1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(3), Article 6(1), Article 6(2)(a) and (g) and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1), Article 1(1), Article 3(1) and (2), Article 14(3) of, and points 1 and 2 of Annex VII to, Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work (seventh individual directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 2000 L 262, p. 21), as amended by Commission Directive (EU) 2020/739 of 3 June 2020 (OJ 2020 L 175, p. 11) (‘Directive 2000/54’), and Article 3(1), Article 31(1) and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, A and Others, namely, several members of the operational staff responsible for emergency assistance within the Tallinna Kiirabi (Tallinn ambulance service, Estonia), and, on the other, the Tallinna linn (City of Tallinn), concerning the termination of those members’ employment contracts on account of the lack of proof of vaccination against the SARS-CoV-2 virus or of a contraindication to such vaccination.
3 The first recital of Directive 89/391 states: ‘Whereas Article 118a of the [EEC] Treaty provides that the Council shall adopt, by means of Directives, minimum requirements for encouraging improvements, especially in the working environment, to guarantee a better level of protection of the safety and health of workers’.
4 Article 1 of that directive, entitled ‘Object’, provides: ‘1. The object of this Directive is to introduce measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work. 2. To that end it contains general principles concerning the prevention of occupational risks, the protection of safety and health, the elimination of risk and accident factors, the informing, consultation, balanced participation in accordance with national laws and/or practices and training of workers and their representatives, as well as general guidelines for the implementation of the said principles. 3. This Directive shall be without prejudice to existing or future national and Community provisions which are more favourable to protection of the safety and health of workers at work.’
5 Under Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Definitions’: ‘For the purposes of this Directive, the following terms shall have the following meanings: …
6 Article 5 of Directive 89/391, entitled ‘General provision’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The employer shall have a duty to ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related to the work.’
7 Article 6 of that directive, entitled ‘General obligations on employers’, provides: ‘1. Within the context of his responsibilities, the employer shall take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including prevention of occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the necessary organisation and means. The employer shall be alert to the need to adjust these measures to take account of changing circumstances and aim to improve existing situations. 2. The employer shall implement the measures referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 on the basis of the following general principles of prevention:
8 Article 9 of that directive, entitled ‘Various obligations on employers’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The employer shall: …’
9 Article 16 of Directive 89/391, entitled ‘Individual Directives - Amendments - General scope of this Directive’, states, in paragraph 3 thereof: ‘The provisions of this Directive shall apply in full to all the areas covered by the individual Directives, without prejudice to more stringent and/or specific provisions contained in these individual Directives.’
10 Recital 8 of Directive 2000/54 is worded as follows: ‘Preventive measures should be taken for the protection of the health and safety of workers exposed to biological agent.’
11 Article 1 of that directive, entitled ‘Objective’, provides: ‘1. This Directive has as its aim the protection of workers against risks to their health and safety, including the prevention of such risks, arising or likely to arise from exposure to biological agents at work. It lays down particular minimum provisions in this area. 2. Directive 89/391/EEC shall apply fully to the whole area referred to in paragraph 1, without prejudice to more stringent and/or specific provisions contained in this Directive. …’
12 Under Article 2 of Directive 2000/54, entitled ‘Definitions’: “Biological agents” shall be classified into four risk groups, according to their level of risk of infection:
13 Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Scope - Determination and assessment of risks’, provides: ‘1. This Directive shall apply to activities in which workers are or are potentially exposed to biological agents as a result of their work. 2. In the case of any activity likely to involve a risk of exposure to biological agents, the nature, degree and duration of workers’ exposure must be determined in order to make it possible to assess any risk to the workers’ health or safety and to lay down the measures to be taken. …’
14 Article 6 of that directive, entitled ‘Reduction of risks’, provides: ‘1. Where the results of the assessment referred to in Article 3 reveal a risk to workers’ health or safety, workers’ exposure must be prevented. 2. Where this is not technically practicable, having regard to the activity and the risk assessment referred to in Article 3, the risk of exposure must be reduced to as low a level as necessary in order to protect adequately the health and safety of the workers concerned … …’
15 Article 14 of that directive, entitled ‘Health surveillance’, states: ‘1. The Member States shall establish, in accordance with national laws and practice, arrangements for carrying out relevant health surveillance of workers for whom the results of the assessment referred to in Article 3 reveal a risk to health or safety. … 3. The assessment referred to in Article 3 should identify those workers for whom special protective measures may be required. When necessary, effective vaccines should be made available for those workers who are not already immune to the biological agent to which they are exposed or are likely to be exposed. When employers make vaccines available, they should take account of the recommended code of practice set out in Annex VII. …’
16 Annex III to Directive 2000/54, entitled ‘Community classification, Article 2, second paragraph, and Article 18’, lists, under the heading ‘Viruses’, the biological agent ‘Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)’ in risk group 3.
17 Annex VII to that directive, entitled ‘Recommended code of practice on vaccination (Article 14(3))’, is worded as follows:
18 Paragraph 13 of the töötervishoiu ja tööohutuse seadus (Law on health and safety at work) of 16 June 1999 (RT I 1999, 60, 616), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the TTOS’), entitled ‘Obligations and rights of the employer’, provides, in subparagraph 2 thereof: ‘The employer may impose more stringent health and safety requirements than those laid down by law.’
19 Adopted on the basis of the TTOS, Paragraph 6 of the Vabariigi Valitsuse määrus nr 144 ‘Bioloogilistest ohuteguritest mõjutatud töökeskkonna töötervishoiu ja tööohutuse nõuded’ (Regulation No 144 of the Government of the Republic ‘on occupational health and safety requirements for working environments affected by biological risk factors’) of 5 May 2000 (RT I 2000, 38, 234), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Regulation on biological risks’), entitled ‘Reduction of health risks’, provides, in point 7 of subparagraph 2: ‘… risks to workers’ health must be reduced to the lowest possible level by implementing the following measures: … (7) ensuring that workers exposed to biological risk factors for which an effective vaccine exists have the possibility of vaccination.’
20 On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization proclaimed a public health emergency of international concern, thereby formally declaring as a pandemic the COVID-19 outbreak caused by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
21 On 4 March 2021, the City of Talinn approved a workplace-related risk assessment, including an action plan which provided, inter alia, for the vaccination of its employees in order to reduce the risk of their contracting a dangerous communicable disease, such as the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and mitigate the attendant risks.
22 On 16 April 2021, the City of Talinn amended the professional rules applicable to ambulance staff, stating that vaccination against dangerous communicable diseases was required in order to exercise the profession. It granted the applicants and respondents in the appeal on a point of law in the main proceedings (‘the applicants in the main proceedings’) a period within which to furnish proof, as appropriate, of vaccination against the SARS-CoV-2 virus or of a contraindication to that vaccination, warning them that, in the absence of such proof, their employment contracts could be terminated.
23 Since the applicants in the main proceedings did not furnish such proof, the City of Tallinn, in July 2021, terminated their employment contracts without notice, on the ground that the specific nature of the work of ambulance staff requires and warrants the vaccination of the persons exercising it and that, since no other measure is sufficient to protect the health of patients, other workers and the worker him or herself, the work of ambulance staff may be carried out only by vaccinated persons.
24 By judgment of 29 September 2022, the Harju Maakohus (Court of First Instance, Harju, Estonia), before which the applicants in the main proceedings brought an action challenging the termination of their employment contracts and seeking compensation from the City of Tallinn for unfair termination, upheld that action in part. That court held that that termination was null and void, on the ground that the City of Tallinn could not unilaterally impose mandatory vaccination in the absence of a law or regulation of the executive enabling it to do so. It therefore ordered the City of Tallinn to pay compensation, albeit in an amount lower than that requested by the applicants in the main proceedings.
25 The applicants in the main proceedings and the City of Tallinn each brought an appeal against that decision before the Tallinna Ringkonnakohus (Court of Appeal, Tallinn, Estonia), which, by judgment of 26 May 2023, held, while setting aside in part the judgment of the Harju Maakohus (Court of First Instance, Harju) as regards the amount of the compensation, that the City of Tallinn could not unilaterally impose mandatory vaccination, pointing out in that regard, in particular, that neither Paragraph 13(2) of the TTOS nor Paragraph 6(2)(7) of the Regulation on biological risks confers on it the power to impose such mandatory vaccination.
26 The City of Tallinn brought an appeal on a point of law against that decision before the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia), which is the referring court.
27 The referring court considers that, in order to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings, it is necessary, in particular, to answer the question whether the City of Tallinn could require the applicants in the main proceedings, as a condition for continuing their professional activity within the ambulance service, to undergo vaccination against the SARS-CoV-2 virus or whether such vaccination needs the agreement of the parties to the employment contract. According to the referring court, the answer to that question depends, in particular, on whether vaccination must be regarded as a requirement relating to health and safety at work or as a unilateral measure on the part of the employer in a context marked by the absence of national rules defining the areas of activity or the professions for which vaccination against the SARS-CoV-2 virus is mandatory.
28 The referring court points out that, under Estonian law, the employer must guarantee the employee working conditions which comply with the requirements relating to health and safety at work and that, to that end, Paragraph 13(2) of the TTOS provides that the employer may impose more stringent requirements than those laid down by the national legislation. Thus, in the present case, the City of Tallinn, after carrying out a risk assessment, required the applicants in the main proceedings to undergo vaccination against the SARS-CoV-2 virus, on the basis of Paragraph 13(2) of the TTOS, which had transposed the provisions of Directives 89/391 and 2000/54 into Estonian law.
29 In that context, the referring court has doubts as to whether national legislation allowing an employer to impose on its workers mandatory vaccination without their consent, as a condition for continuing the employment relationship, is compatible with those directives, having regard also to the right to the integrity of the person, guaranteed by Article 3 of the Charter.
30 The referring court states, first, that vaccination of workers in order to ensure health and safety at work is governed by Directive 2000/54. It could be inferred from Article 14(3) of, and Annex VII to, that directive that vaccination is optional, since the employer is under the sole obligation to ensure that vaccination is possible and to inform workers of the benefits and drawbacks of both vaccination and non-vaccination. Similarly, it is clear from Article 3(2)(a) of the Charter that, in the field of medicine, the free and informed consent of the person concerned is required.
31 Second, according to the referring court, it is clear from Article 1(1) of Directive 89/391 and Article 1(1) of Directive 2000/54 that those directives lay down only minimum provisions for safety and health at work. Those directives do not therefore preclude the application of more favourable national provisions in that area. It is thus possible to adopt an interpretation to the effect that employers may require workers to undergo vaccination without their consent, as a measure which is more favourable to the protection of the health and safety of workers than the minimum provisions laid down by those directives.
32 In the event that the imposition by the employer of mandatory vaccination is contrary to Directives 89/391 and 2000/54, the referring court considers that the TTOS and the Regulation on biological risks should be interpreted in accordance with those directives, that is to say, as not conferring on employers the power unilaterally to impose mandatory vaccination on its workers, which would thus deprive of any legal basis the termination of the employment contracts of the applicants in the main proceedings.
33 In those circumstances, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
34 By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 6(1) and (2) and Article 9(1) of Directive 89/391, Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/54, read in conjunction with points 1 and 2 of Annex VII thereto, and Article 3(1) and Article 31(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding national legislation pursuant to which an employer may require workers with whom it has concluded an employment contract to undergo vaccination if they are exposed to a biological risk.
35 As regards, in the first place, Directive 89/391, it must be recalled that, in accordance with Article 1(1) and (2) thereof, that directive contains, with a view to introducing measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, general principles concerning, inter alia, the prevention of occupational risks and the protection of safety and health.
36 As the Court has previously held, it follows, in that regard, from Article 5(1) and Article 6 of that directive that employers are obliged to evaluate and prevent all risks to the safety and health of workers (judgment of 9 March 2021, Radiotelevizija Slovenija (Period of stand-by time in a remote location), C‑344/19, EU:C:2021:182, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
37 In particular, Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 89/391 provides that the employer is required, within the context of his or her responsibilities, to take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including prevention of occupational risks, as defined in Article 3(d) of that directive, on the basis of general principles of prevention. According to Article 6(2)(a), (b) and (g) of that directive, those general principles consist, inter alia, in avoiding risks, evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided, and developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organisation of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors related to the working environment.
38 Thus, in accordance with Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/391, the employer must carry out an assessment of the risks to the safety and health of workers and decide on the protective measures to be taken in order to avoid or reduce those risks.
39 By contrast, it must be stated that Directive 89/391 does not contain any provisions relating to the vaccination of workers, with the result that no lessons can be drawn from that directive as to the possibility for Member States to provide for mandatory vaccination.
40 As regards, in the second place, Directive 2000/54, it should be noted that the aim of that directive, according to the first subparagraph of Article 1(1) thereof, is the protection of workers against risks to their health and safety, including the prevention of such risks, arising or likely to arise from exposure to biological agents at work, which are, first, defined in point (a) of the first paragraph of Article 2 of that directive and, second, classified in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 2. Under Annex III to Directive 2000/54, SARS-CoV-2 is listed as being such a biological agent in risk group 3, within the meaning of point 3 of the second subparagraph of Article 2 of that directive.
41 In accordance with Article 16(3) of Directive 89/391 and Article 1(2) of Directive 2000/54, the more stringent and/or specific provisions of the latter directive are to apply to all the areas covered by Directive 89/391.
42 In that context, it must be noted, in particular, that Article 3(2) and Article 6(1) and (2) of Directive 2000/54 provide, like, in essence, Article 6(1) and (2) and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/391, that the employer is required, in the case of any activity likely to involve a risk of exposure to biological agents, to determine the nature, degree and duration of workers’ exposure in order to make it possible to assess any risk to the workers’ health or safety and to lay down the necessary protective measures with a view to avoiding or, where that is not technically practicable, reducing those risks.
43 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 14(1) and (3) of Directive 2000/54, in order to carry out relevant health surveillance of workers for whom the results of that assessment reveal a risk to the safety or health of workers, that assessment should identify those workers for whom special protective measures may be required. Article 14(3) states in that regard, in the second and third subparagraphs, respectively, that, first, ‘effective vaccines should be made available for those workers who are not already immune to the biological agent to which they are exposed or are likely to be exposed’, and second, ‘when employers make vaccines available, they should take account of the recommended code of practice set out in Annex VII [to that directive]’.
44 Points 1 and 2 of Annex VII state that, if there is a risk to the safety and health of workers due to their exposure to biological agents for which effective vaccines exist, their employer should ‘offer’ vaccination to them, that vaccination should take place ‘in accordance with national law and/or practice’, and that workers also have to be informed of the benefits and drawbacks ‘of both vaccination and non-vaccination’.
45 It follows that, although Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/54, read in conjunction with points 1 and 2 of Annex VII thereto, imposes on employers the obligation, where an effective vaccine exists, to give the workers concerned access to such a vaccine and, accordingly, confers on those workers the right to have access to that vaccine, that directive does not provide whether and in what circumstances employers may require such vaccination in order to protect the workers concerned or other categories of persons and, accordingly, whether and in what circumstances such workers may be required to undergo that vaccination or whether they may, on the contrary, refuse it.
46 It follows that, by Directives 89/391 and 2000/54, the EU legislature did not intend to define the conditions under which the Member States would be entitled to impose mandatory vaccination such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
47 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with Article 153(2)(b) TFEU, both Directive 89/391, as is apparent from the first recital thereof, and Directive 2000/54, as provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) thereof, lay down only ‘minimum requirements’ as regards the protection of the safety and health of workers.
48 Mandatory vaccination, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it is in addition to the employer’s obligation to provide access to vaccination, is not, as such, capable of affecting or limiting the minimum protection guaranteed by Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/54, read in conjunction with points 1 and 2 of Annex VII thereto; nor is it capable of infringing other provisions of that directive, or adversely affecting its coherence or the objectives pursued thereby (see, by analogy, judgment of 19 November 2019, TSN and AKT, C‑609/17 and C‑610/17, EU:C:2019:981, paragraph 51).
49 As regards, in the third place, Article 3(1) and Article 31(1) of the Charter, relating, respectively, to the right to the physical and mental integrity of the person and to the right of every worker to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity, it must be recalled that the scope of the Charter is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, according to which its provisions are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law.
50 In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in that provision, presupposes a degree of connection between the measure of EU law and the national measure at issue which goes beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (judgments of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 34, and of 3 April 2025, Swiftair, C‑701/23, EU:C:2025:237, paragraph 29).
51 It follows from this, according to settled case-law, that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 19, and of 13 June 2024, Monmorieux, C‑380/23, EU:C:2024:500, paragraph 29).
52 Thus, the Court has, in particular, held that fundamental EU rights could not be applied in relation to national legislation because the provisions of EU law in the area concerned did not impose any specific obligation on Member States with regard to a given situation (judgments of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 35, and of 28 November 2024, PT (Agreement concluded between the prosecutor and the perpetrator of an offence), C‑432/22, EU:C:2024:987, paragraph 36).
53 In such a case, the national rule enacted by a Member State as regards such a situation falls outside the scope of the Charter and, accordingly, that situation cannot be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2022, Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia and Others, C‑301/21, EU:C:2022:811, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
54 It follows from paragraphs 35 to 48 above that mandatory vaccination, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, according to the referring court, follows from Paragraph 13(2) of the TTOS, does not fall within the scope of Directives 89/391 or 2004/54. That mandatory vaccination does not therefore constitute an ‘implementation’ of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2023, Azienda Ospedale-Università di Padova, C‑765/21, EU:C:2023:566, paragraph 44).
55 It follows that a national provision such as Paragraph 13(2) of the TTOS falls outside the scope of the Charter and cannot, accordingly, be assessed in the light of the provisions of the Charter, in particular Article 3(1) or Article 31(1) thereof.
56 Consequently, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 6(1) and (2) and Article 9(1) of Directive 89/391 and Article 14(3) of Directive 2000/54, read in conjunction with points 1 and 2 of Annex VII thereto, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation pursuant to which an employer may require workers with whom it has concluded an employment contract to undergo vaccination if they are exposed to a biological risk.
57 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.