1 This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 33 and 36 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between BNP Paribas SA and TR, concerning his dismissal, which was the subject of a decision of an English court, whose effects on the admissibility of an action subsequently brought before the French courts give rise to a challenge.
3 Recitals 2, 6, 16 and 19 of Regulation No 44/2001 are worded as follows: ‘(2) Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and to simplify the formalities with a view to rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments from Member States bound by this Regulation are essential. … (6) In order to attain the objective of free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, it is necessary and appropriate that the rules governing jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments be governed by a Community legal instrument which is binding and directly applicable. … (16) Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Community justifies judgments given in a Member State being recognised automatically without the need for any procedure except in cases of dispute. … (19) Continuity between the Convention [of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1972 L 299, p. 32)] and this Regulation should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation of [that convention] by the Court …’
4 In Chapter III of Regulation No 44/2001, relating to recognition and enforcement, under Section 1 thereof, entitled ‘Recognition’, Article 33 of that regulation provides: ‘1. A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required. 2. Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised. 3. If the outcome of proceedings in a court of a Member State depends on the determination of an incidental question of recognition that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.’
5 Under Section 1, Article 36 of Regulation No 44/2001 states: ‘Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.’
6 That regulation was repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1). However, in accordance with Article 66(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, Regulation No 44/2001 continues to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of the latter regulation.
7 The Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 2020 L 29, p. 7) (‘the Withdrawal Agreement’) was adopted on 17 October 2019 and entered into force on 1 February 2020.
8 Article 67 of that agreement, entitled ‘Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, and related cooperation between central authorities’, provides in paragraph 2(a): ‘In the United Kingdom, as well as in the Member States in situations involving the United Kingdom, the following acts or provisions shall apply as follows in respect of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, decisions, authentic instruments, court settlements and agreements: (a) Regulation … No 1215/2012 shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period …’
9 Article 126 of that agreement provides for a transition period starting on the date of its entry into force and ending on 31 December 2020, during which, in accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 127(1) of that agreement, EU law is applicable to and in the United Kingdom, unless otherwise provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement.
10 The first paragraph of Article L. 1234-5 of the Code du travail (Labour Code) provides: ‘Where the employee does not work his or her notice period, he or she shall be entitled to compensation, except in the case of serious misconduct by that employee.’
11 Under the first paragraph of Article L. 1234-9 of that code: ‘An employee with an employment contract of indefinite duration who is dismissed … shall be entitled, except in the case of serious misconduct, to compensation for dismissal.’
12 Under Article L. 1235-3 of that code, if an employee’s dismissal is not based on an actual and serious cause, the court may propose that he or she be reinstated in the undertaking and that the benefits he or she has acquired be maintained and, if either party refuses that reinstatement, the court is to award the employee compensation to be borne by the employer.
13 Article R. 1452-6 of that code, in the version in force before its repeal by décret no 2016-660, du 20 mai 2016, relatif à la justice prud’homale et au traitement judiciaire du contentieux du travail (Decree No 2016-660 of 20 May 2016 on prud’homale justice and the judicial resolution of labour disputes) (JORF of 25 May 2016, text No 30), stated: ‘All claims linked with an employment contract between the same parties shall, whether made by the claimant or the defendant, be the subject matter of a single set of proceedings. This rule shall not apply where the basis of the claims arises or comes to light after the matter has been brought before the Labour Tribunal.’
14 The Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘the ERA 1996’) includes Part X, entitled ‘Unfair dismissal’.
15 Chapter I of Part X, entitled ‘Right not to be unfairly dismissed’, contains Section 98, which is worded as follows: ‘(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show - (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held. (2) A reason falls within this subsection if it - … (b) relates to the conduct of the employee. … (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer) - (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. …’
16 Chapter II of Part X, entitled ‘Remedies for unfair dismissal’, includes Section 118, according to which, where a court awards compensation for unfair dismissal under Sections 112(4) and 117(3), that compensation consists of, first, a basic award and, second, a compensatory award.
17 On 25 August 1998, under a contract governed by English law, BNP Paribas, formerly BNP SA, recruited the defendant in the main proceedings to work at the London (United Kingdom) branch of that French company.
18 On 2 April 2009, those parties signed an employment contract of indefinite duration, governed by French law, which provided for the secondment of the person concerned to Singapore. Subsequently, under an addendum to that contract dated 16 August 2010, he was assigned to the London branch.
19 By letter of 30 September 2013, the respondent in the main proceedings was dismissed for serious misconduct on account of events which occurred during his secondment to Singapore, a dismissal which he challenged.
20 It is apparent from the documents before the Court that, on 20 December 2013, that employee brought an action before the Central London Employment Tribunal (United Kingdom) (‘the English court’) seeking a finding of unfair dismissal and compensation in that regard, while expressing a reservation designed to allow him to also submit claims for payment in connection with the termination of his employment contract.
21 By decision of 26 September 2014 (‘the judgment delivered in England’), that court declared that action to be well founded under United Kingdom law and referred the other issues relating to remedies to a subsequent hearing. BNP Paribas paid the interested party the sum of GBP 81175 (approximately EUR 96517) by way of compensatory award. In that judgment, that court stated, inter alia, that BNP Paribas had disciplined its employee in accordance with the French Labour Code, but that that company’s legal representative had accepted that the dispute be decided under the ERA 1996 and British case-law.
22 On 27 November 2014, that employee brought an action before the conseil de prud’hommes de Paris (Labour Tribunal, Paris, France), seeking an order that BNP Paribas pay him various sums, in particular, damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause, compensation in lieu of notice, compensation for dismissal and the bonuses and allowances provided for in his employment contract. By judgment of 17 May 2016, those claims were declared inadmissible on account of the force of res judicata acquired by the judgment delivered in England.
23 By judgment of 22 May 2019, the cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris, France) set aside the judgment of 17 May 2016. It took the view that the judgment delivered in England had the force of res judicata in that the English court had ruled that the dismissal was not based on an actual and serious cause, but that the employee’s claims in France were nevertheless admissible. That court noted that the claim made to the English court expressly stated that the person concerned was seeking ‘a basic and compensatory award’, but not ‘the awards and social benefits in connection with the termination of his employment contract’, which he sought to obtain by bringing proceedings before another court. The cour d’appel de Paris (Court of Appeal, Paris) held that the pecuniary claims brought before the English court were not the same and did not involve the same cause of action as those brought before it, with the result that no force of res judicata could be relied on against them. It ordered BNP Paribas to pay damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause, compensation in lieu of notice, compensation for dismissal and the payment of bonuses and allowances, pursuant to French law and the employment contract at issue in the main proceedings.
24 BNP Paribas brought an appeal against that judgment before the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France), which is the referring court in the present proceedings. It relies, in particular, on Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001 in support of its contention that, on account of the judgment delivered in England, the French courts did not have the power to examine the claims brought by the employee concerned. In that regard, in the first place, it considers that the objection of res judicata should have been assessed in the light of the authority and effectiveness accorded to the foreign judgment in the Member State in which it was given and that the question whether that judgment precluded the courts of another Member State from ruling on claims which could have been made at the time proceedings were brought in that first State should have been examined. In the second place, it submits that, in the dispute in the main proceedings, the claims brought in France by the employee have the same subject matter, namely compensation for the consequences of his dismissal, and the same cause of action, namely the employment contract signed on 2 April 2009, as those which had already been brought before the English court, with the result that they are incompatible with the res judicata nature of that court’s judgment, and are therefore inadmissible.
25 In that regard, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) asks, first, whether, in the light of Articles 33 and 36 of Regulation No 44/2001, recognition of a judgment given by a court of a Member State may render inadmissible an action between the same parties and based on the same contract which was brought subsequently in another Member State for a ruling to be given on claims not made to that foreign court, where the law of the Member State of origin, that is to say, the first State, lays down a rule on the centralisation of claims or on a single set of proceedings and, potentially, the law of the Member State addressed, that is to say, the second State, lays down a similar rule.
26 According to the referring court, in the present case, as regards United Kingdom law, BNP Paribas relies on the abuse of process rule, stemming from the judgment of the Court of Chancery (England and Wales) of 20 July 1843 in Henderson v. Henderson, which ‘requires the parties, when their question becomes the subject matter of proceedings before a competent court, to plead their entire case before that court so that all aspects of that question may be settled, subject to appeal, once and for all’. The referring court adds that, in the case of French law, the ‘single set of proceedings’ rule laid down in Article R. 1452-6 of the Labour Code, which provides that all claims connected with an employment contract between the same parties must in principle be the subject of a single set of proceedings, was still in force at the time the matter was brought before the conseil de prud’hommes de Paris (Labour Tribunal, Paris).
27 Second, in the event that it is held that inadmissibility does not arise from the effects of a foreign judgment, within the meaning of Article 36 of Regulation No 44/2001, in such circumstances, the referring court is uncertain as to the effect of the possible identity of a ‘cause of action’ and ‘subject matter’ for the purposes of the application of Articles 33 and 36 of that regulation, in particular in the light of the specific claims which were brought, in the present case, before the English court and the French courts, respectively.
28 On that basis, the referring court wishes to know whether all claims intended to impose a financial penalty for the non-performance of obligations arising under a single employment contract must be regarded as having the ‘same subject matter’ or whether a distinction should be drawn between those claims according to whether they relate either to obligations inherent in the performance of that contract or to obligations specific to the termination of that contract.
29 That court asks, more specifically, whether there is identity of ‘subject matter’ between, on the one hand, a compensatory award payable in the event of unfair dismissal, such as that provided for in United Kingdom law by the ERA 1996, and, on the other, compensation payable in the event of dismissal without actual and serious cause, such as that provided for in French law in Article L. 1235-3 of the Labour Code, or, potentially, compensation in lieu of notice and compensation for dismissal, such as those provided for in the first paragraph of Article L. 1234-5 and the first paragraph of Article L. 1234-9, respectively.
30 Third and last, it wishes to know whether an action such as that for unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom and an action for payment of bonuses or allowances provided for in an employment contract are to be regarded as having the ‘same cause of action’ and the ‘same subject matter’, where those two actions are based on the same contractual relationship between the parties.
31 In those circumstances, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Articles 33 and 36 of [Regulation No 44/2001] be interpreted as meaning that, where the legislation of the Member State of origin of the judgment confers on that judgment authority such as to preclude a new action being brought by the same parties for determining the claims that could have been raised in the initial proceedings, the effects which that judgment has in the Member State in which enforcement is sought preclude a court of that latter State, whose legislation, as applicable ratione temporis, provided in employment law for a similar obligation of concentration of claims, from adjudicating on such claims? (2) If the first question is answered in the negative, must Articles 33 and 36 of [Regulation No 44/2001] be interpreted as meaning that an action such as a claim of unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom has the same cause of action and the same subject matter as an action such as a claim of dismissal without actual and serious cause in French law, so that the employee’s claims for damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause, compensation in lieu of notice, and compensation for dismissal before the French courts are inadmissible after the employee has obtained a decision in the United Kingdom declaring that there has been an unfair dismissal and making a compensatory award in that respect? Is it necessary in that regard to distinguish between, on the one hand, the damages for dismissal without actual and serious cause that might have the same cause of action and the same subject matter as the compensatory award and, on the other, the compensation for dismissal and compensation in lieu of notice which, in French law, are payable where the dismissal is based on an actual and serious cause, but are not payable in the event of dismissal based on serious misconduct? (3) Likewise, must Articles 33 and 36 of [Regulation No 44/2001] be interpreted as meaning that an action such as a claim of unfair dismissal in the United Kingdom and an action for payment of bonuses or allowances provided for in the employment contract have the same cause of action and the same subject matter when those actions are based on the same contractual relationship between the parties?’
32 In the first place, as regards the applicability ratione temporis of Regulation No 44/2001, it must be observed that that regulation was repealed and replaced by Regulation No 1215/2012, but that, under Article 66(2) of that regulation, Regulation No 44/2001 continues to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before 10 January 2015.
33 Thus, in the context of an application for recognition or enforcement of a judgment given in another Member State, in order to determine which of those two regulations is applicable ratione temporis, reference must be made to the date on which the action which led to the judgment in respect of which recognition or enforcement is sought was brought (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 June 2019, Weil, C‑361/18, EU:C:2019:473, paragraph 24).
34 In the present case, the action which led to the judgment recognition of which is at issue in the main proceedings was brought on 20 December 2013 before the English court. It follows that Regulation No 44/2001 is applicable ratione temporis to the dispute before the referring court.
35 In the second place, as regards the applicability ratione loci of Regulation No 44/2001 notwithstanding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 67(2)(a) of the Withdrawal Agreement, read in conjunction with Articles 126 and 127 thereof, Regulation No 1215/2012 applies, to the United Kingdom and in the Member States in a situation involving the United Kingdom, to the recognition and enforcement of judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before the end of the transition period, namely 31 December 2020.
36 It follows that the provisions relating to recognition and enforcement contained in Regulation No 44/2001, which had already been repealed and replaced by Regulation No 1215/2012 when the Withdrawal Agreement was adopted, also remain applicable under the same conditions.
37 In the present case, given that the judgment delivered in England, recognition of which is sought in France, was given in legal proceedings instituted on 20 December 2013, Regulation No 44/2001 is applicable ratione loci to the dispute in the main proceedings.
38 In the third place, as regards the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001, it must be pointed out that, as is apparent from recital 19 of that regulation and in so far as that regulation replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as amended by successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention (‘the Brussels Convention’), in the relations between Member States, the interpretation given by the Court in respect of the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of that regulation whenever the provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others, C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
39 Having regard to the provisions specifically referred to in this reference for a preliminary ruling, it should be noted that there is such equivalence between, on the one hand, Articles 26 and 29 of the Brussels Convention and, on the other, Articles 33 and 36 of Regulation No 44/2001, since the wording of those former articles was essentially reproduced in those latter articles. Accordingly, the interpretation already provided by the Court in respect of the former provisions also applies to the latter and vice versa.
40 In the fourth and last place, as regards the scope of the questions referred in the present case, it must be stated, first, that the situation at issue in the main proceedings corresponds to the situation referred to in Article 33(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, namely a situation in which recognition of a judgment given in a Member State, known as the ‘Member State of origin’, is raised as an incidental question before a court of another Member State, which is known as the ‘Member State addressed’. Second, it is apparent from the report on the Brussels Convention drawn up by P. Jenard (OJ 1979 C 59, p. 44) that the third paragraph of Article 26 of that convention, which is equivalent to Article 33(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, ‘concerns the case where recognition of a judgment is raised as an incidental question in the course of other proceedings’ in order to prevent that judgment from being called into question by the bringing in that other Member State of claims relating to issues identical to those decided by that judgment.
41 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001, read in conjunction with Article 36 of that regulation, must be interpreted as precluding recognition, in the Member State addressed, of a judgment concerning an employment contract given in the Member State of origin from resulting in the inadmissibility of claims brought before a court of the Member State addressed on the ground that the legislation of the Member State of origin lays down a procedural rule governing the centralisation of all claims relating to that employment contract.
42 In that regard, it should be noted, as the Advocate General observed in point 37 of his Opinion, that the concept of ‘recognition’ is not defined by Regulation No 44/2001, which merely states, in Article 33(1), that a judgment given in a Member State must be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required and, in Article 36, that under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.
43 In accordance with settled case-law, the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently, by reference to its scheme and purpose (judgments of 15 November 2012, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung and Others, C‑456/11, EU:C:2012:719, paragraph 25, and of 7 March 2018, E.ON Czech Holding, C‑560/16, EU:C:2018:167, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
44 As regards the objectives of Regulation No 44/2001, it is clear from recitals 2, 6, and 16 thereof that it seeks, in particular, to ensure the free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters given in the Member States bound by that regulation by unifying the rules governing jurisdiction and simplifying the formalities required with a view to their recognition and enforcement (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2018, Società Immobiliare Al Bosco, C‑379/17, EU:C:2018:806, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited, and of 12 December 2019, Aktiva Finants, C‑433/18, EU:C:2019:1074, paragraph 25).
45 As regards the system established by Regulation No 44/2001, recital 16 thereof underlines the importance of mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union, all the more necessary where the courts of the Member States are called on to apply common rules of direct jurisdiction. That mutual trust justifies that judgments given in one Member State are recognised automatically in another Member State, as provided for in Article 33(1) of that regulation, and implies that there should be no review of the substance of such judgments, as required by Article 36 of that regulation (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung and Others, C‑456/11, EU:C:2012:719, paragraphs 28, 35 and 37; of 26 September 2013, Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel, C‑157/12, EU:C:2013:597, paragraphs 31 and 32; and of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands, C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 40).
46 That trust also implies that the provisions relating to the principle of recognition of such a judgment, like those in Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001, are not to be interpreted restrictively, whereas provisions laying down exceptions to that principle must be interpreted strictly (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 November 2012, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung and Others, C‑456/11, EU:C:2012:719, paragraphs 28 and 30; of 16 July 2015, Diageo Brands, C‑681/13, EU:C:2015:471, paragraph 41; and of 20 June 2022, London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association, C‑700/20, EU:C:2022:488, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
47 In that context, as the Court has already pointed out by citing Mr P. Jenard’s report referred to in paragraph 40 of the present judgment, recognition must ‘have the result of conferring on judgments the authority and effectiveness accorded to them in the State in which they were given’. Therefore, a foreign judgment which has been recognised pursuant to Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001 must in principle have the same effects in the State in which recognition is sought as it does in the State of origin (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2012, Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung and Others, C‑456/11, EU:C:2012:719, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
48 As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 42 to 52 of his Opinion, it follows from that case-law that, where recognition of a judgment given in a Member State is relied on the basis of Regulation No 44/2001, it is necessary, in principle, first, to refer solely to the legal rules of the Member State of origin in order to determine the effects which that judgment must have in the Member State addressed and, second, to confer on such a judgment the authority and effectiveness accorded to it in the Member State of origin.
49 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the law of the Member State of origin requires the parties to centralise all their claims relating to the same legal relationship within a single set of proceedings, failing which they will be inadmissible. It is therefore necessary to determine whether such a procedural rule concerns the authority and effectiveness of a judgment given in the Member State of origin where that judgment is recognised in the Member State addressed; accordingly, new claims brought subsequently before a court of the Member State addressed, between the same parties and on the basis of the same legal relationship, are inadmissible.
50 In that regard, it should be noted that such a rule of national law on the centralisation of claims is procedural in nature and is intended to prevent claims relating to a single legal relationship between the parties from giving rise to a multitude of proceedings, both in the interest of the sound administration of justice and in the interest of the parties concerned. Such a rule is not intended to govern the authority and effectiveness accorded to a judgment in the Member State in which it was given, as provided for in the case-law cited in paragraph 47 of the present judgment. Therefore, that rule is not intended to apply for the purposes of determining the effects of a judgment whose recognition is raised to contest the admissibility of an action between the same parties concerning the same legal relationship which was brought in another Member State after that judgment was given.
51 As the Advocate General stated, in essence, in points 58 to 62 of his Opinion, an interpretation to the contrary would risk calling in question the application of the provisions on recognition, which are set out in Chapter III of that regulation, and could also jeopardise the implementation of the provisions establishing, in a unified manner, the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States, which are set out in Chapter II of that regulation, in that such an interpretation would be liable to have the effect of preventing a party from raising new claims before a court which is however designated as having jurisdiction by that regulation.
52 In any event, the Court observed that while recognition must have the effect, in principle, of conferring on foreign judgments the authority and effectiveness accorded to them in the Member State in which they were given, this is not the case when that judgment is being enforced on the ground that, during that stage, there is no reason for granting to a judgment rights which it does not have in the Member State of origin or effects that a similar judgment given directly in the Member State addressed would not have (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 April 2009, Apostolides, C‑420/07, EU:C:2009:271, paragraph 66, and of 4 October 2018, Società Immobiliare Al Bosco, C‑379/17, EU:C:2018:806, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
53 Similarly, where a foreign judgment is recognised in the Member State addressed, it is incorporated into the legal order of that Member State and its procedural rules apply.
54 It is for the referring court to determine the procedural rules applicable following the recognition of the judgment given in the Member State of origin and the possible procedural consequences regarding claims made subsequently.
55 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that Article 33 of Regulation No 44/2001, read in conjunction with Article 36 of that regulation, must be interpreted as precluding the recognition, in the Member State addressed, of a judgment concerning an employment contract, given in the Member State of origin, from resulting in the inadmissibility of claims brought before a court of the Member State addressed on the ground that the legislation of the Member State of origin lays down a procedural rule for the centralisation of all claims relating to that employment contract, without prejudice to the procedural rules of the Member State addressed which are liable to apply once that recognition has occurred.
56 In the light of the answer to the first question, there is no need to answer the second and third questions.
57 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.