1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness.
2 The request has been made in proceedings between CP and Nissan Iberia SA (‘Nissan’) concerning compensation for harm allegedly suffered as a result of an infringement of competition law committed by a number of undertakings, including Nissan, and established in a decision of the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (National Commission for Markets and Competition, Spain; ‘the CNMC’).
3 Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101] and [102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1), entitled ‘Uniform application of Community competition law’, provides in paragraph 1: ‘When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article [101] or [102 TFEU] which are already the subject of a [European] Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This obligation is without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article [267 TFEU].’
4 Article 10 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 1), entitled ‘Limitation periods’, is worded as follows: ‘1. Member States shall, in accordance with this Article, lay down rules applicable to limitation periods for bringing actions for damages. Those rules shall determine when the limitation period begins to run, the duration thereof and the circumstances under which it is interrupted or suspended. 2. Limitation periods shall not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know: 3. Member States shall ensure that the limitation periods for bringing actions for damages are at least five years. 4. Member States shall ensure that a limitation period is suspended or, depending on national law, interrupted, if a competition authority takes action for the purpose of the investigation or its proceedings in respect of an infringement of competition law to which the action for damages relates. The suspension shall end at the earliest one year after the infringement decision has become final or after the proceedings are otherwise terminated.’
5 Article 21 of that directive, entitled ‘Transposition’, provides, in paragraph 1: ‘Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 27 December 2016. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text thereof. …’
6 Article 22 of that directive, entitled ‘Temporal application’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Member States shall ensure that the national measures adopted pursuant to Article 21 in order to comply with substantive provisions of this Directive do not apply retroactively.’
7 Article 1902 of the Código Civil (Civil Code) states: ‘Any person who, by action or omission, causes harm to another person, through fault or negligence, shall be required to make good the damage caused.’
8 Article 1968 of that law provides: ‘The limitation period shall be one year in respect of: … 2. any civil liability action for libel or slander, or based on the obligations arising from the fault or negligence referred to in Article 1902, from the moment the injured party becomes aware of it’.
9 Article 1973 of that code provides: ‘The limitation period for actions shall be interrupted by the commencement of actions before the courts, by an out-of-court claim made by the creditor, or by any act of recognition of the debt by the debtor.’
10 Article 74 of Ley 15/2007 de Defensa de la Competencia (Law 15/2007 on the protection of competition) of 3 July 2007 (BOE No 159 of 4 July 2007, p. 28848), as amended by Real Decreto-ley 9/2017, por el que se transponen directivas de la Unión Europea en los ámbitos financiero, mercantil y sanitario, y sobre el desplazamiento de trabajadores (Royal Decree-Law 9/2017 transposing European Union directives in the fields of finance, business and health, and on the posting of workers) of 26 May 2017 (BOE No 126 of 27 May 2017, p. 42820), provides: ‘1. ‘The limitation period for an action for damages for harm resulting from an infringement of competition law shall be five years. 2. Limitation periods shall not begin to run before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or can reasonably be expected to know: 3. The time limit shall be interrupted if a competition authority opens an investigation or penalty proceedings relating to an infringement of competition law to which the action for damages relates. The interruption shall end at the earliest one year after the infringement decision has become final or after the proceedings have otherwise been terminated. 4. Similarly, the time limit shall be interrupted by the opening of any alternative dispute resolution procedure relating to the claim for compensation for the damage caused. The suspension of the limitation period shall apply only with regard to those parties that are or were involved or represented in that procedure.’
11 Article 75(1) of Law 15/2007, as amended by Royal Decree-Law 9/2017, provides: ‘The finding of an infringement of competition law by a final decision of a Spanish competition authority or by a Spanish judicial body is deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action for damages brought before a Spanish court.’
12 The first transitional provision of Royal Decree-Law 9/2017 transposing Directive 2014/104 into Spanish law, entitled ‘Transitional arrangements for actions for damages resulting from infringements of the competition law of the Member States and of the European Union’, provides: ‘1. The provisions of Article 3 of the present Royal Decree-Law shall not apply retroactively. 2. The provisions of Article 4 of the present Royal Decree-Law shall apply only to proceedings brought after its entry into force.’
13 Article 90(3) of Ley 39/2015 del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas (Law 39/2015 on the Common Administrative Procedure for Public Bodies) of 1 October 2015 (BOE No 236 of 2 October 2015, p. 89343), applicable to competition law by virtue of Article 45 of Law 15/2007, provides: ‘The decision terminating the proceedings shall be enforceable if no ordinary administrative appeal against it is possible, and it is possible to make provision therein for the necessary precautionary measures to ensure its effectiveness until it becomes enforceable; those measures may consist in the maintenance of any protective measures adopted as the case may be. When the decision becomes enforceable, it may be suspended provisionally if the party concerned informs the administration of his or her intention to bring an administrative action against that final administrative decision. That provisional suspension shall cease where:
14 On 23 July 2015, the CNMC adopted a decision in which it found that a number of undertakings, including Nissan, had infringed Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 of Law 15/2007. The anti-competitive conduct complained of, consisting in exchanges of commercially sensitive information between those undertakings, ended in 2013.
15 On 28 July 2015, the CNMC published on its website a press release relating to that decision.
16 On 15 September 2015, that decision was published in its entirety on that website.
17 A number of actions for annulment were brought against that decision by the perpetrators of the alleged infringement, including Nissan, but the decision was upheld, as regards Nissan, by the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain) in 2021.
18 In March 2023, CP brought an action for damages before the referring court following the decision of the CNMC (follow-on damages action) seeking an order that Nissan pay compensation for the losses which CP allegedly suffered as a result of the purchase of a vehicle the price of which had been affected by the infringement found in that decision.
19 In its defence, Nissan argued, in essence, that that action for damages was time-barred. According to that company, it is apparent from the limitation rules laid down in the Civil Code that the one-year limitation period applicable to such an action begins to run from the time when the injured party became aware of the infringement of competition law at issue. In the present case, in view of the fact, first, that the CNMC’s decision was published in full on that authority’s website on 15 September 2015, second, that the CNMC published a press release in that regard and, third, that the case giving rise to that decision received extensive media coverage at national level, CP cannot claim to have been unaware, on the date of the publication of that decision on the CNMC’s website, of the information necessary for bringing that action for damages. Thus, according to Nissan, since it is not necessary for that decision to become final in order for the limitation period to start to run, the view may be taken that that period began to run on 15 September 2015.
20 According to the referring court, the limitation periods applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules cannot begin to run before the infringement concerned has ceased and the injured party knew, or could reasonably have known, of the information necessary for bringing his or her action for damages.
21 In cases where that infringement has been established by a decision of the national competition authority, that court considers that the view may be taken that the injured parties became aware of that information at the time that decision was published on that authority’s website. In particular, it is on the occasion of that publication that the existence of the infringement at issue is known, that the perpetrators of that infringement are specifically identified, that the duration of the unlawful conduct is cited and that it can be established that the damage occurred. According to that court, since no rule of law requires such a decision to become final in order for the right to compensation for the harm caused by the infringement concerned to arise, the fact that that decision has been the subject of legal proceedings cannot affect the calculation of the limitation period applicable to an action for damages seeking compensation for the harm arising from the infringement at issue.
22 It is true that, according to the referring court, the court hearing an action for damages following a decision of the competition authority, against which an action for annulment has been brought, may be bound by the finding of an infringement in that decision only when that decision has become final. However, under the applicable procedural law, that court could stay the proceedings pending before it until that decision becomes final. Furthermore, in the event that an action for damages is brought for an infringement of the competition rules, which is at the same time the subject of an investigation by the competition authority, that court could stay those proceedings until a decision is taken by that authority and becomes final.
23 In the present case, according to that court, it was possible for CP to know all the information necessary to bring his action for damages following the publication in full, on the CNMC’s website, of the decision of that authority, the publication of the press release in that regard, which expressly invited injured parties to bring an action for damages for the harm resulting from the infringement concerned, and the extensive media coverage at national level of the case covered by that decision.
24 The referring court adds in that regard that, unlike decisions of the CNMC, which are published on the website of that authority and communicated in a press release also published on that website, judgments of the Spanish courts rendering, as the case may be, a decision of that authority final are not communicated in a press release, nor are they published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado (Spanish official journal). Furthermore, the website on which the judgments of the Spanish courts are published is difficult for the general public to access.
25 In that context, the referring court observes, however, that, contrary to its interpretation of the rules governing the dies a quo of the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules, there is a line of national case-law according to which the limitation period applicable to such actions for damages, brought following a decision of the CNMC which is the subject of an action for annulment before the courts having jurisdiction, does not begin to run until that decision has become final following judicial review. According to that line of case-law, it is not possible for the injured party to know the information necessary for bringing his or her action for damages solely on the basis of the publication of the full version of the CNMC’s decision on its website, the press release and the media coverage at national level of the case concerned. Thus, the view should be taken that the limitation period does not begin to run until the judgment of the court of last instance has become final. In any event, it would be pointless bringing an action for damages on the basis of the CNMC’s decision and then seek its suspension in order to be able to determine whether or not to rely on that decision to support that action for damages.
26 According to that court, that line of case-law appears to draw an erroneous distinction between the possibility of bringing an action and the obligation to do so. According to that court, if the applicant concerned is aware of the information necessary for bringing his action for damages, he must do so within the time limit prescribed for that purpose.
27 In those circumstances, the Juzgado de lo Mercantil no 1 de Zaragoza (Commercial Court No 1, Zaragoza, Spain), which is the referring court, decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
28 By a document lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 17 April 2025, Nissan applied, in the first place, for an order to reopen the oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. In the alternative, it invited the Court to send a request for clarification to the referring court, pursuant to Article 101 of those Rules of Procedure.
29 In support of those requests, Nissan submitted, in essence, first, that, in her Opinion, the Advocate General relied on matters of fact and law, raised by CP at the oral hearing, which were not the subject of an adversarial debate at that hearing and, second, that the Court is not sufficiently informed on questions of fact and national law. In particular, it is necessary to clarify, first, the detailed rules for interrupting the limitation period applicable to actions for damages and, in particular, the effects of out-of-court claims on the interruption of that period. In the present case, it is necessary to ask the referring court to specify whether CP brought an out-of-court claim and, as the case may be, its content and the costs of bringing that claim. Second, it would be useful to specify the number of the CNMC’s penalty decisions that were annulled following a judicial review of those decisions. Third, the referring court should be asked to clarify certain aspects of Spanish law concerning, inter alia, the enforceability of the CNMC’s decisions, the differences between the national rules governing the publication of the CNMC’s decisions and those governing the publication of the judgments of the Spanish courts, and the costs associated with the interruption of limitation periods.
30 In that respect, in the first place, as regards the application to reopen the oral part of the procedure, it should be noted that, under the second paragraph of Article 252 TFEU, it is the duty of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require his or her involvement. The Court is not bound either by the Advocate General’s Opinion or by the reasoning on which it is based (judgment of 19 March 2020, Sánchez Ruiz and Others, C‑103/18 and C‑429/18, EU:C:2020:219, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
31 It should also be noted, in that context, that the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure make no provision for the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of that statute to submit observations in response to the Advocate General’s Opinion. The fact that a party or such an interested person disagrees with the Advocate General’s Opinion, irrespective of the questions examined in the Opinion, cannot therefore, in itself, constitute grounds justifying the reopening of the oral procedure (judgment of 19 March 2020, Sánchez Ruiz and Others, C‑103/18 and C‑429/18, EU:C:2020:219, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
32 It follows that, since Nissan’s request to have the oral part reopened is intended to enable it to respond to the position adopted by the Advocate General in her Opinion, it cannot be granted.
33 That being said, pursuant to Article 83 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court may, at any time after hearing the Advocate General, order that the oral part of the procedure be reopened, in particular if it considers that it lacks sufficient information or where a party has, after the close of that part of the procedure, submitted a new fact which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor for the decision of the Court, or where the case must be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties or the interested persons referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
34 In the present case, the Court, after hearing the Advocate General, considers that it has all the information necessary to answer the questions raised by the referring court and that the present case does not need to be decided on the basis of an argument which has not been debated between the parties. In addition, the request that the oral part of the procedure be reopened does not disclose any new fact which is of such a nature as to be capable of being a decisive factor for the decision which the Court is called upon to make in the present case.
35 Accordingly, there is no need to order that the oral part of the procedure be reopened.
36 In the second place, as regards the application made in the alternative, by which Nissan invites the Court to request clarification from the referring court, suffice it to recall that the Court’s power to request clarification from a national court pursuant to Article 101 of its Rules of Procedure is merely an option of which the Court is free to avail itself or not in each case (judgment of 3 December 2015, Banif Plus Bank, C‑312/14, EU:C:2015:794, paragraph 32). As has been pointed out in paragraph 34 above, the Court has all the information necessary to rule on the present request for a preliminary ruling. Accordingly, that application must also be rejected.
37 According to the Court’s settled case-law, in the procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, which provides for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court may also find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions (judgment of 12 January 2023, RegioJet, C‑57/21, EU:C:2023:6, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). In that regard, it is for the Court to extract from all the information provided by the national court, in particular from the grounds of the decision referring the questions, the points of EU law which require interpretation, having regard to the subject matter of the dispute (judgment of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks, C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
38 In the present case, in the light of all the information provided by the referring court, it is necessary, in order to provide that court with an answer that will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it, to reformulate the questions referred for a preliminary ruling.
39 It follows from those factors that the referring court wishes, inter alia, to determine whether CP, who considers that he has been harmed by an infringement of competition law, established by a decision of the CNMC published on that authority’s website on 15 September 2015 and which has become final following a judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) delivered in 2021, may seek compensation for the harm caused to him or whether his action for damages brought in March 2023 is time-barred.
40 In that regard, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that Royal Decree-Law 9/2017 transposing Directive 2014/104 entered into force on 27 May 2017, that is to say, approximately five months after the expiry of the transposition period laid down in Article 21 of that directive. The referring court states that, until the date of the entry into force of that decree-law transposing that directive into Spanish law, the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of competition law had been governed by the general regime of non-contractual civil liability and that, under Article 1968(2) of the Civil Code, that one-year limitation period began to run only from when the circumstances giving rise to liability had become known to the person who considers himself or herself to have been harmed. That court states that, following a legislative amendment made in 2007, the national legislation no longer requires the decision of the national competition authority to be final in order for the right to compensation for the harm caused by the infringement concerned to arise. Thus, the referring court considers that the starting point of the limitation period applicable to CP’s action for damages coincides with the date of publication of the CNMC’s decision on its website, namely 15 September 2015, and not with the date of publication of the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) by which that decision became final in 2021.
41 In that context and in view, in particular, of the fact that the limitation rules of the Civil Code continued to apply approximately five months after the expiry of the period for transposition of Directive 2014/104, it is clear from the information provided by the referring court that it is enquiring as to the compatibility with Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, and, as the case may be, with Article 10 of that directive, of the limitation rules that were in force before the transposition of that directive, in particular as regards the determination of the dies a quo of the limitation period.
42 In those circumstances, the view must be taken that, by its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, and, as the case may be, Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104 must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, according to which, for the purposes of determining the starting point of the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules following a decision of the national competition authority finding an infringement of those rules, it may be concluded that a person who considers himself or herself to have been harmed was aware of the information necessary to enable him or her to bring an action for damages before that decision became final.
43 In that regard, in order to answer the questions referred, it is necessary to ascertain, first of all, the temporal applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, which lays down certain requirements in relation to the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of competition law, by determining, in particular, the minimum duration of that period and the earliest point in time at which it may begin to run and the circumstances in which it must be suspended or interrupted.
44 Thus, it should be recalled that Article 10 of Directive 2014/104 is a substantive provision within the meaning of Article 22(1) of that directive. Under that provision, Member States had to ensure that the national measures adopted pursuant to Article 21 of that directive in order to comply with its substantive provisions do not apply retroactively (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 47).
45 That said, as from the expiry of the period prescribed for transposition of a directive, national law must be interpreted in conformity with any provision of that directive (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 48).
46 Therefore, in order to determine the temporal applicability of Article 10 of Directive 2014/104, it is necessary to ascertain whether the situation at issue in the main proceedings arose before the expiry of the time limit for the transposition of that directive or whether it continued to produce effects after the expiry of that time limit (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 49).
47 To that end, in view of the specificities of the limitation rules, their nature and their operational arrangements, in particular in the context of an action for damages for an infringement of competition law, it is necessary to ascertain whether, at the date of expiry of the time limit for transposition of Directive 2014/104, namely 27 December 2016, the limitation period laid down by national law, applicable to the situation at issue in the main proceedings until that date, had elapsed, which means determining the moment when that limitation period began to run (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 50).
48 In the absence of EU rules governing the matter until the date of expiry of the time limit for transposition of Directive 2014/104, it was for the legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm resulting from an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, including those on limitation periods, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness were observed, that latter principle requiring that the rules applicable to actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of EU law do not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
49 In that regard, it follows from that principle that, even before the expiry of the time limit for transposition of Directive 2014/104, national legislation laying down the date on which the limitation period starts to run, the duration of that period and the rules for its suspension or interruption must be adapted to the specificities of competition law and the objectives of the implementation of the rules of that law by the persons concerned, so as not to undermine completely the full effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).
50 In that context, it should be noted that Article 101(1) and Article 102 TFEU produce direct legal effects in relations between individuals and directly create rights for individuals which national courts must protect (judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
51 The full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in paragraph 1 thereof would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him or her by an infringement of competition law (judgments of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 21, and of 28 January 2025, ASG 2, C‑253/23, EU:C:2025:40, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
52 Any person is thus entitled to claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 5 June 2014, Kone and Others, C‑557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
53 The right for any person to seek compensation for such harm strengthens the working of the EU competition rules, since it discourages conduct which is liable to restrict or distort competition, thereby contributing to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (judgment of 28 January 2025, ASG 2, C‑253/23, EU:C:2025:40, paragraph 63).
54 According to the Court’s settled case-law, that right gives any injured party the possibility to claim damages for the loss caused by conduct liable to prevent, restrict or distort competition (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2001, Courage and Crehan, C‑453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 25; of 13 July 2006, Manfredi and Others, C‑295/04 to C‑298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 60; and of 21 December 2023, International Skating Union v Commission, C‑124/21 P, EU:C:2023:1012, paragraph 201).
55 In that regard, the limitation periods applicable to that law in principle have the function, first, of ensuring protection of the rights of the injured party, who must have sufficient time in which to gather the appropriate information with a view to a possible action, and, second, of preventing the injured party from being able to delay indefinitely the exercise of his or her right to obtain damages to the detriment of the party responsible for the harm. Those limitation periods thus definitively protect both the injured party and the party responsible for the harm (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 June 2022, Volvo and DAF Trucks, C‑267/20, EU:C:2022:494 paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
56 It should also be recalled that the exercise of the right to claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of an infringement of competition law would be rendered practically impossible or excessively difficult if the limitation periods applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the provisions of competition law began to run before the infringement came to an end and the injured party did not know, or could not reasonably have been expected to know, the information necessary for bringing his or her action for damages (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).
57 In the present case, as regards the first condition referred to in the preceding paragraph relating to the cessation of the infringement, it is common ground that the infringement came to an end in 2013.
58 As regards the second condition referred to in the same paragraph, that is to say, when the injured party knew the information necessary for bringing his or her action for damages, it is clear from settled case-law that the existence of an infringement of competition law, the existence of harm, the causal link between that harm and that infringement, and the identity of the infringer form part of that information (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
59 In the absence of that information, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the injured party to obtain compensation for the harm caused to him or her by that infringement (judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 65).
60 In that regard, it is for the national court before which an action for damages has been brought to determine the moment from which it may reasonably be expected that the injured party knew of that information. Indeed, the national court alone has jurisdiction to find and assess the facts in the case before it. That being said, it is open to the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling on a reference, to give clarifications to guide the national court in that determination (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 April 2024, Heureka Group (Online price comparison services), C‑605/21, EU:C:2024:324, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).
61 It is apparent from the order for reference that, according to the national legislation, the liability of the perpetrator of an infringement of the competition rules may, in principle, be established either by the injured party bringing an action for damages before the national court having jurisdiction, where such an infringement has not been found in a decision of the national competition authority, or by the bringing of such an action following the adoption of such a decision by that authority.
62 The referring court points out that there is no rule of law requiring such a decision to be final in order for the right to compensation for the harm caused by the infringement concerned to arise.
63 That being said, that court states that, according to the national legislation, the court hearing an action for damages following a decision of the national competition authority finding an infringement, which has been the subject of an action for annulment, may be bound by the finding of the existence of that infringement only where that decision has become final.
64 Thus, it appears that, unlike Commission decisions ruling on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 or 102 TFEU which, by virtue of Article 16(1) of Regulation No 1/2003, are binding on the national courts, with the result that those courts cannot take decisions running counter to such decisions, in the present case, a decision of the national competition authority finding an infringement of the competition rules, the validity of which has been called into question by judicial means, is not of that nature. It follows that the court hearing an action for damages following such a decision has at its disposal, in the event of an action being brought against that decision, information which is not definitive.
65 Thus, in cases in which a possible perpetrator of an infringement of EU competition law, established in a decision of a national competition authority, calls into question, through an action for annulment, the findings of that authority relating to the nature and the material, personal, temporal and territorial scope of that infringement, with the result that the court hearing an action for damages relating to that infringement is not bound by those findings, it cannot be held that the injured party could actually rely on that decision before that court in order to substantiate his or her action against the possible perpetrator of the infringement.
66 In such a situation, the injured party’s ability to bring an action for damages following a decision of the national competition authority (follow-on damages action) would be undermined, and it would be excessively difficult for that person to exercise his or her right to seek compensation.
67 In those circumstances, it must be held that, in so far as the court hearing an action for damages is not bound by the finding of the existence of the infringement concerned unless the decision of the national competition authority has become final, the injured party cannot reasonably be considered to have become aware of the information necessary to bring his or her action for damages on the basis of that decision, and, therefore, the limitation period cannot begin to run before that decision has become final.
68 It must be made clear that, in the present case, that interpretation is not invalidated either by the detailed rules for the suspension and/or interruption of the limitation period or by those concerning the staying of the proceedings before the court hearing an action for damages, as those rules appear in the documents before the Court.
69 First, as regards the possible suspension of the limitation period, it is not apparent from those documents that such a suspension may be ordered as a result of an action for annulment of the CNMC’s decision at issue being brought before the courts having jurisdiction or that such a suspension necessarily continues until the date of publication of the judgment rendering that decision final.
70 Second, as regards the interruption of the limitation period, it is apparent from those documents that that period may be interrupted by an out-of-court claim made by the injured party, calling on the perpetrator of the alleged infringement to compensate him or her, by initiating a conciliation procedure, or by an application for preliminary measures with a view to gathering information and/or documents that are essential in order to prepare to bring the action for damages.
71 That being said, it must be pointed out that those grounds for interruption are not dependent on bringing an action for annulment of the CNMC’s decision at issue before the courts having jurisdiction. Consequently, it must be held that none of those grounds for interruption makes it possible to guarantee in a sufficiently effective manner that the one-year limitation period laid down in the national legislation has not expired before the completion of the judicial proceedings at the end of which the decision concerned becomes final.
72 Third, as regards the possibility for the court hearing an action for damages to stay the proceedings before it, where that action is brought following a decision of the competition authority which has been the subject of an action for annulment, until that decision becomes final, it is apparent from the order for reference that such a stay is not automatic, since the court hearing the case has a margin of discretion in that regard.
73 In any event, as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 83 of her Opinion, an application to stay the proceedings may not be made until after the action for damages has been brought, which means that that action must be brought before the expiry of the limitation period. In those circumstances, the view cannot be taken that the possibility of applying for a stay of proceedings satisfies the requirements of Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness.
74 That being said, it should be noted that the condition relating to knowledge of the information necessary to bring an action for damages following a decision of a national competition authority requires not only that that decision becomes final but also that that information arising from the final decision has been made public in an appropriate manner.
75 In that regard, in order for it to be reasonable to consider that the injured party has the information necessary to bring his or her action for damages from the date of publication of a judgment in which the decision of the national competition authority at issue has been definitively upheld, that judgment must be officially published, it must be freely accessible to the general public and the date of its publication must be clearly set out in that publication.
76 In the present case, CP brought his action for damages in March 2023 following a decision of the CNMC, adopted on 23 July 2015, published on that authority’s website on 15 September 2015 and which became final as regards Nissan following a judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) delivered in 2021.
77 Furthermore, it is apparent from the order for reference that the website on which the judgments of the Spanish courts are published is the website of the Centro de Documentación Judicial (Cendoj) (Judicial Documentation Center) of the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (General Council of the Judiciary, Spain), which is, in essence, a case-law database freely accessible to the general public.
78 Consequently, subject to verification by the referring court, it may reasonably be concluded that, on the date of publication of the judgment of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) by which the CNMC’s decision became final in 2021, CP was aware of all the information necessary to enable him to bring his action for damages.
79 It follows that, as is apparent from paragraphs 76 to 78 above, on the date of the expiry of the period for transposing Directive 2014/104, that is to say, 27 December 2016, not only had the limitation period not expired, but it had not even begun to run.
80 Therefore, the situation at issue in the main proceedings had not arisen before the expiry of the period for transposing that directive, with the result that Article 10 of that directive is, in the present case, applicable ratione temporis and CP’s action for damages does not appear to be time-barred.
81 In that regard, given that the content of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104, as regards the point at which the limitation period starts to run, essentially reflects the Court’s case-law relating to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness, the reasoning in the present judgment concerning the starting point of the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules, following a decision of the national competition authority finding an infringement, is also applicable to the interpretation of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104.
82 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 101 TFEU, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, and Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/104 must be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts having jurisdiction, according to which, for the purposes of determining the starting point of the limitation period applicable to actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules following a decision of the national competition authority finding an infringement of those rules, it may be concluded that a person who considers himself or herself to have been harmed was aware of the information necessary to enable him or her to bring an action for damages before that decision became final.
83 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.