trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Suggestions of posts on the AF to review
by adamShimi — 2021-02-16T12:40:52.520Z

How does one write a good and useful review of a technical post on the Alignment Forum?

I don’t know. Like many people, I tend to comment and give feedback on posts closely related to my own research, or to write down my own ideas when reading the paper. Yet this is quite different from the quality peer-review that you can get (if you’re lucky) in more established fields. And from experience, such quality reviews can improve the research dramatically, give some prestige to it, and help people navigate the field.

In an attempt to understand what makes a good review for the Alignment Forum, Joe Collman, Jérémy Perret (Gyrodiot on LW) and me are launching a project to review many posts in depth. The goal is to actually write reviews of various posts, get feedback on their usefulness from authors and readers alike, and try to extract from them some knowledge about how to go about doing such reviews for the field. We hope to have enough insights to eventually write some guidelines that could be used in an official AF review process.

On that note, despite the support of members of the LW team, this project isn’t official. It’s just the three of us trying out something.

Now, the reason for the existence of this post (and why it is a question) is that we’re looking for posts to review. We already have some in mind, but they are necessarily biased towards what we’re more comfortable about. This is where you come in, to suggest a more varied range of posts.

Anything posted on the AF goes, although we will not take into account things that are clearly not “research outputs” (like transcripts of podcasts or pointers to surveys). This means that posts about specific risks, about timelines, about deconfusion, about alignment schemes, and more, are all welcome.

We would definitely appreciate it if you add a reason to your suggestion, to help us decide whether to include the post on our selection. Here is a (non-exhaustive) list of possible reasons:

This post is one of the few studying this very important question
This is my post and I want some feedback
This post was interesting but I cannot decide what to make of it
This post is very representative of a way to do AI Alignment research
This post is very different from most of AI Alignment research
…

Thanks in advance, and we’re excited about reading your suggestions!
Heliocentrism in the ancient era
by ForensicOceanography — 2021-02-16T08:34:40.133Z
Link: https://forensicoceanography.wordpress.com/2021/02/16/heliocentrism-in-the-ancient-era/

[epistemic status: mainly based on Lucio Russo's papers, and on my personal research on the sources]

TL;DR: Although it is widely believed that Aristarchus' heliocentric theory was rejected by his contemporaries, we do not have much evidence supporting this belief. We have too few surviving texts to decide, but some of them seem to hint that many Hellenistic astronomers may actually have accepted heliocentrism.

The aim of this post is to provide evidence that heliocentrim was a respected theory (and possibly even the expert consensus) among astronomers in the third and second century BCE. In the first section, we will see that we have no reason to believe that Aristarchus was condemned for his theory. In the second section, I list some ancient sources that show that heliocentrism had at least some followers among ancient scientists. Finally, in the third section we will see a possible way in which Hellenistic scientists could may have convinced themselves that heliocentism is true.

I. Aristarchus was never accused of impiety

The belief that Aristarchus was condemned originated from the one of the most puzzling dialogues of Plutarch, On the face which appears in the orb of the Moon. We do not have the full text of this dialogue, but in the beginning of the surviving part (Plut. De Faciae 6) it is written (in the translation of Harold Cherniss):

Thereupon Lucius laughed and said: ‘Oh, sir, just don't bring suit against us for impiety as Cleanthes thought that the Greeks ought to lay an action for impiety against Aristarchus the Samian on the ground that he was disturbing the hearth of the universe because he sought to save (the) phenomena by assuming that the heaven is at rest while the earth is revolving along the ecliptic and at the same time is rotating about its own axis.

Cherniss translated "Cleanthes accused Aristarchus" based on the accepted greek text, which put Cleanthes in the nominative case (Κλεάνθης), as the subject of the sentence, and Aristarchus in the accusative case (Ἀρίσταρχον), as -no pun intended- the receiver of the accusation. Except that this is not what is written in the original manuscript. The original text of On the face of the moon survives in two codicis (Parisinus B and Parisinus E), and in both of them Aristarchus is in the nominative case (Ἀρίσταρχος) and Cleanthes is in the nominative (Κλεάνθη). So, if we read the original, it...
Remember that to value something infinitely is usually to give it a finite dollar value
by KatjaGrace — 2021-02-16T06:40:15.664Z

Just an occasional reminder that if you value something so much that you don’t want to destroy it for nothing, then you’ve got to put a finite dollar value on it. Things just can’t be infinitely more important than other things, in a world where possible trades weave everything together. A nice illustration from Arbital:

An experiment in 2000–from a paper titled “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals”–asked subjects to consider the dilemma of a hospital administrator named Robert:

Robert can save the life of Johnny, a five year old who needs a liver transplant, but the transplant procedure will cost the hospital $1,000,000 that could be spent in other ways, such as purchasing better equipment and enhancing salaries to recruit talented doctors to the hospital. Johnny is very ill and has been on the waiting list for a transplant but because of the shortage of local organ donors, obtaining a liver will be expensive. Robert could save Johnny’s life, or he could use the $1,000,000 for other hospital needs.

The main experimental result was that most subjects got angry at Robert for even considering the question.

After all, you can’t put a dollar value on a human life, right?

But better hospital equipment also saves lives, or at least one hopes so. 4 It’s not like the other potential use of the money saves zero lives.

Let’s say that Robert has a total budget of $100,000,000 and is faced with a long list of options such as these:

$100,000 for a new dialysis machine, which will save 3 lives

$1,000,000 for a liver for Johnny, which will save 1 life

$10,000 to train the nurses on proper hygiene when inserting central lines, which will save an expected 100 lives

…

Now suppose–this is a supposition we’ll need for our theorem–that Robert does not care at all about money, not even a tiny bit. Robert only cares about maximizing the total number of lives saved. Furthermore, we suppose for now that Robert cares about every human life equally.

If Robert does save as many lives as possible, given his bounded money, then Robert must behave like somebody assigning some consistent dollar value to saving a human life.

We should be able to look down the long list of options that Robert took and didn’t take, and say, e.g., “Oh, Robert took all the options that saved more

...
Don't encourage prisoners dilemmas
by Yair Halberstadt — 2021-02-16T06:33:36.501Z

Donating money to political causes is a waste of resources

A lot of money is donated towards political causes. Most of these causes though are pretty much zero sum games. The democrats and republicans both raise vast amounts of money, but only one of them will win the election. Most of this money is thus wasted.

This is classic game of prisoners dilemma. Everybody ends up better off if each side raises just the minimum needed to disseminate their views*, leaving more money to donate to researching malaria / feeding the poor / non-political charity of your choice.

But each side gains by raising a little bit more money. So the mountains of wasted resources build up. I'm not blaming anyone for this - prisoners dilemmas are really hard to break out of. But one obvious rule is "don't encourage them".

However most countries give tax back off political donations just like other charities. Tax back is a policy that has to be weighed on it's own merits, but even if you support it in general (which I think I do), what is the point of the government encouraging citizens to pour their money into promoting zero sum games?

Lets rethink Tax Back

How can we put this into policy

I think a simple rule that might be workable is:

There's some various rules the government has on what's a valid charity. Let's keep those for now. However let's separate being eligible for tax back from being a valid charity.

Every charity applying to be eligible for tax back presumably has a mission statement. Something like:

We aim to conserve unicorns
We aim to make Ralph Wiggum president

etc.

Consider a charity whose aims were the exact opposite if the mission statement, the anti-charity:

We aim to destroy unicorns
We aim to stop Ralph Wiggum being president

If the anti-charity would also be a valid charity (presumably the destroying unicorns wouldn't and stopping Ralph Wiggum being president would), then neither the charity or the anti-charity is eligible for tax back.

Of course most charities are likely to phrase their mission statements in vague terms to avoid this problem "We aim to make sure presidents are good at their job". For that reason tax back should be judged every year by records of what the charity actually did with their money last year, and decide whether or not a charity which put their money into opposite places would also be a valid charity.

Footnotes

* More Formally:

Assume there ar...
Mathematical Models of Progress?
by abramdemski — 2021-02-16T00:21:44.298Z

I would be interested in collecting a bunch of examples of mathematical modeling of progress. I think there are probably several of these here, but I don't expect to be able to find all of them myself. I'm also interested to know about any models like this elsewhere.

I was reading the LessWrong 2018 books, and the following posts stuck out to me:

1960: The Year The Singularity Was Cancelled
Hyperbolic Growth
Takeoff Speeds

The Year The Singularity Was Cancelled talks about a model which predicted world population quite well, by supplementing a basic population equation with a simple mathematical model of technological progress. To summarize: population carrying capacity is assumed to increase due to technological progress. Technological progress is modeled as proportional to the population: a particular population p leads carrying capacity c to have a derivative pc. (This reflects the idea that carrying capacity multiplies the carrying capacity; if it added to the carrying capacity, we might make the derivative equal p instead.) Population should typically remain close to the carrying capacity; so, we could simply assume that population equals carrying capacity. We then expect hyperbolic growth, IE something like c=1s−t; here, s is the year of the (population) singularity. This model is a decent fit to the data until the year 1960, which is of course the subject of the post.

One of my thoughts after reading this was: wouldn't it make more sense to avoid the assumption that population equals carrying capacity? Population growth can't be greater than exponential. The hyperbolic model doesn't make any sense, and the assumption that population equals carrying capacity appears to be the culprit.

It would make more sense to, instead, use more typical population models (which predict near-exponential growth when population is significantly below carrying capacity, tapering off near carrying capacity). I don't yet know if this has been done in the literature. However, it's commonly said that around the time of the industrial revolution, humankind escaped the Malthusian trap, because progress outpaced birthrates. (I know the demographic transition is a big player here, but let's ignore it for a moment.) If we were modeling this possibility, it makes sense that progress would stop accelerating so much around this point:...
Objective truth? 
by pchvykov — 2021-02-15T21:47:35.973Z

Is there one true way to understand a tree? Well, of course there is — talk to any scientist! A physicist will tell you that it’s a dynamic structure of atoms, a chemist — a complex metabolic network, a biologist — an ecosystem of specialized cells, and an ecologist — that it’s one simple unit in a interconnected network of organisms. Worse yet, non-scientists have opinions too: a logger will see it differently from a kid trying to climb it from a dog peeing on it. We all constantly build models of our reality based on our personal experiences and interests — which do not agree, and so we get different models.

But what’s the “right” model? Well as a physicist, I know what

I would say

: the sub-atomic description is really the true one, everything else is just some calculations on top of it. But as I am now an ex-physicist, I have learned that sometimes information may be as fundamental as energy or matter (c.f.

Maxwell’s demon

). By doing such complex calculations, and by choosing what exactly to calculate, we are creating new information (c.f.

computational irreducibility

+

butterfly effect

), thereby creating an essentially new system.

Worse yet, it turns out information is subjective. In general, this is because the amount of information we get from learning something (“how surprised we are about it”) depends on our personal prior beliefs and interests. If I am cutting down a tree, I care about where it falls — I do not care about the precise location of every single atom in it (this is like the choice of “what to calculate” mentioned above). The “right” model of something thus depends on what we care to observe about it. But on top of this, it further depends on what we choose do with said something. Biologists have their particular way of viewing a tree because they spent most of their life in labs, manipulating individual cells, and caring about their interactions — so in their subjective experience, a tree is indeed best modeled as a cellular ecosystem. In fact, could we even say that for their tasks, this is the “True” model?

What I am thus saying is that the “right” model of something may be task-dependent! This seems an obvious truth from an everyday perspective, yet one that somehow gets lost in the sciences, where we are obsessed with finding THE correct description. Of course, some (especially simple) things have fairly little flexibility with what yo...
Heuristic: Replace "No Evidence" with "No Reason"
by Yair Halberstadt — 2021-02-15T21:25:21.468Z

The phrase "no evidence to suggest" has been used as an excuse to avoid inaction in the face of what is in fact ample evidence.

Health authorities continued bumbling response to coronavirus has really served to highlight this, starting right at the beginning:
https://twitter.com/WHO/status/1217043229427761152

And then continuing pretty steadily though the crisis:
https://twitter.com/UNGeneva/status/1244661916535930886

https://twitter.com/robertwiblin/status/1345800492367142917

(I couldn't quickly find an 'official authority' saying the above, but it must somewhat reflect the mindset of some of them, since otherwise the case for single dose is pretty overwhelming).
Of course from a Bayesian perspective this entire idea of "no evidence to suggest" is almost always meaningless, as pointed out in the full thread of the above tweet: https://twitter.com/robertwiblin/status/1345800480144945152. There was plenty of evidence at the time for everything the WHO dismissed, as evidenced by all the people on this very site who got it right.

However not everyone thinks in terms of Bayesian statistics. Viewing the entire world as a probability distribution and acting accordingly, is not for the average person. Instead the way of deciding between the unsubstantiated and reality is via empirical science. Whilst not perfect, treating something as false until one has done a carefully regulated study is certainly far better than what we had in the past. It sounds at first like the WHO is making the correct decisions here - waiting till we have 'evidence' for something before acting on it, and evidence is not anecdotal data (under the empirical view of things), but double blinded placebo controlled studies. How do we articulate what the WHO did wrong here, without using the word Bayesian?

One idea I had was to use another commonly used phrase: "no reason to suggest". Whilst they sound similar the phrases I think mean very different things to the average person.

To deal in extremes, consider the 2 statements:
1. There is no reason to suggest holding onto the tail of a plane as it takes off is dangerous.

2. There is no evidence to suggest holding onto the tail of a plane as it takes off is dangerous.

The first is obviously false. It takes about 2 seconds to think of reasons why it's a terribly stupid idea.

The second is less obviously false. By evidence some people mean a certain leve...
Bitcoin and ESG Investing
by Annapurna — 2021-02-15T21:01:27.155Z

How do cryptocurrencies fit in Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing?

Original Post

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Investing is a practice that evolved from the practice of excluding equities based on moral values. ESG Investing is broad and constantly evolving, and

key organizations are working on the definition and standardization of it.

ESG Investing has been gaining traction with both institutional and retail investors over the last decade, and there is no sign that this trend will stop anytime soon.

From the CFA Website on ESG

One of the main tenets of ESG Investing is the conservation of the natural world. Professional investors that practice ESG Investing are supposed to analyze whether a company mitigates factors that affect the natural world, and invest based on the conclusion that the company is not purposely engaging in activities that go against this tenet. For example, oil producing companies typically do not qualify for an ESG Investment mandate, as their main driver of economic activity involves extracting a nonrenewable resource that cause human carbon emissions to rise.

Bitcoin and Energy Efficiency

Bitcoin and a few other cryptocurrencies rely on the Proof-of-Work mechanism to maintain their decentralization and security.

Coindesk recently came out with a comprehensive explanation on how Proof-of-Work operates within the Bitcoin ecosystem.

From the website:

Bitcoin is a

blockchain

, which is a shared ledger that contains a history of every Bitcoin transaction that ever took place. This blockchain, as the name suggests, is composed of blocks. Each block has the most recent transactions stored in it.

Proof-of-work is a necessary part of adding new blocks to the Bitcoin blockchain. Blocks are summoned to life by

miners

, the players in the ecosystem who execute proof-of-work. A new block is accepted by the network each time a miner comes up with a new winning proof-of-work, which happens roughly every 10 minutes.

Finding the winning proof-of-work is so difficult the only way to provide the work miners need to win bitcoin is with expensive, specialized computers. Miners will earn bitcoin if they guess a matching computation. The more computations they churn out, the more bitcoin they are likely to earn.

What computations are the miners making exactly? In Bitcoin, miners spit out so-called “hash,” whic

...
KAnon
by jefftk — 2021-02-15T20:50:08.144Z

There's a dangerous conspiracy theory spreading, called "KAnon" by its
adherents. Its claims, at their core, come down to the belief that
there is a "K" great enough to protect us from attacks by the forces of
deanonymization. While followers often make contradictory claims
about "K", no matter how great "K" may really be, their trust has been

misplaced.

This blind trust that proponents place in "K" is best illustrated by
their slogan, "Where We Go One We Go All" (#WWG1WGA). Originating
in the once-marginal "K=N" faction, it represents the idea that
individuals, once united, cannot be divided. Despite the undeniable
rhetorical appeal, however, its protection is illusory and such
division remains possible by resourceful
and determined
attackers.

Believers in KAnon are right to seek better anonymization, and robust
anonymization is possible. Their approach, however, of gathering large
groups not only does not solve the problem but is metaphorically
hazardous given the background of the pandemic. We must engage in patient
discussion, with careful explanation of how the promises of KAnon have
been shown again and again to be false, and bring believers around to more
reliable approaches.

Comment via: facebook
Notes on Amiability
by David Gross — 2021-02-15T19:34:48.204Z

This post examines the virtue of amiability (and closely-related virtues like friendliness, geniality, agreeableness, conviviality, affability, niceness, affection, and warmth). I mean to explore what other people have learned about these virtues, rather than to express my own opinions about them, though I’ve been selective about what I found interesting or credible, according to my own inclinations.

I wrote this not as an expert, but as someone who wants to learn and to become better. I hope it will help people who want to know more about these virtues and how to nurture them.

What are these virtues?

These virtues have to do with being pleasant to be around in casual social settings. If you exhibit these virtues, people feel at ease initiating interactions with you, engaging with you, or simply being around you. You signal that you have benign and respectful intent, in a legible way (you are not a grouch, abrasive or obnoxious, or socially awkward in a way that is off-putting or hard to negotiate). You harmonize well with your social environment (you are not contentious or a shit-stirrer). You welcome friendly interactions with others (you are not stand-offish, cold, brusque). You tone down or repress any inclinations to ratchet up social tensions (you are not ill-natured, querulous, snappy, abrasive, hostile, disputatious).

If you go overboard, being insincere or over-the-top in the way you butter up those around you, you might be accused of being a flatterer or being fawning, obsequious, unctuous, oleaginous. The old-fashioned term “man-pleaser” is sometimes deployed in this context. Someone who is so friendly that you’re sure they’re about to pitch you Amway or Krishna Consciousness puts you on edge rather than at ease with their amiability.

Many of the social virtues can assist amiability. These include hospitality, graciousness, connection, goodwill, courtesy, kindness, sympathy, gentleness/tenderness, tolerance, tact, civility, cheer, warmheartedness, concern, and consideration. Friendliness is distinct from friendship, as the latter involves properly maintaining a more durable, less-superficial relationship, while the former concerns how you interact with people in general, including strangers and casual acquaintances. That said, affection and warmth are also important ingredients of more intimate friendships, romantic relationships, and family relationsh...