1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between JX and FTI Touristik GmbH, a tour operator, concerning the damages sought by JX on account of the claim that he had not been adequately informed by FTI Touristik of the entry conditions and visa requirements for his travel in the third State concerned. Legal context European Union law Regulation No 1215/2012
3 Recitals 3, 4, 15, 18 and 26 of Regulation No 1215/2012 are worded as follows: ‘(3) The [European] Union has set itself the objective of maintaining and developing an area of freedom, security and justice, inter alia, by facilitating access to justice, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extra-judicial decisions in civil matters. For the gradual establishment of such an area, the Union is to adopt measures relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters, having cross-border implications, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. (4) Certain differences between national rules governing jurisdiction and recognition of judgments hamper the sound operation of the internal market. Provisions to unify the rules of conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and to ensure rapid and simple recognition and enforcement of judgments given in a Member State, are essential. … (15) The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the [subject matter] of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor. The domicile of a legal person must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. … (18) In relation to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules. … (26) Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifies the principle that judgments given in a Member State should be recognised in all Member States without the need for any special procedure. In addition, the aim of making cross-border litigation less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition of the declaration of enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State addressed. …’
4 Article 7 of that regulation is worded as follows: ‘A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: (1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question; …’
5 Section 4 of Chapter II of that regulation, entitled ‘Jurisdiction over consumer contracts’ consists of Articles 17 to 19 of that regulation. Article 17 of that regulation provides: ‘1. In matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 6 and point 5 of Article 7, if: (a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; (b) it is a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or (c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 2. Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States, that party shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that Member State. 3. This Section shall not apply to a contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation.’
6 Article 18(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides: ‘1. A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled. 2. Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled.’
7 Article 19(3) of that regulation is worded as follows: ‘The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement: … (3) which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that Member State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that Member State.’
8 Article 24(1) of that regulation states: ‘The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of the parties: (1) in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated. However, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, provided that the tenant is a natural person and that the landlord and the tenant are domiciled in the same Member State.’
9 Article 25(1) of that regulation provides: ‘If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State. …’ Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006
10 Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (OJ 2006 L 399, p. 1) provides: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation, a cross-border case is one in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised.’ German law
11 Under Paragraph 12 of the Zivilprozessordnung (German Code of Civil Procedure) of 5 December 2005 (BGBl. 2005 I, p. 3202), last amended by the law of 7 November 2022 (BGBl. 2022 I, p. 1982) (‘the ZPO’), entitled ‘General place of jurisdiction; concept’: ‘The court at which a person has his or her general place of jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction for all actions brought against him or her, unless exclusive jurisdiction has been established for an action.’
12 In accordance with Paragraph 17(1) of the ZPO, in the case of legal persons, general jurisdiction depends on the place of their registered seat.
13 Paragraph 21(1) of the ZPO, entitled ‘Special place of jurisdiction for branch establishments’, provides: ‘Where, for the purpose of operating a factory or carrying on a trade or other business, a person has a branch establishment from which business is conducted directly, any action against him or her relating to the commercial operation of the branch establishment may be brought against him or her before the court of the place where the branch establishment is situated.’
14 Under Paragraph 29 of the ZPO, entitled ‘Special place of jurisdiction for the place of performance’: ‘1. For disputes arising from a contractual relationship and relating to the existence of the latter, the court of the place where the obligation at issue is to be performed shall have jurisdiction. …’ The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
15 On 15 December 2021, JX, a private individual domiciled in Nuremberg (Germany), concluded a package travel contract with FTI Touristik, a tour operator having its registered seat in Munich (Germany). The booking of that travel was carried out by a travel agency established in Nuremberg, which is neither a party to the contract nor a branch of FTI Touristik.
16 Taking the view that he was not adequately informed of the entry conditions and necessary visa requirements for his travel in the third State concerned, JX brought an action for damages in the amount of EUR 1 499.86 before the court of his place of domicile, namely, the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Local Court, Nuremberg, Germany), which is the referring court. According to JX, the territorial jurisdiction of that court derives from Articles 17 and 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012.
17 FTI Touristik contests the territorial jurisdiction of the referring court by claiming that Regulation No 1215/2012 does not apply to purely internal situations such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings, in which the traveller and the tour operator are domiciled in the same Member State. In such a situation, the international element required for that regulation to be applicable does not exist.
18 As regards the determination of its territorial jurisdiction, the referring court recalls that the general rules on jurisdiction set out in Paragraphs 12 and 17 of the ZPO designate the court of the registered seat of the defendant in the main proceedings as having territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant in the main proceedings is a consumer and the defendant in the main proceedings is a professional. According to the referring court, the rules on derogating jurisdiction set out in Paragraph 21(1) and Paragraph 29 of the ZPO are inapplicable, given that the travel agency established in Nuremberg, through which the applicant in the main proceedings booked his trip, is not a branch of the defendant in the main proceedings and given that nothing in the case files indicates that the obligations of that defendant arising from the travel contract at issue ought to have been performed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Local Court, Nuremberg).
19 In the view of the referring court, the only provision likely to justify the territorial jurisdiction of the referring court in this case is Article 18(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. In the case in the main proceedings, as the consumer and the tour operator are both domiciled in the same Member State, the international element enabling, where appropriate, that provision to be applied, could only be the travel destination abroad.
20 In that regard, the referring court points out that, according to a prevailing line of case-law in Germany, the international element required for the application of Regulation No 1215/2012 is not fulfilled if the only factor connecting it with an international country is the destination of the organised travel. That approach is supported, in particular, by the fact that the provisions of that regulation are to be interpreted strictly, and in the light of the judgments of 17 November 2011, Hypoteční banka (C‑327/10, EU:C:2011:745), and of 19 December 2013, Corman-Collins (C‑9/12, EU:C:2013:860). It is also supported by the purpose of that regulation, which consists in determining international jurisdiction in a way which guarantees that the parties to a dispute have a certain forum and that they are not obliged to search for judicial protection in another Member State or in a third State and in not encroaching on the rules of national jurisdiction where those rules ensure appropriate protection in the State of which the party is a national, and by the necessity to be based on a normative international element and not one which is purely substantive.
21 The referring court notes, however, that certain authoritative authors accept the existence of an international element without it always being necessary for the applicant and the defendant to be domiciled in two different Member States. Articles 18, 24 and 25 of Regulation No 1215/2012 may support that approach. Furthermore, it is not possible to distinguish between the normative and substantive character of the international element, which may result from information specific to the particular case, such as, here, the destination of the travel.
22 In those circumstances, the Amtsgericht Nürnberg (Local Court, Nuremberg) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Is Article 18(1) of Regulation [No 1215/2012] to be interpreted as meaning that, in addition to providing for international jurisdiction, the rule also concerns a provision on the territorial jurisdiction of national courts in matters relating to a travel contract where both the consumer, as a traveller, and the other party to the contract, the tour operator[,] have their seat in the same Member State, but the travel destination is situated not in that Member State but abroad (so-called “false internal cases”) with the consequence that the consumer can make contractual claims against the tour operator supplementing national provisions on jurisdiction at the court of his or her place of residence?’ Consideration of the question referred
23 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that it determines both the international and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose judicial district the consumer is domiciled, where such a court is seised, by that consumer, of a dispute between that consumer and a tour operator following the conclusion of a package travel contract, and where those two contracting parties are both domiciled in that Member State, but where the destination of that travel is abroad.
24 In order to answer that question, it is necessary, in the first place, to determine whether a dispute, such as that in the main proceedings, in which the applicant and the defendant are domiciled in the same Member State, is capable of falling within the scope of that regulation.
25 In that regard, it follows from settled case-law that the application of the rules of jurisdiction of Regulation No 1215/2012 requires the existence of an international element. Recitals 3 and 26 of that regulation use the concepts of ‘civil matters having cross-border implications’ and of ‘cross-border litigation’ respectively, without that regulation containing any definition of that international element (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2024, Inkreal , C‑566/22, EU:C:2024:123, paragraphs 18 and 19 and the case-law cited).
26 However, it is also clear from the case-law of the Court that an international element exists where the situation of the dispute concerned is such as to raise questions relating to the determination of international jurisdiction (judgment of 8 February 2024, Inkreal , C‑566/22, EU:C:2024:123, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
27 As regards the determination of the international nature of the legal relationship at issue, the Court has repeatedly referred to the respective domiciles of the parties to the dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 May 2020, Parking and Interplastics , C‑267/19 and C‑323/19, EU:C:2020:351, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
28 If the international element is manifestly present, assuming that at least one of the parties has his or her domicile or habitual residence in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised, the international character may however, as noted by the Advocate General in point 32 of his Opinion, also result from various factors related, inter alia, to the subject matter of the proceedings.
29 Accordingly, the involvement of a Member State and a third State, for example, because the applicant and one defendant are domiciled in the first State and the events at issue occurred in the second, would also make the legal relationship at issue international in nature, since that situation is such as to raise questions in the Member State relating to the determination of international jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2022, IRnova , C‑399/21, EU:C:2022:648, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
30 It follows from the foregoing that a dispute relating to contractual obligations supposed to be performed in a third State or in a Member State other than the Member State in which the two parties have their seat raises questions in relation to the determination of international jurisdiction and, therefore, fulfils the condition of the international element required in order for the dispute to fall within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012.
31 In relation to disputes between consumers and traders, that interpretation is supported, furthermore, by Article 18(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, which provides that the rule in favour of the consumer laid down in that provision applies ‘regardless of the domicile of the other party’, whereby the consumers are able to rely on that rule against undertakings domiciled not only in other Member States or in third States, but also in the same Member State as that of the consumer’s domicile.
32 Moreover, as is apparent from the wording of Article 19(3) of Regulation No 1215/2012, the EU legislature has expressly referred to the situation where agreements have been ‘entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same Member State’.
33 Such an interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of Regulation No 1215/2012, the Court having repeatedly held that that regulation seeks to unify the rules on conflict of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters by way of rules of jurisdiction which are highly predictable and thus pursues an objective of legal certainty which consists in strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union, by enabling the applicant to identify easily the court before which he or she may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he or she may be sued. In that context, the objective of legal certainty requires that the national court seised may easily decide on its own jurisdiction, without being obliged to examine the merits of the case (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2024, Inkreal , C‑566/22, EU:C:2024:123, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
34 As noted by the Advocate General in point 51 of his Opinion, whether the connection between the claim and the foreign country may be more or less strong depending on the dispute in question, the assessment of whether a dispute contains an ‘international element’ should be sufficiently easy for the court seised. Here, a case involving a traveller’s claim concerning problems suffered in relation to a trip abroad, organised and sold by a tour operator, must, independently of the precise nature of those problems, be treated as international for the purposes of Regulation No 1215/2012, the destination of the trip being an easy element to check and making the applicable jurisdictional regime predictable for the parties.
35 Furthermore, the interpretation of the concept of ‘international element’ such as that set out in paragraph 30 of this judgment cannot be called into question by the reference made, for the sake of completeness, by the Court’s earlier case-law to the concept of ‘cross-border case’ which is defined in Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1896/2006 as a case in which at least one of the parties is domiciled or habitually resident in a Member State other than the Member State of the court seised (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 May 2020, Parking and Interplastics , C‑267/19 and C‑323/19, EU:C:2020:351, paragraph 34, and of 3 June 2021, Generalno konsulstvo na Republika Bulgaria , C‑280/20, EU:C:2021:443, paragraph 33, and the case-law cited).
36 As the Advocate General observed in point 37 of his Opinion, even though Regulation No 1215/2012 and Regulation No 1896/2006 both belong to the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, it does not follow from that to the extent that the provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012 should be interpreted in the light of those of Regulation No 1896/2006, given that the subject matter and scope of those two instruments are not equivalent.
37 While Regulation No 1215/2012 aims to unify the rules of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and those rules must, in principle, be applied and prevail over national rules of jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2021, Markt24 , C‑804/19, EU:C:2021:134, paragraphs 30 and 32), Regulation No 1896/2006 introduces a uniform and alternative instrument for the recovery of debts, without, however, replacing or harmonising the mechanisms for the recovery of debts under national law (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 June 2012, Banco Español de Crédito , C‑618/10, EU:C:2012:349, paragraph 79, and of 13 June 2013, Goldbet Sportwetten , C‑144/12, EU:C:2013:393, paragraph 28).
38 That interpretation of the concept of the ‘international element’ cannot be called into question by the fact that Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 constitutes a derogation both from the general rule of jurisdiction laid down in Article 4 of that regulation, which confers jurisdiction upon the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, and from the rule of special jurisdiction for contracts, set out in Article 7(1) of that regulation, under which jurisdiction lies with the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question on which the claim is based has been or must be performed, and which must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, judgment of 28 January 2015, Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37, paragraph 28).
39 As highlighted by the Advocate General in point 53 of his Opinion, the concept of the ‘international element makes it possible to delimit the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012 and its assessment must be carried out in an identical manner, irrespective of the general or derogating nature of the rule of jurisdiction at issue.
40 It follows from all of the foregoing that a dispute relating to a travel contract falls within the scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, even though the contracting parties, namely the consumer and the other party to the contract, are both domiciled in the same Member State whereas the destination of the trip is abroad.
41 In the second place, as regards the question whether Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2015 determines both the international and the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned, it follows from the very wording of paragraph 1 of that article that the rules of jurisdiction stipulated in that provision, where the action is brought by a consumer, are aimed at, on the one hand ‘the courts of the Member State in which [that other] party is domiciled’ and, on the other hand, ‘the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled’.
42 If the first of the two rules accordingly set out merely confers international jurisdiction on the judicial system of the designated State, taken as a whole, the second rule directly confers territorial jurisdiction on the court for the locality of the consumer’s domicile.
43 As noted by the Advocate General in point 18 of his Opinion, that second rule determines not only the international jurisdiction of the court concerned, but also its territorial jurisdiction, in directly designating a precise court within a Member State, without reference to the rules on allocation of territorial jurisdiction in force in that Member State.
44 That interpretation is supported by the objectives pursued by the provisions of Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012. As is apparent from recital 18 of that regulation, contracts concluded by consumers are characterised by a certain imbalance between the parties, which the provisions of Article 18 of that regulation are intended to correct by giving the weaker party the benefit of the rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his or her interests than the general rules (see, by analogy, in relation to insurance contracts, judgment of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung , C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraph 49).
45 In particular, the rule of special jurisdiction under Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 is designed to ensure that the weaker party who intends to bring an action against a stronger party can do so before a court of a Member State which is easily accessible (see, by analogy, in relation to insurance contracts, judgment of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung , C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraph 50).
46 As highlighted by the Advocate General in points 59 and 61 of his Opinion, that rule protects the consumer by facilitating access to justice and shows the concern of the EU legislature that a consumer may be discouraged from suing if the competent court, while being within the Member State in which he or she lives, were not the court for his or her domicile.
47 It follows from all of the foregoing that the answer to the question referred is that Article 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that it determines both the international and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose judicial district the consumer is domiciled, where such a court is seised, by that consumer, of a dispute between that consumer and a tour operator following the conclusion of a package travel contract, and where those two contracting parties are both domiciled in that Member State, but where the destination of that travel is abroad. Costs
48 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules: Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that it determines both the international and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose judicial district the consumer is domiciled, where such a court is seised, by that consumer, of a dispute between that consumer and a tour operator following the conclusion of a package travel contract, and where those two contracting parties are both domiciled in that Member State, but where the destination of that travel is abroad. [Signatures] * Language of the case: German.