trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Who thinks quantum computing will be necessary for AI?
by ChrisHallquist — 2013-05-28T22:59:57.039Z

While writing my article "Could Robots Take All Our Jobs?: A Philosophical Perspective" I came across a lot of people who claim (roughly) that human intelligence isn't Turing computable. At one point this led me to tweet something to the effect of, "where are the sophisticated AI critics who claim the problem of AI is NP-complete?" But that was just me being whimsical; I was mostly not-serious.

A couple times, though, I've heard people suggest something to the effect that maybe we will need quantum computing to do human-level AI, though so far I've never heard this from an academic, only interested amateurs (though ones with some real computing knowledge). Who else here has encountered this? Does anyone know of any academics who adopt this point of view? Answers to the latter question especially could be valuable for doing article version 2.0.

Edit: This very brief query may have given the impression that I'm more sympathetic to the "AI requires QC" idea than I actually am; see my response to gwern below.
Is there any way to avoid Post Narcissism? [with Video link]
by diegocaleiro — 2013-05-28T22:07:46.617Z

I tried to stop posting for a semester... that didn't work. If I have an idea, I just feel like putting it out somewhere in the world, and sometimes, that is Lesswrong.

Which is totally fine and doesn't worry me at all.

But......

There is another problem also related to time constraints and posting.

Here is the best TED Talker, Juan Enriquez, talking about Narcissus and other greeks at 4:30 of 6 minutes.

http://goo.gl/cMQk1

I'm a Post Narcissist. I don't know how frequent that is, and only one person at FHI told me they were an email Narcissus, but maybe there are others, and more importantly, maybe there is a solution. It may not be clear to you what post Narcissism is, if so, throw your arms up in the air, and scream "Victory!" because you just escaped a terrible thing...

Post Narcissism: An absolutely intense eagerness to read your own posts and comments after you wrote them, accompanied by a feeling of flow while doing so, even when you would do much better to just read someone else's post or do something else altogether. Sometimes, but now always, accompanied by a low anxiety that something may be wrong with your writing, and intermittent thoughts about whether it needs changes. Just to set an arbitrary definitional threshold, if you read it three times after posting, you definitely have it.

Don't care about actual mirrors. Don't care about making enemies while self-actualizing, don't care wearing beautiful or awful clothing or showing off whatever physical ability I may have to show off... Don't care about mentioning what makes me shy, or things I'm absolutely terrible at, but oh, the fuzzy feeling inside when reading a set of words that I know is open to public scrutiny. Gets my attention more than Orangutangs, South Park or family members, more than latest Google scholar new publications updates on Philosophy of Mind. More than the weather, an impending deadline or a self imposed rule.

I know that others must suffer from this condition as I do. And maybe there is a solution... If you don't know a solution, post suggestions, if you do know a solution that has worked, please post it.
Meetup : London - Inaugural Practical Session - June 9th
by sixes_and_sevens — 2013-05-28T13:40:50.431Z

Discussion article for the meetup : London - Inaugural Practical Session - June 9th

WHEN:
09 June 2013 02:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Shakespeare's Head, London WC2B 6BG

Up until now the London Less Wrong meetups have mostly just been social gatherings. Quite a few of us have expressed a desire to get more out of the group. As such, we'll be alternating the fortnightly meetups between a "social" emphasis and a "practical" emphasis.
As the first of our practical-oriented meetups, this session will be more structured than previous gatherings. Attendees are encouraged to think of specific examples of what they would like to work on in advance. This could be:

a specific goal they wish to achieve
("I would like to save 60% of my monthly income")

a specific habit or unreasonable psychological demand they would like to overcome
("I would like to be able to work for four-hour stretches without losing motivation or succumbing to akrasia")

a specific skill they would like to develop
("I would like to be able to competently present material to large groups of people")

any other specific thing they want which they currently don't have to their satisfaction

As this is our first practical, we're still experimenting with the format. In this meetup, discussion will be structured to identify common goals and desires among attendees, and to foster support and collaboration towards achieving them. We are also working on developing group social norms to provide more pleasant, productive and personally-inclusive discussion.

Please be there for 2pm if you can. We can accommodate later arrivals, but we will be starting promptly.

The venue is the Shakespeare's Head by Holborn tube station. Turn left out of the station exit and it's <100m on your left.
We also have a Google Group. Why not join it?

Discussion article for the meetup : London - Inaugural Practical Session - June 9th
Requesting advice: Doing Epistemology Right (Warning: Abstract mainstream Philosophy herein)
by Carinthium — 2013-05-28T13:03:51.269Z

Amongst other things I am currently a First Year Arts student at Melbourne University, doing Philosophy amongst my subjects. At the moment, I'm in several discussions with other students and my lecturers about various matters.

I have naturally read the material here, but am still not sure how to act on two questions.

1: I've been arguing out the question of Foundationalism v.s Coherentism v.s other similiarly basic methods of justifying knowledge (e.g. infinitism, pragmatism). The discussion left off with two problems for Foundationalism.

a: The Evil Demon argument, particularly the problem of memory. When following any piece of reason, an Evil Demon could theoretically fool my reason into thinking that it had reasoned correctly when it hadn't, or fool my memory into thinking I'd reasoned properly before with reasoning I'd never done. Since a Foundationalist either is a weak Foundationalist (and runs into severe problems) or must discard all but self-evident and incorrigible assumptions (of which memory is not one), I'm stuffed.

(Then again, it has been argued, if a Coherentist were decieved by an evil demon they could be decieved into thinking data coheres when it doesn't. Since their belief rests upon the assumption that their beliefs cohere, should they not discard if they can't know if it coheres or not? The seems to cohere formulation has it's own problem)

b: Even if that's discarded, there is still the problem of how Strong Foundationalist beliefs are justified within a Strong Foundationalist system. Strong Foundationalism is neither self-evident nor incorrigible, after all.

I know myself well enough to know I have an unusually strong (even for a non-rationalist) irrational emotive bias in favour of Foundationalism, and even I begin to suspect I've lost the argument (though some people arguing on my side would disagree). Just to confirm, though- have I lost? What should I do now, either way?

2: What to say on the question of skepticism (on which so far I've technically said nothing)? If I remember correctly Elizier has spoken of philosophy as how to act in the world, but I'm arguing with somebody who maintains as an axiom that the purpose of Philosophy is to find truth, whether useful or useless, in whatever area is under discussion.

3: Finally, how do I speak intelligently on the Contextualist v.s Invariantist problem? I

...
Meetup : Berkeley: The Motivation Hacker by Nick Winter
by Nisan — 2013-05-28T06:02:07.554Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Berkeley: The Motivation Hacker by Nick Winter

WHEN:
29 May 2013 07:30:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
Berkeley, CA

Dear all, this week Swimmer963 will give a presentation on Nick Winter's new book The Motivation Hacker:

http://www.nickwinter.net/the-motivation-hacker

Nick Winter is a community member, startup founder, and CFAR workshop alumnus. Thanks to Swimmer963 for giving this presentation!

Doors open at 7:30pm on Wednesday; the presentation will start at 8pm and take roughly half an hour. Stick around afterwards to chat. For directions to Zendo, see the mailing list:

http://groups.google.com/group/bayarealesswrong

or call me at:

http://i.imgur.com/Vcafy.png

Discussion article for the meetup : Berkeley: The Motivation Hacker by Nick Winter
Transhumanist Fables
by Scott Alexander — 2013-05-28T01:55:20.000Z

Once upon a time there were three little pigs who went out into the world to build their houses. The first pig was very lazy and built his house out of straw. The second pig was a little harder-working and built his house out of sticks. The third pig was the hardest-working of all, and built his house out of bricks. Then came the Big Bad Wolf. When he saw the house of straw, he huffed and he puffed and he blew the house down, eating the first little pig. When he saw the house of sticks, he huffed and he puffed and he blew the house down, eating the second little pig. When he saw the house of bricks, he got out a bazooka and blew the house to pieces, eating the third little pig.

Moral: Reality doesn’t grade on a curve.

Once upon a time there was a big strong troll who lived under a bridge. A little goat went across the bridge, and the troll reached out to grab and eat the goat. “Wait, Mr. Troll!”, the goat cried. “Soon my brother is coming, and he is even bigger than I am!” The troll let the goat pass, and soon came another goat, twice as big as the first. The troll reached out to grab and eat him, but the brother likewise objected, saying his brother was even bigger. Sure enough, a third goat arrived at the bridge, twice as big as the second, and the troll, now ready for a very hearty dinner, reached out to grab and eat him. “Wait!” said the third goat. “My brother is the biggest of us all!”. So the troll let the third goat pass. Then came the fourth goat, who was hundreds of miles tall and blotted out the sun, whose very steps caused earthquakes and made the rivers change course. Without even noticing, he stepped on bridge and troll, pulverizing both to bits.

Moral: Sometimes growth is superexponential.

Once upon a time, Chicken Little ran to her friend Henny Penny. “The sky is falling!” she shouted. “We must tell the king!” Henny Penny joined her, and together they headed toward the capital. On their way they run into their friend Goosey Loosey. “The sky is falling!” they shouted. “We must tell the king!” Goosey Loosey joined them, and together they headed toward the capital. On their way, they ran into the cunning Foxy Loxy. “The sky is falling!” they shouted. “We must tell the king!” “Oh,” said Foxy Loxy. “I know...
[LINK] Bets do not (necessarily) reveal beliefs
by Cyan — 2013-05-27T20:13:15.166Z

When does a bet fail to reveal your true beliefs? When it hedges a risk in your portfolio.

If this claim does not immediately strike you as obviously true, you may benefit from reading this post by econblogger Noah Smith. Excerpt:

...Alex Tabarrok famously declared that "a bet is a tax on bullshit".

But this idea, attractive as it is, is not quite true. The reason is something that I've decided to call the Fundamental Error of Risk. It's a mistake that most people make (myself often included!), and that an intro finance class spends months correcting. The mistake is looking at the risk and return of single assets instead of total portfolios. Basically, the risk of an asset - which includes a bet! - is based mainly on how that asset relates to other assets in your portfolio.
The Centre for Applied Rationality: a year later from a (somewhat) outside perspective 
by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg)  — 2013-05-27T18:31:41.379Z

I recently had the privilege of being a CFAR alumni volunteering at a later workshop, which is a fascinating thing to do, and put me in a position both to evaluate how much of a difference the first workshop actually made in my life, and to see how the workshops themselves have evolved.

Exactly a year ago, I attended one of the first workshops, back when they were still inexplicably called “minicamps”. I wasn't sure what to expect, and I especially wasn't sure why I had been accepted. But I bravely bullied the nursing faculty staff until they reluctantly let me switch a day of clinical around, and later stumbled off my plane into the San Francisco airport in a haze of exhaustion. The workshop spat me out three days later, twice as exhausted, with teetering piles of ideas and very little time or energy to apply them. I left with a list of annual goals, which I had never bothered to have before, and a feeling that more was possible–this included the feeling that more would have been possible if the workshop had been longer and less chaotic, if I had slept more the week before, if I hadn't had to rush out on Sunday evening to catch a plane and miss the social.

Like I frequently do on Less Wrong the website, I left the minicamp feeling a bit like an outsider, but also a bit like I had come home. As well as my written goals, I made an unwritten pre-commitment to come back to San Francisco later, for longer, and see whether I could make the "more is possible" in my head more specific. Of my thirteen written goals on my list, I fully accomplished only four and partially accomplished five, but I did make it back to San Francisco, at the opportunity cost of four weeks of sacrificed hospital shifts.

A week or so into my stay, while I shifted around between different rationalist shared houses and attempted to max out interesting-conversations-for-day, I found out that CFAR was holding another May workshop. I offered to volunteer, proved my sincerity by spending 6 hours printing and sticking nametags, and lived on site for another 4-day weekend of delightful information overload and limited sleep.

Before the May 2012 workshop, I had a low prior that any four-day workshop could be life-changing in a major way. A four-year nursing degree, okay–I've successfully retrained my social skills and my ability to react un...
Meetup : Melbourne, social meetup: 31 May 2013 07:00PM
by RyanCarey — 2013-05-27T11:10:23.014Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, social meetup: 31 May 2013 07:00PM

WHEN:
31 May 2013 09:09:16PM (+1000)

WHERE:
Malvern East

You probably all think we're about due for a practical rationality meetup,
but not quite - it's the fifth Friday of the month,
so come to my place instead!

Brayden will share stories from his San Francisco trip. Also, Chris will come, you can meet a couple of my non LW rationalist friends; we'll likely get Thai.
Good ways to get there by public transport are walking from Darling station (5mins) or getting a lift from Caulfield by calling me on 0413275523. The address is available via the Google Group.
As usual, those who commit to come are rewarded with an upvote.
You're welcome to come any time from 6.30

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, social meetup: 31 May 2013 07:00PM
A Proposed Adjustment to the Astronomical Waste Argument
by Nick_Beckstead — 2013-05-27T03:39:01.559Z

This article has been cross-posted at http://effective-altruism.com/.

An existential risk is a risk “that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development,” (Bostrom, 2013). Nick Bostrom has argued that

“[T]he loss in expected value resulting from an existential catastrophe is so enormous that the objective of reducing existential risks should be a dominant consideration whenever we act out of an impersonal concern for humankind as a whole. It may be useful to adopt the following rule of thumb for such impersonal moral action:

Maxipok: Maximize the probability of an “OK outcome,” where an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe.”

There are a number of people in the effective altruism community who accept this view and cite Bostrom’s argument as their primary justification. Many of these people also believe that the best ways of minimizing existential risk involve making plans to prevent specific existential catastrophes from occurring, and believe that the best giving opportunities must be with charities that primarily focus on reducing existential risk. They also appeal to Bostrom’s argument to support their views. (Edited to add: Note that Bostrom himself sees maxipok as neutral on the question of whether the best methods of reducing existential risk are very broad and general, or highly targeted and specific.) For one example of this, see Luke Muehlhauser’s comment:

“Many humans living today value both current and future people enough that if existential catastrophe is plausible this century, then upon reflection (e.g. after counteracting their unconscious, default scope insensitivity) they would conclude that reducing the risk of existential catastrophe is the most valuable thing they can do — whether through direct work or by donating to support direct work.”

I now think these views require some significant adjustments and qualifications, and given these adjustments and qualifications, their practical implications become very uncertain. I still believe that what matters most about what we do is how our actions affect humanity’s long-term future potential, and I still believe that targeted existential risk re...
Meetup : Atlanta LessWrong June Meetup: Effective Altruism
by Nova_Division — 2013-05-27T02:04:19.778Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Atlanta LessWrong June Meetup: Effective Altruism

WHEN:
15 June 2013 07:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
2388 Lawrenceville Hwy. Apt L. Decatur, GA 30033

Effective altruism - the application of rationality to helping other people and improving the world.

Introductions, and meet and greet for new members.

Mini-presentations. Anyone is invited to present on a topic of their choice related to this month’s theme.

Discussions. We’ll start with a large group discussion and break into smaller groups as needed.

Games!

(Please contact me if you have allergies to cats, as our meeting space has two of the most adorable cats you’ve ever seen.)

Discussion article for the meetup : Atlanta LessWrong June Meetup: Effective Altruism
Research is polygamous! The importance of what you do needn't be proportional to your awesomeness 
by diegocaleiro — 2013-05-26T22:29:39.239Z

In a recent discussion a friend was telling me how he felt he was not as smart as the people he thinks are doing the best research on the most important topics. He said a few jaw-dropping names, which indeed are smarter than him, and mentioned their research agenda, say, A B and C.

From that, a remarkable implication followed, in his cognitive algorithm:

Therefore I should research thing D or thing E.

Which made me pause for a moment. Here is a hypothetical schematic of this conception of the world. Arrows stand for "Ought to research"

Humans by Level of Awesome (HLA) Research Agenda by Level of Importance. (RALI)

HLA RALI

Mrs 1 --------> X-risk #1

2 --------> X-risk #2

3 --------> Longevity

4 --------> Malaria Reduction

5 --------> Enhancement

1344 --------> Increasing Puppies Cuteness

Etc...

It made me think of the problem of creating match making algorithms for websites where people want to pair to do stuff, such as playing tennis, chess or having a romantic relationship.

This reasoning is profoundly mistaken, and I can look back into my mind, and remember dozens of times I have made the exact same mistake. So I thought it would be good to spell out 10 times in different ways for the unconscious bots in my mind that didn't get it yet:

1) Research agenda topics are polygamous, they do not mind if there is someone else researching them, besides the very best people who could be doing such research.

2) The function above should not be one-to-one (biunivocal), but many-to-one.

3) There is no relation of overshadowing based on someone's awesomeness to everyone else who researches the same topic, unless they are researching the same narrow minimal sub-type of the same question coming from the same background.

4) Overdetermination doesn't happen at the "general topic level".

5) Awesome people do not obfuscate what less awesome people do in their area, they catapult it, by creating resources.

6) Being in an area where the most awesome people are is not asking to "lose the game" it is being in an environment that cultivates greatness.

7) The amount of awesomeness in a field does not supervene on the amount of awesomeness in it's best explorer.

8) The Best pers...
Meetup : Melbourne, practical rationality
by matt — 2013-05-26T19:07:11.861Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, practical rationality

WHEN:
07 June 2013 07:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
491 King Street, West Melbourne VIC 3003, Australia

NOTE: We've moved a stone's throw from our old office. Note the new address (which is unchanged from May, but changed from April).

Practical rationality. This meetup repeats on the 1st Friday of each month and is distinct from our social meetup on the 3rd Friday of each month.

Topic for June: Hypothetical Apostasies - bring a written down belief you think it likely that at least several other attendees will share but that just might be wrong
http://lesswrongmelbourne.uservoice.com/forums/203428-general/suggestions/3881488-small-groups-hypothetical-apostasies
(http://wiki.lesswrong.com/mediawiki/images/c/ca/How_to_Run_a_Successful_Less_Wrong_Meetup_Group.pdf p23)

Discussion: http://groups.google.com/group/melbourne-less-wrong

All welcome from 6:30pm. Call the phone number on the door and I'll let you in.

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, practical rationality
[LINK] Sign up for DAGGRE to improve science and technology forecasting
by Qiaochu_Yuan — 2013-05-26T00:08:55.793Z

Link:

In When Will AI Be Created?, I named four methods that might improve our forecasts of AI and other important technologies. Two of these methods were explicit quantification and leveraging aggregation, as exemplified by IARPA's ACE program, which aims to “dramatically enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of… forecasts for a broad range of event types, through the development of advanced techniques that elicit, weight, and combine the judgments of many analysts.

GMU's DAGGRE program, one of five teams participating in ACE, recently announced a transition from geopolitical forecasting to science & technology forecasting:

DAGGRE will continue, but it will transition from geo-political forecasting to science and technology (S&T) forecasting to better use its combinatorial capabilities. We will have a brand new shiny, friendly and informative interface co-designed by Inkling Markets, opportunities for you to provide your own forecasting questions and more!

Another exciting development is that our S&T forecasting prediction market will be open to everyone in the world who is at least eighteen years of age. We’re going global!

If you want help improve humanity’s ability to forecast important technological developments like AI, please register for DAGGRE’s new S&T prediction website here.

Experienced PredictionBook veterans should do well.