1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 19 and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2 The request has been made in connection with an extradition request sent by the Georgian authorities to the French authorities in respect of KN, who holds Greek and Georgian nationalities, for the purpose of enforcing a life sentence in Georgia.
3 The European Convention on Extradition, signed in Paris on 13 December 1957 (‘the European Convention on Extradition’), to which the French Republic and Georgia, inter alia, are parties, provides, in Article 1 thereof entitled ‘Obligation to extradite’: ‘The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other, subject to the provisions and conditions laid down in this Convention, all persons against whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who are wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a sentence or detention order.’
4 When it ratified that convention, the French Republic made the following two reservations, among others: ‘Extradition may be refused if surrender is likely to have consequences of an exceptional gravity for the person sought, particularly by reason of his age or state of health. Extradition shall not be granted if the person sought would be tried in the requesting State by a tribunal which does not assure the fundamental procedural guarantees and the protection of the rights of the defence or by a tribunal created for that person’s particular case or if extradition is requested for the enforcement of a sentence or detention order imposed by such a tribunal.’
5 The first paragraph of Article 18 TFEU states: ‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’
6 Article 21(1) TFEU provides: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.’
7 Under Article 67(1) and (3) TFEU: ‘1. The [European] Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. … 3. The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.’
8 According to Article 82(1) TFEU: ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83. The European Parliament and the Council [of the European Union], acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to: …’
9 Article 19 of the Charter, entitled ‘Protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition’, provides, in paragraph 2: ‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’
10 Article 47 of the Charter, headed ‘Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’, states, in the second paragraph: ‘Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.’
11 Article 696-4 of the code de procédure pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure) provides: ‘Extradition shall not be granted if: (1) the requested person had French nationality at the time of the offence for which extradition is sought; …’
12 On 3 December 2010, KN, who holds Greek and Georgian nationalities, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment by the Municipal Court of Poti (Georgia). That sentence was confirmed in absentia on 3 June 2011 by the Court of Appeal of Koutaïssi (Georgia). The offences, committed in Georgia and Türkiye in 2008 and 2009, involved the international trafficking of particularly large quantities of cocaine as part of an organised gang, preparations for the commission of group murder and the illegal possession of firearms.
13 On 2 July 2021, the Georgian authorities asked Interpol to issue a ‘red notice’ in respect of KN, constituting a request for provisional arrest for the purpose of extradition, on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Koutaïssi of 3 June 2011.
14 On 4 October 2021, KN was provisionally arrested in Belgium, where he resided, on the basis of that ‘red notice’. On 13 October 2021, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Georgia submitted an extradition request to the Belgian authorities. After being initially detained for the purpose of extradition, KN was released but was placed under non-custodial judicial supervision from 29 October 2021, pending a decision by the Belgian courts on the extradition request.
15 On 20 January 2025, KN was arrested in France on the basis of the ‘red notice’. The following day, the Georgian authorities sent the French authorities an extradition request similar to that submitted to the Belgian authorities and KN was detained in France for the purpose of extradition.
16 By judgment of 19 February 2025, the indictment division of the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels, Belgium), on the basis of Belgian extradition legislation and Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), refused the request for extradition submitted by the Georgian authorities, finding that there were compelling grounds for believing that the extradition of KN to Georgia would expose him to a denial of justice and a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.
17 On 28 February 2025, in the extradition proceedings initiated in France, KN appeared before the procureur général de Montpellier (Public Prosecutor, Montpellier, France) and stated that he did not consent to extradition.
18 Following that refusal, KN was referred, on 1 March 2025, to the investigating chamber of the cour d’appel de Montpellier (Court of Appeal, Montpellier, France), which is the referring court. He argues before that court that EU law, in particular the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition of judicial decisions taken by the Member States, require the French authorities to recognise the judgment of the indictment division of the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) of 19 February 2025 and, consequently, to refuse his extradition to Georgia. That judgment, which is criminal in nature, recognised his right - guaranteed by the European Union - not to be extradited to a third country if there is a real risk that he would be exposed in that country to inhuman or degrading treatment or a denial of justice.
19 Before the referring court, the Public Prosecutor of Montpellier made clear that the processing of that extradition request by the French authorities is subject to compliance with Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR and that KN, who holds Greek and Georgian nationalities, had claimed that there was a serious risk of being exposed not only to a denial of justice, but also to inhuman or degrading treatment on account of the detention conditions in Georgia. In the light of the political instability affecting that country since November 2024, the Public Prosecutor of Montpellier asked the referring court to find that it was not in a position to secure reliable assurances from the Georgian authorities that the rights provided for in those articles would be respected.
20 The referring court notes that Article 1 of the European Convention on Extradition, to which Georgia is a party as a member of the Council of Europe, requires the requested person to be extradited where the legal conditions are met, subject to the exceptions laid down and the reservations made by the contracting parties. It points out that, under the reservations made by the French Republic, extradition is not to be granted if the requested person would be tried by a court which does not guarantee the fundamental rights of the defence and it may be refused if it is liable to have consequences of an exceptional gravity for that person.
21 The referring court raises the question of whether the judgment of the indictment division of the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) of 19 February 2025, by which that court held that, if KN were extradited to Georgia, he would be exposed to a serious risk of denial of justice and of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, has no authority vis-à-vis the French courts under the principles of mutual trust and mutual recognition. According to the referring court, it is only where EU law makes express provision for such recognition that the courts of a Member State are required, in accordance with those principles, to recognise the authority of decisions delivered by the courts of another Member State.
22 In those circumstances, the investigating chamber of the cour d’appel de Montpellier (Court of Appeal, Montpellier) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must [Article] 67(3) and [Article] 82(1) TFEU, in conjunction with Articles 19 and 47 of [the Charter], be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is obliged to refuse to execute an extradition request for a citizen of the European Union to a third country when another Member State has previously refused to execute the same extradition request on the grounds that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment enshrined in Article 19 of [the Charter] and the right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of [the Charter]?’
23 The referring court has requested that the case be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court.
24 It follows from those provisions that the application of that procedure is subject to two cumulative conditions. First, the reference for a preliminary ruling must raise questions of interpretation relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, which is the subject of Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty. Secondly, the circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings, as described by the referring court, must be characterised by the existence of a situation of urgency.
25 As regards the first condition, it should be noted that the present request for a preliminary ruling concerns, inter alia, the interpretation of Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU, provisions falling within Title V of Part Three of that treaty, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice. Accordingly, that request may be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.
26 As regards the second condition, relating to urgency, it follows from settled case-law that that condition is satisfied where the person concerned is currently deprived of his or her liberty and his or her continued detention turns on the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings, bearing in mind that that person’s situation must be assessed as it stood on the date of consideration of the request to have the case dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure (see, inter alia, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian, C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
27 In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that KN has been detained for the purpose of extradition since 21 January 2025, so that he is currently deprived of his liberty. Furthermore, the question submitted by the referring court seeks to determine whether it must refuse to extradite that person under EU law. If the Court answers that question in the affirmative, KN should, in principle, be released.
28 In those circumstances, the Third Chamber of the Court, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decided, on 3 April 2025, to grant the referring court’s request that the present reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.
29 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU must be interpreted as requiring a Member State to refuse to extradite a national of another Member State to a third country where the authorities of a third Member State have previously refused to execute an extradition request from that third country concerning the enforcement of the same sentence imposed on that national of another Member State, due to the existence of a serious risk of infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(2) and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
30 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, in the absence of an extradition agreement between the European Union and the third country concerned, the rules on extradition fall within the competence of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 26, and of 17 December 2020, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition to Ukraine), C‑398/19, EU:C:2020:1032, paragraph 28).
31 Nevertheless, Member States are required to exercise that competence in accordance with EU law, in particular, the prohibition on discrimination laid down in Article 18 TFEU and the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States guaranteed by Article 21(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina), C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 29).
32 In the first place, it should be pointed out that, by virtue of having EU citizenship, a national of a Member State who moves or resides lawfully within the territory of another Member State is entitled to rely on Article 21(1) TFEU and falls within the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU, which lays down the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius, C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 27, and of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina), C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 30).
33 The fact that a national of a Member State other than the Member State to which the extradition request in respect of him or her was submitted also holds the nationality of the third country which made that request cannot prevent that national from asserting the rights and freedoms conferred by EU citizenship, in particular those guaranteed by Article 18 and Article 21(1) TFEU. The fact that the requested person is, at the same time, a national of a Member State and of a third country cannot deprive that person of those rights and freedoms (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina), C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
34 In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that KN - who holds, inter alia, Greek nationality - exercised, as an EU citizen, his right, provided for in Article 21(1) TFEU, to move freely in another Member State, so that his situation falls within the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, despite the fact that he also holds the nationality of the third country which made the request for extradition to which he is subject.
35 Furthermore, the fact that, when the extradition request at issue in the main proceedings was submitted to the authorities of the French Republic, KN was permanently resident not in the territory of that Member State, but in the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium, is not capable of casting doubt on that finding. The temporary nature of the stay in the territory of the requested Member State is not such as to exclude the situation of the national of another Member State, referred to in that request, from the scope of application of the Treaties, within the meaning of Article 18 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 April 2018, Pisciotti, C‑191/16, EU:C:2018:222, paragraph 34).
36 In the second place, the French Government explained that, under Article 696-4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the French Republic does not extradite its own nationals to third countries, but that that provision does not prevent that Member State from extraditing nationals of other Member States to third countries for the purpose of enforcing a sentence imposed there.
37 It is clear from the Court’s settled case-law that a national rule which prohibits only nationals of the Member State concerned from being extradited introduces a difference in treatment depending on whether the requested person is a national of that Member State or a national of another Member State and thus gives rise to unequal treatment liable to affect the freedom of the latter to move and reside within the European Union (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 32, and of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius, C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 28).
38 It follows that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, the unequal treatment which allows the extradition of an EU citizen who is a national of another Member State, such as KN, gives rise to a restriction of freedom of movement, within the meaning of Article 21 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 33, and of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius, C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 30).
39 In the present case, although the referring court does not ask the Court whether such a restriction is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, it does ask whether certain fundamental rights provided for by the Charter could preclude an extradition such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
40 Where national legislation is liable to obstruct the exercise of one or more fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, in this case the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States provided for in Article 21(1) TFEU, that legislation can be justified in the light of EU law only in so far as it is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which is ensured by the Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 1991, ERT, C‑260/89, EU:C:1991:254, paragraphs 42 and 43). Furthermore, according to settled case-law, such legislation must be regarded as ‘implementing Union law’ within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 September 2023, Bezirkshauptmannschaft Feldkirch, C‑55/22, EU:C:2023:670, paragraph 29, and of 12 December 2024, Nemzeti Földügyi Központ, C‑419/23, EU:C:2024:1016, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
41 It follows that the requested Member State, which does not extradite its own nationals, is required to examine, before deciding to extradite a national of another Member State under, inter alia, the European Convention on Extradition, whether that decision, as a decision implementing EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, could infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, in particular in the second paragraph of Article 47 thereof, enshrining the fundamental right to a fair trial, or Article 19(2) thereof, under which no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius, C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 49, and of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina), C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 55).
42 To that end, the competent authority of the requested Member State must rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, judgments of courts of the requesting third country, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations. The existence of declarations and the accession to international treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient to ensure that the requested person is adequately protected against the risk of human or degrading treatment, where reliable sources have reported practices, carried out or tolerated by the authorities of that third country, which are manifestly contrary to the principles of the ECHR (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin, C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 57 and 59).
43 It is against that background that the referring court enquires whether Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU require it to recognise the judgment of the indictment division of the cour d’appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) of 19 February 2025, mentioned in paragraph 16 above, by which that court refused to extradite KN on the ground that extradition would expose him to a serious risk of infringement of the fundamental right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, enshrined in Article 19(2) of the Charter, and the fundamental right to a fair trial, referred to in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
44 In that regard, it should be noted, first, that neither Article 67(3) nor Article 82(1) TFEU can serve as the basis for an obligation of mutual recognition of decisions of the Member States refusing extradition requests from a third country.
45 Article 67(3) TFEU states that ‘the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia’, in particular ‘through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters’ and ‘if necessary, through the approximation of [the] criminal laws’ of the Member States. Furthermore, the first subparagraph of Article 82(1) TFEU provides that ‘judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’, in particular those referred to in point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(1), under which ‘the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to … lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the Union of all forms of judgments and judicial decisions’.
46 It is apparent from the wording of those provisions that they do not actually establish an obligation of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions in criminal matters adopted in the Member States; they merely provide that judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the European Union is based on the principle of mutual recognition. Point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 82(1) TFEU thus simply states that the Parliament and the Council are to adopt measures to lay down rules and procedures for ensuring the recognition of all forms of judgments and judicial decisions.
47 Secondly, although EU law includes several instruments of secondary legislation laying down an obligation of mutual recognition of certain judgments and judicial decisions in criminal matters, in particular Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1) and Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (OJ 2008 L 327, p. 27), it must be stated that no act of EU law lays down an obligation of mutual recognition of decisions adopted by Member States concerning extradition requests from a third country.
48 Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition does not apply to decisions refusing extradition requests adopted by Member States.
49 By contrast, the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly as regards the area of freedom, security and justice, each Member State, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law (judgments of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 57, and of 29 July 2024, Breian, C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 36).
50 Concerning the European arrest warrant governed by Framework Decision 2002/584, the Court has held that, where another Member State has adopted a decision not to execute such a warrant due to the existence of a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, that principle requires the executing authority of a Member State to which a new request for surrender of the person concerned has been made to give due consideration to the reasons underlying that decision, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a ground for non-execution (judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian, C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 46).
51 For the same reasons, it must be held that, where a Member State has adopted a decision refusing to extradite the requested person to a third country due to a serious risk to that person of infringement of the fundamental right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, enshrined in Article 19(2) of the Charter, and the fundamental right to a fair trial, referred to in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, the principle of mutual trust requires the competent authority of another Member State, to which a new extradition request from the same third country concerning the same person has been made, to give due consideration to the reasons underlying that refusal decision, within the framework of its own examination of the existence of a risk of infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
52 As the Advocate General stated in point 49 of her Opinion, a previous decision refusing extradition, adopted in another Member State, based on the existence of a serious risk of infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, forms part of the information, referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 42 above, that the Member State to which a new extradition request has been made must take into consideration within the framework of its own examination.
53 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU must be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to refuse to extradite a national of another Member State to a third country where the authorities of a third Member State have previously refused to execute an extradition request from that third country concerning the enforcement of the same sentence imposed on that national of another Member State, due to the existence of a serious risk of infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(2) and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter.
54 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.