1 By his appeal, SE seeks the annulment of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 March 2023, SE v Commission (T‑763/21, EU:T:2023:113; ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which that court rejected his action seeking, first, to annul the decision of the European Commission of 23 April 2021 (‘the decision at issue’), by which the European Commission rejected the appellant’s application for the Junior Professional Pilot programme (‘the JPP’) and, secondly, compensation in respect of the harm he allegedly suffered as a result of that decision.
2 Article 1d of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) reads as follows: ‘ 1. In the application of these Staff Regulations, any discrimination based on any ground such as … age … shall be prohibited. … 6. While respecting the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of proportionality, any limitation of their application must be justified on objective and reasonable grounds and must be aimed at legitimate objectives in the general interest in the framework of staff policy. …’
3 Article 1 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) provides as follows: ‘These Conditions of Employment shall apply to servants engaged under contract by the [European] Union. Such servants shall be:
4 Article 2 of the CEOS provides: ‘For the purposes of these Conditions of Employment, “temporary staff” means:
5 Article 9 of the CEOS is worded as follows: ‘Temporary staff shall not be engaged for any purpose other than that of filling, in accordance with this Title, vacant posts included in the list of posts appended to the section of the budget relating to each institution.’
6 Under Article 10(1) of the CEOS: ‘Articles 1d, 1e, 5(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 7 of the Staff Regulations shall apply by analogy.’
7 The background to the dispute, as set out in paragraphs 2 to 7 of the judgment under appeal, may, for the purposes of the present proceedings, be summarised as follows.
8 On 16 May 2018, the appellant took up his duties at the Commission as a member of the temporary staff in grade AST 3 under Article 2(b) of the CEOS for a period of three years. On 18 January 2021, the appellant’s fixed-term contract was extended for a period of two years, until 15 May 2023.
9 In March 2021, the Commission issued a call for expressions of interest (‘the CEI’) with the aim of recruiting junior administrators, otherwise known as ‘young professionals’, within the framework of the JPP.
10 On 23 March 2021, the appellant submitted his application to the relevant Commission services.
11 On 23 April 2021, the Commission adopted the decision at issue in which it rejected the appellant’s application for the JPP on the ground that he was ineligible for that programme.
12 On 27 April 2021, the appellant lodged a complaint against the decision at issue.
13 By decision adopted on 27 August 2021, the Commission rejected that complaint.
14 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 7 December 2021, the appellant brought an action for, first, annulment of the decision at issue and, in so far as necessary, of the decision of 27 August 2021 rejecting his complaint and, secondly, compensation in respect of the material harm he allegedly suffered as a result of the decision at issue.
15 In support of his claims for annulment, the appellant raised three pleas in law, alleging, first, discrimination based on age contrary to Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 1d of the Staff Regulations and Article 10(1) of the CEOS, second, misuse of powers and lack of competence and, third, that the CEI was unlawful.
16 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.
17 As regards the first and the third pleas in law, by which the appellant, in essence, pleaded that the CEI was unlawful on the basis of Article 277 TFEU, the General Court held, first, that the appellant’s line of argument was inadmissible inasmuch as it was directed against provisions of the CEI which did not constitute the legal basis for the decision at issue or have any direct legal connection with that decision. Secondly, the General Court drew attention to the fact that, under point II.2 of the CEI, on which the decision at issue was based, in order to be admitted to the JPP, candidates had to have a maximum of three years’ professional experience on the date of closure of the CEI (‘the criterion at issue’). The General Court held, regarding that criterion, that it did in fact give rise to a difference of treatment based, indirectly, on age. In practice and save in marginal situations, notwithstanding the appearance of neutrality, that criterion was tantamount to allowing only young professionals to join the JPP. However, the General Court held that that difference of treatment was justified by legitimate objectives in the general interest in the context of staff policy, in accordance with the requirements of Article 1d(6) of the Staff Regulations.
18 So far as concerns the second plea in law, the General Court observed that the CEI had been adopted by the ‘Human Resources and Security’ Directorate-General (DG) in accordance with the mandate given to it by Commission Decision PV(2018) 2257 final of 3 July 2018. Although that decision did not expressly refer to a particular limit on the number of years’ professional experience, it did refer to Commission information note PERS(2018) 38/2 of 4 June 2018, which provided, in point 6 thereof, that ‘for the [JPP], the Commission will select 40 candidates having a maximum of [three] years of professional experience by the closure of the [CEI] that will launch the procedure’. In paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that, by that reference, the college of Commissioners had approved the content of that information note, with the result that it had to be found that the establishment of the criterion at issue fell within the remit of the ‘Human Resources and Security’ DG. It consequently rejected the second plea in law.
19 Since the appellant’s claims seeking annulment of the decision at issue had thus been rejected by the General Court, that court also rejected the appellant’s claims for compensation.
20 By his appeal, the appellant claims that the Court should:
21 The Commission contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.
22 The appellant advances 11 grounds in support of his appeal.
23 By the first ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 33 to 36 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in finding that his claims alleging that the CEI was unlawful due to infringement of Articles 2 and 9 of the CEOS were inadmissible. The difference of treatment on grounds of age contained in the criterion at issue cannot be regarded as justified by a legitimate aim since its aim was to circumvent the rules of selection, recruitment and appointment provided by the Staff Regulations and the CEOS.
24 The Commission disputes those arguments.
25 According to settled case-law, Article 277 TFEU gives expression to a general principle conferring upon any party to proceedings the right to challenge, for the purpose of obtaining the annulment of an EU act on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the validity of previous acts of the institutions which form the legal basis of the decision which is being challenged, if that party was not entitled under Article 263 TFEU to bring a direct action challenging those acts by which it was thus affected without having been in a position to ask that they be declared void (judgment of 16 March 2023, Commission v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System and Council v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System and Commission, C‑439/20 P and C‑441/20 P, EU:C:2023:211, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
26 Thus, in an action for annulment brought against individual decisions, the Court has accepted that the provisions of an act of general application that constitute the basis of those decisions or that have a direct legal connection with such decisions may legitimately form the subject matter of an objection of illegality (judgment of 27 April 2023, HC v Commission, C‑102/22 P, EU:C:2023:351, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
27 However, in the present case, the appellant claimed before the General Court that the CEI was unlawful on the ground that successful candidates to the JPP would be engaged as members of the temporary staff on the basis of Article 2(a) or (b) of the CEOS, which would have been contrary to Articles 2 and 9 of the CEOS. In doing so, the appellant was challenging, as the General Court rightly observed in paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, the lawfulness of the conditions of employment of those successful candidates, and not the criterion at issue as applied in the decision at issue. It follows that, by his arguments in relation to infringement of Articles 2 and 9 of the CEOS, the appellant did not seek to call into question the provision of the CEI which constitutes the legal basis of the decision at issue, or provisions which have any direct legal connection with that decision.
28 Consequently, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant’s claims alleging that the CEI was unlawful on the basis that it infringed Articles 2 and 9 of the CEOS were inadmissible.
29 Having regard to the foregoing, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
30 By the second ground of appeal, which concerns paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in holding that the Commission’s ‘blue book’ trainees (‘the “blue book” trainees’) which, according to the CEI, were eligible to participate in the JPP, were members of Commission staff. In fact, the appellant argues, those trainees are not a staff category recognised by the Staff Regulations or the CEOS.
31 The Commission takes the view that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
32 In so far as the Commission contends that the second ground of appeal is inadmissible for the reason that, by that ground of appeal, the appellant merely repeats the arguments which he raised at first instance and thus requests a mere re-examination of those arguments, it must be observed that the appellant is challenging the interpretation and application of EU law by the General Court and, specifically, the ground, set out in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, that the ‘blue book’ trainees had the status of members of Commission staff.
33 Once an appellant challenges the interpretation or application of EU law by the General Court, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal. If an appellant could not thus base his or her appeal on pleas and arguments already relied on before the General Court, an appeal would be deprived of part of its purpose (judgment of 22 June 2023, DI v ECB, C‑513/21 P, EU:C:2023:500, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
34 It follows that the second ground of appeal is admissible.
35 As regards the merits of that ground of appeal, it must be recalled that, under point II.1 of the CEI, in order to be eligible to participate in the JPP, candidates had, on the date of the closure of that call, to work for the Commission as a ‘blue book’ trainee, contract agent, temporary agent or official.
36 While it is true that ‘blue book’ trainees do not fall within any of the categories of staff referred to by the Staff Regulations and the CEOS, the fact remains that, for the period of their traineeship, those trainees do actually work for the Commission. As the General Court observed in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, those trainees may thus be regarded, for the duration of their traineeship, as forming part of the Commission staff.
37 In the light of the foregoing, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
38 By the third ground of appeal, which concerns paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in classifying as indirect rather than direct the difference of treatment based on age resulting from the criterion at issue, since the Commission used an ‘age proxy’. As Advocate General Sharpston stated in point 111 of her Opinion in Bartsch (C‑427/06, EU:C:2008:297), the use of a criterion such as ‘older workers’ constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of age. The same is true as regards references to ‘young’ or ‘junior’ professionals.
39 Furthermore, the fact that conditions concerning professional experience give rise to direct discrimination on grounds of age can be inferred from Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16), which provides in Article 6(1)(b) thereof for derogations in respect of ‘the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in service’. It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that that provision concerns primarily cases of direct discrimination.
40 The Commission takes the view that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
41 In so far as the Commission alleges that the appellant merely repeats the arguments he submitted at first instance and thus requests a mere re-examination of those arguments, that objection of inadmissibility must be rejected for the same reasons as those set out in paragraphs 32 and 33 above.
42 As regards the merits of that ground of appeal, it is sufficient to recall that while, admittedly, the JPP sought to recruit ‘young professionals’, as is apparent from paragraphs 9 and 18 above, the criterion at issue did not refer to the age of the candidates but to the duration of their professional experience.
43 In addition, as regards the argument derived from Directive 2000/78, it must be noted that, under Article 1 and Article 2(1) and (2)(b) of that directive, indirect discrimination on the grounds of ‘religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation’ is prohibited (judgment of 7 February 2019, Escribano Vindel, C‑49/18, EU:C:2019:106, paragraph 41). It follows that Article 6(1)(b) of that directive, under which, notwithstanding Article 2(2) of that directive, Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age are not to constitute discrimination, provided that the conditions laid down in that provision are fulfilled, does not only concern direct differences of treatment but also indirect differences of treatment.
44 In the light of the foregoing, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
45 By the fourth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 70, 71 and 75 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court relied, incorrectly, on Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 to hold that the difference of treatment resulting from the criterion at issue was justified. First, that provision concerns only cases of direct discrimination. Secondly, it is not possible to claim that the JPP was a measure ‘in order to promote [the] vocational integration [of young people] or ensure their protection’ within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a) of Directive 2000/78.
46 The Commission contends that the appellant’s arguments are ineffective.
47 The present ground of appeal is based on the premiss that the General Court held that the difference of treatment to which the criterion at issue gave rise was justified by Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78. However, as the Commission observed in the response and as is apparent from paragraphs 59, 71, 73 and 76 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that that difference of treatment was justified not by that provision, but by Article 1d(6) of the Staff Regulations.
48 It follows that the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded, inasmuch as it is based on a manifestly incorrect reading of the judgment under appeal.
49 By the fifth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 62 to 89 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant alleges that the General Court reached the conclusion that the difference of treatment on grounds of age resulting from the criterion at issue was justified without applying, to that effect, a ‘high standard of proof’.
50 The Commission contends that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible.
51 It follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) and Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested paragraphs of the judgment under appeal and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal concerned may be inadmissible (judgment of 11 January 2024, Foz v Council, C‑524/22 P, EU:C:2024:23, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
52 Thus, elements of an appeal that contain no argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment in respect of which the appeal is brought do not fulfil that requirement and must be rejected as inadmissible (judgment of 22 June 2023, YG v Commission, C‑818/21 P, EU:C:2023:511, paragraph 105 and the case-law cited).
53 In the present case, although the appellant alleges that the General Court failed to apply an appropriate standard of proof in paragraphs 84 and 89 of the judgment under appeal, he does not state with precision the legal arguments which specifically support that criticism.
54 In the light of the foregoing, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
55 By the sixth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 62 to 72 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that in holding that the objectives of the JPP identified by the General Court, in paragraphs 62 and 63 of that judgment, were legitimate objectives in the general interest in the framework of staff policy, that court erred in law. According to the appellant, those objectives are not legitimate since they are intrinsically discriminatory.
56 The Commission disputes the appellant’s arguments.
57 In paragraphs 62 and 63 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court observed that the main objectives pursued by the JPP included, first, that of ensuring a more balanced composition of Commission staff by enabling ‘junior’ staff to join that programme and, secondly, that of enabling JPP participants to develop skills related to work within the EU civil service and, specifically, within the Commission.
58 In that regard, it must be observed, first, that the appellant merely challenges the General Court’s finding that such objectives may be considered legitimate objectives in the general interest in the framework of staff policy, within the meaning of Article 1d(6) of the Staff Regulations, capable of justifying limitations of the principle of non-discrimination, without seeking to call in question the specific considerations in paragraphs 64 to 69 and 74 to 75 of the judgment under appeal on which the General Court relied to reach that finding.
59 Secondly, in so far as the appellant relies on the allegedly discriminatory nature of those objectives, it must be recalled that, as the General Court correctly observed in paragraph 51 of the judgment under appeal, Directive 2000/78 gives specific expression, in the field of employment and occupation, to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as a general principle of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). It thereby follows that, although the provisions of that directive do not apply, as such, to legal proceedings in the EU civil service field, the fact remains that the principles underlying that directive and the case-law relating to it are relevant, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to determining the obligations of the EU institutions and agencies having regard to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age.
60 Article 6(1)(a) of Directive 2000/78 refers, among the legitimate objectives which may justify national measures introducing differences of treatment on grounds of age, to the objective of ‘the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions, for young people … in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection’.
61 It follows that such objectives are capable of justifying limitations on the principle of non-discrimination, despite the fact that they are directed at a certain group of persons to the exclusion of others.
62 In the light of the foregoing, the sixth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
63 By the seventh ground of appeal, which concerns paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the objectives pursued by the Commission in introducing the criterion at issue into the CEI were in the nature of objectives in the general interest. According to the appellant, those objectives, which aimed to increase the competitiveness of that institution, are reasons which are purely specific to that institution as an individual employer and do not have an impact on the staff of other EU institutions.
64 The Commission contends that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
65 According to settled case-law, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. That requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, confines itself to reproducing the pleas in law and arguments previously submitted to the General Court. Such an appeal amounts in reality to no more than a request for re-examination of the application submitted to the General Court, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (judgment of 9 February 2023, Boshab v Council, C‑708/21 P, EU:C:2023:84, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
66 As the Commission observed in the response, the appellant in his appeal merely repeats, in support of that seventh ground of appeal, the arguments which he submitted before the General Court, without seeking to call in question, specifically, the reasoning on the basis of which that court rejected those arguments in the judgment under appeal.
67 In the light of the foregoing, the seventh ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
68 By the eighth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 80 and 81 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in holding that the CEI did not favour ‘blue book’ trainees.
69 It is apparent from statistical data that ‘blue book’ trainees represented 91% of eligible candidates and 79% of successfully selected candidates for the first five intakes of the JPP. In addition, according to the figures provided by the Commission in respect of the sixth intake of that programme, ‘blue book’ trainees represented 70.1% of candidates and 60% of successfully selected candidates. The General Court thus erred in holding that the composition of that programme was ‘balanced’.
70 The Commission contends that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
71 According to the Court’s case-law, under Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts and to evaluate the evidence. The assessment of those facts and evidence does not therefore constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (judgment of 29 February 2024, Euranimi v Commission, C‑95/23 P, EU:C:2024:177, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).
72 In paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, to reject the appellant’s argument that the criterion at issue had been illegitimately drafted in order to favour ‘blue book’ trainees, observed that the possibility of applying for the JPP was not limited to those trainees and that the requirement to satisfy the criterion at issue did not have as a consequence that access to that programme was open only to those trainees.
73 It added that that finding was confirmed by the fact that, first, ‘blue book’ trainees who applied for the JPP had no advantage as compared with the other candidates during the selection procedure and, secondly, it was apparent from the information provided by the Commission that, in the sixth intake of the JPP, the composition was balanced between successful candidates who were ‘blue book’ trainees and other applicants.
74 In his appeal, the appellant does not challenge the General Court’s reasoning summarised in paragraph 72 above, but merely submits that the General Court erred in the assessment of the facts in relation to the participation of ‘blue book’ trainees in the JPP, without raising or demonstrating a distortion of those facts by that court.
75 Consequently, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 71 above, the eighth ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
76 By the ninth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 84 to 89 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits, in essence, that the General Court erred in law in concluding that the difference of treatment to which the criterion at issue gave rise does not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the Commission, given that the average age of successful candidates in competitions organised by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) is lower than the average age of entry into service of officials and temporary staff.
77 The Commission takes the view that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
78 Since the appellant, by his ninth ground of appeal, in essence confines himself to repeating the arguments he previously submitted before the General Court, without seeking to call in question, specifically, the reasoning on the basis of which that court rejected those arguments in the judgment under appeal, that ground must, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 65 above, be rejected as inadmissible.
79 By the tenth ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 91 to 96 of the judgment under appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in holding that DG ‘Human Resources and Security’ had a mandate authorising it to introduce the criterion at issue into the CEI since, in Decision PV(2018) 2257 final of 3 July 2018, on the basis of which that DG had prepared the call in question, the Commission had referred to its information note PERS(2018) 38/2 of 4 June 2018, which mentioned that criterion, and had therefore approved the content of that information note. According to the appellant, that information note cannot be considered a substitute for a mandate.
80 The Commission takes the view that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, ineffective.
81 Since the appellant, by his tenth ground of appeal, in essence confines himself to repeating the arguments he submitted previously before the General Court, without seeking to call in question, specifically, the reasoning on the basis of which that court rejected those arguments in the judgment under appeal, that ground must, in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 65 above, be rejected as inadmissible.
82 By the eleventh ground of appeal, the appellant claims that, even if the college of Commissioners had approved the content of the Commission’s information note PERS(2018) 38/2 of 4 June 2018, the General Court failed to address his argument that DG ‘Human Resources and Security’ exceeded its mandate by not including, in the criterion at issue, the requirement that the maximum of three years of professional experience had to have been acquired in the five years preceding the application to the JPP, as provided for in that information note.
83 The Commission maintains that the appellant’s arguments are inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
84 Contrary to what the Commission submitted in the rejoinder, the appellant’s arguments must be considered admissible. First, the appellant alleges that the General Court failed to take into account an argument submitted to it, which constitutes a complaint that may legitimately be raised in an appeal. Secondly, that argument concerns an additional condition which, according to the appellant, should have been added to the criterion at issue which was the legal basis of the decision at issue, and which has a connection with that decision.
85 As regards the merits of the appellant’s arguments, it is apparent from the Commission's information note PERS(2018) 38/2 of 4 June 2018 that, to be eligible to participate in the JPP, candidates had, at the date of closure of the CEI, to have a maximum of three years of professional experience. It was also stated in that note that that professional experience should have been accumulated within the five years preceding the application to that programme.
86 In that regard, it must be recalled that while the obligation on the General Court to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union requires it to disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning that it has followed, in a way that allows the interested parties to understand the justification for the decision taken and permits the Court of Justice to exercise its powers of review, it does not require the General Court to provide an account that follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments articulated by the parties to the case. The reasoning may therefore be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to understand the grounds of the General Court’s judgment and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient information to exercise its powers of review when examining an appeal (judgment of 21 December 2023, United Parcel Service v Commission, C‑297/22 P, EU:C:2023:1027, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
87 The line of argument put forward by the appellant in support of the eleventh ground of appeal consists in claiming, in essence and as he submitted under the tenth ground of appeal, that, by providing for the criterion at issue in the CEI, DG ‘Human Resources and Security’ exceeded the limits of its mandate.
88 First, the General Court explained, in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the judgment under appeal, clearly and unequivocally, the reasons which led it to conclude that such was not the case.
89 Secondly, as the Commission pointed out in the rejoinder and at the hearing before the Court of Justice, without the appellant being capable of calling that finding into question, the appellant would not have been eligible for the JPP even had the CEI provided that the maximum of three years’ professional experience also had to have been accumulated in the five years preceding the application to that programme, given that, on the sole basis of his activity in the service of the Commission as a ‘blue book’ trainee and a member of the temporary staff, the appellant’s professional experience already exceeded the maximum of three years provided for by the CEI.
90 Given that the appellant’s line of argument alleging an additional condition that the criterion at issue should have provided for was therefore not capable to calling into question the finding reached by the General Court in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the judgment under appeal, that court accordingly cannot be criticised for failing to reply expressly in the judgment under appeal to that line of argument.
91 Having regard to the foregoing, the eleventh ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
92 Since none of the grounds of appeal are capable of succeeding, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
93 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs. Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
94 Since the Commission has applied for costs and the appellant has been unsuccessful, the appellant must, in addition to bearing his own costs, be ordered to pay those incurred by the Commission. 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders SE to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.