Spreadsheet: james_steffes__12895__Values 2001
Sheet: Sheet1

 | Representative Sample of Government Affairs Impact (Sept 2000 - Sept 2001)
 | Project | Person | Total Value ($[NAME]) | EGA Impact % | EGA Impact ($[NAME]) | Methodology for EGA Share
 | -1 | -2 | -3 | -4 | -5 | -6
1 | EBS Network ROW Fee Increase | [NAME] | 50.8 | 1 |  | EGA drafted and Congress pass an FY2001 Appropriations [NAME] clause (8/00) which expressly forbade the BLM/USFS from implementing increased fees on fiber optic rights-of-way on public lands until October 2001.  The effect of the language implied 2 years of fee waiver.  The annual exposure to EBS that would have taken place is calculated at $50.8 million  [$1.00 per linear foot x number of fibers (EIN = 12) x 5280ft. x number of route miles (EIN =802mi)].
2 | EPMI-TVA  Settlement | [NAME] | 145 | 0.2 |  | Settlement of an Options agreement with TVA.  Settlement occurred because EGA  identified contact persons to intervene between the parties that resulted in  a settlement that was $145 million below the Mid curve.   Conservative estimate of EGA contribution is 20% of $145 million.
3 | Allocation of 3c/kwh Surcharge for PG&E / SCE | [NAME] | 80 | 0.333 |  | EGA intervened into CPUC 3c/kwh [NAME] case.  EES had 100% bundled customers at that time.  CPUC Initial Decision applied majority of 3c/kwh [NAME] to on-peak industrial customers potentially costing EES $255 million.  CPUC Decision 01-05-064 modified this Initial Decision that resulted in a $175 million loss = $80 million gain.  EGA was the most important and most effective intervenors (AReM, WPTF),  thus 1/3 of the value.
4 | No 3c/kwh Surcharge to DA for PG&E / SCE | [NAME] | 70 | 0.333 |  | EGA intervened into CPUC 3c/kwh [NAME] case.  EES had 100% bundled customers at that time.  CPUC Initial Decision applied [NAME] to all customers CPUC Decision 01-05-064 modified this Initial Decision that prevented a surcharge (3 cents/kWh) on all Direct Access customers in PG&E, SDG&E, and SCE.  This led to a booked net gain of $70mm for a retail position of 8 million nMWh.  EGA was the most important and most effective intervenors (AReM, WPTF),  thus 1/3 of the value.
5 | [NAME] | [NAME] | 75 | 0.1 |  | West Fork Power Plant - sale price was $300 million to Allegheny Energy Services, of which Enron booked $75 million as gains (the difference between $450 /KW cost price and $600/kW sale price for a 500 MW plant).  During the time the sale was pending, legislation was introduced in Indiana creating onerous recertification requirements upon the event of a sale.  These requirements would have called for full blown environmental impact statements, consideration of alternative sites, and requiring that all power produced be sold within the state.  Passage of this bill threatened the possibility of the deal going through because Allegheny had no guarantee that the project would pass the recertification process and be able to operate.  EGA successfully killed the bill, and conservatively assumes 10% of the value.
5 | NYISO Transmission Congestion Contracts | D. Staines | 8 | 0.75 |  | This represents the income Enron has booked to date as result of trading Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCC) in the NYISO.  EGA has developed the strategy and the mechanism to operate, and manage, the portfolio within this auctioning/contract system, and expects to book between $12 and $14 million by end of 2001.  EGA assumes 75% of the contribution.
6 | Central Hudson Refunds | [NAME] | 5.6 | 1 |  | EGA intervention secured a refund of excess proceeds of generating assets ( a total of $45 million over three years, i.e., $15 million annually) to all customers.  Enron's customer (IBM, 20% of the load) share is $15M x 20%x 3 which if calculated NPV (@10% for the three years deal would result a total of  $5.6 million.  Two stakeholders were behind this regulatory effort of whom the other party was also supported by EGA; thus 100% of the value.
7 | SoCal Gas Dispute | [NAME] | 7.8 | 0.5 |  | This represents the result of EGA filing a protest at FERC in a proceeding dealing with allocation of delivery point rights on El Paso’s system at the Topock delivery point.  ENA had acquired released capacity from SoCal Gas with a term through October 2001 and SoCal Gas had advised ENA that the delivery points under its released capacity would be the less valuable Topock points of PG&E and Mojave.  EGA’s protest argued that FERC should require a releasing shipper to allocate delivery point rights at Topock on a pro rata basis.  FERC’s ruling on the issue accepted EGA’s argument.    The value  is the difference between the March 8th April-October forward curve for PG&E-Malin (which represents the price curve that we would have had to use for the Mojave-Topock and PG&E-Topock delivery points that [NAME] tried to give us) and the forward curve for SoCal-Topock (which is the price curve we were able to sell at based on the FERC ruling).  The volume was 34,401 [NAME]/day and the difference in price curves for Apr-Oct was over $1.00. EGA was one of two parties that filed comments on this issue intervenors ([NAME]), thus 50% of the value.
8 | [NAME] Offer | [NAME] | 10 | 0.25 |  | ENA entered into a 12 month Standard Offer Service arrangement from March 01 - March 02.  EGA was critical in the structuring of the offer and worked with the Maine PSC to process our bid.  EGA was 25% of the deal.
9 | MECC Aggregation | [NAME] | 24 | 0.15 |  | EES entered into a transaction with the retail aggregation group  Maine Electric Consumers Cooperative (MECC).  MECC in turn presented EES with individual supply contracts with its commercial and industrial members for approximately 300 MW of retail electric load.  Most of these were 12 month contracts, which were signed in 2000.  These contracts were extended for 3 to 5 year terms in 2001 ($12 million margin to EES and $12million offer-mid). EGA provided the lead customer connection, developed and managed the relationship necessary to the deal,  plus performing  all the required due diligence and technical support necessary.  EGA is responsible for 10% of the on-going value.
10 | TXU/Reliant - Stranded Cost Case | [NAME] | 7 | 0.33 |  | EGA's intervention in Texas PUC Docket No. 22344 (generic issues associated with utility unbundling) resulted in a PUC decision which led to a calculation resulting in negative stranded costs for [NAME] and TXU.  EGA successfully argued against utility claims that future installed capacity prices and natural gas fuel prices used in an administrative model to determine stranded costs were overstated.  EGA's recommendations, supported by two other parties, will result in a $7M benefit to EWS' current tariff position.  EWS has booked a gain of  $7M in Q2 related to the PUC adoption of EGA's recommendation. EGA has a share of 33% of value.
11 | First Energy Market Support Generation | [NAME] | 6.5 | 0.2 |  | EES booked $6.5 million so far this year for sales to customers in the FirstEnergy service territory under the IOU's Market Support Generation (MSG) program.  EGA was instrumental in negotiating on behalf of EES the terms and conditions under which EES could successfully  transact business.  Key provisions included aggregation of load to minimize the risk of individual customers exceeding maximum demand requirements which would have been costly to EES among numerous other provisions.  EGA worked intimately with EES on assuring that contracts were approved with FE and handled audits and interface with FE on a number of accounts that might not have been approved but for EGA's assistance.
12 | EPMI - PSE&G Gas Storage Deal | [NAME] | 2 | 0.5 |  | This is a 3-year gas storage deal with PSE&G.  The $2 million is only the value for the first year because the additional two years are conditioned upon the NJ BPJ approving the transaction (EGA expects that to occur in Nov 01 and will capture the value in next year's report).  EGA provided the lead customer connection, developed and managed the relationship necessary to the deal,  plus EGA performed  all the required due diligence and technical support necessary.  EGA is responsible for 50% of the value.
13 | SPP-ERCOT DC Tie | [NAME] | 1.8 | 0.5 |  | EGA Protected EPMI's ability, in submitting requests for transmission over the DC tie against SPP request to FERC, to limit transmission requests to 5 per entity.  EGA reached a compromise that resulted in EPMI  continuing to win the transmission without resulting in any scheduling rule changes (worth approx.  $10,000 - $20,000 day - traders will use most days in the summer, thus 90 days X $10,000-20,000 = $900,000 - 1,800,000). |  |  |  | 3 | 3
14 | Resolution 109/2001 - Argentina | [NAME] | 3.6 | 0.3 |  | This is the NPV @10% for the additional revenue stream that will accrue to Enron's Generation Station Modesto Maranzana (70MW) resulting from  EGA lobby and relationship management with the Secretariat of Energy to approve Resolution 109/2001.  The resolution  regulates the remuneration of the forced dispatch generation which [NAME] can now provide.
15 | Transredes Supreme Decree | [NAME] | 80 | 0.25 |  | The 25% is Enron's ownership % x Enron's participation.