trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
New LW Meetup: Boise ID, Bay City MI
by FrankAdamek — 2016-07-08T15:25:06.825Z

This summary was posted to LW Main on July 8th. The following week's summary is here.

New meetups (or meetups with a hiatus of more than a year) are happening in:

Bay City Meetup: 19 August 2016 01:25PM
Boise, ID Meetup: 24 July 2016 02:30PM
Dallas Meetup: 09 July 2016 01:30PM

Irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups are taking place in:

Ann Arbor Area Amalgam of Rationalist-Adjacent Anthropoids: Assemblage at Adam's: 09 July 2016 07:00PM
Australian-ish Online Hangout July: 15 July 2016 07:30PM
Baltimore Weekly Meetup: 10 July 2016 08:00PM
European Community Weekend: 02 September 2016 03:35PM
San Antonio Meetup: 10 July 2016 02:00PM

The remaining meetups take place in cities with regular scheduling, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Austin, TX - Quack's: 09 July 2016 01:30PM
[Melbourne] Soldier Mindset and Scout Mindset : 09 July 2016 03:30PM
[Moscow] Role playing game based on HPMOR in Moscow: 16 July 2016 03:00PM
San Francisco Meetup: Cooking: 11 July 2016 06:15PM
San Jose Meetup: Park Day (V): 10 July 2016 03:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - August 2016: 07 August 2016 04:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - September 2016: 04 September 2016 04:00PM
Sydney Rationality Dojo - October 2016: 02 October 2016 04:00PM
Washington, D.C.: Webcomics: 10 July 2016 03:30PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berlin, Boston, Brussels, Buffalo, Canberra, Columbus, Denver, Kraków, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Moscow, New Hampshire, New York, Philadelphia, Research Triangle NC, San Francisco Bay Area, Seattle, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Toronto, Vienna, Washington DC, and West Los Angeles. There's also a 24/7 online study hall for coworking LWers and a Slack channel for daily discussion and online meetups on Sunday night US time.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview is posted on the front page every Friday. These are an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in upcoming weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the...
Meetup : Washington, D.C.: Webcomics
by RobinZ — 2016-07-08T03:25:17.297Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Webcomics

WHEN:
10 July 2016 03:30:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Donald W. Reynolds Center for American Art and Portraiture

We will be meeting in the courtyard to talk about webcomics - be that specific webcomics, webcomics as a medium, or webcomics as a cultural phenomenon.

As usual, side conversations are allowed and encouraged.

Upcoming meetups:

Jul. 17: Reading Book Excerpts

Jul. 24: Fun & Games

Jul. 31: Visiting Museums

Discussion article for the meetup : Washington, D.C.: Webcomics
On liking things about crushes
by KatjaGrace — 2016-07-07T12:00:38.000Z

Sometimes I have had crushes on people, and then all kinds of miscellaneous characteristics they had seemed good. Not just their face or their sense of style or the exact way they pronounce my name. But also things that would usually be considered unattractive. For instance, if they are balding, I might suddenly find myself excited by sparse head stubble, when I had previously liked luxuriant hair. And then subsequently I would be more attracted to every other balding guy I met.

I think this is not just directly because the person having those characteristics makes the characteristics by association the most excellent characteristics a person could have. Though that is maybe part of it (your face reminds me of…you!)

I think it is also because I implicitly infer that the person in question likes those characteristics, and I expect people to like me more if I like the things they like. For instance, if they are grumpy and have crumpled clothes, I think I implicitly infer that they like people being grumpy and wearing crumpled clothes, and that if I favor those things too, it will help us be friends. And I can appreciate a pretty wide range of things, so I implicitly give attention to the ones that are helpful.

So I suppose that I must implicitly believe everyone likes almost all of their characteristics. Explicitly, I think this is unlikely to be true. Though I do expect people relate more to people who share their characteristics, whether or not they like the characteristics. So maybe that is what I’m implicitly going for.

All this leads me to think that that my brain is probably doing a milder version of the thing it does with crushes with respect to other people who I like in less extreme ways all the time. “Ooh—I guess you like being mildly irritated! I can do that too! Grr. Do you like me?” It is just only so strong as to be introspectively perceptible in the case of crushes. Which I guess matches the observation that people copy each other a lot.

I have long had the abstract impression that I should choose who I spend much time with carefully because company makes an alarmingly large difference to one’s own behavior. But the way that my brain updates on crushes makes that concern feel more viscerally real to me. Happily (not coincidentally) current company seems pretty good. Though unusual, so probably I don’t give things l...
Hiding misinformation in meanings
by KatjaGrace — 2016-07-07T06:59:26.000Z

I

It is hard to spread misinformation, because information spreads too, and they eventually run into each other and explode.

If a person wants to lie then, they can be better off to make words correspond to different things for different people, so that even when people hear the information it sounds the same as the misinformation.

For instance, suppose you buy tea in Alphaland and sell it in Betaland. As a dishonest businessperson, you would like it if the people in Alphaland believed tea was cheaper that people in Betaland believed it was. However if there are two different verbal sentences kicking around about the price of tea, they will eventually run into each other, because sentences can spread fast.

A different solution is to corner the market for tea weighing devices in at least one nation. Then make them all give slightly biased readouts. Now tea costs the same amount per pound in the two places, but you just sell more pounds than you buy. The information and the misinformation both sound like “tea costs $10/lb”. Tea measuring devices cross the sea slower than words, so this might be more sustainable.

Relatedly, if you wanted to not have your children informed about Santa Claus, you might just call him something else—e.g. Joulupukki—in your home. If you want, you can tell them there is a probable faker called Santa Clause and it is a matter of controversy whether he is the real deal like Joulupukki. Because words refer to unusual things, the information—‘Santa Clause isn’t real’—sounds just like your misinformation.

This can really only work if people are sufficiently isolated that the differences in meanings don’t become obvious, but that sometimes happens.

II

I’m not much in favor of misinformation. But one time I was young and desperate and I did something like this.

From when I was a young teenager I was substantially in charge of raising my three younger brothers, and (because I was not a good necromancer) I had to keep the violence within certain limits.

First (I think) I tried to be nice. I sat down and talked to them about what had happened, and if someone had clearly been vicious, I sent him to his room or something. But it seemed that only punishing people who are clearly guilty leads to not-very-conscionable levels of violence to innocent children.

I pondered justice and mercy. I construed the situation game theoretically. I experimented with differ...
Meetup : Baltimore Weekly Meetup
by iarwain1 — 2016-07-06T17:29:51.672Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Baltimore Weekly Meetup

WHEN:
10 July 2016 08:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
1726 reisterstown road pikesville maryland 21208

Pikesville DoubleTree - Hilton, at the restaurant / bar or at one of the tables outside.

Discussion article for the meetup : Baltimore Weekly Meetup
Meetup : Soldier Mindset and Scout Mindset 
by Chriswaterguy — 2016-07-06T14:03:11.084Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Soldier Mindset and Scout Mindset

WHEN:
09 July 2016 03:30:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
247 Flinders Lane, Melbourne

[3:30pm to socialise, 4pm to start.]

In our July Dojo we look at Soldier Mindset and Scout Mindset – being a partisan advocate for your side versus genuinely seeking for understanding. This includes watching a TED talk by Julia Galef (www.youtube.com/watch?v=cD5WxbIKMXw), some brief reading material and lively discussion groups.

We'll finish with some strategic self-improvement (with some options, none of which involve walking across hot coals or being forced to cry).

At about 6:30pm some of us will probably have dinner in the CBD, and you are welcome to join us.

WHERE: Ross House, 247 Flinders Lane. Level 4, Room 4.1, Hayden Raysmith Room. (Just this month we're in a different room.)

If you have any trouble finding the venue or getting in, text or call Chris on 0439 471 632. For the greatest convenience and most prompt service, please arrive before 4 pm - that also gives us more chance to catch up before things start.

WHAT'S THIS ABOUT?: The Less Wrong Melbourne Rationality Dojos are self-improvement sessions for those committed to the art of rationality and personal growth. We welcome new members who are interested in exploring rationality. We're all "aspiring rationalists".

Dojos are usually held on the first Saturday of each month, so you may wish to add that as a recurring event in your calendar.

Discussion article for the meetup : Soldier Mindset and Scout Mindset
Meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - October 2016
by luminosity — 2016-07-06T11:26:18.781Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - October 2016

WHEN:
02 October 2016 04:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
10 Shepherd Street, Chippendale

From 4 - 6 we'll be holding our normal rationality dojo at Humanist house. Afterwards there'll be an informal dinner gathering for those who want to join.

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - October 2016
Meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - September 2016
by luminosity — 2016-07-06T11:25:24.065Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - September 2016

WHEN:
04 September 2016 04:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
10 Shepherd Street, Chippendale

From 4 - 6 we'll be holding our normal rationality dojo at Humanist house. Afterwards there'll be an informal dinner gathering for those who want to join.

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - September 2016
Meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - August 2016
by luminosity — 2016-07-06T11:24:53.159Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - August 2016

WHEN:
07 August 2016 04:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
10 Shepherd Street, Chippendale

From 4 - 6 we'll be holding our normal rationality dojo at Humanist house. Afterwards there'll be an informal dinner gathering for those who want to join.

Discussion article for the meetup : Sydney Rationality Dojo - August 2016
Abstract model of human bias
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2016-07-06T11:08:26.000Z

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

Any suggestions for refining this model are welcome!

Somewhat inspired by the previous post, this is a model of human bias that can be used to test theories that want to compute the "true" human preferences. The basic idea is to formalise the question:

If the AI can make the human give any answer to any question, can it figure out what humans really want?

The AI's influence

The AI has access to an algorithm H, representing the human. It can either interact with H or simulate the interaction correctly.

The interaction consists of describing the outcome of choice A versus choice B, and then asking the human which option is better. The set of possible binary choices is C (thus (A,B)∈C). The set of descriptions is D; the set of possible descriptions for (A,B) is DA,B.

Then we have the assumption that humans can be manipulated:

Given any description D1∈DA,B for which H(D1) prefers A to B, there exists a description D2∈DA,B, logically equivalent to D1, such that H(D2) prefers B to A, and vice-versa.

Note that D1 could be a paragraph while D2 could be a ten-volume encyclopedia; all that's required is that they be logically equivalent.

But manipulating human answers in the immediate sense is not the only way the AI can influence them. Our values can change through interactions, reflection, and even through being given true and honest information, and the AI can influence this:

There is a wide class of algorithms H, such that for all H′∈H, there exists a sequence D1,D2,…Dn of descriptions the AI can give to H that will transform H into H′.

The grounding assumptions

So far, we've just made the task hopeless: the AI can get any answer from H, and can make H into whatever algorithm it feels like. Saying H has preferences is meaningless.

However, we're building from a human world where the potential for human manipulating humans is limited, and somewhat recognisable. Thus:

There exists a subset C′⊂C (called standard choices) such that, for all (A,B)∈C′, there exists a subset D′A,B⊂DA,B (called standard descriptions) such that D′A,B is tagged as fair and highly reflective of the true values of H.

Basically these are examples of interactions that are agreed to be fair, honest, and informative. The more abstract the choices, the harder it is to be sure of this.

Of course, we'd also allow the AI to learn from examples of nega

...
Shame as low verbal justification alarm
by KatjaGrace — 2016-07-06T06:36:23.000Z

What do you think feeling shame means?

You are scared that you might be ostracized from the group

But I feel shame about things that other people don’t even care about.

You are scared that you should be ostracized from the group.

That seems unrelated to the social realities. Why would evolution bother to equip me with a feeling for that?

Because you need to be able to justify yourself verbally. It is important that you think you should not be ostracized, so you can argue for it. Even if nobody shares your standards, if other people try to ostracize you for some stupid reason and you—for other reasons—believe that you really should be ostracized, then you are in trouble. You want to believe wholeheartedly that you are worthy of alliance. So if you don’t, an alarm bell goes off until you manage to justify yourself or sufficiently distance yourself from the activity that you couldn’t justify.

(From a discussion with John Salvatier)
[LINK] Concrete problems in AI safety
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2016-07-05T21:33:08.341Z

From the Google Research blog:

We believe that AI technologies are likely to be overwhelmingly useful and beneficial for humanity. But part of being a responsible steward of any new technology is thinking through potential challenges and how best to address any associated risks. So today we’re publishing a technical paper, Concrete Problems in AI Safety, a collaboration among scientists at Google, OpenAI, Stanford and Berkeley.

While possible AI safety risks have received a lot of public attention, most previous discussion has been very hypothetical and speculative. We believe it’s essential to ground concerns in real machine learning research, and to start developing practical approaches for engineering AI systems that operate safely and reliably.

We’ve outlined five problems we think will be very important as we apply AI in more general circumstances. These are all forward thinking, long-term research questions -- minor issues today, but important to address for future systems:

Avoiding Negative Side Effects: How can we ensure that an AI system will not disturb its environment in negative ways while pursuing its goals, e.g. a cleaning robot knocking over a vase because it can clean faster by doing so?

Avoiding Reward Hacking: How can we avoid gaming of the reward function? For example, we don’t want this cleaning robot simply covering over messes with materials it can’t see through.

Scalable Oversight: How can we efficiently ensure that a given AI system respects aspects of the objective that are too expensive to be frequently evaluated during training? For example, if an AI system gets human feedback as it performs a task, it needs to use that feedback efficiently because asking too often would be annoying.

Safe Exploration: How do we ensure that an AI system doesn’t make exploratory moves with very negative repercussions? For example, maybe a cleaning robot should experiment with mopping strategies, but clearly it shouldn’t try putting a wet mop in an electrical outlet.

Robustness to Distributional Shift: How do we ensure that an AI system recognizes, and behaves robustly, when it’s in an environment very different from its training environment? For example, heuristics learned for a factory workfloor may not be safe enough for an office.

We go into more technical detail in the paper. The machine learning res...
Meetup : Boise, ID Meetup
by  — 2016-07-05T20:41:24.729Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Boise, ID Meetup

WHEN:
24 July 2016 02:30:00PM (-0600)

WHERE:
Blue Cow Frozen Yogurt 2333 S Apple St, Boise, ID 83706

Idaho exists! This is the first Boise meetup I can find evidence of.

Topic: Introductions, getting to know each other. What brought you here?

Discussion article for the meetup : Boise, ID Meetup
Meetup : San Antonio Meetup
by Bryan-san — 2016-07-05T20:19:00.646Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Antonio Meetup

WHEN:
10 July 2016 02:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
12651 Vance Jackson Rd #118, San Antonio, TX 78230

Meetup to discuss rationality and all things LessWrong at Yumi Berry.

Topic of the Week: graceful failure modes

Look for the sign that says "LW"

Discussion article for the meetup : San Antonio Meetup
Meetup : Bay City Meetup
by Bound_up — 2016-07-05T17:25:45.407Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Bay City Meetup

WHEN:
19 August 2016 01:25:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
2010 5th St, Bay City, MI

Potential Bay City Meetup

Comment below if you're interested

Discussion article for the meetup : Bay City Meetup
Notes on Imagination and Suffering
by SquirrelInHell — 2016-07-05T14:28:46.939Z

Time: 22:56:47

I

This is going to be an exercise in speed writing a LW post.

Not writing posts at all seems to be worse than writing poorly edited posts.

It is currently hard for me to do anything that even resembles actual speed writing: even as I type this sentence, I have a very hard to resist urge to check it for grammar mistakes and make small corrections/improvements before I've even finished typing.

But to reduce the burden of writing, I predict it is going to be highly useful to develop the ability of actually writing a post as fast as I can type, without going back.

If this proves to have acceptable results, you can expect more regular posts from me in the future.

And possibly, if I develop the habit of writing regularly, I'll finally get to describing some of the topics on which I have (what I believe are) original and sizable clusters of knowledge, which is not easily available somewhere else.

But for now, just some thoughts on a very particular aspect of modelling how human brains think about a very particular thing.

This thing is immense suffering.

Time: 23:03:18

(Still slow!)

II

You might have heard this or similar from someone, possibly more than once in your life:

"you have no idea how I feel!"

or

"you can't even imagine how I feel!"

For me, this kind of phrase has always had the ring of a challenge. I have a potent imagination, and non-negligible experience in the affairs of humans. Therefore, I am certainly able to imagine how you feel, am I not?

Not so fast.

(Note added later: as Gram_Stone mentions, these kinds of statements tend to be used in epistemically unsound arguments, and as such can be presumed to be suspicious; however here, I am more concerned with the fact of the matter of how imagination works.)

Let's back up a little bit and recount some simple observations about imagining numbers.

You might be able to imagine and hold the image of five, six, nine, or even sixteen apples in your mind.

If I tell you to imagine something more complex, like pointed arrows arranged in a circle, you might be able to imagine four, or six, or maybe even eight of them.

If your brain is constructed differently from mine, you might easily go higher with the numbers.

But at some fairly small number, your mental machinery simply no longer has the capacity to imagine more shapes.

III

However, if I tell you that "you can't even imagine 35 apples!" it is obviously not an insult or...
Reputation bets
by KatjaGrace — 2016-07-05T05:25:29.000Z

People don’t often put their money where their mouth is, but they do put their reputation where their mouth is all the time. If I say ‘The Strategy of Conflict is pretty good’ I am betting some reputation on you liking it if you look at it. If you do like it, you will think better of me, and if you don’t, you will think worse. Even if I just say ‘it’s raining’, I’m staking my reputation on this. If it isn’t raining, you will think there is something wrong with me. If it is raining, you will decrease your estimate of how many things are wrong with me the teensiest bit.

If we have reputation bets all the time, why would it be so great to have more money bets?

Because reputation bets are on a limited class of propositions. They are all of the form ’doing X will make me look good’. This is pretty close to betting that an observer will endorse X. Such bets are most useful for statements that are naturally about what the observer will endorse. For instance (a) ’you would enjoy this blog’ is pretty close to (b) ‘you will endorse the claim that you would enjoy this blog’. It isn’t quite the same – for instance, if the listener refuses to look at the blog, but judges by its title that it is a silly blog, then (a) might be true while (b) is false. But still, if I want to bet on (a), betting on (b) is a decent proxy.

Reputation bets are also fairly useful for statements where the observer will mostly endorse true statements, such as ‘there is ice cream in the freezer’. Reputation bets are much less useful (for judging truth) where the observer is as likely to be biased and ignorant as the person making the statement. For instance, ‘removing height restrictions on buildings would increase average quality of life in our city’. People still do make reputation bets in these cases, but they are betting on their judgment of the other person’s views.

If the set of things where people mostly endorse true answers is roughly the set where it is pretty clear what the true answer is, then reputation bets do not buy much in the quest for truth. This seems not quite right though. One thing reputation bets do buy is prompting investment in finding out the answer, if it is somewhat expensive but worth finding out if it is a certain way. For instance, if it looks like all the restaurants are closed today so you want to turn around and go home, and I say ‘no, I promise the ...
Meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (V)
by steven0461 — 2016-07-04T18:38:01.992Z

Discussion article for the meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (V)

WHEN:
10 July 2016 03:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
438 Coleman Ave, San Jose, CA 95110

You're invited to bring whatever you'd like to see at Park Day - balls, frisbees, food, etc. (Also, consider taking measures against the sun.) We'll carry a green blanket so you can recognize us. The idea is to gather outside near the listed address at the park entrance first, but probably walk elsewhere soon. If you can't find us or there's something else, please call me (Steven) at 510-6844565.

Discussion article for the meetup : San Jose Meetup: Park Day (V)