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CASE | FACTS | ISSUE | HOLDING | REASONING | [NAME] | Categories | Class Notes On Case
PART 1:  THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN LAW + POLITICS
[NAME] |  |  |  |  |  | Judicial Review
Marbury v. [NAME] (1803) (p108) | Marbury had been nominated by President [NAME] as a justice of the peace of D.C., and the nomination was approved by the Senate, signed by the President, and sealed.   [NAME], who had been Secretary of State, had failed to deliver the commission letter to Marbury. | Whether the executive branch was amenable to judicial process – whether the Court could compel the executive to issue the commission | Normally, the Executive would be amenable to judicial process b/c Marbury suffered a legal injury, to which the Court can offer a remedy.  However, the Judiciary Act, granting the Court the power to offer a remedy through a writ of mandamus on original jurisdiction, was unconstitutional, so the Court lacked jurisdiction | Why does the Supreme Court have Judicial Review? 6 Arguments: 1) Laws inconsistent with the Constitution are Void • So Court cannot enforce them, but does this mean strike them down? 2) Conflict b/n a Law and the Constitution implies an Arbiter –  • Court faced with a conflict b/n law and Constitution must resolve it • But must this be the Court? 3) Written Constitution • Does this mean void laws must be struck from the books? 4) “Arising Under” Power – therefore have to look to the Const. to resolve cases arising under them 5) Judges take Oath to support the Const. • But this isn’t exclusive to the Court 6) Supremacy Clause lists the Constitution First as the first supreme law • Structural argument – if Supreme Court can review state court decisions that their laws are consistent w/ Const., Supreme Court should be able to review Fed. Ct. decisions that Act of Congress is consistent with the Constitution | [NAME] | Judicial Review | NOTE:  [NAME] = Federalist (strong national power)  Is Marbury a power grab?  If so, is it legitimate?  Could have decided case on Jx grounds - instead, the court went further and found power of judicial review through controversial interpretation of the Judiciary Act so as to make it unconstitutional;  Irony:  Assertion of judicial power in the face of a lack of judicial power.  Court is concerned that if court orders mandamus, [NAME] will refuse to enforce it, thereby diminishing SCOTUS's power  Sometimes SCOTUS decides things b/c the "country will fall apart otherwise."  Legitimate?  Not sure which claim SCOTUS is making: Narrow Claim - In cases before it, SCOTUS treats constitution as higher law, declines to give effect to statutes it finds unconstitutional  [NAME] interprets the constitution and its interpretations are binding on all other actors (private parties, states, etc)
[NAME] [NAME] |  |  |  |  |  | Judicial Review of State Statutes
[NAME] v. Virginia |  |  |  |  |  | Judicial Review of State Statutes
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) (p67) | In 1818, the Maryland Assembly enacted a law taxing the 2nd Nat’l Bank.  McCulloch, the Nat’l Bank’s local cashier, refused to pay the tax | 1) Whether Congress has the power to incorporate a bank   2) Whether a state may tax a fed’l program w/o violating the Const. | 1) Congress has the power to incorporate the bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause  2) A state may not tax  a federal program due to the Supremacy Clause | Text: • Other powers enumerated, so N&P would be superfluous • N&P together means necessary can’t mean indispensible [NAME]. I §10 – “absolutely necessary” is used, so necessary alone couldn’t mean that • “Expressly” included in the Art. of [NAME]. but not in 10A Ratification/Framer’s Intent: • Attempts to enumerate Congress’ power to create a Bank and corporation (for canals) both failed Post-Ratification History: • Early on, 1st and 2nd Banks both passed Congress and weren’t vetoed  The power to tax is the power to destroy No taxation w/o represent. – no fed. reps in MD | [NAME] | Federalism | [NAME]:  "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action."  Decision rests on reason, not constitutional text.  "Strong" federalism - ennumerated powers operating in a sea of state police power.  Fed power is not a carve-out of state power Counter:  ennumerated powers  Congress must be "allowed to select the means" to execute its purpose under the Constitution  States can still tax federal bank, just can't discriminate - cannot tax it more than state banks
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) (p168) | N.Y. St. Legislature granted Livingston & Fulton the exclusive right to operate steamboats in N.Y. waters, and [NAME] the exclus. Right b/n N.Y. and N.J. A 1793 Act of Congress entitled Gibbons to navigate b/n N.Y. and N.J., despite the [NAME]-Fulton-Ogden state-granted monopoly | 1) Whether the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate interstate navigation  2) Whether a state can regulate interstate commerce while Congress is regulating it | 1) Yes.  Interstate navigation is Commerce.       2) No.  The state law interferes with an Act of Congress and is trumped by the Supremacy Clause | Commerce = • Traffic • Buying/selling • Interchange of commodities • Intercourse • Navigation “Among the Several States” =  • Interstate but NOT intrastate Commerce Power is plenary  States have right to regulate intrastate commerce under their police powers (power to maintain "the public  good and order").  But Congress can regulate commerce internal to a state if it is part of the flow of interstate commerce  When a state regulates interstate commerce, it interferes with Congress’ power (unlike tax power) | [NAME] | Commerce Clause | Note:  [NAME] later vetoed Second Bank and said that judicial precedent alone is a "dangerous source of authority," but that the power must come from the people (theme of decentralized constitutionalism - ppl, not courts, have last say on Constitution)  Acts of Congress = more legitimate b/c directly reflect will of ppl (vs courts)?  Do courts have the expertise to make prudential decisions?  Sources of constitutional interpretation ([NAME]): - historical (relying on intent of framers/ratifiers) - textual (looking to meaning of words in [NAME].) - structural (inferring rules from structure of [NAME].) - doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent) - ethical (rules from morals reflected in Cons.) - prudential (balancing costs/benefits of rules)
Groves v. Slaughter (1841) (p213) | Case about Mississippi trade protection that conflicted with federal commerce power | Is Federal Commerce Power exclusive? |  |  | Thompson | Slavery and Commerce
Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) (p217) | PA passes law restricting self-help in recapture of fugitive slaves (conflicts with Cons. [NAME] 3 - Fugitive Slave Clause and Fugitive Slave Act) | Is the Fugitive Slave Act supposed to be preemptive of state laws? | Yes.  FSA trumps state laws | Federal Law is supreme to state law | Story | Slavery, Federalism | [NAME]'s moral dilemma:  He opposes slavery, but believes in federal preemption.  He elevates Fed power but says Congress must be deferential to slave interests.  [NAME] (concurrence): Fed power = one-way ratchet.  South feels threatened no matter what happens
[NAME] (1857) (p229) | Scotts (slaves) were transported through a free state then ended up in Missouri | Are blacks "people," able to bring cases in Federal court?  Is the Missouri Compromise constitutional? | No.  Blacks are not people and, thus, are not citizens.  The Constitution does not apply to them, even if they are free.  The Missouri Compromise is unconstitutional. | Jx decision based on race, not slave status | Taney | Slavery | Concerned about free blacks at this time - afraid of rebellion; free black pop's seen as destabilizing (even in North)  Could have established "weak" citizenship - blacks would be citizens for Federal Jx purposes, but not necessarily in their own states  Court finds Missouri Compromise unconstitutional as well - no state can be prevented from adopting slavery if they want to  Taney thought he was preventing Civil War - he caused it; gave Southern position legitimacy  NOTE:  OVERTURNED BY 14A, giving all privileges and immunities to blacks
The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) (p320) | Louisiana mandated that everyone use one slaughterhouse, outside city | Whether the Louisiana statute violates the 13th or 14th Amendments | No.  The Louisiana statute does not violate the 13th or 14th Amendments  13th: outlaws slavery – doesn’t violate  14th:  Priv. & Immun. – doesn’t violate  Due Process – doesn’t violate  Equal Protection – doesn’t violate | Privileges and Immunities Clause – • Only applies to few rights of U.S. Citizenship: (access to seat of gov’t, the seaports, the courts of justice, demand protection while abroad or on the high seas, to assemble, to use the navigable waters, treaties, or to become a citizen of any other state) (see p. 325 for complete list) • Didn’t want courts to have so much oversight that they would have to/get to constantly decide if state laws infringed on liberty. • Didn’t want the Civil War Amendments to alter the balance of federalism and give Congress the power to legislate over states’ interests/police powers Due Process Clause –  • Not a deprivation of property b/c not a mere redistribution of wealth – where’s the line b/n permissible (taxation) and not (seizing)? Equal Protection Clause –  • Purpose of EPC was to protect blacks/freedmen | [NAME] | 13A, Economic Rights | What was the meaning of ending slavery?  Freeing blacks or embracing free labor?  Majority says freeing blacks, dissenters says free labor  Same thing happens with gender challenge based on 14A - fails (Bradwell v. Illinois)
Bradwell v. Illinois (1873)(p337) | Illinois Supreme Court refused [NAME] a license to practice law b/c she was a woman.  No one doubted she was qualified | Whether IL’s policy violated the Privileges & Immunities Clause of the 14th Amend. | No.  IL’s policy does not violate the Privileges & Immunities Clause of the 14th Amend. | [NAME]: • 2 Types of citizenships and therefore 2 types of privileges and immunities – state grants right to practice law | [NAME] (majority)  Bradley’s (concurrence): • Men and women have different privileges / sep. spheres | Privileges and Immunities, Gender Rights
Minor v. [NAME] (1874)(p343) | See above - gender discrimination case |  |  |  | Waite | Gender Rights
Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) (p351) | blacks not allowed to serve as jurors |  | Violates equal protection (14A) because on its face it discriminates | Would have been the same problem if majority of blacks had done this to whites - wrong is being done to black people as a whole, by placing on them a "badge of inferiority" | Strong | Equal Protection | "High water mark" of 14A extension b/c reaches beyond agreed-upon range of "civil" rights Maybe has something to do w/ the right to juries affecting one's ability to enforce civil rights in court
The Civil Rights Cases (1883) (p373) | Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to prevent discrimination on the basis of race, color, or condition of previous servitude in various public accommodations such as inns, public conveyances, and theatres. | Whether the Civil Rights Act of 1875, with its regulation of private behavior, is within Congress’ enforcement power under the 13th or 14th Amendment | No.  The Civil Rights Act is not w/in Congress’ power under the 13th or 14th Amend.  14th Amend. – Congress exceeds its authority  13th Amend. –  Congress exceeds its authority | State Action Doctrine – the guarantees of the 14th Amend. apply only against the states, not against individuals  Badges & Incidents: The 13th Amend. does apply to individual action, but only to those necess. components of slavery, not mere discrimination                       ← For Congress to have the power to intervene, must pass corrective legislation • State law must be passed, or state action commenced that violates the 14th Amend. • Remember freedom of assoc. concerns • Entanglement Doctrine – when is private action sufficiently entangled w/ state action? [NAME] v. [NAME] exception – state can’t enforce racially restrict. covenants • States are only liable for action, not inaction (e.g. if not enforcing their law)  ← Badges & Incidents of slavery =  compulsory service; restraint from movement; no rights to property, K, standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, etc. (see pp. 377-8) "Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery" (p.379) | Bradley (majority)  Harlan (dissent) | 13A; Equal Protection | Lynchings are really what's at stake here.  Trying to regulate individual private behavior to protect blacks.  SCOTUS says "no."
[NAME] v. [NAME] (1896) (p359) | Louisiana statute required RRs to provide separate but equal accommodations for white and colored races, and made it a misdemeanor to insist on being in the other. | Whether the separate accommodations violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14A | No.  The statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | Separate but equal: Separate does not nec. mean inferior;  laws enforcing the separation of the races in public are w/in state’s police                               Different Kinds of Equality  (14th Amend. only applies to Civil Equality): [NAME] (property, contracts, courts) • Political (voting, juries - but does [NAME] categorize juries as civil right (to avoid issues with Strauder)) • Social (marriage, water fountains, schools) Ct says social inequalities are not "badges of inferiority" | [NAME] (majority)  Harlan (dissent) | Equal Protection | Harlan (dissent) concerned about limiting voluntary association b/w whites and blacks (ex:  2 friends sitting together at a bar).  Real concern = intermarriage (Harlan = white supremacist)
[NAME] (1886) | Chinese  exclusion case |  | Rule:  [NAME] can be neutral on its face, but if applied in a (intentionally) discriminatory fashion, can be challenged under Equal Protection clause | "foreigners of a different race…who will not assimilate with us" (p.403)  Harlan says blacks are assimilable, Chinese are not |  | Equal Protection, Immigration | exclusion preferred to discrimination?
Insular Cases (1901) (p385) | Status of territories acquired by US in Spanish-American War (Puerto Ricans) |  | [NAME] are unassimilable | SCOTUS says full constitutional rights do not automatically extend to all areas under American control.  Full constitutional rights are conveyed once territories incorporate (like Alaska, Hawaii). | [NAME] | Imperialism | Still unresolved (PR = commonwealth)
[NAME] (1905) (p417) | New York Legislature passed a law stating a maximum of 60 hour work week for bakers.  They justified the law based on their Police Power to protect the health and safety of bakers, as well as the people who eat their bread. | Liberty: Whether the right to work as much as you choose is protected under the Due Process Clause of the 14A.  Power:  Whether the State’s Police Powers over health and safety encompasses the regulation of maximum work hours | Yes.  No.  The Freedom of Contract in a case like this cannot be prohibited or interfered with w/o violating the (substantive) Due Process Clause of 14A | Court says only certain workers can be limited - those that pose big threat (not bakers)  Given a right at stake, the gov’t must have a legitimate means (“direct relationship”) to achieve a legitimate end.                                              [NAME] finds the state legislature acting dubiously, so smoking out illegitimate ends: • Dubious Means: • Intervening in the Market • Class Legislation Principle – can’t take from A to give to B • Dubious Ends: • Clean bread? Health of the bakers? – will either improve w/ less hours? [NAME] like pretext | [NAME] (majority)  Harlan (dissent): • Judicial deference to the legislature – here, there is evidence of a substantial relation b/n the law and the baker’s health and public safety  [NAME] (dissent): • A majority of people in a state can enact laws that regulate the liberty to contract | Substantive Due Process; Contract Clause | Court prepared to concede that health regulations can limit freedom to K, but labor regulation cannot.  This was labor regulation  DP includes something beyond procedure - includes substance, as well (substantive DP)  In Lochner era, states constrained in what they can do.  Post-Lochner, not applied much (treated as factual)
Champion v. Ames (1903) (p437) The Lottery Case | Congress prohibited sending lottery tickets through the mails, or from one state to another by any means | Whether the regulation of the transport of lottery tickets in interstate commerce is a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce Power | Yes.  Congress may use the Commerce Power to prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another. | Inherently Harmful  vs. Harmless Distinction                     Carrying things of value from one state to another = Commerce Lottery tickets are inherently harmful. • Isn’t Congress really legislating morality (gambling = bad)? If states  can legislate morality, Congress should be able to do so through the only means available – the Commerce Clause | Harlan | Commerce Clause | Is completely prohibiting an item the same as "regulating"?
[NAME] (1918) (p441) | Father brought suit against an Act of Congress that prevented the shipment w/in interstate commerce of any product that was produced by labor of any person under the age of 14, or of any person under the age of 16 who worked more than 8 hrs./day, 6 days a week | Whether the Act of Congress (preventing shipment) is w/in Congress’s powers to regulate interstate Commerce | No.  It is purely state authority to regulate child labor, so it is not w/in Congress’ Commerce Powers | Manufacture vs.  Commerce Distinction  Congress can’t regulate things (like production or manufacture) that are internal to the states, even if the effects spill over into interstate commerce    10A reserves powers to the states • Local Trade and Manufacture • Police Powers • Local matters Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to negate one state’s economic advantage | Day (majority)  [NAME] (dissent) | Commerce Clause, 10A | Does the court really distinguish [NAME] (lottery case) sufficiently?
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) (p430) |  | minimum wage law for women | struck down | freedom to contract | Holmes dissent | Contracts Clause
Meyer, Pierce, [NAME] |  |  |  | Fundamental Rights at stake |  | Substantive Due Process
PART 2:  THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Nebbia v. New York (1934) (p500) |  |  | there is no constitutionally protected fundamental right to freedom of contract |  | [NAME] | Substantive Due Process
RR Retirement Bd v. [NAME] (not in CB) | Case challenging compulsory retirement age and pension plan under New Deal.  [NAME] justified under Commerce Clause (efficiency and safety of the RRs) | Constitutionality of compulsory retirement age and pension plan | No - not constitutional | [NAME] b/w "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce.  This is indirect (and overly broad), so not protected by the Commerce Clause | [NAME] | Commerce Clause
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934) (p501) | MN mortgage moratorium case. |  | Constitutional. | Contracts Clause exists to "tie hands" of the government  (Victory for [NAME]'s New Deal) | Hughes | Contracts Clause | Cardozo unpublished opinion - says 14A makes adherence to original intent of Commerce Clause irrelevant  Concern about states using flexible standard like "public interest"
Morehead v. NY ex rel Tipaldo |  |  |  |  | Butler (majority)  Hughes (dissent) | Substantive Due Process
Schecter Poultry (511) | Deals w/ Live Poultry  Code of the Nat'l Industrial Recovery Act (New Deal)   Gov. says wages always affect interstate commerce | Does the Commerce Clause cover this Live Poultry Code? | No- the law is unconstitutional | Minimum wage = "indirect" effect on interstate commerce.  [NAME] must be in the "flow" of commerce; sale of poultry = mostly intrastate | Hughes | Commerce Clause
US v. Butler |  |  |  |  |  | Tax+Spending Clause
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel (1937) (p549) | The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 prohibited employers “from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce.”  A multi-state coal-steel manufacturing plant was charged with interfering w/employee’s right to organize and bargain collectively | Does Congress have the power to regulate labor issues like this? | Yes | Congress may regulate activities intrastate in character when separately considered if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate (N&P?) to protect commerce from burdens and obstructions.  This means Congress can regulate labor.  OVERTURNS SCHECTER POULTRY | Hughes | Commerce Clause | Key turning point in Interstate Commerce caselaw - upholds labor regulation (imanufacturing, even - traditionally a state-only power)
United States v. [NAME] (1941) (p551) | Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 set minimum wages and [NAME]. hrs. for employees engaged in the production of goods related to interstate commerce such that if a company didn’t meet the standard, they couldn’t ship it. | Does Congress have the power to regulate these employment practices (i.e. are [NAME] and [NAME] overruled?) | Yes (and yes).  The prohibition of the shipment of interstate goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is w/in Congress’ const’l authority.  [NAME] and [NAME] are pretty much overruled | Congress’ Commerce Power extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the power to regulate interstate commerce                                                The 10th Amendment is merely a truism | Stone | Commerce Clause | Court says "unfair" wage competition is enough of a reason by itself
[NAME] (1942) (p553) | Farmer grew wheat for personal consumption and not for sale, but b/c he grew more than he was allotted to grow and it was deemed “available for marketing,” he was found in violation of the Agriculture Adjustment Act | Whether Congress may use its Commerce Clause Power to regulate crops grown for personal consumption | Yes.  Congress may regulate crops grown for personal consumption | Congress may regulate activity even if it may not be regarded as commerce if it "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce," irrespective of whether such effect is “direct” or “indirect,” and the proper standard for determining substantial effect is in the aggregate of people in similar situations acting similarly                                     • Doesn’t have to be “commerce” • Doesn’t matter whether it is “direct” or “indirect” effect • Look to the AGGREGATE • Size of individual's effect on interstate commerce can be "trivial by itself," but if lots of ppl did it, would be serious - that is enough | [NAME] | Commerce Clause | Any limitations left in the commerce clause?  Or can Congress pretty much do anything even remotely relating to commerce?  Here, appears to be forcing farmer to participate in the commodity market - argument for requiring people to buy health insurance?
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) (p511) | Minimum wage regulation for women | Whether the minimum wage regulation interfered with the freedom of contract in violation of the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. | No.  The minimum wage law did not violate the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend.   OVERRULED ADKINS | Police power covers regulation that is "reasonable in its relation to its subject and is adopted in the interest of the community" | Hughes | Substantive Due Process | Sunstein sees a core change caused by the New Deal = gov. regulatory intervention as the norm.  If regulation is normal, court can only go so far in regulating it
United States v. [NAME] (1938) (p513) | Congress passed the “Filled Milk Act” which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat. | Whether the Act violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 5th Amend. | No.  The Filled Milk Act does not violate the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 5th Amend. | Presumption of Constitutionality (Rational Basis) for Economic Rights                   ← Deferring to Congress’ findings of the facts in stating its purpose and the appropriate means for achieving that purpose.  Congress doesn't have to "prove it."  Carolene Products FN4: 3 reasons for heightened scrutiny: 1) Constitution-Specific – laws that on their face conflict w/ specific Const. provisions 2) Impede Political Process – laws that prevent accountability, free speech, right to vote 3) *Prejudice Against Discrete & Insular Minorities* – in relation to (2), ability to protect minorities | Stone | Substantive Due Process | Does specific rights mean no heightened scrutiny for implied rights?  Not all minority groups entitled to heightened scrutiny - must be those grousp that face obstacles to political processes that normally protect minorities
[NAME] v. [NAME] (1955) (p520) | Fed law prohibits advertising by Optometrists.  Also requires optometrist visit before filling glasses prescription |  | For gov. | [NAME] - deferential to Congressional findings; "Legislature may have concluded" = OK | [NAME] | Substantive Due Process
Korematsu v. United States (1944) (p966) | Congress passed a law making it a crime to enter or remain in a military zone contrary to restrictions.  May 9, 1942, General Dewitt issued a Civilian Exclus Order requiring all people of Japanese descent to be removed from Military Area No. 1 (most of the West Coast) to detention camps.  [NAME] refused | Whether the Executive’s exclusion of those of Japanese descent were within the Executive’s powers | Yes. Despite the Strict Scrutiny analysis, given the compelling gov’t interest, the Executive’s actions were justified | Strict Scrutiny for Suspect Classes (racial classifications): [NAME] tailored law/regulation (means) to a compelling government interest (end)  Majority (Black): • Because of racial classification, the decision was subject to strict scrutiny.   • However, b/c this was a military emergency (evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the great need for action, and the short amount of time), there was a compelling gov’t interest Dissent (Murphy/Roberts): • No evidence of necessity (none of threat, danger of entire Japanese population or even some of them, not short amt. of time – took 11 months, could’ve had hearings of everyone relevant by then) • Racism was the main impetus Other: • Youngstown #1, so only strike down if not w/in Executive’s Const’l powers / violates Const. | Black (majority)  [NAME], [NAME] (dissent) | Equal Protection | Is [NAME]'s strict scrutiny too strict?  "immediate, imminent and impending public danger"  Is Black's strict scrutiny too lenient?  But this was about race - Pearl Harbor was months ago - could have interviewed Japanese citizens to see if disloyal, but didn't.  This is about racism and hatred of the Japanese
Ex Parte Quirin (1942) (p872) | Nazis spies came to US but ditched uniforms.  President approved military tribunals for them.  They were convicted and sentenced to death | Did the president have authority to authorize military tribunals?  Were the tribunals proper? | Yes (on both counts) | President was not operating unilaterally - he had authority from Congress and the Cons. under the articles of war  Unlawful combatants are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunal | Stone | Executive Power
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) (p823) | In the midst of the Korean War, a mountings strike of steel workers threatened to shut down steel manufacturing plants.  Stating that these plants needed to stay open for the nat’l defense, Pres. Truman issued E.O. 10340 which stated that the Secretary of Commerce had the authority to seize the steel mills from their owners and keep them open | Whether the President has the power to issue an Executive Order to seize steel mills in the absence of Congressional consent | No | Majority (Black): • President’s power to act comes from a higher authority.  Either an Act of Congress (express or implied) or the Constitution itself • Congress explicitly refused to allow the Pres. to seize the mills to stop labor disputes • Not in the Const: Not implied by military powers, president is not a lawmaker Concurrence ([NAME]):  3 Categories: 1) Congress has explicitly authorized Pres to do something – Exec. [NAME] power 2) Twilight Zone – Congress is silent – President’s power is limited to those powers in the Const. and will depend on the imperatives and circumstances of the situation • Maj. is for proposition that if Congress is silent, can do this AND that Congress is silent, but that’s not how the votes ended up 3) Lowest Ebb – President’s Actions are incompatible w/ the express or implied will of Congress – Pres’ powers limited to Const., minus Congress’ – strong presumption against the Pres b/c taking powers from Congress • This case is a #3 according to Jackson Concurrence (Frankfurter): • Look to history – Congress can acquiesce to Presidential power over time | Black | Executive Power | [NAME]'s concurrence = most important; concerned about courts not employing constitution to limit congressional action  Legislature defines presidential power?
Brown v. Board of Ed. (1954) (p898) | Black children were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race | Whether segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group equal educational opportunities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  The segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | De jure segregation - segregation caused by law (either statutory (caused by written law) or non-statutory (caused by practices))  De facto segregation - segregation caused by private actions  Separate is not equal in terms of public education  There are signs of inferiority complex among black people (doll test - children picking white dolls over black), perhaps as a result of school segregation (but they don't prove this). | [NAME] | Equal Protection; School Desegregation | Reads more like a speech than a legal decision - lots of rhetoric.  Not based in fact, based in reason  Reasoning:  Education is special?  [NAME] is a vector - a signal of things to come
[NAME] v. [NAME] (1964) (p560) | Title II case again: [NAME] restaurant near an interstate hwy. with 220 seats and at least half of the food is procured from out-of-state |  |  | Where Congress has a “rational basis” for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of Commerce, courts will not interfere There was a plethora of evidence that discrimination of black people had a severe effect on interstate commerce Wrongly Decided? • Black people have to eat somewhere, so still contributing to commerce regardless if some places won’t let them eat there • But almost creating an alternative market by forcing blacks to eat in different places | [NAME] | Commerce Clause | Will the BBQ sell more if it desgregates?  Maybe.  Or maybe racists will refuse to eat there and it will cost them business
[NAME] | Arkansas refuses to implement school desegregation, says [NAME] is unconstitutional |  | Arkansas cannot refuse to desegregate | Marbury says SCOTUS is supreme |  | Equal Protection; School Desegregation | Enforcement problems - SCOTUS can't enforce decisions  Example of decentralized constitutionalism (state interpreting constitution) - what wins?  State vs SCOTUS
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964) (p560) | Title II of Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation; the motel had 216 rooms, accessible to interstate hwys, advertised in nat’l media, 75% of clientele out-of-state - wouldn't allow blacks | Whether the Civil Rights Act is within Congress’ power to regulate interstate Commerce | Yes.  The Civil Rights Act is within Congress’ Commerce Clause power | Congress is not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing is also deemed a moral wrong             There was a plethora of evidence that discrimination of black people has a severe effect on interstate commerce | [NAME] | Commerce Clause; Race | Balcks won't travel or will be less likely to travel.  What about truck drivers?
Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Electors (1959) | Pre-Voting Rights Act.  Challenge to literacy test voting requirement | Literacy requirement allowed in voting? | Yes.  Literacy test req OK | No sign that literacy requirement was racially discriminatory.  [NAME] under 14A |  | 15A Section 2; Voting Rights | Does SCOTUS upholding literacy tests as constitutional constrain Congress in later banning them (which they do in the VRA)?
South Carolina v. [NAME] (1966) (p572) | Challenge to Voting Rights Act prohibiting literacy tests for voting. | Congress can ban literacy voting requirement? | Yes. | Court says Congress can seek to remedy violations of 15A by proactively banning practices that were used to discriminate prior | [NAME] | 15A Section 2: Voting Rights | Implies that states were violating 15A even though SCOTUS said they weren't in Lassiter
Katzenback v. Morgan (1966) (p576) | Section 4(e) of the VRA prohibited an English language voting requirement for non-English speakers who had graduated the 6th grade in non-English speaking American schools.  Seeking to remedy PRs being denied right to vote |  |  | One-way ratchet:  Congress can enforce 14A beyond where the court has gone, but cannot fall short of where court has ruled  Remedial rationale - trying to remedy past violations of non-voting rights of 14A Substantive rationale - trying to remedy past violations of voting rights - this is controversial (SCOTUS held could have English requirements for voting rights)           Strong - Congress telling SCOTUS wrong in Lassiter           Weak - Lassiter still allows case-by-case analysis | Brennan | 14A Section 5; Voting Rights; Reconstruction Powers
[NAME] v. [NAME] |  |  |  |  |  | Reconstruction Powers
[NAME] (1968) (p932) |  | Is a freedom of choice plan regarding schools sufficient to comply with [NAME]? | No.  Merely offering a freedom of choice plan for blacks is not enough - must actively desegregate | Suggests de facto segregation (as opposed to de jure) was the primary focus of [NAME] | Brennan | Equal Protection; School Desegregation | Court is impatient with Southern defiance - maybe the plan would have worked over time.   Court doesn't want to wait any longer
Loving v. Virginia (1967) (p959) | Jeter (a black woman) and Loving (a white man) were married in D.C. and moved back to Virginia, which had made it illegal for interracial marriage.  White people could not marry “colored” people, but “colored” people of different races could marry eachother. | Whether Virginia’s laws against interracial marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  The Statute violates both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amend. | Strict Scrutiny for Suspect Classes (racial classifications): [NAME] tailored law/regulation (means) to a compelling government interest (end)                                                Why we consider one classification to be suspect, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny: • Text of the Equal Protection Clause = “person” • Intent of the Framers/Ratifiers of the EPC = race • Moral Relevance = no good reasons [NAME] = of racial subordination  / prejudice • Immutability of the characteristic = can’t change • Discreteness of the characteristic = obviousness • Political Power = insularity / weak mobilization | [NAME] | Equal Protection; Marriage Desegregation | Opinion polls showed 90% of all whites opposed interracial marriage  Loving not the true origin of modern Strict Scrutiny  Opinion has elements of anticlassification (wrong to even classify by race) and antisubordination (wrong to keep minorities down via law)  Post-Griswold - could argue invasion of privacy of marital relations.  But the court assumes this - says marriage = due process protected
Griswold v. CT (1965) (p.1342) | CT had law imposing min. $50 fine for use of contraceptive drug or device and anyone  who "assists, abets, counsels another as a principal offender"  Appellants were Planned Parenthood physicians who aided married people in obtaining contraception | Whether the Connecticut statute violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  The CT statute violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. | There is a Right to Privacy that is a Fundamental Right (unlike the right to contract) - found in "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights and Constitution.  Fundamental Rights are deserving of more protection from government interference, thru Strict Scrutiny | [NAME] | Substantive Due Process
Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) (p1668) | New York’s public assistance program had a policy of terminating welfare payments prior to the holding of a hearing. | Whether New York’s policy of terminating welfare payments w/o a termination hearing deprives a person of property w/o Due Process of Law | Yes. New York’s policy deprives welfare recipients of property w/o Due Process.  Welfare benefits are property, so New York must offer pretermination hearings. | Property = whatever is “dear” to someone, something that is important and means a lot to a person;  Need a hearing to prevent inaccurate decisions, arbitrariness, provide equality and legitimacy.  [NAME]:  subjective definition  Court follows a fundamental rights/due process rationale - idea that arguably protected groups (here, poor) face denials/restrictions that affect their fundamental rights; invoking Strict Scrutiny | Brennan
Swann (1971) (p935) | School system practiced de jure segregation and court said it had to create better plan for integration that included busing | Can courts impose within-district busing? | Yes. | [NAME] allowed, self-imposed quotas allowed, as well | Burger |  | Very controversial case - high point of judicial creativity  Last unanimous SCOTUS decision
[NAME] (1973) (p937) | Northern school district shown to engage in non-statutory de jure segregation in some of its schools |  |  | [NAME] concurrence/dissent:  Offers deal to majority - do away w/ de facto, de jure distinction and treat North and South the same.  Opposes busing, thinks court has diverged from holding in [NAME] | [NAME] (majority)  [NAME] (dissent) |  | Not unanimous decision
[NAME] (1974) (p941) | Non statutory de jure segregation in Detroit.  District court imposes plan including busing | Busing able to be imposed by court? | No. | [NAME] concerned about white flight | Burger |  | First overruling of desegregation decree
Griggs v. Duke Power Supply (1971) (p1024) | Employer required high school diplomas of job applicants and subjected them to an intelligence test.  The effect disadvantaged black applicants, and the criteria had not been demonstrated to predict job performance | Whether the employment requirements violated Title VII  of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 | Yes.  The employment requirements violate Title VII, b/c of their discriminatory effect, and the lack of a business necessity | Congress passed Title VII to address the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation                   For Title VII, • P need not demonstrate discrim. intent, only discrim. Effect (disparate impact theory). • Burden shifts to D to show “business necessity” | Burger (unanimous) | Equal Protection | High point of court's creativity under Title VII  Disparate impact theory about smoking out current discrimination, remedying past discrimination or dismantling racial hierarchy?  Court says intent-based standard does not adequately combat discrimination  But see Washington v. [NAME] (1976)- employment testing case like Griggs; court says only intentional racial discrimination is subject to Strict Scrutiny AND Arlington Heights (1977) - Only in "rare" cases can disparate impact infer discriminatory intent
Washington v. [NAME] (1976) (p1026) | Blacks applied to become police officers in D.C. and had been rejected b/c they had failed a written personnel test. | Whether the test was racially discriminatory in violation of the 5th Amend. (EPC of 5th!) | No. The procedure is valid under the EPC b/c must show discrim. intent. The approach to Title VII in Griggs doesn’t apply to 14th/5th Amend. | Disproportionate impact is relevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Const. • It is assumed actors, (esp. legislatures) intend the consequences of their actions (Gomillion) • Palmer v. Thompson – (closed all public schools so as not to desegregate) – can look to facts b/c legislative purpose is hard to discover | White | Equal Protection
Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Develop. (1977) (p1039) | Challenge to the city’s refusal to rezone a 15-acre parcel from single-family to muli-family classification, that would benefit low and moderate income tenants |  |  | May show that intent to discrim. was a motivating factor, even if not the primary factor  [NAME] to show a Motivating Factor: 1) Impact of the Official Action 2) Historical Background of the Decision 3) Sequence of Events leading up to it 4) Departures from the Normal Proced’l Sequence 5) Substantive Departures – what’s normally important would lead to a contrary decision 6) Legislative/Administrative History  ←Then burden shifts to gov’t to show would’ve done the same thing anyway, even if hadn’t considered the suspect class | [NAME] | Equal Protection
Bakke (1978) (p. 1072) | U.C. Davis Medical School set aside 16 seats in the class for minorities | Whether this violates the EP Clause of the 14A | Yes.  The Medical School’s set-aside violates the EP Clause of the 14A. | Powell’s Swing Vote (Concurrence): • Strict Scrutiny applied, but this still fails • Compelling interest can’t be to remedy past discrim. • Can say that diversity is a good reason • The Davis Plan was not narrowly tailored, Harvard plan was better (used race as "plus" factor) | [NAME] (majority)  [NAME] (concur)  [NAME] dissenters went for intermediate scrutiny - concerned about poor whites being adversely affected | Equal Protection; Affirmative Action | [NAME] thinks it's important that the Regents of CA made the decision, not the legislature (delegated to the Regents)
Reed v. Reed (1971) (p1182) | Statute preferring males over females as estate administrators | Such a statute violates 14A? | Yes. | Rational basis review (not Strict Scrutiny or Intermediate Scrutiny) - state says men more likely to have business experience.  Court says this does not satisfy rational basis | Unanimous | Equal Protection; Gender
Frontiero v. [NAME] (1973) (p. 1188) | Members of the uniformed services were allowed to claim their spouses as dependents.   A serviceman could claim his wife as a “dependent” w/o regard whether she was dependent on him for support.   A servicewoman could not claim her husband unless he was dependent upon her for over half of his support. The military said that the policy’s purpose was to provide benefits only to those who need it & keep admin. costs low | Whether classifications based on sex, like classifications based on race, alienage, and nat’l origin are inherently suspect and therefore subject to close judicial scrutiny.  Whether the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. | Yes.  Classifications based on sex are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny     Yes.  The statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amend. insofar as it uses differential treatment of males and females | Heightened Scrutiny for Gender - Factors behind classification:  Historical Prejudice Against Discrete & Insular Minority (women), Women included in 14th amendment? (19th amend, right to vote, cuts the other way - implies women not included in 14th), gender/sex = immutable | Brennan | Equal Protection; Gender | Categories  Strict Scrutiny:  race, alienage, national origin - must be "narrowly tailored" and the gov. must have a "compelling interest"  Intermediate Scrutiny:  gender, illegitimacy - must be "substantially related" to an "important interest"  Rationality Review:  must be "rationally related" to a "legitimate interest"
Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) (p1276) | Provision of CA disability insurance system which excluded coverage for normal pregancy and childbirth | Did this provision violate Equal Protection? | No, because no evidence of pregancy being a pretext with the invidious design to discriminate against women.  State has interest in keeping the insurance system solvent. | Decision based on disability, not gender discrimination.  Would have been subject to intermediate scrutiny for gender later | [NAME] | Equal Protection; Gender | Court also held that pregnancy discrimination not covered under "sex discrimination" under Title VII
Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney (1979) (p1262) |  | Whether Massachusetts, in granting an absolute preference to veterans, discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14A. | No. The veteran preference does NOT violate the Equal Protection Clause b/c it is not discriminatory in its purpose. | Gender Discrimination must show discriminatory intent, not effect  To prove intent based on effects: • The law must be taken BECAUSE OF the effects on a group, NOT merely IN SPITE of those effects [NAME] b/c a decisionmaker knew of disasterous effects (b/c the impact is harsh and predictable) on a particular suspect class (e.g. that the law would disproportionately harm women) does not mean that there was an intent to discriminate | [NAME] | Equal Protection; Gender
Miss. U. for Women v. Hogan |  |  |  |  |  | Equal Protection; Gender
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) (p1327) | Sought a permit to have a 4-BR house made into a group home for 13 mentally retarded people, and city council denied it | Whether mental retardation is a suspect class that is subject to strict scrutiny. | No.  Mental retardation deserves a rational basis test b/c it is not a suspect classification.  However, the city’s reasons do not pass the rational basis test | ←Rational Basis: 1) MR are all different & state has interest in help 2) Historically, states have tried to help, not hurt 3) Have a lot of public support/power/influence 4) Ct. unwilling to give intermediate/scrict scrutiny to other groups ← City’s reasons not rational despite legit. interest: 1) Neighbors/students’ private bias = bad reason 2) Location/size/congestion concerns = irrational given treatment of frat houses, apartments, etc. | White | Equal Protection | Intermediate scrutiny for gender b/c of improper stereotypes  Rationality Review w/ Bite
[NAME] (1984) (p994) | 2 white parents divorced, the mother got custody of their child and then remarried a black man.  Father got custody through the FL courts. |  | Does not survive strict scutiny | The law may not, directly or indirectly, give effect to private prejudices. | Burger (unanimous) | Equal Protection; Race
Roe v. Wade (1973) (p1388) | TX criminal abortion laws prohibit procuring or attempting an abortion except for the purposes of saving the mother’s life. | Whether there is a right to an abortion found in the (substantive) Due Process Clause, and if so,   Whether the TX statute violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14A | Yes.  There is a fundamental right to abortion found in the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. [NAME]: 1st:  no state interfer. 2nd:  state can regulate to promote maternal health 3rd:  (viability) state may regulate or proscribe in interest of potent. human life | Why is this a right? • History/Tradition: • Common Law – abortions before quickening weren’t punished (evidentiary reason for this?) • Then, in the 1850s, statutes got strict, but by the 1950s, there was liberalization (really just mother’s health b/c unsafe, not potential life?) Also - Griswold right to privacy Fetus is not a "person" under the constitution  State’s Interest: Why draw the line where they did? • Health of the Mother: • 1st Trimester, abortion safer than birth • Potential Life: • Doesn’t surpass mother’s interest til viability • States inconsistent on potential life w/ rape/tort | Burger | Substantive Due Process | Same verbal formulation as for strict scrutiny in equal protection for "fundamental rights" narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov. interest  Important:  in light of Griswold, court couldn't really make an exception to right to privacy for abortion  Open question:  Should the court act quasi-legislatively?  Lochnering...  [NAME] (later overturned in [NAME]) = product of its time and the choices it contained  Failures of Roe:  Does not guarantee funding (not a positive right to an abortion), decision does not focus on privacy (what is the right in question?)
Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) (sq. p. 1671) | The Social Security Act requires the state agencies to make a continuing assessment of disability benefit recipients.  Before a final determination, a recipient was able to produce documents and evidence of continued need. | Whether a hearing prior to termination of disability benefits under the Social Security Act is entitled to a pretermination hearing under the Due Process Clause | No.  A recipient of disability benefits under the Social Security Act is not entitled to a hearing prior to termination as part of his/her Due Process Rights. | 3-Part Test:  1) Individual’s interest – what’s at stake 2) Nature of the Process – risk of error and probable value of add’l safeguards 3) Gov’t’s Interest – admin. Cost and burdens  Different from Goldberg - with welfare, individual needs the benefits; with disability, person usually has safety net  Concern with accuracy of part (2) | [NAME]
[NAME] v. [NAME] (1970) (p1616) | Large families sue MD for limiting maximum welfare benefits w/out accounting for size of fam, etc. | Is MD's welfare cap constiutional under Equal Protection? | Yes.  The cap is constitutional | Provision limits benefits to all families, regardless of size MD doing all it can, so no violation of SSA of 1935 "Overreaching" argument DNA to 14A - only to 1A  Continuation of fundamental rights/DP rationale | [NAME] | Equal Protection
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) (p1624) | Richer areas can provide better schooling through higher property taxes | Local property taxes funding schooling constitutional? | Yes.  Schooling funded by local property taxes is constitutional | Ps did not prove that education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution; also did not prove less educated people = suspect class  So financing system not subject to Strict Scrutiny (and easily passes rational basis test) | [NAME] | Equal Protection
Plyler v. Doe (1973) (p1641) | TX had a statute denying funding for education to illegal aliens.  A school district attempted to charge illegal aliens $1000 a year tuition | Whether such a state statute and school district policy are constitutional | No - court strikes down the TX statute and the school's actions | Intermediate Scrutiny for laws and actions that limit the rights afforded to people (specifically children) based on their status as aliens (must further substantial goal of the state - this did not)  Note:  Court says that education is a fundamental right - but not equal education; unclear how minimal education can be  Court says it's applying rationality review, but enforces "substantial goal" requirement, language of intermediate scrutiny | Brennan | Equal Protection | EP/SDP hybrid
[NAME] (1977) (p1692) | CT created regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for 1st-trimester abortions | Did the CT statute violate the EP clause of 14A? | No.  The regulation stands | CT law placed no obstacle in woman's path to an abortion (OK by Wade - financial need does not create a suspect class; limited to rational basis test (which regulation passes)  [NAME] v. [NAME] - similar restriction on federal Medicaid upheld (financial resources not guaranteed under Wade) | [NAME] | Equal Protection | Seems a little unjust that the state favors some outcomes (funding childbirth) but not others (not funding abortion) - shows that abortion right is not enforced as a positive right  Note:  South African constitution enforces positive rights - can't fund one and not the other
Oregon v. [NAME] (1970) (p594) | Congress passed law requiring states to register citizens between 18 and 21 as voters.  Oregon did not want to lower its voting age | Can states set their own age limits for state elections? | Yes.  States can set their own age limits for state elections | Congress can set voting age for federal elections, but not state elections Overturned by 26A, lowering voting age to 18 for all elections  [NAME] says congress is the superior factfinder.  But [NAME] (dissent) says that that would give Congress the power to decide which classifications are suspect (Court's job)  Open question:  can states lower age below 18 for state elections? | [NAME] (majority)  Burger (dissent) | 14A Section 5; Federalism | Different visions of Section 5 - Stewart says that Congress should only act after Courts make determinations on 14A  Note:  Court had not yet decided that rationality review (rational basis) applied to age discrimination
National League of Cities v. Usery (1976) (p650) | In 1974, Congress extended the minimum wage and maximum hour regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act to almost all state and municipal employees | Whether the Fair Labor Standards Act interferes with States’ abilities to structure their business as protected principles of federalism | Yes, it interferes with the States in violation of principles of federalism.  (NOTE OVERRULED BELOW) | Any Federal Law that follows the following 3 part test, is unconst’l b/c it interferes with principles of federalism and the rights of the states: 1) Regulates states qua states, 2) Interferes  w/ the structuring of the state’s operations in the way the states wanted, AND 3) The operation is a “traditional gov’t function” | [NAME] | 10A | Clear statement rule:  10A stands for proposition that some areas must be left to states without fed interference - use "clear statement" lens to limit Commerce Power, etc. of fed gov
[NAME] v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985) (p653) | The Department of Labor determined that a San Antonio mass-transit system was required to abide by federal minimum wage laws | Whether the San Antonio mass-transit system is a “traditional or integral gov’t function under Nat’l League of Cities such that Congress cannot regulate it under the Commerce Clause | Nat’l League of Cities is overruled. | The traditional government function test of Nat’l League of Cities was unworkable and inconsistent with federalism b/c the Const. never says what the “traditional functions” of the States are  The political system/structure and the political process are the safeguards of states’ interests • Substantive constraints on Congress’s power based on “sacred state autonomy” do not protect states’ interests NO COURT PROTECTION NEEDED FOR STATES | Blackmun | 10A
PART 3:  THE PRESENT; CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND THE DEEPENING IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE ([NAME])
South Dakota v. [NAME] (1986) (p627) | Fed law withheld 5% of federal highway funding if states don't set drinking age to 21 | Law constitutional? | Yes.  Congress may induce states to prevent underage drinking by withholding federal highway fnds from states the don't prohibit drivers from under 21 from drinking. | Test for Spending Power: money must be…   (1) for the general welfare,  (2) unambiguous conditions,  (3) related to a federal interest in national programs,  (4)not barred by other constitutional provisions, and  (5) can't be so much money so as to constitute compulsion (5% not enough, but we are not told what is) | [NAME] | Tax+Spending Clause
United States v. Lopez (1995) (p601) | The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 forbade “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that he knows is a school zone.”  12th grade student brought a concealed handgun to school and was charged w/ violating the Act | Whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act is within Congress’ powers to regulate interstate Commerce | No.  The Act is not within Congress’ Commerce Clause Powers | 3 Categories Congress can Regulate under Commerce: 1) Channels of interst. commerce 2) Instrumentalities, or persons or things of interst. commerce, even if the threat may only come from intrastate activities 3) Activities that substantially effect interstate commerce (this is the one at issue here)  Education is traditionally within the realm of the state  Court uses rational basis - faults Congress for insufficient findings (and dismisses [NAME]'s potential findings) - says findings makes it easier for courts to do their job  [NAME] says no way to draw line b/w education and family - concerned about slippery slope  Court says must be dealing with "economic activity" - very vague what this means | [NAME] | Commerce Clause | Not a "race to the bottom" issue - no indication that fed must be "first movers" here  What standard of review for Commerce Clause?  [NAME] in Comstock
United States v. [NAME] (2000) (p623) | Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 gave victims of gender-motivated violence a fed’l civil  COA against their assailants.  [NAME] was gang raped by football team and wanted to sue | Whether the VAWA is within Congress’ powers to regulate interstate Commerce | No.  The Act is not within Congress’ Commerce Clause Powers | Congress’ can’t use the Commerce Clause to regulate things that are non-economic or non-commercial  Court says this was also not particularly "interstate" | [NAME] | Commerce Clause
[NAME] (2005) (p624) | CA Compassionate Use Act allowed medical [NAME].  [NAME] used medical marijuana prescribed by her Dr. that had never been bought or sold; never crossed state lines | Whether Congress may use its Congress Clause Power to regulate [NAME] grown for personal consumption | Yes.  The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate this behavior through the CSA | This is economic activity that is more like [NAME] than Lopez. • Concern about the aggregate effects b/c can’t be sealed off from the market - Marijuana "set aside" for her use could be diverted into illegal trade  • Growing marijuana = "economic"/"commercial" activity (under commerce clause) • [NAME] says that Congress can also regulate  noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary (necessary + proper justification) part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce | [NAME] | Commerce Clause
US v. Comstock (2010) (p100 [NAME]) | Law passed by Congress required the civil commitment of mentally ill sex offenders after completing their criminal sentences | Is such a law constitutional? | Yes - SCOTUS upholds Congress's authority to pass the law under the "Necessary and Proper" clause | 5 Considerations ([NAME] majority): 1.  N+P clause grants Congress power to enact laws "rationally related" and "reasonably adapted" to executing the other enumerated powers 2.  Lots of similar statutes exist 3.  Statute extends longstanding policy 4.  Statute properly accounts for state interests by allowing the state to take over when it requests 5.  Statute is narrowly tailored to only address the legitimate federal interest  [NAME] if this  is a new test or just [NAME]'s reasoning | [NAME] | [NAME] clause | Necessary and Proper Clause (Art 1, Sec 8): "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Florida v. US Dept. of Health and Human Services (2011) | Challenge to federal law (PPACA; Obamacare) requiring individuals to purchase health insurance | Is a health insurance mandate constitutional? | No - the entire act is void | Failing to buy health insurance is not an act of interstate commerce; N+P clause does not allow Congress to impose an individual mandate; Ind. Mandate cannot be severed from the rest of the PPACA  Rejects 4-part [NAME] test in Dole, says nothing ever gets thrown out from the test - says N+P test is better |  | Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, Tax+Spending Clause | Individual Mandate issue:  Commerce Clause - Health insurance = economic.   Self-insure requirement = activity (vs inactivity)
[NAME] (2010) | Challenge to federal law (PPACA; Obamacare) requiring individuals to purchase health insurance | PPACA constitutional? | Yes. | Relief denied; preliminary injunction denied  PPACA allowed under the Commerce Clause Not an invalid tax under taxation clause |  | Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause, Tax+Spending Clause
Gregory v. [NAME] (1991) (p665) | Missouri constitution requires judges to retire at 70.  Judges claim that state law conflicts with ADEA.  ADEA has exemption provision and judges claim they aren't under it | Whether a state may place an age limitation on judges (conflicts with Age Discrimination in Employment Act by Congress) | Yes.  The law does not violate the 14A EP clause or the ADEA | Missouri has 10A right to set qualifications for office  "If Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Gov., it must make its intentions to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" (it did not in ADEA) - needed to say "this will apply to state judges."  Applies rational basis test - judges become less capable as they grow older (limitation = reasonable) | O'Connor | 10A | Concern about the effect such a rule will have - expresio uniis - by applying law to specific ppl, won't that seem to exclude others (perhaps who were intended to be covered)?  Protect states by making Congressional legislation harder to enact
New York v. United States (1992) (p674) | Federal law requires states to "take title" of radioactive waste if they fail to comply with federal law | Whether the federal gov’t may direct or otherwise motivate the State legislature to regulate in a particular field in a particular way | No.  The federal gov’t. cannot commandeer the legislative machinery of a state.  To do so interferes with the structure of our federal government system | The federal gov’t cannot require states to regulate; cannot compel the States to enact laws or administer a federal regulatory program. • Congress can’t commandeer state legislatures and make them pass laws for the federal gov’t. • State officials can’t consent to the enlargement of Congress’ powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. | O'Connor | 10A; Commandeering | Note:  States likely wanted Congress to "tie their hands" to make them do something the electorate will not like.
[NAME] v. United States (1997) (p693) | [NAME] Handgun Violence Prevention Act required the AG to establish a national system for checking prospective buyers’ backgrounds; required local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks in the meantime | Whether federal gov’t may issue directives requiring the states to address particular problems, or command the States’ officers to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program | No. The federal gov’t cannot commandeer the executive machinery of a state. | “The federal gov’t may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program” | [NAME] | 10A; Commandeering | Is commandeering the state executive any different from legislative branch?  No.  They are the same - follow NY v. US
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) (p629) | Archbishop sues local zoning board under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) for denying his request to expand his church (located in historical district) | Whether the RFRA is unconstitutional for, in part, overriding a local preservation ordinance | Yes.  The RFRA is unconstitutional | Congress can only "substantially burden" free exercise of religion to further a compelling federal interest, and even then, only the least restrictive burden  Under Section 5 of 14A, Congress can pass RFRA but cannot determine how states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions  No evidence that historical preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, not aimed at religion | [NAME] | Section 5 of 14A | Problem:  RFRA could be read to benefit religious over non-religious (violation of EP); basically Congress reading law into 14A that doesn't exist there - courts should make these determinations.  Purpose of RFRA is to overturn SCOTUS decision - court mad about this - Marbury!
Northwest Austin Utility District v. Holder (2009) | Voting Rights Act (VRA) challenge |  |  |  |  | 15A Section 2 | Court  doesn’t answer question of whether the VRA satisfies the “congruence and proportionality”  test under 14A § 5.  [NAME] implies that it does (it has time constraints, limitations, etc)  Note:  VRA had sunset date and needed to be re-authorized.  Does that mean it shouldn't be subject to the C&P test.
Planned Parenthood v. [NAME] (1992) (p1424) | Pennsylvania passed abortion law requiring • Informed consent prior to abortion • Parental consent prior to abortion • Waiting period prior to abortion [NAME] notification prior to abortion • Certain reporting req's on facilities providing abortion services | Whether  Roe v. Wade should be overturned | No. (kinda):  Roe’s “central holding” should be upheld – woman has a right to an abortion • Trimester framework is thrown out (and allows restrictions before viability) • State’s interest in potential life goes back to the beginning of pregnancy  New Test: State can pass restrictions before viability if they don't pose an Undue Burden: • Waiting period = OK • Informed consent = OK • Reporting Req's = OK [NAME] notification = NOT OK | Court claims to be upholding "essential holding" of Roe - Substantive DP  Stare Decisis – NOT an  inexorable command b/c it’s hard for Const’l decisions to be overturned by Congress; Stare Decisis/Overturning Considerations: 1) Workability – [NAME] is still workable/clear 2) *Special Reliance* – Maybe? Women have planned their lives around Roe 3) New Legal Developments – No. 4) Changed Facts – Yes, but only change the limits of viability, not Roe’s central holding (rejects trimester rule)  Court’s Legitimacy Interest • Can’t go overruling itself all the time • Must decide according to principle • Mustn’t decide according to public pressure, or b/c of new justices (ex. Lochner → West Coast Hotel; Plessy → [NAME]?) | O'Connor, [NAME], [NAME] plurality | Substantive Due Process; Abortion | Gutting Roe or protecting its "essential holdings"?
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) (p1457) | Nebraska law making partial-birth abortion illegal, except where necessary to save life (pre-viability, 2d trimester cases) | Whether such a law is unconstitutional | Yes.  [NAME] struck down | This imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to choose (violation of [NAME]).   But the case isn't really about the "undue burden" standard.  Main problem:  No exception for health of mother.  Also concerned about limiting doc's ability to determine what is the safest method for the mother - failure to have exception for woman's health is not justified by state's interest in potential life | [NAME] | Substantive Due Process; Abortion | Difference b/w PBA and normal Abortion is about appearances - do appearances matter?  This is a very political question
[NAME] (2007) (supp p185) Carhart II | Congress passed a nationwide ban on Partial Birth Abortion (intact dilation and extraction (D&E)) in response to Carhart | Whether the ban on partial birth abortion is an undue burden ([NAME] test) on the mother’s right to have an abortion, given that in some situations, it may be the safest way for the mother to obtain an abortion  Whether the lack of exception for the mother’s health is an undue burden | No and no.  The partial birth abortion ban is not an undue burden on the mother’s ability to have an abortion.  [NAME] upheld | “When there is a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including the life of the unborn” | Dissent Argument: • *The right as stake is “the woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature”* • *Should be heightened scrutiny, not rat’l basis* [NAME] burden, esp. the “as applied” requirement • Congress’ findings are irrational | Substantive Due Process; Abortion | But congressional findings were sloppy here - can we rely on them?   Very incoherent - court appears to employ rational basis test, but also SS test.  Doesn't make sense.  Court seems to be saying that women are unable to make a rational decision about this - having a child changes who you are.  No absolure requirement for health of the mother exception anymore - doesn't this undo an essential holding of [NAME]?    [NAME] = too big to fail (like Roe)?
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) (p1466) | Georgia anti-sodomy law (sodomy in general).  Two men caught having oral sex. | Whether the 14th Amendment of the Constitution confers a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy ([NAME] the majority defines it)  And does the Georgia Law violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend.? | No.  There is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, and therefore, no deprivation under the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. | There is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.                  History & Tradition: • Proscribed at Common Law • Proscribed in all 13 states at Bill of Rights ratif. • Proscribed in most states at 14th Amend. ratific. • Present day: 24 states outlaw it | White | Substantive Due Process; Gay Rights | Protecting public morality = compelling state interest
[NAME] (2003) (p1482) | Texas anti-sodomy statute (outlaws only homosexual sodomy).  Two men caught having anal sex. | Whether the statute violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  The Texas statute violates the (substantive) Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend. Bowers OVERRULED | There is a right to engage in private homosexual conduct under the (substantive) Due Process Clause  of 14A                                      History & Tradition: • History of non-enforcement • Emerging Trend/Polling –  • 50 states →30 (only 4 outlaw homosexual sodomy) • Model Penal Code Common Law/Precedent: • Griswold and it’s progeny: broader conception of the right to privacy than stated in Bowers Int’l [NAME]: • European Court of Human Rights • United Kingdom State’s Interest:   • Issue isn’t whether a maj. of people view a conduct as immoral, it’s whether that maj. can use the state’s power to impose that on everyone | [NAME] (majority)  O’Connor (concur): • Equal protection Arg. – This is singling out homosexual sodomy • Legislating Morality – never a legitimate reason | Substantive Due Process; Gay Rights | Majority says protecting public morals is not a compelling gov. interest;  cannot legislate morality.  But this is about something more - Ct says that this deals w/ criminalizing homosexual conduct - more scrutiny req'd to criminalize?  [NAME] critique - this is protecting the "homosexual agenda" - concened about overturning state laws that don't comport w/ current majoritarian views (majoritarian view might change later on).  Also, we reject Judeo-Christian values but look at Int'l Law?!?!?!?  What group is the majority and what group is the minority?  Stare decisis from Bowers not enough - not too big to fail, like Roe
City of Richmond v. [NAME] (1989) (p1081) | Richmond had minority program giving preference in public construction Ks to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) - target goal: 30% of Ks to MBEs | Is this set-aside AA program unconstitutional under EP? | Yes.  AA program is unconstitutional | SS applied for racial classification - Richmond failed to demonstrate (1) a need for remedial action ("compelling interest")and (2) that other non-discriminatory remedies would be insufficient ("narrowly tailored").   SS FAIL.  There were serious problems w/ this program, even for supporters of AA  Are local gov's able to apply 14A Sec. 5 to proactively redress past discrimination?   [NAME] (majority):   NO - concern abt extending this power to local gov's - might get hijacked by a crazy faction.    O'Connor:  YES - Richmond is in a new era - not concerned about blacks hijacking gov. through majority on city council.   [NAME]: YES - insulting to assume that minority leaders will abuse power | O'Connor | Equal Protection; Affirmative Action | Same level of scrutiny applies to benign and malign classifications.  SS appears to require that benign race-based classification be remedial
Adarand v. Pena (1995) (p1109) | Federal law provides financial incentives for contractors to employ minority subcontractors | Whether the classification is unconsitutional | Yes.  AA program is unconstitutional | Court applies SS to federal AA law - 5A binds federal gov. to same standards that state and local gov's are bound to under 14A ("reverse incorporation") | O'Connor | Equal Protection; Affirmative Action | WASN'T CONGRESS SUPPOSED TO BE DIFFERENT?!?!?!  I GUESS NOT.  No dice under Section 5.
[NAME] v. [NAME]  (2003) (p1120) | Michigan Law School AA admission policy – trying to reach a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students.   At the same time, [NAME] v. [NAME] challenged Michigan undergrad AA program | Whether the Michigan Law School admission policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | No.  The policy survives SS  b/c it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling gov’t interest.  Gratz fails-not narrowly tailored | Strict Scrutiny for Affirmative Action Programs  Compelling Gov’t Interest: (defer to University?): 1) Diversity - breaking down stereotypes 2) Preparation for a Diverse Workforce 3) Legitimacy of Gov’t – leadrship door open to all grps Narrowly Tailored: • Not a quota, but individualized holistic view of all applicants – race is but one factor  Gratz - What's so wrong w/ points system?  Undergrad said too expensive to implement individualized determinations - SCOTUS skeptical of administrative convenience as a compelling interest | O'Connor (majority)  [NAME] (dissent): • Different levels of critical mass for different grps Thomas’ Dissent: • Stigma – even benign racial classifications hurt • Concerned abt "mismatch" (minorities underperforming) | Equal Protection; Affirmative Action | So SS is not the kiss of death, after all! But since SCOTUS deferred to the school, is that really SS?  O'Connor - "race matters in this country"; persuaded by brief by retired generals, noting importance of diversity in military + businesses - need diverse students coming up pipeline from schools.  Amorphous "critical mass" goal = good or bad?  NOTE:  AA limitations apply to private universities as well - spending clause (could condition funding)
Parents Involved v. Seattle School District (2007) | Seattle never ordered to desegregate by court (no history of de jure segregation).  K-12 schools engage in voluntary desegregation programs:  For oversubscribed Seattle schools tiebreakers:  1) sibling at school,  2) race balance school (w/in 10 points of area’s white/nonwhite ratio),  3) geographic proximity to school  Louisville: declared unitary of Ct.-ordered desegregation in 2000, voluntarily adopted requirement that  schools maintain black enrollment from 15-50%.  Parents select school, if outside balance, placed to maintain the balance | Whether the schools’ policies violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  Both schools’ policies violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend.  [NAME] doesn't apply to K-12 | Strict Scrutiny both for burdens or benefits based on racial classifications  Roberts’ Plurality: • No compelling interests: [NAME] past discrim. – can only remedy de jure (otherwise, not compelling interest) Diversity – this is outright racial balancing ([NAME]) - need race to be part of holistic individualized consideration • No Narrow Tailoring – schools should have considered alternatives w/ race-neutral criteria (ie build school in particular areas, socioeconomic status, etc.)  [NAME] Concurrence:  Outs himself as integrationist.  Says diversity = compelling interest.   [NAME]: • Studies show integration hurts minority students Breyer’s Dissent: • Schools can take corrective measures to combat segregation, even if not de jure • Critical of 3-tier scrutiny business • Few placement decisions actually come down to race |  | Equal Protection; School Desegregation | The idea that race-neutral alternatives should be used instead of a racial classification is disingenuous - just pretending it's not about race.  Sloppy workarounds preferable to racist methods?  [NAME] and WA v. [NAME] stand for proposition that proxies for race and gender = same thing as using race and gender classifications
United States v. Virginia (1996) (p1229) VMI Case | Virginia Military Institute had male-only admission policy | Whether VMI, standing alone, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend. | Yes.  VMI standing alone violates the EPC of the 14th Amend.  VA must somehow provide equal opportunity for women that is afforded men at VMI | Intermediate Scrutiny Substantially related: • VWIL alternative as possible remedy - means separate could be equal under Int. Scrutiny? Ct relies on [NAME], not [NAME] Important Gov. interest: • Justification must be genuine, and not hypothesized or invented post hoc • Must not rely on overbroad generalizations (or old stereotypes) about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females • Can be based on physiological but not psychological dif's | Ginsburg | Equal Protection; Gender | Gov. must show "exceedingly persuasive justification"; cannot rely on "overbroad generalizations" - seems higher than Int. S, but less than SS(?)  [NAME] doesn’t like this uncertainty; [NAME] thinks SCOTUS is secretly employing SS.  [NAME] concern that there would not be enough women to form "critical mass" of females under adversarial system - would have to do away w/ adversarial system entirely?  Sep but equal in gender discrimination still an open question in K-12 education
[NAME] (1996) (p1505) | CO modified their constitution to say that being a homosexual would not give someone minority status to claim being a protected class or discrimination. |  | Struck down based only on rationality basis. | This did not put gays in the same category as everyone else, it singled them out for worse treatment.                   Desire to harm is not a legitmate state interest  2 competing views of what CO amendment does: 1.  It bars gay rights legislation enacted through any means short of a constitutional amendment ([NAME] dissent) 2.  Deprives gays of the right to challenge discriminatory enforcement of generally applicable laws even where state law prohibits arbitrary treatment ([NAME] majority)  DM thinks this is a bad opinion - 2 ships passing in night | [NAME] (majority)  See also O'Connor's Concurrence from [NAME] - she thinks homosexual conduct is a question of EP, not SDP | Equal Protection; Gay Rights | Rationality Review w/ Bite - 3 possible readings: 1.  Legislation passed out of a naked desire to harm a politically unpopular group violates EP. 2.  Legislation that expressly makes access to the political process more difficult for one group than for others violates EP. 3.  Legislation making access to political process more difficult for a politically unpopular group (and that is its naked purpose) violates EP.  EP/SDP synthesis?  Combine access to political process w/ intimate sexual relations and a politically unpopular group = Cons. protection
Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health (Mass. 2003) | Gay couples sue the Mass. Dept. of Public Health for being denied the right to marry.  Case goes up to  Mass. State Supreme Court. |  | State may not deny right to marry to same-sex couples | Majority says that the right to marriage = fundamental right and gays are being singled out.  But rather than SS for a fundamental right under SDP, court applies rationality review under EP and determines that there was no rational basis in denying marriage to gays |  | Equal Protection; Gay Rights | Rationality Review w/ Bite  State's stated goals/interests:  creating favorable setting for procreation, childrearing (but some gays have kids/adopt. Should we rely on social science evidence?), preserving monetary resources (limiting tax benefits), and preseriving institution of marriage (slippery slope to polygamy?)
[NAME] v. [NAME] (2000) | Recount issue - some counties recount certain ways, others do it  w/ differing standards | Does the recount violate EP? | Yes - the recount is unconstitutional | Lack of uniformity in recount, only a single magistrate hearing challenges (doesn't this cut the other way - ensures uniformity, no EP violation?) |  | Equal Protection | How well does Ct do at deciding when the country needs it to step in and fix everything?  Was calling off the recount the appropriate remedy?  Use of judicial review at federal level to protect integrity of judicial review at state level?