1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the provisions of Chapter II and Article 66 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1) and of the provisions of Chapter II of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between G.M.K-Z.B.M, a Polish municipal authority, and S.O., a natural person domiciled in the Netherlands, concerning the payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property situated in Poland.
3 Recitals 11, 12 and 15 of Regulation No 44/2001 were worded as follows: ‘(11) The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the [subject matter] of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor. … (12) In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. … (15) In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States. …’
4 Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, included Section 1, entitled ‘General provisions’, which contained Articles 2 to 4 of that regulation.
5 Article 2 of that regulation provided, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’
6 Article 3 of that regulation stated, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of [Chapter II].’
7 Section 2 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001 was entitled ‘Special jurisdiction’ and comprised Articles 5 to 7 of that regulation.
8 Under Article 5 of that regulation: ‘A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 1. (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question; … 3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur; …’
9 Article 6 of that regulation provided: ‘A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings; …’
10 Section 6 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, entitled ‘Exclusive jurisdiction’, comprised Article 22, which provided: ‘The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: 1. in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated. However, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, provided that the tenant is a natural person and that the landlord and the tenant are domiciled in the same Member State; …’
11 Regulation No 1215/2012 repealed and replaced Regulation No 44/2001.
12 Recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012 states: ‘Continuity between the [Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction of judgments and enforcement in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), as amended by the successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention (“the Brussels Convention”)], Regulation [No 44/2001] and this Regulation should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the … Brussels Convention and of the Regulations replacing it.’
13 Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, entitled ‘Jurisdiction’, includes Section 2, entitled ‘Special jurisdiction’, which contains Articles 7 to 9 of that regulation.
14 Under Article 7 of that regulation: ‘A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: (1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question; … (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur; …’
15 Article 8 of that regulation provides: ‘A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: (1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings; …’
16 Section 6 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, entitled ‘Exclusive jurisdiction’, includes Article 24 of that regulation, which provides: ‘The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of the parties: (1) in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated. However, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, provided that the tenant is a natural person and that the landlord and the tenant are domiciled in the same Member State; …’
17 In Chapter VI of that regulation, entitled ‘Transitional provisions’, Article 66 provides: ‘1. This Regulation shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded on or after 10 January 2015. 2. Notwithstanding Article 80, Regulation [No 44/2001] shall continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted, to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or concluded before 10 January 2015 which fall within the scope of that Regulation.’
18 Article 18(1) of the Ustawa o ochronie praw lokatorów, mieszkaniowym zasobie gminy i o zmianie Kodeksu cywilnego (Law on the protection of tenants’ rights, municipal housing stock and amendments to the Civil Code), of 21 June 2001 (Dz. U No 71, item 733), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Law on the protection of tenants’ rights’), provides: ‘Persons occupying a property without legal title shall be obliged to pay compensation on a monthly basis until the date on which the property is vacated.’
19 Article 505 of the ustawa - Kodeks postępowania cywilnego (Law on the Code of Civil Procedure), of 17 November 1964 (Dz. U. No 43, item 296), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Code of Civil Procedure’), provides: ‘§ 1. The defendant may lodge a statement of opposition to the order for payment. § 2. The order for payment shall become null and void in so far as it is contested by the statement of opposition. A statement of opposition by only one of the co-defendants concerning the same case and concerning one or more of the claims granted shall render the order null and void only as regards those claims. …’
20 In 1994, T.O., a natural person, concluded a tenancy agreement with G.M.K.-Z.B.M., a Polish municipal authority, for housing situated in Koszalin (Poland), in which that person lived with her three children, including S.O. That agreement was later terminated by that municipal authority. In 2007, a Polish court ordered the eviction of the occupants from that housing; however, according to that municipal authority, the occupants did not vacate the property.
21 On 15 March 2013, G.M.K.-Z.B.M. brought an action before the Sąd Rejonowy w Koszalinie I Wydział Cywilny (District Court (First Civil Division), Koszalin, Poland), the referring court, for payment of compensation. By that action, which appears to have been brought under Article 18 of the Law on the protection of tenants’ rights, G.M.K.-Z.B.M. sought payment, from T.O. and her three children, of compensation for the non-contractual use of the housing concerned between 2011 and 2012. A residential address in Poland for all those defendants was stated in the application.
22 Following that action, an order for payment was issued. That order was received, in Poland, by one of those defendants on behalf of all the others. Since that order was not, at that time, challenged, it was declared valid and enforceable.
23 On 7 July 2023, S.O. duly lodged a statement of opposition to that order for payment under Article 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting that the case be reviewed and the action of 15 March 2013 against her be dismissed as inadmissible. S.O. contended that the Polish courts lacked jurisdiction, stating that since 2007 she had been residing solely in the Netherlands. S.O. added that she had never concluded a tenancy agreement in relation to the housing in question.
24 By contrast, G.M.K.-Z.B.M. maintained that the Polish courts did have jurisdiction. That authority claimed that there is such a close connection between the defendants concerned, inasmuch as that they are related and lived together in that housing, that it is expedient to determine together the requests for payment made against them.
25 In that context, the referring court is uncertain as to, in the first place, the scope ratione temporis of Regulation No 44/2001, as compared to that of Regulation No 1215/2012, which replaced it, and, specifically, the interpretation of the concept of ‘legal proceedings instituted’, set out in Article 66 of the latter regulation. It wishes to know whether that term relates, in the present case, to the action seeking compensation, which was brought by the applicant in the main proceedings on 15 March 2013, or to the statement of opposition to the order for payment made following that action, which was brought by S.O. on 7 July 2023 seeking a review of the case concerned.
26 In the second place, the referring court seeks to establish whether it follows from the provisions of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, or from those of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, if the latter is found to apply, that a person domiciled in one Member State may be sued before a court of another Member State, before which an action for payment of compensation is brought for the non-contractual use of immovable property situated in that other Member State.
27 First, the referring court asks whether such an action falls within the concept of ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, or Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012. The judgment of 25 March 2021, Obala i lučice (C‑307/19, EU:C:2021:236), states that that concept covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and do not concern ‘matters relating to a contract’ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 or Article 7(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012. However, it is apparent from Polish case-law that, as regards the Law on the protection of tenants’ rights, residing in another person’s property without legal title does not constitute a tortious act.
28 Second, that court wishes to know whether it may be inferred from Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 or Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 that it must examine the action brought before it so as to decide jointly in respect of all the persons concerned by that action who have resided in the housing in question. A possibility arises from Polish law that different judgments may be delivered in respect of each of those persons, depending on whether the individual concerned did or did not occupy that housing after the termination of the tenancy agreement in question, because there is no joint and several liability between those persons. That possibility could indicate that those provisions do not apply to the dispute in the main proceedings as the basis for the international jurisdiction of that court.
29 Third, the referring court seeks to establish whether an action for payment of compensation for the use, without legal title, of immovable property belonging to another, after the termination of the tenancy agreement relating to it, constitutes an action ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property’, within the meaning of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 or Article 24(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. According to that court, such an interpretation should be rejected in light of the judgment of 3 October 2013, Schneider (C‑386/12, EU:C:2013:633).
30 Lastly, that court states that if none of the provisions of Regulations No 44/2001 and No 1215/2012, referred to in paragraphs 27 to 29 above, establishes the jurisdiction of the Polish courts, it will dismiss as inadmissible the action brought on 15 March 2013 by the applicant in the main proceedings.
31 In those circumstances, the Sąd Rejonowy w Koszalinie I Wydział Cywilny (District Court (First Civil Division), Koszalin) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must Article 66 of Regulation [No 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that the “institution of legal proceedings” means the lodging of an application by an applicant in a procedural matter or the lodging, by the defendant, of a request for review of the case after the definitive conclusion thereof, and, depending on the answer to the above question: (2) Must the provisions of Chapter II of [Regulation No 44/2001] or the provisions of Chapter II of [Regulation No 1215/2012] be interpreted as meaning that a person domiciled in one Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State for payment of remuneration for the non-contractual use of immovable property situated in that other Member State?’
32 By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 66(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing the applicability ratione temporis of that regulation, legal proceedings are considered to be instituted, within the meaning of that provision, on the date on which the applicant brought his or her action, in a case in which there was subsequently a judgment, or on the date on which the defendant, at a later stage, lodged a statement of opposition against that judgment seeking a review of the case.
33 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that Article 66 of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides, in paragraph 1 thereof, that that regulation is to apply, inter alia, to legal proceedings instituted on or after 10 January 2015. Article 66(2) of that regulation adds that Regulation No 44/2001 is to continue to apply to judgments given in legal proceedings instituted before that date.
34 In the present case, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that the applicant in the main proceedings brought before it an action seeking compensation, on 15 March 2013, and that one of the four defendants concerned by that action, namely S.O., successfully lodged before that court, on 7 July 2023, a statement of opposition to the order for payment, which was issued following that action.
35 The wording of the first question refers to the circumstances in which ‘the case’ opened by the action in question was ‘definitively concluded’. However, it is apparent from the grounds of the order for reference that, in the present case, the statement of opposition lodged by S.O., seeking a review of that case, is valid so that the contested order for payment becomes null and void in respect of that person, in accordance with Article 505(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
36 In that context, it is necessary to establish whether, for the purposes of determining the applicability of Regulation No 44/2001 or Regulation No 1215/2012, the relevant date to identify the legal proceedings referred to in Article 66 of Regulation No 1215/2012 is the date on which the applicant brought the action which led to a judgment delivered by a court, or the date on which the defendant lodged, against that judgment, a statement of opposition seeking a review, by that court, of the case concerned.
37 In the context of that assessment of the direct jurisdiction of a court of a Member State, in order to establish whether it is Regulation No 44/2001 or Regulation No 1215/2012 which applies ratione temporis pursuant to Article 66(1) of the latter regulation, it is necessary to refer to the date on which the legal proceedings were brought before that court (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 2017, Pula Parking, C‑551/15, EU:C:2017:193, paragraphs 25 and 26, and of 7 November 2019, Guaitoli and Others, C‑213/18, EU:C:2019:927, paragraph 29).
38 More specifically, for the purposes of Article 66(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, a statement of opposition lodged before a court of a Member State which includes, in accordance with the applicable national rules of procedure, a request for review of the case concerned, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must be regarded as part of the continuation of the initial action, since that request made by the defendant is an application initiating proceedings which does not constitute proceedings separate from those opened by the initial action, but an extension of that action.
39 That interpretation is consistent with the Court’s case-law from which it is apparent that, in applying Article 66(1), an appellate court must establish its own international jurisdiction as a continuation of that of the court before which the action was brought at first instance, so that the date on which the initial proceedings were brought must be taken into account as a criterion of reference (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2017, Hanssen Beleggingen, C‑341/16, EU:C:2017:738, paragraphs 3, 4, 20 and 22, and of 5 September 2019, AMS Neve and Others, C‑172/18, EU:C:2019:674, paragraphs 16, 28, 34 and 36).
40 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 66(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing the applicability ratione temporis of that regulation, legal proceedings are considered to be instituted, within the meaning of that provision, on the date on which the applicant brought his or her action, in a case in which there was subsequently a judgment, and not on the date on which the defendant, at a later stage, lodged a statement of opposition against that judgment seeking a review of that case.
41 By the second question, the referring court seeks clarification of its jurisdiction, on the basis of two alternatives, depending on the response provided by the Court to the first question, either pursuant to the provisions of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, specifically Article 5(3), Article 6(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) thereof, or pursuant to the provisions of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, specifically Article 7(2), Article 8(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) thereof.
42 It follows from the answer to the first question that it must be held that in the dispute in the main proceedings, the legal proceedings were instituted, within the meaning of Article 66(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, on the date that the action was brought by the applicant in the main proceedings, namely on 15 March 2013. Accordingly, the provisions of Regulation No 44/2001 are applicable ratione temporis to that dispute and must therefore be interpreted to enable the referring court to resolve it.
43 Nevertheless, it is apparent from recital 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012 that, in so far as that regulation repealed and replaced Regulation No 44/2001, which itself replaced the Brussels Convention, the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of one of those legal instruments also applies to the provisions of the other instruments, whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’ (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, Mahá, C‑494/23, EU:C:2024:848, paragraph 27, and of 30 April 2025, Mutua Madrileña Automovilista, C‑536/23, EU:C:2025:293, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). There is such equivalence between, first, Article 5(3), Article 6(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 and, second, Article 7(2), Article 8(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, respectively.
44 That being said, it appears that, by its second question, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 5(3), Article 6(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that one of those provisions is applicable to an action for payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property after the termination of a tenancy agreement relating to that immovable property, which is situated in a Member State other than the one in which the defendant concerned is domiciled.
45 It is necessary to interpret, in turn, the first subparagraph of Article 22(1), then Article 5(3) and Article 6(1) of that regulation.
46 As regards the possible application of the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 to legal proceedings, such as those referred to in paragraph 44 above, it must be borne in mind that under that provision, the courts of the Member State where the immovable property concerned is situated have exclusive jurisdiction ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property’, regardless of the domicile of the parties.
47 Article 22 appears in Section 6 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, which contains a certain number of rules of exclusive jurisdiction, which derogate from the general rule governing jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in whose territory the defendant is domiciled, provided for in Article 2(1) of that regulation, read in conjunction with Article 3(1) and in the light of recitals 11 and 12 of that regulation. Since it constitutes a derogation, the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) must not be given an interpretation broader than is required by its objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 2 October 2008, Hassett and Doherty, C‑372/07, EU:C:2008:534, paragraph 19, and of 16 November 2023, Roompot Service, C‑497/22, EU:C:2023:873, paragraph 25).
48 As regards the objective pursued by the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has pointed out considerations of sound administration of justice, stating that the essential reason for conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the Member State in which the immovable property concerned is situated is that the courts of the locus rei sitae are the best placed, for reasons of proximity, to ascertain the facts satisfactorily and to apply the rules and practices which are generally those of the State in which the property is situated. As regards tenancies of immovable property in particular, that exclusive jurisdiction is justified, specifically, by the complexity of the relationship of landlord and tenant and by the fact that that relationship is governed by special legislative provisions, some of a mandatory nature, of the State in which the immovable property which is the subject of the lease is situated (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 December 2015, Komu and Others, C‑605/14, EU:C:2015:833, paragraphs 25 and 30, and of 16 November 2023, Roompot Service, C‑497/22, EU:C:2023:873, paragraphs 26 and 27).
49 In accordance with settled case-law, in the first place, an independent definition must be given to the phrase ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property’, which appears in the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, in order to ensure its uniform application in all the Member States. The rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down in that provision covers only actions concerning those rights which come within the scope of that regulation and which seek, first, to determine the extent, content, ownership or possession of immovable property or the existence of other rights in rem therein and, second, to provide the holders of those rights with protection for the powers which attach to their interest. For the purposes of the application of that provision, it is not sufficient that the action concerns a right in rem in immovable property or that the action has a link with immovable property. The action must be based on a right in rem, which exists in corporeal property and has effect erga omnes, and not on a right in personam, which may be claimed only against the debtor (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 October 2013, Schneider, C‑386/12, EU:C:2013:633, paragraph 21; of 16 November 2016, Schmidt, C‑417/15, EU:C:2016:881, paragraphs 30, 31 and 34; and of 14 February 2019, Milivojević, C‑630/17, EU:C:2019:123, paragraphs 97, 99 and 100).
50 In the second place, to establish whether a dispute relates to ‘tenancies of immovable property’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, it must be examined, first, whether that dispute relates to a tenancy agreement of immovable property and, second, whether the subject matter of that dispute relates directly to the rights and obligations arising from that tenancy agreement, since it does not suffice that the same dispute involves such an agreement. The rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provision relates to disputes concerning the conditions of enjoyment of immovable property, namely, inter alia, those between lessors and lessees relating to the existence or interpretation of tenancies, repair of damage caused by a lessee or giving up possession of the premises (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 November 2023, Roompot Service, C‑497/22, EU:C:2023:873, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).
51 In the present case, it is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that the action pending before it concerns the payment of compensation for the use of housing after the end of the tenancy agreement relating to it. It is not disputed that, from the date on which the municipal authority that owned that housing terminated the lease that it concluded with T.O., the four defendants who were sued as a result of the initial action, namely T.O. and her three children, became occupants without legal title to that housing, in so far as they still resided there and no longer had any right in respect of it. Further, it appears not to be in dispute that S.O. did not personally enter into that tenancy agreement, given that she is the child of the person who signed that tenancy, nor did she subsequently sign it, so that she must be classified as a third party in respect of that contractual relationship.
52 It must be held that such an action, seeking payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property after the termination of the tenancy agreement relating to it, does not come within the scope of the rule of exclusive jurisdiction provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001.
53 In the first place, that analysis satisfies the requirement of a strict interpretation of the derogation set out in that provision and is compatible with the objectives pursued by it, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 47 and 48 above. In particular, the assessment of such an action seeking compensation does not require on-site investigations, nor does it involve the assessment of facts or the application of rules and practices of the locus rei sitae in such a way as to justify conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a court of the Member State in whose territory that property is situated (see, by analogy, judgment of 10 July 2019, Reitbauer and Others, C‑722/17, EU:C:2019:577, paragraphs 47 and 48 and the case-law cited).
54 In the second place, that analysis is consistent with the interpretations of the expression ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property’ and the concept of ‘tenancies of immovable property’ within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, which are set out in paragraphs 49 and 50 above. First, an action for payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property, after the termination of a tenancy agreement relating to it, is not covered by that expression because such an action is not based on a right in rem, having effect erga omnes, but a right in personam, which may only be relied upon against the alleged debtor from whom that compensation is sought. Second, an action such as that brought against S.O., who is classified as a third party in relation to the terminated tenancy agreement, cannot be included in the concept of ‘tenancies of immovable property’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 22(1), because such an action does not directly relate to the rights and obligations arising from that tenancy and is therefore not based on the relationship of landlord and tenant (see, by analogy, as regards the provision equivalent to the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) set out in Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention, judgment of 9 June 1994, Lieber, C‑292/93, EU:C:1994:241, paragraphs 15 and 20, and order of 5 April 2001, Gaillard (C‑518/99, EU:C:2001:209, paragraph 20).
55 In the third place, that analysis is supported by the Report by Professor Dr Peter Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction of judgments and enforcement in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice (OJ 1979 C 59, p. 71). It is apparent from paragraph 163 of that report that actions for damages based on infringement of rights in rem do not fall within the scope of Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention, equivalent to the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, because in that context the existence and content of such rights in rem, usually rights of ownership, are only of marginal significance.
56 Consequently, the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that legal proceedings for payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property after the termination of the tenancy agreement relating to that immovable property, which is situated in a Member State other than the one in which the defendant concerned is domiciled, do not constitute an action ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property’ and do not come within the concept of ‘tenancies of immovable property’, within the meaning of that provision.
57 As regards the possible application of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 to legal proceedings such as those referred to in paragraph 44 above, it must be borne in mind that it is apparent from that provision that ‘in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, a person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.
58 In accordance with settled case-law, the rule of special jurisdiction set out in Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted independently (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2024, FCA Italy and FPT Industrial, C‑81/23, EU:C:2024:165, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, for the purposes of interpreting that provision, it is irrelevant whether national case-law, such as that concerning the Law on the protection of tenants’ rights, characterises the fact of residing in another person’s property without legal title as ‘tort’ or not.
59 It is also settled case-law, first, that that rule of special jurisdiction, by way of derogation from the general rule laid down in Article 2 of that regulation that the courts of the place where the defendant is domiciled have jurisdiction, must be interpreted strictly and, second, that that rule is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings, inter alia, as regards the taking of evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2024, FCA Italy and FPT Industrial, C‑81/23, EU:C:2024:165, paragraphs 23 to 25 and the case-law cited).
60 As the referring court noted, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the concept of ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, includes all claims which, first, do not concern ‘matters relating to a contract, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of that regulation and, second, seek to establish the liability of a defendant, so that it is necessary to ascertain whether those two conditions are satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Obala i lučice, C‑307/19, EU:C:2021:236, paragraphs 83 and 85, and of 9 December 2021, HRVATSKE ŠUME, C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraphs 42 and 43 and the case-law cited).
61 As regards the first of those conditions, the Court has stated that the independent concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001, covers any claim based on an obligation freely consented to by one person towards another (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 September 2015, Holterman Ferho Exploitatie and Others, C‑47/14, EU:C:2015:574, paragraph 52, and of 9 December 2021HRVATSKE ŠUME, C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraph 44).
62 In the present case, a claim for compensation such as that brought by the applicant in the main proceedings against S.O. is not covered by the concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’ because such a claim is based on the fact that a person has occupied immovable property without the free consent of the landlord expressed in the form of a tenancy agreement.
63 As regards the second condition set out in paragraph 60 above, it has already been held that an action seeks to establish the liability of a defendant where a harmful event, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, may be imputed to the defendant, in that he or she is alleged to have committed an act or omission contrary to a duty or prohibition imposed by law. It must be possible to establish a causal connection between the damage and the event in which that damage originates and it is not necessary to draw any specific distinction as regards ‘matters relating to quasi-delict’, within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 December 2021HRVATSKE ŠUME, C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraphs 52 to 54 and the case-law cited).
64 In the present case, a claim for payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property belonging to another is based on an obligation which originates in a harmful event, since that obligation does not arise irrespective of the defendant’s conduct, with the result that a causal link may be established between the damage and any unlawful act or omission committed by that defendant (see, a contrario, judgment of 9 December 2021, HRVATSKE ŠUME, C‑242/20, EU:C:2021:985, paragraph 55).
65 Since the two conditions referred to in paragraph 60 above are thus satisfied in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, as the Polish Government and the European Commission have stated in their written observations, a claim for compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property must be considered as coming within ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001.
66 Accordingly, in the main proceedings, the referring court could, in principle, declare that it has jurisdiction on the basis of Article 5(3), as the court for the ‘place where the harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of that provision, since the immovable property is situated in Poland and specifically in the territorial jurisdiction of that court. In that regard, it must be borne in mind, first, that the concept of ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ refers both to the place where the alleged damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it. Second, that provision allows the court’s jurisdiction over all alleged perpetrators to be established on the basis of the place where the alleged damage occurred, provided that the damage occurred within the jurisdiction of the court seised (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 July 2018, flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, C‑27/17, EU:C:2018:533, paragraph 42, and of 4 July 2024, MOL, C‑425/22, EU:C:2024:578, paragraph 26).
67 However, having regard to the facts set out by the referring court, it is necessary, in order to give a useful answer to that court, to state that it is for that court to ascertain whether, in the dispute before it, a ‘harmful event occurred’, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, owing to S.O.’s, conduct and, more specifically, whether S.O. personally occupied the immovable property concerned during the period in question in the main proceedings, that is to say between 2011 and 2012. In the light of the order for reference, it has not been ruled out that S.O. resided exclusively in the Netherlands during that period. In the absence of such occupation on her part, no connecting factors making Article 5(3) applicable can be identified.
68 It follows from the foregoing that Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that a claim for compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property must be considered as coming within ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of that provision.
69 As regards the possible application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 to legal proceedings such as those referred to in paragraph 44 above, it must be borne in mind that that provision stated that a person domiciled in a Member States may be sued, where he or she is one of a number of defendants, in the court for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
70 The objective of the rule of special jurisdiction set out in Article 6(1) of that regulation meets, in accordance with recitals 12 and 15 of that regulation, the wish to facilitate the sound administration of justice, to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in two Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, C‑366/13, EU:C:2016:282, paragraph 61, and of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken, C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
71 Since that rule of special jurisdiction derogates from the principle that jurisdiction be based on the defendant’s domicile, set out in Article 2 of Regulation No 44/2001, it must be interpreted strictly. In order for a judgment to be considered ‘irreconcilable’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of that regulation, there must be a divergence in the outcome of the disputes, which arises in the context of the same situation of fact and law. The mere fact that the result of one of the proceedings concerned may have an effect on the result of the other does not suffice to characterise the judgments to be delivered in the two proceedings as ‘irreconcilable’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, C‑366/13, EU:C:2016:282, paragraphs 63, 65 and 66, and of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken, C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85, paragraphs 21 and 22 and the case-law cited).
72 Furthermore, Article 6(1) cannot allow an applicant to make a claim against a number of defendants for the sole purpose of removing one of them from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which that defendant is domiciled and, thus, of circumventing the rule of jurisdiction contained in that provision. The court seised of the case can find that that rule has been circumvented only where there is firm evidence to support the conclusion that the applicant artificially fulfilled, or prolonged the fulfilment of, that provision’s applicability (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken, C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85, paragraphs 23 and 24 and the case-law cited).
73 Accordingly, it is for the referring court, first, to assess, having regard to all of the relevant facts of the case before it, whether the same situation of fact and law exists, without examining either the admissibility or the substance of the action concerned, and, second, to satisfy itself that the claims brought against more than one defendant are not intended artificially to satisfy the conditions for the application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001. The Court may nevertheless provide that court with the points of interpretation of EU law which are useful for the purposes of that assessment (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, C‑366/13, EU:C:2016:282, paragraph 64, and of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken, C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85, paragraphs 25 and 41 and the case-law cited).
74 In the present case, the applicant in the main proceedings maintains that the Polish courts have international jurisdiction, on the ground that there is such a close connection between the four defendants initially sued, by its action of 15 March 2013, that it is expedient to determine the claims for compensation brought against them together, in order to avoid irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. As stated in paragraph 28 above, the referring court doubts the need for a joint determination of those claims, whilst nevertheless noting that the defendants concerned are members of the same family and that they used to reside together in the same housing, the use of which gives rise to those claims.
75 Subject to the verifications to be carried out by the referring court, it must be stated that it seems unlikely that there was, on the date that the action was brought, the same situation of fact and law from which there could have been a risk that ‘irreconcilable judgments’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, were delivered in different Member States were the claims in question to be determined separately, which would justify the application of the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in that provision.
76 The claims for compensation brought by the applicant in the main proceedings against the four persons concerned by that action are, admittedly, connected by their subject matter, the purpose of those claims being identical. However, it is apparent from the order for reference that, under the applicable provisions of Polish law, first, those claims are severable in so far as different judgments could be delivered in respect of those persons, depending on whether each of those defendants occupied the property concerned during the relevant period, and, second, there is no joint and several liability between them, which appears to imply an individual examination of the facts alleged. In its written observations, the Polish Government appears to confirm, in essence, that national law allows for individualised decisions to be made in respect of those persons, depending on whether or not it follows from the factual findings of the court hearing the case that each of them did or did not occupy the property in question.
77 Thus, it is necessary to interpret Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 as applicable only where, on the date an action is brought by which an applicant sued several defendants before the court of a Member State, there is the same situation of fact and law so that it is expedient to hear and determine all the claims brought against those defendants at the same time to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings were those claims to be determined separately in different Member States, which is for the referring court to verify.
78 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 5(3), Article 6(1) and the first subparagraph of Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that: - legal proceedings for payment of compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property after the termination of the tenancy agreement relating to that immovable property, which is situated in a Member State other than the one in which the defendant concerned is domiciled, do not constitute an action ‘in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property’ and do not come within the concept of ‘tenancies of immovable property’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 22(1); - a claim for compensation for the non-contractual use of immovable property must be considered as coming within ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’, within the meaning of Article 5(3); and - Article 6(1) is applicable only where, on the date an action is brought by which an applicant sued several defendants before the court of a Member State, there is the same situation of fact and law so that it is expedient to hear and determine all the claims brought against those defendants at the same time to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings were those claims to be determined separately in different Member States.
79 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.