1 By his appeal, Mr Igor Shuvalov asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 7 February 2024, Shuvalov v Council (T‑289/22, ‘the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2024:57), by which the General Court dismissed his action for annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/265 of 23 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 42 I, p. 98) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/260 of 23 February 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 42 I, p. 3) (together ‘the original acts at issue’); second, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1) (together ‘the first maintaining acts at issue’), and; third, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 134) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75 I, p. 1) (together ‘the second maintaining acts at issue’), in so far as those acts (together ‘the acts at issue’) concern the appellant.
2 The factual and legal context of the present case is set out in paragraphs 2 to 13 of the judgment under appeal and may be summarised and supplemented as set out below.
3 Between 2008 and 2018, the appellant was Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation before becoming Chairman of the Vnesheconombank (VEB.RF) (Development and Foreign Trade Bank, Russian Federation) on 24 May 2018.
4 Following Crimea’s attachment to the Russian Federation, the Council of the European Union, on 17 March 2014, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, adopted Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).
5 Article 1(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Council Decision 2014/658/CFSP of 8 September 2014 (OJ 2014 L 271, p. 47) (‘the original Decision 2014/145’), prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons meeting the criteria laid down, inter alia, in subparagraphs (a) and (b) thereof, while Article 2(1) of that decision provides for the freezing of the funds and economic resources of natural persons meeting the criteria laid down, inter alia, in subparagraphs (a) and (d) thereof, which are essentially identical to those laid down in Article 1(1)(a) and (b) of that decision (together respectively ‘the criteria (a) and (d)’).
6 On 23 February 2022, Article 2 of the original Decision 2014/145 read as follows: ‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by: (a) natural persons responsible for, actively supporting or implementing, actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine, and natural or legal persons, entities or bodies associated with them; … (d) natural or legal persons, entities or bodies actively supporting, materially or financially, or benefitting from, Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine …’
7 Following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, the Council adopted, on 25 February 2022, Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1).
8 The criteria laid down in Article 1(1)(a) and (b) and Article 2(1)(a) and (d) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘Decision 2014/145 as amended’), are analogous to those laid down in Article 1(1)(a) and (b) and Article 2(1)(a) and (d) of the original Decision 2014/145, with the exception, first, that the adverb ‘actively’ was removed both from the criterion relating to support for actions or policies undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and from the criterion relating to supporting, materially or financially, Russian decision-makers and, second, that the reference made to eastern Ukraine was extended to the whole of that State (the criterion laid down in Article 1(1)(b) and Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145 as amended is hereafter also referred to as ‘criterion (d)’).
9 On 17 March 2014, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
10 On 23 February 2022, Article 3(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 811/2014 of 25 July 2014 (OJ 2014 L 221, p. 11) (‘the original Regulation No 269/2014’), contained provisions that were essentially analogous to those laid down in Article 2(1)(a) and (d) of the original Decision 2014/145, as reproduced in paragraph 6 above, in particular as regards the criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(d) of the original Regulation No 269/2014 (‘criterion (d)’).
11 Following the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, the Council adopted, on 25 February 2022, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1). The criteria laid down in Article 3(1)(a) and (d) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330 (‘Regulation No 269/2014 as amended’), were subject to the same amendments as those to which the criteria referred to in paragraph 8 above were subject (the criterion laid down in Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation No 269/2014 as amended is hereafter also referred to as ‘criterion (d)’).
12 On 23 February 2022, the Council adopted the original acts at issue and included the appellant’s name on the list of restrictive measures in the annex to each of the two acts under number 227 as follows: ‘Igor Ivanovich Shuvalov is the chairman of State Development Corporation VEB.RF and a member of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission. He was previously a First Deputy Prime Minister of [the Russian Federation]. In this capacity he made remarks stating that [the Russian Federation] would change budget rules to reflect an additional [two] million in population after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. He is therefore supporting actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’
13 On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the first maintaining acts at issue and maintained the appellant’s name under number 227 on the list set out in the annex to each of those two acts, for the same reasons as those set out in the preceding paragraph.
14 On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted the second maintaining acts at issue and maintained the appellant’s name under number 227 on the list set out in the annex to each of those two acts, for the following reasons: ‘Igor Ivanovich Shuvalov is the chairman of State Development Corporation VEB.RF. He was previously a First Deputy Prime Minister of [the Russian Federation] and a member of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission. In his capacity of First Deputy Prime Minister, he made remarks stating that [the Russian Federation] would change budget rules to reflect an additional two million in population after the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. He is therefore supporting actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.’
15 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 May 2022, the appellant asked the General Court to annul the acts at issue in so far as they concern the appellant. In support of his action, he put forward seven pleas in law alleging, first, a manifest error of assessment of the facts by the Council, second, infringement of the Council’s obligation to state reasons, third, infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of expression, fourth, infringement of the right to effective judicial protection, fifth, infringement of the right to property in the light of the principle of proportionality, sixth, infringement of the principle of equal treatment and, seventh, misuse of powers.
16 As regards the second plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the General Court held, in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the judgment under appeal, that the statement of reasons for the acts at issue was based on sufficiently individual, specific and concrete reasons to enable the appellant to defend himself and to understand the criterion and the reasons underlying those acts, with the result that that plea was rejected.
17 As regards the first plea, alleging an error of assessment of the facts, the General Court held, in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, that it is possible to take into account, as the Council did, facts which occurred at a time relatively far removed from the date on which a restrictive measure was enacted, provided, first, that those facts substantiate one of the criteria justifying the inclusion of the name of the person concerned on the list of restrictive measures and, second, that it is established that, at the time the restrictive measures were enacted, that person had not definitively ceased any activity capable of justifying such enactment. In the present case, the General Court noted, in paragraphs 81 to 87 of that judgment, that a sufficiently detailed, precise and consistent body of evidence supported the conclusion that, as a member of the Government of the Russian Federation and then Chairman of VEB.RF, a public institution that supports the economic policy determined by the President of the Russian Federation and pursued by the Government of that Federation, and which has participated continuously in the economic development of Crimea since its invasion by the Russian Federation, the appellant satisfied the conditions laid down in criterion (a).
18 As regards the fifth plea, alleging infringement of the right to property in the light of the principle of proportionality, the General Court held, in paragraphs 96 to 116 of the judgment under appeal, that the restrictive measures imposed on the appellant were precautionary, temporary and reversible, with the possibility for the national authorities to authorise the use of certain frozen assets, so that they did not deprive him of his right to property, that the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) for that right to be legitimately limited were satisfied, that the proportionality of the measures was justified by their appropriateness to the objective pursued and that it was sufficient for the appellant to put an end to the conduct which justified those measures in order for them to be lifted.
19 In paragraphs 123 and 124 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, in response to the appellant’s third plea, that the restrictive measures enacted against him in no way affected his freedom of expression and that the statements made by the appellant and reproduced in the grounds of the acts at issue amounted only to some factors, among others, which were duly corroborated by the evidence pack and intended to support the finding that he satisfied the conditions laid down in criterion (a). In paragraph 126 of that judgment, the General Court also held that, since the Council had not made an error of assessment in finding that that criterion was established with regard to the appellant, the sixth plea, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment, had to be rejected.
20 Lastly, the General Court rejected, in paragraphs 131 to 133 of that judgment, the fourth and seventh pleas, alleging, respectively, infringement of the right to effective judicial protection and misuse of powers.
21 In those circumstances, since none of the pleas in law in the action was upheld, the General Court, by the judgment under appeal, dismissed that action.
22 By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; - uphold the action by annulling the acts at issue in so far as they concern the appellant and, consequently, Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 in so far as those acts concern or are likely to concern the appellant; - order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings at both instances.
23 The Council contends that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal in its entirety; and - order the appellant to pay the costs.
24 The appellant relies on six grounds in support of his appeal. Those six grounds of appeal allege that the General Court erred in law in holding that the Council did not make an error of assessment (first ground), that the Council complied with its obligation to state reasons (second ground), that the acts at issue do not infringe the appellant’s right to freedom of expression (third ground), that his right to property was not infringed in the light of the principle of proportionality (fourth ground), that the principle of equal treatment was not infringed (fifth ground), that the right to effective judicial protection was respected and that the Council did not misuse its powers (sixth ground).
25 By his first ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that, as a result of a manifest distortion of the facts, the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 58 to 87 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had not made an error of assessment when applying criterion (a) to his case.
26 In paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, without mentioning any case-law in that regard, that, for the purposes of enacting restrictive measures, it is possible to take into account facts which occurred at a time relatively far removed from the date on which those measures were enacted. However, it is apparent from several judgments of the General Court that the reasons relied on by the Council must satisfy the current criterion on the date on which the Council adopts restrictive measures against the person concerned. In particular, account should be taken of changes in the situation of the person concerned without it being possible to presume that, as a result of the positions formerly held and previous public statements, that person maintained or was capable of maintaining, on the date on which the restrictive measures at issue were enacted, his or her support for the regime of the third country concerned or for the situation targeted by the measures.
27 The appellant also challenges paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal in so far as the General Court wrongly held that the fact that, after ceasing to hold governmental office, the appellant assumed the chairmanship of VEB.RF entails that he continues to support actions and policies threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The statement of reasons for the acts at issue does not refer to the activities of VEB.RF and does not contain any specific complaint against the appellant, even though it is he who is targeted by the restrictive measures at issue. By holding the position of Chairman of VEB.RF, the appellant, contrary to what the General Court held, performed professional business management functions which are in no way linked to the actions and policies pursued by the Russian Government.
28 In its defence, the Council states that, as a result of the appellant’s broad claims and the fact that he refers specifically only to paragraphs 65 and 82 of the judgment under appeal, it was exposed to difficulties in refuting those claims and understanding, in particular, what form the clear distortion of the facts is alleged to have taken. As to the substance, the Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
29 In his reply, the appellant submits, inter alia, that his first ground of appeal is admissible in that it clearly mentions the contested paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, namely paragraphs 58 to 87. Furthermore, even though it is true that the first ground of appeal refers more specifically to paragraphs 65 and 82 of that judgment, account should be taken of the fact that both those paragraphs contain the conclusions of the legal reasoning developed in the other contested paragraphs of that judgment.
30 In its rejoinder, the Council states, inter alia, that it merely indicated its difficulties in understanding the first ground of appeal and that it contended, in any event, that the appeal should be dismissed on the merits, and not that it was inadmissible.
31 By his first ground of appeal, the appellant complains, in essence, that the General Court, as a result of a manifest distortion of the facts, held, in paragraphs 58 to 87 and more particularly in paragraphs 65 and 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council did not make an error of assessment. The General Court wrongly held that the Council could base its reasoning, when giving reasons for the acts at issue, on functions and public statements prior to the adoption of those acts. The appellant also complains that the General Court inferred support, for the purposes of criterion (a), from the fact that he holds the position of Chairman of VEB.RF, whereas, in that position, he exercises only the functions of a business manager that are in no way linked to the actions and policies of the Russian government in relation to Ukraine.
32 It should be noted that, without formally pleading that the first ground of appeal is inadmissible, the Council refers, in view of the large number of paragraphs contested en bloc by the appellant, to the difficulties encountered in understanding the scope of that ground of appeal, in particular as regards the manifest distortion of the facts alleged.
33 In that regard, it must be recalled that it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and from Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal in question will be dismissed as inadmissible (judgment of 25 January 2022, Commission v European Food and Others, C‑638/19 P, EU:C:2022:50, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited) and that it is for the Court, if necessary of its own motion, to determine whether that requirement of precision is satisfied (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1961, Fives Lille Cail and Others v High Authority, 19/60, 21/60, 2/61 and 3/61, EU:C:1961:30, p. 294, and of 25 June 2020, HF v Parliament, C‑570/18 P, EU:C:2020:490, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
34 Moreover, where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, that person must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in that person’s view, led to such distortion. In addition, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 6 June 2024, Ryanair v Commission, C‑441/21 P, EU:C:2024:477, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
35 In the present case, as regards the claim relating to the manifest distortion of the facts, it must be stated that the appellant does not indicate precisely, in his appeal, the facts alleged to have been distorted, still less does he demonstrate the errors of analysis which the General Court allegedly made. In those circumstances, that claim must be declared inadmissible.
36 However, although it is true that the appellant challenges en bloc paragraphs 58 to 87 of the judgment under appeal, while concentrating his reasoning solely on paragraphs 65 and 82 of that judgment, it should be noted, as the appellant rightly submits in his reply, that paragraph 82 of that judgment contains the conclusions of the legal reasoning developed in the other contested paragraphs of that judgment, to which paragraph 82 expressly refers, with the result that the first ground of appeal satisfies the requirements set out in paragraph 33 above and is, in the light of the considerations set out in the preceding paragraph, in part admissible.
37 By his arguments, the appellant contests in essence, first, the considerations contained in paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal and, second, the conclusion reached by the General Court in paragraph 82 of that judgment.
38 It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that any decision imposing or maintaining restrictive measures against a person must be taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis, and the EU Courts must then determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of the information or evidence provided and assess the probative value of that information or evidence in the circumstances of the particular case and in the light of any observations submitted in relation to them by, among others, the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 119 and 124).
39 As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 61 of the judgment under appeal, it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of a challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce negative evidence that those reasons are not well founded. Although there is no requirement that that authority produce before the EU Courts all the information and evidence underlying the reasons alleged, it is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 120 and 121).
40 As regards, first, paragraph 65 of the judgment under appeal, it must be pointed out that, contrary to what the appellant claims, the case-law cited in the two preceding paragraphs does not preclude, in a case such as the present one, the Council from being able to take into account, when assessing whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as criterion (a) or criterion (d), information or evidence relating to circumstances predating the adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence substantiates the grounds supporting that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and taking into account all relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2019, K.P., C‑458/15, EU:C:2019:522, paragraph 57). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation.
41 Second, in order to conclude, in the present case, that the Council had not committed an error of assessment, the General Court found, in paragraphs 62 to 64, 66, 68, 69, 72, 76 and 80 of the judgment under appeal, first that, on the date of the adoption of the acts at issue, the appellant actively supported the actions or policies covered by criterion (a), in particular the economic development of Crimea, because, in his capacity as Chairman of VEB.RF, he acted, together with all the directors and corporate administrators directly or indirectly appointed or dismissed by the Head of State of the Russian Federation or by the Russian government, in accordance with the economic policy determined by that Head of State and pursued by that government. Second, the General Court stated that the appellant had already provided such support some years previously by having occupied, until his appointment as Chairman of VEB.RF in 2018, the position of Deputy Prime Minister and, in that respect, in 2014, had made public statements in favour of the economic development of Crimea.
42 Having thus found, in essence, that the active support provided by the appellant in his capacity as Chairman of VEB.RF on the date on which the acts at issue were enacted was an extension of the active support already demonstrated in 2014 in his position as Deputy Prime Minister, the General Court did not err in law in concluding, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had adduced a sufficiently detailed, precise and consistent body of evidence demonstrating that, from 2014 until the date of the adoption of the original acts at issue, the appellant had been continuously responsible for providing such support, for the purposes of criterion (a).
43 As regards the complaint that the General Court was wrong to conclude, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, that, as Chairman of VEB.RF, the appellant provided active support, for the purposes of criterion (a), even though he merely performed a professional business management function that is in no way linked to the actions and policies pursued by the Russian Government, suffice it to point out that, under Article 256 TFEU and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts and to evaluate the evidence. The assessment of those facts and evidence does not therefore constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (judgment of 29 February 2024, Euranimi v Commission, C‑95/23 P, EU:C:2024:177, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).
44 By such a complaint, the appellant seeks to call into question the General Court’s assessment of the facts and evidence, bearing in mind that, even if he formally alleges distortion of the facts, he has failed, as is apparent from paragraph 35 above, to indicate precisely the facts alleged to have been distorted and to show the errors of analysis which the General Court allegedly made.
45 Furthermore, in so far as the appellant criticises the General Court for having adopted, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, reasoning which does not appear in detail in the statement of reasons for the acts at issue, since that statement merely explains that the appellant is ‘the Chairman of VEB.RF’ without reference to the activities of that entity or to any information concerning the appellant’s role in that position as Chairman, it is important to point out that the question of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from that of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act in question and involves, as is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 38 above, assessing the truth of the facts set out in that act and the characterisation of those facts as evidence justifying the use of restrictive measures against the person concerned (judgment of 15 November 2012, Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
46 In that regard, as noted in paragraphs 38 and 39 above, it is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of a challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and for the EU Courts to determine whether the facts alleged are made out in the light of the information or evidence provided.
47 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraphs 62, 69, 76, 81 and 82 of the judgment under appeal that, in accordance with that case-law, the General Court, first, found that the evidence provided in the Council’s file was sufficiently linked to the reasoning according to which the appellant is the Chairman of VEB.RF, second, determined that the facts underlying that reasoning were made out in the light of that evidence and, third, found, in essence, that the appellant, by virtue of his position as Chairman of VEB.RF, implemented the economic policy of the Russian government and thus participated in the economic development of Crimea, so that it could be concluded that he provided active support, for the purposes of criterion (a).
48 Finally, as regards the appellant’s claim that the General Court wrongly stated, in paragraph 18 of the judgment under appeal, that the wording of the appellant’s pleadings shows that he was not requesting the annulment of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, suffice it to note that the appellant does not contest, as is indicated in paragraph 18 of the judgment under appeal, that he confirmed, during the hearing before the General Court, that he was not seeking the annulment of those two acts as such. Furthermore, the appellant merely refers to alleged ‘false assertions’ by the General Court in that regard, without claiming that the latter failed to examine the arguments which he presented at first instance relating to the legality of Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 as such and, in particular, the legality of the criteria provided for therein, such as criteria (a) and (d).
49 In the light of the foregoing reasons, the first ground of appeal must be rejected.
50 By his second ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court wrongly held, in paragraphs 36, 38 and 39 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had complied with its obligation to state reasons. Moreover, in paragraph 33 of that judgment, the General Court itself acknowledged that the criterion on the basis of which the appellant was subject to restrictive measures was not clear from the wording of the reasons. Although, in that paragraph, the General Court concluded in the end that the reasoning for the acts at issue referred only to criterion (a) and not to criterion (d), that assertion is not consistent with the conduct of the Council during the proceedings before the General Court, since the Council systematically invoked both criteria against the appellant.
51 In paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court was also misled by the statement of reasons for the acts at issue in that it stated that the appellant held the positions of member of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission and Chairman of VEB.RF at the same time, whereas, as the appellant proved before the General Court, he occupied those positions successively. That irrefutably demonstrates the failure to state reasons for the acts at issue.
52 As regards the General Court’s reasons set out in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the position of Chairman of VEB.RF, referred to in the reasoning for the contested acts, must be read taking into account the context in which that position was entrusted to the person concerned and is being performed, and in particular the position of Deputy Prime Minister which he previously held, the appellant submits that that context specifically makes the reason why he was subject to restrictive measures impossible to understand, because ceasing to hold important political office to become the chairman of a public body entails a clear reduction in his ability to influence the politics of his country and to support the actions of the Russian government against Ukraine.
53 The Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
54 By his second ground of appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in finding, in paragraphs 33, 35, 36, 38 and 39 of the judgment under appeal, that the Council had complied with its obligation to state reasons.
55 In that regard, it should be noted that, as regards paragraph 33 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, without being challenged on that point by the appellant, that the statement of reasons for the acts at issue referred only to criterion (a), with the result that the statement of reasons for those acts was such as to preclude the appellant from identifying another listing criterion such as criterion (d). Therefore, the Council’s reliance on criterion (d) during the proceedings before the General Court has no bearing on the question whether, as the General Court held, the Council provided an adequate statement of reasons for the acts at issue in the light of criterion (a).
56 As regards the alleged inadequacy of the statement of reasons for the original acts at issue, which the General Court did not refer to in paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, it must be borne in mind that, as stated in paragraph 45 above, the issue of the statement of reasons, which concerns an essential procedural requirement, is separate from the issue of the evidence of the alleged conduct, which concerns the substantive legality of the act at issue.
57 In paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly stated that the wording of the statement of reasons for the original acts at issue and the first maintaining acts at issue showed that the Council, in order to impose and maintain the restrictive measures against the appellant, had taken the view inter alia that the appellant was, on the date of the adoption of those acts, Chairman of VEB.RF and a member of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission. It then held, in that paragraph and in paragraphs 38 and 39 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant had been able to understand the reasons why he had been subject to restrictive measures and that he had thus been given the opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, contrary to what the appellant claims in essence, the General Court duly took into account his claim that he was no longer a member of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission on the date of the adoption of the original acts at issue and of the first maintaining acts at issue. It stated, in paragraph 82 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant satisfied the criteria at issue in the present case regardless of the fact that he was no longer a member of that committee.
58 As regards paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, it must be borne in mind, as the General Court itself did in paragraph 29 of that judgment, that the reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in circumstances known to that person which enable him or her to understand the scope of the measure concerning him or her (judgment of 25 June 2020, Vnesheconombank v Council, C‑731/18 P, EU:C:2020:500, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). The General Court correctly applied that case-law in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal when it held that, in view of the context in which the duties as Chairman of VEB.RF were entrusted to him and are being performed, and having regard also to the fact that he was previously Deputy Prime Minister, the mere reference to the performance of those duties had to be regarded, in the light of the obligation to state reasons, as a sufficient factor enabling the appellant to defend himself and understand the criterion and the reasons underlying the restrictive measures adopted against him.
59 In the light of the foregoing reasons, the second ground of appeal must be rejected.
60 By his third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraphs 122 to 124 of the judgment under appeal, that the acts at issue do not infringe his fundamental right to freedom of expression. The appellant recalls that he has been sanctioned by the Council on account, inter alia, of earlier public statements made in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister. By validating such a causal link between those statements and the restrictive measures, the General Court infringed his right to freedom of expression. The fact that those measures do not affect his freedom of expression does not mean that it is not infringed, especially since the European Court of Human Rights recognised, in its judgment of 15 March 2011, Otegi Mondragón v. Spain (CE:ECHR:2011:0315JUD000203407), that politicians, in the exercise of their functions, enjoy an almost unlimited right to freedom of expression, superior to that enjoyed by other people.
61 The Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
62 By his third plea, the appellant essentially argues that, in paragraphs 122 to 124 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court committed an error of law by validating the Council’s approach according to which he was subject to restrictive measures due in particular to previous public statements made in his capacity as Deputy Prime Minister, thereby infringing his fundamental right to freedom of expression.
63 In that regard, it is apparent from paragraphs 64 to 66, 82 and 124 of the judgment under appeal that the public statements referred to in the preceding paragraph constitute one factor among others which enabled the Council to establish a sufficiently detailed, precise and consistent body of evidence to consider that, on the date of the adoption of the acts at issue, the appellant had been responsible for providing active support for the purposes of criterion (a), following on from the support already demonstrated by those statements in 2014.
64 Since those statements were used as evidence to corroborate the fact that the conditions of criterion (a) were satisfied with regard to the appellant, it must be held that the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraphs 122 to 124 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s freedom of expression had not, in itself, been infringed by the adoption of the acts at issue. In particular, it must be held, as the General Court did, that a person such as the appellant cannot rely on that right as a safeguard against the use of such statements as evidence and that restrictive measures such as freezing of funds and a ban on entry into, travel to and transit through the territory of the European Union in no way affect the freedom of expression of such a person.
65 Unlike the case which gave rise to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 15 March 2011, Otegi Mondragón v. Spain (CE:ECHR:2011:0315JUD000203407), which concerned comments made by a politician and which led, in breach of his right to freedom of expression, to a criminal sanction against him, it should be noted, as the General Court recalls in paragraphs 122 and 123 of the judgment under appeal, that the restrictive measures to which the appellant is subject, first, are of a precautionary nature and, second, do not as such affect the exercise of his right to freedom of expression.
66 In the light of the foregoing reasons, the third ground of appeal must be rejected.
67 By his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in holding, in particular in paragraphs 100 to 113 of the judgment under appeal, that his right to property was not infringed in the light of the principle of proportionality.
68 The fact that, as is apparent from paragraphs 102 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, the restrictive measures are temporary and reversible precautionary measures and are also subject to periodic reviews has absolutely no basis in reality, since, first, those measures frequently last for a long time and, second, their review is often only formal or even impossible to carry out. Thus, the appellant is still subject to restrictive measures for statements made more than 10 years ago and even though his position as Chairman of VEB.RF is merely a technical professional position. That shows that the Council did not take account of the change in his personal situation. Ultimately, the appellant has been the victim of expropriation, with the result that the restrictive measures adopted against him do not respect the essential content of the right to property.
69 Furthermore, the fact, noted in paragraphs 103 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, that the national authorities of the Member States may authorise the use of certain frozen funds does not mean that the appellant’s right to property is respected, since there are as many authorisation practices as Member States.
70 The appellant also submits that the restrictive measures adopted against him are contrary to the principle of proportionality in that, contrary to what the General Court held, they do not make it possible to achieve the legitimate objective pursued by the acts at issue and do not genuinely meet an objective of general interest, since the appellant no longer has the capacity to support the policies and actions covered by criterion (a) or to influence the Russian authorities.
71 Lastly, the appellant criticises the General Court for having held, in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, that it is sufficient for him to put an end to the conduct justifying the adoption of restrictive measures against him in order for those measures to be brought to an end, when his position as Chairman of VEB.RF is his sole means of subsistence.
72 The Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
73 By his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant alleges, in essence, that the General Court committed, in paragraphs 100 to 113 of the judgment under appeal, a number of errors of law in the analysis of the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter in relation to the right to property, in particular as regards the question of compliance with the principle of proportionality.
74 In that regard, it should be pointed out that the right to property laid down in Article 17 of the Charter is not an absolute right, so that restrictive measures such as those at issue in the present case may result in limitations to that right (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2019, HX v Council, C‑540/18 P, EU:C:2019:707, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited, and of 21 March 2024, Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden, C‑61/22, EU:C:2024:251, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
75 Limitations may therefore be placed on that right, provided that, in accordance with the first sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, they are provided for by law and respect the essence of that right. In addition, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter, subject to the principle of proportionality, such limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
76 Furthermore, as regards restrictive measures, the Court of Justice has held that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. It has inferred from this that the legality of a measure adopted in those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue (judgments of 31 January 2019, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and Others v Council, C‑225/17 P, EU:C:2019:82, paragraph 103, and of 17 September 2020, Rosneft and Others v Council, C‑732/18 P, EU:C:2020:727, paragraph 105).
77 In the first place, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court wrongly held, in paragraphs 102, 103 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, that the acts at issue do not infringe the essence of the right to property and that the limitation imposed by those acts on the exercise of his right to property does not appear, in the light of the principle of proportionality, to be manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued. According to the appellant and as demonstrated in his case, the restrictive measures are not, in actual fact, temporary and reversible precautionary measures, but often continue for a long period. Similarly, their review is very often only formal, or even impossible to carry out, and authorisations to release frozen funds are subject to very disparate practices by the national authorities of the Member States.
78 It should be noted in that regard that the appellant does not as such dispute the fact that, in accordance with the provisions of EU law recalled by the General Court in paragraphs 102, 103 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, restrictive measures are temporary and reversible precautionary measures, that they are subject to regular review and that the national authorities may authorise the use of frozen funds or grant specific authorisations allowing funds to be released.
79 In those circumstances, the General Court did not commit an error of law by holding in essence, in paragraphs 102, 103 and 107 to 109 of that judgment, that those provisions of EU law reveal that the acts at issue do not infringe the essential content of the right to property and that the limitation brought by those acts to the exercise of the appellant’s right to property is not, in the light of the principle of proportionality, manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective pursued, that is to say, as is apparent from paragraph 104 of that judgment, exerting direct or indirect pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation and its leaders so that they put an end to their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine. That is all the more so since the appellant’s arguments amount to only a set of general claims which seek, without any evidence, to call into question the appropriateness of the implementation of those provisions.
80 In addition, it is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraphs 41 and 43 above that the General Court correctly held that the Council had not made an error of assessment when it adopted the acts at issue, with the result that the enactment and subsequent maintenance of the restrictive measures against the appellant were justified in the light of the facts and the listing criterion concerned. In those circumstances, the fact that the restrictive measures to which the appellant was subject were renewed twice can neither invalidate the considerations set out by the General Court in paragraphs 102, 103 and 109 of the judgment under appeal, nor imply that the restrictive measures are of a permanent and irreversible nature and that the appellant could not subsequently secure the removal of his name from the list or authorisation to release his funds.
81 In the second place, the appellant submits that the restrictive measures adopted against him are contrary to the principle of proportionality in that, contrary to what the General Court held, they do not make it possible to achieve the legitimate objective pursued by the acts at issue and do not genuinely meet an objective of general interest.
82 In that regard, it should be noted that the only legal argument seeking to demonstrate that the General Court erred in law in that regard is that the appellant, in his capacity as Chairman of VEB.RF, does not have the ability to support the policies and actions covered by criterion (a) or to influence the Russian authorities. It is apparent from paragraphs 41 and 43 above that the General Court did not err in law in holding that the Council had not made an error of assessment in finding that, as a result of his position as Chairman of VEB.RF, criterion (a) was established as far as he was concerned.
83 In the third place, the appellant criticises the General Court for having held, in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal, that it is sufficient for him to put an end to the conduct justifying the adoption of restrictive measures against him in order for those measures to be brought to an end, when his position as Chairman of VEB.RF is his sole means of subsistence.
84 In that regard, it should be noted that the grounds thus set out by the General Court in paragraph 113 of the judgment under appeal were intended to respond to one of the appellant’s arguments relating not to his means of subsistence but to the consequences of the restrictive measures in terms of his public image. The General Court cannot be criticised for having erred in law with regard to an argument that was not envisaged in that paragraph.
85 In the light of the foregoing reasons, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected.
86 By his fifth ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in holding, in paragraph 126 of the judgment under appeal, that the principle of equal treatment had not been infringed on the ground that the Council had not made an error of assessment. According to the appellant, that reasoning is vitiated by an error of law given that, as he stated in his first ground of appeal, the General Court was wrong to hold that the Council had not committed an error of assessment.
87 The Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
88 In view of the fact that the success of the fifth ground of appeal depends on the success of the first ground of appeal and that that ground of appeal has been rejected in paragraph 49 above, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected.
89 By his sixth ground of appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 131 to 133 of the judgment under appeal in holding that the right to effective judicial protection had been respected and that the Council did not misuse its powers. In his submission, the acts at issue infringe the right to effective judicial protection and are vitiated by a misuse of powers because they are not based on an adequate statement of reasons, are not supported by sufficient evidence and infringe freedom of expression and the right to property. The appellant refers in that regard to the arguments put forward at first instance.
90 The Council disputes the appellant’s arguments.
91 In that regard, it should be noted that, contrary to what is required by the case-law referred to in paragraph 33 above, the sixth ground of appeal does not contain any legal argument to show that the General Court erred in law. In particular, the appellant limits himself to contesting paragraphs 131 to 133 of the judgment under appeal and to referring to the arguments which he submitted to the General Court without explaining them further and without highlighting the aspects of the judgment under appeal which he intends to criticise. Thus, that ground of appeal merely constitutes a request to have the action brought at first instance re-examined, in breach of the rules imposed by both the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its Rules of Procedure (judgment of 13 September 2007, Il Ponte Finanziaria v OHIM, C‑234/06 P, EU:C:2007:514, paragraphs 45 and 46).
92 Consequently the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected and, accordingly, the appeal in its entirety must be dismissed.
93 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. Article 138(1) and (2) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 184(1) thereof, provides that the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
94 Since the Council has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful in all his grounds of appeal, the appellant must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council.