1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of, first, Articles 3, 5 and 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29), and point 1(e) of the Annex thereto and, secondly, of Article 12(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (OJ 2019 L 158, p. 125).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between innogy Energie s.r.o., an energy supply company, and QS, a consumer, regarding that company’s claim seeking payment of a penalty on the basis of a term of a contract for the supply of electricity concluded with that consumer.
3 Article 3 of Directive 93/13 provides: ‘1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. 2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract. The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract. Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him. 3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair.’
4 Article 4(1) of that directive provides: ‘Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.’
5 Under Article 5 of that directive: ‘In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail. …’
6 Article 7(1) of that directive provides: ‘Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.’
7 The Annex to Directive 93/13 is entitled ‘Terms referred to in Article 3(3)’. Point 1(e) of that annex is worded as follows: ‘Terms which have the object or effect of: … (e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation’.
8 Article 12 of Directive 2019/944, entitled ‘Right to switch and rules on switching-related fees’, provides: ‘1. Switching supplier or market participant engaged in aggregation shall be carried out within the shortest possible time. Member States shall ensure that a customer wishing to switch suppliers or market participants engaged in aggregation, while respecting contractual conditions, is entitled to such a switch within a maximum of three weeks from the date of the request. By no later than 2026, the technical process of switching supplier shall take no longer than 24 hours and shall be possible on any working day. 2. Member States shall ensure that at least household customers and small enterprises are not charged any switching-related fees. 3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, Member States may permit suppliers or market participants engaged in aggregation to charge customers contract termination fees where those customers voluntarily terminate fixed-term, fixed-price electricity supply contracts before their maturity, provided that such fees are part of a contract that the customer has voluntarily entered into and that such fees are clearly communicated to the customer before the contract is entered into. Such fees shall be proportionate and shall not exceed the direct economic loss to the supplier or the market participant engaged in aggregation resulting from the customer’s termination of the contract, including the costs of any bundled investments or services that have already been provided to the customer as part of the contract. The burden of proving the direct economic loss shall be on the supplier or market participant engaged in aggregation, and the permissibility of contract termination fees shall be monitored by the regulatory authority, or by another competent national authority.’
9 Article 71 of Directive 2019/944, entitled ‘Transposition’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with … Articles 11 to 24, … by 31 December 2020 …’
10 Paragraph 1811(1) of zákon č. 89/2012 Sb., občanský zákoník, v platném znění (Law 89/2012, the Civil Code, as amended), provides: ‘All communication with the consumer by a seller or supplier shall be in plain intelligible language and in the language of the contract.’
11 Paragraph 2048(1) of that law provides: ‘Where the parties have agreed, in the event of a breach of an agreed contractual obligation, on a contractual penalty in a certain amount or on a method whereby a contractual penalty amount will be determined, the creditor may demand the contractual penalty regardless of whether the breach of the obligation confirmed [by the contractual penalty] caused it damage. A contractual penalty may be agreed upon in consideration other than financial.’
12 Paragraph 28 of zákon č. 458/2000 Sb., energetický zákon (Law No 458/2000 on Energy), provides, in subparagraphs 1(e) and 2(l): ‘1. The customer shall have the right … (e) to choose and switch electricity supplier free of charge; … 2. A customer shall be obliged … (l) in exercising his right to choose a supplier pursuant to subparagraph 1(e), to adhere to the agreed duration of the termination period in the event of a contract for an indefinite period.’
13 On 24 January 2020, QS and innogy Energie concluded a fixed-term contract for the supply of electricity for household purposes, providing for a guaranteed electricity price for the duration of the contract, which was lower than that applied in contracts for the supply of electricity for an indefinite period.
14 That pre-formulated standard contract, corresponding to a pre-established electronic form of two pages, provided for the payment of monthly advances of 1 200 Czech koruny (CZK) (approximately EUR 48) for an envisaged consumption of 1.8 MWh/year. On the first page of the contract, in the section entitled ‘Contract “Conclusion and Term”’, it is stated that the contract has been concluded for a fixed term of 30 months, corresponding to the ‘basic [p]eriod’, and, during that period, it could not be prematurely terminated.
15 In addition, that contract provided, in the section entitled ‘Other terms’ on the first page, that the customer was to provide to innogy Energie without undue delay the cooperation required for the implementation of the contract, in particular not to take any legal or other act preventing the fulfilment of such an obligation, except for those acts that he or she is entitled to take by law. In the event of a failure to comply with that obligation, that contract provided for a term under which the customer was required to pay innogy Energie a penalty of CZK 3 000 (approximately EUR 120). Likewise, in the event, inter alia, of a repeated breach of the obligation to pay the electricity price, a contractual penalty including possible compensation in respect of the damage incurred by innogy Energie in respect of a failure by the customer to purchase the electricity contracted could be billed to that customer. That penalty corresponded to an amount of CZK 400 (approximately EUR 16) in respect of each calendar month following the date of termination of the contract or the interruption of the supply of electricity until the end of the contract term.
16 The contract concluded between QS and innogy Energie was filled in by that company’s employees by electronic means. QS had the opportunity to visualise that contract on a computer screen before signing it using a digital tablet device. The final, signed contract was sent to the customer by email, who could request a paper version at any stage of the negotiations.
17 By letter of 21 July 2020, innogy Energie requested QS to pay the advances of CZK 1 200 (approximately EUR 48) in respect of the month of June 2020 and the month of July 2020. On account of QS’s failure to comply with his obligation to duly pay the electricity price, that company, on 11 September 2020, terminated, in accordance with the applicable national law, the supply of electricity to QS, and then, by letter of 13 September 2020, claimed from QS by way of a contractual penalty payment of CZK 8 800 (approximately EUR 360) by 23 September 2020, that is CZK 400 (approximately EUR 16) in respect of each of the 22 remaining months until the term of the contract as initially agreed. QS made partial payment of CZK 2 190.34 (approximately EUR 90). By letter of 23 September 2020, innogy Energie terminated the contract concluded with the QS on the ground that, despite repeatedly being given notice, he had not paid the sums due under that contract. That company also drew up a final account balance showing an overpayment, in respect of the period from 4 February 2020 to 11 September 2020, of CZK 316.36 (approximately EUR 12).
18 In that context, innogy Energie brought an action before the Okresní soud v Teplicích (District Court, Teplice, Czech Republic), which is the referring court, seeking an order, on the basis of the term providing for that penalty, that QS was to pay CZK 6 609.66 (approximately EUR 270), namely the remainder payable in respect of that penalty.
19 The referring court points out, first, that, under the national legislation concerning unfair terms in force before 1 January 2014, the Ústavní soud (Constitutional Court, Czech Republic) found that, for a term establishing a contractual penalty not to be regarded as unfair, it must form part of the very text of the contract concluded with a consumer, be sufficiently legible, clear and logically structured so that an average consumer may understand it, in a sufficient font size and it must not be inserted in a section of that contract which could give the impression to that consumer that it is an ancillary term.
20 The referring court observes, next, that innogy Energie inserted the terms concerning penalties into the contract in a manner which led that court to raise the issue of whether the transparency requirements provided for in Article 5 of Directive 93/13 are met. It refers, in particular, to the location of the term at issue in the main proceedings on the first page of the contract, in the section entitled ‘Other terms’, that is to say, in the part of the contract which does not contain any term which has been individually negotiated, unlike those in the second page of that contract. The referring court has doubts as to whether that term complies with the rules of EU law on the protection of consumers, inasmuch as it is on a page of the pre-formulated standard contract which does not need to be filled in, which renders it less visible to the customer.
21 That court observes that, where the contract is terminated on account of the customer’s failure to comply with his or her financial obligations, innogy Energie applies a contractual penalty of CZK 400 (approximately EUR 16) per month in respect of all the months during which the purchase of electricity by the customer provided for by the fixed-term contract did not take place, without there being any obligation for that company to demonstrate the amount of the actual direct economic loss it has incurred. By contrast, where the contract is terminated by the consumer on account of that party switching supplier during the agreed term of the contract, the supplier would have the right to compensation, provided for by the contractual penalty, amounting to the economic loss incurred, which the supplier must demonstrate.
22 Lastly, it points out that, in the case in the main proceedings, there is no underpayment on the price to be paid for the supply of energy, but, on the contrary, there is an overpayment to innogy Energie, even though QS had failed to pay at least two monthly advances of CZK 1 200 (approximately EUR 48).
23 In those circumstances, the Okresní soud v Teplicích (District Court, Teplice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
24 By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3 of Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with the Annex thereto, point 1(e) ‘and/or’ with Article 12(3) of Directive 2019/944, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of premature termination by a supplier of a contract for the supply of electricity at a fixed price and for a fixed term, on account of the consumer’s failure to fulfil his or her obligations, and the application of a contractual penalty covering the direct economic loss incurred by that supplier as a result of that termination, the latter is required to prove that it has actually incurred that loss.
25 Innogy Energie raises doubts as to the admissibility of the referring court’s second question in so far as that question refers to Article 12(3) of Directive 2019/944, since that provision had not yet been fully transposed into Czech law at the time of the conclusion and termination of the contract at issue in the main proceedings and that, accordingly, it is of no relevance in the present case.
26 It should be borne in mind that a new rule of law applies from the entry into force of the act introducing it, and, while it does not apply to legal situations that have arisen and become definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects, and to new legal situations. It is otherwise - subject to the principle of the non-retroactivity of legal acts - only if the new rule is accompanied by special provisions which specifically lay down its conditions of temporal application (judgment of 13 July 2023, Banco Santander (Reference to an official index), C‑265/22, EU:C:2023:578, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
27 Therefore, as regards directives more specifically, it is, as a general rule, only legal situations existing after the expiry of the period prescribed for transposition of a directive which fall, ratione temporis, within the scope of that directive (judgment of 13 July 2023, Banco Santander (Reference to an official index), C‑265/22, EU:C:2023:578, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
28 In accordance with Article 71 of Directive 2019/944, the Member States had to adopt and publish, at the latest by 31 December 2020, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with, inter alia, Article 12 of that directive. It is apparent from the file before the Court that the Czech legislation transposing that Directive, namely the amended version of Law No 458/2000 on Energy, entered into force on 1 January 2022. It is also apparent from that file, that the electricity supply contract at issue in the main proceedings was concluded on 24 January 2020 and terminated by innogy Energie on 23 September 2020, ten days after it demanded payment of the contractual penalty, that is, before the expiry of the deadline for transposition of Article 12 of Directive 2019/944.
29 It follows that Directive 2019/944 was applicable neither at the date the contract at issue in the main proceedings was concluded, nor at the date that contract was terminated.
30 Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the interpretation of Article 12(3) of Directive 2019/944 has no bearing on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings, so that the second question referred is inadmissible in so far as it concerns that provision.
31 By the two questions it has referred, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether, first, Article 3(1) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with the Annex thereto, point 1(e), and Article 7 of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a term of a contract for the supply of electricity for a fixed term and at a fixed price allowing a supplier which has terminated that contract before its maturity, on the ground of a failure to pay by the consumer, to impose automatically on that consumer a flat-rate penalty, irrespective of the direct economic loss actually incurred by that supplier, may be regarded as unfair and, secondly, whether that term, in terms of its structure and its location in that contract and the circumstances attending the conclusion, by electronic means, of that contract, meets the transparency requirements set out in Article 5 of Directive 93/13.
32 In the first place, it should be observed that, in accordance with Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13, a contractual term which has not been individually negotiated is to be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
33 As stated in Article 3(3) of Directive 93/13, the Annex to that directive contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair. The terms listed in that annex include, inter alia, as is apparent from point 1(e) thereof, those which have the object or effect of ‘requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation’.
34 If the content of that annex does not suffice in itself to establish automatically the unfair nature of a contested term, it is nevertheless an essential element on which the competent court may base its assessment as to the unfair nature of that term (judgment of 26 April 2012, Invitel, C‑472/10, EU:C:2012:242, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
35 It follows that it is for the national court to assess whether a contractual term is unfair for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13. In that context, it is for that court to assess, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, first, the possible failure to observe the requirement of good faith and, secondly, the possible existence of a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2019, Kiss and CIB Bank, C‑621/17, EU:C:2019:820, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
36 The referring court must therefore examine whether the term at issue in the main proceedings, first, complies with the requirement of good faith and, secondly, whether there is a significant imbalance to the consumer’s detriment and, specifically, whether the flat-rate compensation provided for in that term is disproportionately high within the meaning of point 1(e) of the Annex to Directive 93/13.
37 With regard to the question of the circumstances in which such an imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’, it should be recalled that, having regard to the 16th recital of Directive 93/13, the national court must assess for those purposes whether the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations (judgment of 26 January 2017, Banco Primus, C‑421/14, EU:C:2017:60, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
38 In that examination, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that it is necessary, inter alia, to take account of the applicable rules of national law in the absence of an agreement of the parties to that effect, the national court being thus led to evaluate, in a comparative analysis, whether and, as the case may be, to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in force (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2017, Banco Primus, C‑421/14, EU:C:2017:60, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
39 The referring court will also have to determine whether the contractual penalty at issue is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objectives pursued by it and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 74).
40 It must be borne in mind that Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13 stipulates that the unfairness of a contractual term is to be assessed by taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of that contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.
41 The Court has held that it should be possible to declare unfair those contractual terms which seem to lay down penalties which are automatic and disproportionate in relation to the potential breach of obligations by the consumer, on the basis of Article 3(3) of Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with point 1(e) of the Annex to that directive (see, to that effect, order 24 October 2019, Topaz, C‑211/17, EU:C:2019:906, paragraph 59).
42 It is apparent from the order for reference that the contractual penalty of CZK 400 (approximately EUR 16) was applied to QS due to his failure to pay two monthly advances of CZK 1 200 (approximately EUR 48), and applied in respect of each month following the termination of the supply of electricity and for the remaining duration of the contract, initially fixed at 30 months. That penalty may therefore constitute an automatic and ‘disproportionately high’ penalty within the meaning of point 1(e) of the Annex to Directive 93/13 and the Court’s case-law referred to in paragraph 41 of the present judgment, which is a matter for the referring court to determine.
43 That court must also verify, in that examination, whether the amount of that penalty is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objectives pursued by it and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 39 of the present judgment. In particular, it should be observed, first, that the penalty at issue in the main proceeding stems from a term inserted into a fixed-term contract for the supply of electricity for household purposes, providing for a guaranteed electricity price for the duration of the contract, that price being lower than that applied in contracts for the supply of electricity for an indefinite period. The objective of that term seems to be to make good any damage caused to the supplier resulting from the customer’s failure to purchase of the energy agreed upon in his or her respect, purchased in advance by the supplier for that customer on volatile wholesale markets, in the context of fixed-term contracts, for the agreed duration of the contract. Secondly, the referring court should take account of the fact that the final balance established by the supplier shows an overpayment, despite the fact that QS did not pay two monthly advances.
44 In the second place, so far as concerns the transparency requirement in Article 5 of Directive 93/13 and providing that contractual terms in writing must ‘always’ be drafted in plain, intelligible language, that requirement constitutes one of the aspects to be taken into account in the assessment of whether that term is unfair. Nevertheless, it follows from Article 4(2) of that directive that the fact that a term is not drafted in plain intelligible language is not, in itself, capable of rendering it unfair (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2023, Banco Santander (Reference to an official index), C‑265/22, EU:C:2023:578, paragraph 66).
45 That requirement cannot be reduced merely to those terms being formally and grammatically intelligible. Since the system of protection introduced by that directive is based on the idea that consumers are in a position of weakness vis-à-vis sellers or suppliers, in particular as regards their level of knowledge, that requirement, laid down by that directive, that the contractual terms are to be drafted in plain, intelligible language and, accordingly, that they be transparent, must be understood in a broad sense (judgment of 16 March 2023, Caixabank (Loan arrangement fees), C‑565/21, EU:C:2023:212, paragraph 30).
46 Therefore, the requirement that a contractual term must be drafted in plain intelligible language is to be understood as requiring also that the contract should set out transparently the specific functioning of the mechanism to which the relevant term relates and the relationship between that mechanism and that provided for by other contractual terms, so that that consumer is in a position to evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic consequences for him or her which derive from it (judgment of 20 September 2017, Andriciuc and Others, C‑186/16, EU:C:2017:703, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
47 That question must be examined by the referring court in the light of all the relevant facts, including the promotional material and information communicated by the supplier in the negotiation of the contract at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2017, Andriciuc and Others, C‑186/16, EU:C:2017:703, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
48 Specifically, information, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and the consequences of concluding it, is of fundamental importance for a consumer, since it is on the basis of that information in particular that the consumer will decide whether he or she wishes to be bound contractually to a seller or supplier by adhering to the terms previously drawn up by the latter (judgment of 20 September 2017, Andriciuc and Others, C‑186/16, EU:C:2017:703, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
49 In order to determine whether a contractual term is drafted in plain, intelligible language, account must also be taken of the level of attention which can be expected, with regard to that term, of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (judgment of 16 March 2023, Caixabank (Loan arrangement fees), C‑565/21, EU:C:2023:212, paragraph 44).
50 It must also be observed that the location and structure of a contractual term such as that at issue in the main proceedings make it possible to establish whether it constitutes an important element of the contract, inasmuch as those elements provide the consumer with the opportunity to assess the economic consequences of that term for him or her (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2023, Caixabank (Loan arrangement fees), C‑565/21, EU:C:2023:212, paragraph 46).
51 It is a matter for the referring court to assess, in the light of the considerations referred to in paragraphs 44 to 50 of the present judgment, whether the term providing for the contractual penalty meets the transparency requirements set out in Article 5 of Directive 93/13.
52 In the present case, as regards, first, the circumstances attending the conclusion of the electricity supply contract, it is apparent from the file before the Court that that contract took the shape of a pre-established form presented electronically, QS having had the option to request a printout of it at any stage of the negotiations. It must be observed, as is apparent from the order for reference, that that contract was filled in not by the consumer, but by the employees of the contracting company, who checked it was duly completed throughout the negotiation phase. It is also apparent from that order that QS seems merely to have consulted the contract at issue using a computer screen before signing it using a digital tablet device. In those circumstances, subject to the assessments which must be made by the referring court, it does not appear certain that the consumer had the opportunity to acquaint himself sufficiently with the substance and functioning of the term at issue in the main proceedings for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 48 of the present judgment.
53 Secondly, it must be noted that the file before the Court does not contain any details as regards the information provided by innogy Energie before the contract was concluded concerning the contractual conditions and the consequences of concluding that contract.
54 As regards, third, the specific location and structure of the term at issue in the main proceedings, which was not individually negotiated, it is apparent from the order for reference that it is on the first page of a pre-formulated, standard contract which takes the shape of a pre-established, two-page form. Since the contract was concluded electronically, using a computer, and it was employees of innogy Energie who navigated within the text of that contract, it seems that QS had only limited opportunity to access the whole document. Thus, it appears that that term, even though it was placed on the first page, might have remained unnoticed or not attracted QS’s attention in the same way as the information under which his signature was placed. The second page of that contract, which was the only page to have been filled in by those employees and to have been signed by QS, merely refers to all the individually negotiated terms. It must also be observed that the term at issue in the main proceedings was inserted in the section of that contract entitled ‘Other terms’, which might imply that it was a provision of lesser importance.
55 In those circumstances, it is for the referring court to examine whether the contract at issue in the main proceedings is sufficiently legible, clear and logically presented in order that an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect may become acquainted with the contractual terms and, in particular, whether the insertion in a specific section of that contract of the term providing for the penalty is such as to give the consumer the false impression that it is an ancillary term.
56 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to be given to the referring court is that Article 3(1) and Article 5 of Directive 93/13, read in conjunction with the Annex thereto, point 1(e), and Article 7 of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a term of a contract for the supply of electricity for a fixed term and at a fixed price allowing a supplier which has terminated that contract before its maturity on the ground of a failure to pay by the consumer to impose automatically on that consumer a flat-rate penalty, irrespective of the direct economic loss actually incurred by that supplier, may be regarded as unfair. That term meets the transparency requirements set out in Article 5 of Directive 93/13 if the structure and location of that term in the contract and the circumstances attending the conclusion, by electronic means, of that contract, including the information which the seller or supplier has provided to the consumer, are such as to allow an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect to become acquainted with the substance and functioning of the term imposing on him or her payment of a flat-rate penalty and to evaluate the economic consequences which flow for him or her from that term.
57 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.