trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
We prosecute CEOs for failing to do due diligence. But with people, we call it 'faith'
by avichapman — 2012-07-05T08:51:30.456Z

I wrote the following on my blog last night. I thought that I'd run it past an intelligent audience. Note that what I have referred to as an idea is what we here at lesswrong would call a 'belief'. I changed the name to remove any strange foggy baggage that might appear in the heads of potential readers who are not familier with belief vs belief-in-belief and other concepts like that.

What are your thoughts?

I recently got into a discussion on Facebook that started with an assertion that free-thought/atheism/humanism/etc was no different than the certainties of fundamentalism. But that discussion moved into many topics, one of which is why it should not be controversial to assert that one idea can be more 'right' than another.

I asserted that the view that the universe was created 13.72 billion years ago was more 'right' than the view that the universe was sneezed out of a giant space cow. My interlocutor felt that the giant space cow could be 'right' for one person, even if it is not 'right' for others.
It is at this point that we ran into a problem, as it became apparent that her view of the meaning of 'right' and my own were different. As best I can tell, she felt that 'right' meant that it feels right or brings comfort. I, of course, use the word 'right' to mean that an idea contains explanatory and predictive power. The idea that the universe started in a big bang explains a lot about what we see in the cosmos and predicts what we will see as we keep looking - with a high degree of accuracy. That makes is 'right'. And it's more 'right' now than it was two decades ago because we have found places where it is 'wrong' (the increase in the rate of expansion of the universe) and revised the idea to explain it (dark energy), making it more 'right'.
So we had two versions of 'right'. It wasn't a given that she would accept my version, so I had to come up with a good reason why my version of 'right' was, well, 'right'.
What I came up with was to point out an ethical imperative to be as 'right' as possible - using my definition. Consider this: If there are two ideas, one of which is 'right' enough to predict certain unintended consequences of an action that the other idea fails to predict. If you consciously choose the less 'right' of the two ideas (perhaps because it is 'more right for you'), you have consciously chosen to risk harming

...
[Link] "First Is Best" - The serial position effect / primacy effect
by aelephant — 2012-07-05T03:01:43.322Z

"First is Best"

Abstract
We experience the world serially rather than simultaneously. A century of research on human and nonhuman animals has suggested that the first experience in a series of two or more is cognitively privileged. We report three experiments designed to test the effect of first position on implicit preference and choice using targets that range from individual humans and social groups to consumer goods.

While this effect has been known about for many years, these researchers added an interesting component, an "Implicit Association Test (IAT)":

Each option within a pair was presented sequentially for 30-seconds and participants were forced to maximally consider both options. Immediately after each choice-pair was presented, participants completed a measure which assessed automatic preference for each option (an Implicit Association Test, or IAT) [22].

and

Regardless of the actual option, the one presented first compared to the one presented next was significantly more strongly associated with the concept ‘‘better’’ rather than ‘‘worse’’, F(1, 121) =20.20, p,.001; effect size r =.38 (Figure 1). There was no difference in self-reported preference for firsts versus seconds, F(1, 121) =.08, p= .78.

I was surprised to find there is no reference to "recency", "primacy" or "serial position" on the LessWrong Wiki. A search on LessWrong.com for "recency effect" turns up 8 posts that mention it but don't give it a thorough discussion as far as I can tell; "primacy effect" turns up 1 post about Rationality & Criminal Law; and "serial position" turns up nothing. Is there another name for this effect that I'm missing?

Wikipedia has some discussion of the serial position effect here, although from a quick skim it doesn't appear that they talk about preference at all.
[SEQ RERUN] The Gift We Give To Tomorrow
by MinibearRex — 2012-07-05T01:36:42.888Z

Today's post, The Gift We Give To Tomorrow was originally published on 17 July 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

How did love ever come into the universe? How did that happen, and how special was it, really?

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Whither Moral Progress?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[Link] Why the kids don’t know no algebra
by GLaDOS — 2012-07-04T10:29:39.656Z

Post by fellow LW reader Razib Khan, who many here probably know from the gnxp site or perhaps from his debate with Eliezer.

A few days ago I stumbled upon a really interesting post. And I’m wondering if my readers are at all familiar with the phenomenon outlined here (it was a total surprise to me), The myth of “they weren’t ever taught….”:

With all this I am not saying conditions which are non-hereditary are irrelevant. What I am saying is that we can’t ignore the shape of the pre-existent landscape before we attempt to reshape it to our own image. Excoriating teachers for having pupils who can’t master mid-level secondary school mathematics is in some cases like excoriating someone for the fact that their irrigation canals from the plains into the mountains are failures. You need to level the mountains before your canals can work (or, barring that design and implement a mechanical system which will move water against the grade). Easier said than done. E. O. Wilson said of Communism, “Great Idea, Wrong Species.” The reaction of Communist regimes to this reality was brutal and shocking. Obviously the modern rejection of unpalatable aspects of human nature are not so grotesque. But they have a human toll nonetheless. I’m skeptical that this generation will pass before we have to acknowledge these realities and calibrate our policies accordingly.

Stage One: I will describe this stage for algebra I teachers, but plug in reading, geometry, writing, science, any subject you choose, with the relevant details. This stage begins when teachers realize that easily half the class adds the numerators and denominators when adding fractions, doesn’t see the difference between 3-5 and 5-3, counts on fingers to add 8 and 6, and looks blank when asked what 7 times 3 is.

Ah, they think. The kids weren’t ever taught fractions and basic math facts! What the hell are these other teachers doing, then, taking a salary for showing the kids movies and playing Math Bingo? Insanity on the public penny. But hey, helping these kids, teaching them properly, is the reason they became teachers in the first place. So they push their schedule back, what, two weeks? Three? And go through fraction operations, reciprocals, negative numbers, the meaning of subtraction, a few properties of equality, and just wallow in

...
[SEQ RERUN] Whither Moral Progress?
by MinibearRex — 2012-07-04T06:33:24.946Z

Today's post, Whither Moral Progress? was originally published on 16 July 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Does moral progress actually happen? And if it does so, how?

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Lawrence Watt-Evans's Fiction, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Rationality Quotes July 2012
by RobertLumley — 2012-07-04T00:29:52.306Z

Here's the new thread for posting quotes, with the usual rules:

Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be voted up/down separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)

Do not quote yourself

Do not quote comments/posts on LW/OB

No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
Irrationality Game II
by  — 2012-07-03T18:50:20.055Z

I was very interested in the discussions and opinions that grew out of the last time this was played, but find digging through 800+ comments for a new game to start on the same thread annoying. I also don't want this game ruined by a potential sock puppet (whom ever it may be). So here's a non-sockpuppetiered Irrationality Game, if there's still interest. If there isn't, downvote to oblivion!
The original rules:

Please read the post before voting on the comments, as this is a game where voting works differently.

Warning: the comments section of this post will look odd. The most reasonable comments will have lots of negative karma. Do not be alarmed, it's all part of the plan. In order to participate in this game you should disable any viewing threshold for negatively voted comments.

Here's an irrationalist game meant to quickly collect a pool of controversial ideas for people to debate and assess. It kinda relies on people being honest and not being nitpickers, but it might be fun.

Write a comment reply to this post describing a belief you think has a reasonable chance of being true relative to the the beliefs of other Less Wrong folk. Jot down a proposition and a rough probability estimate or qualitative description, like 'fairly confident'.

Example (not my true belief): "The U.S. government was directly responsible for financing the September 11th terrorist attacks. Very confident. (~95%)."

If you post a belief, you have to vote on the beliefs of all other comments. Voting works like this: if you basically agree with the comment, vote the comment down. If you basically disagree with the comment, vote the comment up. What 'basically' means here is intuitive; instead of using a precise mathy scoring system, just make a guess. In my view, if their stated probability is 99.9% and your degree of belief is 90%, that merits an upvote: it's a pretty big difference of opinion. If they're at 99.9% and you're at 99.5%, it could go either way. If you're genuinely unsure whether or not you basically agree with them, you can pass on voting (but try not to). Vote up if you think they are either overconfident or underconfident in their belief: any disagreement is valid disagreement.

That's the spirit of the game, but some more qualifications and rules follow.

If the proposition in a comment isn't incredibly precise, use

...
Where to Intervene in a Human?
by lukeprog — 2012-07-03T06:31:18.608Z

The "What is Rationality?" page on the new CFAR website contains an illuminating story about Intel:

Semiconductor giant Intel was originally a memory chip manufacturer. But by 1985, memory chips had been losing them money for years. Co-founders Andy Grove (CEO) and Gordon Moore met to discuss the problem. The mood was grim. At one point, Andy turned to Gordon and asked, “If we get kicked out and the board brings in a new CEO, what do you think he would do?”

Gordon replied without hesitation. “He would get us out of the memory business.”

“Okay,” said Andy. “Then why shouldn’t you and I walk out the door, come back, and do it ourselves?”

That year, Andy and Gordon shifted the focus of the company to microprocessors, and created one of the greatest success stories in American business.

I presume Andy and Gordon had considered intervening at many different levels of action: in middle management, in projects, in products, in details, etc. They had probably implemented some of these plans, too. But the problem with Intel — it was in the wrong market! — was so deep that the place to intervene was at a very low level, the foundations of the entire company. It's possible that in this situation, no change they could have made at higher levels of action would have made that big of a difference compared to changing the company's market and mission.

In 1997, system analyst Donella Meadows wrote Places to Intervene in a System, in which she outlined twelve leverage points at which one could intervene in a system. Different levels of action, she claimed, would have effects of different magnitudes.

This got me thinking about levels of action and self-improvement. "I want to improve myself: where should I intervene in my own system next?"

My bet is that if the next greatest leverage point you can push on is something like neurofeedback, then you're pretty damn self-optimized already.

In fact, I suspect almost nobody is that self-optimized. We do things like neurofeedback because (1) we don't think enough about choosing the highest-leverage self-interventions, (2) in any case, we don't know how to figure out which interventions would be higher leverage for ourselves, (3) even if there are higher-leverage interventions to be had, we might not successfully carry them through, but neurofeedback or whatever ...
[SEQ RERUN] Lawrence Watt-Evans's Fiction
by MinibearRex — 2012-07-03T06:10:25.144Z

Today's post, Lawrence Watt-Evans's Fiction was originally published on 15 July 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

A review of Lawrence Watt-Evans's fiction.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Probability is Subjectively Objective, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Boston MA: Optimal Philanthropy Meetup (July 6th)
by jefftk — 2012-07-03T03:31:35.608Z

Julia and I have done a lot of thinking and writing about how to do the most good in the world [1] [2] but we don't have things all figured out. We'd love to talk to other people interested in optimal philanthropy, so if you're in the Boston area on Friday July 6th we'd love to have you over for dinner and discussion.

Details:

RSVP for directions (West Medford)

6pm to about 9pm

94 bus from the red line, 95 bus from the orange line.

We can give rides back into the city at the end of the evening.

RSVPs would be nice; let us know if you have dietary restrictions.

[1] Julia's blog: givinggladly.com

[2] Jeff's posts on giving: jefftk.com/giving
Real World Solutions to Prisoners' Dilemmas
by Scott Alexander — 2012-07-03T03:25:25.052Z

Why should there be real world solutions to Prisoners' Dilemmas? Because such dilemmas are a real-world problem.

If I am assigned to work on a school project with a group, I can either cooperate (work hard on the project) or defect (slack off while reaping the rewards of everyone else's hard work). If everyone defects, the project doesn't get done and we all fail - a bad outcome for everyone. If I defect but you cooperate, then I get to spend all day on the beach and still get a good grade - the best outcome for me, the worst for you. And if we all cooperate, then it's long hours in the library but at least we pass the class - a “good enough” outcome, though not quite as good as me defecting against everyone else's cooperation. This exactly mirrors the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Diplomacy - both the concept and the board game - involves Prisoners' Dilemmas. Suppose Ribbentrop of Germany and Molotov of Russia agree to a peace treaty that demilitarizes their mutual border. If both cooperate, they can move their forces to other theaters, and have moderate success there - a good enough outcome. If Russia cooperates but Germany defects, it can launch a surprise attack on an undefended Russian border and enjoy spectacular success there (for a while, at least!) - the best outcome for Germany and the worst for Russia. But if both defect, then neither has any advantage at the German-Russian border, and they lose the use of those troops in other theaters as well - a bad outcome for both. Again, the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Civilization - again, both the concept and the game - involves Prisoners' Dilemmas. If everyone follows the rules and creates a stable society (cooperates), we all do pretty well. If everyone else works hard and I turn barbarian and pillage you (defect), then I get all of your stuff without having to work for it and you get nothing - the best solution for me, the worst for you. If everyone becomes a barbarian, there's nothing to steal and we all lose out. Prisoner's Dilemma.

If everyone who worries about global warming cooperates in cutting emissions, climate change is averted and everyone is moderately happy. If everyone else cooperates in cutting emissions, but one country defects, climate change is still mostly averted, and the defector is at a significant economic advantage. If everyone defects and keeps polluting, the climate changes and everyone loses out. Ag...
Learn Power Searching with Google 
by  — 2012-07-02T19:09:44.550Z

Google Search makes it amazingly easy to find information. Come learn about the powerful advanced tools we provide to help you find just the right information when the stakes are high.

Daniel Russell is doing a free Google class on how to search the web. Besides six 50-minute classes it will include interactive activities to practice new skills. Upon passing the post-course assessment you get a Certificate of Completion.

Advanced search skills are not only a useful everyday skill but vital to doing scholarship. Searching the web is a superpower that would make thinkers of previous centuries green with envy. Learn to use it well. I recommend checking out Inside Search, Russel's Blog or perhaps reading the article "How to solve impossible problems" to get a feeling about what you can expect to gain from it.

I think for most the value of information is high enough to be worth the investment. Also I suspect it will be plain fun. I am doing the class and strongly recommend it to fellow LessWrong users. Anyone else who has registered please say so publicly in the comments as well. :)

Registration is open from June 26, 2012 to July 16, 2012.
Malthusian copying: mass death of unhappy life-loving uploads
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2012-07-02T16:37:40.791Z

Robin Hanson has done a great job of describing the future world and economy, under the assumption that easily copied "uploads" (whole brain emulations), and the standard laws of economics continue to apply. To oversimplify the conclusion:

There will be great and rapidly increasing wealth. On the other hand, the uploads will be in Darwinian-like competition with each other and with copies, which will drive their wages down to subsistence levels: whatever is required to run their hardware and keep them working, and nothing more.

The competition will not so much be driven by variation, but by selection: uploads with the required characteristics can be copied again and again, undercutting and literally crowding out any uploads wanting higher wages.

Megadeaths

Some have focused on the possibly troubling aspects voluntary or semi-voluntary death: some uploads would be willing to make copies of themselves for specific tasks, which would then be deleted or killed at the end of the process. This can pose problems, especially if the copy changes its mind about deletion. But much more troubling is the mass death among uploads that always wanted to live.

What the selection process will favour is agents that want to live (if they didn't, they'd die out) and willing to work for an expectation of subsistence level wages. But now add a little risk to the process: not all jobs pay exactly the expected amount, sometimes they pay slightly higher, sometimes they pay slightly lower. That means that half of all jobs will result in a life-loving upload dying (charging extra to pay for insurance will squeeze that upload out of the market). Iterating the process means that the vast majority of the uploads will end up being killed - if not initially, then at some point later. The picture changes somewhat if you consider "super-organisms" of uploads and their copies, but then the issue simply shifts to wage competition between the super-organisms.

The only way this can be considered acceptable is if the killing of a (potentially unique) agent that doesn't want to die, is exactly compensated by the copying of another already existent agent. I don't find myself in the camp arguing that that would be a morally neutral or positive action.

Pain and unhappiness

The preceding would be mitigated to some extent if the uploads were happy. It'...
Meetup : Less Wrong Sydney 16th July Event for Less Wrong
by Oklord — 2012-07-02T13:37:16.765Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Less Wrong Sydney 16th July Event for Less Wrong

WHEN:
16 July 2012 06:35:00PM (+1000)

WHERE:
565-567 George Street, Sydney, Australia 2000

Hello everyone - the time has come for another meet up!

As per suggestions made at the previous event, the food at Norita's is crap, and Mafia has proven to be more fun than most board games. Hence, the suggestion goes that we might try City of Sydney RSL!

That said, esoteric pursuit is encouraged, and if you want to bring any materials like board games, feel free! Suggestions on time changes, venue changes and topics, as always, are solicited from the floor.

Discussion article for the meetup : Less Wrong Sydney 16th July Event for Less Wrong
Less Wrong Product & Service Recommendations
by lukeprog — 2012-07-02T13:18:20.084Z

I have often benefited from recommendations for Things I Didn't Know I Wanted.

Given that Less Wrong is a community of unusually intelligent, critical, and self-improvement-focused people, I suspect we can generate a pretty helpful thread of product recommendations — perhaps even a monthly thread of product recommendations.

Rules:

Post one product your recommend per comment, so they can be discussed and voted on independently.

Provide a link for purchasing the product.

No books, movies, TV, games, or music. (These should go in other threads, like this one or this one.)

I'll post my own recommendations to the comments section, too.
New "Best" comment sorting system
by matt — 2012-07-02T11:08:02.521Z

Way back in October 2009 Reddit introduced their "Best" comment sorting system. We've just pulled those changes into Less Wrong. The changes affect only comments, not stories.

It's good. It should significantly improve the visibility of good comments posted later in the life of an article. You (yes you) should adopt it. It's the default for new users.

See http://blog.reddit.com/2009/10/reddits-new-comment-sorting-system.html for the details.