1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 27 and Article 29(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31) (‘the Dublin III Regulation’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between H, an Afghan national, and the Udlændingestyrelsen (Immigration Service, Denmark) concerning the latter’s decision to transfer him to Romania.
3 In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark, the Dublin III Regulation is not binding on the Kingdom of Denmark.
4 However, pursuant to Article 2 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in Denmark or any other Member State of the European Union and ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention (OJ 2006 L 66, p. 38), approved on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 2006/188/EC of 21 February 2006 (OJ 2006 L 66, p. 37), the Dublin III Regulation applies to relations between the European Union and the Kingdom of Denmark.
5 The first paragraph of Article 48 of the Dublin III Regulation repealed Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1), which had replaced, in accordance with Article 24 thereof, the Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990 (OJ 1997 C 254, p. 1).
6 Recitals 4, 5 and 19 of the Dublin III Regulation are worded as follows: …
7 Article 18 of that regulation, entitled ‘Obligations of the Member State responsible’, provides: ‘1. The Member State responsible under this Regulation shall be obliged to: … …’
8 Article 27 of that regulation provides, under the heading ‘Remedies’: ‘1. The applicant or another person as referred to in Article 18(1)(c) or (d) shall have the right to an effective remedy, in the form of an appeal or a review, in fact and in law, against a transfer decision, before a court or tribunal. … 3. For the purposes of appeals against, or reviews of, transfer decisions, Member States shall provide in their national law that: 4. Member States may provide that the competent authorities may decide, acting ex officio, to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision pending the outcome of the appeal or review. …’
9 Article 29 of that regulation, entitled ‘Modalities and time limits’, provides: ‘1. The transfer of the applicant or of another person as referred to in Article 18(1)(c) or (d) from the requesting Member State to the Member State responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting Member State, after consultation between the Member States concerned, as soon as practically possible, and at the latest within six months of acceptance of the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3). … 2. Where the transfer does not take place within the six months’ time limit, the Member State responsible shall be relieved of its obligations to take charge or to take back the person concerned and responsibility shall then be transferred to the requesting Member State. …’
10 H is an Afghan national who entered Denmark on 25 April 2021, where he applied for international protection on the same day. According to the information contained in the Eurodac database, H had already been registered as an applicant for international protection in Romania on 5 March 2021.
11 On 24 June 2021, the Immigration Service therefore requested Romania to take back H in accordance with Article 18(1)(c) of the Dublin III Regulation.
12 On 7 July 2021, Romania agreed to take back H.
13 On 19 July 2021, the Immigration Service decided to transfer H to Romania in accordance with Article 18(1)(c) of the Dublin III Regulation. On the same day, H brought an appeal against that decision before the Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Board, Denmark), the referring tribunal in the present case. That appeal had a suspensive effect, in accordance with Article 27(3)(a) of that regulation.
14 On 28 February 2022, Romania informed all Member States that, with effect from 1 March 2022, it would suspend all inbound transfers under the Dublin III Regulation due to the conflict in Ukraine and the increased influx of refugees to Romania.
15 On 15 March 2022, the referring tribunal remitted the case to the Immigration Service for re-examination, in particular so that it could express its view on the effect of the general notification of the Romanian authorities, referred to in the preceding paragraph, on the decision to transfer H to Romania.
16 On 8 April 2022, the Immigration Service again decided to transfer H to Romania pursuant to Article 18(1)(c) of the Dublin III Regulation. On the same day, H brought an appeal against that decision before the referring tribunal. That appeal had suspensive effect, in accordance with Article 27(3)(a) of that regulation.
17 On 24 May 2022, Romania informed all Member States that the suspension of inbound transfers under that regulation had been lifted.
18 On 2 December 2022, the referring tribunal confirmed the legality of the decision of the Immigration Service of 8 April 2022.
19 On 2 February 2023, H requested that the procedure be reopened on the ground that the six-month time limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, in which the transfer of an asylum seeker from the requesting Member State to the Member State responsible must be carried out, had already expired on the date on which the Immigration Service took the second transfer decision, on 8 April 2022. Accordingly, in his view, the Kingdom of Denmark was now responsible for the substantive examination of his asylum application, in accordance with Article 29(2) of that regulation.
20 After reopening the proceedings, the referring tribunal again confirmed the validity of the decision of the Immigration Service of 8 April 2022. It held that that six-month period had not started to run until its final decision of 2 December 2022.
21 On a request from DRC Dansk Flygtningehjælp (Danish Refugee Council, Denmark), the referring tribunal decided to reopen the case once again in order to re-examine the interpretation of the rules on the time limit provided for in Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 27 thereof.
22 In that regard, the referring tribunal notes that, although those provisions provide that the transfer of an asylum seeker must take place within six months of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is suspensive effect, they do not, however, contain rules expressly governing the situation in which a judicial authority decides to remit a case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination. According to the referring tribunal, such a remittal is likely to contribute to ensuring that applicants for international protection enjoy effective judicial protection, in that it provides them with the opportunity to have their case re-examined at two levels.
23 In that context, the referring tribunal states that, in accordance with the national legislation in question in the main proceedings, a transfer decision may be annulled and remitted to the competent administrative authority for re-examination where significant new information relating to that decision has been brought to the attention of the tribunal hearing the appeal. In the present case, that remittal was justified by external and unforeseeable circumstances relating to the fact that, after accepting the transfer, the Member State responsible suspended all transfers under the Dublin III Regulation due to the conflict in Ukraine and the influx of refugees into the country.
24 In those circumstances, the Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Board) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘Are the [rules on the calculation of time limits] in Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that the time limit of six months laid down in the second part of Article 29(1) of that regulation is to run from the final, substantive decision in the case, in a situation where an appellate body in the requesting Member State, as referred to in Article 27 of [that regulation], has remitted the transfer case back to the competent [administrative authority], which subsequently made a fresh transfer decision more than six months after receipt of the acceptance by the Member State responsible, including where the remittal is based on the fact that the Member State responsible, which had initially accepted the transfer, subsequently decided to suspend all transfers under the Dublin III Regulation, and where suspensive effect has been granted as regards the removal of the person concerned?’
25 In its request for a preliminary ruling, the Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Board) has requested that the present case be determined under the expedited procedure laid down in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
26 On 15 December 2023, the President of the Court decided, having heard the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General, to reject that request.
27 On 27 November 2023, the Court sent the Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Board) a request for clarification, asking it to clarify whether it was a ‘court or tribunal’, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
28 On 8 January 2024, the Flygtningenævnet (Refugee Board) responded to that request.
29 By its single question, the referring tribunal seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court or tribunal hearing an action for annulment with suspensive effect makes a final decision on the substantive legality of a second transfer decision, adopted after a first transfer decision concerning the same person has been annulled - solely on the ground of a change in circumstances that is decisive for the correct application of that regulation - resulting in a remittal of the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination, the six-month transfer time limit laid down in Article 29(1) of that regulation starts to run - on the date of the final decision on the legality of the second transfer, or - on the date on which the first transfer decision was annulled.
30 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the referring tribunal has doubts as to which of the two decisions adopted by the national court or tribunal is decisive for the application of the six-month transfer time limit in respect of the second situation provided for in Article 29(1) of that regulation. H claims, in essence, that that second situation has become inapplicable in the case in the main proceedings. He submits that, after the annulment of the first transfer decision, the transfer time limit started to run again in accordance with the first situation provided for in that provision, from the date on which Romania had agreed to take him back, namely 7 July 2021.
31 It must be borne in mind, first of all, that the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides that the transfer of the person concerned to the Member State responsible is to be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting Member State, as soon as practically possible, and at the latest within six months of the acceptance by another Member State of the request to take charge or take back that person or of the final decision on an appeal where there is suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) of that regulation.
32 It follows from the very wording of the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of that regulation, and in particular from the use of the conjunction ‘or’ which contrasts ‘acceptance’ by another Member State, on the one hand, and the ‘final decision’ on an appeal or review, on the other, that, as the Advocate General observed in point 34 of his Opinion, the two moments referred to in that provision, from which the six-month transfer time limit may start to run, constitute two situations which are mutually exclusive.
33 In addition, as regards the second situation, that provision refers to the moment when the decision on an appeal against a transfer decision has become final, without, however, making any distinction on the basis of the outcome reached by the judicial authority in its decision on the appeal. In particular, it is in no way apparent from the wording of that provision that the second situation would become inapplicable if the judicial authority were to annul the transfer decision.
34 Accordingly, where a transfer decision is the subject of an appeal with suspensive effect under Article 27(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, it follows from the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of that regulation that the six-month transfer time limit is to run not from the acceptance of the request to take charge or to take back but, by way of derogation, from the final decision on the appeal against the transfer decision. In that case, the time limit does not therefore start to run until the judicial decision on the appeal against the transfer decision has become final, after all legal remedies provided for by the law of the Member State concerned have been exhausted (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Suspension of the transfer time limit on appeal), C‑556/21, EU:C:2023:272, paragraphs 23 and 24 and the case-law cited).
35 Next, it should be borne in mind that extending the postponement of the running of the transfer time limit until the outcome of the appeal against the transfer decision ensures equality of arms and the effectiveness of appeal proceedings, by guaranteeing that that time limit does not expire while implementation of the transfer decision has been made impossible by the lodging of an appeal with suspensive effect against that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 March 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Suspension of the transfer time limit on appeal), C‑556/21, EU:C:2023:272, paragraph 35).
36 The interpretation relied on by H is liable to undermine the equality of arms and the effectiveness of the appeal procedures which the second situation provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation seeks to ensure. Since, according to that interpretation, the annulment of the transfer decision by the judicial authority would mean that the transfer time limit would start to run again from the date on which the Member State responsible agreed to take back the person concerned, the consequence could in fact be that the six-month transfer time limit expires at a time when enforcement of the decision is impossible due to an action for annulment with suspensive effect. That would have been the case, in particular, in the main proceedings, since, according to that interpretation, that period had already expired on 7 February 2022, on which date the action for annulment of the first transfer decision was still pending.
37 Lastly, contrary to what H submits, it is in no way apparent from the case-law arising from the judgment of 30 March 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Suspension of the transfer time limit on appeal) (C‑556/21, EU:C:2023:272), that the annulment, following an action for annulment with suspensive effect, of the transfer decision is such as to render inapplicable the second situation provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.
38 In that regard, it is true that the Court noted, in paragraph 29 of that judgment, that, where the transfer decision has been annulled at first instance, there is no longer any transfer decision the implementation of which could be suspended in the context of an appeal at second instance. However, the situation which led to that judgment differs substantially from that at issue in the main proceedings. It is apparent from paragraphs 29 and 39 of that judgment that the Court was ruling on the possibility of applying interim measures under Article 27(4) of that regulation in the context of an appeal at second instance, in a situation in which the appeal at first instance had not had suspensive effect. In the present case, however, H brought two actions for annulment of the two transfer decisions at issue in the main proceedings, both of which had suspensive effect such as to rule out the first situation provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of that regulation in favour of the second alternative, namely the appeal against the initial transfer decision and, after the annulment of that decision, the appeal brought against the second transfer decision.
39 That said, it is necessary to examine the question referred relating to the application of the second situation provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.
40 In the first place, it should be noted that, in order to determine the time from which the six-month transfer time limit starts to run, that provision merely refers, as regards the second situation, to the final decision on the appeal where there is suspensive effect.
41 As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 40 of his Opinion, that provision does not therefore lay down specific rules on the calculation of that time limit where the judicial authority - having annulled a first transfer decision and remitted the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination solely on the ground of a change in circumstances that is decisive for the correct application of the Dublin III Regulation and which occurred after the adoption of that decision - rules on the legality of the second transfer decision adopted in respect of the same person, following that annulment and that remittal of the case.
42 In the second place, pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants for international protection have the right to an effective remedy, in the form of an appeal or a review, in fact and in law, against a transfer decision, before a court or tribunal.
43 In that regard, it is apparent from the second sentence of recital 19 of that regulation that, in order to ensure that international law is respected, an effective remedy against the transfer decisions must cover both the examination of the application of that regulation and of the legal and factual situation in the Member State to which the applicant is transferred. Accordingly, Article 27(1) of that regulation, read in the light of that recital, confers on the data subject the right to obtain a judicial review of the lawfulness of the transfer decision.
44 In view of the link which exists, in the context of the system established by the Dublin III Regulation, between the establishment of remedies with suspensive effect, pursuant to Article 27(1) and (3) of that regulation, and the postponement of the transfer time limit provided for in the second situation of the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of that regulation, the Court has already held that that transfer time limit must run not from the provisional judicial decision suspending the implementation of the transfer procedure, but only from the date of the judicial decision ruling on the merits of that procedure and which is no longer capable of hindering its implementation (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2009, Petrosian and Others, C‑19/08, EU:C:2009:41, paragraphs 46 and 50).
45 In that regard, it is true that the application of national legislation under which, where there are new circumstances which are decisive for the correct application of the Dublin III Regulation, the judicial authority is to annul the transfer decision and remit the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination may lead to the existence of two transfer decisions and two separate appeals. However, in so far as those successive decisions both concern the transfer of the same applicant for international protection following the acceptance by the Member State responsible of the request to take him back, it appears, as the Advocate General observed in point 44 of his Opinion, that those decisions form part of a single procedure.
46 In the context of such a single procedure, the decision by which the judicial authority annuls the first transfer decision solely on the ground of a change in circumstances that is decisive for the correct application of the Dublin III Regulation and remits the case for re-examination must be regarded as an interim decision which allows the competent administrative authority to assess the possible impact of those new circumstances on the transfer of the person concerned, without, however, terminating the procedure relating to that transfer definitively.
47 In the third place, although it is apparent from Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation that the EU legislature intended to promote the rapid implementation of transfer decisions, the fact remains that it did not intend to sacrifice the judicial protection of applicants for international protection to the requirement of expedition in the processing of their application, and that it provided, in order to guarantee that protection, that the implementation of those decisions may, in certain cases, be suspended (judgments of 29 January 2009, Petrosian and Others, C‑19/08, EU:C:2009:41, paragraph 48, and of 30 March 2023, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Suspension of the transfer time limit on appeal), C‑556/21, EU:C:2023:272, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). Those provisions must therefore be interpreted in the light of the right to effective judicial protection guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter.
48 Furthermore, it is settled case-law that, although, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States and subject to the observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing remedies for ensuring that individual rights derived from the EU legal order are safeguarded, Member States nevertheless have the responsibility to ensure observance in every case of the right to effective judicial protection of those rights as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter (see, by analogy, as regards the right to a remedy guaranteed in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), judgment of 3 July 2025, Al Nasiria, C‑610/23, EU:C:2025:514, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
49 In Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation, the EU legislature harmonised only some of the procedural rules governing the action brought against, or the review, in fact and in law, of a transfer decision before a court or tribunal that must be available to the person concerned. In particular, it did not specify in that article whether and according to what procedures the court or tribunal hearing that action is required to take account of circumstances arising after the adoption of that decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2021, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a transfer decision), C‑194/19, EU:C:2021:270, paragraph 38 and 40).
50 It follows that, as regards the taking into account of circumstances that arise after the adoption of a transfer decision, each Member State bound by the Dublin III Regulation must organise its national law in such a way as to enable applicants for international protection to exercise their right to an effective remedy, as guaranteed by Article 47 and given specific expression by Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with recital 19 thereof (see, by analogy, judgment of 3 July 2025, Al Nasiria, C‑610/23, EU:C:2025:514, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
51 First, in that regard, it should be recalled that the Court held, in paragraph 49 of the judgment of 15 April 2021, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a transfer decision) (C‑194/19, EU:C:2021:270), that those provisions preclude national legislation which provides that the court or tribunal seised of an action for annulment of a transfer decision may not, in the context of the examination of that action, take account of circumstances subsequent to the adoption of that decision which are decisive for the correct application of that regulation, unless that legislation provides for a specific remedy entailing an ex nunc examination of the situation of the person concerned, the results of which are binding on the competent authorities and which may be exercised after such circumstances have arisen. As is apparent from paragraph 47 of that judgment, such decisive circumstances include, inter alia, those which preclude the implementation of the decision to transfer the person concerned to a Member State other than the requesting Member State or which entail the responsibility of the requesting Member State.
52 The case-law referred to in the preceding paragraph applies mutatis mutandis to national legislation under which, where there is new information relating to such circumstances, the judicial authority is to annul the transfer decision and remit the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination in order for that authority to take that information into account. In those circumstances, such a decision to annul the transfer decision and remit the case for re-examination cannot constitute a final decision on the appeal, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.
53 Second, the Court has held that, in the light of the objective, referred to in recital 19 of the Dublin III Regulation, of guaranteeing, in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, effective protection of the persons concerned, and the objective of determining rapidly the Member State responsible for processing an application for international protection set out in recital 5 of that regulation, the applicant must have an effective and rapid remedy available to him or her which enables him or her to rely on circumstances subsequent to the adoption of the transfer decision, where the taking into account of those circumstances is decisive for the correct application of the regulation. That obligation to provide for a rapid and effective remedy is satisfied, inter alia, by national legislation which allows the applicant to rely on such circumstances in an action brought against the transfer decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 April 2021, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a transfer decision), C‑194/19, EU:C:2021:270, paragraph 35 and 36 and the case-law cited).
54 The fact that national legislation provides that, after the annulment of the initial transfer decision by the judicial authority and the remittal to the competent administrative authority for re-examination, it is for that administrative authority to re-examine the transfer of the person concerned in the light of circumstances subsequent to that decision does not, in principle, preclude compliance with the obligation to provide for a rapid and effective remedy. Compliance with that obligation presupposes, however, as the Advocate General observed in point 54 of his Opinion, that national law is adapted in such a way that the competent administrative authority carries out the re-examination thus requested without undue delay and that the judicial authority hearing the case rules in a short period of time (see, by analogy, as regards the right to a remedy guaranteed in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, judgment of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 148).
55 In any event, the duration of the administrative and judicial procedure relating to the transfer of the person concerned cannot, as a whole, go beyond what is necessary in the light of the purposes for which that procedure was initiated.
56 In particular, such national legislation cannot, as the Advocate General observed in point 55 of his Opinion, allow the authorities of the requesting Member State to evade their responsibility by repeatedly remitting the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination, without the procedure for granting international protection ever being decided. Such legislation would be liable to compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications for international protection, referred to in recital 5 of the Dublin III Regulation, guaranteeing effective access to the procedures for granting international protection. Furthermore, such legislation would also be liable to undermine the effectiveness of judicial protection, as guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 27 of the Dublin III Regulation, read in conjunction with recital 19 thereof.
57 In that context, it should also be noted that the transfer time limit laid down in Article 29(1) of the Dublin III Regulation makes a decisive contribution to achieving the objective of rapidly processing applications for international protection, as referred to in recital 5 of that regulation, by ensuring that the take charge and take back procedures are implemented without undue delay. That mandatory time limit and, in particular, the rule laid down in Article 29(2) of that regulation show that, according to the EU legislature, such applications should, where appropriate, be examined by a Member State other than that designated as responsible pursuant to the criteria set out in Chapter III of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 November 2018, X and X, C‑47/17 and C‑48/17, EU:C:2018:900, paragraphs 69 and 70).
58 In the present case, it is apparent from the information in the request for a preliminary ruling that the Immigration Service adopted the second transfer decision in respect of H on 8 April 2022, that is to say, less than four weeks after the annulment of the initial transfer decision and the remittal of the case to that department for re-examination on 15 March 2022. It thus appears, subject to verification by the referring tribunal, that the Immigration Service carried out the required re-examination without undue delay.
59 Furthermore, having regard to the considerations set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the present judgment, it is for that tribunal to ascertain in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, first, whether it may be considered that, by dismissing the action for annulment of the second transfer decision on 8 December 2022, it ruled on that appeal within a short period of time, even though the appeal was lodged before it almost eight months earlier and Romania informed all the Member States of the lifting of the suspension of incoming transfers under the Dublin III Regulation on 24 May 2022. Second, it is for that tribunal to ascertain whether the duration of the procedure relating to H’s transfer - amounting to almost 17 months since Romania’s acceptance, on 7 July 2021, to take back that applicant - as a whole went beyond what was necessary in view of the purposes for which it was initiated.
60 That being said, if the referring tribunal finds that the take back procedures were not carried out without undue delay, the application for international protection should be examined by a Member State other than the one designated as responsible under the criteria set out in Chapter III of the Dublin III Regulation.
61 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 29(1) and (2) of the Dublin III Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, where a national court or tribunal hearing an action for annulment with suspensive effect makes a final decision on the substantive legality of a second transfer decision, adopted after a first transfer decision concerning the same person has been annulled - solely on the ground of a change in circumstances that is decisive for the correct application of that regulation - resulting in the remittal of the case to the competent administrative authority for re-examination, the six-month transfer time limit laid down in Article 29(1) of that regulation starts to run on the date of the final decision on the substantive legality of that second decision. In order to ensure that the duration of the procedure relating to the transfer of the person concerned does not, as a whole, go beyond what is necessary in the light of the purposes for which it was initiated, that second transfer decision and the final decision on the action for annulment brought against that decision must be adopted within a short period of time.
62 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national tribunal, the decision on costs is a matter for that tribunal. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.