1 By its appeal, the Centre d’étude et de valorisation des algues SA (Centre for the Study and Exploitation of Algae SA) (CEVA) asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 6 September 2023, Commission v CEVA and Others (T‑748/20, EU:T:2023:521; ‘the judgment under appeal’) by which the General Court fixed the amount of the European Commission’s claim at EUR 168 220.16, plus default interest, corresponding to the reimbursement of grants paid under the financing contract concluded with CEVA for the implementation of a project in the context of the specific programme for research and development entitled ‘Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources’ (the ‘claim at issue’).
2 Article 71 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1), headed ‘Establishment of amounts receivable’, provided, in the version applicable to the facts of the present appeal, in paragraphs 1 to 3: ‘1. Establishment of an amount receivable is the act by which the authorising officer by delegation or subdelegation: (a) verifies that the debt exists; (b) determines or verifies the reality and the amount of the debt; (c) verifies the conditions in which the debt is due. 2. The own resources made available to the Commission and any amount receivable that is identified as being certain, of a fixed amount and due must be established by a recovery order to the accounting officer followed by a debit note sent to the debtor, both drawn up by the authorising officer responsible. 3. Amounts wrongly paid shall be recovered.’
3 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 1), headed ‘International jurisdiction’, provided, in the version applicable to the facts, in paragraphs 1 and 2: ‘1. The courts of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary. 2. Where the centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated within the territory of a Member State, the courts of another Member State shall have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings against that debtor only if he possesses an establishment within the territory of that other Member State. The effects of those proceedings shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor situated in the territory of the latter Member State.’
4 Article 4 of Regulation No 1346/2000, headed ‘Law applicable’, provided in paragraph 2: ‘The law of the State of the opening of [insolvency] proceedings shall determine the conditions for the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure. It shall determine in particular: …
5 Article 16 of that regulation, headed ‘Principle’, provided in paragraph 1: ‘Any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 shall be recognised in all the other Member States from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings.’
6 Article 17 of that regulation, headed ‘Effects of recognition’, provided in paragraph 1: ‘The judgment opening the proceedings referred to in Article 3(1) shall, with no further formalities, produce the same effects in any other Member State as under this law of the State of the opening of proceedings, unless this Regulation provides otherwise and as long as no proceedings referred to in Article 3(2) are opened in that other Member State.’
7 Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code, in the version applicable to the facts of the present appeal (‘the Belgian Civil Code’), provided: ‘Agreements lawfully entered into shall be legally binding on the parties thereto. … They must be executed in good faith.’
8 Under Article 2257 of the Belgian Civil Code: ‘The limitation period shall not start to run: in respect of a claim which is dependent on a condition as long as the condition is not fulfilled; …’
9 As set out in the first subparagraph of Article 2262a(1) of the Belgian Civil Code: ‘The limitation period for all personal actions shall be 10 years.’
10 Article L. 622-21-I of the French Commercial Code, in the version applicable to the facts of the present appeal (‘the French Commercial Code’), provided: ‘The judgment opening proceedings shall stay or prohibit legal actions of all creditors whose claims are not referred to in Article L. 622-17(I) seeking to obtain:
11 Article L. 622-24 of the French Commercial Code was worded as follows: ‘From the date of publication of the judgment, all creditors other than employees whose claims arose prior to the judgment opening proceedings shall lodge their claims with the court-appointed receiver within time limits set by a Conseil d’État (Council of State) decree. Where the debarment of a creditor’s claims has been set aside under Article L. 622-26, the time limits shall run only from the date of notification of that decision, in which case they are reduced by half. Creditors who hold a published security or are bound to the debtor by a published contract shall be notified in person or, where appropriate, at their elected domicile. The time limit for lodging claims with respect to these creditors shall run from notice of this information. …’
12 Article L. 622-25-I of that code provided: ‘The lodging of a claim shall interrupt the limitation period until the conclusion of the proceedings; it shall dispense with any formal notice and is equivalent to an act in pursuance of the proceedings.’
13 Article 2(1) of the contract concluded between the Commission and CEVA on 17 January 2001 for the implementation of a project in the context of the specific programme for research and development entitled ‘Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources’ (‘the Seapura project’) and providing for the payment of a grant of EUR 123 735 (‘the Seapura contract’), provides: ‘The duration of the project shall be 36 months from 01/02/2001.’
14 Article 5(1) and (2) of the Seapura contract provides: ‘1. The law of Belgium shall govern this contract. 2. The [General Court] and, in the case of an appeal, the [Court of Justice] shall have sole jurisdiction to hear any disputes between the [European Union], on the one hand, and the contractors, on the other hand, as regards the validity, the application or any interpretation of this contract.’
15 Article 3(5) of Annex II to that contract states: ‘After the contract completion date, or the termination of the contract or of the participation of a contractor, the Commission may or shall, as relevant, where fraud or serious financial irregularities have been discovered during a financial audit, claim from the contractor the repayment of all the Community’s financial contribution paid to him. …’
16 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 22 of the judgment under appeal.
17 On 17 January 2001, the Commission concluded the Seapura contract with CEVA providing for the payment of a grant of EUR 123 735.
18 In 2006, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) opened an investigation following suspicions of fraud in relation to several projects implemented by CEVA, including the Seapura project.
19 On 11 December 2007, OLAF drew up its final report on that investigation (‘the OLAF report’), in which it found irregularities in the performance of the Seapura contract consisting of, inter alia, falsifications of the timesheets of CEVA staff.
20 By letter of 29 October 2008, the Commission informed CEVA that, in view of the serious financial irregularities found in the OLAF report, it intended to issue debit notes to CEVA in the amount of EUR 123 735, plus interest, for repayment of the grant paid under the Seapura contract.
21 On 13 March 2009, the Commission sent CEVA four debit notes for a total amount of EUR 168 220.16 (‘the debit notes’).
22 On 12 June 2009, as CEVA had failed to act on the debit notes or the four reminder letters sent to it by the Commission on 11 May 2009, the Commission sent CEVA four letters of formal notice.
23 On 17 July 2009, CEVA brought an action before the General Court seeking annulment of those reminder letters.
24 By judgment of 15 September 2011, CEVA v Commission (T‑285/09, EU:T:2011:479), the General Court dismissed that action as inadmissible.
25 By judgment of the tribunal correctionnel de Rennes (Criminal Court, Rennes, France) of 26 April 2011, CEVA and its former director were found guilty of fraud and misappropriation of public funds and sentenced, respectively, to a fine of EUR 80 000 and to an 18-month suspended prison sentence. Ruling on the civil action brought by the Commission, that court ordered the accused parties, in part on a joint and several basis, to pay the Commission the sum of EUR 303 631 as compensation for the material damage suffered, inter alia as a result of the financial irregularities committed in implementing the Seapura contract.
26 By judgment of 1 April 2014, the cour d’appel de Rennes (Court of Appeal, Rennes, France) acquitted CEVA and its former director of all charges and dismissed the Commission’s civil action.
27 By judgment of 12 November 2015, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, France) set aside that judgment of 1 April 2014 in respect solely of its provisions ordering that the accused parties be acquitted of the charge of misappropriation of public funds and to that extent referred the case to the cour d’appel de Caen (Court of Appeal, Caen, France).
28 By judgment of 22 June 2016, the tribunal de commerce de Saint-Brieuc (Commercial Court, Saint-Brieuc, France) opened insolvency proceedings known as a ‘safeguard procedure’ (financial recovery procedure) in respect of CEVA and appointed SELARL TCA as the court-appointed receiver.
29 On 15 September 2016, the Commission, in the course of that safeguard procedure, declared a claim corresponding to the total amount of the debit notes issued with a view to securing repayment of subsidies, including those paid under the Seapura contract, for a principal amount of EUR 289 012.95, plus default interest, making a total of EUR 431 002.18.
30 On 6 December 2016, TCA challenged the Commission’s claim.
31 By judgment of 21 July 2017, the tribunal de commerce de Saint-Brieuc (Commercial Court, Saint-Brieuc) adopted the safeguard plan for CEVA and appointed SELARL AJIRE as the administrator for the implementation of that plan.
32 By judgment of 23 August 2017, which has become final, the cour d’appel de Caen (Court of Appeal, Caen), ruling after the case had been referred to it following the setting aside of the judgment by the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), acquitted CEVA of the charge of misappropriation of public funds and sentenced its former director to a one-year suspended prison sentence and to a fine of EUR 20 000 for misappropriation of public funds.
33 By order of 11 September 2017, the Juge-Commissaire (judge responsible for supervising the safeguard procedure) rejected the Commission’s claim in its entirety.
34 The Commission appealed against that order.
35 By judgment of 24 November 2020, the cour d’appel de Rennes (Court of Appeal, Rennes) set aside that order, finding that there were two serious challenges with regard to the Commission’s claim, which concern the limitation period and the validity of the debit notes, and taking the view that those challenges had to be resolved by the competent court, before which the Commission had to bring the matter.
36 On 19 December 2020, the Commission brought an action against CEVA, TCA and AJIRE under Article 272 TFEU, pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Seapura contract, with a view to determining the amount of its claim corresponding to the reimbursement of the grants awarded to CEVA under that contract.
37 At the hearing before the General Court on 11 November 2022, the Commission stated that its action was not directed against TCA or AJIRE and that it was not asking the General Court to find that they were required to reimburse the amounts paid in the performance of the Seapura contract, of which the General Court took formal note in paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal.
38 In its defence, CEVA contended, first, that the Commission’s claim was time-barred, second, that OLAF’s investigation did not relate to the Seapura project and that the OLAF report had not established that the irregularities identified had been committed in the performance of the Seapura contract, third, that the charges of fraud and misappropriation of public funds had not been upheld against it by the French criminal courts and, fourth, that, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, the Commission could not rely on the proceedings brought in France on the basis of French law when the Seapura contract was governed by Belgian law.
39 In that regard, in the first place, the General Court, in paragraphs 30 to 59 of the judgment under appeal, rejected the plea of limitation raised by CEVA.
40 After finding that the question whether the Commission’s claim was time-barred was governed by Belgian law, under which the limitation period was, in the present case, ten years, the General Court held, in paragraphs 40 and 41 of the judgment under appeal, that payment of the European Union’s claim was subject to a prior request for reimbursement made by the Commission, pursuant to Article 3(5) of Annex II to the Seapura contract. It found that the date of that claim corresponded, in the present case, to the date on which the Commission had sent the debit notes to CEVA, namely 13 March 2009; CEVA had not put forward any specific argument to establish that the claim had become due prior to that date. The General Court concluded, in paragraph 46 of that judgment, that, under Belgian law, the limitation period for the European Union’s claim expired, in principle, on 14 March 2019.
41 Furthermore, the General Court held, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the declaration of claim made by the Commission on 15 September 2016 in the context of the safeguard procedure had interrupted the limitation period.
42 In that regard, the General Court held, first, that, under French law, the declaration of a claim interrupts the limitation period until the proceedings have concluded. Second, it found that, under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1346/2000, the law of the Member State of the opening of insolvency proceedings is to determine the conditions for the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure and the effects of those proceedings on proceedings brought by individual creditors. Furthermore, the General Court held that, in accordance with Article 16(1) and Article 17(1) of that regulation, any judgment opening insolvency proceedings is to be recognised in all Member States and is to produce the same effects with no further formalities. The General Court found that the opening, in France, of the safeguard procedure with regard to CEVA and the declaration of a claim by the Commission in the context of that procedure had produced, pursuant to French law and in particular Article L. 622-25-1 of the French Commercial Code, effects in Belgian law and, more specifically, that it had interrupted the limitation period for the Commission’s claim, with the result that that claim was not time-barred on the date on which it was lodged.
43 In the second place, in paragraphs 66 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, ruling on the merits of the claim, examined whether the Commission was justified in relying on the OLAF report in order to claim full reimbursement from CEVA of the sums which had been paid to it in the context of the performance of the Seapura contract.
44 In that regard, the General Court found, first, in paragraphs 70 and 71 of the judgment under appeal, that OLAF’s investigation concerning CEVA had comprised two aspects, the first relating to direct expenditure and the second to the structural funds, and had related to two types of conduct which had given rise to suspicions, namely, first, falsification of staff timesheets and, second, plagiarism of scientific documents in various projects carried out by CEVA.
45 Second, in paragraphs 72-74 of that judgment, the General Court found that, since it had failed to identify the scientific documents allegedly plagiarised in the performance of the Seapura contract, the OLAF report had not established the existence of plagiarism. By contrast, the General Court pointed out that that report had concluded that there were serious financial irregularities concerning all of the projects entrusted to CEVA, including the Seapura project. It considered that it followed, first, that OLAF had established the existence of serious financial irregularities concerning the timesheets of CEVA staff and, second, that those sheets had been falsified deliberately and systematically in all of those projects. Accordingly, in paragraph 79 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected CEVA’s argument alleging that the irregularities found in the OLAF report were not linked to the Seapura project.
46 In the third place, the General Court, in paragraphs 81 to 88 of the judgment under appeal, examined the impact of the criminal proceedings before the French courts, in so far as CEVA maintained, in its defence, that the Commission could not base its claim on the allegedly fraudulent nature of the management of the grant which had been paid to CEVA when it had ultimately been acquitted of the charges of fraud and misappropriation of public funds. In that regard, the General Court held, in paragraph 87 of that judgment, that Article 3(5) of Annex II to the Seapura contract made reimbursement of the EU contribution to the Seapura project conditional simply on a finding of the existence of fraud or serious financial irregularities in the context of an audit, without making that reimbursement dependent on a criminal conviction or criminal classification of the facts in question. It concluded, in paragraph 88 of that judgment, that the acquittal of CEVA had no bearing on the application of that contractual provision.
47 In the fourth place, the General Court examined and rejected, in paragraphs 89 to 95 of the judgment under appeal, CEVA’s argument alleging a breach of the principle of procedural autonomy in that the effects of insolvency proceedings opened in France could not produce effects under Belgian law. In that regard, the General Court held, in paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal, that proceedings had been brought before it pursuant to an arbitration clause on the basis of Article 272 TFEU and that it was for the General Court to resolve the dispute on the basis of the substantive law applicable to the contract, and in particular Regulation No 1346/2000, under which certain provisions of the French Commercial Code are to have effect under Belgian law. The General Court therefore held that the Commission was justified in relying, on the basis of Regulation No 1346/2000, on the effects under Belgian law of the insolvency proceedings brought in France.
48 On the basis of all of those grounds, the General Court upheld the Commission’s application and fixed the amount of the claim at issue at EUR 168 220.16, plus interest.
49 CEVA claims that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal, and - order the Commission to pay the costs.
50 The Commission contends that the Court should: - uphold the judgment under appeal, and - order CEVA to pay the costs.
51 In support of its appeal, CEVA relies on two grounds of appeal, alleging, in essence, first, an error of law, in that the General Court erred in its determination of the limitation period for the Commission’s legal action, and, second, breach of the principle of the sound administration of justice.
52 The first ground of appeal is directed against paragraphs 42 to 59 of the judgment under appeal and comprises four parts.
53 By the first part of the first ground of appeal, CEVA argues that, by holding that the date on which the debit notes were issued was the starting point of the limitation period, the General Court erred in law.
54 In the first place, CEVA submits that, in this regard, the General Court erred in basing its decision on Article 3(5) of Annex II to the Seapura contract when that contractual provision refers only to the possibility of conducting a financial audit.
55 In the second place, CEVA considers that, first, having regard to Article 2(1) of the Seapura contract and Article 7(2) of Annex II thereto, that contract terminated on 12 October 2004. Second, in accordance with Belgian law, the limitation period starts to run on the day on which the right to bring an action which is subject to that period arises; that day corresponds to that on which the obligation which is the subject of the action was to be performed.
56 Thus, according to CEVA, a correct interpretation of the Seapura contract and of Belgian law must lead to the conclusion that the claim at issue became due when the research covered by that contract was produced. CEVA adds that, under Article 7(6) of Annex II to the Seapura contract, the Commission could require reimbursement of the financial contribution, taking into account the nature and results of the work carried out. On the basis of those factors, it considers that the starting point of the 10-year limitation period provided for by Belgian law should be set at 13 October 2004, with the result that that period expired on 13 October 2014.
57 CEVA argues that the first part of the first ground of appeal does not constitute a new line of argument and is therefore admissible, since it raised similar arguments before the General Court, as is apparent from its defence and paragraphs 48 to 58 of its rejoinder at first instance.
58 The Commission contends that the first part of the first ground of appeal is inadmissible inasmuch as CEVA, first, did not claim before the General Court that the starting point of the limitation period should be the end of the Seapura contract. Second, CEVA conceded before the General Court that the date on which the debit notes were sent to it by the Commission corresponded to the date on which the claim at issue became due, with the limitation period starting to run on the day after that date. It is in that context that the General Court held, in paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘CEVA has not put forward any specific argument which would make it possible to establish that the claim had become due prior to 13 March 2009’.
59 Should the first part of the first ground of appeal be held to be admissible, the Commission contends that it is, in any event, unfounded.
60 It must be borne in mind that, under Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the subject matter of the proceedings before the General Court may not be changed in the appeal. Thus, in accordance with settled case-law, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in an appeal is limited to review of the findings of law on the pleas and arguments debated before the General Court. A party cannot therefore put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a ground of challenge which it has not raised before the General Court, since that would allow that party to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a wider case than that heard by the General Court (judgment of 16 March 2023, Commission v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System and Council v Jiangsu Seraphim Solar System and Commission, C‑439/20 P and C‑441/20 P, EU:C:2023:211, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).
61 In the present case, CEVA submits that it addressed ‘the issue of the starting point of the limitation period’ in its defence and that it ‘explained in detail’ its reasoning in paragraphs 48 to 58 of its ‘statement of claim’, with the result that it put before the General Court a plea relating to the limitation of the Commission’s claim.
62 In that regard, it must be stated that no line of argument such as that put forward in the first part of the first ground of appeal is apparent from any of CEVA’s written pleadings before the General Court.
63 In paragraphs 48 to 56 of its defence and in paragraphs 48 to 58 of its rejoinder, CEVA contended that the claim at issue was time-barred because, contrary to the Commission’s contention, no interruption of the limitation period could be accepted. However, CEVA did not dispute that the starting point of that period corresponded to the date on which the debit notes were issued.
64 On the contrary, in paragraph 56 of its defence and in paragraph 58 of its rejoinder, CEVA expressly stated that, ‘ultimately, the debit notes of 12 March 2009 must be regarded as starting the 10-year limitation period under Belgian law’.
65 It follows that the ground of appeal, in this first part, alleging that the General Court erred in law by relying on the date on which the debit notes were issued and not on the date on which the contract ended in order to determine the starting point of the limitation period constitutes a new plea in law.
66 In those circumstances, it must be held that the first part of the first ground of appeal is inadmissible.
67 CEVA argues that, by holding, in paragraphs 39 to 44 of the judgment under appeal, that a contractual claim could arise from a debit note, the General Court erred in law.
68 In that regard, CEVA submits that, in accordance with the case-law of the Courts of the European Union, first, debit notes are neither challengeable administrative decisions nor enforceable instruments and, second, the Commission, in the context of its contractual relations, does not enjoy the right to adopt unilateral acts having the nature of a decision vis-à-vis its contractual partners. CEVA concludes that the Commission could not adopt a unilateral act aimed at recovering a contractual debt without first having the existence of that debt declared by the court having jurisdiction.
69 The Commission contends that the second part of CEVA’s first ground of appeal should be rejected as inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
70 It should be noted that, by this part of the ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by relying on a date after 13 October 2004 as the starting point of the limitation period for the claim at issue.
71 As pointed out in paragraphs 63 and 64 above, it did not dispute before the General Court but instead conceded that the starting point of that period corresponded to the date on which the debit notes were issued, that is to say, 12 March 2009.
72 Accordingly, the ground of appeal alleging, in this second part, that the General Court erred in law by not finding that the limitation period had started to run prior to the latter date constitutes a new plea in law.
73 It follows that the second part of the first ground of appeal must also be rejected as inadmissible.
74 First of all, CEVA submits that, by holding that the limitation period for the claim at issue had been interrupted by the declaration of that claim in the context of the safeguard procedure, the General Court erred in law.
75 In that regard, CEVA disputes the existence of the claim at issue, which, it is submitted, the Commission cannot demonstrate merely by producing the debit notes or the declaration of claim. CEVA recalls that that claim was rejected by the order of the Juge-Commissaire of 11 September 2017, referred to in paragraph 33 above, and contends that the Commission did not establish its claim before the court having jurisdiction. Furthermore, according to CEVA, that declaration of claim in the context of the safeguard procedure opened in France has no effect on the limitation period for the civil action governed by Belgian law. By finding that Regulation No 1346/2000 leads to the interruption of the limitation period for a claim which had not been due when the safeguard procedure was opened, the General Court erred in law.
76 Moreover, in its reply, CEVA argues that, even if it were accepted that the opening of a safeguard procedure is capable of interrupting the limitation period, the interrupting act must be the result of a formal request by the creditor, which cannot be effected, as in the present case, by the debit notes.
77 Furthermore, the safeguard procedure was not opened until 22 June 2016, whereas the Commission’s claim became time-barred during 2014. According to CEVA, it follows that the declaration of claim made by the Commission in the context of that procedure could not interrupt the limitation period, since, on the date of that declaration, that period had expired.
78 In addition, CEVA submits that by finding that the limitation period had been interrupted by a summons to appear before the French criminal courts issued in respect of CEVA, the General Court erred in law inasmuch as ‘Belgian law does not provide for either the interruption of limitation periods or the application of time limits in Belgian criminal proceedings to proceedings opened in another State’.
79 CEVA submits that it is apparent from the case-law of the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation, Belgium) that an interruption by a summons benefits only the person who is behind the interrupting act. In the present case, it was not the Commission but the French Public Prosecutor’s Office which brought proceedings before the French criminal court. In addition, it also follows from that case-law that a summons interrupts the limitation period ‘for the claim which it brings and for any claim the subject matter of which is to all intents and purposes covered by the summons’, which requires account to be taken of the subject matter of the claim. In the present case, the subject matter of the prosecution in France was the charges of fraud and misappropriation of public funds, whereas the Commission’s claim related to reimbursement of the grants paid to CEVA.
80 Lastly, CEVA states that, in any event, under Belgian law, the interruption of the limitation period is regarded as without effect if the claimant’s claim is rejected and that the Commission was unsuccessful in its civil action before the French criminal courts.
81 The Commission contends that the third part of the first ground of appeal is in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
82 In that regard, it disputes CEVA’s interpretation of Article L. 622-25-1 of the French Commercial Code.
83 The Commission argues that the General Court was right to find that the declaration of claim made in the context of the safeguard procedure had an interrupting effect in all the Member States, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation No 1346/2000. The Commission submits that, in any event, Belgian law recognises the same interrupting effect as a declaration of claim.
84 As regards CEVA’s argument that the General Court erred in finding that the summons to appear before the French criminal courts served on it interrupted the limitation period, the Commission argues that it is inadmissible because the General Court did not make a finding on that issue.
85 In the alternative, the Commission submits that the limitation period for the claim at issue was interrupted by the joining of the European Union as a civil party before the French criminal court in 2011 and was suspended until 23 August 2017, the date on which the criminal proceedings were concluded.
86 As regards, in the first place, CEVA’s line of argument that the General Court erred in law in finding that the limitation period had been interrupted by the summons issued for CEVA to appear before the French criminal courts, it must be stated that that line of argument is based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal.
87 After finding, in paragraphs 52 to 59 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission’s declaration of claim in the context of the safeguard procedure had interrupted the limitation period in respect of that claim, the General Court did not rule on the question whether the summons for CEVA to appear before the French courts also interrupted that limitation period.
88 In the second place, as regards CEVA’s line of argument relating to the interruption of the limitation period by the Commission’s declaration of claim in the context of the safeguard procedure, it should be pointed out that, first of all, the General Court found in paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, that the tribunal de commerce de Saint-Brieuc had opened a safeguard procedure in relation to CEVA on 22 June 2016 and that the Commission had, in the context of that procedure, declared its claim on 15 September 2016.
89 Next, the General Court stated, first, in paragraph 53 of the judgment under appeal, that it was clear from Article L. 622-24 of the French Commercial Code that all creditors whose claims arose prior to the judgment opening a safeguard procedure, with the exception of employees, had to send the declaration of their claims to the court-appointed receiver from the date of publication of the judgment opening the procedure. Second, in paragraph 54 of that judgment, it noted that, under Article L. 622-25-1 of that code, the declaration of a claim is to interrupt the limitation period until the conclusion of the proceedings; it dispenses with any formal notice and is equivalent to an act in pursuance of the proceedings.
90 Lastly, the General Court found, first, in paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, that Regulation No 1346/2000 was directly applicable. Second, in paragraph 56 of that judgment, it held, in essence, that, under that regulation, first, the law of the State of the opening of proceedings is to determine the conditions for the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure, secondly, any judgment opening insolvency proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State is to be recognised in all the other Member States from the time that it becomes effective in the Member State of the opening of proceedings and, thirdly, a judgment opening proceedings is to produce the same effects, with no further formalities, in any other Member State as under the law of the State of the opening of proceedings.
91 The General Court concluded, in paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, that the opening, in France, of the safeguard procedure and the declaration of claim made by the Commission produced, pursuant to French law, effects in Belgian law and, more specifically, had interrupted the limitation period for that claim.
92 In so doing, the General Court did not err in law.
93 First, CEVA’s line of argument that the Commission’s claim had to be established by a court in order to interrupt the limitation period is not supported by the wording of Article L. 622-25-1 of the French Commercial Code, according to which a simple declaration of claim in the context of a safeguard procedure is sufficient to interrupt the limitation period.
94 Second, CEVA’s argument that Regulation No 1346/2000 cannot produce effects under Belgian law cannot succeed.
95 In that regard, suffice it to recall that, under Article 288 TFEU, a regulation is to have general application. Thus, it is to be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
96 In the third place and lastly, in so far as the appellant submits that the declaration of claim in the context of the safeguard procedure, in 2016, occurred after the European Union’s claim was time-barred on 13 October 2014, it follows from the response to the first and second parts of the present ground of appeal that that ground for complaint is inadmissible.
97 It follows that the third ground of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
98 CEVA argues that, in finding the existence of the Commission’s claim and in determining the amount of that claim, the General Court erred in law. CEVA submits that French law prohibits all the creditors of the entity which is the subject of a safeguard procedure from individually pursuing the judicial recovery of their claims once that procedure has been opened. CEVA concludes that ‘under French insolvency law, the [judgment under appeal] cannot be taken into account by the French court since the claim declared is of a later date’.
99 The Commission contends that this part is unfounded.
100 It is sufficient to state that the General Court did not make any finding against CEVA in that regard.
101 It is apparent from paragraph 95 of the judgment under appeal and from point 1 of the operative part of that judgment that the General Court merely established the existence of the claim at issue and fixed its amount at the principal sum of EUR 168 220.16, plus interest, but did not order CEVA to settle that claim. CEVA’s argument is therefore based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal.
102 In those circumstances, the fourth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected and, consequently, the first ground of appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
103 The second ground of appeal is divided into four parts.
104 CEVA submits that the General Court erred in finding, in paragraphs 70 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, that CEVA had committed financial irregularities in the performance of the Seapura contract. In that regard, CEVA argues, by reference to a specific passage in the OLAF report, that it is clear from that report that the allegation that CEVA had committed financial irregularities was not proven as regards the Seapura project. It maintains that the report’s findings of such irregularities concerned not the Seapura contract, but two other contracts, under which the grants paid had been reimbursed to the Commission.
105 In its reply, CEVA adds, first, that there is nothing in the file to establish any falsification of staff timesheets as regards the Seapura project. Second, it is also clear from that report that, contrary to the Commission’s contention, CEVA did not plagiarise any scientific documents in the performance of the Seapura contract.
106 The Commission contends that the first part of the second ground of appeal is unfounded.
107 As the General Court pointed out in paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal, the OLAF report consisted of two aspects relating to, first, direct expenditure and, second, the structural funds, and that it concerned two types of conduct, namely, first, falsification of staff timesheets and, second, plagiarism of scientific documents.
108 The General Court stated, in paragraphs 74 and 75 of the judgment under appeal, that, although the OLAF report had not established the allegation of plagiarism of scientific documents in the context of the Seapura project, that report had nevertheless concluded that CEVA had falsified the timesheets of its staff, ‘in particular for European projects, in order to secure release of the maximum amount of funds allocated to each project’.
109 On the basis of an analysis of various passages of the OLAF report, the General Court concluded that there were serious financial irregularities in respect of all the projects entrusted to CEVA, including the Seapura project.
110 In that regard, the Court considers that CEVA’s line of argument in the present part of the second ground of appeal, in so far as it is based on the passage cited from the OLAF report, confuses, as regards the Seapura contract, the exoneration as regards the allegation of plagiarism with an alleged general exoneration of any irregularity. In any event, by that line of argument, CEVA is in fact asking the Court of Justice to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the General Court.
111 However, in accordance with Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal lies on points of law only. The General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (judgment of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping), C‑48/22 P, EU:C:2024:726, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
112 Since no distortion of the facts has been alleged or demonstrated, the first part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
113 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, CEVA argues that the General Court failed to observe the principle of the sound administration of justice, which is referred to in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in so far as it held, in paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal, that the ‘horizontal nature of the field of OLAF’s investigation necessarily included the Seapura contract’, even though it had also acknowledged that it was clear from the OLAF report that the allegation of plagiarism of scientific documents had not been established for that contract.
114 Thus, CEVA submits that, in its review of the Commission’s assessment of the OLAF report, the General Court confined itself to a general reading of that report, with the result that it breached the principle of the sound administration of justice, which required it to examine all the relevant aspects of the case carefully, whereas a proper reading of that report shows that the irregularities found were not linked to the Seapura contract.
115 The Commission contends that this part is inadmissible and, in any event, unfounded.
116 By this part, CEVA claims that the General Court carried out, in paragraphs 70 to 80 of the judgment under appeal, a general, and therefore incorrect, reading of the OLAF report, failing to examine all the relevant aspects of the case carefully. By that line of argument, CEVA is seeking, in reality, to have the Court of Justice substitute its own assessment of the facts, as would result from an examination of that report, for that of the General Court.
117 However, as noted in paragraph 111 of the present judgment, the appraisal of the facts and the assessment of the evidence do not - save where the facts or evidence are distorted, which has not been alleged and, in any event, has not been demonstrated in the present case - constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal.
118 Accordingly, the second part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible.
119 CEVA submits that the General Court was wrong to hold that the Commission was due the sum of EUR 168 220.16, without taking into account the fact that the French criminal courts had acquitted CEVA of the charges of fraud and misappropriation of public funds and had definitively dismissed the Commission’s claims as a civil party. Those decisions have the force of res judicata at national level, with the result that the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and legal certainty preclude such decisions from being challenged on the basis of EU law.
120 The Commission contends that this part of the ground of appeal is inadmissible in so far as CEVA does not specify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which it refers. It is, in any event, ineffective.
121 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested. Consequently, in accordance with settled case-law, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or the relevant ground of appeal will be declared inadmissible (judgment of 28 September 2023, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, C‑123/21 P, EU:C:2023:708, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).
122 Although CEVA does not cite the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which it is objecting, given that that judgment contains the subheading ‘The criminal proceedings before the French courts’, it is clear that that line of argument is directed against paragraphs 85 to 88 of the judgment under appeal.
123 In that regard, the General Court first recalled, in paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, that, in the context of a contract such as the Seapura contract, the mere finding of the existence of fraud or serious financial irregularities in the course of an audit was sufficient to form the basis of the Commission’s right to claim reimbursement of the sums which it had granted. Next, in the context of its definitive assessment of the facts, it found, in paragraph 86 of that judgment, that the falsification of the staff timesheets, as found in the OLAF report, constituted, at the very least, a serious financial irregularity. Furthermore, in paragraph 87 of that judgment, it held, in essence, that Article 3(5) of Annex II to the Seapura contract conferred on the Commission the right to claim reimbursement of the European Union’s contribution in question simply on the basis of a finding of fraud or serious financial irregularities, without that right being subject to the condition that such conduct had, in addition, been the subject of a criminal conviction or criminal classification.
124 Lastly, in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, on the basis of those findings, that the acquittal of CEVA by a national criminal court of the charges of fraud or misappropriation of public funds had no bearing on the Commission’s right to claim reimbursement of the grant concerned on the basis of Article 3(5) of Annex II to the Seapura contract.
125 That reasoning is not vitiated by any error of law. In particular, contrary to what the appellant is arguing implicitly, the French criminal courts did not rule on whether there were ‘serious financial irregularities’, within the meaning of that provision, since that contractual concept is distinct from the classifications of fraud or misappropriation of public funds to which the charges of which CEVA was acquitted corresponded.
126 Consequently, the third part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
127 CEVA argues that the General Court breached the principle of procedural autonomy in that, as EU law currently stands, litigants cannot rely on the law of one Member State before the courts of another Member State. The General Court was therefore wrong to reject CEVA’s argument that the Commission could not rely on the proceedings opened in France on the basis of French law when the Seapura contract provides for the application of Belgian law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union.
128 The Commission submits that CEVA does not state how the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law, with the result that the present part must be rejected as inadmissible.
129 In any event, the fourth part of the second ground of appeal is unfounded.
130 As a preliminary point, while CEVA does not cite the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal to which it is objecting, given that the latter judgment contains the subheading ‘The principle of procedural autonomy’, it is clear that that line of argument is directed against paragraphs 92 to 95 of that judgment.
131 As to the substance, it should be noted, first, that, as recalled in paragraphs 94 and 95 above, under Article 288 TFEU, Regulation No 1346/2000 is to be of general application, binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
132 Second, the application of the principle of procedural autonomy presupposes that there are no provisions of EU law on the matter (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Balgarska Narodna Banka, C‑501/18, EU:C:2021:249, paragraph 116 and the case-law cited), with the result that no breach of that principle can be claimed in the present case.
133 Accordingly, by holding, in paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal, that the applicability of Belgian law to the Seapura contract was without prejudice to the direct applicability of Regulation No 1346/2000, under which certain provisions of the French Commercial Code are to have effect in Belgian law, the General Court did not breach the principle of procedural autonomy.
134 Consequently, the fourth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded and, accordingly, the second ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
135 Since none of the grounds of appeal put forward by CEVA in support of its appeal are capable of succeeding, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
136 Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.
137 Pursuant to Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
138 Since the Commission has applied for costs and CEVA has been unsuccessful in its appeal, CEVA must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to the present proceedings and to pay those incurred by the Commission. 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders the Centre d’étude et de valorisation des algues SA (CEVA) to bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.