1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1, Article 2(1) and Article 17(1) of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, concluded in Montreal on 28 May 1999, signed by the European Community on 9 December 1999 and approved on its behalf by Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 (OJ 2001 L 194, p. 38) (‘the Montreal Convention’), which entered into force, as regards the European Union, on 28 June 2004, and that of Article 3(g) of Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators (OJ 2004 L 138, p. 1).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, DZ, EO, YV, YE and MP, successors of NK, who died in a helicopter accident, and, on the other hand, the Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic), the owner and operator of that helicopter, concerning compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicants in the main proceedings as a result of NK’s death.
3 Entitled ‘Civil and State aircraft’, Article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944 (United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 15, No 102; ‘the Chicago Convention’) and ratified by all the Member States of the European Union, provides: ‘(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to State aircraft. (b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft. …’
4 Article 1 of the Montreal Convention, entitled ‘Scope of application’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof: ‘1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking. 2. For the purposes of this Convention, the expression international carriage means any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two States Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a State Party. Carriage between two points within the territory of a single State Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention.’
5 Article 2 of that convention, entitled ‘Carriage performed by [the] State and carriage of postal items’, provides, in paragraph 1, that that convention ‘applies to carriage performed by the State or by legally constituted public bodies provided it falls within the conditions laid down in Article 1’.
6 Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, entitled ‘Death and injury of passengers - damage to baggage’, sets out, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.’
7 The second sentence of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air (OJ 1997 L 285, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 May 2002 (OJ 2002 L 140, p. 2) (‘Regulation 2027/97’), extends the application of the relevant provisions of the Montreal Convention ‘to carriage by air within a single Member State’.
8 According to Article 1(1) of Regulation No 785/2004, the latter’s ‘objective … is to establish minimum insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties’.
9 Article 2 of that regulation, entitled ‘Scope’, provides: ‘1. This Regulation shall apply to all air carriers and to all aircraft operators flying within, into, out of, or over the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies. 2. This Regulation shall not apply to: (a) State aircraft referred to in Article 3(b) of the [Chicago Convention]; …’
10 Article 3 of that regulation provides: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation: (a) “air carrier” means an air transport undertaking with a valid operating licence; … (c) “aircraft operator” means the person or entity, not being an air carrier, who has continual effective disposal of the use or operation of the aircraft; the natural or legal person in whose name the aircraft is registered shall be presumed to be the operator, unless that person can prove that another person is the operator; … (g) “passenger” means any person who is on a flight with the consent of the air carrier or the aircraft operator, excluding on-duty members of both the flight crew and the cabin crew; …’
11 Article 4 of that regulation, entitled ‘Principles of insurance’, is worded as follows: ‘1. Air carriers and aircraft operators referred to in Article 2 shall be insured in accordance with this Regulation as regards their aviation-specific liability in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties. … … 3. This Regulation is without prejudice to the rules on liability as arising from: - international Conventions to which the Member States and/or the Community are parties, - Community law, and - national law of the Member States.’
12 On 10 May 2017, NK died following the crash of a helicopter, the owner and operator of which was the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, which occurred in the military sector of Prešov Airport (Slovakia), in the context of specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, which involved the evacuation and rescue of people from difficult to access terrain using an on-board hoist. At the time of that crash, the helicopter was in hovering mode.
13 Before the referring court, the applicants in the main proceedings seek compensation for the non-material damage suffered by them as a result of NK’s death, in the amount of EUR 550000 for DZ, EUR 350000 for EO, EUR 350000 for YV, EUR 150000 for YE and EUR 150000 for MP. In support of their request, the applicants rely on the relevant EU regulations in the field of civil aviation, which take precedence over the provisions of Slovak law, in particular those of the Civil Code. They submit that both the Montreal Convention and Regulation No 785/2004 are applicable since, first, NK had the status of ‘passenger’ and, second, hoisting constitutes a specific way of boarding.
14 For its part, the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, supported by KOOPERATIVA Poisťovňa a.s., Vienna Insurance Group, and by Generali Česká pojišťovna a.s., formerly Generali Poisťovňa a.s., two insurance companies, argues that the Montreal Convention and Regulation No 785/2004 do not apply to the case in the main proceedings, since NK was not a ‘passenger’, within the meaning of those two instruments, but a member of the ‘cabin crew’ and that, at the time of the accident, he was suspended from the equipment of the helicopter, without therefore having boarded or disembarked the helicopter.
15 KOOPERATIVA Poisťovňa a.s., Vienna Insurance Group, also disputes the applicability of the Montreal Convention to the case in the main proceedings, arguing that the use of a helicopter in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is not comparable to ‘carriage’ within the meaning of Article 1 of that convention. It submits that, under its Article 2(1), that convention applies to carriage performed by the State solely for the purpose of carrying passengers from a place of departure to a place of destination, which must not be confused with the use of State aircraft, as in the present case, for the purpose of performing a task of public servants.
16 At the hearing before the Court, it was stated that the applicants in the main proceedings have, as a whole, been compensated by the State in the amount of approximately EUR 70000, in accordance with the Slovak legislation on social security for officers of a firefighting and rescue unit, and that a sum of EUR 30000, from the reserve of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, was paid to them on an exceptional basis.
17 In those circumstances, the Okresný súd Prešov (District Court, Prešov, Slovakia) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 3(g) of Regulation [No 785/2004] be interpreted as meaning that a person - who is not on board a helicopter of a [European Union] air carrier, but who is suspended from a hoist cable as an integral piece of equipment (or component) of the helicopter while the helicopter is in flight and who was lifted along with the ascent of the helicopter (as a result of being suspended from the hoist cable); - who was transported as part of a free transport operation provided by the State (a State helicopter used in police services) as a carrier under a “carriage contract” between the air carrier (State aviation squadron) and the employer of the person performing a special task (namely, on the basis of Uznesenie vlády č. 411/2006, zo dňa 10. mája 2006, k návrhu zásad vykonávania letov lietadiel v policajných službách (Decree No 411/2006 of the Slovak Government of 10 May 2006 on the draft principles for the performance of aircraft flights by the police) and the Nariadenie Ministerstva vnútra Slovenskej republiky č. 50/2012 zo dňa 14. marca 2012 o vyžadovaní a schvaľovaní letov (Decree No 50/2012 of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic of 14 March 2012 on request and approval of flights), providing that the aircraft of the air carrier will operate flights to carry out the tasks of the employer of the person concerned); - the purpose of the carriage was to perform a special task such as that at issue in the main proceedings (performance of a service task consisting in the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit using aerial equipment (helicopter) in the form of a crane-hoisting exercise for rescuer and rescued), and - who was participating in a task as a trainee member of a firefighting module attached to the helicopter by means of a hoist cable as an integral piece of equipment (or component) of the helicopter on the instructions of the helicopter’s pilot and operator, and was to be hoisted aboard the helicopter during the flight, (a) is a passenger or (b) a member of the flight crew or cabin crew? (2) Must Article 17(1) of the [Montreal Convention] be interpreted as meaning that, in the circumstances set out in the first question, such a person is deemed to be (a) a passenger or (b) a member of the flight crew or a member of the cabin crew? (3) Can the use of the State helicopter of 10 May 2017 be regarded as carriage within the meaning of Article 2(1) and Article 1 of the [Montreal Convention]?’
18 According to the Slovak Government, the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible since it does not meet the requirements laid down in Article 94(b) and (c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. It claims that the referring court does not sufficiently define the factual and legislative context of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and does not set out the reasons which led it to have doubts as to the interpretation of EU law. Furthermore, it argues, the applicability of both Regulation No 785/2004 and the Montreal Convention to the case in the main proceedings is questionable.
19 Under Article 94(a) to (c) of the Rules of Procedure, it is essential that the national court should, in its request for a preliminary ruling, expand on its definition of the factual and legislative context of the dispute in the main proceedings and give the necessary explanation of the reasons for the choice of the provisions of EU law which it seeks to have interpreted and of the link it establishes between those provisions and the national law applicable to the proceedings pending before it. Those cumulative requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling are also recalled in paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 of the Recommendations of the Court of Justice of the European Union to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C 380, p. 1) (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 June 2023, Lyoness Europe, C‑455/21, EU:C:2023:455, paragraphs 26 and 27).
20 In the present case, first, the request for a preliminary ruling contains a sufficiently precise account of the relevant facts and, second, the referring court expressly states in that request that the interpretation of the concepts of EU law mentioned in its questions referred for a preliminary ruling is a matter of dispute between the parties to the main proceedings, which led it to refer the questions concerning the interpretation of those concepts to the Court. Furthermore, the link which that court establishes between those questions and the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings is sufficiently clear from that request and from the very wording of those questions.
21 It is true that that court has not indicated the wording of the provisions of Slovak law under which the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic is responsible for the non-material damage alleged by the applicants in the main proceedings. However, since the preliminary-ruling procedure is not concerned with the interpretation of national laws or regulations, in the spirit of cooperation which must govern relations between national courts and the Court of Justice in that procedure, the lack, in a request for a preliminary ruling, of certain information concerning the national law applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings cannot necessarily entail the inadmissibility of that request (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 April 1986, Asjes and Others, 209/84 to 213/84, EU:C:1986:188, paragraph 12, and of 6 October 2021, LU (Recovery of road traffic fines), C‑136/20, EU:C:2021:804, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
22 Furthermore, where it is not obvious that the interpretation of an act of EU law bears no relation to the facts of the main action or its purpose, the objection alleging the inapplicability of that act to the case in the main action does not relate to the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling, but concerns the substance of the questions submitted (judgment of 16 February 2023, Rzecznik Praw Dziecka and Others (Suspension of the return decision), C‑638/22 PPU, EU:C:2023:103, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited).
23 In those circumstances, it must be held that the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
24 By its second and third questions, which it is appropriate to examine together and in the first place, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 and Article 2(1) of that convention, must be interpreted as meaning that it may confer a right to compensation on the successors of a person who, during his or her participation in the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, carried out in the military sector of an airport of a State Party, died as a result of the crash of a helicopter operated by police services, when that person was suspended from a hoist cable connected to that helicopter.
25 In accordance with Article 1(1) of the Montreal Convention, that convention applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft, including where that carriage is gratuitous and performed by an air transport undertaking. Article 1(2) of that convention defines the concept of ‘international carriage’ as ‘any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two States Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State, even if that State is not a State Party’, and makes it clear that ‘carriage between two points within the territory of a single State Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of [that] Convention’. Article 2(1) of that convention states that it applies to carriage performed by the State or by legally constituted public bodies provided it falls within the conditions laid down in Article 1.
26 It thus follows from Article 1(1) and (2) and Article 2(1) of the Montreal Convention that the concepts of ‘international carriage’ and ‘carriage performed by the State’, on which the application of that convention depends, presuppose movement by aircraft, according to the agreement between the parties, of persons, baggage or cargo from a ‘place of departure’ to a ‘place of destination’ other than that ‘place of departure’.
27 It is, however, apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the purpose of the operation performed by the helicopter at issue in the main proceedings was not the movement of persons, baggage or cargo to a place of destination other than the place of departure, but the performance of specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, in the form of a crane-hoisting exercise, carried out in the military sector of the same airport.
28 In that regard, the case in the main proceedings can be distinguished from that which gave rise to the judgment of 26 February 2015, Wucher Helicopter and Euro-Aviation Versicherung (C‑6/14, EU:C:2015:122, paragraphs 40 and 41), since, in that latter case, the purpose of the flight at issue was the carriage, as occupants of a helicopter, of employees of a company from the take-off location of that helicopter to the places where they had to perform their usual task and then bring them back to that take-off location.
29 In those circumstances, and subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, an operation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not come within the scope of the Montreal Convention as ‘international carriage’ or as ‘carriage performed by the State’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) and (2) and Article 2(1) thereof, respectively.
30 Such an operation also does not come within the scope of Regulation 2027/97. Although the second sentence of Article 1 of that regulation extends the application of the relevant provisions of the Montreal Convention to ‘carriage by air within a single Member State’, the application of those provisions nevertheless requires the presence of such carriage. However, as is apparent from paragraph 27 of the present judgment, and subject to the verifications which it is for the referring court to carry out, there is also no ‘carriage by air within a single Member State’ in the present case.
31 Thus, irrespective of whether a person who participated in specialised training such as that at issue in the main proceedings and was suspended from a hoist cable connected to the helicopter concerned at the time of its crash should be regarded as a ‘passenger’, within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention, that provision cannot confer a right to compensation on that person’s successors, since such training, during which the accident which caused the death of that person occurred, cannot be classified as ‘international carriage’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) and (2) of that convention, as ‘carriage performed by the State’, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of that convention, or as ‘carriage by air within a single Member State’ within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Regulation 2027/97 (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2015, Prüller-Frey, C‑240/14, EU:C:2015:567, paragraph 35).
32 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second and third questions is that Article 17(1) of the Montreal Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1 and Article 2(1) of that convention, must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot confer a right to compensation on the successors of a person who, during his or her participation in the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, carried out in the military sector of an airport of a State Party, died as a result of the crash of a helicopter operated by police services, when that person was suspended from a hoist cable connected to that helicopter, since such a situation cannot be classified as ‘international carriage’ or as ‘carriage performed by the State’, within the meaning of Article 1 and Article 2(1) of that convention, respectively.
33 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3(g) of Regulation No 785/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that a person who, during his or her participation in the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, carried out in the military sector of an airport of a Member State, died as a result of the crash of a helicopter operated by police services, when that person was suspended from a hoist cable connected to that helicopter, is covered by the concept of ‘passenger’ within the meaning of that provision.
34 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in the cooperation procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, the Court may be required to provide the referring court with all the elements of interpretation of EU law which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not the national court has referred to them in the wording of its questions. It is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision to make the reference, the points of EU law which require interpretation in view of the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 December 1990, SARPP, C‑241/89, EU:C:1990:459, paragraph 8, and of 15 July 2021, DocMorris, C‑190/20, EU:C:2021:609, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
35 In the present case, in order to give a useful answer to the referring court, it is necessary to examine whether a right to compensation, such as that relied on by the applicants in the main proceedings, may be based on Regulation No 785/2004, the objective of which, according to Article 1(1) thereof, is to ‘establish minimum insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties’.
36 The concept of ‘air carrier’ is defined in Article 3(a) of Regulation No 785/2004 as ‘an air transport undertaking with a valid operating licence’. Article 3(c) of that regulation defines ‘aircraft operator’ as ‘the person or entity, not being an air carrier, who has continual effective disposal of the use or operation of the aircraft’ and makes it clear that ‘the natural or legal person in whose name the aircraft is registered shall be presumed to be the operator, unless that person can prove that another person is the operator’.
37 Article 2(1) of Regulation No 785/2004 provides that it applies ‘to all air carriers and to all aircraft operators flying within, into, out of, or over the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies’. Pursuant to Article 4(1) and (3) of that regulation, those air carriers and aircraft operators are to be insured ‘as regards their aviation-specific liability in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties’. Such liability is subject to the international conventions to which the Member States and/or the European Union are parties, to EU law or to the national law of the Member States.
38 However, Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation No 785/2004 excludes from the scope of that regulation ‘State aircraft’ as referred to in Article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention. Article 3(a) of that convention provides that it ‘shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to State aircraft’. Article 3(b) states that ‘aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft’.
39 In the present case, it is apparent from the wording of the first question that the helicopter the crash of which caused the death of NK is a ‘State helicopter [used] in police services’ and that that helicopter was assigned, on the basis of two acts of Slovak law, to the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit.
40 It follows that the operation of such an aircraft is not subject to the requirements imposed by Regulation No 785/2004 regarding insurance in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties, in accordance with Article 4(1) of that regulation. In those circumstances, it is not necessary to interpret the concepts of ‘passenger’ and ‘members of the flight crew or the cabin crew’ within the meaning of Article 3(g) of that regulation.
41 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that the combined provisions of Article 1(1), Article 2(2)(a) and Article 4(1) of Regulation No 785/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that they cannot confer a right to compensation on the successors of a person who, during his or her participation in the specialised training of officers of the firefighting and rescue unit, carried out in the military sector of an airport of a Member State, died as a result of the crash of a helicopter operated by police services, when that person was suspended from a hoist cable connected to that helicopter, which is a ‘State aircraft’.
42 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.