trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
An additional problem with Solomonoff induction
by gedymin — 2014-01-22T23:34:05.971Z

Let's continue from my previous post and look how Solomonoff induction fails to adequately deal with hypercomputation.

You may have heard of the Physical Church-Turing thesis. It's the idea that the Universe can, in a perfect level of detail, be simulated on a Turing machine. (No problem if the Universe turns out to be infinite - the thesis requires only that each finite portion of it can be simulated.) A corollary to the Physical CTT is the idea that there are no physically realizable uncomputable processes. We can talk about hypercomputers as mathematical abstractions, but we'll never be able to build (or see) one.

We don't have a very strong scientific evidence for the Physical CTT thesis yet - no one has built the perfect simulator yet, for example. On the other hand, we do have something - all known laws of physics (including quantum physics) allow arbitrary precision simulations on a computer. Even though the complete unified theory of all fundamental forces isn't there yet, the Standard model already makes pretty accurate predictions for almost all environments. (Singularities being the only known exception, as their neighborhoods are the only locations where the role of quantum gravity is not negligible.)

So the Physical CTT does not contradict any known laws of physics. Of course, these laws are not contradicted by a multitude of alternative hypotheses as well; all the hypotheses which suggest that the universe cannot be simulated on a Turing machine. We prefer the Physical CTT solely because it's the simplest one; because Occam's razor says so.

There are multiple levels and kinds of uncomputability; none of the problems placed on either of these levels are uncomputable in the absolute sense; all of them can computed by some hypothetical devices. And all of these devices are called hypercomputers. A corollary to the "Universe is uncomputable" position is that we someday may be able to, in fact, build a hypercomputer that is embedded in the physical world, or at least access some of the Nature's mystical, uncomputable processes as a black box.

Now, the "standard" Solomonoff induction uses the Universal prior, which in turn is related to Kolmogorov complexity (KC). An uncomputable process formally has undefined Kolmogorov complexity. Informally, the KC of such as process is infinitely large, as it must be larger than th

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Polling Thread
by Gunnar_Zarncke — 2014-01-22T21:14:58.174Z

This is an experiment to use polls to tap into the crowd knowledge probably present on LW.

This is your chance to ask your multiple choice question you always wanted to throw in. Get qualified numeric feedback to your comments. Post fun polls.

There are some rules:

Each poll goes into its own top level comment and may be commented there.

You must at least vote all polls that were posted earlier than you own. This ensures participation in all polls and also limits the total number of polls. You may of course vote without posting a poll.

Your poll should include a 'don't know' option (to avoid conflict with 2). I don't know whether we need to add a troll catch option here but we will see.

If you don't know how to make a poll in a comment look at the Poll Markup Help.

This being an experiment I do not announce it to be regular. If it is successful I may. Or you may. In that case I recommend the following to make this potentially more usable:

Use "Polling Thread" in the title.

Copy the rules.

Add the tag "poll".

Link to this Thread or a previous Thread.

Create a top-level comment saying 'Discussion of this thread goes here; all other to-level comments should be polls or similar'

Add a second top-level comment with an initial poll to start participation.

EDIT: Added recommendations from KnaveOfAllTrades.
Meetup : Frankfurt meetup
by Kendra — 2014-01-22T19:05:34.704Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Frankfurt meetup

WHEN:
09 February 2014 02:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Frankfurt

We are meeting again! If you have any special requirements to attend or need some help, please try me in advance, we'll try to accommodate your needs.

Location will be published in time.

Discussion article for the meetup : Frankfurt meetup
Meetup : Berkeley: Weekly goals
by Nisan — 2014-01-22T18:16:38.107Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Berkeley: Weekly goals

WHEN:
22 January 2014 07:00:00PM (-0800)

WHERE:
2030 Addison, 3rd Floor, Berkeley, CA

Hello all, at today's meetup I'd like to start experimenting with an accountability practice other meetup groups have tried: Keeping a list of personal goals for the next week. If you're up for it, you'll describe your goal and how you plan to achieve it, and we'll enter it into the list this week. Next week, we'll report whether we achieved our goals, what worked, and what didn't.

Please arrive between 7pm and 7:30pm today. The exercise will begin at 7:30pm. It won't take very long, and we will hang out afterward. The CFAR office is at 2030 Addison, 3rd floor, Berkeley, near the Downtown Berkeley BART. If you find yourself locked out, text me at

http://i.imgur.com/Vcafy.png

Even though this takes place at CFAR, it's not a CFAR-sponsored event.

Discussion article for the meetup : Berkeley: Weekly goals
Do we underuse the genetic heuristic?
by Stefan_Schubert — 2014-01-22T17:37:26.608Z

Someone, say Anna, has uttered a certain proposition P, say "Betty is stupid", and we want to evaluate whether it is true or not. We can do this by investigating P directly - i.e. we disregard the fact that Anna has said that Betty is stupid, but look only at what we know about Betty's behaviour (and possibly, we try to find out more about it). Alternatively, we can do this indirectly, by evaluating Anna's credibility with respect to P. If we know, for instance, that Anna is in general very reliable, then we are likely to infer that Betty is indeed stupid, but if we know that Anna hates Betty and that she frequently bases her beliefs on emotion, we are not.

The latter kind of arguments are called ad hominem arguments, or, in Hal Finney's apt phrase, the genetic heuristic (I'm going to use these terms interchangeably here). They are often criticized, not the least within analytical philosophy, where the traditional view is that they are more often than not fallacious. Certainly the genetic heuristic is often applied in fallacious ways, some of which are pointed out in Yudkowsky's article on the topic. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that such fallacies would be much more common if they weren't so frequently pointed out by people (accussations of ad hominem fallacies are common in all sorts of debates). No doubt, we are biologically disposed to attack the person rather than what he is saying on irrelevant grounds.

The genetic heuristic is not always fallacious, though. If a reputable scientist tells us that P is true, where P falls under her domain, then we have reason to believe that P is true. Similarly, if we know that Liza is a compulsive liar, then we have reason to believe that P is false if Liza has said P.

We see that genetic reasoning can be both positive and negative - i.e. it can both be used to confirm, and to disconfirm, P. It should also be noted that negative genetic arguments typically only make sense if we assume that we generally put trust into what other people say - i.e. that we use a genetic argument to the effect that the fact that S having said P makes P more likely to be true. If people don't use such arguments, but only look at P directly to evaluate whether it is true or not, it is unclear what importance arguments that throw doubt on the reliability of S have, since it that case, knowing whether S is reli

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Meetup : Atlanta Meetup, Topic: How to Become Immortal
by Nova_Division — 2014-01-22T17:00:29.670Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Atlanta Meetup, Topic: How to Become Immortal

WHEN:
26 January 2014 07:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
491 Lindbergh Place NE Apt 618 Atlanta, GA 30324

Come join us! Our topic this time is how to become immortal. We'll be bring up the various organizations working towards this goal, cryonics, current research etc.

There will be presentation by Oge Nnadi based on the book "Ending Aging," linked here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/56456472/Aubrey-de-Grey-Ending-Aging

Please feel free to look over the book if you like, but it's not required!

We'll be doing our normal eclectic mix of self-improvement brainstorming, educational mini-presentations, structured discussion, unstructured discussion, and social fun and games times!

Check out ATLesswrong's facebook group, if you haven't already: https://www.facebook.com/groups/Atlanta.Lesswrong/ where you can connect with Atlanta Lesswrongers, suggest a topics for discussion at this meetup, and join our book club or study group!

Discussion article for the meetup : Atlanta Meetup, Topic: How to Become Immortal
Why are we not starting to map human values?
by  — 2014-01-22T14:03:45.990Z

I agree that trying to map all human values is extremely complex as articulated here [http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Complexity_of_value] , but the problem as I see it, is that we do not really have a choice - there has to be some way of measuring the initial AGI to see how it is handling these concepts.
I dont understand why we don’t try to prototype a high level ontology of core values for an AGI to adhere to - something that humans can discuss and argue about for many years before we actually build an AGI.

Law is a useful example which shows that human values cannot be absolutely quantified into a universal system. The law is constantly abused, misused and corrected so if a similar system were to be put into place for an AGI it could quickly lead to UFAI.

One of the interesting things about the law is that for core concepts like murder, the rules are well defined and fairly unambiguous, whereas more trivial things (in terms of risk to humans) like tax laws, parking laws are the bits that have a lot of complexity to them.
Studying and Part-time work/supplementary income
by Goobahman — 2014-01-22T02:22:00.639Z

Hi Less Wrong,

I'd like to draw on you for some advice.

I'm about to undertake studies, but will need some supplementary income to attain my desired standard of living while doing so.

Part-time work could be attained quite easily, but is likely to take the form of something fairly boring e.g. data entry/bar work.

I was thinking that there might be ways out there for me to learn a particular skill set that would enable me to work from home and at more flexible hours for a source of income, as well as providing me the opportunity to learn something new, given that so many people on here seem to do such things quite successfully.

Given my circumstances below what would you recommend:

I'm fairly intelligent, enjoying learning, and have strong social skills

I live in Sydney Australia

I have musical talents

I have a car

I lack softward development/programming skills

I have decent office application skills.

I'm willing to put the hours in to level up a new ability.

Any suggestions/Tips/criticisms are welcome.
Prescriptive vs. descriptive and objective vs. subjective definitions
by PhilGoetz — 2014-01-21T23:21:45.645Z

Imagine you're writing a Field Guide to Boats, and you want to know what you should include in your field guide. Barges? Rafts? These things?

You want something like a dictionary definition of boat. A descriptive definition that includes anything people commonly think of as a boat; an objective definition, because you're only writing one book, not a separate version for each reader.

Now imagine you're stranded on an island, and you open a bottle, and a genie comes out and gives you one wish, and you say, "I wish for a boat!", and the genie says, "Well, what's a boat?" And you know, because you've read stories, that the genie will take your definition of "boat" and try to screw you over. You'd better not read out the dictionary definition, or the genie will give you a toy boat, or a boat with a hole in it, or a kayak too small for you to fit into. You need a prescriptive, subjective definition of a thing that will transport you over water.

Too often I write a story, then read it and say, "Is that really a story?" It's easy to write something that fits existing theories of what a story is, and is emotionally powerful, yet seems to lack some integrity, relevance, or, hell, I might as well call it a "soul"--some magic stuff that makes a story satisfying.

I want to figure out what the magic stuff is so I can produce it consistently. So I've been blogging about the question, "What makes a narrative a story (to person P)?"

My blog quickly bogged down in unproductive debates about how I'm using the word "story". I'm trying to come up with a category definition that includes things I think are good dramatic stories, excludes things that I think are bad stories, and does not need to include poems, comedies, genre fiction, or meta-fiction. But people keep objecting that that isn't what the word "story" means.

True; it isn't. I'm trying to come up with a prescriptive, subjective definition of a dramatic story that says what a story ought to be in order to satisfy person P, exclusive of certain well-understood or highly-distinctive categories, so that I can write stories that satisfy a large number of people and also myself. But my readers are used to descriptive, objective definitions of story that describe things found in books, and can be used in public discourse without reference to a subject. It would be confusing if I said, "The 10 Best Dinosaur Porn Stories an...
Meetup : First Meetup in Hamburg, Germany
by Gunnar_Zarncke — 2014-01-21T23:18:23.758Z

Discussion article for the meetup : First Meetup in Hamburg, Germany

WHEN: 07 February 2014 07:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE: Einstein Bistro, Grindelberg 81-83, 20144 Hamburg, Germany

The first Meetup in Hamburg!

We will get to know each other and depending on time and interest do the following:

Discuss rationality topics (no politics or sports)

Play Liars Dice aka Bluff

Play Set (the game)

Play a calibration game (Wits and Wagers or a special variant)

For the latter you may bring a demanding guessing question e.g. "how many cars are registered in Hamburg?"

The Meetup is open-ended. You may ask for a ride.

I'd be happy if you could tell us whether you will participate so I can reserve accordingly. You can ask any questions in this brand-new mailing list: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/lesswrong-hamburg

The location is directly next to the train and bus station Hoheluft, easily reachable from campus, central station and the homes of some participants. We will sit in the back and have a sign so you can find us. Sorry to say but it being a restaurant you will have to pay for a dish or drink. On later meetups we may choose a different location if that suits you better.

Einstein Bistro: http://www.einstein-bistro.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=36%3Akontakt&id=74%3Ahoheluft&Itemid=60

Discussion article for the meetup : First Meetup in Hamburg, Germany
Decision Auctions aka "How to fairly assign chores, or decide who gets the last cookie"
by daenerys — 2014-01-21T21:13:19.363Z

After moving in with my new roomies (Danny and Bethany of Beeminder), I discovered they have a fair and useful way of auctioning off joint decisions. It helps you figure out how much you value certain chores or activities, and it guarantees that these decisions are worked out in a fair way. They call it "yootling", and wrote more about it here.
A quick example (Note: this only works if all participants are of the types of people who consider this sort of thing a Good Idea, and not A Grotesque Parody of Caring or whatnot):

Use Case: Who Picks up the Kids from Grandma's?

D and B are both busy working, but it's time to pick up the kids from their grandparents house. They decide to yootle for it.
B bids $100 (In a regular Normal Person exchange, this would be like saying "I'm elbows deep in code right now, and don't want to break flow. I'd really rather continue working right now, but of course I'll go if it's needed.")
D bids $15 (In a regular Normal Person exchange this would be like saying "I don't mind too much, though I do have other things to do now...")

So D "wins" the bid, and B pays him $15 to go get the kids from their grandma's.

Of course.... it would be a pain in the butt to constantly be paying each other, so instead they have a 10% chance of paying 10x the amount, and a 90% chance to pay nothing, using a random number generator.

This is made easier by the fact that we have a bot to run this, but before that they would use the high-tech solution of Holding Up Fingers.

We may do this multiple times per day, whenever there’s a good that we have shared ownership of and one of us wants to offload their shares onto the other person. The goods can be anything, e.g. the last brownie, but they’re more often “bads” like who will get up in the middle of the night with a vomiting child, or who will book plane tickets for a trip.

We find this an elegant means of assigning loathed tasks. The person who minded least winds up doing the chore, but gets compensated for it at a price that by their own estimation was fair.

Some other ways it can be implemented:

Joint purchase auction

The decision auction and variants are about allocating shared or partially shared resources to one person or the other, or picking one person to do something. Once in a while you have the opposite problem: deciding on a joint purchase.

Suppose Danny t

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Meetup : Social meetup in Raleigh
by evand — 2014-01-21T14:27:35.517Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Social meetup in Raleigh

WHEN:
23 January 2014 07:30:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
3709 Neil St, Raleigh, NC 27607

New location this time!

We'll have a followup to our previous meetup about persuasion techniques and defenses to them from Influence, with a somewhat more low-key social focus. For those that have been eagerly anticipating it, this is also the date and location for our friend Deniz' cider release party (Sourwood Brewing).

Discussion article for the meetup : Social meetup in Raleigh
Rationalists Are Less Credulous But Better At Taking Ideas Seriously
by Scott Alexander — 2014-01-21T02:18:17.720Z

Consider the following commonly-made argument: cryonics is unlikely to work. Trained rationalists are signed up for cryonics at rates much greater than the general population. Therefore, rationalists must be pretty gullible people, and their claims to be good at evaluating evidence must be exaggerations at best.
This argument is wrong, and we can prove it using data from the last two Less Wrong surveys.
The question at hand is whether rationalist training - represented here by extensive familiarity with Less Wrong material - makes people more likely to believe in cryonics.
We investigate with a cross-sectional study, looking at proto-rationalists versus experienced rationalists. Define proto-rationalists as those respondents to the Less Wrong survey who indicate they have been in the community for less than six months and have zero karma (usually indicative of never having posted a comment). And define experienced rationalists as those respondents to the Less Wrong survey who indicate they have been in the community for over two years and have >1000 karma (usually indicative of having written many well-received posts).
By these definitions, there are 93 proto-rationalists, who have been in the community an average of 1.3 months, and 134 experienced rationalists, who have been in the community an average of 4.5 years. Proto-rationalists generally have not read any rationality training material - only 20/93 had read even one-quarter of the Less Wrong Sequences. Experienced rationalists are, well, more experienced: two-thirds of them have read pretty much all the Sequence material.
Proto-rationalists thought that, on average, there was a 21% chance of an average cryonically frozen person being revived in the future. Experienced rationalists thought that, on average, there was a 15% chance of same. The difference was marginally significant (p < 0.1).
Marginal significance is a copout, but this isn't our only data source. Last year, using the same definitions, proto-rationalists assigned a 15% probability to cryonics working, and experienced rationalists assigned a 12% chance. We see the same pattern.
So experienced rationalists are consistently less likely to believe in cryonics than proto-rationalists, and rationalist training probably makes you less likely to believe cryonics will work.
On the other hand, 0% of proto-rationalists had signed up for cryonics comp...
Propagandizing Meta-Ethics in an Essay Contest
by  — 2014-01-20T23:30:53.521Z

So someone I follow on Facebook linked to this essay contest on the subject of: How Should Humanity Steer the Future? My urge to make a joke of it immediately kicked in. The impulse to joke turned into an impulse to actually submit an essay when the words "steering the future" set off a minor "ding!" in my head.

At least regarding AI, many papers and articles have already been published on what that problem is: even well-intentioned people could accidentally create a Completely or Partially Alien Mind-Design that has no care and no sympathy for us or our values. Should such a thing grow more powerful than us, it would proceed to kill us all. We would be in the way, as a bacterium is to us, and dealt with identically.

Blah blah blah blah.

To me personally, by sheer madness of personal preferences, that is not the interesting part. Danger, even existential danger, seems to me quite passe these days. In only the time I've been alive, we've been under threat of nuclear apocalypse via war between nation-states or nuclear-weapons usage by terrorist groups, global warming and other environmental damages are slowly destroying the only planetary-level habitat we humans have, and in the past five or so years we've been dealing with continental-level economic collapses and stagnation as well (I personally subscribe to the theory that capitalism itself is a human-Unfriendly optimization process, which is partially apropos here). Those are just the apocalypses: then we have to add in all the daily pains, indignities and deaths suffered by the vast majority of the world's people, many of whom are so inured to their suffering that they consider it a normal or even morally appropriate part of their lives. Only at the end of that vast, astronomical summation can we say we have totalled humanity's problems.

All that, only in the time I've been alive, for about 25 years now, even when, statistically speaking, I'm living in a steadily improving golden age (or at least a gilded age that's fighting to become a golden age). No previous generation of humanity was ever so rich, so educated, so able to dream! Why did I constantly feel myself to be well-past the Despair and Cynicism Event Horizons?

Which left the younger me asking: what's the point, then? How can it be that "everything's amazing...