trentmkelly/LessWrong-43k huggingface dataset:
Were atoms real?
by AnnaSalamon — 2010-12-08T17:30:37.453Z

Related to: Dissolving the Question, Words as Hidden Inferences.

In what sense is the world “real”? What are we asking, when we ask that question?

I don’t know. But G. Polya recommends that when facing a difficult problem, one look for similar but easier problems that one can solve as warm-ups. I would like to do one of those warm-ups today; I would like to ask what disguised empirical question scientists were asking were asking in 1860, when they debated (fiercely!) whether atoms were real.[1]

Let’s start by looking at the data that swayed these, and similar, scientists.

Atomic theory: By 1860, it was clear that atomic theory was a useful pedagogical device. Atomic theory helped chemists describe several regularities:

The law of definite proportions (chemicals combining to form a given compound always combine in a fixed ratio)

The law of multiple proportions (the ratios in which chemicals combine when forming distinct compounds, such as carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide, form simple integer ratios; this holds for many different compounds, including complicated organic compounds).

If fixed volumes of distinct gases are isolated, at a fixed temperature and pressure, their masses form these same ratios.

Despite this usefulness, there was considerable debate as to whether atoms were “real” or were merely a useful pedagogical device. Some argued that substances might simply prefer to combine in certain ratios and that such empirical regularities were all there was to atomic theory; it was needless to additionally suppose that matter came in small unbreakable units.

Today we have an integrated picture of physics and chemistry, in which atoms have a particular known size, are made of known sets of subatomic particles, and generally fit into a total picture in which the amount of data far exceeds the number of postulated details atoms include. And today, nobody suggests that atoms are not "real", and are "merely useful predictive devices".

Copernican astronomy: By the mid sixteen century, it was clear to the astronomers at the University of Wittenburg that Copernicus’s model was useful. It was easier to use, and more theoretically elegant, than Ptolemaic epicycles. However, they did not take Copernicus’s theory to be “true”, and...
Why is our sex drive too strong?
by PhilGoetz — 2010-12-08T17:02:45.186Z

It is a cultural universal that people are discouraged from having sex as often and with as many people as they want to. Every culture I've ever heard of imposes many restrictions on sex. I've never heard of a culture that shames people for being too stingy with sex.

If we assume that culture is adaptive, this means that the human sex drive is too strong for humans in society. Why is this? As sex drive is a phenotypic feature with extraordinarily strong selective pressure, why haven't we evolved to have the proper sex drive?

One reason could be that reduced sex drive is selected for at the level of the group, while higher sex drive is selected for at the level of the individual.
Bridging Inferential Gaps
by atucker — 2010-12-08T04:50:14.749Z

This idea isn't totally developed, so I'm putting it in Discussion for now.

Introduction:

A few hands have been wrung over how to quickly explain fundamental Less Wrong ideas to people, in a way that they can be approached, appraised, an considered rather than being isolated and bereft across an inferential gulf.

I'm pretty embarrassed to say that I hardly talk about these things with people in my everyday life, even though it makes up a major part of my worldview and outlook. I don't particularly care about making people have similar beliefs to me, but I feel like I'm doing my friends a disservice to not adequately explain these things that I've found so personally helpful. (Ugh, that sounds pseudo-religious. Cut me off here if this is a Bad idea.)

Would it be useful to start a project (read: group of posts by different people) to find ways to bridge said gaps in normal conversation? (Normal conversation meaning talking to a non-hostile audience that nonetheless isn't particularly interested in to LW ideas). Mainly to talk about rationality things with friends and family members and whatnot, and possibly to help raise the sanity waterline (though this wasn't designed to do that).

A problem with the sequences for a nonplussed audience is that it assumes they care. I find that when trying to explain ideas like holding off on proposing solutions until talking about the problem to other people it just comes across as boring, even if they aren't opposed to the idea at all.

With an ideological audience, the problem is much more difficult. Not only do you need to explain why something is correct, you need to convince them that believing in it is more important than holding on to their ideology, and that they should lower their "defenses" enough to actually consider it.

I think that, should this project be undertaken, it should be very tested and experimental based. Like, people would actually try out the techniques on other people to see if they actually work.

Background/Thoughts/Questions:

Do we actually want to do this? It seems like its a step towards a possibly PR-damaging evangelism, or just being generally annoying in conversation, among other things. On the other hand, I still want to be able to talk about these things offline every now and then.

It's been said that being half a rationalist is da...
Help Request: How to maintain focus when emotionally overwhelmed
by throwaway — 2010-12-07T23:29:13.208Z

So my personal life just got very interesting. In a net-positive way, certainly, but still, I am, as Calculon put it, "filled with a large number of powerful emotions!" -- some of which are anxious and/or panicky.

This is making it annoyingly difficult to focus at work. I am an absolutely textbook "Attention Deficit Oh-look-a-squirrel!" case at the best of times, and this seems to have made it much, much worse. I can handle small tasks, but anything where I'm going to have to spend an hour solving multiple problems before producing results, I can hardly make myself start.

Has anyone dealt with the problem of maintaining productive focus while emotionally overwhelmed/exhausted, and if so, do you have any pointers?
$100 for the best article on efficient charity: the finalists
by Roko — 2010-12-07T21:15:31.102Z

Part of the Efficient Charity Article competition. Several people have written articles on efficient charity --

Throwawayaccount_1 has an excellent article hidden away in a comment

Waitingforgodel has an article in discussion: "How Greedy Bastards Have Saved More Lives Than Mother Theresa Ever Did"

Multifoliaterose has an article entitled "Efficient Charity" which scored 23 on the main site despite not being promoted.

Louie Has an article entitled "How to save the world" which scored an excellent 49.

Any comments on the finalists? Who do we think should be the winner?
Best career models for doing research?
by Kaj_Sotala — 2010-12-07T16:25:22.584Z

Ideally, I'd like to save the world. One way to do that involves contributing academic research, which raises the question of what's the most effective way of doing that.

The traditional wisdom says if you want to do research, you should get a job in a university. But for the most part the system seems to be set up so that you first spend a long time working for someone else and research their ideas, after which you can lead your own group, but then most of your time will be spent on applying for grants and other administrative trivia rather than actually researching the interesting stuff. Also, in Finland at least, all professors need to also spend time doing teaching, so that's another time sink.

I suspect I would have more time to actually dedicate on research, and I could get doing it quicker, if I took a part-time job and did the research in my spare time. E.g. the recommended rates for a freelance journalist in Finland would allow me to spend a week each month doing work and three weeks doing research, of course assuming that I can pull off the freelance journalism part.

What (dis)advantages does this have compared to the traditional model?

Some advantages:

Can spend more time on actual research.

A lot more freedom with regard to what kind of research one can pursue.

Cleaner mental separation between money-earning job and research time (less frustration about "I could be doing research now, instead of spending time on this stupid administrative thing").

Easier to take time off from research if feeling stressed out.

Some disadvantages:

Harder to network effectively.

Need to get around journal paywalls somehow.

Journals might be biased against freelance researchers.

Easier to take time off from research if feeling lazy.

Harder to combat akrasia.

It might actually be better to spend some time doing research under others before doing it on your own.

EDIT: Note that while I certainly do appreciate comments specific to my situation, I posted this over at LW and not Discussion because I was hoping the discussion would also be useful for others who might be considering an academic path. So feel free to also provide commentary that's US-specific, say.
Akrasia as a collective action problem
by fortyeridania — 2010-12-07T15:44:56.626Z

Related to: Self-empathy as a source of "willpower" and some comments.

It has been mentioned before that akrasia might be modeled as the result of inner conflict. I think this analogy is great, and would like to propose a refinement.1

Here's the mental conflict theory of akrasia, as I understand it:

Though Maud appears to external observers (such as us) be a single self, she is in fact a kind of team. Maud's mind is composed of sub-agents, each of whom would like to pursue its own interests. Maybe when Maud goes to bed, she sets the alarm for 6 AM. When it buzzes the next morning, she hits the snooze...again and again and again. To explain this odd behavior, we invoke the idea that BedtimeMaud is not the same person as MorningMaud. In particular, BedtimeMaud is a person who likes to get up early, while MorningMaud is that bully BedtimeMaud's poor victim.The point is that the various decisionmakers that inhabit her brain are not always after the same ball. The subagents that compose the mind might not be mutually antagonistic; they're just not very empathetic to each other.

I like to think of this situation as a collective action problem akin to those we find in political science and economics. What we have is a misalignment of costs and benefits. If Maud rises at 6, then MorningMaud bears the whole cost of this decision, while a different Maud, or set of Mauds, enjoys the benefits. The costs are concentrated in MorningMaud's lap, while the benefits are dispersed among many Mauds throughout the day. Thus Maud sleeps in.

Put differently, MorningMaud's behavior produces a negative externality: she enjoys the whole benefit of sleeping in, but the rest of the day's Mauds bear the costs.

So, how can we get MorningMaud to lie in the bed she makes, as it were, and get a more efficient outcome?

We can:

Legislate. Maud tirelessly tells herself to be less lazy and exerts willpower to get the job done. This is analogous to direct, blanket government action (such as banning coal) in response to a negative externality (such as once-verdant, now barren hillsides). But it's expensive, and it doesn't always work.

Negotiate. Maud rewards herself when she gets up on time by taking a hot shower right away or eating a nice breakfast (the latter has a cost borne by MoneyMaud); or she allows herself to sleep in once a week. If MorningMaud fol

...
The End of Men
by Kaj_Sotala — 2010-12-07T13:40:03.121Z

Interesting article arguing that society is strongly slanted towards women doing better, and also noting that parents who are given the choice of choosing their children's sex are preferring women, sometimes in a 2-to-1 ratio:

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/8135/
Writing and enthusiasm
by NancyLebovitz — 2010-12-07T12:01:46.091Z

Steve Pavlina explains that the method he'd been taught in school-- a highly structured writing process of organizing what to say before it's written-- tends to produce dull writing, but starting from enthusiasm results in articles which are a pleasure to write and are apt to be more fun and memorable to read.

Inspirational energy has a half life of about 24 hours. If I act on an idea immediately (or at least within the first few hours), I feel optimally motivated, and I can surf that wave of energy all the way to clicking “Publish.” If I sit on an idea for one day, I feel only half as inspired by it, and I have to paddle a lot more to get it done. If I sit on it for 2 days, the inspiration level has dropped by 75%, and for all practical purposes, the idea is dead. If I try to write it at that point, it feels like pulling teeth. It’s much better for me to let it go and wait for a fresh wave. There will always be another wave, so there’s no need to chase the ones I missed.

This looks like PJ Eby territory-- it's about the importance of pleasure as a motivator.
It's not about truth
by Eneasz — 2010-12-06T19:43:11.014Z

A rather sane article about the actual purpose of religions and why they persist among the rational & intelligent.

http://blog.evangelicalrealism.com/2010/12/04/getting-religion/

A bit of a Hansonian bent as well. "Genuine objective truths can be complicated and uncomfortable, but what’s worse, they confer no particular social advantage "
New Haven Meetup, Saturday, Dec. 11
by Alicorn — 2010-12-06T15:15:45.524Z

On Saturday, New Haven residents, people who live in other nearby assorted Havens, and anybody else who would like to trek out here are welcomed to a Less Wrong meetup in thomblake's and my home at noon(ish). The address is thus:

173 Russo Ave Unit 406
East Haven, CT 06513

I will make food; if you plan to come and wish to submit food-related requests, say so.
Berkeley LW Meet-up Friday December 10
by LucasSloan — 2010-12-06T06:11:54.173Z

Last month, about 20 people showed up to the Berkeley LW meet-up. To continue the tradition of Berkeley Meetups, we will be meeting on Saturday, December 11 Friday, December 10 at 7 PM at the Starbucks at 2128 Oxford Street. Last time, we chatted at the Starbucks for about 45 minutes, then went to get dinner and ate and talked under a T-Rex skeleton - we'll probably do something similar, so don't feel like you have to eat before you come. Hope to see you there!

ETA: Some people are unavailable on Saturday, do people have a strong preference for Saturday? If no one does, I'll move it to Friday. Due to two votes for Friday and none for Saturday, I have changed the date to Friday.
It's Not About Efficiency
by DanielLC — 2010-12-06T04:12:41.198Z

When I explain the importance of donating only to the right charity, I've been told that it's not about efficiency. This is completely correct.

Imagine a paperclip company. They care only about making paperclips. They will do anything within their power to improve efficiency, but they don't care about efficiency. They care about making paperclips. Efficiency is just a measure of how well they're accomplishing their goal. You don't try to be efficient because you want to be efficient. You try to be efficient because you want something.

When I try to help people, the same principle applies. I couldn't care less about a charity's efficiency. I care about how much they help people. Efficiency is just a measure of how well they accomplish that goal.
How seriously should I take the supposed problems with Cox's theorem?
by jsalvatier — 2010-12-06T02:04:43.359Z

I had been under the impression that Cox's theorem said something pretty strong about the consistent ways to represent uncertainty, relying on very plausible assumptions. However, I recently found this 1999 paper, which claims that Cox's result actually requires some stronger assumptions. I am curious what people here think of this. Has there been subsequent work which relaxes the stronger assumptions?
The Truth about Scotsmen, or: Dissolving Fallacies
by Tesseract — 2010-12-05T21:57:07.976Z

One unfortunate feature I’ve noticed in arguments between logically well-trained people and the untrained is a tendency for members of the former group to point out logical errors as if they were counterarguments. This is almost totally ineffective either in changing the mind of your opponent or in convincing neutral observers. There are two main reasons for this failure.

1. Pointing out fallacies is not the same thing as urging someone to reconsider their viewpoint.

Fallacies are problematic because they’re errors in the line of reasoning that one uses to arrive at or support a conclusion. In the same way that taking the wrong route to the movie theater is bad because you won’t get there, committing a fallacy is bad because you’ll be led to the wrong conclusions.

But all that isn’t inherent in the word ‘fallacy’: the vast majority of human beings don’t understand the statement “that’s a fallacy” as “you seem to have been misled by this particular logical error – you should reevaluate your thought process and see if you arrive at the same conclusions without it.” Rather, most people will regard it as an enemy attack,with the result that they will either reject the existence of the fallacy or simply ignore it. If, by some chance, they do acknowledge the error, they’ll usually interpret it as “your argument for that conclusion is wrong – you should argue for the same conclusion in a different way.”

If you’re actually trying to convince someone (as opposed to, say, arguing to appease the goddess Eris) by showing them that the chain of logic they base their current belief on is unsound, you have to say so explicitly. Otherwise saying “fallacy” is about as effective as just telling them that they’re wrong.

2. Pointing out the obvious logical errors that fallacies characterize often obscures the deeper errors that generate the fallacies.

Take as an example the No True Scotsman fallacy. In the canonical example, the Scotsman, having seen a report of a crime, claims that no Scotsman would do such a thing. When presented with evidence of just such a Scottish criminal, he qualifies his claim, saying that no true Scotsman would do such a thing.

The obvious response to such a statement is “Ah, but you’re committing the No Tr

...
The Truth about Scotsmen, or: Dissolving Fallacies
by Tesseract — 2010-12-05T21:49:06.384Z

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One unfortunate feature I’ve noticed in arguments between logically well-trained people and the untrained is a tendency for members of the former group to point out logical errors as if they were counterarguments. This is almost totally ineffective either in changing the mind of your opponent or in convincing neutral observers. There are two main reasons for this failure.

1. Pointing out fallacies is not the same thing as urging someone to reconsider their viewpoint.

Fallacies are problematic because they’re errors in the line of reasoning that one uses to arrive at or support a conclusion – and in the same way that taking the wrong route to the movie theater is bad because you won’t get there, committing a fallacy is bad because you’ll be led to the wrong conclusions.

But all that isn’t inherent in the word ‘fallacy’: the vast majority of human beings don’t understand the statement “that’s a fallacy” as “you seem to have been misled by this particular logical error – you should reevaluate your thought process and see if you arrive at the same conclusions without it.” Rather, most people will regard it as an enemy attack,with the result that they will either reject the existence of the fallacy or simply ignore it. If, by some chance, they do acknowledge the error, they’ll usually interpret it as “your argument for that conclusion is wrong – you should argue for the same conclusion in a diff

...
Help request: What is the Kolmogorov complexity of computable approximations to AIXI?
by AnnaSalamon — 2010-12-05T10:23:55.626Z

Does anyone happen to know the Komogorov complexity (in some suitable, standard UTM -- or, failing that, in lines of Python or something) of computable approximations of AIXI?

I'm writing a paper on how simple or complicated intelligence is, and what implications that has for AI forecasting. In that context: adopt Shane Legg's measure of intelligence (i.e., let "intelligence" measure a system's average goal-achievement across the different "universe" programs that might be causing it to win or not win reward at each time step, weighted according to the universe program's simplicity).

Let k(x, y) denote the Kolmogorov complexity of the shortest program that attains an intelligence of at least x, when allowed an amount y of computation (i.e., of steps it gets to run our canonical UTM). Then, granting certain caveats, AIXI and approximations thereto tell us that the limit as y approaches infinity of k(x,y) is pretty small for any computably attainable value of x. (Right?)

What I'd like is to stick an actual number, or at least an upper bound, on "pretty small".

If someone could help me out, I'd be much obliged.