1 By her appeal, the appellant seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑361/22, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2023:502), by which the General Court dismissed her action seeking, first, annulment (i) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/582 of 8 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 55) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/581 of 8 April 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 110, p. 3) (together, ‘the initial acts at issue’) and (ii) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together, ‘the maintaining acts at issue’), in so far as the initial acts at issue and the maintaining acts at issue (together, ‘the acts at issue’) concern her, and, second, compensation for the non-material harm which she claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of the acts at issue.
2 The factual and legal background of the present case is set out in paragraphs 2 to 16 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, it can be summarised and supplemented as follows.
3 Following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, on 25 February 2022, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1).
4 Article 1(1) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended by Decision 2022/329, (‘Decision 2014/145’) prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons meeting the criteria laid down, in particular, in paragraphs (a), (b) and (e) of that article, while Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145 provides for the freezing of the funds and economic resources of natural persons meeting the criteria laid down, inter alia, in paragraphs (a), (d) and (g) of that article, which latter criteria are, in essence, identical to those laid down in Article 1(1)(a), (b) and (e) of that decision. In addition, Article 1(1) in fine and Article 2(1) in fine of that decision provide that those restrictive measures may also be imposed in respect of, inter alia, natural persons associated with natural persons who are themselves subject to restrictive measures under the criteria referred to above.
5 Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/145 reads as follows: ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of: … and natural persons associated with them, as listed in the Annex.’
6 On 25 February 2022, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1).
7 In that context, the Council included in Article 3(1)(a), (d), (g) and in fine of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), as amended by Regulation 2022/330, (‘Regulation No 269/2014’) the same criteria as reproduced in paragraph 5 of the present judgment.
8 On 8 April 2022, in view of the gravity of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted the initial acts at issue. Recitals 6 and 7 of each of those acts state:
9 In addition, by means of those acts, the appellant’s name was added to the list annexed to Decision 2014/145 and to that in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014 respectively, for the following reasons: ‘[Ms] Elena [Petrovna] Timchenko is the wife of the billionaire Gennady Timchenko, listed under [Decision 2014/145]. She participates in his public affairs via the Timchenko Foundation. She is thus benefitting from [Mr] Gennady Timchenko who is responsible for supporting actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and for providing financial and material support, and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
10 On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the maintaining acts at issue in order to extend the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the appellant. Those acts are based on reasons identical to those contained in the initial acts at issue and reproduced in the preceding paragraph.
11 By application of 17 June 2022, the appellant applied to the General Court to annul the acts at issue in so far as they concern her and to award her compensation for the non-material harm which she claimed to have suffered as a result of the adoption of those acts. In her action for annulment, she claimed, among other matters, that the Council had made an error of assessment by finding that she was ‘associated’ within the meaning of, inter alia, Article 1(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145 (‘the association criterion’) with her husband, on whom restrictive measures had been imposed under, inter alia, Article 1(1)(a) of that decision (‘the (a) criterion’).
12 By the judgment under appeal, among other matters, the General Court, in paragraphs 67 to 85 of the judgment under appeal, rejected the appellant’s plea in law alleging an error of assessment. After holding, in paragraphs 74 to 76 of that judgment, that the concept of association referred in particular to members of the same family who are linked by common interests going beyond the family relationship between them, and that that definition was not called into question by recital 7 of the initial acts at issue, the General Court found, in paragraphs 77 and 78 of that judgment, that the appellant is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Timchenko Foundation and that she and her husband were founders of that organisation and played an active role in it in so far as they were directly linked to its operational activities and held substantial powers.
13 The General Court then held, in paragraph 79 of that judgment, that the Council had been entitled, without thereby making an error of assessment, to find that the appellant was, within the Timchenko Foundation, associated with her husband, who in turn, as was apparent from the judgment of 6 September 2023, Timchenko v Council (T‑252/22, EU:T:2023:496), satisfied the (a) criterion among others, and consequently to adopt restrictive measures against her.
14 The General Court also, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, rejected the appellant’s argument that her activities within the Timchenko Foundation were unconnected to the invasion of Ukraine, on the ground that the (a) criterion did not provide that such a link must be established.
15 Since it also rejected the appellant’s other pleas in law and her claim for compensation, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.
16 By her appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; - dispose of the action on the merits and annul the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellant; and - order the Council to pay the costs both at first instance and on appeal.
17 The Council claims that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal; and - order the appellant to pay the costs.
18 The European Commission claims that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal; and - order the appellant to pay the costs.
19 The appellant submits three grounds in support of her appeal, the first alleging that the General Court erred in law by adopting an arbitrary and erroneously broad interpretation of the association criterion in conjunction with the concept of ‘common interests’; the second, alleging an error of law in its interpretation of the word ‘unduly’ in recital 7 of Decision 2022/582; and the third, alleging an error of law in its interpretation of that criterion in the light of the objective pursued by the restrictive measures, and a failure to fulfil the obligation to state reasons.
20 By her first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the association criterion, in so far as that interpretation effectively makes it possible to apply that criterion to natural persons solely because there is a family relationship with a person subject to restrictive measures, contrary to the case-law arising in particular from the judgment of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council (C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138). The General Court held, in paragraphs 74 and 76 of the judgment under appeal, that, where a natural person is a family member of a person subject to restrictive measures, it is necessary to establish the objective existence of ‘interrelated common interests’, which do not necessarily have to take the form of an economic activity or be formalised in a common legal structure. By means of those vague terms, the General Court sought to encompass a very large number of situations without identifying any common interests going beyond a purely family relationship and without clarifying the notion of ‘interrelated common interests’, thereby infringing the principle of legal certainty.
21 While acknowledging that the context and circumstances of each case must be taken into consideration, the appellant asserts that the General Court should have explained in what respects, by their nature, their quality and their quantity, such common interests went beyond the mere commonality of interests inherent in any family relationship and thereby enabled it to establish the objective existence of the interrelated common interests in question. In the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that the appellant was associated with her husband but did not identify any business links or any economic, shareholding or other types of common interest shared by the two spouses beyond their family relationship. The appellant states that, in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court merely inferred an association between the appellant and her husband from the usual functions and powers associated with being a founder of a charitable association, whereas the spouses’ common interest in pursuing a charitable activity forms part of their family relationship.
22 The Council claims that the appellant is seeking to question the assessment of the facts made by the General Court in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment under appeal. Unless there is distortion, which the appellant has not invoked in the present case, the assessment of the facts and evidence is not a question of law subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, and the appellant’s arguments should therefore, to that extent, be declared inadmissible. As to the remainder, the Council disputes the appellant’s arguments on the merits.
23 The Commission disputes that the appellant’s arguments are well founded.
24 It should be recalled that, under Article 256 TFEU and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts and to evaluate the evidence. The assessment of those facts and evidence does not therefore constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ferriere Nord v Commission, C‑31/23 P, EU:C:2024:851, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). Conversely, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions which it has drawn from them (judgment of 1 October 2014, Council v Alumina, C‑393/13 P, EU:C:2014:2245, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
25 In the present case, the Council claims that, by certain of her arguments, the appellant is seeking to question the assessment of the facts made by the General Court in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment under appeal.
26 That ground of inadmissibility cannot succeed. It is clearly apparent from the appeal that, by her first ground of appeal, the appellant is not seeking to question the factual findings and assessments relating to her association with her husband, as made by the General Court in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment under appeal. By taking issue with those paragraphs, she is criticising the General Court for finding, in paragraph 79 of that judgment, that such an association existed even though, in disregard of the criteria that it had nevertheless laid down in paragraphs 74 and 76 of that judgment, it did not identify any common interests shared by the spouses beyond their family relationship. In those circumstances, the appellant’s arguments relate to the review of the legal characterisation of the facts and to the legal conclusions which the General Court has drawn from them, within the meaning of the case-law summarised in paragraph 24 of the present judgment. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal is admissible in its entirety.
27 By her first ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court, in the first place, for adopting, in paragraphs 74 and 76 of the judgment under appeal, so broad an interpretation of the association criterion that the criterion can be applied to natural persons solely because there is a family relationship with a person subject to restrictive measures, thereby disregarding the case-law arising in particular from the judgment of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council (C‑376/10 P, EU:C:2012:138). She also argues that the broad interpretation adopted by the General Court infringes the principle of legal certainty.
28 In the present case, the General Court held, in paragraphs 74 and 76 of the judgment under appeal, that the concept of association covers, inter alia, natural or legal persons who are, generally speaking, linked by common interests without, however, requiring a link by means of an economic activity. That concept therefore relates to any natural person having a link that goes beyond his or her family relationship with a person who is subject to restrictive measures. The General Court stated that, where those persons have a family relationship, it was necessary to establish the objective existence of ‘interrelated common interests’, which did not necessarily have to be formalised in a legal structure created for that purpose.
29 That definition does not amount to limiting the concept of association to the existence of a mere family relationship. The interpretation adopted by the General Court means that it is necessary to establish common interests that objectively go beyond a mere family relationship in order for it to be possible to find the members of a family to be ‘associated’ within the meaning of the association criterion.
30 The General Court thereby held that the common interests of those family members must go beyond the mere commonality of interests inherent in any family relationship.
31 Since it is sufficient that those common interests objectively go beyond the family relationship between the two individuals concerned, it is not necessary, as the General Court correctly held and in contrast to the appellant’s claims, that those interests take the form of an economic activity or are formalised in a legal structure.
32 Having regard to the fact that the word ‘associated’ that appears, for example, in Article 1(1) in fine of Decision 2014/145 is used generically without any further clarification or contextualisation and that, as is also apparent, in essence, from recitals 6 and 7 of each of the initial acts at issue, the purpose of imposing restrictive measures on persons associated with other persons who are themselves subject to restrictive measures is to prevent the risk of those measures being circumvented (see, by analogy, judgments of 14 June 2018, Makhlouf v Council, C‑458/17 P, EU:C:2018:441, paragraph 79, and of 1 October 2020, Souruh v Council, C‑350/19 P, EU:C:2020:784, paragraph 83), the concept of association must be given a broad interpretation which therefore cannot be limited to persons associated by business links or economic or shareholding links (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 November 2021, Bank Sepah, C‑340/20, EU:C:2021:903, paragraph 56).
33 Furthermore, the General Court did not infringe the principle of legal certainty by interpreting the concept of association as set out in paragraph 28 of the present judgment. It should be recalled that that principle, which requires that the rules of law be clear and precise and that their application be foreseeable for those subject to the law, in particular where they may have adverse consequences, cannot be understood as meaning that the legislature or the Courts of the European Union must, in the context of a norm that the legislature adopts and those Courts interpret, refer to the various specific hypotheses in which an abstract norm may apply, given that those hypotheses cannot all be determined in advance (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Lithuania and Others v Parliament and Council (Mobility package), C‑541/20 to C‑555/20, EU:C:2024:818, paragraphs 159 and 160 and the case-law cited).
34 As the Advocate General emphasised in point 55 of her Opinion and as is apparent from paragraph 28 of the present judgment, in paragraphs 74 and 76 of the judgment under appeal the General Court identified sufficiently clear and precise criteria for applying that concept in the case of two people who have a family relationship, whereas the General Court was not required to refer in detail to the hypotheses in which that concept could apply because, first, that concept must be interpreted broadly and, second, as the General Court noted in paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal and as the appellant herself concedes in her written submissions to the Court of Justice, the types of relationship that it can encompass are contingent ‘on the contexts and circumstances in question’.
35 In the second place, the appellant criticises the General Court for finding, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, that she was associated with her husband even though, contrary to what it had earlier held in paragraphs 74 to 76 of that judgment, it failed to establish, in the light of the factual findings set out in paragraphs 77 and 78 of that judgment, the objective existence between the two spouses of ‘interrelated common interests’ going beyond their family relationship.
36 In that regard, it should be recalled that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the reasons which are the basis of the decision to include or to maintain a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that the Courts of the European Union determine, in addition to whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific, whether those reasons - or at the very least one of them - constitute in themselves a sufficient basis to support that decision. The Courts of the European Union must also ensure that that decision, which affects the person concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons - or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision - are substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 118 and 119; of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited; and of 19 December 2018, Azarov v Council, C‑530/17 P, EU:C:2018:1031, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
37 As is apparent from paragraph 47 of the judgment under appeal, which is not disputed in the appeal, restrictive measures were imposed on the appellant on the basis of the association criterion, on the ground that, through her activities within the Timchenko Foundation, she participated in the public affairs of her husband, Mr Timchenko and benefited from him.
38 In paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated that the appellant and her husband set up the Timchenko Foundation and are directly linked to its operational activities. It also found that their active role within that foundation is confirmed, inter alia, by the functions and powers they have in it. The General Court therefore cannot be criticised for failing to determine whether those elements of fact met the criteria attaching to the concept of association, which are established in paragraphs 74 to 76 of the judgment under appeal.
39 Consequently, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, it must be found, as the Advocate General stated in point 62 of her Opinion, that in order to hold, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant was associated with her husband within the meaning of the association criterion, the General Court could validly conclude that the spouses were linked by common interests going beyond the mere commonality of interests inherent in any family relationship, even a marital relationship.
40 In the light of the foregoing, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
41 Under her second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law when interpreting the word ‘unduly’ in recital 7 of Decision 2022/582. By providing that the association criterion can be applied to family members unduly benefitting from a person who is in turn subject to restrictive measures, the EU legislature intended, in order to prevent family members from being subject to restrictive measures solely as a result of their family relationship, to require proof of an undue benefit, that is to say, an individual benefit of a certain magnitude going beyond a normal family relationship.
42 In paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court interpreted the word ‘unduly’ as requiring proof of a mental element on the part of the family member concerned, that is to say, the fact that the family member in question had to be aware that the benefit obtained derived from a person satisfying one of the criteria laid down for the adoption of restrictive measures. In addition to the fact that it would be impossible to prove the absence of such awareness, the appellant submits that the interpretation adopted by the General Court is ‘not reasonable’, inasmuch as the General Court does not indicate in what respect that awareness can objectively turn the benefits obtained from a family relationship into undue benefits. Furthermore, that interpretation effectively obliges the family member concerned to determine in advance whether the person with whom he or she has a family relationship satisfies the criteria for inclusion laid down in an act such as Decision 2014/145, which would contravene the principle of foreseeability.
43 The Council and the Commission dispute the appellant’s arguments although they concur, in the alternative, that the General Court did not in fact use a correct interpretation of the word ‘unduly’.
44 By her second ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court, in essence, for misinterpreting, in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, the word ‘unduly’ contained in recital 7 of Decision 2022/582, that is to say, one of the two initial acts at issue.
45 Recital 7 of Decision 2022/582, in common moreover with recital 7 of Implementing Regulation 2022/581, which is the second of the initial acts at issue, states that restrictive measures may be imposed on natural persons associated with leading businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, and that those associated natural persons may encompass, as follows from the word ‘including’, family members ‘unduly’ benefitting from those businesspersons.
46 In paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court stated, inter alia, that by using the adverb ‘unduly’, the EU legislature had intended to make clear that the family member concerned had to be aware that the benefit obtained derived from a person satisfying one of the criteria justifying the adoption of restrictive measures.
47 In that regard, as the parties unanimously acknowledge, it must be held that the General Court misinterpreted the adverb ‘unduly’ contained in recital 7 of the initial acts at issue.
48 First, it is not apparent from the wording of recital 7 that whether or not a benefit is undue must necessarily be contingent on a mental element, that is to say, on the family member concerned being aware that it was undue.
49 Second, the concept of association cannot correspond or be confined solely to situations in which a family member benefits from a person subject to restrictive measures by reason of the fact that that family member is aware that the benefit in question derives from a person satisfying one or more criteria for inclusion. Given that, as is clear from paragraph 32 of the present judgment, the purpose of imposing restrictive measures under the association criterion is to prevent the risks of circumvention, that objective could not be fully and effectively achieved if it were necessary as a matter of course to establish such awareness on the part of the family member concerned. The interpretation of the word ‘unduly’ adopted by the General Court is therefore contrary to the objective pursued by the association criterion.
50 Under those circumstances, it must be found that recital 7 of the initial acts at issue is intended to elucidate - purely by way of example since it uses the word ‘including’, and therefore without prejudice to other forms of association - the concept of association in the case of two associated persons who have a family relationship. Recital 7 reflects the notion that, as set out in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the present judgment, a natural person cannot be subject to restrictive measures unless he or she is linked to persons who are themselves subject to restrictive measures by common interests that objectively go beyond their family relationship.
51 However, the misinterpretation by the General Court in the last sentence of paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal has no effect on the operative part of the judgment under appeal, which remains well founded on other legal grounds, and in consequence that judgment cannot be set aside (judgment of 6 October 2021, Prosegur Compañía de Seguridad v Commission, C‑55/19 P, EU:C:2021:797, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).
52 The General Court’s misinterpretation of the word ‘unduly’ does not call into question the interpretation of the concept of association in the case of members of the same family that it adopted in paragraph 74 and in the first sentence of paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, and that interpretation is not vitiated by errors of law, as is apparent from paragraphs 29 to 32 of the present judgment.
53 Furthermore, the General Court’s error of interpretation has no bearing on its appraisal of the merits of the reason on the basis of which restrictive measures were imposed on the appellant. The General Court did not at any point in the judgment under appeal examine whether the appellant was aware that the benefit which she could gain from her participation in the public affairs of her husband via the Timchenko Foundation derived from a person satisfying one of the criteria for inclusion laid down by Decision 2014/145 and by Regulation No 269/2014.
54 In those circumstances, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
55 By her third ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in law and infringed its obligation to state reasons by simply rejecting her argument that her activities within the Timchenko Foundation had no connection with the invasion of Ukraine on the ground that the (a) criterion which justified the adoption of restrictive measures against her husband did not provide that such a link must be established. Taking the view that the restrictive measures adopted against her under the association criterion must be necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures regime introduced against the Russian Federation, that is to say, to put pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation and to increase the costs of the actions by that State to undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the appellant submits that the General Court should have set out, at that point of the judgment under appeal, in what respect the imposition of restrictive measures on her served to achieve those objectives.
56 The Council and the Commission dispute the appellant’s arguments, and the Council moreover claims that, to the extent that it relates to the proportionality of the association criterion and of the restrictive measures taken thereunder, the third ground of appeal is inadmissible because, before the General Court, the appellant had stated that she was withdrawing her plea in law alleging breach of the principle of proportionality.
57 By her third ground of appeal, the appellant alleges, in essence, that the General Court erred in law and infringed its obligation to state reasons by failing to ascertain and to make clear, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, whether and in what respect the restrictive measures imposed on her serve to achieve the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures regime introduced against the Russian Federation.
58 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the appellant confirms in her reply that, by that ground of appeal, she is not claiming a breach of the principle of proportionality, but is asserting that the General Court should have determined whether, by reason of the common interests she shares with her spouse and that go beyond their family relationship, she was sufficiently linked to the situation targeted by the restrictive measures regime introduced against the Russian Federation. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to rule on the ground of inadmissibility raised by the Council.
59 As regards the substance, it should be recalled that, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the appellant’s argument that her activities within the Timchenko Foundation have no connection with the invasion of Ukraine. In that regard, that court stated that the (a) criterion, established, inter alia, by Decision 2014/145, did not provide that such a link had to be established.
60 The General Court did not thereby err in law or infringe its obligation to state reasons.
61 First, as the General Court correctly held, in essence, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, neither the (a) criterion, on the basis of which restrictive measures were imposed on the appellant’s husband, nor moreover the association criterion, under which the appellant was made the subject of restrictive measures, provides that the Council was required to establish that the appellant’s activities are linked to the destabilisation actions or policies pursued by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Specifically, the association criterion is contingent only on there being a link between the person concerned and the person with whom he or she is associated and who is in turn subject to restrictive measures under a different criterion for inclusion.
62 The General Court’s reasoning is also in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which the importance of the aims pursued by an EU act establishing a restrictive measures regime is such as to justify negative consequences, even substantial negative consequences, for some persons, including where, as is the case with persons associated with a person or entity subject to restrictive measures, they are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the measures in question (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 361 and 362).
63 Second, in those circumstances, the General Court was not in any way required, in order to respond to the appellant’s argument that her activities within the Timchenko Foundation had no link with the invasion of Ukraine, to examine the - separate - question of whether the restrictive measures imposed on her under the association criterion served to achieve the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures regime adopted by the European Union against the Russian Federation. Moreover, it is sufficient to recall that, as is apparent from paragraph 32 of the present judgment, the purpose of restrictive measures imposed on associated persons such as the appellant is to prevent the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures imposed in the first instance on the person with whom they are associated, and it would therefore in any event be irrelevant to examine whether the restrictive measures adopted in respect of the appellant also serve to achieve the other objectives which, according to her claims summarised in paragraph 55 of the present judgment, are pursued by that regime.
64 The third ground of appeal must therefore also be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
65 Pursuant to Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. Under Article 138(1) of those Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
66 Since the Council and the Commission have applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must be ordered to pay the costs. 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders Ms Elena Petrovna Timchenko to pay the costs.