1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 20(1) of Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15) and Article 8(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013 (OJ 2013 L 158, p. 1) (‘Regulation No 1393/2007’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between the company Manuel Costa Filhos Lda. (‘Manuel Costa’), whose registered office is in Vizela (Portugal), and the company OÜ Wine Port of Paldiski (‘Wine Port’), whose registered office is in Tallinn (Estonia), concerning the enforcement in Portugal of a judgment handed down and certified as a European Enforcement Order in Estonia.
3 Recitals 8, 10 to 12, 14, 18 and 21 of Regulation No 805/2004 are worded as follows: ‘(8) In its Tampere conclusions, the European Council considered that access to enforcement in a Member State other than that in which the judgment has been given should be accelerated and simplified by dispensing with any intermediate measures to be taken prior to enforcement in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. A judgment that has been certified as a European Enforcement Order by the court of origin should, for enforcement purposes, be treated as if it had been delivered in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. … … (10) Where a court in a Member State has given judgment on an uncontested claim in the absence of participation of the debtor in the proceedings, the abolition of any checks in the Member State of enforcement is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the existence of a sufficient guarantee of observance of the rights of the defence. (11) This Regulation seeks to promote the fundamental rights and takes into account the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [(“the Charter”)]. In particular, it seeks to ensure full respect for the right to a fair trial as recognised in Article 47 of the Charter. (12) Minimum standards should be established for the proceedings leading to the judgment in order to ensure that the debtor is informed about the court action against him, the requirements for his active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim and the consequences of his non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. … (14) All the methods of service listed in Articles 13 and 14 are characterised by either full certainty (Article 13) or a very high degree of likelihood (Article 14) that the document served has reached its addressee. In the second category, a judgment should only be certified as a European Enforcement Order if the Member State of origin has an appropriate mechanism in place enabling the debtor to apply for a full review of the judgment under the conditions set out in Article 19 in those exceptional cases where, in spite of compliance with Article 14, the document has not reached the addressee. … (18) Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States justifies the assessment by the court of one Member State that all conditions for certification as a European Enforcement Order are fulfilled to enable a judgment to be enforced in all other Member States without judicial review of the proper application of the minimum procedural standards in the Member State where the judgment is to be enforced. … (21) When a document has to be sent from one Member State to another for service there, this Regulation and in particular the rules on service set out herein should apply together with Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [(OJ 2000 L 160, p. 37)], and in particular Article 14 thereof in conjunction with Member States declarations made under Article 23 thereof.’
4 Under Article 1 of that regulation, entitled ‘Subject matter’: ‘The purpose of this Regulation is to create a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims to permit, by laying down minimum standards, the free circulation of judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments throughout all Member States without any intermediate proceedings needing to be brought in the Member State of enforcement prior to recognition and enforcement.’
5 Under Article 5 of that regulation, entitled ‘Abolition of exequatur’: ‘A judgment which has been certified as a European Enforcement Order in the Member State of origin shall be recognised and enforced in the other Member States without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition.’
6 Article 10 of that regulation, entitled ‘Rectification or withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate’, provides in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof: ‘1. The European Enforcement Order certificate shall, upon application to the court of origin, be (a) rectified where, due to a material error, there is a discrepancy between the judgment and the certificate; (b) withdrawn where it was clearly wrongly granted, having regard to the requirements laid down in this Regulation. 2. The law of the Member State of origin shall apply to the rectification or withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate.’
7 Article 13 of Regulation No 805/2004, entitled, ‘Service with proof of receipt by the debtor’, which is in Chapter III of that regulation, entitled ‘Minimum standards for uncontested claims procedures’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document may have been served on the debtor by one of the following methods: (a) personal service attested by an acknowledgement of receipt, including the date of receipt, which is signed by the debtor; (b) personal service attested by a document signed by the competent person who effected the service stating that the debtor has received the document or refused to receive it without any legal justification, and the date of the service; (c) postal service attested by an acknowledgement of receipt including the date of receipt, which is signed and returned by the debtor; (d) service by electronic means such as fax or e-mail, attested by an acknowledgement of receipt including the date of receipt, which is signed and returned by the debtor.’
8 Article 14 of the regulation, entitled ‘Service without proof of receipt by the debtor’, provides: ‘1. Service of the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document and any summons to a court hearing on the debtor may also have been effected by one of the following methods: (a) personal service at the debtor’s personal address on persons who are living in the same household as the debtor or are employed there; (b) in the case of a self-employed debtor or a legal person, personal service at the debtor’s business premises on persons who are employed by the debtor; (c) deposit of the document in the debtor’s mailbox; (d) deposit of the document at a post office or with competent public authorities and the placing in the debtor’s mailbox of written notification of that deposit, provided that the written notification clearly states the character of the document as a court document or the legal effect of the notification as effecting service and setting in motion the running of time for the purposes of time limits; (e) postal service without proof pursuant to paragraph 3 where the debtor has his address in the Member State of origin; (f) electronic means attested by an automatic confirmation of delivery, provided that the debtor has expressly accepted this method of service in advance. 2. For the purposes of this Regulation, service under paragraph 1 is not admissible if the debtor’s address is not known with certainty. 3. Service pursuant to paragraph 1, (a) to (d), shall be attested by: (a) a document signed by the competent person who effected the service, indicating: (i) the method of service used; and (ii) the date of service; and (iii) where the document has been served on a person other than the debtor, the name of that person and his relation to the debtor, or (b) an acknowledgement of receipt by the person served, for the purposes of paragraphs 1(a) and (b).’
9 Article 18 of that regulation, entitled ‘Cure of non-compliance with minimum standards’, which is in Chapter III, provides: ‘1. If the proceedings in the Member State of origin did not meet the procedural requirements as set out in Articles 13 to 17, such non-compliance shall be cured and a judgment may be certified as a European Enforcement Order if: (a) the judgment has been served on the debtor in compliance with the requirements pursuant to Article 13 or Article 14; and (b) it was possible for the debtor to challenge the judgment by means of a full review and the debtor has been duly informed in or together with the judgment about the procedural requirements for such a challenge, including the name and address of the institution with which it must be lodged and, where applicable, the time limit for so doing; and (c) the debtor has failed to challenge the judgment in compliance with the relevant procedural requirements. 2. If the proceedings in the Member State of origin did not comply with the procedural requirements as set out in Article 13 or Article 14, such non-compliance shall be cured if it is proved by the conduct of the debtor in the court proceedings that he has personally received the document to be served in sufficient time to arrange for his defence.’
10 Article 20 of that regulation, entitled ‘Enforcement procedure’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Without prejudice to the provisions of this Chapter, the enforcement procedures shall be governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement. A judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order shall be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement.’
11 Article 21 of Regulation No 805/2004, entitled ‘Refusal of enforcement’, provides: ‘1. Enforcement shall, upon application by the debtor, be refused by the competent court in the Member State of enforcement if the judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in any Member State or in a third country, provided that: (a) the earlier judgment involved the same cause of action and was between the same parties; and (b) the earlier judgment was given in the Member State of enforcement or fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State of enforcement; and (c) the irreconcilability was not and could not have been raised as an objection in the court proceedings in the Member State of origin. 2. Under no circumstances may the judgment or its certification as a European Enforcement Order be reviewed as to their substance in the Member State of enforcement.’
12 Under Article 23 of that regulation, entitled ‘Stay or limitation of enforcement’: ‘Where the debtor has - challenged a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order, including an application for review within the meaning of Article 19, or - applied for the rectification or withdrawal of a European Enforcement Order certificate in accordance with Article 10, the competent court or authority in the Member State of enforcement may, upon application by the debtor: (a) limit the enforcement proceedings to protective measures; or (b) make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine; or (c) under exceptional circumstances, stay the enforcement proceedings.’
13 Article 28 of that regulation, entitled ‘Relationship with Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000’, provides: ‘This Regulation shall not affect the application of Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000.’
14 Regulation No 1393/2007 was repealed by Regulation (EU) 2020/1784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) (OJ 2020 L 405, p. 40), applicable from 1 July 2022. However, in view of the date of the facts which gave rise to the dispute in the main proceedings, the request for a preliminary ruling must be examined in the light of Regulation No 1393/2007.
15 Article 8 of Regulation No 1393/2007, entitled ‘Refusal to accept a document’, provided in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The receiving agency shall inform the addressee, using the standard form set out in Annex II, that he may refuse to accept the document to be served at the time of service or by returning the document to the receiving agency within one week if it is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, either of the following languages: (a) a language which the addressee understands; or (b) the official language of the Member State addressed or, if there are several official languages in that Member State, the official language or one of the official languages of the place where service is to be effected.’
16 The standard form, entitled ‘Information to the addressee about the right to refuse to accept a document’, which was set out in Annex II to that regulation, contained, inter alia, the following statement for the attention of the addressee of the document: ‘You may refuse to accept the document if it is not written in or accompanied by a translation into either a language which you understand or the official language or one of the official languages of the place of service. If you wish to exercise this right, you must refuse to accept the document at the time of service directly with the person serving the document or return it to the address indicated below within one week stating that you refuse to accept it.’
17 Article 191(1) of the Código de Processo Civil (Code of Civil Procedure; ‘the CCP’) provides: ‘Without prejudice to Article 188, the service effected shall be invalid where the formal requirements prescribed by law have not been satisfied.’
18 In the context of an enforcement procedure, Article 696 of the CCP provides: ‘A (final) judgment may be subject to review only where: … (e) [t]he proceedings have been conducted under the default procedure, due to the absolute failure of the defendant to participate, and it is proven that: (i) [t]he defendant was not served with notice of the proceedings or the service effected was invalid; (ii) [t]he defendant was not aware that notice had been served due to circumstances which are not attributable to the defendant; (iii) [t]he defendant was not able to file a defence for reasons of force majeure; …’
19 Under Article 729 of the CCP: ‘Where the enforcement is based on a judgment, the opposition may only be based on one of the following grounds: … (d) [t]he defendant’s failure to participate in the declaratory proceedings, where any of the circumstances provided for in Article 696(e) [of the present code] arise. …’
20 Wine Port brought enforcement proceedings in Portugal against Manuel Costa, on the basis of a judgment handed down on 12 April 2022 by the Harju Maakohtu Tallinna kohtumaja (Court of First Instance, Harju, sitting at Tallinn, Estonia), certified as a European Enforcement Order under Regulation No 805/2004, by which Manuel Costa was ordered to pay Wine Port compensation of EUR 38 732.84, plus court costs and disbursements amounting to EUR 2 418.97 and default interest.
21 Manuel Costa opposed that enforcement on the ground that it had never been served for the purposes of the proceedings in which that judgment was handed down and that it became aware of that judgment only at the time of its enforcement, with the result that it was not in a position to bring an appeal against that enforcement.
22 Wine Port contested that assertion stating that the document instituting the proceedings and the list of court costs and disbursements were duly served on Manuel Costa, at its registered office and, on each occasion, its legal representative signed and dated the corresponding acknowledgements of receipt, without that company disputing the existence, validity or enforceability of the claim.
23 In particular, following service of the document instituting the proceedings, the Estonian court invited Manuel Costa to lodge any objections within 28 days from the acknowledgement of receipt of that document, dated 21 January 2022 and signed by the legal representative of that company.
24 On 24 March 2022, that court also served on Manuel Costa a list of court costs and disbursements informing the company that it had a period of five days in which to submit its observations or lodge an objection. Those documents were also served at the registered office of that company, without that company adopting a position in that connection.
25 On 22 June 2022, that company was informed by registered letter that the judgment of 12 April 2022 had become an enforceable instrument.
26 All of the documents thus served were written in Estonian and were not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007.
27 In the context of the enforcement proceedings, the Portuguese court of first instance upheld the opposition lodged by Manuel Costa and ordered that the enforcement be stayed, holding that the service on that company for the purposes of the declaratory proceedings in Estonia was invalid, within the meaning of Article 191(1) of the CCP. It found that that service did not comply with the requirements set out in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 since the documents served on that company were not written in Portuguese or accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation, enabling that company to be informed of its right to refuse to accept those documents.
28 Wine Port brought an appeal against the judgment handed down at first instance before the Tribunal da Relação do Porto (Court of Appeal, Porto, Portugal), which, by a judgment of 11 April 2024, allowed the appeal and ordered the continuation of the enforcement proceedings. In that regard, that court held that according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in particular, the judgments of 16 September 2015, Alpha Bank Cyprus (C‑519/13, EU:C:2015:603), and of 2 March 2017, Henderson (C‑354/15, EU:C:2017:157), and the order of 5 May 2022, ING Luxembourg (C‑346/21, EU:C:2022:368), when effecting service by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, the failure to send the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 does not result in the invalidity of that service.
29 Manuel Costa brought an appeal on a point of law before the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court, Portugal), which is the referring court, against the judgment handed down on appeal.
30 That court states that it follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 above that the omission of the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 cannot render that service invalid, but merely creates an obligation to rectify. However, the court notes that, in the cases which gave rise to that case-law, the absence of that form was established during the declaratory proceedings, at a stage where it was still possible to rectify that omission, by sending that standard form to the party concerned. By contrast, in the present case, the absence of that form was raised after the declaratory proceedings had concluded so that it was no longer possible to rectify that omission.
31 The referring court therefore asks whether, in such a situation, in the light of the requirements imposed by respect for the rights of the defence, as enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 precludes a finding that service effected by registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt is invalid on the ground that it was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation.
32 That jurisdiction is also uncertain as to the interpretation of Article 20(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, and observes in that regard that it is apparent from that provision that a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order is to be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement.
33 It states that, in the national case-law, that provision has been interpreted as meaning that in the case of enforcement based on a European Enforcement Order, the judgment debtor may oppose the enforcement on the same grounds as those on which he or she could rely in the case of enforcement based on a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement. Article 729(d) of the CCP, read in conjunction with Article 696(e) of that code, allows the judgment debtor to oppose the enforcement on the ground that that party did not participate in the declaratory proceedings and that the service effected by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt is invalid because it was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007.
34 However, the referring court asks whether that interpretation is compatible with the objective referred to in Article 1 of Regulation No 805/2004 and with the minimum requirements for service of documents, as set out in Articles 13 and 14 of that regulation, read in the light of recital 14 thereof, applicable to the proceedings in which the judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order was handed down.
35 In those circumstances, the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) In the event that, from a procedural perspective, the failure to send the standard form set out in Annex II to [Regulation No 1393/2007] cannot be rectified, on account of the declaratory proceedings having already given rise to a final judgment ordering payment, does Article 8(1) of that regulation, taking into account the right to a defence of the addressee of that document in accordance with the requirements of a fair trial, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the [Charter] and in Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, preclude national legislation which considers service effected by registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt to be invalid when it was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation? (2) Must Article 20(1) of [Regulation No 805/2004], which provides that “a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order shall be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement”, be interpreted as meaning that the judgment debtor may oppose enforcement based on a European Enforcement Order relying on the same grounds on which he or she could rely in the case of enforcement based on a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement, in particular on the ground that he or she did not participate in the declaratory proceedings and that the service, effected by registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt, was invalid because it was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation [No 1393/2007]? (3) In view of the objectives which led to the creation of the European Enforcement Order (Article 1 of Regulation No 805/2004) and of the minimum requirements for the service of documents applicable to the proceedings in which the judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order was handed down (Articles 13 and 14 of that regulation), which, according to recital 14 of that regulation, are characterised by either full certainty (Article 13) or a very high degree of likelihood (Article 14) that the document served had reached its addressee, does Regulation No 805/2004 preclude national legislation, such as that contained in Article 729(d), read in conjunction with Article 696[(e)(i)], of the [CCP], according to which the judgment debtor may oppose the enforcement on the ground that he or she did not participate in the declaratory proceedings and that the service, effected by registered letter with an acknowledgement of receipt, was invalid because it was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation [No 1393/2007]?’
36 By its second and third questions, which it is appropriate to examine together and first of all, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 20(1) of Regulation No 805/2004 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of the Member State of enforcement which enables the judgment debtor, in the context of the enforcement of a court decision delivered and certified as a European Enforcement Order in the Member State of origin, to oppose that enforcement on the ground that, during the proceedings which led to the delivery of that decision, the document instituting the proceedings was served on the judgment debtor by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, without it being written in, or accompanied by a translation into either a language which that party understands or the official language of the Member State of enforcement or, as the case may be, one of the official languages of the place where service of that document is to be effected, and without it being accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007, which enables that party to be informed of his or her right to refuse to accept the document to be served.
37 It is appropriate to bear in mind that, with regard to the interpretation of a provision of EU law, it is necessary, in accordance with settled case-law, to take into account not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the act of which it forms part (judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 7 July 2022, LKW WALTER, C‑7/21, EU:C:2022:527, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
38 First, as is apparent from the wording of Article 20(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, that provision states that, without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter IV of that regulation, which include Articles 21 and 23 setting out the grounds for the refusal, stay or limitation of the enforcement of a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order, such a judgment is to be enforced under the same conditions as a judgment handed down in the Member State of enforcement.
39 It is apparent from the wording of those provisions that the enforcement procedure is governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement and that the courts of that Member State are empowered to refuse, stay or limit the enforcement of a court decision certified as a European Enforcement Order on the grounds set out in that regulation.
40 Second, it should be noted that, in the scheme of that regulation, there is a clear division of jurisdiction between, on the one hand, the courts and authorities of the Member State of origin and, on the other, those of the Member State of enforcement, together with requirements to be observed in the context of the procedure leading to the adoption of a judgment on an uncontested claim as well as when that judgment is enforced. That division of jurisdiction stems from the fact that the claim and the European Enforcement Order establishing it rely on the law of the Member State of origin, while the enforcement procedure is governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement, in accordance with Article 20(1) of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey, C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 38).
41 Thus, in the Member State of origin, the certification of a judgment on an uncontested claim as a European Enforcement Order is subject to compliance with the minimum standards laid down in Chapter III of Regulation No 805/2004. In that regard, pursuant to Article 18 of that regulation, non-compliance with those standards may be cured only before the courts or authorities of that State (judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey, C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 39).
42 Those minimum standards express the EU legislature’s intention to ensure that procedures leading to the adoption of judgments concerning uncontested debts offer adequate guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence in the Member State of origin, taking account of the fact that, in principle, there is no review thereof in the Member State of enforcement (judgment of 28 February 2018, Collect Inkasso and Others, C‑289/17, EU:C:2018:133, paragraph 36) and seek to ensure, as set out in recital 12 of that regulation, that the debtor is informed about the court action against him or her, the requirements for his or her active participation in the proceedings to contest the claim at issue and the consequences of his or her non-participation in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him or her to arrange for a defence.
43 With a view to providing that information, where a document is to be sent from one Member State to another Member State, it follows from Article 28 of Regulation No 805/2004, read in the light of recital 21 thereof, that that regulation does not affect the application of Regulation No 1348/2000 which preceded Regulation No 1393/2007. The service of that document must therefore comply with the conditions set out in Article 8(1) of the latter regulation and, as a result, be accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 in order to inform the addressee of the right that he or she has to refuse to accept the document to be served if it is not written in, or accompanied by a translation into, a language which that addressee understands or the official language of the Member State addressed or, as the case may be, one of the official languages of the place where service of that document is to be effected.
44 It is important therefore to ensure not only that the debtor is duly informed of the existence and content of the claim brought against him or her abroad and that he or she is able to know and understand effectively and completely the meaning and scope of that action, but also that an appropriate application may be made in the Member State of origin in the event of a failure to comply with those requirements.
45 It follows that, where the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document has not been served together with the standard form and where that omission has not been rectified during the proceedings in the Member State of origin, the judgment handed down in those proceedings cannot meet the requirements of the minimum standards set out in Chapter III of Regulation No 805/2004 and cannot be certified as a European Enforcement Order.
46 A certificate issued in such circumstances will therefore be wrongly granted within the meaning of Article 10(1)(b) of Regulation No 805/2004 so that it must be withdrawn by the court of origin if so requested.
47 For their part, the competent courts or authorities of the Member State of enforcement, within the framework of the jurisdiction conferred on them by Article 20 of Regulation No 805/2004, are empowered to examine whether there are factors justifying the refusal of enforcement pursuant to Article 21(1) of that regulation or the limitation or stay of enforcement in accordance with Article 23 of that regulation (judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey, C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 40).
48 It follows that the judgment debtor may oppose the enforcement in the Member State of enforcement only on the grounds set out in Article 21 of Regulation No 805/2004, concerning the existence of irreconcilable judgments, and Article 23 of that regulation, concerning the stay or limitation of enforcement, during proceedings brought in the Member State of origin.
49 In particular, under Article 23(c) of Regulation No 805/2004, where the debtor has challenged a judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order, including an application for review within the meaning of Article 19 of that regulation, or has applied for the rectification or withdrawal of a European Enforcement Order certificate in accordance with Article 10 of that regulation, the competent court or authority in the Member State of enforcement may, upon application by the debtor, under exceptional circumstances, stay the enforcement proceedings.
50 Those possibilities of bringing a challenge or of making an application for withdrawal or review in the Member State of origin ensure that the abolition of checks in the Member State of enforcement, provided for by that regulation, cannot take effect without ensuring that guarantees of respect for the rights of the defence are implemented.
51 In the present case, as is apparent from the information provided by the referring court, the fact that the judgment debtor did not intervene in the declaratory proceedings at the end of which the judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order was handed down and that the document to be served, which was sent to the judgment debtor by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt in those proceedings, was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 does not fall within the grounds set out in Articles 21 and 23 of Regulation No 805/2004.
52 That fact refers to the proceedings in the Member State of origin and the certification of the judgment handed down at the end of those proceedings as a European Enforcement Order, so that those aspects cannot be submitted to the competent courts or authorities of the Member State of enforcement for their assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 February 2023, Lufthansa Technik AERO Alzey, C‑393/21, EU:C:2023:104, paragraph 41).
53 Third, it must be noted that the interpretation of Article 20(1) of Regulation No 805/2004, which results from the wording and the context in which that provision occurs, meets the objective pursued by that regulation which, as is apparent from a combined reading of Articles 1 and 5, read in the light of recitals 8, 10, 11 and 18, with due regard for the mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Member States on which the division of jurisdiction between, on the one hand, the courts and authorities of the Member State of origin and, on the other, those of the Member State of enforcement is based, seeks to ensure the free movement, inter alia, of judgments on uncontested claims, and to accelerate and simplify their enforcement, by abolishing the procedure for making those judgments enforceable, while ensuring the respect for the rights of the defence.
54 In the present case, no steps, such as an application for withdrawal of the European Enforcement Order certificate, appear to have been taken to date in Estonia. By contrast, as is apparent from the order for reference, it is common ground that Manuel Costa opposes the enforcement in Portugal of the court decision certified as a European Enforcement Order in Estonia on the ground that, during the proceedings which led to the delivery of that judgment, the document instituting the proceedings was not served on that company, in accordance with Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007, in a language which that party understands or in the official language of the Member State of enforcement and was not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation, enabling that party to be informed of the right that it has to refuse to accept the document to be served.
55 It follows from the foregoing that that ground does not fall within those set out in Articles 21 and 23 of Regulation No 805/2004, allowing for the refusal, stay or limitation of enforcement of the court decision certified as a European Enforcement Order.
56 By contrast, it should be noted that that ground concerns the validity of the certification of the judgment to be enforced as a European Enforcement Order, which, as set out in paragraphs 41 and 52 above, may be challenged only before the Member State of origin.
57 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second and third questions is that Article 20(1) of Regulation No 805/2004 must be interpreted as precluding legislation of the Member State of enforcement which enables the judgment debtor, in the context of the enforcement of a court decision delivered and certified as a European Enforcement Order, to oppose that enforcement on the ground that, during the proceedings which led to the delivery of that decision, the document instituting the proceedings was served on the judgment debtor by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, without it being written in, or accompanied by a translation into, either a language which that party understands or the official language of the Member State of enforcement or, as the case may be, one of the official languages of the place where service of that document is to be effected, and without it being accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007, which enables that party to be informed of his or her right to refuse to accept the document to be served.
58 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1393/2007 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which service of a judicial document effected by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt is invalid where the document to be served is written in a language other than those referred to in that provision and that document is not accompanied by the standard form set out in Annex II to that regulation, where the proceedings at the end of which the court decision was certified as a European Enforcement Order have concluded, so that it is no longer possible to rectify that service.
59 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that the Court may decline to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling by a national court only where, inter alia, it is quite obvious that the provision of EU law referred to the Court for interpretation is incapable of applying (judgment of 17 September 2015, van der Lans, C‑257/14, EU:C:2015:618, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
60 In that regard, it must be pointed out that, as is apparent from the answer to the second and third questions, the referring court, before which the opposition to the enforcement of a court decision certified as a European Enforcement Order under Regulation No 805/2004 has been brought, has jurisdiction to review whether the grounds relied on in support of that opposition fall within the grounds for refusal of enforcement, as set out in Article 21 of that regulation or, as the case may be, the grounds for the stay or limitation of that enforcement, as set out in Article 23 of that regulation.
61 By contrast, as set out in paragraphs 41 and 52 above, the certification of a judgment as a European Enforcement Order, including the review of the validity of that certification, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of origin which handed down that judgment, before which, to that end, an application seeking the withdrawal of a certificate wrongly granted may be made, in accordance with Article 10(1)(b) of Regulation No 805/2004.
62 Thus, in order to verify whether the European Enforcement Order certificate was wrongly granted, the court of origin should review whether the judicial proceedings in the Member State of origin, which led to the judgment certified as a European Enforcement Order, met the requirements of the minimum standards set out in Chapter III of Regulation No 805/2004 or whether, as the case may be, the conditions set out in Article 18 of that regulation, which enable non-compliance with minimum standards to be cured, are satisfied.
63 It follows that the finding that a European Enforcement Order certificate has been wrongly granted because of defective service of the document instituting the proceedings due to the omission of the standard form set out in Annex II to Regulation No 1393/2007 and the failure to have that document written in one of the languages provided for in Article 8(1) of that regulation is governed by the law of the Member State of origin and the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State.
64 Consequently, since that provision does not apply to the dispute before the referring court, it is not necessary to answer the first question.
65 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.