trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Fasting Mimicking Diet Looks Pretty Good
by sarahconstantin — 2018-10-04T19:50:00.695Z

Epistemic status: pretty much factual.

CW: diets, calories

One of the odd things about working on longevity is that now people ask me for lifestyle advice.

Or they ask me what I, personally do to live longer.

Mostly my response has been a lame “um, nothing?”

There are, as of now, no interventions shown to make humans live longer or slow or reverse the human aging process. And, of the interventions reported to make animals live longer, many are doubtful, and many are too risky or unpleasant to make the cost-benefit tradeoff look good for healthy people.

Also, as a personal matter, I’m just not very interested in my own “lifestyle optimization” for the most part. My motivation is about helping people, not especially staving off death for myself; I think I’m more mentally prepared for death than most people my age. Certainly I’ve thought about it more concretely. (BTW, if you too like to know all the gory and technical details about how people die, this blog by an ICU nurse is gold.)

And “lifestyle optimization” turns out to be heavily about diet and exercise, and…I confess, diet culture really creeps me out. Not at all my thing.

That said, there is a lifestyle intervention that seems pretty evidence-based and also pretty low on risk and inconvenience: the Fasting Mimicking Diet, developed by Valter Longo of USC.

It’s actually been tested in a clinical trial on 100 healthy participants, where it improved a bunch of biomarkers related to aging and disease (reduced IGF and blood pressure, though no change in glucose, triglycerides, cholesterol, or CRP.)

The really good results are in mice, where it rescues both Type I and Type II diabetes as well as a mouse model of MS, reduces tumors by 45% and dermatitis by 50%, increases mesenchymal stem cells by 45x, improves motor and cognitive performance, and results in an 11% lifespan extension.

So, what is the FMD?

It’s a 5-day low-calorie, low-carb, low-protein diet, followed by a period of eating however you would by default.

Caloric restriction (reducing calorie intake about 1/3 from baseline or ad-lib) is probably the most replicated lifespan- and healthspan-extending intervention in animals. It’s about 30-40% life extension in mice and rats. In monkeys, it extends lifespan little if at all, but delays age-related disease and hair loss. However, the side effects are nontrivial — humans on CR experience weakness, lethargy, depr...
A Rationality Condition for CDT Is That It Equal EDT (Part 1)
by abramdemski — 2018-10-04T04:32:49.483Z

[Epistemic Status: this series of two posts gives some arguments which, in my eyes, make it difficult to maintain a position other than CDT=EDT, but not impossible. As I explain at the end of the second post, it is still quite tenable to suppose that CDT and EDT end up taking different actions.]

Previously, I argued that fair comparisons of CDT and EDT (in which the same problem representation is given to both decision theories) will conclude that CDT=EDT, under what I see as reasonable assumptions. Recently, Paul Christiano wrote a post arguing that, all things considered, the evidence strongly favors EDT. Jessica Taylor pointed out that Paul didn't address the problem of conditioning on probability zero events, but she came up with a novel way of addressing that problem by taking the limit of small probabilities: COEDT.

Here, I provide further arguments that rationality constraints point in the direction of COEDT-like solutions.

Note that I argue for the conclusion that CDT=EDT, which is somewhat different from arguing directly for EDT; my line of reasoning suggests some additional structure which could be missed by advocating EDT in isolation (or CDT in isolation). Paul's post described CDT as a very special case of EDT, in which our action is independent of other things we care about. This is true, but, we can also accurately describe EDT is a very special case of CDT where all probabilistic relationships which remain after conditioning on what we know turn out to also be causal relationships. I more often think in the second way, because CDT can have all sorts of counterfactuals based on how causation works. EDT claims that these are only correct when they agree with the conditional probabilities.

(ETA: When I say "CDT", I'm pointing at some kind of steel-man of CDT which uses logical counterfactuals rather than physical counterfactuals. TDT is a CDT in this sense, whereas UDT could be either CDT or EDT.)

This post will be full of conjectural sketches, and mainly serves to convey my intuitions about how COEDT could fit into the larger picture.

Hyperreal Probability

Initially, thinking about COEDT, I was concerned that although something important had been accomplished, the construction via limits didn't seem fundamental enough that it should belong in our basic notion of rationality. Then, I recalled how hyperreal numbers (which ...
Upcoming API changes: Upgrading to Open-CRUD syntax
by habryka — 2018-10-04T02:28:39.366Z

This post will only really be relevant to people who are using our API, so the vast majority of people can skip this.

We are about to update our API to the closest what graphQL currently has to an industry standard. Starting tomorrow morning (PST), you will be able to find the new API at lessestwrong.com/graphql for a few days, until we upgrade the main site (probably either on Friday, or on Monday). There is also a documentation for the changes, written by the guy who maintains one of the frameworks we are using (Vulcan), that you can find here.

Sorry for the inconvenience, but it will definitely make the API a lot easier to use in the long-run.
The Rocket Alignment Problem
by Eliezer Yudkowsky — 2018-10-04T00:38:58.795Z

The following is a fictional dialogue building off of AI Alignment: Why It’s Hard, and Where to Start.

(Somewhere in a not-very-near neighboring world, where science took a very different course…)

ALFONSO: Hello, Beth. I’ve noticed a lot of speculations lately about “spaceplanes” being used to attack cities, or possibly becoming infused with malevolent spirits that inhabit the celestial realms so that they turn on their own engineers.

I’m rather skeptical of these speculations. Indeed, I’m a bit skeptical that airplanes will be able to even rise as high as stratospheric weather balloons anytime in the next century. But I understand that your institute wants to address the potential problem of malevolent or dangerous spaceplanes, and that you think this is an important present-day cause.

BETH: That’s… really not how we at the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute would phrase things.

The problem of malevolent celestial spirits is what all the news articles are focusing on, but we think the real problem is something entirely different. We’re worried that there’s a difficult, theoretically challenging problem which modern-day rocket punditry is mostly overlooking. We’re worried that if you aim a rocket at where the Moon is in the sky, and press the launch button, the rocket may not actually end up at the Moon.

ALFONSO: I understand that it’s very important to design fins that can stabilize a spaceplane’s flight in heavy winds. That’s important spaceplane safety research and someone needs to do it.

But if you were working on that sort of safety research, I’d expect you to be collaborating tightly with modern airplane engineers to test out your fin designs, to demonstrate that they are actually useful.

BETH: Aerodynamic designs are important features of any safe rocket, and we’re quite glad that rocket scientists are working on these problems and taking safety seriously. That’s not the sort of problem that we at MIRI focus on, though.

ALFONSO: What’s the concern, then? Do you fear that spaceplanes may be developed by ill-intentioned people?

BETH: That’s not the failure mode we’re worried about right now. We’re more worried that right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination. Whether Google or the US Government or North Korea is the one to launch the rocket won’t ...
Moloch in whom I sit alone
by KatjaGrace — 2018-10-03T23:40:00.636Z

I went to a party. Arriving guests got stickers: cats and pineapples. Pineapples would have to talk in a big group, cats would be pairs and trios. Everyone knew the cats had it better.

I got there before the game. When the fifth person came, I broke off and sat alone. He sat with me. More people wandered over, and soon we were six, seven, eight.

We talked about how small groups are better, and laughed at our big group. But what can you do? It’s hard to invite your preoccupied neighbor to more intimacy with an audience of seven.

I got up and stood alone on the other side of the room. A friend followed. Success. But normally I wouldn’t have walked. And normally he wouldn’t have followed. Our group grew. Three, four, five..

The game began. I was a cat. It was good. What is basically going on in the world? What are different people’s experiences like? What do I get out of knowing this? What is romance? What romantic advice does one give a radically inexperienced person? How good was my previous five year romance with my conversation partner? Is it better to love or to be loved, if you have to pick only one, forever? How does one escalate conversational intimacy? Should one do that, or just jump in?

The game ended. How would we decide which was best? Each of us only saw one side. Oh well. A show of hands. Repartee. Almost everybody likes small groups. Nobody’s mind was changed by tonight. Perhaps this large group wasn’t up to scratch.

For a magical moment, this largest group of all—a space of circles, paused and opened up, calling out to each other—was a kind of good that I hadn’t seen below.

We collapsed back into party. I talked to a friend next to me. What is fun like? She told me. That was surprising. What is love like? Our group grew out to block the doorway. I had some work to do, so I took a walk.

I came back to two giant circles. Exclamation. I sat alone. Eventually a friend sat down. What is fun like? The same as for the other friend. Interesting. Our group grew. Two, three, four. Six.

I crossed the room and sat alone. A friend joined me. The room joined us.

Was this really what nobody wanted?
Epistemic Spot Check: The Dorito Effect (Mark Schatzker)
by Elizabeth — 2018-10-03T17:10:01.026Z

Epistemic Spot Checks is a series in which I fact check claims a book makes, to determine its trustworthiness. It is not a book review or a check on every claim the book makes, merely a spot check of what I find particularly interesting or important (or already know).

Today’s subject is The Dorito Effect, which claims that Americans are getting fat because food is simultaneously getting blander and less nutritious, and then more intensely flavored through artificial means. This is leaving people fat and yet malnourished.

Claims

Claim: Humans did not get fatter over the last 100 years due to changes in genetics.

True. People are fatter than their ancestors, indicating it’s not a change in genetics (although genetics still plays a role in an individual’s weight).

Claim: Casimir Funk discovered that an extract of brown rice could cure beriberi in chickens.

True.

Claim: In 1932, the average farm produced 63 sacks of potatoes/acre. By the mid 1960s, it was 200 sacks/acre.

True.

(source).

Claim: Everything is getting blander and more seasoned.

More seasoned.

Blander food.

Note that both sources were provided by the book itself.

Claim: “We eat for one reason: because we love the way food tastes. Flavor is the original craving”.

This doesn’t jive with my personal experience. I definitely crave nutrients and am satisfied by them even without tasting them.

Claim: “In 1946 and 1947, regional Chicken Of Tomorrow contests were held.”

True.

Claim: Over time the Chicken Of Tomorrow winners consistently weighed more, with less feed and less time to maturity.

True.

Claim: Produce is getting less nutritious over time.

True (source provided by author).

Conclusions

Extremely trustworthy, and therefore worrisome, given the implication that food is becoming inexorably worse. Dorito Effect is unfortunately light on solutions, so you might just freak yourself out to no purpose. On the other hand, if you’re looking for a kick to start eating better, this could easily be it.
A Neglected Cause: Altruism Cultivation Practices
by willfranks — 2018-10-03T14:52:45.736Z

How are we to address the problem that not enough people are working to solve the many great challenges of the modern world?

It is obvious from the outset that this is a question of human motivations: in my daily life, do I work only to benefit myself (and perhaps my family), or do I purposefully strive to have a positive impact on others and the world? How can we move towards a world where more people act in the latter way?

This post aims to draw attention to a powerful yet largely overlooked tool for solving this motivation problem at the level of the individual, with the potential to impact the social and global. This tool is a set of mental training practices which increase the occurrence of motivations and behaviours of an altruistic and compassionate nature. They were originally developed in the context of the Buddhist religion but have recently been secularised and subjected to scientific scrutiny, giving us a set of extremely simple and increasingly accessible techniques for growing people's concern and care for others.

I strongly believe in the importance of these practices for the simple reason that before addressing the world's problems, we should address the fact that not enough people are motivated to solve them. At present, the great challenges of the world are being actively addressed by only a small minority, begging the question: how might we turn entire populations onto combatting them? Our current methods to achieve this rely mainly on guilt-tripping and fear tactics. But what if everyone wanted to help - because they actually cared?

Spreading the motivations of altruism through these mental training practices, and the subsequent actions they engender, would benefit all other causes backed by Effective Altruism, myriad other charities, and the vast network of interpersonal relations constitutes our entire society. Should this not be a priority of modern philanthropy?

These practices can do a remarkable thing: extend the circle of human altruism and compassion to embrace all beings on planet Earth. Everybody is capable of genuine altruism. We all embody it on a daily basis towards our friends and families; such loving care is the glue of human society. But we face grave problems when our altruism has only a limited circle, and does not extend to those of different nations, ethnicities, cultures, genders, sexual orientations, species ...
You're never wrong injecting complexity, but rarely you're right
by MrMind — 2018-10-03T14:20:15.177Z

I just want to put this idea in the form of a post, to gather your impressions. I think it's my main rationalist failure mode.

Recently in a Facebook group, some poster has proposed this synthesis of Harari's book '21 lessons':

In the 21st century, three narratives were used to explain the past and predict the future: the fascist, the communist and the liberal narrative. During the century, the latter has prevailed, although in recent times it has started to crack, due to events like the election of Trump, the Brexit, and so on.

Then, the same user asked: what could be a new narrative that would help us in the future?

I was tempted to reply as I always do: criticize the simplification. I was about to write that the concept of narrative itself is a narrative, that Harari is seeing the past with the eyes of the present, but not necessarily this lens will help with navigating the future, that also a better concept would be that of a memeplex, which is less internally coherent than a story, and thus more complex to pinpoint.

Then a reflection occured to me: I always end up doing this, in almost all discussions I partecipate. People simplify too much and come to the wrong conclusion, they consider only the extremes of a spectrum, they use words as rigid classifiers and debate endlessly about them, they do not have internally coherent point of views, etc. I almost invariable end up 'winning' (i.e. appear wise) by injecting some complexity: usually in the form of a new parameter that was buried in the presuppositions.

Then, I was struck by another insight: it is too easy to win this way. From a mathematical point of view, a system with a bigger state space is more flexible than a smaller system, and so an 'optimization' that increases the space state is always correct. Is that possible? How probable it is that I've discovered a universal optimization of every human debate? I reasoned that it's very low, and indeed I think I've always failed to consider the downside: a more complex system is more difficult to use. When I add a parameter to the problem space, I'm multiplying the costs to use said idea in practice.

A classic example: was Martin Luther King a criminal? Some argue from the letter of the law, some argue from a moral point of view. If I 'win' the debate by injecting the concept of 'moral ...
Does This Fallacy Have A Name?
by Apollo13 — 2018-10-03T00:27:02.302Z

As I have been going about my rationalist training, I have noticed a fallacy which I can’t find the name of. My aim is to describe it to all you smart people who know more than I do in hopes that someone can give me the proper name for it. If, indeed, I have found something that constitutes as a new fallacy, I’m happy to name it, but I wanted to make sure it really truly doesn’t already exist.

Here’s how it goes:

You believe A to be true
You are in any of the following situations:

a. “I cannot ask anyone their opinion on A.”

b. “I don’t have something I need in order to ask other’s their opinion on A” (examples of things you might need: time, courage, a clipboard, an intergalactic spaceship etc.)

c. “I haven’t promoted this to conscious attention or questioned the validity of my opinion on A and therefore haven’t even thought to ask anyone their opinion on A"

You don’t ask others their opinion on A
You assume A to be true based on your one data point

Some examples of this fallacy in action:

The Fermi Paradox (a/b)

Synesthetic people assuming everyone else is synesthetic too (c)

Agender people assuming everyone else has as little regard for the value of gender as they do (b/c)

Lots more examples can be found in the LW post

“Other People are Occasionally Rather Weird”

and

“Being Wrong About Your Own Subjective Experience”

as well as the Slate Star Codex post:

“What Universal Human Experiences are you Missing Without Realising it?”

In my search for what this fallacy might be called, the closest I’ve gotten to is Extension Neglect, in which one ignores the size of a set. Please let me know in the comments if my fallacy is indeed part of Extension Neglect, if it has another name I don’t know, or if you have a suggestion for what it should be named (assuming it doesn’t already have a match). Thanks!
Reflections on Being 30
by sarahconstantin — 2018-10-02T19:30:01.585Z

Epistemic Status: Personal

I haven’t written a lot of personal stuff here recently, because I’ve been doing a lot more private contemplation, and been busy with life things. (Nonprofit and baby, among other things.) But I thought I might want to put out some thoughts about what growing in maturity means to me and what I’ve come to believe — since I still believe firmly in the blogging medium and the practice of transparency.

Prudence

There’s a transition that a lot of people go through as they get older, that has to do with “practicality” or “prudence.” They no longer want to do things that will predictably fail. They are no longer as willing to deal with people who will predictably fail at life. They are no longer as interested in ideas that can’t stand up to practical tests.

I’ve noticed more of this spirit in myself as I get older, but I’ve always been somewhat ambivalent about it. I like interestingness. I want to avoid the natural tendency to stop exploring as I age. Meeting new people, learning new things, having new experiences, expanding my boundaries, are still important to me.

On the other hand, I’ve really enjoyed becoming more adept at the “practical” or “operational” side of things — schedules, housework, childcare, managing a small organization, etc. My identity up until now has been “talented mess” — so much so that I got an ADHD diagnosis quite by accident, and am now exploring the very different world of practicality and detail-orientation and organization. It’s strange. It’s very calm, and it’s a satisfying challenge to keep up with things and bring more order to different parts of my life, and it’s completely non-narrative. Life becomes a series of tasks, rather than a story. I’m continually marveling that this is how some people have been living all along.

Of course, the real reason for being more prudent in your thirties or as a parent is hard necessity. You have less energy, and more responsibilities, and so you have to be more cautious with resources and time. This isn’t something I really want to spin as a good thing — it’s scarcity, plain and simple.

You have to give up something, and the cheapest thing to give up is being a dumbass.

I want to have an “abundance mentality”, to be generous and spendthrift with my time and energy; but sometimes I come up against irreducible scarcity.

A friend advised me last year to “have an ego.” H...
Rationalism for the masses
by marcus_gabler — 2018-10-02T17:10:52.217Z

I think the ideas of rationalism have the potential to make our world better - or to even save it.

I see this potential largely undeveloped and currently only recognized in rather academic / intellectual circles.

I think it's more than time to bring this "wisdom" to a wider audience. Firstly online but with the final goal to have it integrated into society practically (ie. in school education) and generally (so that truth, reason and empathy become widely accepted values).

I am asking the community for assistance here.

Key challenges

Filtering for key concepts/ideas/issues/solutions
Condensing such key content
Simplifying language (much less academic)
Finding use cases (global issues as well as daily life) that users can easily identify with, to show them either how they can directly (daily life applicability) or indirectly (belief in a better future) benefit
Finding rather catchy / entertaining content that makes users want to stay tuned, come back and share.
Presenting content in an appealing manner, not minding common marketing techniques. This starts with any "Brand" for the cause itself and sub-brands of individual concepts. (For example "Epic Karma" oder "Final Good" works better than "Effective Altruism" or "Rationalist Movement".)
Avoiding counterproductive language / appearance. I don't think terms like "Revolution" or even "Movement" are helpful. Users should be addressed as "Curious folks" rather than "lost souls" or "average frustrated chumps"

I wonder if there are others out there who thought about this.

The thought of me being the only "messiah" to bring this to the world is much more scary than it might sound intriguing, trust me. I only want to get the stones rolling, and so far, I can't help but feeling on my own.

Any feedback appreciated.

And never forget to have fun, no matter how serious this might be.

Take care, Marcus.

PS: I learned to anticipate obstacles. One might be that I am not taken seriously because I have no publications out yet and that this post might as well be written by someone who can merely spell the word rationalizm. :-).

But then again: Enough great stuff has been theorized here. Even in the (theoretically assumed) case that I didn't have a clue about rationalist ideas and simply only knew noth...