trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
[SEQ RERUN] Ends Don't Justify Means (Among Humans)
by MinibearRex — 2012-09-23T05:42:24.475Z

Today's post, Ends Don't Justify Means (Among Humans) was originally published on 14 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

There may be consequentialist reasons for why humans should not reason in an explicitly consequentialist way. We are running on corrupted hardware, and it may seem to us that something benefits others when it does not.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Why Does Power Corrupt?, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
High School Lecture - Report
by Xece — 2012-09-23T02:06:02.191Z

This post is a followup report to this.

On Friday's lecture, I was able to briefly cover several topics as an introduction. They centred around rationality (what it is), truth (what it is and why we should pursue it), and Newcomb's Paradox.

The turnout was as expected (6 out of a total 7 group members, with 1 having other obligations that day). Throughout the talk I would ask for some proposed definitions before giving them. It is unfortunate when I asked what "truth" is, mysterious answers such as "truth is the meaning of life", and "truth is the pursuit of truth". When asked what they meant by their answers, they either rephrased what they said with the same vagueness or were unable to give an answer. One member, however, did say that "Truth is what is real", only to have other members ask what he meant by "real". It offered a rather nice opportunity for a map-and-territory tangent before giving some version of "The Simple Truth".

I used the definitions given in 'What Do We Mean By "Rationality"?' to describe epistemic and instrumental rationality, and gave several examples as to what rationality is not (Dr. Spock, logic/reason, etc). As a practice, I introduced Newcomb's Paradox. There was ample debate with an even split between one-box and two-boxers. Due to time constraints, we weren't able to come to a conclusion (although the one-boxing side was making a stronger argument). By the end of lunch period, everyone seemed to have a good grasp that rationality is simply making the best decision to achieve one's goals, whatever they may be.

Overall, I'd say it was successful. My next turn is on October 3rd, and apart from a little review, I'm going to go over the 5-second level, and use of words. Saying what they mean is something we as a group need to work on.
Meetup : Vancouver
by  — 2012-09-23T01:25:48.023Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Vancouver

WHEN:
27 September 2012 06:00:00PM (-0700)

WHERE:
885 west georgia vancouver

Last meetup was fun, it's almost time for the next!

Meet us in the lobby of 885 west georgia at 18:00 on thursday. Better to be early than late. We go upstairs at about 18:30, after which it will be very difficult to meet up with us. Come on out.

I'll be leading a discussion of Yvain's rational home buying and disolving questions about desiese because they are such good examples of LW ideas in action.

Last time, I presented Letting Go from HTACYM. The consensus on the
Letting Go sequence was that it was a bag of tricks and inspiration for dealing with the
need to face reality (when you are trying to actually change the world).
We had a lot of discussion of what you can expect from other people vs
what you expect from yourself, dealing with emotions, value of
predictive vs descriptive explanations, some rationality fundamentals,
some fun math proofs, etc.

Hopefully we'll have some more cool discussion and maybe even some application of these ideas to our own lives.

As usual, join us on the mailing list. Be there.

Discussion article for the meetup : Vancouver
Memes?
by Crystalist — 2012-09-23T00:05:45.858Z

"All models are wrong, but some are useful" — George E. P. Box

As a student of linguistics, I’ve run into the idea of a meme quite a lot. I’ve even looked into some of the proposed mathematical models for how they transmit across generations.

And it certainly is a compelling idea, not least because the potential for modeling cultural evolution alone is incredible. But while I was researching the idea (and admittedly, this was some time ago; I could well be out of date) I never once saw a test of the model. Oh, there were several proposed applications, and a few people were playing around with models borrowed from population genetics, but I saw no proof of concept.

This became more of a problem when I tried to make the idea pay rent. I don’t think anyone disputes that ideas, behaviors, etc. are transmitted across and within generations, or that these ideas, behaviors, etc. change over time. As I understand it, though, memetics argues that these ideas and behaviors change over time in a pattern analogous to the way that genes change.

The most obvious problem with this is that genes can be broken down into discrete units. What’s the fundamental unit of an idea? Of course, in a sense, we could think of the idea as discrete, if we look at the neural pattern it’s being stored as. This exact pattern is not necessarily transmitted through whatever channel(s) you’re using to communicate it — the pattern that forms in someone else’s brain could be different. But having a mechanism of reproduction isn’t so important as showing a pattern to the results of that reproduction: after all, Darwin had no mechanism, and yet we think of him as one of the key figures in discovering evolution.

But I haven’t seen evidence for the assertion that memes change through time like genes. I have seen anecdotes and examples of ideas and behaviors that have spread through a culture, but no evidence that the pattern is the same. I haven’t even seen a clear way of identifying a meme, observing it’s reproduction, or tracking its offspring. Not so much as a study on the change of frequency of memes in an isolated population. Memetics today has less evidence than Darwin did when he started out; at least Darwin could point to discrete entities that were changing.

Without this sort of evidence, all the concept of a meme gives...
Meetup : Research Triangle Area Less Wrong
by  — 2012-09-22T21:34:08.557Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Research Triangle Area Less Wrong

WHEN:
11 October 2012 06:00:00PM (-0400)

WHERE:
Francesca's Dessert Cafe 706 9th St Durham, NC 27705‎

We'll get together and play Zendo, with interspersed discussion of the biases involved. We'll also determine readings for future groups

Discussion article for the meetup : Research Triangle Area Less Wrong
[link] Betting on bad futures
by fortyeridania — 2012-09-22T15:50:22.934Z

Garett Jones, an economist at George Mason University and guest blogger for EconLog, suggests a way for people to bet on apocalyptic events:

http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/09/how_to_bet_on_b.html

The basic idea:

Suppose Alice and Bob disagree on whether the world will end a year from tomorrow, with Alice believing it will end. If she is right, then there will be no way to settle the bet, what with the apocalypse and all that. Thus there is no way for her to collect, and so she has no incentive to bet on the apocalypse, no matter how certain she is.

Or so it would seem! The way around the difficulty is simply for Alice to get her money today, and enjoy it for a year. If she turns out to have been right, then she will have been paid properly. If the world doesn't end, then of course she'll have to return the money, plus interest--plus a penalty for being wrong.

The actual terms should depend on the confidence Alice and Bob place in their respective positions.

Personal note: Several people at my place of work have told me that they are worried about the world ending later this year. They saw a movie about it, or something. So far, they have rejected my bet proposals.
RFC: A Self-quantification Essay (ongoing draft)
by  — 2012-09-22T15:17:29.793Z

I am not the best writer on the block, but I been working on a self quantification essay. It is of interest to lesswrongers since it is about It's about applying epistemic and instrumental rationality to self improvement in the form of running scientific experiments and data analysis on one self.

If you have any criticism or comment, let me know. Also, it needs grammar fixing since I suck at grammar. Thanks.

Be advised that the essay is undergoing continuous revisions. Some of the content may change drastically.
Meetup : Vienna meetup
by Nisan — 2012-09-22T13:14:23.668Z

Discussion article for the meetup : Vienna meetup

WHEN:
28 September 2012 07:00:00PM (+0200)

WHERE:
Favoritenstraße 55, 110 Vienna, Austria

Let's have a meetup in Vienna!

The Cafe Illy at Favoritenstraße 55 is on the southeast corner of Favoritenstraße and Johannitergasse. You can take the underground line U1 to the Südtiroler Platz station. Inside the station, follow the "Bahnorama" signs to get to the southern exit. Then walk south through the construction site to get to Favoritenstraße.

Alternatively, you can take U1 to Keplerplatz and simply walk north to the intersection with Johannitergasse.

I will be sitting inside at 19:00 with a sign that says "Less Wrong". I look forward to meeting you!

Discussion article for the meetup : Vienna meetup
[SEQ RERUN] Why Does Power Corrupt?
by MinibearRex — 2012-09-22T04:35:27.325Z

Today's post, Why Does Power Corrupt? was originally published on 14 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

There are simple evolutionary reasons why power corrupts humans. They can be beaten, though.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The Ritual, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
[LINK] Why Your Customers Would Be Happier If You Charged More
by lincolnquirk — 2012-09-21T20:10:39.525Z

http://www.kalzumeus.com/2012/09/21/ramit-sethi-and-patrick-mckenzie-on-why-your-customers-would-be-happier-if-you-charged-more/

Surprising material to discover on Less Wrong, I know, but has some core insights about effectiveness and entrepreneurship and freelancing which I think people here will appreciate.

Quotes:

So you have to understand that if you make an amazing product and you’ve tested it and you know it will help, it is your obligation to get it out to the market as aggressively as possible.

[Patrick notes: I think this is important enough to emphasize, twice. If you got into this business to make peoples’ lives better, and you have produced something which will succeed with that, and you are aware of truth about reality such as “better marketed products beat better engineered products every single bloody time”, then you have an obligation to get better at marketing yourself. To do otherwise is to compromise the value of your offering to the world based on selfish desires such as appeasing your own vanity (“Everyone should realize how great my work is without me needing to tell them”) or indulging your own unspoken fears (“If this were really good, it would sell itself, so if I try selling it, it must not be good.”)]

I was inventing excuses – in real time! – as to why I couldn’t have possibly delivered the value he already reported having gotten from the conversation we just had.
What are the best books on evolutionary psychology?
by diegocaleiro — 2012-09-21T19:59:01.453Z

I'd like to divide three classes of reasons to read a discipline:

1) You are curious and want to begin reading by something 100-500 pages. I'd go for Pinker's 1990's "How the mind works"

2) You want to screen the whole field, by reading something 500-1500 pages. I definitely recommend David Buss 2004 "The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology" which defeats the usual SI recommendations on the field

3) You want to know the state of the art of the field, so you really need something that is very recent, say from the last 2 or 3 years at most. This is me. Please help me if you know what should I read. 300-1500 seems a good interval.

Just for a comparative, in Cognitive Neuroscience, 3 would be 2009 "MIT The Cognitive Neurosciences IV"

Post your opinions on what 1 2 and 3 should be for Evolutionary Psychology.

Oh, and if you like Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience (a field so new I don't know any of the 3) please post yours too...
Life-changing decisions pertaining to education. Help.
by tomme — 2012-09-21T16:27:04.468Z

I just graduated from high school and I want to continue my formal education by studying for a bachelor's degree in science.

I can go on to study in: Hungary, England, the USA.

Hungay. I'll graduate debt-free and I will spend little on my cost of living(e.g., accommodation, food). However, I'll earn a useless degree in that the university I would attend is poor in terms of academic performance. So, Hungary's a good choice from a financial standpoint, but horrible when it comes to the value of the education.

USA. I'll graduate with some negligible debt and I will spend a modest sum of money for my cost of living, but overall it's still affordable. The education I will receive is so-so, but still better than the one in Hungary. The USA is somewhere in between England and Hungary in terms of financial matters and education.

England. I'll graduate with the most debt and I won't even afford to pay for accommodation; I'll probably have to squat somewhere. The quality of the education is top-notch.

It seems that every place I could go on to study involves a trade-off—England's best for education, Hungary for money.

Now, another dilemma I've ran into is whether I should study Biology or Medicine. I can study Medicine in Hungary, but not in the USA or in England. I am an introvert and a very private person and I enjoy solitude, so some might argue that Medicine is not the best career path, but I contend that some medical specialties, like Pathology, involve less human contact than others. Biology is also appealing as I think I would thrive on doing pure research. I did some job shadowing at a hospital and I can't tell whether a career in Medicine would make me happy. But I definitely won't be happy being an unemployed biologist or a technician who does the same stuff over and over again.

Since I'm confused and depressed, I come to you asking for advice about: (1) What and how should I decide to study; (2) Where should I study.

Thanks for reading!
Weekly LW Meetups: Austin, Brussels, Cambridge MA, Chicago, Madison, Melbourne, Salt Lake City, Sydney, Washington DC
by FrankAdamek — 2012-09-21T16:02:38.906Z

This summary was posted to LW Main on September 14th, and has now been moved to discussion. The current summary is here.

There are upcoming irregularly scheduled Less Wrong meetups in:

Brussels meetup: 15 September 2012 12:00PM
(Washington DC) Dc Zendo meetup: 16 September 2012 03:00PM
Less Wrong Sydney: 17th September: MInd Games: 17 September 2012 06:30PM
Moscow: applied rationality and web resources: 29 September 2012 04:00PM

The following meetups take place in cities with regularly scheduled meetups, but involve a change in time or location, special meeting content, or simply a helpful reminder about the meetup:

Predictions Chi September 15 (September 8 -- cancelled): 15 September 2012 01:05PM
Austin, TX: 15 September 2018 01:30PM
SLC, UT: Free Will and Rationality Checklists: 15 September 2012 03:00PM
Cambridge (MA) third-Sundays meetup: 16 September 2012 02:00PM
Madison: Reading Group, Seeing with Fresh Eyes: 16 September 2012 07:00PM
Melbourne social meetup: 21 September 2012 07:00PM
Portland Oregon: 22 September 2012 12:00PM
Cambridge (MA) first-Sundays meetup: 07 October 2012 02:00PM
Cambridge (MA) third-Sundays Meetup: 21 October 2012 02:00PM

Locations with regularly scheduled meetups: Austin, Berkeley, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge UK, Chicago, Madison WI, Melbourne, Mountain View, New York, Ohio, Oxford, Portland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, Toronto, Waterloo, and West Los Angeles.

If you'd like to talk with other LW-ers face to face, and there is no meetup in your area, consider starting your own meetup; it's easy (more resources here). Check one out, stretch your rationality skills, build community, and have fun!

In addition to the handy sidebar of upcoming meetups, a meetup overview will continue to be posted on the front page every Friday. These will be an attempt to collect information on all the meetups happening in the next weeks. The best way to get your meetup featured is still to use the Add New Meetup feature, but you'll now also have the benefit of having your meetup mentioned in a weekly overview. These overview posts will be moved to the discussion section when the new post goes up.

Please note that for your meetup to appear in the weekly meetups feature, you need to post your meetup before the Friday before your meetup!

If you check Less Wrong irregularly, consider subscribing to ...
[SEQ RERUN] The Ritual
by MinibearRex — 2012-09-21T04:43:27.290Z

Today's post, The Ritual was originally published on 11 October 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):

Depiction of crisis of faith in Beisutsukai world.

Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Crisis of Faith, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.
Principals, agents, negotiation, and precommitments
by gwillen — 2012-09-21T03:41:55.923Z

I'm sure this observation has been made plenty of times before: a principal can gain negotiating power by delegating negotiations to an agent, and restricting that agent's ability to negotiate.

For example: If I'm at a family-owned pizza joint, and I want a slice of pepperoni but all they've got is meat-lover's, I can negotiate for the latter at the price of the former. This is a good deal with well-aligned incentives, and is likely to be accepted. But at a chain restaurant, the employees are not empowered to negotiate: It's the menu prices or nothing. Since I'm aware of their lack of power, and my demand for pizza is not very elastic, I'm likely to give them the higher price.

If I squint, this looks a lot like a precommitment, on the part of the pizza store, not to negotiate prices. But if they explicitly made such a precommitment, it might turn off customers -- nobody likes to feel like they're getting a bad deal, and a statement of precommitment (e.g. a sign reading "all prices are final") is likely to make customers feel marginally negative towards the business by drawing their attention to the money they aren't saving.

By contrast, the corporate form -- such as the chain store has -- gives this kind of 'precommitment' as a side-effect of the otherwise socially-normal behavior of delegating limited responsibility to employees. Same benefit, but without the drawback, mostly because the practice is socially-accepted.

Is there any literature that covers this kind of thing further? Particularly the link between precommitment and agents with limited negotating ability.

(I am sitting in a chain pizza store as I write this. Guess what I wanted to order, and what I got instead?)
New study on choice blindness in moral positions
by nerfhammer — 2012-09-20T18:14:33.437Z

Change blindness is the phenomenon whereby people fail to notice changes in scenery and whatnot if they're not directed to pay attention to it. There are countless videos online demonstrating this effect (one of my favorites here, by Richard Wiseman).

One of the most audacious and famous experiments is known informally as "the door study": an experimenter asks a passerby for directions, but is interrupted by a pair of construction workers carrying an unhinged door, concealing another person whom replaces the experimenter as the door passes. Incredibly, the person giving directions rarely notices they are now talking to a completely different person. This effect was reproduced by Derren Brown on British TV (here's an amateur re-enactment).

Subsequently a pair of Swedish researchers familiar with some sleight-of-hand magic conceived a new twist on this line of research, arguably even more audacious: have participants make a choice and quietly swap that choice with something else. People not only fail to notice the change, but confabulate reasons why they had preferred the counterfeit choice (video here). They called their new paradigm "Choice Blindness".

Just recently the same Swedish researchers published a new study that is even more shocking. Rather than demonstrating choice blindness by having participants choose between two photographs, they demonstrated the same effect with moral propositions. Participants completed a survey asking them to agree or disagree with statements such as "large scale governmental surveillance of e-mail and Internet traffic ought to be forbidden as a means to combat international crime and terrorism". When they reviewed their copy of the survey their responses had been covertly changed, but 69% failed to notice at least one of two changes, and when asked to explain their answers 53% argued in favor of what they falsely believed was their original choice, when they had previously indicated the opposite moral position (study here, video here).