1 By its appeal, the European Association of Non-Integrated Metal Importers & Distributors (Euranimi) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 October 2023, Euranimi v Commission (T‑598/21, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2023:606), by which the General Court dismissed its action for annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1029 of 24 June 2021 amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 to prolong the safeguard measure on imports of certain steel products (OJ 2021 L 225 I, p. 1; ‘the regulation at issue’).
2 The Agreement on Safeguards is in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 and approved by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 1) (‘the WTO Agreement on Safeguards’).
3 Article 2(1) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards states: ‘A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.’
4 Article 4(1)(a) and (b) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards reads as follows: ‘For the purposes of this Agreement:
5 Article 7(1) and (2) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provides: ‘1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. The period shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended under paragraph 2. 2. The period mentioned in paragraph 1 may be extended provided that the competent authorities of the importing Member have determined, in conformity with the procedures set out in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, that the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting, and provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8 and 12 are observed.’
6 Recital 11 of Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports (OJ 2015 L 83, p. 16) states: ‘It falls to the [European] Commission to adopt the safeguard measures required by the interests of the [European] Union. Those interests should be considered as a whole and should in particular encompass the interests of Union producers, users and consumers.’
7 Article 4(3) of that regulation provides: ‘The following definitions shall apply: …’
8 Article 9 of that regulation states: ‘1. Examination of the trend in imports, of the conditions in which they take place and of serious injury or threat of serious injury to Union producers resulting from such imports shall cover in particular the following factors: 2. Where a threat of serious injury is alleged, the Commission shall also examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury. In this regard account may be taken of factors such as:
9 The first subparagraph of Article 15(1) of that regulation reads as follows: ‘Where a product is imported into the Union in such greatly increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to Union producers, the Commission, in order to safeguard the interests of the Union, may, acting at the request of a Member State or on its own initiative:
10 The first paragraph of Article 16 of Regulation 2015/478 provides: ‘Where the interests of the Union so require, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 3(3) and the terms of Chapter III, may adopt appropriate measures to prevent a product being imported into the Union in such greatly increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to Union producers of like or directly competing products.’
11 Article 19(1) and (2) of that regulation provides: ‘1. The duration of safeguard measures must be limited to the period of time necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment on the part of Union producers. The period must not exceed 4 years, including the duration of any provisional measure. 2. Such initial period may be extended, except in the case of the measures referred to in the third subparagraph of Article 15(4) provided it is determined that:
12 Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21) is entitled ‘General provisions’. Paragraph 4 of that article provides: ‘In the Union interest, measures imposed pursuant to this Regulation may be suspended by a decision of the Commission in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15(2) for a period of nine months. The suspension may be extended for a further period, not exceeding one year, by the Commission acting in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15(2). Measures may only be suspended where market conditions have temporarily changed to an extent that injury would be unlikely to resume as a result of the suspension, and provided that the Union industry has been given an opportunity to comment and those comments have been taken into account. Measures may at any time be reinstated in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 15(2) if the reason for suspension is no longer applicable.’
13 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 12 of the judgment under appeal. It may be summarised as follows for the purposes of the present appeal.
14 Following a safeguard investigation concerning 28 categories of steel products, the Commission provisionally concluded that the EU steel industry was under threat of serious injury with respect to 23 of those categories. It therefore adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1013 of 17 July 2018 imposing provisional safeguard measures with regard to imports of certain steel products (OJ 2018 L 181, p. 39).
15 Subsequently, as it considered that the EU steel industry was under threat of serious injury with respect to 26 product categories of steel products, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31 January 2019 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products (OJ 2019 L 31, p. 27). That implementing regulation put in place a definitive safeguard measure for a period of three years, with the possibility of an extension of up to eight years, in the form of specific tariff-rate quotas per category, the quantitative ceiling of which was set at the average import volumes of the countries concerned during the period from 2015 to 2017, increased by 5% to ensure that traditional trade flows were maintained and that the existing user and importing industry in the European Union remained sufficiently supported (‘the safeguard measure’). The out-of-quota tariff rate was set at 25%.
16 Implementing Regulation 2019/159 established country-specific quotas for countries with a significant interest as suppliers of the products at issue. A ‘residual’ or ‘global’ tariff-rate quota was also established for other countries exporting to EU territory. The Commission also considered that when a supplying country had exhausted its specific tariff-rate quota, it should be allowed to have access to the residual tariff-rate quota not only to ensure the maintenance of traditional trade flows but also to avoid that, as the case may be, parts of the tariff-rate quota would remain unused.
17 From 2 February 2019, the date of entry into force of Implementing Regulation 2019/159, to 30 June 2021, when the initial period of three years came to an end, the safeguard measure was regularly reviewed and gradually liberalised, at regular intervals, in order gradually to increase the quantitative thresholds to allow the EU industry to adjust. When the reviews were carried out during September 2019 and June 2020, the Commission made changes to the administration of the tariff-rate quota system, in particular to take more recent trade data into account.
18 Following a reasoned request from 12 EU Member States and an investigation relating to the possible extension of the safeguard measure, the Commission adopted the regulation at issue on 24 June 2021, extending that measure for three years until 30 June 2024.
19 On the one hand, the Commission considered that, in the context of the COVID‑19 pandemic, a removal of the safeguard measure was liable to cause a sudden import wave that would severely worsen the still fragile financial situation of the EU steel industry.
20 On the other hand, it considered that users, across all product categories, had had the possibility to source free-of-duty steel from multiple sources since around 11 million tonnes of free-of-duty tariff-rate quotas remained unused, that is, 36% of the total tariff-rate quotas available.
21 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 20 September 2021, Euranimi sought the annulment of the regulation at issue.
22 Euranimi put forward two pleas in law in support of its application. By its first plea, it alleged that the conditions for the extension of the safeguard measure under Article 19 of Regulation 2015/478 were not met. By its second plea, it claimed that that extension was not in the interests of the European Union.
23 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that the action brought by Euranimi was admissible. It rejected each of the pleas on the merits and, consequently, dismissed the action in its entirety.
24 By its appeal, Euranimi claims that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; - annul the regulation at issue; and - order the Commission to pay the costs relating to the appeal proceedings and the proceedings at first instance.
25 The Commission contends that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal and - order Euranimi to pay the costs of the proceedings.
26 In support of its appeal, Euranimi puts forward two grounds of appeal.
27 By its first ground of appeal, Euranimi complains that the General Court infringed Article 19(2) of Regulation 2015/478, committed several errors of law and distorted the facts and evidence in finding that the Commission had not made any manifest error in its assessment of the conditions for extending the safeguard measure. This ground of appeal is divided into two parts.
28 By the first part of its first ground of appeal, Euranimi contests paragraphs 72 to 94 of the judgment under appeal. It submits that the General Court erred in finding in those paragraphs that the Commission had not made any manifest error of assessment in the analysis of the ‘necessary’ nature of the safeguard measure ‘to prevent or remedy serious injury’, within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation 2015/478, in conjunction with Article 4 thereof. Euranimi argues that the General Court applied a flawed and contradictory method for assessing the merits of the Commission’s analysis, that it distorted the facts and evidence, wrongly characterised the facts, and failed to rule on certain arguments, in breach of its duty to state reasons.
29 First, in holding that the positive market trends highlighted by Euranimi were irrelevant, the General Court erred in finding that economic factors relating to decreasing imports on the EU market, the increasing market share of the EU steel industry and the increasing profits of the main players on the market had no relevance.
30 Euranimi argues that its own analysis of the economic situation of that industry did not lack context. It in fact carried out an overall assessment of the economic factors, in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation 2015/478. That assessment showed that the industry was not likely to suffer possible injury as a result of the imports concerned but rather that it needed those imports to compensate for its inability to meet the demand for material.
31 Second, contrary to what was held by the General Court, Euranimi pointed to the inadequacies of the non-attribution analysis concerning the exceptional market circumstances in 2020 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commission was under a duty, owing to that pandemic, to evaluate the exceptional market circumstances subsequent to the investigation period in order to assess whether or not the safeguard measure should be extended. Such a forward-looking examination could not be refused on the ground, wrongly advanced in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, that its temporal scope extended beyond the period considered by the Commission. That examination was required in the present case on the basis of an application by analogy of Article 14(4) of Regulation 2016/1036 and for considerations of legal logic. In paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, in a contradictory manner, took into account the factors related to overproduction and overcapacity.
32 In any event, even if the assessment of the presence of ‘serious injury’ requires an overall and contextualised interpretation of the economic factors listed in Article 9 of Regulation 2015/478, Euranimi argues that the Commission must, when exercising its discretion, place more value on some factors than others. That is clear from Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, which points to the paramount importance of the presence of increased imports, where that rise must be unexpected. Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 2015/478 support that interpretation.
33 However, the General Court made no findings in the judgment under appeal on any aspect related to WTO law.
34 The Commission contends that the first part of the first ground of appeal is inadmissible since it amounts to challenging the assessment of the facts made by the General Court. In any event, the first part of the first ground of appeal is unfounded.
35 As regards the admissibility of the first part of the first ground of appeal, it should be observed that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, it follows from Article 256 TFEU and from the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction (i) to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and (ii) to assess those facts. When the General Court has established or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 256 TFEU to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the General Court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them. The Court of Justice thus has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the General Court accepted in support of those facts. Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that assessment does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (judgment of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
36 Where an appellant alleges such a distortion by the General Court, that appellant must, under Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in its view, led to such distortion. In addition, in accordance with the Court of Justice’s settled case-law, distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
37 In the present case, it must be stated that the arguments made by Euranimi in support of the first part of its first ground of appeal largely amount to criticism of the factual assessments made by the General Court concerning the existence of ‘serious injury’ within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation 2015/478. Although Euranimi alleges distortion of the facts and evidence by the General Court, it does not specify either the facts or evidence which the latter distorted or the way in which it did so. The first part of the ground of appeal is therefore inadmissible in so far as it is based on the contesting of matters of fact.
38 That said, Euranimi also claims in the first part of the ground of appeal, first, that the General Court applied a flawed method in rejecting the forward-looking examination of market circumstances. Second, it complains that the General Court failed to rule on the arguments which it had put forward on the basis on WTO law. Since those two claims are based, in essence, on errors of law they are admissible.
39 First, Euranimi submits that, in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erroneously rejected the forward-looking examination of market circumstances. Euranimi argues that an examination of that kind is, however, necessary on the basis of an application, by analogy, of Article 14(4) of Regulation 2016/1036 and for ‘logical-legal’ reasons.
40 In that regard, it should be observed that in the regulation at issue the Commission analysed the period from 2018 to 2020. In paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal the General Court found, furthermore, that that institution had carried out a forward-looking examination, which was not disputed before it by Euranimi.
41 Nevertheless, Euranimi had raised a complaint before the General Court by which it criticised the Commission for failing to take into consideration the increase in profits of the main players in the EU industry in the course of 2021. In so doing, it relied on certain data subsequent to that period. The General Court rejected that complaint as ineffective in paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal, on the ground that it was ‘based on factors whose temporal scope extends beyond the period considered by the Commission’.
42 Euranimi has not succeeded in its appeal in establishing that that ground is vitiated by an error of law. While Euranimi claims that a forward-looking examination was required, on the basis of an application by analogy of Article 14(4) of Regulation 2016/1036 and for ‘logical-legal’ reasons, it fails to substantiate that assertion. That provision concerns the suspension of anti-dumping measures in the event of a temporary change in market conditions. Its purpose is thus different from that of the extension of safeguard measures and, moreover, it has no equivalent in Regulation 2015/478, which was the basis for adopting the regulation at issue.
43 Accordingly, the argument by which Euranimi criticises paragraph 87 of the judgment under appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
44 Second, Euranimi complains that the General Court failed to make any findings on the arguments it made before it that were based on WTO law, in particular, Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, as interpreted by a WTO panel. It infers from that article that some of the factors which the Commission takes into account when assessing ‘serious injury’ within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Regulation 2015/478, in particular that of increased imports, are of paramount importance.
45 In that regard, it is true that, according to settled case-law, the duty incumbent upon the General Court under Article 36 and the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to state reasons for its judgments does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review on appeal (judgment of 30 November 2016, Commission v France and Orange, C‑486/15 P, EU:C:2016:912, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
46 However, in the present case the General Court did not, in the judgment under appeal, address the arguments made by Euranimi based on the WTO Safeguards Agreement and which it had put forward in a clear and substantiated manner in its application at first instance. The General Court thereby breached its duty to state reasons.
47 Nevertheless, that breach has no bearing on the operative part of the judgment under appeal since the arguments based on WTO law were in any event bound to fail.
48 Indeed, without it being necessary to rule on the issue, not debated by the parties, of whether the provisions of WTO law put forward by Euranimi could be relied on before the General Court, it is necessary to point out that the proceedings before the latter concerned the extension of a safeguard measure under the provisions of Article 19 of Regulation 2015/478. By contrast, the subject matter of Article 2 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, as relied on by Euranimi, is the initial adoption of such a measure. As the Commission has observed, the context for assessing ‘serious injury’ or a threat of such injury is different, depending on whether the situation concerns the initial adoption of a safeguard measure or its possible extension. In that latter situation, the initial safeguard measure has in fact already caused effects which may have an impact on the assessment, at the stage of adopting an extension measure, of the existence of such an injury or such a threat. However, Euranimi has failed to explain why, in such a situation, the reasoning followed should be the same as when adopting an initial measure.
49 Accordingly, the arguments based on WTO law are ineffective.
50 For all the foregoing reasons, the first part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible, in part unfounded, and in part ineffective.
51 By the second part of its first ground of appeal, Euranimi contests paragraphs 95 to 104 of the judgment under appeal. In its view, the General Court erred in holding that the Commission had not committed a manifest error of assessment by finding that EU producers were adjusting, within the meaning of Article 19(2)(b) of Regulation 2015/478.
52 Referring to the preamble and to Article 7 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, Euranimi claims that safeguard measures are intended to enable the EU industry to make adjustments in order to compete with fairly traded imports. In the absence of adjustments, the existence of which the Commission must prove, such measures cannot be extended.
53 In the present case, the General Court found, in paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal, that the finding of adjustment measures taken by the EU industry was based on confidential information and on the information in recitals 69 and 70 of the regulation at issue, which Euranimi had failed to rebut with supporting evidence. However, first, it was not possible for Euranimi to access confidential evidence, meaning that its rights of defence and the adversarial principle were infringed. Second, Euranimi submits that it provided sufficient arguments to contest the information in those recitals by pointing to the general nature of the information and the lack of evidence of a concrete adjustment plan.
54 The Commission contends that the second part of the first ground of appeal is inadmissible since it amounts to challenging the assessment of the facts made by the General Court. In any event, this second part is unfounded.
55 In the first place, as regards the claim of infringement of the rights of the defence and of the adversarial principle, it should be observed that, in an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is, in principle, confined to the assessment of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance (judgment of 28 April 2022, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, C‑666/19 P, EU:C:2022:323, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
56 Since Euranimi did not raise an infringement of the rights of defence and of the adversarial principle before the General Court, its claim relating to such an infringement is inadmissible at the appeal stage.
57 In the second place, the claim based on the absence of a concrete adjustment plan amounts in reality to challenging the factual assessments made by the General Court. In the absence of any substantiated plea of distortion of the facts or evidence, that claim is inadmissible, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 35 above.
58 It follows from the foregoing that the second part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
59 Consequently, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
60 By its second ground of appeal, Euranimi complains that the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts and evidence in paragraphs 105 to 121 of the judgment under appeal. In particular, the appellant disputes the finding in paragraph 119 of that judgment that it failed to demonstrate the existence of a manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission as regards the interest of the European Union in prolonging the safeguard measure.
61 Euranimi observes that in the light of recital 11 of Regulation 2015/478, the interest of the European Union includes, in particular, the interests of producers, users and consumers.
62 First, the General Court erred in rejecting, in paragraph 107 of the judgment under appeal, the argument made by Euranimi that the safeguard measure was solely in the interests of European producers. Euranimi argues that the reason given by the General Court, that importers could have easily diversified their source of supply by importing the products concerned from non-EU countries whose tariff quota had not been exhausted, was inconsistent with the actual functioning of the market. In that regard, the General Court failed to take account of several arguments and items of evidence provided by Euranimi, set out in paragraphs 37 to 54 of the reply submitted at first instance and in Annexes 6 and 14 to its application at first instance. By those arguments and that evidence, Euranimi had shown that the extension of the safeguard measure was contrary to the interest of the European industry overall. Accordingly, the General Court failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons and committed a manifest error of assessment.
63 Second, the General Court distorted the facts in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal. Contrary to what the General Court found in that paragraph, Euranimi had raised a different argument, claiming that, in view of the incapacity of the EU industry to meet domestic demand for the product concerned, the prolongation of the safeguard measure was clearly not required in the name of the interest of European industry since it made importing that product even more complex.
64 Third, Euranimi also submits that it demonstrated that the extension of the safeguard measure was inconsistent with the exceptional market condition that arose during the investigation period due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The General Court failed in paragraphs 112 and 117 of the judgment under appeal to take account of the arguments put forward to that end by Euranimi in the reply. The General Court thereby breached its duty to state reasons.
65 The Commission contends that the second ground of appeal is inadmissible since it seeks to challenge the factual assessment carried out by the General Court, without demonstrating any distortion of those facts. In any event, this ground of appeal is unfounded.
66 The second ground of appeal alleges error of law and distortion of the facts and evidence in paragraphs 105 to 121 of the judgment under appeal. In those paragraphs, the General Court rejected Euranimi’s second plea for annulment on the ground, in essence, that the Commission had not committed a manifest error in its assessment of the EU interest in extending the safeguard measure.
67 In the first place, Euranimi complains that the General Court failed to take account, when analysing the second plea in the action for annulment, of several arguments intended to demonstrate that the safeguard measure was solely in the interest of European producers. In that regard, it refers to arguments which it made before the General Court in paragraphs 37 to 54 of the reply and in certain annexes to its application.
68 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice, the ‘summary of the pleas in law’ which must be stated in any application, for the purposes of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, means that the application must specify the nature of the grounds on which the application is based. Accordingly, it is necessary, in particular, for an action before the General Court to be admissible, that the basic matters of law and fact relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (judgment of 3 March 2022, WV v EEAS, C‑162/20 P, EU:C:2022:153, paragraphs 67 and 68 and the case-law cited).
69 However, before the General Court, Euranimi did not establish any link between the arguments referred to in paragraph 67 above and its second plea for annulment.
70 It is true that there is nothing to prevent an applicant from developing further in its reply a plea raised in its application. However, it should be observed in the present case that paragraphs 37 to 54 of Euranimi’s reply are included in the first part of that document, which essentially seeks to rebut, ‘on a preliminary basis’, various factual assertions made by the Commission in the introductory part of its defence. Accordingly, that first part of Euranimi’s reply clearly does not concern the second plea in its action for annulment. Only one paragraph in that preliminary part refers, without further clarification, to paragraphs 43 and 45 of that reply.
71 As regards the arguments purportedly set out in the annexes to the application at first instance, it should be observed that, according to the case-law, while the body of the application at first instance may certainly be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to extracts from documents annexed thereto, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot make up for the absence of the essential arguments in law which, in accordance with the provisions referred to in paragraph 68 above, must appear in the application (judgment of 3 March 2022, WV v EEAS, C‑162/20 P, EU:C:2022:153, paragraph 68 and the case-law cited).
72 In those circumstances, the General Court cannot be criticised for not having made specific findings with respect to the arguments referred to in paragraph 67 above in its assessment of the second plea in law raised before it.
73 As to the remainder, the arguments made by Euranimi on the actual functioning of the market amount to challenging the findings of fact made by the General Court. However, Euranimi has failed to establish and explain with the requisite precision the facts or evidence that the General Court distorted. Those arguments are thereby inadmissible in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraphs 35 and 36 above.
74 In the second place, as regards the claim of distortion of the facts in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, it should be observed that in that paragraph the General Court, referring to paragraph 107 of that judgment, ‘noted that, since the tariff-rate quotas were not exhausted … the safeguard measure cannot be the cause of the alleged incapacity of the EU industry to meet demand in the EU market’.
75 Accordingly, contrary to what Euranimi appears to argue by that claim, the General Court did not refer in paragraph 116 of that judgment to a line of argument made before it by Euranimi, but repeated a factual finding already made in paragraph 107 thereof. While Euranimi has clearly expressed its disagreement with that finding, it has, however, failed to establish any distortion in that regard.
76 In the third place, as regards the arguments relating to the extension of the safeguard measures being inconsistent with the exceptional market condition that arose during the investigation period due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it suffices to state that Euranimi does not identify in its appeal the arguments put forward in its reply at first instance that the General Court failed to take into account. In those circumstances, the Court of Justice is not in a position to rule effectively on the General Court’s alleged failure to give a ruling.
77 For the foregoing reasons, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
78 Since none of the grounds of appeal put forward in support of the present appeal has been successful, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
79 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
80 Since the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against Euranimi and the latter has been unsuccessful, Euranimi must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission. 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders European Association of Non-Integrated Metal Importers & Distributors (Euranimi) to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.