trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
[LINK] "Scott and Scurvy": a reminder of the messiness of scientific progress
by hesperidia — 2013-02-14T02:02:26.421Z

http://idlewords.com/2010/03/scott_and_scurvy.htm

Now, I had been taught in school that scurvy had been conquered in 1747, when the Scottish physician James Lind proved in one of the first controlled medical experiments that citrus fruits were an effective cure for the disease. From that point on, we were told, the Royal Navy had required a daily dose of lime juice to be mixed in with sailors’ grog, and scurvy ceased to be a problem on long ocean voyages.

But here was a Royal Navy surgeon in 1911 apparently ignorant of what caused the disease, or how to cure it. Somehow a highly-trained group of scientists at the start of the 20th century knew less about scurvy than the average sea captain in Napoleonic times. Scott left a base abundantly stocked with fresh meat, fruits, apples, and lime juice, and headed out on the ice for five months with no protection against scurvy, all the while confident he was not at risk. What happened?

This article is a vivid illustration of just how nonlinear and downright messy science actually is, and how little the superficial presentation of science as neat "progress" reflects the reality of the field.
Meetup : Vienna Meetup 9th March
by Ratcourse — 2013-02-13T21:35:39.396Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Vienna Meetup 9th March

WHEN:
09 March 2013 04:00:00PM (+0100)

WHERE:
Schottengasse 2, 1010 Innere Stadt (1.Bez)

Cafe im schottenstift.

Mainly this is a meeting to kickstart the vienna lesswrong/rationality group. We will get to know each other and discuss ways to promote a rational
lifestyle.

Confirmed attendees:
Five attendees so far, 3 of whom are working on creating a rationality education project.

See you there.

Discussion article for the meetup : Vienna Meetup 9th March
Higher than the most high
by Stuart_Armstrong — 2013-02-13T16:10:48.091Z

In an earlier post, I talked about how we could deal with variants of the Heaven and Hell problem - situations where you have an infinite number of options, and none of them is a maximum. The solution for a (deterministic) agent was to try and implement the strategy that would reach the highest possible number, without risking falling into an infinite loop.

Wei Dai pointed out that in the cases where the options are unbounded in utility (ie you can get arbitrarily high utility), then there are probabilistic strategies that give you infinite expected utility. I suggested you could still do better than this. This started a conversation about choosing between strategies with infinite expectation (would you prefer a strategy with infinite expectation, or the same plus an extra dollar?), which went off into some interesting directions as to what needed to be done when the strategies can't sensibly be compared with each other...

Interesting though that may be, it's also helpful to have simple cases where you don't need all these subtleties. So here is one:

Omega approaches you and Mrs X, asking you each to name an integer to him, privately. The person who names the highest integer gets 1 utility; the other gets nothing. In practical terms, Omega will reimburse you all utility lost during the decision process (so you can take as long as you want to decide). The first person to name a number gets 1 utility immediately; they may then lose that 1 depending on the eventual response of the other. Hence if one person responds and the other doesn't, they get the 1 utility and keep it. What should you do?

In this case, a strategy that gives you a number with infinite expectation isn't enough - you have to beat Mrs X, but you also have to eventually say something. Hence there is a duel of (likely probabilistic) strategies, implemented by bounded agents, with no maximum strategy, and each agent trying to compute the maximal strategy they can construct without falling into a loop.
The Fundamental Question - Rationality computer game design
by Kaj_Sotala — 2013-02-13T13:45:25.024Z

I sometimes go around saying that the fundamental question of rationality is Why do you believe what you believe?

-- Eliezer in Quantum Non-Realism

I was much impressed when they finally came out with a PC version of DragonBox, and I got around to testing it on some children I knew. Two kids, one of them four and the other eight years old, ended up blazing through several levels of solving first-degree equations while having a lot of fun doing so, even though they didn't know what it was that they were doing. That made me think that there has to be some way of making a computer game that would similarly teach rationality skills at the 5-second level. Some game where you would actually be forced to learn useful skills if you wanted to make progress.

After playing around with some ideas, I hit upon the notion of making a game centered around the Fundamental Question. I'm not sure whether this can be made to work, but it seems to have promise. The basic idea: you are required to figure out the solution to various mysteries by collecting various kinds of evidence. Some of the sources of evidence will be more reliable than others. In order to hit upon the correct solution, you need to consider where each piece of evidence came from, and whether you can rely on it.

Gameplay example

Now, let's go into a little more detail. Let's suppose that the game has a character called Bob. Bob tells you that tomorrow, eight o'clock, there will be an assassination attempt on Market Square. The fact that Bob has told you this is evidence for the claim being true, so the game automatically records the fact that you have such a piece of evidence, and that it came from Bob.

(Click on the pictures in case you don't see them properly.)

But how does Bob know that? You ask, and it turns out that Alice told him. So next, you go and ask Alice. Alice is confused and says that she never said anything about any assassination attempt: she just said that something big is going to be happen at the Market Square at that time, she heard it from the Mayor. The game records two new pieces of evidence: Alice's claim of something big happening at the Market Square tomorrow (which she heard from the Mayor), and her story of what she actually told Bob. Guess that Bob isn't a very reliable source of evidence: he has a tendency to come up with fancy invented details.

Or is he? After all, your sole knowledge ...
Realism : Direct or Indirect?
by kremlin — 2013-02-13T09:40:18.946Z

Stanford Encyclopedia : Perception
Wikipedia : Direct and Indirect Realism

On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

When I was first initiated to the conversation, I immediately took the indirect side -- There is a ball, photons bounce off the ball, the frequency of those photons is changed by some properties of the ball, the photons hit my retina activating light-sensitive cells, those cells send signals to my brain communicating that they were activated, the signals make it to the visual cortex and...you know...some stuff happens, and I experience the sight of a ball.

So, my first thought in the conversation about Indirect vs Direct realism was that there was a lot of stuff in between the ball and my experience of it, so, it must be indirect.

But then I found that direct realists don't actually disagree about any part of that sequence of events I described above. For them as well, at least the few that have bothered to respond, photons bounce off a ball, interact with our retinas, send signals to the brain, etc. The physical process is apparently the same for both sides of the debate.

And when two sides vehemently disagree on something, and then when the question is broken down into easy, answerable questions you find that they actually agree on every relevant question, that tends to be a pretty good hint that it's a wrong question.

So, is this a wrong question? Is this just a debate about definitions? Is it a semantic argument, or is there a meaningful difference between Direct and Indirect Realism? In the paraphrased words of Eliezer, "Is there any way-the-world-could-be—any state of affairs—that corresponds to Direct Realism being true, or Indirect Realism being true?"
[LINK] Open Source Software Developer with Terminal Illness Hopes to Opt Out of Death
by lsparrish — 2013-02-13T05:57:55.058Z

Aaron Winborn writes:

TLDR: http://venturist.info/aaron-winborn-charity.html

So maybe you've heard about my plight, in which I wrestle Lou Gehrig in this losing battle to stay alive. And I use the phrase "staying alive" loosely, as many would shudder at the thought of becoming locked in with ALS, completely paralyzed, unable to move a muscle other than your eyes.

But that's only half the story. Wait for the punchline.

As if the physical challenges of adapting to new and increasingly debilitating disabilities were not enough, my wife and two young daughters are forced to watch helplessly as the man they knew loses the ability to lift a fork or scratch an itch, who just two years ago was able to lift his infant daughter and run with the 7-year-old. The emotional strain on my family is more than any family should have to bear. Not to mention the financial difficulties, which include big purchases such as a wheelchair van and home modifications, and ultimately round the clock nursing care, all of it exacerbated by the fact that we have had to give up my income both because of the illness and to qualify for disability and Medicaid.

Meet me, Aaron Winborn, software developer and author of Drupal Multimedia, champion of the open source software movement.

Years ago, I worked for the lady of death herself, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, the author of On Death and Dying. Of course, I knew that one day I would need to confront death, but like most people, I assumed it would be when I was old, not in the prime of my life. Not that I'm complaining; I have lived a full life, from living in a Buddhist monastery to living overseas, from marrying the woman of my dreams to having two wonderful daughters, from teaching in a radical school to building websites for progressive organizations, from running a flight simulator for the US Navy to working as a puppeteer.

I accept the fact of my inevitable death. But accepting death does not, I believe, mean simply rolling over and letting that old dog bite you. Regardless of the prevalent mindset in society that says that people die and so should you, get over it, I believe that the reality we experience of people living only to a few decades is about to be turned upside down.

Ray Kurzweil spells out a coming technological singularity, in which accelerating technologies reach a critical mass and we reach a post-hum

...
Questions for Moral Realists
by Peter Wildeford — 2013-02-13T05:44:44.948Z

My meta-ethics are basically that of Luke's Pluralistic Moral Reductionism. (UPDATE: Elaborated in my Meta-ethics FAQ.)

However, I was curious as to whether this "Pluralistic Moral Reductionism" counts as moral realism or anti-realism. Luke's essay says it depends on what I mean by "moral realism". I see moral realism as broken down into three separate axes:

There's success theory, the part that I accept, which states that moral statements like "murder is wrong" do successfully refer to something real (in this case, a particular moral standard, like utilitarianism -- "murder is wrong" refers to "murder does not maximize happiness").

There's unitary theory, which I reject, that states there is only one "true" moral standard rather than hundreds of possible ones.

And then there's absolutism theory, which I reject, that states that the one true morality is rationally binding.

I don't know how many moral realists are on LessWrong, but I have a few questions for people who accept moral realism, especially unitary theory or absolutism theory. These are "generally seeking understanding and opposing points of view" kind of questions, not stumper questions designed to disprove or anything. While I'm doing some more reading on the topic, if you're into moral realism, you could help me out by sharing your perspective.

~

Why is there only one particular morality?

This goes right to the core of unitary theory -- that there is only one true theory of morality. But I must admit I'm dumbfounded at how any one particular theory of morality could be "the one true one", except in so far as someone personally chooses that theory over others based on preferences and desires.

So why is there only one particular morality? And what is the one true theory of morality? What makes this theory the one true one rather than others? How do we know there is only one particular theory? What's inadequate about all the other candidates?

~

Where does morality come from?

This gets me a bit more background knowledge, but what is the ontology of morality? Some concepts of moral realism have an idea of a "moral realm", while others reject this as needlessly queer and spooky. But essentially, what is grounding morality? Are moral facts contingent; could morality have been different? Is it possible to make it different in th...
Questions for Moral Realists
by Peter Wildeford — 2013-02-13T05:42:21.888Z

My meta-ethics are basically that of Luke's [Pluralistic Moral Reductionism](http://lesswrong.com/lw/5u2/pluralistic_moral_reductionism/). You can see details on my blog series, starting with ["The Meaning of Morality"](http://www.greatplay.net/essays/the-meaning-of-morality).

However, I was curious as to whether this "Pluralistic Moral Reductionism" counts as moral realism or anti-realism. Luke's essay says it depends on what I mean by "moral realism". I see moral realism as broken down into three separate axes:

There's **success theory**, the part that I accept, which states that moral statements like "murder is wrong" do successfully refer to something real (in this case, a particular moral standard, like utilitarianism -- "murder is wrong" refers to "murder does not maximize happiness").

There's **unitary theory**, which I reject, that states there is only one "true" moral standard rather than hundreds of possible ones.

And then there's **absolutism theory**, which I reject, that states that the one true morality is rationally binding.

I don't know how many moral realists are on LessWrong, but I have a few questions for people who accept moral realism, especially unitary theory or absolutism theory. These are "generally seeking understanding and opposing points of view" kind of questions, not stumper questions designed to disprove or anything. While I'm doing some more reading on the topic, if you're into moral realism, you could help me out by sharing your perspective.

~

[size=130]Why is there only one particular morality?[/size]

This goes right to the core of unitary theory -- that there is only one true theory of morality. But I must admit I'm dumbfounded at how any one particular theory of morality could be "the one true one", except in so far as someone personally chooses that theory over others based on preferences and desires.

So why is there only one particular morality? And what is the one true theory of morality? What makes this theory the one true one rather than others? How do we know there is only one particular theory? What's inadequate about all the other candidates?

~

[size=130]Where does morality come from?[/size]

This gets me a bit more background knowledge, but what is the ontology of morality? Some concepts of moral realism have an idea of a "moral realm", while others reject...
[SEQ RERUN] The Baby-Eating Aliens (1/8)
by MinibearRex — 2013-02-13T05:29:57.295Z

Today's post, The Baby-Eating Aliens (1/8) was originally published on 30 January 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Future explorers discover an alien civilization, and learns something unpleasant about their civilization.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Value is Fragile, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : London Meetup, 24th Feb
by philh — 2013-02-13T00:02:47.786Z

Discussion article for the meetup : London Meetup, 24th Feb

WHEN: 24 February 2013 02:00:00PM (+0000)

WHERE: Holborn, London

A meetup in the Shakespeare's Head pub by Holborn tube station. We meet every other Sunday at 2pm. Everyone is welcome.

We also have a Google group.

Discussion article for the meetup : London Meetup, 24th Feb
Meetup : Montreal LessWrong Meetup - The Science of Winning at Life
by Paul_G — 2013-02-12T21:19:24.569Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Montreal LessWrong Meetup - The Science of Winning at Life

WHEN:
18 February 2013 06:30:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
655 Avenue du Président Kennedy, Montréal, QC H3A 3H9

Weekly meeting of the Montreal LessWrong Meetup group.

We've decided to look into the Science of Winning at Life. You can read the sequence here (http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/The_Science_of_Winning_at_Life) if you're interested.

See you there!

Discussion article for the meetup : Montreal LessWrong Meetup - The Science of Winning at Life
Is suicide high-status?
by Stabilizer — 2013-02-12T09:41:19.788Z

I sometimes have thoughts of suicide. That does not mean I would ever come within a mile of committing the act of suicide. But my brain does simulate it; though I do try to always reduce such thoughts.

But what I have noticed is that 'suicide' is triggered in my mind whenever I think of some embarrassing event, real or imagined. Or an event in which I'm obviously a low-status actor. This leads me to think that suicide might be a high-status move, in the sense that its goal is to recover status after some event which caused a big drop in status. Consider the following instances when suicide is often considered:

One-sided break-ups of romantic relationships. The party who has been 'dumped' (for the lack of a better word), has obviously taken a giant status hit. In this case, suicide is often threatened.

A samurai committing seppuku. The samurai has lost in battle. Clearly, a huge drop in status (aka 'honor').

PhD student says he/she can't take it anymore. A PhD is a constant hit in status: you aren't smart enough, you don't have much money, and you don't yet have intellectual status.

Further, suicide (or suicidal behavior leading to death) seems to have conferred status to artists. Examples: Kurt Cobain, Amy Winehouse, Jimi Hendrix, Hunter S. Thompson, Ernest Hemingway, David Foster Wallace and many more. I'm not saying that they committed suicide due to a pressure to achieve high-status (though that may be the case, I'm not sure). What I am saying is that suicide has been associated with high-status.

Further, after a person is dead, he/she is almost always celebrated (at least for a while) and all their faults are forgotten.

My theory: in many low-status situations, an instinctive way to recover status is to say that you are too good for this game and check-out. In fact, children (and adults) will often just leave a game they're not very good at and disparage the rest of the players for playing. And suicide is the ultimate check-out. This theory is motivated by observations of my own brain going through thoughts of suicide. They almost always consist of imagining other people crying about my death and saying what an awesome person he was. And about how he was just too smart to be able to live in this world.

Do you think this theory has some weight? I'm certain that I'm not the first person to think of this. But a quick Google didn't yiel

...
[SEQ RERUN] Value is Fragile
by MinibearRex — 2013-02-12T01:32:09.073Z

Today's post, Value is Fragile was originally published on 29 January 2009. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

An interesting universe, that would be incomprehensible to the universe today, is what the future looks like if things go right. There are a lot of things that humans value that if you did everything else right, when building an AI, but left out that one thing, the future would wind up looking dull, flat, pointless, or empty. Any Future not shaped by a goal system with detailed reliable inheritance from human morals and metamorals, will contain almost nothing of worth.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was 31 Laws of Fun, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Meetup : Cambridge, MA third-Sunday meetup
by jimrandomh — 2013-02-11T23:48:58.812Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Cambridge, MA third-Sunday meetup

WHEN:
18 February 2013 02:00:00PM (-0500)

WHERE:
25 Ames St Cambridge, MA 02138

Cambridge/Boston-area Less Wrong meetups recur on the first and third Sunday of every month, 2pm at the MIT Landau Building [25 Ames St, Bldg 66], room 148.

Discussion article for the meetup : Cambridge, MA third-Sunday meetup
A confusion about deontology and consequentialism
by  — 2013-02-11T19:19:03.805Z

I think there’s a confusion in our discussions of deontology and consequentialism. I’m writing this post to try to clear up that confusion. First let me say that this post is not about any territorial facts. The issue here is how we use the philosophical terms of art ‘consequentialism’ and ‘deontology’.

The confusion is often stated thusly: “deontological theories are full of injunctions like ‘do not kill’, but they generally provide no (or no interesting) explanations for these injunctions.” There is of course an equivalently confused, though much less common, complaint about consequentialism.

This is confused because the term ‘deontology’ in philosophical jargon picks out a normative ethical theory, while the question ‘how do we know that it is wrong to kill?’ is not a normative but a meta-ethical question. Similarly, consequentialism contains in itself no explanation for why pleasure or utility are morally good, or why consequences should matter to morality at all. Nor does consequentialism/deontology make any claims about how we know moral facts (if there are any). That is also a meta-ethical question.

Some consequentialists and deontologists are also moral realists. Some are not. Some believe in divine commands, some are hedonists. Consequentialists and deontologists in practice always also subscribe to some meta-ethical theory which purports to explain the value of consequences or the source of injunctions. But consequentialism and deontology as such do not. In order to avoid strawmaning either the consequentialist or the deontologist, it’s important to either discuss the comprehensive views of particular ethicists, or to carefully leave aside meta-ethical issues.

This Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article provides a helpful overview of the issues in the consequentialist-deontologist debate, and is careful to distinguish between ethical and meta-ethical concerns.

SEP article on Deontology