1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 3, 4 and 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (OJ 1998 L 225, p. 16), as amended by Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 2015 (OJ 2015 L 263, p. 1) (‘Directive 98/59’).
2 The request has been made in the proceedings between BL and Dr A, acting as insolvency practitioner for Luftfahrtgesellschaft Walter mbH, concerning the validity of BL’s dismissal, occurring in the context of collective redundancies.
3 Recitals 2 and 12 of Directive 98/59 state: …
4 Article 1(1) of that directive provides: ‘For the purposes of this Directive:
5 Article 2 of the directive provides: ‘1. Where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations with the workers’ representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement. 2. These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and of mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for redeploying or retraining workers made redundant. Member States may provide that the workers’ representatives may call on the services of experts in accordance with national legislation and/or practice. 3. To enable workers’ representatives to make constructive proposals, the employers shall in good time during the course of the consultations: (a) supply them with all relevant information and (b) in any event notify them in writing of: The employer shall forward to the competent public authority a copy of, at least, the elements of the written communication which are provided for in the first subparagraph, point (b), subpoints (i) to (v).’
6 The first and fourth subparagraphs of Article 3(1) of that directive provide: ‘Employers shall notify the competent public authority in writing of any projected collective redundancies. … This notification shall contain all relevant information concerning the projected collective redundancies and the consultations with workers’ representatives provided for in Article 2, and particularly the reasons for the redundancies, the number of workers to be made redundant, the number of workers normally employed and the period over which the redundancies are to be effected.’
7 According to Article 4(1) and (2) of Directive 98/59: ‘1. Projected collective redundancies notified to the competent public authority shall take effect not earlier than 30 days after the notification referred to in Article 3(1) without prejudice to any provisions governing individual rights with regard to notice of dismissal. Member States may grant the competent public authority the power to reduce the period provided for in the preceding subparagraph. 2. The period provided for in paragraph 1 shall be used by the competent public authority to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies.’
8 Under Article 6 of that directive: ‘Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive are available to the workers’ representatives and/or workers.’
9 According to Paragraph 134(1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code): ‘Any legal act contrary to a statutory prohibition shall be void except as otherwise provided by law.’
10 Paragraph 4 of the Kündigungsschutzgesetz (Law on protection against dismissal), in the version applicable to the case in the main proceedings (‘the KSchG’), provides: ‘Where a worker wishes to challenge a dismissal because it is socially unjustified or otherwise legally ineffective, he or she must bring an action before the [Arbeitsgericht (Labour Court, Germany)] within three weeks of receiving written notice of the dismissal in order to seek a finding that the dismissal has not ended the employment relationship. …’
11 According to Paragraph 17 of the KSchG: ‘(1) The employer is under an obligation to notify the employment agency before it makes redundant: … … over a period of 30 calendar days. … … (3) … The notification referred to in subparagraph 1 shall be given in writing and shall enclose the observations of the works council on the redundancies. If the works council has not made any observations, the notification shall be valid if the employer can demonstrate that the works council was notified at least two weeks prior to the notification given in accordance with the first sentence of subparagraph 2 and sets out the stage reached in consultations. The notification must include information on the name of the employer, the registered office and type of establishment, as well as the reasons for the projected redundancies, the number and professional categories of workers to be made redundant, the number of workers normally employed, the period over which it is planned to carry out the redundancies and the criteria for selecting the workers to be made redundant. The notification shall also include, for the purposes of job placement and in agreement with the works council, information on the sex, age, profession and nationality of the workers to be made redundant. …’
12 Paragraph 18(1) and (2) of the KSchG reads as follows: ‘(1) Redundancies which must be notified under Paragraph 17 may take effect less than one month after the employment agency has received the notification only with the latter’s consent; consent may be given with retroactive effect up to the date of the application. (2) In certain cases, the employment agency may decide that the redundancies shall take effect not earlier than at most two months after receipt of the notification.’
13 Article 20(1) of the KSchG provides: ‘The decisions of the employment agency pursuant to Paragraph 18(1) and (2) shall be made by its management or a committee (decision-maker). …’
14 Under Paragraph 2(3) of the Drittes Buch des Sozialgesetzbuches (Book III of the Social Security Code), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the SGB III’): ‘Employers shall inform the employment agencies at an early stage of any operational changes that may have an impact on employment. This includes in particular notifications about …
15 Article 38 of the SGB III provides: ‘(1) Persons whose … employment relationship ends shall undertake to register as jobseekers with the employment agency at least three months before the end of the employment relationship, stating their personal details and the date of termination of the … employment relationship. If less than three months elapse between the date on which the termination date is known and the termination of the … employment relationship, they must register within three days of the date on which the termination date is known. The obligation to register exists irrespective of whether or not continuation of the … employment relationship is claimed before a court or contemplated by the employer. … (1a) The competent employment agency shall conduct an initial advice and placement interview with the person registered as a jobseeker in accordance with paragraph 1 immediately after the jobseeker’s registration, …’
16 Paragraph 45 of the Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (Law on the organisation of labour courts), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the ArbGG’), provides: ‘(1) A Grand Chamber shall be established at the [Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany) (‘the Grand Chamber’)]. (2) The Grand Chamber shall decide where a chamber wishes to deviate from the decision of another chamber or the Grand Chamber on a matter of law. (3) A referral before the Grand Chamber shall be admissible only if the chamber from whose decision another chamber wishes to deviate has declared, upon request from the latter chamber, that it maintains its legal position. … The respective chamber shall rule on the question and the answer by means of an order in the composition required for judgments.’
17 BL had been working since 2012 as a captain at Luftfahrtgesellschaft Walter mbH, which employed around 348 people.
18 On 15 June 2020, the company had initiated a consultation procedure under Paragraph 17(2) of the KSchG with the captains’ staff committee in connection with the dismissal of those employees.
19 On 30 June 2020, that company decided to cease its business activities with immediate effect.
20 On 1 July 2020, insolvency proceedings were initiated in respect of that company. Dr A was appointed as insolvency practitioner.
21 On the same day, Dr A notified the projected collective redundancies to the competent public authority. No final observations of the staff representatives were enclosed. Moreover, as to the alternative possibility under national law of setting out the stage reached in consultations, the notification merely indicated that the consultation had been initiated and would be continued, without providing any information on the content of the discussions that had taken place during the consultation procedure.
22 That authority acknowledged receipt of the projected collective redundancies notification, noting that it was ‘only’ acknowledging receipt of the documents accompanying the notification.
23 At the beginning of July 2020, Dr A dismissed the cabin and ground crew, for whom no worker’s representation had been organised.
24 By letter of 29 July 2020, he also gave notice of termination of the contracts of employment of BL and of other captains in the context of projected collective redundancies, to take effect within three months.
25 On 17 August 2020, BL brought an action before the Arbeitsgericht Berlin (Labour Court, Berlin, Germany), seeking a declaration, first, that the termination of her employment contract is void and, second, that the employment relationship continued to exist. In support of the action, she submitted, inter alia, that the consultation procedure as set out in the KSchG had not been observed.
26 By decision of 30 September 2020, that court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the action and it referred the action to the Arbeitsgericht Düsseldorf (Labour Court, Düsseldorf, Germany).
27 By judgment of 26 November 2020, the latter court dismissed BL’s action on the ground that the consultation procedure and the procedure for the notification of the projected collective redundancies had been duly observed.
28 By judgment of 28 October 2021, the Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Labour Court, Düsseldorf, Germany) dismissed BL’s appeal against that latter judgment.
29 BL brought an appeal on a point of law against that judgment before the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court), which is the referring court. The case was assigned to the Sixth Chamber of that court (‘the Sixth Chamber’).
30 That Chamber states that the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings turns on the question whether the failure to comply with the obligation to notify the projected collective redundancies in the prescribed manner necessarily means that the termination of the employment contract at issue is void, in the absence of any penalty provided for by national law, where notification of the projected collective redundancies was not given or notification thereof was incorrect or incomplete. In that regard, that Chamber states that, until then, in accordance with its own case-law, the penalty applied in the event of failure to comply with that obligation was to render the termination of the employment contracts concerned void, in accordance with Paragraph 134 of the Civil Code.
31 Accordingly, it explains that the consequence of that penalty, imposed on the basis of that provision, is that the employment relationship continues, which entails payment to the worker of his or her remuneration, until the employer again gives notice of termination of the contract of employment, after initiating a new consultation and notification procedure, provided that the thresholds laid down in Paragraph 17(1) of the KSchG have been reached.
32 The Sixth Chamber observes, however, that it does not intend to maintain that case-law, since the penalty of being rendered void, although consistent with the principle of effectiveness, is contrary to the principle of proportionality in that, first, the absence of notification of the projected collective redundancies to the competent public authority should not affect the employer’s intention to terminate the individual employment contract and, second, such a penalty limits the employer’s discretion in implementing the termination of employment contracts, which is contrary to the case-law resulting from the judgment of 21 December 2016, AGET Iraklis (C‑201/15, EU:C:2016:972, paragraph 31).
33 However, in the light of Paragraph 45 of the ArbGG, a departure from the case-law is conceivable only if the Second Chamber of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) (‘the Second Chamber’) would agree to it, since, also according to the case-law of that chamber, incorrect notification of planned collective redundancies or the absence of notification thereof renders the termination of the employment contracts concerned void.
34 It is apparent from the order for reference that, pursuant to Paragraph 45(2) of the ArbGG, the Grand Chamber is to decide where a chamber wishes to deviate from the decision of another chamber or the Grand Chamber on a matter of law. Under Paragraph 45(3) of the ArbGG, a referral before the Grand Chamber is admissible only if the chamber from whose decision another chamber wishes to deviate has declared, upon request from the latter chamber, that it maintains its legal position.
35 The Sixth Chamber indicates that it initiated that internal consultation procedure by requesting clarification from the Second Chamber on 14 December 2023, the Second Chamber having subsequently referred to the Court, in Case C‑134/24, Tomann, a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 98/59.
36 In that request for a preliminary ruling, the Second Chamber raises the question as to the actions to be taken in response to the termination of the employment contracts in the absence of notification of the projected collective redundancies as provided for by that directive, and in particular as to the employer’s obligation to give such notification.
37 The Sixth Chamber takes the view that, despite the Second Chamber’s request for a preliminary ruling, the matter in the present case must also be referred to the Court in order to ascertain the legal consequences not of the absence of notification of the projected collective redundancies, as is the case in Case C‑134/24, Tomann, but, as in the present case, of an incorrect or incomplete notification.
38 In that regard, the Sixth Chamber points out that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, a question may be referred to the latter under the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU only if there is a case pending before the referring court and if that court is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature.
39 The Sixth Chamber wonders whether the Second Chamber was entitled to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling, in so far as the dispute which is the subject of that internal consultation procedure is pending not before the Second Chamber, but before the Sixth Chamber. In the context of that internal consultation procedure, the Second Chamber is thus asked questions in the abstract, as evidenced by the absence of adversarial proceedings before it. Furthermore, the Second Chamber’s reply would not be given in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature, since that chamber is not the court before which the dispute in the main proceedings was brought.
40 Accordingly, only the Sixth Chamber would be entitled to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling, since the internal consultation procedure is merely one condition for a referral to the Grand Chamber of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) to be admissible under Paragraph 45 of the ArbGG.
41 However, according to the Sixth Chamber, without an answer from the Court regarding the interpretation of Article 3, Article 4(1) to (3) and Article 6 of Directive 98/59, the Second Chamber would not be in a position to provide a reply to the request for clarification under the internal consultation procedure, for the purposes of Paragraph 45(3) of the ArbGG, which entitles the Sixth Chamber to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of Directive 98/59.
42 By its first question in the present case, which is similar to the fourth question referred in Case C‑134/24, Tomann, the Sixth Chamber asks, first, whether, in the light of the judgment of 13 July 2023, G GmbH (C‑134/22, EU:C:2023:567, paragraph 34 et seq.), the objective of the procedure for notifying projected collective redundancies to the competent public authority, laid down in Article 3 of Directive 98/59, which is to make collective redundancies subject to prior notification to that authority, may be regarded as being achieved where that authority raises no objection as to the incomplete nature of the notification and thus suggests that it considers that it has sufficient information to carry out its task of seeking solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies within the periods laid down in Article 4 of that directive.
43 Second, the Sixth Chamber asks whether the objective pursued by Article 3 of that directive may also be regarded as being achieved where a national provision in the field of employment promotion, such as Article 2 of SGB III, provides that the employer is to cooperate with the competent public authority in preventing or limiting unemployment, even if that provision is not one of those relating to the procedure for collective redundancies which are formally transposed by Paragraph 17 et seq. of the KSchG and/or where national law provides that the national employment authority is required to investigate on its own initiative in the context of a collective redundancy procedure.
44 By its second question, which corresponds to the first to third questions in Case C‑134/24, Tomann, and which is asked in the event that the first question in the present case is answered in the negative, the Sixth Chamber, which has doubts as to the position taken by the Second Chamber, seeks to ascertain whether the objective of Article 3 of Directive 98/59 may be regarded as being achieved where the notification of projected collective redundancies, which is incomplete or non-existent, may be rectified, supplemented or regularised after the employee has been informed of his or her dismissal.
45 By its third question, the Sixth Chamber asks about the relationship between the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) and Article 6 of Directive 98/59, in particular the scope of Article 6 in the light of the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), which provides for a standstill period, which could be regarded as constituting the penalty for incorrect notification or the absence of notification of projected collective redundancies.
46 In that regard, the Sixth Chamber observes, inter alia, that the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) does not provide for any penalty relating to errors affecting the procedure for notifying projected collective redundancies. The standstill period provided for therein arguably does not constitute a penalty but has the purpose of enabling the competent authority to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies. If it were otherwise, Article 6 of that directive would have no autonomous meaning as regards the notification procedure.
47 Accordingly, the penalty applicable to errors affecting the procedure for notifying projected collective redundancies should be provided for by the national legislature in the context of the provisions concerning employment promotion. In the light of Article 6 of that directive and pending the intervention of that legislature with a view to providing for such a penalty, the determination of that penalty is a matter for the courts having jurisdiction.
48 In those circumstances, the Sixth Chamber of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
49 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as meaning that the objective of the notification of projected collective redundancies to the competent public authority may be regarded as being achieved, first, where that authority raises no objection as to an incorrect or incomplete notification and thus considers that it has sufficient information to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies within the period laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive and, second, where national legislation provides that the employer is to cooperate with that authority in preventing or limiting unemployment and/or that the national employment authority is required to investigate on its own initiative in the context of a collective redundancy procedure.
50 As to the first limb of the first question, it should be recalled, first of all, that the main objective of Directive 98/59 is to make collective redundancies subject to prior consultation with the workers’ representatives and prior notification to the competent public authority (judgment of 13 July 2023, G GmbH, C‑134/22, EU:C:2023:567, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
51 It follows that, once the quantitative and temporal conditions for the application of that directive, laid down in Article 1 thereof, are satisfied, two procedural obligations must be complied with by any employer contemplating collective redundancies.
52 First, under Article 2(1) of Directive 98/59, employers are required to begin consultations with the workers’ representatives. Under Article 2(2) of that directive, those consultations are, at least, to cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, and of mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for redeploying or retraining workers made redundant. In particular, under the first subparagraph of Article 2(3) of that directive, employers are to supply workers’ representatives with all relevant information and in any event notify them in writing of the information referred to in point (b) of that subparagraph.
53 Second, under Article 3(1) of that directive, employers are to notify the competent public authority in writing of any projected collective redundancies.
54 Under the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive, ‘this notification shall contain all relevant information concerning the projected collective redundancies and the consultations with workers’ representatives provided for in Article 2, and particularly the reasons for the redundancies, the number of workers to be made redundant, the number of workers normally employed and the period over which the redundancies are to be effected’.
55 The first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 98/59 provides that such ‘projected collective redundancies notified to the competent public authority’, together with the relevant information referred to in the preceding paragraph, are to take effect not earlier than 30 days after that notification, a period which that authority must use, according to paragraph 2 of that article, in order to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies.
56 The obligation to notify must thus allow the competent public authority to explore, on the basis of all the information forwarded to it by the employer, the possibilities of limiting the negative consequences of those redundancies by means of measures tailored to the data characterising the labour market and economic activity to which those collective redundancies relate (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2023, G GmbH, C‑134/22, EU:C:2023:567, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
57 The first subparagraph of Article 4(1) therefore guarantees a minimum period which must be available to that authority for the purpose of taking the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph (judgment of 27 January 2005, Junk, C‑188/03, EU:C:2005:59, paragraph 51).
58 It follows that, where the employer has not notified the competent public authority of projected collective redundancies in accordance with its obligations under Directive 98/59 and that authority does not have all the information necessary to enable it to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies, the main objective of that directive cannot be regarded as having been achieved.
59 In the present case, subject to verification by the referring court, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the notification of the projected collective redundancies made by Dr A on 1 July 2020, as referred to in paragraph 21 above, was incorrect or incomplete, in that it did not contain all the relevant information referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive.
60 In that regard, the fact that the competent public authority confined itself to acknowledging receipt of that incorrect or incomplete notification, without, however, stating whether it meets the requirements of that directive, clearly cannot result in that notification being regarded as nevertheless meeting the requirements of that directive.
61 It is true that that authority is not intended to examine the individual situation of each of the workers affected by the projected collective redundancies. However, in so far as that authority’s action seeks to gain an overall understanding of the projected collective redundancies (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2023, G GmbH, C‑134/22, EU:C:2023:567, paragraph 37), incorrect or incomplete notification would prevent it from carrying out its task of seeking solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies under Article 4(2) of Directive 98/59.
62 As regards the second limb of the first question, it is already apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 51 to 55 above that no employer may be relieved of the procedural obligations set out in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive simply by the fact that an initially incorrect or incomplete notification is regularised by the competent public authority on its own initiative on the basis of the applicable national legislation.
63 It should be noted, first, that such a regularisation is liable to infringe the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive, read in conjunction with the first and fourth subparagraphs of Article 3(1) thereof, from which it is apparent that the 30-day period referred to therein does not begin to run until the employer has notified the competent public authority of projected collective redundancies, with such notification complying with those provisions.
64 Second, the time which the competent public authority would have to devote to taking the necessary steps for such regularisation on its own initiative is likely to preclude that authority from using the full 30-day period to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies, in accordance with Article 4(2) of that directive.
65 It follows that national legislation which relieves every employer of its obligation, under Directive 98/59, to notify the competent public authority of any projected collective redundancies in the prescribed manner is liable to undermine the effectiveness of that directive, even if that legislation also enables that authority to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies under that Article 4(2).
66 In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that Article 3 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as meaning that the objective of the notification of projected collective redundancies to the competent public authority cannot be regarded as being achieved, on the one hand, where that authority raises no objection as to an incorrect or incomplete notification and thus considers that it has sufficient information to seek solutions to the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies within the period laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive and, on the other, where national legislation provides that the employer is to cooperate with that authority in preventing or limiting unemployment and/or where the national employment authority is required to investigate on its own initiative in the context of a collective redundancy procedure.
67 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as meaning that the objective of notification to the competent public authority of projected collective redundancies may be regarded as being achieved where an incorrect or missing notification of such projected collective redundancies may be rectified, supplemented or regularised after the worker concerned has been informed of the termination of his or her employment contract.
68 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling where the question submitted concerns the interpretation or the validity of a rule of EU law, unless it is quite obvious that the interpretation sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main proceedings or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to that question (judgment of 19 December 2024, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe), C‑601/23, EU:C:2024:1048, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
69 It should be noted that, in the present case, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that Dr A did not attempt to rectify, supplement or regularise the incorrect notification of the projected collective redundancies made on 1 July 2020.
70 Thus, it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Article 3 of Directive 98/59 sought by the referring court is hypothetical and that, therefore, the referring court is in fact inviting the Court to formulate an advisory opinion, in disregard of its task in the context of the judicial cooperation established by Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 October 2024, Ararat, C‑156/23, EU:C:2024:892, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
71 It follows that the second question is inadmissible.
72 By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of incorrect or incomplete notification of projected collective redundancies, the fact that the 30-day period laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive does not run constitutes a measure intended for the enforcement, within the meaning of Article 6, of the obligation to notify laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive.
73 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the question of the relationship between the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) and Article 6 of that directive arises, in particular, where the notification of projected collective redundancies is incorrect or incomplete, justifying the fact that the 30-day period laid down in the former provision does not run until notification that complies with Directive 98/59 has been given.
74 Article 6 of Directive 98/59 provides that Member States are to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the enforcement of obligations under the directive are available to the workers’ representatives and/or workers.
75 It is clear from the terms of that article that Member States are required to introduce procedures to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down by that directive. On the other hand, and in so far as the directive does not develop that obligation further, it is for the Member States to lay down detailed arrangements for those procedures (judgment of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling, C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 34).
76 Article 6 of Directive 98/59 does not specify which measures Member States are to adopt in the event of a failure to comply with the procedural obligations laid down in that directive, but leaves them free to choose the measures suitable for achieving the objective pursued by that directive, depending on the different situations which may arise, it being specified that those measures must, however, ensure real and effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and have a real deterrent effect (judgment of 5 October 2023, Brink’s Cash Solutions, C‑496/22, EU:C:2023:741, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
77 However, it should be pointed out that, although it is true that Directive 98/59 merely carries out a partial harmonisation of the rules for the protection of workers in the event of collective redundancies, it is also true that the limited character of such harmonisation cannot deprive the provisions of the directive of useful effect (judgment of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling, C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
78 Consequently, although it is for the Member States to introduce procedures to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in Directive 98/59, such procedures must not deprive the provisions of the directive of useful effect (judgment of 16 July 2009, Mono Car Styling, C‑12/08, EU:C:2009:466, paragraph 36).
79 In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 98/59 provides that projected collective redundancies notified to the competent public authority are to take effect not earlier than 30 days after the notification referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) without prejudice to any provisions governing individual rights with regard to notice of dismissal. It follows that the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) must be regarded as merely providing for the simple legal consequence of a failure to comply with the employer’s obligation to notify in the prescribed manner the projected collective redundancies as regards the rights of the workers concerned and of their representatives in the context of the collective redundancy procedure.
80 Article 6 of Directive 98/59 purses a different purpose. It is intended to ensure the enforcement of the procedural obligations laid down by that directive, in particular the obligation, laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) thereof, requiring employers to notify the competent public authority in writing and in the prescribed manner of any projected collective redundancies. The purpose of that article is thus to ensure the effectiveness of the provisions of the directive by adopting effective, efficient and proportionate national measures.
81 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the only national measure which the referring court considers it could apply in the present case, in the event of failure to comply with the employer’s obligations in the procedure for notifying projected collective redundancies, would consist of suspending the notice of dismissal for a period equivalent to that provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive, leading to the extension of the employment relationship of the workers concerned.
82 However, as is apparent from paragraphs 79 and 80 above, the 30-day period laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 98/59, and the national measures adopted pursuant to Article 6 thereof, which are intended for the enforcement of the obligations under that directive, serve different purposes.
83 It follows that the suspension of the notice of dismissal for a period aligned with that 30-day period, in the event of incorrect or incomplete notification to the competent public authority of projected collective redundancies, until such time as notification that complies with that directive is given, first, cannot replace the simple legal consequence of a failure to comply with the employer’s obligation to notify the projected collective redundancies in the prescribed manner under the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) and, second, nor can it relieve Member States from adopting, in addition, an effective, efficient and proportionate measure such as to encourage employers to comply with the obligation to notify laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive, thus guaranteeing the effectiveness of the provisions of that directive, such as, in particular, compensation for the workers concerned.
84 In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the third question is that Article 6 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of incorrect or incomplete notification of projected collective redundancies, the fact that the 30-day period laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of that directive does not run does not constitute a measure intended for the enforcement, within the meaning of Article 6, of the obligation to notify laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive.
85 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. 1. Article 3 of Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, as amended by Directive (EU) 2015/1794 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 6 October 2015, 2. Article 6 of Directive 98/59, as amended by Directive 2015/1794,