trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Our Phyg Is Not Exclusive Enough
by  — 2012-04-14T21:08:24.464Z

EDIT: Thanks to people not wanting certain words google-associated with LW: Phyg

Lesswrong has the best signal/noise ratio I know of. This is great. This is why I come here. It's nice to talk about interesting rationality-related topics without people going off the rails about politics/fail philosophy/fail ethics/definitions/etc. This seems to be possible because a good number of us have read the lesswrong material (sequences, etc) which innoculate us against that kind of noise.

Of course Lesswrong is not perfect; there is still noise. Interestingly, most of it is from people who have not read some sequence and thereby make the default mistakes or don't address the community's best understanding of the topic. We are pretty good about downvoting and/or correcting posts that fail at the core sequences, which is good. However, there are other sequences, too, many of them critically important to not failing at metaethics/thinking about AI/etc.

I'm sure you can think of some examples of what I mean. People saying things that you thought were utterly dissolved in some post or sequence, but they don't address that, and no one really calls them out. I could dig up a bunch of quotes but I don't want to single anyone out or make this about any particular point, so I'm leaving it up to your imagination/memory.

It's actually kindof frustrating seeing people make these mistakes. You could say that if I think someone needs to be told about the existence of some sequence they should have read before posting, I ought to tell them, but that's actually not what I want to do with my time here. I want to spend my time reading and participating in informed discussion. A lot of us do end up engaging mistaken posts, but that lowers the quality of discussion here because so much time and space has been spent battling ignorance instead of advancing knowledge and dicussing real problems.

It's worse than just "oh here's some more junk I have to ignore or downvote", because the path of least resistance ends up being "ignore any discussion that contains contradictions of the lesswrong scriptures", which is obviously bad. There are people who have read the sequences and know the state of the arguments and still have some intelligent critique, but it's quite hard to tell the difference between that and someone explaining for the millionth time the problem with "but won't the AI know what'...
Are Magical Categories Relatively Simple?
by jacobt — 2012-04-14T20:59:18.027Z

In Magical Categories, Eliezer criticizes using machine learning to learn the concept of "smile" from examples. "Smile" sounds simple to humans but is actually a very complex concept. It only seems simple to us because we find it useful.

If we saw pictures of smiling people on the left and other things on the right, we would realize that smiling people go to the left and categorize new things accordingly. A supervised machine learning algorithm, on the other hand, will likely learn something other than what we think of as "smile" (such as "containing things that pass the smiley face recognizer") and categorize molecular smiley faces as smiles.

This is because simplicity is subjective: a human will consider "happy" and "person" to be basic concepts, so the intended definition of smile as "expression of a happy person" is simple. A computational Occam's Razor will consider this correct definition to be a more complex concept than "containing things that pass the smiley face recognizer". I'll use the phrase "magical category" to refer to concepts that have a high Kolmogorov complexity but that people find simple.

I hope that it's possible to create conditions under which the computer will have an inductive bias towards magical categories, as humans do. I think that people find these concepts simple because they're useful to explain things that humans want to explain (such as interactions with people or media depicting people). The video has pixels arranged in this pattern because it depicts a person who is happy because he is eating chocolate.

So, maybe it's possible to learn these magical categories from a lot of data, by compressing the categorizer along with the data. Here's a sketch of a procedure for doing this:

Amass a large collection of data from various societies, containing photographs, text, historical records, etc.

Come up with many categories (say, one for each noun in a long list). For each category, decide which pieces of data fit the category.

Find categorizer_1, categorizer_2, ..., categorizer_n to minimize K(dataset + categorizer_1 + categorizer_2 + ... + categorizer_n)

What do these mean:

K(x) is the Kolmogorov complexity of x; that is, the length of the shortest (program,input) pair that, when run, produces x. This is uncomputable so it has to be approximated (such as through resource-bounded data compression).

+ denotes strin

...
Decision Theories: A Semi-Formal Analysis, Part III
by orthonormal — 2012-04-14T19:34:38.716Z

Or: Formalizing Timeless Decision Theory

Previously:

0. Decision Theories: A Less Wrong Primer
1. The Problem with Naive Decision Theory
2. Causal Decision Theory and Substitution

WARNING: The main result of this post, as it's written here, is flawed. I at first thought it was a fatal flaw, but later found a fix. I'm going to try and repair this post, either by including the tricky bits, or by handwaving and pointing you to the actual proofs if you're curious. Carry on!

Summary of Post: Have you ever wanted to know how (and whether) Timeless Decision Theory works? Using the framework from the last two posts, this post shows you explicitly how TDT can be implemented in the context of our tournament, what it does, how it strictly beats CDT on fair problems, and a bit about why this is a Big Deal. But you're seriously going to want to read the previous posts in the sequence before this one.

We've reached the frontier of decision theories, and we're ready at last to write algorithms that achieve mutual cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma (without risk of being defected on, and without giving up the ability to defect against players who always cooperate)! After two substantial preparatory posts, it feels like it's been a long time, hasn't it?

But look at me, here, talking when there's Science to do...

Once again, we're programming an agent X to face another agent Y in a game G, where X and Y have access to each others' source codes and the source code of G. (In this post, we'll sweep the "player 1, player 2" bit back into the definition of G for simplicity in our code.) We may assume that at least one of the xi is a Nash equilibrium, since X and Y can treat a mixed equilibrium like an extra option and define its expected payoffs as usual.

Not Quite Timeless Decision Theory

Here's our first shot at TDT, based on the idea of substituting different things for the source code of X in our prediction of Y...

def X(code G, code Y):

For each xi:

Write a very simple agent Ai that always outputs xi in game G.

Try to deduce output Y(code G, code Ai).

If this succeeds, calculate U(xi, output Y(code G, code Ai)); call this ui.

If ui has been deduced for all xi, return the xi for which ui is largest.

Otherwise, return the default Nash equilibrium.

To see what this algorithm does, let's try it on Newcomb's Problem as we formalized it last time; we'll let A1 denote the agent that alw...
Meetup : Fort Lauderdale
by gabraham — 2012-04-14T19:07:27.409Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Lauderdale

WHEN:
21 April 2012 06:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Starbucks (2026 North Flamingo Road, Pembroke Pines, FL 33027)

As usual, during this meeting we will be bringing articles of interest to discuss. We are very informal and all newcomers are encouraged to join in, even if they can't stay the whole time. We will usually have gone out for food as a group around 8pm, but typically reconvene afterward unofficially for a while longer. For more information, contact Lance Bush at cfibroward@gmail.com.

Additional specific articles and topics may be brought in by Lance to help seed discussion. Details will be published soon.

Location info and directions are here: http://g.co/maps/5ktrv

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Lauderdale
Meetup : Fort Lauderdale
by FrankAdamek — 2012-04-14T17:12:38.412Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Lauderdale

WHEN:
14 April 2012 06:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
Starbucks (2026 North Flamingo Road, Pembroke Pines, FL 33027)

As usual, during this meeting we will be bringing articles of interest to discuss. We are very informal and all newcomers are encouraged to join in, even if they can't stay the whole time. We will usually have gone out for food as a group around 8pm, but typically reconvene afterward unofficially for a while longer. For more information, contact Lance Bush at cfibroward@gmail.com.

Location info and directions are here: http://g.co/maps/5ktrv

Discussion article for the meetup : Fort Lauderdale
[SEQ RERUN] The So-Called Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
by MinibearRex — 2012-04-14T05:38:16.340Z

Today's post, The So-Called Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle was originally published on 23 April 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Unlike classical physics, in quantum physics it is not possible to separate out a particle's "position" from its "momentum". The evolution of the amplitude distribution over time, involves things like taking the second derivative in space and multiplying by i to get the first derivative in time. The end result of this time evolution rule is that blobs of particle-presence appear to race around in physical space. The notion of "an exact particular momentum" or "an exact particular position" is not something that can physically happen, it is a tool for analyzing amplitude distributions by taking them apart into a sum of simpler waves. This uses the assumption and fact of linearity: the evolution of the whole wavefunction seems to always be the additive sum of the evolution of its pieces. Using this tool, we can see that if you take apart the same distribution into a sum of positions and a sum of momenta, they cannot both be sharply concentrated at the same time. When you "observe" a particle's position, that is, decohere its positional distribution by making it interact with a sensor, you take its wave packet apart into two pieces; then the two pieces evolve differently. The Heisenberg Principle definitely does not say that knowing about the particle, or consciously seeing it, will make the universe behave differently.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Decoherence, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Pittsburgh - Presentation on Anthropics
by thejash — 2012-04-13T23:16:05.609Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Pittsburgh - Presentation on Anthropics

WHEN:
20 April 2012 06:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
151 N Craig St, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. Apt #7C.

Katja Grace will be giving a presentation on anthropics, a topic on
which she is quite a bit more knowledgeable than me. Afterwards,
we'll go get some dinner.

Also--this will be my last LW meeting in Pittsburgh because I'm moving
to Mountain View, so you'd better all come and say goodbye, or at
least hello if you still haven't come to one of these yet :)

See you all soon!

PS: the door code is *0511, or call 585 506 6900 when you arrive.

Discussion article for the meetup : Pittsburgh - Presentation on Anthropics
Center for Modern Rationality currently hiring: Executive assistants, Teachers, Research assistants, Consultants.
by AnnaSalamon — 2012-04-13T20:28:06.071Z

Hi there,

We are still looking for:

A second executive assistant -- preferably someone who lives in the SF bay area or is willing to relocate here, but remote work will also be considered. Apply here.

Teachers / curriculum designers. This *does* need to be someone who can relocate to the SF bay area, and who has the legal ability to work in the US. Apply here. Especially apply if:

Rationality, or similar changes in your skill set, have made a big difference in your life;

You enjoy teaching, and helping others change their lives; you have strong interpersonal skills;

You have exceptional analytic skills, and want to help us figure out what sort of "rationality" and "rationality training" can actually work -- by being skeptical, trying things out, measuring outcomes, etc.

Distant curriculum designers: as above, except that you don't need the interpersonal/teaching skills, and do need to be extra-exceptional in other respects. Apply here.

Programmers -- folks who can whip up simple prototype web apps quickly, to help with rationality training. Apply here.

Consultants -- folks who have relevant experience, and can spend a few hours offering suggestions for how to structure our workshops, or for how to structure rationality group more generally (after watching us teach, or by giving advice over the phone). If you've run successful workshops for adults before, of any sort (e.g., on italian cooking), consider applying to help us organize our program. Apply here.

If you live in the SF bay area, you are also very welcome to come on a Satuday and help us test out draft lessons (by being a participant as we present them): email stephenpcole at gmail dot com to be added to that email list.

Do err on the side of applying; hope to hear from you soon!

(These application forms take the place of the previous ones; but if you've applied with the previous one, you're still golden, I'm just a bit behind on processing the applications.)
Weekly LW Meetups: Atlanta, Austin, Madison, Melbourne, Salt Lake City, Vancouver
by FrankAdamek — 2012-04-13T16:45:34.277Z

There are upcoming irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups in:

Salt Lake City Meetup: 07 April 2012 12:00PM
Atlanta: 07 April 2012 06:30PM
Vancouver Board Games Meetup: 08 April 2012 01:00PM
Brussels meetup: 14 April 2012 11:00AM
First Dorset UK Meetup: 14 April 2012 03:00PM
Shanghai Less Wrong Meetup: 15 April 2012 10:36PM
Twin Cities, MN (for real this time): 15 April 2012 01:00PM
Sydney meetup - Biased pandemic and other games: 17 April 2012 07:30PM
Rome LessWrong Meetup: 21 April 2012 07:00PM
Graz LessWrong Meetup: 22 April 2012 12:00AM

The following meetups take place in cities with regularly scheduled meetups, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Melbourne, practical rationality: 06 April 2012 08:00PM
Austin, TX: 07 April 2012 01:30PM
Monday Madison Meetup: 09 April 2012 06:30PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge UK, London, Madison WI, Melbourne, Mountain View, New York, Ohio, Ottawa, Oxford, Portland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Toronto, Waterloo, and West Los Angeles.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview will continue to be posted on the front page every Friday. These will be an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in the next weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll now also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts will be moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feature, you need to post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!

If you check Less Wrong irregularly, consider subscribing to one or more city-specific mailing list in order to be notified when an irregular meetup is happening: Atlanta, Chicago, Helsinki, London, Marin CA, Pittsburgh, Southern California (Los Angeles/Orange County area), St. Louis, Vancouver, Washington, DC.

If your meetup has a mailing list that you'd like ment...
Intelligence risk and distance to endgame
by Kyre — 2012-04-13T09:16:05.486Z

There are at least three objections to the risk of an unfriendly AI. One is that uFAI will be stupid - it is not possible to build a machine that is much smarter than humanity. Another is that AI would be powerful but uFAI is unlikely - the chances of someone building something that turn out malign, either deliberately or accidentally, is small. Another one that I haven't seen articulated, is the AI could be malign and potentially powerful, but effectively impotent due to its situation.

To use a chess analogy: I'm virtually certain that Deep Blue will beat me at a game of chess. I'm also pretty sure that a better chess program with vastly more computer power would beat Deep Blue. But, I'm also (almost) certain that I would beat them both at a rook and king vs king endgame.

If we try to separate out the axes of intelligence and starting position, where does your intuition tell you the danger area is ? To illustrate, what is the probability that humanity is screwed in each of the following ?

1) A lone human paperclip cultist resolves to convert the universe (but doesn't use AI).

2) One quarter of the world has converted to paperclip cultism and war ensues. No-one has AI.

3) A lone paperclip cultist sets the goal of a seed AI and uploads it to a botnet.

4) As for 2) but the cultists have a superintelligent AI to advise them.
Why I Moved from AI to Neuroscience, or: Uploading Worms
by davidad — 2012-04-13T07:10:32.377Z

This post is shameless self-promotion, but I'm told that's probably okay in the Discussion section. For context, as some of you are aware, I'm aiming to model C. elegans based on systematic high-throughput experiments - that is, to upload a worm. I'm still working on course requirements and lab training at Harvard's Biophysics Ph.D. program, but this remains the plan for my thesis.

Last semester I gave this lecture to Marvin Minsky's AI class, because Marvin professes disdain for everything neuroscience, and I wanted to give his students—and him—a fair perspective of how basic neuroscience might be changing for the better, and seems a particularly exciting field to be in right about now. The lecture is about 22 minutes long, followed by over an hour of questions and answers, which cover a lot of the memespace that surrounds this concept. Afterward, several students reported to me that their understanding of neuroscience was transformed.

I only just now got to encoding and uploading this recording; I believe that many of the topics covered could be of interest to the LW community (especially those with a background in AI and an interest in brains), perhaps worthy of discussion, and I hope you agree.
[SEQ RERUN] Decoherence
by MinibearRex — 2012-04-13T05:15:27.091Z

Today's post, Decoherence was originally published on 22 April 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

A quantum system that factorizes can evolve into a system that doesn't factorize, destroying the illusion of independence. But entangling a quantum system with its environment, can appear to destroy entanglements that are already present. Entanglement with the environment can separate out the pieces of an amplitude distribution, preventing them from interacting with each other. Decoherence is fundamentally symmetric in time, but appears asymmetric because of the second law of thermodynamics.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Three Dialogues on Identity, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Exponential Economist Meets Finite Physicist [link]
by Dreaded_Anomaly — 2012-04-13T03:55:55.856Z

A dialogue discussing how thermodynamics limits future growth in energy usage, and that in turn limits GDP growth, from the blog Do the Math.

Physicist: Hi, I’m Tom. I’m a physicist.

Economist: Hi Tom, I’m [ahem..cough]. I’m an economist.

Physicist: Hey, that’s great. I’ve been thinking a bit about growth and want to run an idea by you. I claim that economic growth cannot continue indefinitely.

Economist: [chokes on bread crumb] Did I hear you right? Did you say that growth can not continue forever?

Physicist: That’s right. I think physical limits assert themselves.

Economist: Well sure, nothing truly lasts forever. The sun, for instance, will not burn forever. On the billions-of-years timescale, things come to an end.

Physicist: Granted, but I’m talking about a more immediate timescale, here on Earth. Earth’s physical resources—particularly energy—are limited and may prohibit continued growth within centuries, or possibly much shorter depending on the choices we make. There are thermodynamic issues as well.

I think this is quite relevant to many of the ideas of futurism (and economics) that we often discuss here on Less Wrong. They address the concepts related to levels of civilization and mind uploading. Colonization of space is dismissed by both parties, at least for the sake of the discussion. The blog author has another post discussing his views on its implausibility; I find it to be somewhat limited in its consideration of the issue, though.

He has also detailed the calculations whose results he describes in this dialogue in a few previous posts. The dialogue format will probably be a kinder introduction to the ideas for those less mathematically inclined.