1 By its appeal, ClientEarth AISBL asks the Court to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 1 February 2023, ClientEarth v Commission (T‑354/21, EU:T:2023:34; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed its action for annulment of Commission Decision C(2021) 4348 final of 7 April 2021 refusing access to certain documents requested under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43) (‘the decision at issue’).
2 Recitals 4, 6 and 11 of Regulation No 1049/2001 state: … …
3 Article 1 of that regulation provides: ‘The purpose of the Regulation is:
4 Article 2 of that regulation provides as follows: ‘1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this Regulation. … 3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union. …’
5 Article 4(2), third indent, and (6) of Regulation No 1049/2001 states: ‘2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: … - the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. … 6. If only parts of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the document shall be released.’
6 Article 7(2) of that regulation is worded as follows: ‘In the event of a total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 15 working days of receiving the institution’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the institution to reconsider its position.’
7 Under Article 12(2) of that regulation, ‘legislative documents, that is to say, documents drawn up or received in the course of procedures for the adoption of acts which are legally binding in or for the Member States, should, subject to Articles 4 and 9, be made directly accessible’.
8 The first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13), provides: ‘As regards Article 4(2), first and third indents, of [Regulation No 1049/2001], with the exception of investigations, in particular those concerning possible infringements of Community law, an overriding public interest in disclosure shall be deemed to exist where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment.’
9 The background to the dispute, which is set out in paragraphs 2 to 15 of the judgment under appeal, can be summarised as follows for the purposes of these proceedings.
10 ClientEarth, the appellant, is an international non-profit association whose aim is the protection of the environment.
11 On 15 July 2020, the appellant applied to the European Commission for access to certain documents and audits from that institution, relating, in particular, to the application by the French Republic and the Kingdom of Denmark of Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006 (OJ 2009 L 343, p. 1).
12 On 11 September 2020, the Commission granted that request only in part.
13 On 2 October 2020, ClientEarth submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, a confirmatory application requesting that the latter reconsider its position regarding the documents to which it had refused access.
14 On 7 April 2021, by the decision at issue, the Commission confirmed its refusal to disclose some of the documents available on the basis of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, which relates, in particular, to the protection of investigations.
15 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 17 June 2021, the appellant brought an action seeking annulment of the decision at issue.
16 In support of the action, the appellant relied on two pleas in law. The first alleged misapplication of the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and failure to state reasons. The second alleged an incorrect and unreasoned finding that there was no overriding public interest, and failure to state reasons.
17 In paragraph 5 of the judgment under appeal, the Court stated that, among the documents referred to by the confirmatory application, those still at issue before that court corresponded to five final audit reports regarding Denmark, a document concerning the audit action plan follow-up regarding France and six final audit reports regarding France (‘the documents in question’).
18 As regards the first plea, the Court held, in paragraph 22 of the judgment under appeal, that the alleged failure to state reasons did not constitute a separate plea alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, but related to the separate question of the merits of the grounds of the decision at issue.
19 Next, in paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, the Court rejected as unfounded the first part of the first plea, alleging that a general presumption of confidentiality for inspections, investigations and audits, in environmental matters, is incompatible with the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, signed at Aarhus on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1), as well as with Regulation No 1367/2006.
20 The General Court also rejected as unfounded, in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, the second part of the first plea, alleging that the documents in question regarding France were not related to an inspection, investigation or hearing procedure which was ongoing on the date of the decision at issue.
21 As regards the second plea, the Court held, as a preliminary point, in paragraphs 79 to 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s arguments relating to a failure to state reasons also alleged in the context of that plea in fact related rather to the merits of the Commission’s assessment.
22 In paragraph 94 of the judgment under appeal, the Court held that, although the appellant had explained in a convincing manner that the documents in question would be necessary for it to participate effectively in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009, with the aim of increasing the protection of human health and the environment, its explanations were not sufficient, however, to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest justifying their disclosure.
23 In that connection, it noted, first of all, in paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, that the administrative activity of the Commission did not require such extensive access to documents as that required by the legislative activity of an EU institution.
24 It then stated, in paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s argument could be extended to any document relevant to participation in the legislative debate in environmental matters and thus make worthless the exception provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, with the result that it was too general to constitute an overriding public interest in disclosure.
25 As to the appellant’s arguments relating to consumer protection and the good administration of EU funds, the Court held, in paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal, that they were also too general in nature, adding that the Commission, in any event, was to inform the public about the progress of specific infringement cases through the regular publication of press releases.
26 Accordingly, the General Court rejected the two pleas in law put forward by the appellant as unfounded and, after rejecting a request for a measure of inquiry made by the appellant, ordering the production of the documents in question, dismissed the action in its entirety.
27 By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; - annul the decision at issue; - in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court; and - order the Commission to pay the costs of the present proceedings and of the proceedings before the General Court, including the costs of any intervening parties.
28 The Commission contends that the Court should: - reject the appeal as partially inadmissible and partially unfounded; and - order the appellants to pay the costs.
29 By document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 11 August 2023, Ms Grace O’Sullivan and Ms Caroline Roose, Members of the European Parliament, applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the appellant. By order of 6 November 2023, ClientEarth v Commission (C‑249/23 P, EU:C:2023:828), the President of the Court rejected that application.
30 The appellant raises two grounds in support of its appeal. The first ground of appeal is divided into two parts, the first alleging contradictory reasoning and distortion of evidence; the second, an error of law in so far as concerns the finding that there was no overriding public interest within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The second ground of appeal alleges infringement of the obligation to state reasons in so far as concerns the discounting of the existence of an overriding public interest.
31 As regards the first part of its first ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in the first place, that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by contradictory reasoning in paragraphs 94 and 96. Indeed, while in paragraph 94 the General Court accepted that, as the appellant put forward in its argument, the disclosure of the documents in question would have been necessary for the appellant to participate effectively in the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009, it then held, in paragraph 96, that that argument was too general. It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that a contradiction in the reasoning constitutes an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, which, as a question of law, can be relied on in the context of an appeal.
32 In the second place, the appellant submits that, in paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court distorted the evidence by finding that its arguments were too general, whereas it had, on the contrary, put forward specific arguments to justify the need for access to the documents in question in order to participate in the revision procedure under Regulation No 1224/2009.
33 It recalls, in that regard, the reasons why it is necessary for it to have access to the documents in question so as to participate in a meaningful and effective way in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009 in order to ensure the implementation of an effective control system for fisheries policy, even though the system presents serious deficiencies, in particular in so far as concerns the reliability of fishing data. The appellant submits that it has demonstrated that disclosure of the documents in question would specifically contribute to the protection of the public interest identified, and it refers to paragraphs 89 to 115 of its application at first instance.
34 By the second part of its first ground of appeal, the appellant also submits that the General Court erred in law by concluding that there was no overriding public interest in the disclosure of the documents in question, since the Court incorrectly considered that the appellant’s arguments in that regard were too general.
35 The appellant adds that, although the General Court was right to hold, in paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission’s administrative activity did not require such extensive access to documents as that required by the legislative activity, that finding would not, in any event, be relevant to explain why the documents in question were not relevant for actual participation in the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009 or for justifying the absence of an overriding public interest in their disclosure. The appellant also refers to the judgment of 5 February 2018, Pari Pharma v EMA (T‑235/15, EU:T:2018:65), in which the General Court found that there was an overriding public interest in the disclosure of administrative documents drawn up by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in the context of its administrative activity.
36 According to the appellant, the refusal to grant access to documents, on the ground that they are administrative in nature, is also not consistent with Regulation No 1049/2001, which enshrines the widest possible access to documents of the institutions. In any event, the appellant argues that documents of a legislative nature must be disclosed pursuant to Article 10 TEU and Article 12 of that regulation.
37 In its reply, the appellant also submits that the judgments of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission (C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738), and of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth v Commission (C‑612/13 P, EU:C:2015:486), relied on by the Commission, are not relevant to the present dispute.
38 Moreover, contrary to what the Commission also contended, the appellant submits that it substantiated its position by specific and detailed arguments.
39 In the appellant’s submission, the General Court was therefore required, after recognising the existence of a public interest capable of justifying disclosure, on the basis of sufficiently specific and convincing explanations relating to the particular circumstances which the appellant had put forward, to annul the decision at issue on the ground that the Commission had not weighed the opposing interests in order to decide which of those interests prevailed in the present case.
40 The Commission contends that those arguments cannot succeed.
41 As regards the first part of the first ground of appeal, in so far as it relates, in the first place, to the existence of allegedly contradictory reasoning in the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraph 94 of that judgment, the General Court accepted that the disclosure of documents would be necessary for it to participate effectively in the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009, and then held, in paragraph 96 of that judgment, that the argument was too general to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest within the meaning of the last clause of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001.
42 In that regard, it is true that the question whether the grounds of a judgment of the General Court are contradictory or insufficient is a question of law, which can, as such, form the basis of an appeal (judgment of 8 June 2023, Council v Pech, C‑408/21 P, EU:C:2023:461, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
43 However, in the present case, it is apparent that the reasoning set out in paragraphs 94 and 96 of the judgment under appeal is not contradictory. Indeed, the General Court noted, respectively, that the appellant’s explanations ‘[were] not sufficient’ and that its arguments ‘[were] too general’ to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest justifying disclosure of the documents in question. In so doing, the Court intended to specify that the explanations and arguments put forward by the appellant did not demonstrate such an overriding public interest, even if disclosure of those documents had been necessary for the appellant to participate effectively in the legislative process for revision of Regulation No 1224/2009. The question whether that assessment by the Court is vitiated by an error of law is the subject of the second part of the present ground of appeal and will therefore be examined in that context.
44 Regarding, in the second place, the allegation of a distortion of the evidence, it is important to note that the appraisal of the facts by the General Court does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited).
45 Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, that appellant must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by that court and show the errors of appraisal which, in that person’s view, led to such distortion. In addition, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 25 June 2020, SatCen v KF, C‑14/19 P, EU:C:2020:492, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).
46 The appellant submits essentially that the argument that it put forward before the General Court demonstrates sufficiently that access to the documents in question presented particular importance for its participation in the legislative debate on the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009 and that the Court therefore wrongly considered that that argument was too general in that it could be extended to any document relevant to participation in the legislative debate on any environmental matter. The appellant also refers to the judgment of 5 February 2018, Pari Pharma v EMA (T‑235/15, EU:T:2018:65), in which the Court adopted a different position with regard to EMA documents to that taken in the judgment under appeal.
47 However, those arguments relate, in reality, to the merits of the General Court’s analysis in the judgment under appeal in so far as concerns the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure of the documents in question.
48 It follows that the first part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
49 As regards the second part of that ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law in so far as concerns the interpretation, in paragraphs 94 to 96 of the judgment under appeal, of the concept of ‘overriding public interest’, it follows from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that Regulation No 1049/2001 is intended to confer on the public the widest possible right of access to documents of the EU institutions. It is also apparent from that regulation, in particular from Article 4 thereof, which lays down a system of exceptions in that regard, that that right is, nevertheless, subject to certain limits based on reasons of public or private interest (see judgments of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 40; of 27 February 2014, Commission v EnBW, C‑365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 61; and of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth v Commission, C‑612/13 P, EU:C:2015:486, paragraph 57).
50 By virtue of the exception relied upon by the Commission, set out in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the EU institutions are to refuse access to a document where its disclosure would undermine the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure of the document concerned.
51 The system of exceptions laid down in Article 4 of that regulation, particularly in paragraph 2 thereof, is thus based on a balancing of the opposing interests in a given situation, that is to say, first, the interests which would be favoured by the disclosure of the documents in question and, secondly, those which would be jeopardised by such disclosure. The decision taken on a request for access to documents depends on which interest must prevail in the particular case (judgments of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 42, and of 7 September 2023, Breyer v REA, C‑135/22 P, EU:C:2023:640, paragraph 72).
52 It should be noted, first of all, that the appellant does not dispute paragraphs 58 to 76 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court examined, only to reject it as unfounded in paragraph 77 of that judgment, the second part of the first plea in law raised before that court, alleging that there was no link between the documents in question concerning France and an inspection, investigation or audit procedure carried out by the Commission at the date of the decision at issue.
53 By contrast, the appellant does dispute the General Court’s analysis of the existence of an overriding public interest in disclosure of such documents.
54 In that regard, it follows from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that it is for the party arguing for the existence of an overriding public interest to rely on the specific circumstances which justify the disclosure of the documents concerned and that setting out purely general considerations cannot provide an appropriate basis for establishing that an overriding public interest prevails over the reasons justifying the refusal to disclose the requested documents (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraphs 93 and 94, and of 11 May 2017, Sweden v Commission, C‑562/14 P, EU:C:2017:356, paragraph 56).
55 As regards the overriding public interest capable of justifying disclosure of a document, the Court has already held that considerations as general as those according to which the principles of transparency and democracy imply the right of citizens to be informed of the state of conformity of national laws with EU environmental law and to participate in the decision-making process are not capable of establishing that those principles are of particularly pressing concern which could prevail over the reasons justifying the refusal to disclose the documents concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth v Commission, C‑612/13 P, EU:C:2015:486, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).
56 Similarly, in a case where a non-governmental organisation requested access to information available to the Commission in respect of a project which is the subject matter of infringement proceedings, the Court of Justice has held that the circumstances alleged by that organisation, according to which access to the information was such as to allow it to take an active part in that procedure, did not at all show the existence of an overriding public interest of that type, notwithstanding that that organisation acted in accordance with its statutory aims, which consisted in the protection of the environment (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 95).
57 Furthermore, it is appropriate to emphasise the importance which is attached to the confidentiality of documents relating to a Commission investigation procedure.
58 Thus, the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, which lays down a rule to facilitate access to documents containing environmental information, provides that it does not apply to ‘investigations, in particular [to] those concerning possible infringements of Community law’.
59 The Court has inferred that infringement procedures are regarded, by that European Union legislation, as a type of procedure which, as such, has characteristics precluding full transparency being granted in that field and which therefore has a special position within the system of access to documents (judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 55).
60 More generally, the Court has also considered that the disclosure of the documents concerning an infringement procedure during its pre-litigation stage would be likely to change the nature and progress of that procedure, given that, in those circumstances, it could prove even more difficult to begin a process of negotiation and to reach an agreement between the Commission and the Member State concerned putting an end to the infringement alleged, in order to enable European Union law to be respected and to avoid legal proceedings (judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 63).
61 Lastly, it should be added that the investigation procedures at issue in the present case, relating to a possible failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations, are intended to ensure compliance by the Member States with EU environmental legislation and also pursue, by their purpose, the objective of ensuring protection of the environment and health within the European Union.
62 It follows from the foregoing that the mere fact that an environmental association claims that the disclosure of documents covered by the confidentiality attached to the Commission’s investigations would be necessary for it to participate effectively in the legislative process for revision of a piece of EU legislation in the environmental field, in order to ensure the best possible protection of the environment and health, is too general and is not sufficient, in itself, to establish the existence of an ‘overriding’ public interest capable of prevailing over the reasons justifying the refusal to disclose such documents.
63 None of the evidence submitted by the appellant in the context of its appeal is capable of establishing that the General Court’s findings relating to both the burden of proof which was borne by the appellant in the context of the action at first instance, referred to in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, and the fact that the appellant merely claimed, in a general manner, that access to those documents would be necessary for it in order to participate effectively in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009, but without putting forward specific reasons justifying that such access fell within the scope of an overriding public interest, are incorrect in law.
64 In particular, the circumstance, alleged by the appellant, that the information contained in such documents is important to active participation in that legislative process and makes it possible to remedy an ‘asymmetry’ of information held by the Commission is not sufficient to establish the existence of such an interest.
65 Therefore, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 94 and 96 of the judgment under appeal, that although disclosure of the documents in question could be necessary for the appellant in order to participate effectively in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009, with the aim of increasing the protection of human health and the environment, its arguments were not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest, justifying their disclosure, such as to prevail over the confidentiality requirements attached to the Commission’s investigations.
66 Such an argument is too general and could apply to any document relevant to participation in the legislative debate in environmental matters, in such a way that, if it were to be accepted, it would deprive the exception provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 of any practical effect.
67 Furthermore, while it is indeed apparent from recital 6 and Article 12(2) of that regulation that wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are acting in their legislative capacity and that, to the fullest extent possible, those documents should be directly accessible, it should be noted that, contrary to what the appellant claims, the documents in question - which, it is not disputed, were drawn up by the Commission in the context of the review which it carries out in relation to the Member States in order to ensure compliance by those Member States with EU law - cannot be regarded as relating to a legislative procedure or be subject to the same system of access on the ground that they would be necessary to the appellant in the context of a legislative revision process for an EU regulation.
68 Accordingly, the General Court was fully entitled to refer, in support of its analysis, in paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, to the case-law stating that the administrative activity of the Commission did not require the same extensive access to documents as that required by the legislative activity of an EU institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 March 2019, AlzChem v Commission, C‑666/17 P, EU:C:2019:196, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
69 Consequently, the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
70 By its second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by insufficient reasoning, in paragraphs 94 to 96 thereof, in so far as concerns the finding that there was no overriding public interest. It is submitted on that point that the General Court did not sufficiently explain the reasons why the appellant’s argument was not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest justifying disclosure and was too general in nature.
71 The appellant submits that the only justifications put forward by the General Court in support of its analysis, in paragraphs 95 and 96 of the judgment under appeal, relating to the administrative nature of the documents in question and to the alleged possibility of extending the appellant’s arguments to any document relevant to participation in a legislative debate in environmental matters, respectively, fail to explain why the appellant’s arguments relating to the need to have access to the documents in question in order to participate effectively in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009 are not sufficient and are too general in nature.
72 It is argued, furthermore, and contrary to what is stated in paragraph 96 of the judgment under appeal, since that assessment should depend on the present case, that the finding that there is such an interest in disclosure in the present case in no way prejudges the analysis that should be carried out in other situations.
73 The appellant also submits that the circumstances of the present case are different from those in the case giving rise to the judgment of 16 July 2015, ClientEarth v Commission (C‑612/13 P, EU:C:2015:486), in which the line of argument put forward to justify access to the documents in question was not supported by specific circumstances.
74 The Commission contends that this ground of appeal cannot succeed.
75 It is clear from the settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the statement of the reasons on which a judgment of the General Court is based must clearly and unequivocally disclose that court’s thinking, so that the persons concerned can be apprised of the justification for the decision taken and the Court of Justice can exercise its power of review (judgment of 9 March 2023, Les Mousquetaires and ITM Entreprises v Commission, C‑682/20 P, EU:C:2023:170, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
76 In the present case, the General Court stated to the requisite legal standard, in paragraphs 94 to 96 of the judgment under appeal, the reasons why the fact that access to the documents in question was necessary for the appellant in order for it to participate effectively in the legislative process for the revision of Regulation No 1224/2009 was not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an overriding public interest, by emphasising, in paragraph 95 of that judgment, the non-legislative nature of those documents and, in paragraph 96 of that judgment, that the argument relied on was too general.
77 As regards the appellant’s arguments relating to the irrelevance of those assertions and the case-law cited in those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, they relate, in reality, not to the obligation to state reasons, but to the merits thereof.
78 It follows that the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
79 Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
80 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.
81 Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
82 Since the Commission has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs. 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders ClientEarth AISBL to pay the costs.