understand whether they can change. High-level maximisers certainly cause themselves a lot of grief.

I beg to differ. Satisficers may be more content with their lives, but most of us don't live for the sake of happiness alone. Of course, satisficing makes sense when not much is at stake3. However, maximizing also can prove beneficial, for the maximizers themselves and for the people around them, especially in the realm of knowledge, ethics, relationships and when it comes to more existential issues – as I will argue below4.

Belief systems and Epistemology

Ideal rationalists could be thought of as epistemic maximizers: They try to notice slight inconsistencies in their worldview, take ideas seriously, beware wishful thinking, compartmentalization, rationalizations, motivated reasoning, cognitive biases and other epistemic sins. Driven by curiosity, they don't try to confirm their prior beliefs, but wish to update them until the...
Answer to Job
by Scott Alexander — 2015-03-15T18:02:53.000Z

(with apologies to Jung)

Job asked: “God, why do bad things happen to good people? Why would You, who are perfect, create a universe filled with so much that is evil?”

Then the Lord spoke to Job out of the whirlwind, saying “WHAT KIND OF UNIVERSE WOULD YOU PREFER ME TO HAVE CREATED?”

Job said “A universe that was perfectly just and full of happiness, of course.”

“OH,” said God. “YES, I CREATED ONE OF THOSE. IT’S EXACTLY AS NICE AS YOU WOULD EXPECT.”

Job facepalmed. “But then why would You also create this universe?”

Answered God: “DON’T YOU LIKE EXISTING?”

“Yes,” said Job, “but all else being equal, I’d rather be in the perfectly just and happy universe.”

“OH, DON’T WORRY,” said God. “THERE’S A VERSION OF YOU IN THAT UNIVERSE TOO. HE SAYS HI.”

“Okay,” said Job, very carefully. “I can see I’m going to have to phrase my questions more specifically. Why didn’t You also make this universe perfectly just and happy?”

“BECAUSE YOU CAN’T HAVE TWO IDENTICAL INDIVIDUALS. IF YOU HAVE A COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF IDENTITY, THEN TWO PEOPLE WHOSE EXPERIENCE IS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SATURATED BY BLISS ARE JUST ONE PERSON. IF I MADE THIS UNIVERSE EXACTLY LIKE THE HAPPY AND JUST UNIVERSE, THEN THERE WOULD ONLY BE THE POPULATION OF THE HAPPY AND JUST UNIVERSE, WHICH WOULD BE LESS GOOD THAN HAVING THE POPULATION OF THE HAPPY AND JUST UNIVERSE PLUS THE POPULATION OF ONE EXTRA UNIVERSE THAT IS AT LEAST SOMEWHAT HAPPY.”

“Hmmmmm. But couldn’t You have have made this universe like the happy and just universe except for one tiny detail? Like in that universe, the sun is a sphere, but in our universe, the sun is a cube? Then you would have individuals who experienced a spherical sun, and other individuals who experienced a cubic sun, which would be enough to differentiate them.”

“I DID THAT TOO. I HAVE CREATED ALL POSSIBLE PERMUTATIONS OF THE HAPPY AND JUST UNIVERSE AND ITS POPULACE.”

“All of them? That would be…a lot of universes.”

“NOT AS MANY AS YOU THINK.” said God. “IN THE END IT TURNED OUT TO BE ONLY ABOUT 10^(10^(10^(10^(10^984)))). AFTER THAT I RAN OUT OF POSSIBLE PERMUTATIONS OF UNIVERSES THAT COULD REASONABLY BE DESCRIBED AS PERFECTLY HAPPY AND JUST. SO I STARTED CREATING ONES INCLUDING SMALL AMOUNTS OF EVIL.”

“Small amounts! But the universe has…”

“I WAS NOT REFERRING TO YOUR UNIVERSE. I EXHAUSTED THOSE, AND THEN I STARTED CREATING ONES INCLUDING IMMENSE AMOUNTS OF EVIL.”

“Oh.” Then: “What, exa...
Meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Useful Skill sharing
by rocurley — 2015-03-15T08:30:33.938Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Useful Skill sharing

WHEN:
16 March 2015 06:15:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
1061 Market St #4, San Francisco, CA 94103

We'll be meeting to share the most useful skills people have learned, how they're useful, and how to acquire them.

If you need help getting in, call 301-458-0764. As always, feel free to show up late.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Francisco Meetup: Useful Skill sharing
How to pay for lives to be worth living
by KatjaGrace — 2015-03-14T20:00:00.000Z

Slate Star Codex writes about a patient (or patient amalgam) who was suicidal, apparently for want of a few thousand dollars:

…So what bothered me is that psychiatric hospitalization costs about $1,000 a day. Average length of stay for a guy like him might be three to five days. So we were spending $5,000 on his psychiatric hospitalization, which was USELESS, so that we could send him out and he could attempt suicide again…

…Problem is, you don’t have to be an economics PhD to realize that “give $5,000 to anyone who attempts suicide and says they need it” might create some bad incentives.

I have no good solution to this…

I’m curious about solutions to this. However I’m going to talk about a slightly different situation, where the person in question is driven by desperation to be in a drug experiment which will make the rest of their life of neutral value. The drug, Neutrazine, has no social value, and is being trialed for entirely morally neutral reasons.

So we want to be able to give people a few thousand dollars at times when their not taking Neutrazine is worth more than a few thousand dollars to us, and where a few thousand dollars would be enough to keep them away from Neutrazine, without causing them to get into such situations more readily, or to lie to you about whether they are really so badly off that they would take Neutrazine.

This sounds kind of hopeless: if you are willing to rescue people in a bad situations, and they know this ahead of time, surely some people will get into bad situations more and/or lie about it.

Lets start with just the problem of people taking more risks, knowing that you will save them. That is, suppose they will honestly report their values.

This actually seems like a case where moral hazard should be avoidable. The person in question has the option to make their life worth nothing using Neutrazine, from any initial level of value. This is worth a positive amount to them, in the cases where you are hoping to help them. But if you give them just the same positive amount in money, this also makes their life neutral and takes the Neutrazine option off the table (because it would do nothing). So it doesn’t change the expected value from their perspective at all, and thus doesn’t influence their decisions ahead of time. Yet it is much better from your perspective, because you valued t...
Chapter 84: Taboo Tradeoffs, Aftermath 2
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2015-03-14T19:00:59.813Z

When Hermione Granger woke, she found herself lying in a soft, comfortable bed of the Hogwarts infirmary, with a square of setting sunlight falling on her midriff, warm through the thin blanket. Memory said that there would be a screen-sheet above her, either drawn around her bed or open, and that the rest of Madam Pomfrey's domain would lie beyond: the other beds, occupied or unoccupied, and bright windows set in the curvily-carven stone of Hogwarts.

When Hermione opened her eyes, the first thing she saw was the face of Professor McGonagall, sitting on the left side of her bed. Professor Flitwick wasn't there, but that was understandable, he'd stayed by her side all morning in the detention cell, his silver raven standing extra guard against the Dementor and his stern little face always turned outward toward the Aurors. The Head of Ravenclaw had surely spent way too much time on her, and probably had to get back to teaching his classes, instead of keeping watch on a convicted attempted-murderess.

She felt horribly, horribly sick and she didn't think it was because of any potions. Hermione would've started crying again, only her throat hurt, her eyes still burned, and her mind just felt tired. She couldn't have borne to weep again, couldn't find the strength for tears.

"Where are my parents?" Hermione whispered to the Head of House Gryffindor. Somehow it seemed like the worst thing in the world to face them, even worse than everything else; and yet she still wanted to see them.

The gentle look on Professor McGonagall's face Transfigured into something sadder. "I'm sorry, Miss Granger. Though it was not always so, we have found in recent years that it is wiser not to tell the parents of Muggleborns about any danger their child has faced. I should advise you also to remain silent, if you wish to stay at Hogwarts without trouble from them."

"I'm not being expelled?" the girl whispered. "For what I did?"

"No," said Professor McGonagall. "Miss Granger... surely you heard... I hope you heard Mr. Potter, when he said that you were innocent?"

"He was just saying that," she said dully. "To get me free, I mean."

The older witch shook her head firmly. "No, Miss Granger. Mr. Potter believes you were Memory-Charmed, that the whole duel never happened. The Headmaster suspects even Darker magics may have been involved - that your own hand might have cast the spell, but not your ow

...
Chapter 119: Something to Protect: Albus Dumbledore
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2015-03-14T19:00:59.687Z

Harry stood now before the gargoyles that guarded the Headmaster's - no, the Headmistress's office. He had been summoned by Professor Sinistra, told that it was an emergency, but the gates were not opening for him.

Experiment had showed that the Stone made one Transfiguration permanent every three minutes and fifty-four seconds, irrespective of the size of object Transfigured. Just once, holding the Philosopher's Stone up to the light of Harry's most powerful flashlight in an otherwise darkened closet, Harry had thought he'd seen an array of tiny points inside the chunk of crimson glass; but Harry hadn't been able to see it again, and now suspected himself of having imagined it. The Stone had no other powers that Harry could detect, nor did it respond to any attempted mental commands.

Harry had given himself until noon tomorrow to figure out how to begin using the Stone without it being grabbed by someone else, trying not to think about what was still happening, what had always been happening, in the meanwhile.

Ten minutes late, Minerva McGonagall approached, moving in a swift stride. Her arms were full of papers, she was once again wearing the Sorting Hat.

The gargoyles, with a brief sound of grinding stone, bowed low before her.

"The new password is 'Impermanence'," Minerva said to the gargoyles, and they stepped aside. "I'm sorry, Mr. Potter, I was delayed -"

"Understood."

Minerva mounted the long spiral stairs, climbing instead of waiting to be carried, Harry following behind her.

"We are meeting with Amelia Bones, Director of the Department of Magical Law Enforcement; with Alastor Moody, whom you have met; and with Bartemius Crouch, Director of the Department of International Magical Cooperation," Minerva said as she climbed. "They are Dumbledore's heirs as much as you or I."

"How - how's Hermione doing?" Harry hadn't had a chance to ask until now.

"Filius said she seemed rather in shock, which I suppose is not surprising. She asked where you were, was told you were at a Quidditch game, asked where you really were, and refused to speak with anyone about what happened until she was allowed to talk with you. She was taken to St. Mungo's, where," the Headmistress now sounded slightly perturbed, "a standard diagnostic Charm showed Miss Granger as a healthy unicorn in excellent physical condition except that her mane needs combing. Charms to detect active magic have e

...
Chapter 32: Interlude: Personal Financial Management
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2015-03-14T19:00:59.231Z

"But Headmaster," Harry argued, some of his desperation leaking into his voice, "leaving all of my assets in one undiversified vault full of gold coins - it's crazy, Headmaster! It's like, I don't know, doing Transfiguration experiments without consulting a recognized authority! You just don't do that with money!"

From the lined face of the old wizard - underneath a festive holiday hat like a catastrophic automobile collision between cars of green and red cloth - a grave, sad look peered out at Harry.

"I'm sorry, Harry," said Dumbledore, "and I do apologize, but allowing you control over your own finances would give you far too much independence of action."

Harry's mouth opened and no sound came out. He was, literally, speechless.

"I will permit you to withdraw five Galleons for Christmas presents," said Dumbledore, "which is more than any boy your age should spend, but poses no threat, I think -"

"I can't believe you just said that!" the words burst out of Harry's mouth. "You admit to being that manipulative?"

"Manipulative?" said the old wizard, smiling slightly. "No, manipulative would be if I did not admit it, or if I had some deeper motive behind the obvious. This is quite straightforward, Harry. You are not yet ready to play the game, and it would be foolish to allow you thousands of Galleons with which to upset the gameboard."

The bright hustle and bustle of Diagon Alley had increased by a hundredfold and redoubled as Christmas approached, with all the shops enshrouded in brilliant sorceries that flashed and sparkled as though the season's spirit was about to blaze out of control and turn the whole area into a cheerful holiday crater. The streets were so crowded with witches and wizards in festive and loud clothing that your eyes were assaulted almost as severely as your ears; and it was clear, from the bewildering variety of the shoppers, that Diagon Alley was considered an international attraction. There were witches wrapped in giant swathes of cloth like toweled mummies, and wizards in formal top hats and bath-robes, and young children barely past toddling age who were decorated with lights that blazed almost as bright as the shops themselves, as their parents took them hand in hand through that magic wonderland and let them shriek to their heart's content. It was the season to be merry.

And in the midst of all that light and cheer, a note of blackest nigh

...
Chapter 46: Humanism, Pt 4
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2015-03-14T19:00:58.847Z

The last tip of the Sun was sinking below the horizon, the red light fading from the treetops, only the blue sky illuminating the six people standing upon the winter-dried and snow-spotted grass, near a vacant cage on whose floor lay an empty, tattered cloak.

Harry felt... well, normal again. Sane-ish. The spell hadn't undone the day and its damage, hadn't made the injuries as if they had never been, but his hurts had been... bandaged, meliorated? It was hard to describe.

Dumbledore was also looking healthier, though not fully restored. The old wizard's head turned for a moment, locked eyes with Professor Quirrell, then looked back to Harry. "Harry," Dumbledore said, "are you about to collapse in exhaustion and possibly die?"

"No, strangely enough," Harry said. "That took something out of me, but a lot less than I thought it would." Or maybe it gave something back, as well as taking... "Honestly, I expected my body to be hitting the ground with a thud about now."

There was a distinct body-hitting-the-ground-with-a-thuddish sort of sound.

"Thank you for taking care of that, Quirinus," said Dumbledore to Professor Quirrell, who was now standing above and behind the unconscious forms of the three Aurors. "I confess I am still feeling a bit peaky. Though I shall handle the Memory Charms myself."

Professor Quirrell inclined his head, and then looked at Harry. "I will omit a good deal of useless incredulity," said Professor Quirrell, "remarks to the effect that Merlin himself failed to do that, et cetera. Let us go straight to asking the important question. What the sweet slithering snakes was that?"

"The Patronus Charm," Harry said. "Version 2.0."

"I rejoice to see that you are your usual self again," said Dumbledore. "But you are not going anywhere, young Ravenclaw, until you tell me what exactly was that warm and happy thought."

"Hm..." said Harry. He tapped a contemplative finger on his cheek. "I wonder if I should?"

Professor Quirrell suddenly grinned.

"Please?" said the Headmaster. "Pretty please with sugar on top?"

Harry felt an impulse and decided to go with it. It was dangerous, but there might not ever be a better opportunity until the end of time.

"Three sodas," Harry said to his pouch, then looked up at the Defense Professor and the Headmaster of Hogwarts. "Gentlemen," Harry said, "I bought these sodas on my first visit to Platform Nine and Three-Quarters, on the d

...