1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 3 and 13 of Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability (OJ 2009 L 263, p. 11).
2 The request has been made in proceedings between, on the one hand, the Mutuelle assurance des travailleurs mutualistes (Matmut) and, on the other, TN, MAAF assurances SA, the Fonds de garantie des assurances obligatoires de dommages (FGAO) and PQ concerning the enforceability against the latter of the nullity of a contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles concluded between him and Matmut.
3 Recitals 1, 2 and 20 of Directive 2009/103 state:
4 Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 states: ‘Each Member State shall, subject to Article 5, take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance. The extent of the liability covered and the terms and conditions of the cover shall be determined on the basis of the measures referred to in the first paragraph. … The insurance referred to in the first paragraph shall cover compulsorily both damage to property and personal injuries.’
5 Article 10(1) of that directive provides: ‘Each Member State shall set up or authorise a body with the task of providing compensation, at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation for damage to property or personal injuries caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation provided for in Article 3 has not been satisfied. The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member States to regard compensation by the body as subsidiary or non-subsidiary and the right to make provision for the settlement of claims between the body and the person or persons responsible for the accident and other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the victim in respect of the same accident. However, Member States may not allow the body to make the payment of compensation conditional on the victim establishing in any way that the person liable is unable or refuses to pay.’
6 Article 12(1) of that directive states: ‘Without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 13(1), the insurance referred to in Article 3 shall cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.’
7 Under Article 13 of that directive: ‘1. Each Member State shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy issued in accordance with Article 3 shall be deemed to be void in respect of claims by third parties who have been victims of an accident where that statutory provision or contractual clause excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by: However, the provision or clause referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph may be invoked against persons who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury, when the insurer can prove that they knew the vehicle was stolen. Member States shall have the option - in the case of accidents occurring on their territory - of not applying the provision in the first subparagraph if and in so far as the victim may obtain compensation for the damage suffered from a social security body. 2. In the case of vehicles stolen or obtained by violence, Member States may provide that the body specified in Article 10(1) is to pay compensation instead of the insurer under the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article. Where the vehicle is normally based in another Member State, that body can make no claim against any body in that Member State. Member States which, in the case of vehicles stolen or obtained by violence, provide that the body referred to in Article 10(1) is to pay compensation may fix in respect of damage to property an excess of not more than EUR 250 to be borne by the victim. 3. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any statutory provision or any contractual clause contained in an insurance policy which excludes a passenger from such cover on the basis that he knew or should have known that the driver of the vehicle was under the influence of alcohol or of any other intoxicating agent at the time of an accident, shall be deemed to be void in respect of the claims of such passenger.’
8 Article L. 113-8 of the Insurance Code provides that the insurance contract is null and void in the event of an intentional omission or false statement by the insured person where that omission or false statement changes the subject matter of the risk or reduces its extent in the insurer’s opinion, even if the risk omitted or misrepresented by the insured person had no bearing on the accident.
9 On 5 October 2012, PQ entered into a motor insurance contract with Matmut. In doing so, he stated that he was the only driver of the insured vehicle.
10 On 28 September 2013, that vehicle, while being driven by TN, who was under the influence of alcohol, was involved in a road traffic accident with another vehicle insured by MAAF assurances. PQ, who was a passenger in the first vehicle, was injured in that accident.
11 Criminal proceedings were brought against TN before a criminal court (France) and he was found guilty, inter alia, of causing ‘unintentional physical injuries to [PQ] resulting in a period of incapacity of more than three months by driving a motorised road vehicle whilst under the influence of alcohol’.
12 At the hearing in the course of the criminal proceedings before that court, during which PQ’s civil compensation claims were examined, Matmut raised an objection alleging that the insurance contract was null and void on the ground of an intentional false statement by the insured person as to the identity of the usual driver of the vehicle concerned, requested to be absolved from liability and requested that liability for the payment of compensation to PQ be assumed by the FGAO, which, under the Insurance Code, is the body responsible for paying compensation to victims of road traffic accidents where the person responsible is not insured.
13 By judgment of 17 December 2018, the criminal court declared the insurance contract concluded between Matmut and PQ null and void on account of a false intentional statement made by PQ. Consequently, Matmut was absolved from liability, TN was ordered to make good the damage suffered by the victims of the road traffic accident in question and that judgment was declared enforceable against the FGAO.
14 FGAO, MAAF assurances and TN appealed against that judgment to the Cour d’appel de Lyon (Court of Appeal, Lyon, France). By judgment of 21 October 2020, that court upheld that judgment in so far as it annulled the insurance contract between PQ and Matmut. It found that, at the time the insurance contract was concluded by PQ, TN was the owner of the vehicle concerned and its usual driver. That court thus held that PQ had made an intentional false statement concerning the identity of the usual driver, which had changed the insurer’s assessment of the risk, given that TN had previously been convicted of drink-driving.
15 The Cour d’appel de Lyon (Court of Appeal, Lyon) held, however, that the nullity of the insurance contract at issue could not be relied on against PQ and refused to absolve Matmut from liability on the ground that it follows from the primacy of EU law over national law that the nullity of the insurance contract on the ground of an intentional false statement by the insured person, provided for in Article L. 113-8 of the Insurance Code, cannot be relied on against the victims of a road traffic accident or their successors in title. It further stated that the fact that the victim was a passenger in the vehicle which caused the accident, the policyholder or the owner of that vehicle could not deny him the status of a ‘third party who has been a victim’.
16 Matmut brought an appeal before the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France), which is the referring court, against the judgment of the cour d’appel de Lyon (Court of Appeal, Lyon), claiming that the latter had wrongly found that the nullity of the insurance contract could not be invoked against PQ.
17 The referring court notes that, under Article L. 113-8 of the code des assurances (French Insurance Code), an insurance contract is to be null and void in the event of an intentional omission or false statement by the insured person where that omission or false statement changes the subject matter of the risk or reduces its extent in the insurer’s opinion, even if the risk omitted or misrepresented by the insured person had no bearing on the accident.
18 In that regard, that court observes that, according to national case-law, the nullity of the insurance contract takes effect on the date of the intentional false statement. Consequently, where such a statement was made at the time of conclusion of the contract, the contract is retroactively annulled and is thus deemed void ab initio.
19 The referring court states that, until a judgment of 29 August 2019, which marked a departure from its case-law, it had held that the nullity of a contract resulting from a false declaration by the insured person could be relied on against the victim. Since that judgment, it has held, in essence, that it can be inferred from Article L. 113-8 of the Insurance Code, interpreted in the light of Articles 3 and 13 of Directive 2009/103, that the nullity provided for in that provision cannot be invoked against the victims of a road traffic accident or their dependants and that the FGAO cannot be required to compensate the victim in such a case.
20 The referring court also states that, in order to bring the Insurance Code into line with EU law, the French legislature, in 2019, inserted Article L. 211-7-1 into that code, under which, first, the nullity of a motor insurance contract cannot be relied on against the victims of damage caused by a road accident, or their successors in title, and, in such a case, the insurer who covers the civil liability for the vehicle involved is required to pay compensation and, secondly, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the creditor of the compensation against the person responsible for the accident, up to the amount of the sums paid by it.
21 However, the referring court notes that, although it is apparent, in essence, from the relevant case-law of the Court in relation to motor vehicle liability insurance that the fact that a passenger in a vehicle who is the victim of a road traffic accident is also the person who is covered by the insurance of the vehicle involved in that accident does not mean that he or she can be denied the status of a third party victim, the case in the main proceedings raises the question whether the nullity of an insurance contract may be relied on against the passenger victim where he or she is also the policyholder and the person who made the false statement that led to the invalidity of that contract.
22 The referring court also wonders whether, in the event that the nullity of the insurance contract is declared to be unenforceable against the victim who is the policyholder, the insurer may be permitted, without contravening EU law, to bring an action against that victim based on that victim’s intentional wrongdoing when the insurance contract was concluded, in order to obtain reimbursement of all the sums paid to the victim in performance of the contract.
23 In that regard, the referring court states that, according to the relevant national case-law, a person entering into a contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles who intentionally makes false statements may incur liability towards the insurer, and that, in the event of annulment of that contract on the ground of intentional misrepresentation, the subscriber is required to reimburse the insurer for the compensation which the latter has paid to the victim of the road traffic accident.
24 However, in the event that the nullity of the insurance contract is enforceable against the victim who is the policyholder, the national legislation provides that the FGAO is responsible for the compensation which must be paid to the victim.
25 In those circumstances, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Articles 3 and 13 of Directive [2009/103] be interpreted as precluding the nullity of a contract for civil liability motor insurance from being declared enforceable against a passenger who is a victim where that person is also the policyholder and intentionally made a false statement at the time of conclusion of the contract which gave rise to that nullity?’
26 According to the settled case-law of the Court, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The fact that a national court has, formally speaking, worded a question referred for a preliminary ruling with reference to certain provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing the national court with all the points of interpretation which may be of assistance in adjudicating on the case pending before it, whether or not that court has referred to them in its questions. In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 22 February 2024, Direcţia pentru Evidenţa Persoanelor şi Administrarea Bazelor de Date, C‑491/21, EU:C:2024:143, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
27 In the present case, having regard to all the information provided by the national court and to the observations submitted by TN, Matmut, the FGAO, the French Government and the European Commission, it is necessary, in order to provide the national court with useful interpretative guidance, to reformulate the question referred.
28 Thus, it must be held that, by its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the first paragraph of Article 3 and Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which (i) it is possible to invoke against a passenger of a vehicle involved in a road traffic accident, who is a victim of that accident, where he or she is also the policyholder, the nullity of the contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles resulting from a false statement made by that policyholder in concluding that contract as regards the identity of the usual driver of the vehicle concerned and (ii) the insurer, in the event that such nullity cannot in fact be invoked against that passenger victim, may obtain reimbursement of all the sums which it has paid to that passenger in performance of the insurance contract by means of an action brought against that passenger on the basis of that passenger’s intentional wrongdoing when concluding that contract.
29 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as stated in recital 1 of Directive 2009/103, that directive codified Directive 72/166, the Second Directive 84/5, the Third Directive 90/232, Directive 2000/26 and Directive 2005/14. Those directives progressively defined the obligations of Member States with respect to compulsory insurance. They are intended, first, to ensure the free movement of vehicles normally based in the territory of the European Union and of persons travelling in those vehicles and, secondly, to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).
30 Furthermore, it follows from recitals 2 and 20 of Directive 2009/103 that it pursues the same objectives as those directives (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
31 The development of the EU legislation concerning compulsory insurance shows that the objective of protecting the victims of accidents caused by vehicles has continuously been pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).
32 The first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 provides that each Member State is, subject to Article 5 of that directive, to take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.
33 In that regard, under the first subparagraph of Article 13(1), a civil liability motor insurance company may not refuse to compensate third party victims of an accident caused by an insured vehicle by relying on statutory provisions or contractual clauses contained in an insurance policy excluding from insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles damage or injury caused to third party victims as a result of the use or driving of the insured vehicle by persons who do not have authorisation to drive that vehicle, by persons who do not hold a driving licence or by persons who are in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning the condition and safety of that vehicle (see, to that effect, order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraphs 58 and 59 and the case-law cited).
34 By way of derogation from that first subparagraph, the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103 provides that certain victims may not be compensated by the insurance company, taking into account the situation which they have themselves created, namely in cases where the vehicle which caused the damage or injury was used or driven by persons who did not have express or implied authorisation to do so and where third party victims voluntarily entered that vehicle, knowing that it had been stolen (see, to that effect, order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
35 It follows from Article 12(1) of that directive that, without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) thereof, the insurance referred to in Article 3 of that directive is to cover liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the driver, arising out of the use of a vehicle.
36 The Court has held that the objective of protecting victims precludes national rules from restricting unduly the concept of passenger covered by compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes, C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
37 As regards the circumstance of a victim of a motor vehicle accident being the insurance policy-holder and owner of the vehicle involved in that accident, the Court held that that objective requires the legal position of the owner of the vehicle, present in the vehicle at the time of an accident as a passenger, to be the same as that of any other passenger who is a victim of that accident (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes, C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
38 The Court has also held that that objective requires the legal position of the person who was insured to drive a vehicle but who was, at the time of an accident, a passenger in that vehicle, to be the same as that of any other ‘passenger victim’ and that, consequently, the fact that a person was insured to drive the vehicle which caused the accident does not mean that that person should be excluded from the concept of ‘third parties who have been victims’ within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of the Directive 2009/103, since that person was a passenger in that vehicle, and not the driver (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes, C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
39 Thus, the fact that a passenger in a road traffic accident was the insurance policy-holder does not allow that person to be excluded from the concept of ‘third parties who have been victims’, within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103. (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes, C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
40 The fact that the passenger was also the insurance policyholder cannot justify different treatment, having regard to the same objective of protection pursued by that directive, as referred to in paragraph 31 above (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 September 2017, Delgado Mendes, C‑503/16, EU:C:2017:681, paragraph 45).
41 The same is true as regards the circumstance that the policyholder is not the usual driver of the vehicle involved in a road traffic accident (judgment of 20 July 2017, Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros, C‑287/16, EU:C:2017:575, paragraph 28).
42 It follows that, in the present case, the fact that, at the time when the road traffic accident occurred, PQ, the policyholder, was a passenger in the vehicle concerned has no bearing on his status as a ‘third party who has been a victim’ within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103.
43 As to whether the nullity of the contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles resulting from PQ’s false statement made when concluding that contract as to the identity of the usual driver of the vehicle concerned may be relied on against PQ, it is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 34 above that the legislature provided in the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103 for a single derogation from the obligation of insurance companies to compensate third party victims of a road traffic accident.
44 It also follows from the case-law that that derogation must be interpreted strictly (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
45 Any other interpretation would allow Member States to limit compensation to third party victims of a road traffic accident to certain circumstances, which Directive 2009/103 is intended precisely to avoid (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
46 Thus, the first and second subparagraphs of Article 13(1) of that directive must be interpreted as meaning that a statutory provision or a contractual clause contained in an insurance policy, which excludes from insurance the use or driving of vehicles by persons who do not have express or implied authorisation to do so, can be relied on against third party victims of a road traffic accident only in cases where the vehicle which caused the damage or injury was used or driven by such persons and where the third party victims of the accident voluntarily entered that vehicle knowing that it had been stolen (see, to that effect, order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
47 It follows that the fact that an insurance company has concluded an insurance contract on the basis of omissions or false statements on the part of the policyholder does not enable that company to rely on statutory provisions or a contractual clause providing for the nullity of that contract in order to invoke that nullity against a third party victim so as to be released from its obligation under the first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2009/103 to compensate that victim for damage or injury suffered as a result of an accident caused by the insured vehicle (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 July 2017, Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros, C‑287/16, EU:C:2017:575, paragraph 27).
48 That interpretation is not called in question by the fact that it is possible for the victim to receive compensation from the FGAO. The payment of compensation by the body referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/103 was designed to be a measure of last resort, envisaged only for cases in which the vehicle that caused the injury or damage has not satisfied the requirement for insurance referred to in Article 3 of that directive, that is to say, it is a vehicle in respect of which no insurance contract is in place (order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros, C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
49 In the present case, however, it should be noted that, unlike the cases that gave rise to the judgment of 20 July 2017, Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros (C‑287/16, EU:C:2017:575), and the order of 13 October 2021, Liberty Seguros (C‑375/20, EU:C:2021:861), in the present case, PQ is not only the ‘passenger victim’ of the road traffic accident at issue in the main proceedings seeking compensation but also the policyholder who made the intentional false statement which led to the nullity of the insurance contract.
50 In that regard, in the first place, it should be noted that Directive 2009/103 does not contain any provisions governing any abuse of rights by the policyholder.
51 Nevertheless, in accordance with settled case-law, there is, in EU law, a general legal principle that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 281 and the case-law cited).
52 That general principle of law must be complied with by individuals. Indeed, the application of EU legislation cannot be extended to cover transactions carried out for the purpose of fraudulently or wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by EU law (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 282 and the case-law cited).
53 It thus follows from that principle that a Member State must refuse, even in the absence of national provisions providing for such a refusal, to grant the benefit of the provisions of EU law where they are relied upon by a person not with a view to achieving the objectives of those provisions, but with the aim of benefiting from an advantage granted to that person by EU law when the objective conditions required for obtaining the advantage sought, prescribed by EU law, are met only formally (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 283 and the case-law cited).
54 As is apparent from the Court’s case-law, proof of an abusive practice requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the EU rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved and, secondly, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 et C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 285 and the case-law cited).
55 In establishing such abuse, the referring court must take into account all the facts and circumstances of the case, including those subsequent to the transaction which is alleged to be abusive (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 286 and the case-law cited).
56 It is therefore for the referring court to determine, in accordance with the rules of evidence laid down by national law, provided that the effectiveness of EU law is not undermined, whether the constituent elements of an abusive practice, as set out in paragraph 54 above, are present in the dispute in the main proceedings. However, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may, where appropriate, provide clarification designed to give the referring court guidance in its interpretation (judgment of 21 December 2023, BMW Bank and Others, C‑38/21, C‑47/21 and C‑232/21, EU:C:2023:1014, paragraph 287 and the case-law cited).
57 In that regard, as regards, first, the question whether, in the present case, the objective pursued by Directive 2009/103 has been achieved, it should be noted, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 67 and 68 of his Opinion, that, subject to verification by the referring court, the objective of protecting victims of road traffic accidents appears to be achieved, as PQ is a victim of the accident concerned who is seeking compensation.
58 As regards, secondly, the subjective element consisting of the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it, it is apparent from the order for reference that the purpose of the false statement in question was to avoid TN’s having to conclude an insurance contract in view of his previous conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. Thus, that false declaration was made by PQ in order to have TN’s vehicle insured while benefiting from a more advantageous insurance premium than that which would have applied if the identity of the usual driver of that vehicle had been known to the insurer.
59 In that regard, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 77 of his Opinion, it does not appear, subject to verification by the referring court, that PQ made false statements with the essential aim of relying himself on Articles 3 and 13 of Directive 2009/103 and of circumventing a national provision relating to the legal conditions for nullity of an insurance contract.
60 In those circumstances, it does not appear, subject to verification by the referring court, that the constituent elements of an abusive practice, as set out in paragraph 54 above, are present in the present case.
61 Thus, in so far as PQ did not infringe the principle prohibiting abuse of rights, it must be held that the nullity of the insurance contract against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles at issue in the main proceedings, resulting from the false statement he made in concluding that contract, cannot be relied on against him.
62 In the second place, as regards the possibility for the insurer, in such a situation, to obtain from PQ reimbursement in full of the sums which it paid to him in performance of the insurance contract by means of an action based on PQ’s intentional wrongdoing when concluding that contract, it should be noted that the legal conditions of validity of an insurance contract and those relating to the policyholder’s liability for false statements made at the time of concluding the insurance contract are governed not by EU law but by the laws of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 July 2017, Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros, C‑287/16, EU:C:2017:575, paragraph 31).
63 In that respect, it is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that the Member States must exercise their powers in that field in a way that is consistent with EU law and that the provisions of national legislation which govern compensation for road traffic accidents may not deprive Directive 2009/103 of its effectiveness (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 July 2017, Fidelidade-Companhia de Seguros, C‑287/16, EU:C:2017:575, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
64 The Court has, on several occasions, held that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of provisions of EU law relating to compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation which undermines that effectiveness, in that, by automatically excluding or disproportionately limiting the victim’s right to compensation by compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, it impedes the achievement of the objective of protecting victims of road traffic accidents, which has continuously been pursued and reinforced by the EU legislature (judgment of 10 June 2021, Van Ameyde España, C‑923/19, EU:C:2021:475, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
65 In those circumstances, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 105 and 110 of his Opinion, it must be held that national legislation which allows the insurer, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings and by means of an action brought against the ‘passenger victim’, who is also the policyholder and the person who made the false statement in concluding the insurance contract, to obtain reimbursement of ‘all’ of the sums paid to that ‘passenger victim’ in performance of that contract is liable to deprive that person, definitively and disproportionately, of the protection which Directive 2009/103 grants to the victims of such accidents and, consequently, to infringe the right of that individual to be compensated by compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles.
66 In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the first paragraph of Article 3 and Article 13(1) of Directive 2009/103 must be interpreted as precluding, unless the referring court finds that there is an abuse of rights, national legislation under which (i) it is possible to invoke against a passenger of a vehicle involved in a road traffic accident, who is a victim of that accident, where he or she is also the policyholder, the nullity of the contract of insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles resulting from a false statement made by that policyholder in concluding that contract as regards the identity of the usual driver of the vehicle concerned and (ii) the insurer, in the event that such nullity cannot in fact be invoked against that ‘passenger victim’, may obtain reimbursement of all the sums which it has paid to that passenger in performance of the insurance contract by means of an action brought against that passenger on the basis of that passenger’s intentional wrongdoing when concluding that contract, since such reimbursement would deprive the provisions of that directive of all practical effect, by disproportionately limiting the right of the victim to obtain compensation by the compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles.
67 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.