trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 8
by Unnamed — 2011-08-25T02:17:00.455Z

Update: Discussion has moved on to a new thread.

The hiatus is over with today's publication of chapter 73, and the previous thread is approaching the 500-comment threshold, so let's start a new Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread. This is the place to discuss Eliezer Yudkowsky's Harry Potter fanfic and anything related to it.
The first 5 discussion threads are on the main page under the harry_potter tag. Threads 6 and on (including this one) are in the discussion section using its separate tag system. Also: one, two, three, four, five, six, seven. The fanfiction.net author page is the central location for information about updates and links to HPMOR-related goodies, and AdeleneDawner has kept an archive of Author's Notes.
As a reminder, it's often useful to start your comment by indicating which chapter you are commenting on.
Spoiler Warning: this thread is full of spoilers. With few exceptions, spoilers for MOR and canon are fair game to post, without warning or rot13. More specifically:

You do not need to rot13 anything about HP:MoR or the original Harry Potter series unless you are posting insider information from Eliezer Yudkowsky which is not supposed to be publicly available (which includes public statements by Eliezer that have been retracted).
If there is evidence for X in MOR and/or canon then it's fine to post about X without rot13, even if you also have heard privately from Eliezer that X is true. But you should not post that "Eliezer said X is true" unless you use rot13.
[SEQ RERUN] Applause Lights
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-25T02:04:52.405Z

Today's post, Applause Lights was originally published on 11 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Words like "Democracy" or "freedom" are applause lights - no one disapproves of them, so they can be used to signal conformity and hand-wave away difficult problems. If you hear people talking about the importance of "balancing risks and opportunities" or of solving problems "through a collaborative process" that aren't followed up by any specifics, then the words are applause lights, not real thoughts.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was We Don't Really Want Your Participation, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[Link] Simon Cowell plans to sign up for cryonics
by lsparrish — 2011-08-24T22:46:05.072Z

From a GQ interview:

A while ago, a piece of gossip appeared in a British newspaper, alleging that Cowell had declared—while dining with the British prime minister at the time, Gordon Brown—that upon his death he plans to be frozen. Cowell tells me he doesn't recall this discussion ("I had dinner with him a couple of times, but I can't remember talking about that—that's probably why I wasn't invited back a third time") but agrees that, although he has yet to make the arrangements, this is indeed his plan.

"It's an insurance policy," he reasons. "If it doesn't work, it doesn't work. If it does work, I'll be happy. If it's possible, and I think it will be, why not have a second crack? Does that sound crazy? I think it's a good idea."
When to explain
by KatjaGrace — 2011-08-24T22:18:22.000Z

It is commonly claimed that humans’ explicit conscious faculties arose for explaining to others about themselves and their intentions. Similarly when people talk about designing robots that interact with people, they often mention the usefulness of designing such robots to be able to explain to you why it is they changed your investments or rearranged your kitchen.

Perhaps this is a generally useful principle for internally complex units dealing with each other: have some part that keeps an overview of what’s going on inside and can discuss it with others.

If so, the same seems like it should be true of companies. However my experience with companies is that they are often designed specifically to prevent you from being able to get any explanations out of them. Anyone who actually makes decisions regarding you seems to be guarded by layers of people who can’t be held accountable for anything. They can sweetly lament your frustrations, agree that the policies seem unreasonable, sincerely wish you a nice day, and most importantly, have nothing to do with the policies in question and so can’t be expected to justify them or change them based on any arguments or threats you might make.

I wondered why this strategy should be different for companies, and a friend pointed out that companies do often make an effort at more high level explanations of what they are doing, though not necessarily accurate: vision statements, advertisements etc. PR is often the metaphor for how the conscious mind works after all.

So it seems the company strategy is more complex: general explanations coupled with avoidance of being required to make more detailed ones of specific cases and policies. So, is this strategy generally useful? Is it how humans behave? Is it how successful robots will behave?*

Inspired by an interaction with ETS, evidenced lately by PNC and Verizon

*assuming there is more than one
[LINK] Google Talks: Author lectures about the history of Bayes' Theorem.
by Eneasz — 2011-08-24T16:45:17.227Z

Authors@Google, Sharon Bertsch McGrayne discusses her book "The Theory That Would Not Die" How Bayes' Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy".

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8oD6eBkjF9o

She traces its discovery by an amateur mathematician in the 1740s through its development into roughly its modern form by French scientist Pierre Simon Laplace. She reveals why respected statisticians rendered it professionally taboo for 150 years—at the same time that practitioners relied on it to solve crises involving great uncertainty and scanty information, even breaking Germany's Enigma code during World War II, and explains how the advent of off-the-shelf computer technology in the 1980s proved to be a game-changer.
How to be Deader than Dead
by gwern — 2011-08-24T15:47:24.846Z

For your consideration, a psychology study as summarized by The Economist in "How dead is dead? Sometimes, those who have died seem more alive than those who have not":

"They first asked 201 people stopped in public in New York and New England to answer questions after reading one of three short stories. In all three, a man called David was involved in a car accident and suffered serious injuries. In one, he recovered fully. In another, he died. In the third, his entire brain was destroyed except for one part that kept him breathing. Although he was technically alive, he would never again wake up.

...each participant was asked to rate David’s mental capacities, including whether he could influence the outcome of events, know right from wrong, remember incidents from his life, be aware of his environment, possess a personality and have emotions. Participants used a seven-point scale to make these ratings, where 3 indicated that they strongly agreed that he could do such things...and -3 indicated that they strongly disagreed.

...the fully recovered David rated an average of +1.77 and the dead David -0.29. That score for the dead David was surprising enough, suggesting as it did a considerable amount of mental acuity in the dead. What was extraordinary, though, was the result for the vegetative David: -1.73. In the view of the average New Yorker or New Englander, the vegetative David was more dead [-1.73] than the version who was dead [-0.29].

...they ran a follow-up experiment which had two different descriptions of the dead David. One said he had simply passed away. The other directed the participant’s attention to the corpse. It read, “After being embalmed at the morgue, he was buried in the local cemetery. David now lies in a coffin underground.”...In this follow-up study participants were also asked to rate how religious they were.

Once again, the vegetative David was seen to have less mind than the David who had “passed away”. This was equally true, regardless of how religious a participant said he was. However, ratings of the dead David’s mind in the story in which his corpse was embalmed and buried varied with the participant’s religiosity. Irreligious participants gave the buried corpse about the same mental ratings as the vegetative patient (-1.51 and -1.64 respectively). Religious participants, however, co

...
A failure of conservation of evidence
by PhilGoetz — 2011-08-24T15:21:22.071Z

From Bloomberg:

U.S. stocks rallied, driving the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index up from the cheapest valuations since 2009, as weaker-than-estimated economic data reinforced optimism the Federal Reserve will act to spur growth.

The S&P 500 rose 3.4 percent to 1,162.35 at 4 p.m. in New York, for the biggest rally since Aug. 11. All 10 industries in the benchmark gauge rose, with gains ranging between 1.8 percent and 4.6 percent. The Dow Jones Industrial Average added 322.11 points, or 3 percent, to 11,176.76.

“There’s plenty of evidence that the economy has slowed,” Kevin Caron, market strategist in Florham Park, New Jersey, at Stifel Nicolaus & Co., said in a telephone interview. His firm has more than $115 billion in client assets. “The speculation would be that it’s possible that the Fed will say something designed to calm markets and provide a bit of encouragement.”

So, bad news about the economy explains the market going both up and down!

(Presumably, good news about the economy can also explain the market going both up and down.)
Existential Risk Reduction Career Network
by FrankAdamek — 2011-08-24T15:20:08.154Z

Interested in donating to existential risk reduction efforts? Would you like to exchange career information with like-minded others? Then you should consider the Existential Risk Reduction Career Network! ("X Risk Network" for those short on time.) From the front page of the website:

"This network is for anyone interested in donating substantial amounts (relative to income) to non-profit organizations focused on the reduction of existential risk, such as SIAI, FHI, and the Lifeboat Foundation. [...] We are a community of people assisting each other to increase our resources available for contribution. Members discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different careers, network, share advice on job applications and career advancement, assist others with finding interviews, and occasionally look for qualified individuals to hire from within the network."

For more details, including on the process of requesting invitations, head on over to the front page at http://www.xrisknetwork.com/

Keep in mind that the network is for students as well, not just those currently on the job market. The network also has discussion of long term job strategy, school admissions, and intern possibilities.
Meetup : Melbourne, Ben's house
by matt — 2011-08-24T11:25:31.217Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, Ben's house

WHEN:
09 September 2011 06:00:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
5/52 Leicester St Carlton 3053

6pm for 7pm, at Ben's place. Ben will supply meat/vege burgers and maybe some salad etc. for a BBQ. If you comment here to tell him you're coming he'll get food for you. It's also okay to just turn up, but there might not be enough food. BYO drinks and board games (if you have any that you think we'll enjoy). If you have any problems getting in, you can call the host on 0412 996 288.

Discussion article for the meetup : Melbourne, Ben's house
Help Fund Lukeprog at SIAI
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2011-08-24T07:16:45.967Z

Singularity Institute desperately needs someone who is not me who can write cognitive-science-based material. Someone smart, energetic, able to speak to popular audiences, and with an excellent command of the science. If you’ve been reading Less Wrong for the last few months, you probably just thought the same thing I did: “SIAI should hire Lukeprog!” To support Luke Muelhauser becoming a full-time Singularity Institute employee, please donate and mention Luke (e.g. “Yay for Luke!”) in the check memo or the comment field of your donation - or if you donate by a method that doesn’t allow you to leave a comment, tell Louie Helm (louie@intelligence.org) your donation was to help fund Luke.

Note that the Summer Challenge that doubles all donations will run until August 31st. (We're currently at $31,000 of $125,000.)

During his stint as a Singularity Institute Visiting Fellow, Luke has already:

Co-organized and taught sessions for a well-received one-week Rationality Minicamp, and taught sessions for the nine-week Rationality Boot Camp.

Written many helpful and well-researched articles for Less Wrong on metaethics, rationality theory, and rationality practice, including the 20-page tutorial A Crash Course in the Neuroscience of Human Motivation.

Written a new Singularity FAQ.

Published an intelligence explosion website for academics.

...and completed many smaller projects.

As a full-time Singularity Institute employee, Luke could:

Author and co-author research papers and outreach papers, including

A chapter already accepted to Springer’s The Singularity Hypothesis volume (co-authored with Louie Helm).

A paper on existential risk and optimal philanthropy, co-authored with a Columbia University researcher.

Continue to write articles for Less Wrong on the theory and practice of rationality.

Write a report that summarizes unsolved problems related to Friendly AI.

Continue to develop his metaethics sequence, the conclusion of which will be a sort of Polymath Project for collaboratively solving open problems in metaethics relevant to FAI development.

Teach courses on rationality and social effectiveness, as he has been doing for the Singularity Institute’s Rationality Minicamp and Rationality Boot Camp.

Produce introductory materials to help bridge inferential gaps, as he did with the Singularity FAQ.

Raise awareness

...
[SEQ RERUN] We Don't Really Want Your Participation
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-24T03:16:37.649Z

Today's post, We Don't Really Want Your Participation was originally published on 10 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Advocates for the Singularity sometimes call for outreach to artists or poets; we should move away from thinking of people as if their profession is the only thing they can contribute to humanity. Being human is what gives us a stake in the future, not being poets or mathematicians.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Radical Honesty, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
What to not know
by KatjaGrace — 2011-08-24T02:32:20.000Z

I just read ‘A counterexample to the contrastive account of knowledge‘ by Jason Rourke, at the suggestion of John Danaher. I’ll paraphrase what he says before explaining why I’m not convinced. I don’t actually know much more about the topic, so maybe take my interpretation of a single paper with a grain of salt. Which is not to imply that I will tell you every time I don’t know much about a topic.

Traditionally ‘knowing’ has been thought of as a function of two things: the person who does the knowing, and the thing that they know. The ‘Contrastive Account of Knowledge’ (CAK) says that it’s really a function of three things – the knower, the thing they know, and the other possibilities that they have excluded.

For instance I know it is Monday if we take the other alternatives to be ‘that it is Tuesday and my computer is accurate on this subject’, etc. I have excluded all those possibilities just now by looking at my computer. However if alternatives such as that of it being Tuesday and my memory and computer saying it is Monday are under consideration, then I don’t know that it’s Monday. Whether I have the information to say P is true depends on what’s included in not-P.

So it seems to me CAK would be correct if there were no inherent set of alternatives to any given proposition, or if we often mean to claim that only some of these alternatives have been excluded when we say something is known. It would be wrong if knowing X didn’t rely on any consideration of the mutually exclusive alternatives, and unimportant if there were a single set of alternatives determined by the proposition whose truth is known, which is what people always mean to consider.

Rourke seems to be arguing that CAK is not like what we usually mean by knowledge. He seems to be doing this by claiming that knowing things need not involve consideration of the alternatives. He gives this example:

The Claret Case. Imagine that Holmes and Watson are investigating a crime that occurred during a meeting attended by Lestrade, Hopkins, LeVillard, and no others. The question Who drank claret? is under discussion. Watson announces ‘‘Holmes knows that Lestrade drank claret.’’ Given the question under discussion and the facts described, the alternative propositions that partially constitute the knowle

...
[link] Apostles' Creed = Tsuyoku Naritai???
by SilasBarta — 2011-08-23T14:49:35.891Z

Background: Apostles' Creed, Tsuyoku Naritai

Related to: A Parable on Obsolete Ideologies

Just something I thought I might add to the annals of cases where someone tries to re-interpret an old religious text to mean something more acceptable to the modern ear, in contradiction to what most people (especially its contemporaries) think the texts mean. And this is not some random person, but Gene Callahan, who makes sure you understand he holds a doctorate in philosophy, and pretty much makes a career out of defending this and anti-reductionist views in general. Here's the post:

I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth...
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God...
And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of Life..."
If I say these words, what do I mean? I am asserting that I have some secret knowledge that others do not? Do I believe these things like I believe it will rain tonight?
No, I asserting that, by meditating on these symbols, I believe I will come to understand better what I now know only through a glass darkly.
I believe that I may understand.

I suggested that this is not what most people mean when they say the Creed, but (surprise) the comment was deleted.

(Yes I know Tsuyoku Naritai is not quite the same as Callahan's interpretation, but it's the closest short LW term for the general idea.)
Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas
by Vladimir_M — 2011-08-23T09:13:13.807Z

So says the title of an interesting recent paper I stumbled on yesterday (ungated link; h/t Chris Bertram). Here's the abstract:

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral.

This conclusion is very much along the lines of some of my recent LW comments (for example, those I left in this thread). To me it seems quite obvious that in the space of possible human minds, those that produce on the whole reasonably cooperative and reliably non-threatening behavior are overwhelmingly unlikely to produce utilitarian decisions in trolley-footbridge and similar "sacrificial" problems.

Of course, what people say they would do in situations of this sort is usually determined by signaling rather than a realistic appraisal. Kind and philosophical utilitarians of the sort one meets on LW would be extremely unlikely to act in practice according to the implications of their favored theories in real-life "sacrificial" situations, so their views are by themselves not strong evidence of antisocial personality traits. However, actually acting in such ways would be, in my opinion, very strong evidence for such traits, which is correctly reflected in the typical person's fear and revulsion of someone who is known to have acted like that. I would venture to guess that it is in fact the signaling-driven disconnect between people's endorsement of utilitarian actions and the actual decisions they would make that makes the found correlations fairly low. (Assuming also that these tests really are strong indicators of...
[SEQ RERUN] Radical Honesty
by MinibearRex — 2011-08-23T03:59:25.135Z

Today's post, Radical Honesty was originally published on 10 September 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

The Radical Honesty movement requires participants to speak the truth, always, whatever they think. The more competent you grow at avoiding self-deceit, the more of a challenge this would be - but it's an interesting thing to imagine, and perhaps strive for.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The Crackpot Offer, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Computer Programs Rig Elections
by magfrump — 2011-08-23T02:03:07.890Z

I don't know how interested this community would be in this topic, I don't mean to be talking politics so much as technology and decision mechanisms.

According to this programmer's testimony, voting machine companies requested that their programmers make it possible for the companies to rig elections, while in communication with elected officials.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1thcO_olHas&sns=fb

If there is a discussion of how worthwhile taking the time to vote is, this may be worth knowing.

This is something that I expected to be true beforehand, but I am wondering: How reliable is this testimony? What are other LWers' prior and posterior probabilities of elections being rigged in this way? Is it worth trying to do something about this, and if so what?