trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Dissolving the Problem of Induction
by Liron — 2020-12-27T17:58:27.536Z

The Problem of Induction, first published by David Hume in 1739, is potentially a longstanding crack in the foundations of science. From LessWrong's tag:Induction page:

Modern views of induction state that any form of reasoning where the conclusion isn't necessarily entailed in the premises is a form of inductive reasoning [...] "The sun has always risen, so it will also rise tomorrow". [...] Contrary to deduction, induction can be wrong since the conclusions depend on the way the world actually is, not merely on the logical structure of the argument.

There has historically been a problem with the justification of the validity of induction. Hume argued that the justification for induction could either be a deduction or an induction. Since deductive reasoning only results in necessary conclusions and inductions can fail, the justification for inductive reasoning could not be deductive. But any inductive justification would be circular.

When I was first taught the Problem of Induction as a college student, I felt the same way as Bertrand Russell:

[Russell] expressed the view that if Hume’s problem cannot be solved, “there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity”.

I felt unsure—maybe not on a gut level, but on an intellectual level—about the solidity of the literal ground under my feet. Sure, the ground has been solid every day of my life, but why should it continue to be solid for even another second? What's the logic? What's the justification?

I didn't have a satisfactory answer at the time, so I just went on with my life. I was acting like a typical non-philosopher civilian, acting as if it's okay to just step over a crack in the foundation of science, taking a leap of faith that the whole sane world won't crumble like Russell warned, and going on with my other activities.

Then I read Eliezer's 2008 post on the topic, titled "Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom":

Why do I believe that the Sun will rise tomorrow?

Because I've seen the Sun rise on thousands of previous days.

Ah... but why do I believe the future will be like the past?

Even if I go past the mere surface observation of the Sun rising, to the apparently universal and exceptionless laws of gravitation and nuclear physics, then I am still left with the question: "Why do I believe this will also be true tomorrow?"

I could appeal to Occam's Razor, the principle of using the simplest

...
The Perversity of High Standards
by SocratesDissatisfied — 2020-12-27T14:37:54.556Z

Concept

A rational agent will follow a standard where the benefit he receives (or disbenefit he avoids) from following that standard, is less than the cost of following that standard.

In this way, raising standards can perversely disincentivise the behaviour those standards intend to promote; by raising the cost of complying with a standard above the benefit gained by doing so.

Exploration

Given the simplicity of the above concept, one might think that perversely high standards would be rare and easily avoided. However, my perception is that they are surprisingly impactful. One especially important example involves popular standards of political honesty in western democracies.

A common refrain in the popular culture of these societies is that politicians are “all corrupt”, “all liars”, or “all the same” (in the sense of “similarly awful” rather than “similarly wonderful”)[1]. One way to conceptualise this assessment is that the assessors set exceptionally high standards for political propriety[2]. For instance, they may believe that accepting any campaign contribution not derived from small donors constitutes corruption; that telling a single mistruth merits being labelled a liar; or that having a voting record of less than perfect ideological purity constitutes moral evil or cynicism.

But to the extent that politicians believe that – for instance – the public treat a single misstatement as equal to repeated and deliberate deception, their incentive to stay “honest” decreases markedly. The implicit standard for “honesty” here is exceptionally difficult and costly to meet[3], and therefore unlikely to warrant the effort required. Not only does this standard fail to incentivise the exceptional “honesty” it supposedly promotes, it also undermines politicians incentive to avoid far more severe deception. They and their opponents are going to be seen as liars in any case, so why not “go all in” and employ all advantages of deception, instead of pursuing an unrewarded honesty.

Following this theory, it is precisely those leaders with the least regard for truth who seem to have most capitalised on the decline in public trust for politicians[4]; with Trump in particular being able to shrug off accusations of corruption amongst a voter base who write off his opponents, and the US political system, as irredeemably crooked[5]. Something similar, t...
An open Christmas card to my stepfather
by KatjaGrace — 2020-12-27T12:30:23.975Z

Happy Christmas!

I made you a link post of things you might find interesting on the internet. (Please don’t feel obliged to look at them!)

Lots of love,
Katja
oxo

(Picture: Christmas Eve, by Carl Larson, 1904-5)

George Saunders, e.g. The Braindead Megaphone, and Tent City, USA

Epic tomato sorting machine

Slatestarcodex archives, e.g. on meaning and the problem of evil and thinking under conformity pressure (these are incidentally all funny stories, but the site is mostly non-fiction)

Test your ability to distinguish real people from AI generated faces (or to just see unreal people, look at thispersondoesnotexist.com)

Julia Galef, probably via Rationally Speaking Podcast

Robin Hanson: Politics isn’t about policy; The Great Filter - Are We Almost Past It?

Did President Truman not realize that Hiroshima was a city?

Politics and the English Language: I found the writing ironically uncompelling, but the idea interesting

Xkcd, e.g.

Informative ones: Earth’s temperature over time, chart of what improvements are worth the time

Hamilton the Musical

How to live for much longer in expectation
Asking For Help
by Neel Nanda — 2020-12-27T11:32:32.462Z
Link: neelnanda.io/blog/40-help

Introduction

I really suck at asking other people for help. I find it very anxiety inducing and aversive to think about. It sits at the intersection of a bunch of biases I have. Some part of me is convinced that I can do everything myself - that it is weakness, or being a burden to ask anything of someone else. Part of me is convinced that any cost to myself is fine, but a cost to someone else is a really big deal - a strong anxiety around bothering other people. Asking for help is rarely necessary, often I could get by without someone’s advice, or get it done on my own. There’s no urgency, and it feels much harder to value my time and welfare over other people’s. I feel afraid that my request or question will seem dumb or obvious, or that it’s a waste of their time. Especially if the other person seems high-status, or unfamiliar.

This triggers even when asking for help is the obviously correct thing to do. When I want a favour from a friend that I know they’ll enjoy giving, or could give effortlessly. If I’m working somewhere, and am confused, I feel a high aversion to asking my mentor, even though that’s the entire point of having a mentor.

Anecdotally, this bias also seems common in many of my friends. And when I’m people I respect for life advice, they often point to a general failure to ask for help. I think this is really, really dumb, and at times a pretty major bottleneck on my life. In this post, I want to make the case that asking for help is clearly the way to maximise total value, tips on getting the most out of help, and ways to be a fun person to help.

Some of the most common places this triggers for me are below. This advice applies across all of these examples, though I find it generally helpful to take a different perspective for eg asking friends for help, vs asking someone high status for career advice.

Asking a friend for a favour
Asking people for feedback
Asking for emotional support
Asking someone for career/life advice

Especially if they seem busy. highly-qualified, high status, or all of the above!

Asking people for an outside view/advice
Asking questions, trying to learn

This is an annoying topic to write a blog post about, because this advice can obviously be taken too far. Some people don’t ask for help enough, some people ask for help too much. And there are many times when aski...
How to reliably signal internal experience?
by df fd — 2020-12-27T11:18:14.451Z

So my friends told me that they think I was being defeatist and not trying the best I could to do what I said I want to do.

So I shrugged, Akrasia, am I right? And take on more work toward my professed goals.

Almost immediately, I meet severe internal resistance. A general sense of vague fatigue and tiredness, running out of spoons.

I reported this to my friends who continue to believe that I was standing in my own way to success.

I shrugged, inside-outside views time, I trust my friend's rational ability as much as mine, and if I look from the outside as if I am shirking it, how likely is it that I actually am?

I continue the intensified schedule until I got heartburn, which I assume to be from the stress since I haven't changed eating habit. I took it to mean that the intensified schedule is unsustainable long term.

eh have to try it to know it.

Looking back, however, it struck me how easy it is to explain to my friends that I am already at the limit by citing stress-induced heartburn compare to a vague sense of fatigue and tiredness, an insufficiency of spoons.

I would assume that it is better for me to stop before actual stress-induced anything happened since they would also sap at the already depleted willpower, take time to heal, and bad for health. But I also want my friends to spur me on when I appear to be slacking, social motivation is a thing you know?

The question is: is there any way I can signal "I am at my limit" without having to wait for my body to actually break down and report that?

[related "pain is not the unit of effort" and "pain is the unit of effort"]

a few solutions:

I can report "heartburn" without actually having heartburn just to signal my limit. I don't like this because it makes it hard for my friends to coordinate with me. I am saying untrue things for the sake of signaling, this is the path down the maze [or up the simulacra levels]. If my friends found out [and they probably would since I am a crappy liar], it would be very hard to communicate with them again.
I can do something else to signal my limit. e.g. "I am going to donate 500 bucks to X charity to prove what I am saying is at least that important". I am not sure it proves anything.

Unrelated, I am also wondering if I am teaching my body some bad habits, [i.e. body see: stress->report breakdown->stress goes away. body learns to report breakdown when st...
Luna Lovegood and the Chamber of Secrets - Part 11
by lsusr — 2020-12-27T09:03:19.624Z

Luna closed Professor Gilderoy Lockhart's office door behind her.

"I thought our next interview wasn't until Friday," Professor Lockhart said.

"You-Know-Who is alive. He transferred his soul to Harry Potter twelve years ago. I know because both of their real names is Tom Riddle," Luna showed him the map and explained how she had gone back in time, "Harry Potter is constructing a secret citadel inside the Hogwarts grounds from which he plans to rule the world. He even told me he plans to 'save the world', which is code for conquering it."

"It is not easy to kill a Dark Lord," said Professor Lockhart.

"We must take him alive," Luna said, "Tom Riddle has all the magical secrets of Salazar Slytherin. We need them to kill the nargle. Fortunately he is in the body of a 12-year-old. You can crush him with a Finite Incantatem and then stun him. In the best case you are heralded as the vanquisher of You-Know-Who. In the worst case we Obliviate him and forget this ever happened."

"We should alert the proper authorities," Professor Lockhart said.

"Cease the humility," Luna said, "Do you not have more confirmed kills than anyone in the ministry?"

"I take credit for the kills of paranoid Aurors who want to keep a low profile," Lockhart said, "We should tell Mad-Eye Moody. He can kill You-Know-Who. I can take the credit. You can invent an exciting story about me for The Quibbler. Everybody wins except You-Know-Who."

"Mad-Eye Moody knows You-Know-Who is abusing his power. It is a joke to them. You know Mad-Eye's feelings about the law," Luna said.

"If Harry's behavior is acceptable to Mad-Eye then it is acceptable to me too," said Professor Lockhart. He rested his feet on his desk.

"Mad-Eye doesn't know about the nargle," said Luna.

"What's a nargle?" said Professor Lockhart.

Luna unfolded the Marauder's Map. Luna carefully read off the name of each being in Hogwarts until exactly one of them gave her a feeling of unimportance. She read it aloud. The name smelled warm and tasted rough on her ears. The nargle ate Luna's shoes by her bed in the Ravenclaw Common Room.

"Look here at this dot in the Ravenclaw Common Room named ˢ̴̨͔̻̘͆͌̎̾͑́̓͒̎́̎̐͘͠ͅε̵̧̭̲̭̰̭̏̾̌̂̐̋̾̓͗̽̚͠ͅl̵̢̡̧̘̫̼͙̥̖͍̫̫̖͔̤̥̆̔̎̓͆̈́̓́̎͜d̴̨̨̨͙̳̻̫̠̜̹̥͝Σ̷̛͇̙̻̪̆̀ʅ̵̢̡̖̱̯͇̙͙̜̟͔̼̭͚͌̊̽̈́̋̂̃̈́̐̈̏̓̿̈́̑Ⱡ̸͈͛͑̐̌̍̇̄̉̎̍̚̕͘̕͝͝͝ɾ̵̭̈́̆͝ι̵̧̳̮̥͉̂̄̐̀͆̎̏̈́͘̕̕ƚ̷̻͈̣̜̺̞̼̿̓́̽̽̐͐̕͝ƈ̶̡̩̯̰͙̦̲̀̓̀̅̊̇̌̽̋͗̎̚ͅԋ̸̺̟̳̠̰͔͉͎͈̳̳̻͚̩̋̈́̋̀̽̅͘͘̚Ꭷ̷̳͔͈̗͖̞̦̟̱͔͍̫̬̞̓̿́̈́͊́ʀ̸̧̫̥̙̞̱̩̄̊̅̊...
In software engineering, what are the upper limits of Language-Based Security?
by mako yass — 2020-12-27T05:50:46.772Z

Given the most security-amenable language you know, or that you could imagine building (or given some tools and processes that change the qualities of an existing language), by what proportion could we reduce the incidence rate of major security errors? In what domains could incidence be reduced all the way to zero?

Are there situations where your more secure language can't currently be used, because it imposes higher development or runtime costs?
Martin Seligman’s “Authentic Happiness”
by David Gross — 2020-12-27T05:06:39.104Z

Martin E.P. Seligman (W) is a pioneer of “positive psychology” (W). His book Authentic Happiness (2002) is a pop-psych examination of how people can use positive psychology in their lives (I've put page number references in superscript below).

Positive psychology

Positive psychology supplements traditional psychology, which often focuses on fixing pathologies and bringing people up to a normal baseline, by aiming to help people live better, happier, more meaningful lives that exceed such a baseline.

The discipline, according to Seligman, has three focuses:xiii

positive emotions (e.g. confidence, hope, trust). These are fleeting but important to living a flourishing life.
positive traits (or sometimes “strengths,” “virtues,” or “abilities”). These are characteristic, abiding dispositions.
positive institutions. These are social and political structures and practices that support the virtues.

Concentrate on your strengths

Seligman believes everyone has certain strengths already (“signature strengths”), and you should concentrate on using those strengths as much as possible rather than on trying to improve your weaknesses:

“I do not believe that you should devote overly much effort to correcting your weaknesses. Rather, I believe that the highest success in living and the deepest emotional satisfaction comes from building and using your signature strengths.”13

(For the record, I disagree.)

Happiness is where it’s at

This is in part due to Seligman’s belief that simple “happiness” (as opposed to, say, Aristotle’s more complex eudaimonia) is our end goal. To use your signature strengths feels easy, natural, and competent; by contrast strengthening our weaknesses can be hard, frustrating, and tiring; so while the latter may help make you more well-rounded and capable, the former is more conducive to happiness.

What’s good about happiness isn’t just the enjoyable feeling itself, but that when we feel happy we are better at forming social connections, we are more “expansive, tolerant, and creative,” we learn better, and we are mentally quicker.35–36 (Though there are some conflicting studies suggesting depressed people have better critical thinking skills.37–38) Happier people are healthier and live longer. They are more satisfied in their jobs, and tend to earn more and get better employee evaluations. Two other things that seem to correlate with happiness are connection and al...
My Model of the New COVID Strain and US Response
by Jacob Falkovich — 2020-12-27T04:34:23.796Z

Cross-posted from Putanumonit, I will likely keep the post more up-to-date there than on here as my estimates change. This was also intended for a non-LW audience, since smarter people than me have provided their estimates here and you shouldn't overweight me because I have my own blog. I am including some new info and analysis that wasn't in Zvi's post, so update accordingly.

There is evidence of a new highly-infectious strain of COVID-19 emerging in the UK and other countries. This post is an elaboration of my current model of it, as promised in my

review of LessWrong’s collection on

Epistemology

. Most of the information I have on this new COVID variant comes from

this post by Zvi

, the links from it, and comments. Read those if you haven’t yet.

Though I usually strive to have timeless content on my blog, I’m making another COVID exception. I’ve heard from dozens of people who were able to prepare for COVID’s first outbreak as a result of reading

Seeing The Smoke

, and this post may end up even timelier than the last. I anticipate both my model and the evidence to change rapidly, everything below is a snapshot of what I believe as of Christmas Day 2020. Reminder: I am not an expert on this even compared to other non-experts in the LessWrong comments.

The median prediction on

Zvi’s LW post

is around 60% that the new variant is at least 50% more transmissible and same for there being a third COVID wave in the US:

I would add a few things without straying too far from the crowd’s wisdom.

First, I would revise the crowd’s estimate for the first question down for no other reason than that the poll came at the end of a post titled We’re Fucked, It’s Over. If ever there was going to be a framing effect pushing estimates upwards, this would be it. There are also

more alternative explanations

for the information coming out of the UK than Zvi accounted for.

Instead of just saying that that there’s a 60% chance it has a 50% higher transmissibility, I would break it down something like this:

35% that the new strain is a nothingburger.
30% that it’s slightly more transmissible, say with an effective reproduction rate (rt) 20% higher.
30% that it’s significantly more transmissible, e.g. 70% higher.
5% in the Captain Malcolm Reynolds probability bucket.

I also believe it very likely that new variant is already present in the US, given that a dozen flights from London have landed in N...
Simultaneous Randomized Chess
by jefftk — 2020-12-27T03:30:06.937Z

David and I played around with
the idea of a simultaneous chess variant until we found one that seems
balanced. Rules:

Both players secretly select a move.

If both can execute without conflict, both do.

If both can execute only in a specific order,
they are executed in that order.

Otherwise, one move is discarded at random and the other executes.

You may not choose a move that would end with your king in check, given
the current board position.

You win by capturing or checkmating the opponent's king.

In selecting a move you choose a maximum number of spaces, but a
capture before reaching the maximum counts as a successful
move.

You may select a move if it could be legal after some opponent
move. If it ends up not being legal, it doesn't happen.

To capture en passant you must attempt the capture
simultaneously.

If you are using a clock, it only counts the time between
the move selections.

Consider this position:

Say White chooses f3-f7 and Black anticipates that and chooses e8-f7.
Black is allowed to make this move because (2) does not apply and (5)
does. If we resolved Black's move first then only White's move could
happen, but if we resolve White's first then both can happen, so we
get the latter:

First White takes the pawn at f7, then Black takes the queen at f7.
Alternatively, Black could have selected f7-f6. In that case the only
way for both to happen would have been for Black's moved to happen
first, at which point (4) means White's queen captures at f6 instead
of f7:

This is a bad situation for White, because pawns very powerful.
Because a diagonal move only succeeds if it is a capture, (1.3) means
Black selecting g7-f6 forces a 50-50 for the White queen. Whereas, if
the queen were threatened by any other piece it could just move away
(1.2).

In writing this up I found that there is already a Simultaneous
Chess variant. That version has a system of "initiative" to
handle conflict resolution, which seems like it would play quite
differently.

Comment via: facebook
The Good Try Rule
by DirectedEvolution — 2020-12-27T02:38:11.168Z

I didn't really try the Zettelkasten Method. I jotted a few notes on cards, complete with indexing designations, over the course of a day. Then the notecards migrated to a back corner of my desk, and eventually made their way to the bottom of the Big Bin Of Office Supplies. Such has always been the fate of my paper journals.

I reverted to my habit of jotting ideas into LessWrong draft posts. The best camera is the one that's with you. Perhaps the best note-taking system is the one you actually use. If a post catches fire and I publish it, I may remember and pursue the idea in the future. If not, I'm fine with forgetting about those half-baked ideas. Zettelkasten is for letting you write freely and link ideas together without the structure imposed by a page. Instead of having a huge number of linked notecards, I have a web of published ideas that are accumulating over time. Maybe I don't need a new system.

But what would have happened if I'd really invested in Zettelkasten, even though it didn't grab me at first?

Some people don't do enough experimentation. That sounds like akrasia. Others let failed experiments drag on too long. There's the sunk cost fallacy, perhaps, or just sheer force of habit.

I tend to start experiments impulsively, with no firm commitments, and give up when the new habit doesn't catch on. With Zettelkasten, I bought the note cards after I finished reading the how-to post; jotted in them for an hour or two; and forgot about them. It was only a few dollars and a few minutes: guess it wasn't all it's cracked up to be.

The gears of symbolic experimentation

This is symbolic experimentation, and it's worse than doing nothing at all. I can feel as though I've explored many ways to optimize my life, when in fact I've been accumulating failed attempts to change my habits. The anecdotal opinions I gather from these experiences are worse than sheer ignorance. They're a bunch of fish stories.

Symbolic experimentation starts with a suggestion. Try Zettelkasten! Try running! Try art!

Next, there's an action you can easily take to "get started." Buy notecards! Go for a run! Smoke weed and get out your colored pencils!

And that's it. A suggestion and an immediate actionable step are the gears of symbolic experimentation. It's a motivational machine just stable enough to crank out some of your money or attention before the gears fall apart.

To turn symboli...