1 By their appeal, Mr Giacomo Santini, Mr Marco Cellai, Mr Domenico Ceravolo, Mr Natalino Gatti, Ms Rosa Maria Avitabile, as heiress of Mr Antonio Mazzone, Mr Luigi Moretti, Mr Gabriele Sboarina, Ms Lina Wuhrer, Ms Patrizia Capraro and Ms Luciana Meneghini, as heiress of Mr Ferruccio Pisoni, seek to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 February 2021, Santini and Others v Parliament (T‑345/19, T‑346/19, T‑364/19 to T‑366/19, T‑372/19 to T‑375/19 and T‑385/19, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2021:78), by which the General Court dismissed their action seeking, first, annulment of the notes of 11 April 2019 and, with regard to Ms Meneghini, as heiress of Mr Pisoni, of 8 May 2019, drawn up, in the case of each of the appellants, by the European Parliament (together, ‘the decisions at issue’) concerning the adjustment of the amount of the pensions received by the appellants following the entry into force, on 1 January 2019, of Decision No 14/2018 of the Ufficio di Presidenza della Camera dei deputati (Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy) of 12 July 2018 (‘Decision No 14/2018’) and, second, compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the appellants as a result of those acts.
2 Article 1 of Annex III to the Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament, in the version in force until 14 July 2009 (‘the PEAM Rules’), provided: ‘1. All Members of the European Parliament shall be entitled to a retirement pension. 2. Pending the establishment of a definitive Community pension scheme for all Members of the European Parliament, where no pension is provided under national arrangements or where the level and/or conditions of such pension are not identical to those applicable to Members of the national parliament of the Member State for which the Member was elected, a provisional pension shall, at the request of the Member concerned, be paid from the European Union budget, Parliament Section.’
3 Article 2 of Annex III to the PEAM Rules provided: ‘1. The level and conditions of [the provisional] pension shall be identical to those applicable to the pension for Members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which the Member of the European Parliament was elected. 2. A Member benefiting under Article 1(2) shall be required, when joining the scheme, to pay to the European Union budget a sum so calculated that he or she pays the same overall contribution as that payable by a Member of his or her parliament under national provisions.’
4 Under Article 3(1) and (2) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules: ‘1. Applications to join this provisional pension scheme must be submitted within 12 months of the beginning of the Member’s term of office. Once that time limit has expired, membership of the pension scheme shall take effect from the first day of the month in which the application was received. 2. Applications for payment of the pension must be made within six months of the commencement of entitlement. Once that time limit has expired, the pension shall be payable from the first day of the month in which the application was received.’
5 Article 25(1) and (2) of Decision 2005/684/EC, Euratom of the European Parliament of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (OJ 2005 L 262, p. 1; ‘the Statute for Members’), which entered into force on 14 July 2009, reads as follows: ‘1. Members who belonged to Parliament prior to the entry into force of this Statute and were re-elected may opt for the national system applicable hitherto in respect of the salary, transitional allowance and pensions for the entire duration of their membership of the European Parliament. 2. These payments shall be made from the budget of the Member State in question.’
6 Article 28(1) of the Statute for Members provides: ‘Any pension entitlement that a Member has acquired in accordance with national arrangements at the time when this Statute is applied shall be retained in full.’
7 Recital 7 of Decision 2009/C 159/01 of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 19 May and 9 July 2008 concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament (OJ 2009 C 159, p. 1), as amended by Decision 2010/C 340/06 of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 13 December 2010 (OJ 2010 C 340, p. 6) (‘the Implementing Measures’), states: ‘… in the transitional provisions steps should be taken to ensure that persons in receipt of certain benefits under the PEAM Rules continue to receive them after those rules have been repealed, in keeping with the principle of [the protection of] legitimate expectations. Steps should also be taken to guarantee maintenance of the pension rights acquired on the basis of the PEAM Rules prior to the entry into force of the Statute [for Members].’
8 Article 49(1) of the Implementing Measures states: ‘After the cessation of their term of office, Members who have exercised their mandate for at least one complete year shall be entitled, for life, to an old-age pension payable from the first day of the month following that in which they reach the age of 63. Former Members or their legal representatives shall, except in cases of force majeure, submit their application for payment of the old-age pension within six months of the commencement of entitlement. After that deadline the date on which enjoyment of the old-age pension takes effect shall be the first day of the month in which the application is received.’
9 Pursuant to Article 73 of the Implementing Measures, those measures entered into force on the same date as the Statute for Members, namely on 14 July 2009.
10 Article 74 of the Implementing Measures specifies that, subject to the transitional provisions laid down in Title IV thereof - and in particular Article 75 thereof - the PEAM Rules were to cease to be valid on the date on which the Statute for Members entered into force.
11 Under Article 75 of the Implementing Measures: ‘1. The survivor’s pension, the invalidity pension, the additional invalidity pension granted for dependent children and the old-age pension paid pursuant to Annexes I, II and III to the PEAM Rules shall continue to be paid pursuant to those annexes to those persons who were in receipt of the benefits in question prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute [for Members]. Where a former Member in receipt of the invalidity pension dies after 14 July 2009, the survivor’s pension shall be paid to his or her spouse, stable non-marital partner or dependent children, subject to the conditions laid down in Annex I to the PEAM Rules. 2. The old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute [for Members] pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III shall be maintained. Persons who have acquired rights under that pension scheme shall receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III as soon as they meet the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned and they have submitted the application referred to in Article 3(2) of the aforementioned Annex III.’
12 Under Article 1(1) to (3) of Decision No 14/2018: ‘1. From 1 January 2019, the amount of direct and survivors’ lifetime annuities and of the lifetime annuity proportion of pro rata direct and survivors’ pension benefits, entitlement to which was acquired pursuant to the rules in force on 31 December 2011, shall be calculated in accordance with the new rules provided for in this decision. 2. The new calculation referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be carried out by multiplying the amount of the individual contribution by the conversion coefficient relating to the age of the Member of Parliament on the date on which the Member of Parliament became entitled to the lifetime annuity or pro rata pension benefit. 3. The conversion coefficients set out in Table 1, annexed to this decision, shall be applied.’
13 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 14 to 21 of the judgment under appeal. For the purposes of the present appeal, it may be summarised as follows.
14 Each of the appellants is either a former Member of the European Parliament elected in Italy or a beneficiary of such a former Member of the European Parliament, in receipt of a retirement pension or a survivor’s pension (‘the pension’).
15 By inserting a comment into the pension statements for January 2019, the Parliament warned the appellants that the amounts of their pensions could be revised pursuant to Decision No 14/2018 and that that new calculation might give rise to the recovery of overpaid sums.
16 From 1 January 2019, the Parliament, by applying that decision in accordance with Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, reduced the amount of the appellants’ pension.
17 By an undated note from the Head of the Members’ Salaries and Social Entitlements Unit of the Parliament’s Directorate-General (DG) for Finance (‘the Head of Unit’), appended to the appellants’ pension statements for February 2019, the Parliament, first of all, advised the appellants that, by Opinion No SJ-0836/18 of 11 January 2019, its Legal Service had confirmed that Decision No 14/2018 was automatically applicable to their situation (‘the Opinion of the Legal Service’). It then went on to explain that once it had received the necessary information from the Camera dei deputati (Chamber of Deputies, Italy), the Parliament would notify the appellants of the new amounts of their pensions and would recover any difference over the following 12 months. Finally, it informed the appellants that the definitive amounts of their pensions would be decided in a formal act against which it would be possible to lodge a complaint or an action for annulment.
18 By the decisions at issue, the Head of Unit, first, informed the appellants that the amounts of their pensions would be adjusted, pursuant to Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, in line with the reduction of similar pensions paid in Italy to former members of the national parliament by the Chamber of Deputies pursuant to Decision No 14/2018. Second, the amounts of the appellants’ pensions would be adjusted as from April 2019, with retroactive effect from 1 January 2019, pursuant to the proposed new pension calculations appended to those decisions. Third, the decisions at issue gave the appellants a period of 30 days, from their receipt, to submit their comments. If they did not do so, the effects of those decisions would be considered final and would entail, in particular, the recovery of the amounts overpaid for January to March 2019.
19 Since no appellant submitted any such comments within the prescribed period, the effects of the decisions at issue became final in their respect on the expiry of that period.
20 The appellants brought their actions for annulment of the decisions at issue by applications lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 10 June (Cases T‑345/19 and T‑346/19), 17 June (Cases T‑364/19 and T‑365/19), 18 June (Case T‑366/19), 20 June (Cases T‑372/19 to T‑375/19) and 25 June 2019 (Case T‑385/19).
21 In support of their actions, the appellants relied on eight pleas in law. The first plea alleged lack of competence on the part of the author of the decisions at issue and unlawful automatic application of Decision No 14/2018. The second plea alleged infringement of the provisions of the PEAM Rules, the Statute for Members and the Implementing Measures. The third plea alleged infringement of Article 28 of the Statute for Members and of Articles 75 and 76 of the Implementing Measures. The fourth plea alleged infringement of Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and of the principle that penalties must have a sound legal basis, and infringement of the principles of non-retroactivity and of equality. The fifth plea alleged infringement of the right to property. The sixth plea alleged infringement of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, legal certainty and the protection of acquired rights. The seventh plea alleged infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality and equal treatment. The eighth plea alleged other grounds of infringement of the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, equality and solidarity.
22 By the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected all those pleas and, accordingly, dismissed those actions.
23 The appellants claim that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; - annul the decisions at issue; and - order the Parliament to pay the costs of the appeal and of the procedure before the General Court.
24 The Parliament contends that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal and - order the appellants to pay the costs of the appeal and of the procedure before the General Court.
25 On 12 January 2022, Mr Enrico Falqui, in Case C‑391/21 P concerning him, lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice a copy of judgment No 4/2021 of the Consiglio di giurisdizione della Camera dei deputati (Judicial Council of the Chamber of Deputies, Italy) of 23 December 2021 (‘Judgment No 4/2021’), annulling Decision No 14/2018. That document was not, at that stage, added to the file.
26 On 9 March 2022, the appellants lodged that judgment at the Court Registry.
27 In the present case, as well as in Falqui v Parliament (C‑391/21 P) and Coppo Gavazzi and Others v Parliament (C‑725/20 P), the Registry, on 16 March 2022, addressed to the parties a measure of organisation prescribed by the Judge-Rapporteur and the Advocate General pursuant to Article 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, according to which they were requested to produce all the documents likely to have a bearing on the subject matter of the case concerning them, inter alia, Judgment No 4/2021.
28 On 23 March 2022, the appellants in the present case produced several documents, including Judgment No 4/2021. On 29 March 2022, the Parliament also produced a number of documents, including Judgment No 4/2021 and a document entitled ‘New rules for the calculation of pensions adopted by the Italian Chamber of Deputies’. The Parliament also informed the Court that, upon receipt of the additional clarifications it had requested from the Chamber of Deputies regarding the application of those rules in practice, it would recalculate the appellants’ retirement pensions and send them a new draft decision on the determination of their pension rights, on which they would then have the opportunity to submit comments before the adoption of a final decision.
29 On 12 October and 29 November 2022, the Parliament lodged at the Court Registry the final decisions fixing the new amount of the pensions to be paid to the appellants from November 2022 with the arrears payable (‘the new decisions of the Parliament’).
30 By decision of 25 October 2022, the President of the Court of Justice asked the parties to state whether they took the view, first, that the new decisions of the Parliament had replaced the decisions at issue ex tunc and, second, that, following the adoption of those new decisions, the appeal retained its purpose.
31 On 29 November 2022, the Parliament stated that it took the view that the new decisions of the Parliament had replaced the decisions at issue ex tunc, but that the appeal retained its purpose. In its view, it would be in the interests of the parties and the proper administration of justice for the Court to rule on the merits of the appeal, in order to clarify whether the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error of law and whether the Parliament may recalculate, on the basis of Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, the appellants’ pensions in the event of a change in the applicable national rules.
32 By letter lodged on 29 November 2022, the appellants stated that they considered that all the grounds of appeal continued to be of interest and relevance, in so far as the new decisions of the Parliament had not replaced the decisions at issue, which continued to maintain their full effectiveness and validity. The new decisions of the Parliament, like the decisions at issue, entail a recalculation of their pension amounts and, in so far as they alter the conditions for their entitlement to a pension, a redefinition of that entitlement with retroactive and permanent effect. Decision No 14/2018 was amended only in the part relating to the conversion coefficient relating to the age of the Member in receipt of the retirement pension.
33 In the present appeal, the appellants put forward six grounds of appeal seeking to call into question, in essence, the General Court’s confirmation of the soundness of the interpretation of Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules (‘the Parliament’s internal rules’), which led the Parliament to apply Decision No 14/2018 in order to review the amount of their retirement pension. The first to fourth grounds, which it is appropriate to examine together, allege misinterpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules, breach of the principles of legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations and proportionality and of the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter as well as the Parliament’s failure to adopt a measure. The fifth ground alleges misinterpretation of Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. The sixth ground alleges an error of law on the part of the General Court in its assessment as to whether the decisions at issue contained a proper statement of reasons.
34 It is apparent from paragraph 29 above that the new decisions of the Parliament, adopted in the course of the proceedings before the Court, seek to fix the new amounts of the pensions paid to the appellants from November 2022 with the arrears payable.
35 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court, the purpose of the action must, like the interest in bringing proceedings, continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate, which presupposes that the appeal must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage for the party bringing it (judgment of 4 September 2018ClientEarth v Commission, C‑57/16 P, EU:C:2018:660, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
36 Nevertheless an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings does not necessarily disappear because the act challenged by him or her has ceased to have effect in the course of proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 May 2013, Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 62).
37 In certain circumstances, an applicant may retain an interest in seeking the annulment of an act repealed in the course of proceedings, in order to induce the author of the contested act to make suitable amendments in the future, and thereby avoid the risk that the unlawfulness alleged in respect of that act will be repeated (judgment of 6 September 2018, Bank Mellat v Council, C‑430/16 P, EU:C:2018:668, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
38 In the present case, it follows unambiguously from the Parliament’s reply of 29 November 2022, summarised in paragraph 31 above, that the Parliament wishes, also in the future, to recalculate the pensions of former Members of the European Parliament in the event of a change in the national rules referred to in Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules (‘the dynamic system’).
39 Although the Parliament replaced the decisions at issue with the new decisions, the fact remains that all those decisions are based on an interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to former Members of the European Parliament in receipt of the retirement pension and to persons in receipt of the survivor’s pension who, like the appellants, come within the scope of the annexes to the PEAM Rules (‘the former Members of the European Parliament concerned’).
40 It is precisely that interpretation which is called into question by the appellants in the present appeal. It follows that, notwithstanding the ex tunc replacement of the decisions at issue, the appellants retain an interest in obtaining a finding that the General Court erred in law in confirming the soundness of that interpretation, since the latter is liable to be applied by the Parliament when it adopts, in the future, decisions similar to the decisions at issue or to the new decisions of the Parliament, with the result that there is not only a risk that the alleged unlawfulness will be repeated, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 above, but also a risk that, in the event of an action for annulment of such similar decisions, the General Court may again commit the alleged errors of law which led it to confirm the soundness of that interpretation.
41 It is apparent, moreover, from the new decisions that the Parliament remains of the view that the Head of Unit is authorised to adopt decisions changing the pension amounts in the event of a change in national legislation and that those decisions do not have to include a statement of reasons as to their compliance with EU law.
42 It must be held that the appellants retain an interest in bringing proceedings before the Court of Justice, in so far as the present appeal is directed against the grounds of the judgment under appeal which constitute the ratio decidendi for the General Court’s findings that, first, it follows from the Parliament’s internal rules that the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned, second, the Head of Unit is competent to adopt decisions changing the amount of the pensions of those former Members and, third, the Parliament is not required to set out, in such decisions, the reasons for their compliance with EU law.
43 Two separate complaints are put forward in support of the first to fourth grounds of appeal.
44 By their first complaint, the appellants criticise the General Court for finding, first, in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, that Annex III to the PEAM Rules remained applicable to them after the entry into force of the Statute for Members and, second, in paragraph 90 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament’s internal rules do not infringe the acquired rights of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
45 In that regard, the appellants claim that Article 74 of the Implementing Measures repealed Annex III to the PEAM rules and maintains in force only the transitional provisions under Title IV of those measures and Article 75 thereof. As from the entry into force of the Statute for Members, the content of that Annex III at the time of its repeal was maintained by operation of Articles 74 and 75 of the Implementing Measures, as is apparent inter alia, from recital 7 thereof.
46 The reference in Article 75 of the Implementing Measures to the annexes to the PEAM Rules should be regarded as referring to the pension benefit which was applicable when those annexes were in force. The purpose of that provision is to safeguard the acquired rights of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned, as is, moreover, confirmed by Article 28 of the Statute for Members.
47 In those circumstances, to find that a reduction in the amount of the pension does not affect the acquired right to receive a pension would require clarification of the circumstances in which that is the case and a distinction between Article 75(1) and (2) of the Implementing Measures, which the General Court failed to provide.
48 In the present case, the amount of the appellants’ pensions was calculated using a multiplier fixed unilaterally and retroactively by the Office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, on the basis of events which, according to actuarial logic, should be regarded as uncertain, in that they are linked to future and uncertain events, such as the average probability of survival of the beneficiary on the date of payment of the retirement pension or the probable existence of a spouse or heirs in receipt of a survivor’s pension. However, at the time of the change in the amount of the appellants’ pensions, it could have been determined with certainty whether or not those events had already taken place.
49 Even if Article 2 of Annex III to the PEAM Rules were applicable in the present case by virtue of Article 75 of the Implementing Measures, that provision does not concern the conditions for entitlement to a pension. However, the decisions at issue changed not only the amount of the pensions concerned, but also the method for calculating that amount, replacing the method based on the allowance received during the term of office of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned with the method based on the contributions paid by those Members, as if they had always been calculated according to a method modelled on the contributory method. The appellants did not have the possibility, when they were in active service, of foreseeing the change brought about by the decisions at issue, nor did they have the possibility of increasing their contributions to that pension scheme in order to mitigate the negative effects thereof.
50 In the alternative, namely if the distinction between the right to a pension and the right to a pension benefit were applicable, the appellants submit that they are not only entitled to a pension, but they are also entitled to receive a fixed amount of retirement pension, as is clear from Article 75 of the Implementing Measures, so that they are entitled to receive a pension amount corresponding to that which they could have expected when paying their contributions. The decisions at issue lead to an imbalance to the detriment of the appellants, given that the contributions paid did not at the time have any influence on the acquisition of the entitlement to a pension or on the extent of that entitlement, and were therefore of a small amount during the first legislatures, which currently penalises primarily the oldest former Members of the European Parliament concerned, such as the appellants.
51 By their second complaint, the appellants claim that the General Court infringed the principle of legal certainty, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter and the principle of proportionality.
52 First, the determination of pension rights on the basis of the new rules infringes the principle of legal certainty in so far as it precludes an infringement of acquired rights in accordance with the rationale of Article 28 of the Statute for Members and Article 75 of the Implementing Measures.
53 Second, that new method of determining the amount of retirement pensions infringes the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, in so far as it precludes any alteration in the calculation rules to which the appellants have voluntarily acceded. The former Members of the European Parliament concerned were not aware that their pension scheme was based on an automatic reference to the amounts of the retirement pensions of former members of parliament of the Member State in which they were elected.
54 In addition, the General Court failed to take account of the fact that the Parliament did not inform the appellants of the possible application to them of Decision No 14/2018 until 2019, that is to say, after the date on which the reduction in the amount of their retirement pension should have applied, namely 1 January 2019, thus effectively assuring them that the previously acquired right would continue to exist.
55 Moreover, Decision No 14/2018 makes no mention of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
56 In any event, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senato (Senate, Italy) gave assurances as to the immutability of the appellants’ pension rights, in accordance with Articles 27 and 28 of the Statute for Members and Article 75 of the Implementing Measures.
57 As regards, third, the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, the appellants observe that the General Court found that the objective relied on by the Parliament to justify the infringement of that right by the decisions at issue is expressly mentioned in the preamble to Decision No 14/2018. However, the decision does not mention that its purpose is to carry out a recalculation of the amount of the retirement pensions. Furthermore, neither the Parliament nor Decision No 14/2018 referred to an objective of general interest which would justify that infringement.
58 The appellants also point out that, in paragraph 160 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court drew a distinction between an infringement of the right to a pension and a mere adjustment of the amount of the retirement pension. However, the General Court did not indicate the limit beyond which the change in the amount of that pension no longer respects the essence of the right to property and results in an infringement of the right to a pension as such.
59 Furthermore, according to the appellants, in paragraph 172 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court wrongly found that the purpose of the reduction in the amount of the appellants’ pensions was to adjust the amount of the pensions paid to all Members of the Parliament to the contribution-based method of calculation on the basis of the content of Decision No 14/2018.
60 According to the appellants, that reasoning of the General Court is circular. It is based on the provisions of Italian law and not on an objective of general interest recognised by the EU legal order, while nevertheless forming part of the examination of the compatibility of the decisions at issue with the right to property enshrined in the Charter.
61 In addition, the appellants claim that that reasoning distorted the method for calculating the amount of retirement pensions provided for by Decision No 14/2018, which cannot be regarded as contributory, since, first, under Article 1(4) of that decision, the amount of life annuities is limited. Second, the new method of calculation provided for by that decision is based not on an individually determined contribution rate, but on a rate that is identical for all the former Members of the European Parliament concerned. Thus, a former Member of the European Parliament who, during his or her term of office, paid contributions calculated at a rate higher than the identical rate would lose the benefit of the share of contribution going beyond that rate.
62 Fourth, according to the appellants, the method for calculating the amount of retirement pensions introduced by Decision No 14/2018 also demonstrates an infringement of the principle of proportionality, in so far as it is based on a non-individualised contribution rate.
63 The appellants claim that the decisions at issue imposed an excessively high individual charge, particularly for the older appellants. Mr Gatti, who is currently 80 years of age, is the most heavily penalised since the amount of his retirement pension was reduced by 61% even though he served as Member of the European Parliament for two terms. As for Mr Ceravolo, who is currently 91 years of age, that amount was reduced by 47%. Mr Pisoni, who was 83 years of age at the time of his demise, had that amount reduced by 24%, although he had performed the same function during the same period as Mr Ceravolo, who had the same amount reduced by 47%.
64 According to the appellants, the infringement of the principle of proportionality in relation to the justification put forward is all the more evident if it is considered that the contributory retirement pension scheme was introduced for the first time in Italy on 1 January 1996, and that it was extended to the majority of workers as from 1 January 2012. By contrast, by the decisions at issue, the contributory system is imposed on the appellants in respect of a period long before 1995 for the payment of contributions, when that contributory system did not exist for anyone in Italy.
65 The Parliament contends that the first to fourth grounds of appeal must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
66 By the first complaint, the appellants, relying on the Parliament’s internal rules, dispute the retention of the dynamic system after the entry into force of the Statute for Members and claim that such a system adversely affects acquired rights to receive a retirement pension.
67 Therefore, by such a complaint, the appellants dispute, in essence, the soundness of the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
68 The same is true of the second complaint, in so far as, by that complaint, the appellants claim that the application of the new rules for calculating the amount of their pension is inconsistent not only with the principle of legal certainty, in so far as those new rules adversely affect the acquired rights to receive a pension, but also with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, in so far at that principle precludes any reduction in the pension amount which the appellants should have been able to claim by voluntarily joining the scheme established by Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules.
69 However, while, by the second complaint, the appellants criticise the General Court for failing to take account of the fact, first, that the Parliament informed them belatedly that Decision No 14/2018 might apply, second, that that decision does not mention the former Members of the European Parliament concerned and, third, that the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate gave assurances as to the immutability of the appellants’ right to a pension, the appellants do not criticise, even indirectly, grounds of the judgment under appeal which constitute the ratio decidendi for the decision of the General Court confirming the soundness of the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
70 As regards the third complaint, in so far as, by that complaint, the appellants criticise the General Court for assessing the compatibility of the decisions at issue with the right to property enshrined in the Charter in the light not of an objective recognised by EU law, but of that pursued by Decision No 14/2018, they dispute, in essence, the compatibility with EU law of the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
71 By contrast, the appellants do not dispute the soundness of the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules when they criticise the General Court, first, for failing to specify the limit beyond which a change in the amount of the retirement pension no longer respects the essence of the right to property and results in an infringement of the right to a pension as such, second, for holding that the objective relied on by the Parliament to justify the infringement of that right by the decisions at issue is expressly mentioned in the preamble to Decision No 14/2018 and, third, for distorting the method for calculating pensions provided for in that decision.
72 As regards the fourth complaint, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, it should be noted that, by that complaint, the appellants submit that Decision No 14/2018 is not consistent with that principle because, first, of the method for calculating pensions provided for by that decision, second, of the effect which that method has on the appellants’ situation and, third, of the historical context of that decision. Therefore, by such a complaint, the appellants do not dispute, even indirectly, the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
73 It follows that it is appropriate to examine the first to fourth grounds of appeal only in so far as, by those grounds, the appellants criticise the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned, on the ground that such an interpretation, first, is not apparent from those rules, second, is not consistent with the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, and, third, is not consistent with the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.
74 The appellants complain, in essence, that the General Court held, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament was entitled to rely on its internal rules in order to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
75 It should be noted, first of all, that, according to Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, ‘the level and conditions of [the provisional] pension shall be identical to those applicable to the pension for Members of the lower house of the parliament of the Member State for which the Member of the European Parliament was elected’.
76 As the General Court stated, in essence, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, it is apparent from the expression ‘the level and conditions of [the provisional] pension shall be identical’ that the Parliament is required to apply to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned the rules for calculating pensions as applied to members of the parliament of the Member State in which those former Members of the European Parliament were elected. In other words, the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
77 That interpretation of Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules is consistent with the objective pursued by that provision, as set out in Article 1(2) of that annex.
78 The latter provision states that only former Members of the European Parliament in respect of whom the retirement scheme of the Member State in which they were elected does not provide for a pension or the level and/or method of calculation of the pension to which they are entitled are not identical to those applicable to members of the national parliament may receive the pension provided for in Article 2(1) of that annex.
79 Therefore, the main purpose of Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules is to enable former Members of the European Parliament who find themselves in the situation referred to in Article 1(2) of that annex to be treated in the same way as Members of the European Parliament whose national pension scheme provided for a retirement pension the level and/or method of calculation of which were identical to those applicable to members of their national parliament.
80 An interpretation of that provision to the effect that it requires the Parliament to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned thus has the effect of making those Members, like those other former Members of the European Parliament, subject to amendments made to the rules for calculating the pension amount of members of their national parliament.
81 In addition, the pension scheme established by Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules was maintained, pursuant to the Implementing Measures, after the entry into force of the Statute for Members as regards the former Members of the European Parliament concerned who had begun to receive a retirement pension on the basis of that scheme before that entry into force.
82 Article 74 of the Implementing Measures provides, first, that the PEAM Rules were to cease to be valid on the date on which that statute entered into force, but also, second, that that repeal was without prejudice to the transitional provisions laid down in Title IV of those measures, and in particular to Article 75 thereof.
83 In accordance with Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures, retirement pensions awarded under Annex III to the PEAM Rules are to continue to be paid to those persons who were in receipt of those benefits prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute for Members.
84 As the General Court noted in paragraph 88 of the judgment under appeal, it must be inferred from the wording of that provision, and more specifically from the mandatory nature of the wording ‘shall continue to be paid pursuant to [Annex III to the PEAM Rules]’ and from the use of the present indicative in that wording, that the dynamic system remains applicable to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned after the entry into force of the Statute for Members.
85 Therefore, the General Court did not err in law, contrary to what the appellants claim, in finding, in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, that the provisions of Annex III to the PEAM Rules were not repealed following the entry into force of the Statute for Members.
86 The interpretation of Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures according to which the dynamic system remains applicable to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned after the entry into force of the Statute for Members is not invalidated, contrary to what the appellants claim, either by paragraph 2 of that provision, recital 7 of the Implementing Measures, or Article 28 of the Statute for Members.
87 As regards, first of all, the first sentence of Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures, that provision provides that ‘the old-age pension rights acquired prior to the date of entry into force of the Statute [for Members] pursuant to the aforementioned Annex III [to the PEAM Rules] shall be maintained’.
88 However, contrary to what the appellants claim, no guarantee can be inferred from that provision, either as regards the payment of a retirement pension calculated on the basis of the rules for calculating national pensions applicable on the date of entry into force of the Statute for Members, or of a fixed and immutable pension amount when joining the pension scheme established by Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules.
89 The General Court rightly pointed out, in paragraph 146 of the judgment under appeal, that the Statute for Members and the Implementing Measures established two successive pension schemes involving two types of pension rights, namely, on the one hand, retirement pension rights acquired prior to 14 July 2009, the date on which the statute entered into force, on the basis of the Parliament’s internal rules, and, on the other hand, old-age pension rights acquired since that date, on the basis of Article 49 of the Implementing Measures.
90 In that context, Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures applies, as the General Court found in paragraph 92 of the judgment under appeal, to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned, including some of the appellants, who paid contributions into the EU budget under Article 2(2) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules and had begun to receive a retirement pension prior to the entry into force of the Statute for Members, whereas Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures applies to Members of the European Parliament who, while they too had paid such contributions, had not yet begun to receive a retirement pension on the date on which the Statute for Members entered into force.
91 In accordance with the second sentence of Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures, ‘persons who have acquired rights under [Annex III to the PEAM Rules] shall receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to [that annex] as soon as they meet the relevant conditions laid down by the national law of the Member State concerned and they have submitted the application referred to in Article 3(2) of the aforementioned Annex III’.
92 In so far as the second sentence of Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures lays down conditions which former Members of the European Parliament must meet in order to receive a pension calculated on the basis of their acquired rights pursuant to Annex III to the PEAM Rules, that provision is not intended to apply to former Members of the European Parliament who began to receive a pension pursuant to that annex before the entry into force of the Statute for Members, such as the appellants.
93 Furthermore, in so far as the second sentence of Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures provides that the former Members of the European Parliament concerned are to receive an old-age pension pursuant to Annex III to the PEAM Rules on the basis of acquired rights, the concept of ‘acquired retirement pension rights’ for the purposes of Article 75(2) must be understood, as the General Court correctly stated, in essence, in paragraph 91 of the judgment under appeal, as referring to the pension rights resulting from the contributions paid on an individual basis by each of the former Members of the European Parliament concerned and which form the basis for the calculation of the retirement pension paid to them in accordance with Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules. That concept therefore cannot be understood as referring to an alleged right to receive a fixed and immutable amount of retirement pension, calculated on the basis of the national rules in force at the time the Statute for Members entered into force or at the time of joining the pension scheme established by that provision.
94 As regards, next, recital 7 of the Implementing Measures, that recital states, first, that ‘persons in receipt of certain benefits under the PEAM Rules [should be able to] continue to receive them after those rules have been repealed, in keeping with the principle of [the protection of] legitimate expectations’ and, second, that ‘steps should also be taken to guarantee maintenance of the pension rights acquired on the basis of the PEAM Rules prior to the entry into force of the Statute [for Members]’.
95 It follows from that recital that it states that the benefits granted under those rules are to continue to be paid, without its being possible to infer therefrom that those rules would cease to apply after that date.
96 Thus, the concept of ‘acquired pension rights’ has the same scope in that recital as in Article 75(2) of the Implementing Measures, as set out in paragraph 93 above.
97 It was in that context of examining the Parliament’s internal rules that the General Court found, in paragraph 90 of the judgment under appeal, without erring in law, that the Parliament’s internal rules do not infringe acquired pension rights.
98 As regards, lastly, Article 28 of the Statute for Members, as the General Court correctly pointed out in paragraph 93 of the judgment under appeal, that provision applies to the pension entitlements that former Members of the European Parliament have acquired not in accordance with Annex III to the PEAM Rules, but in accordance with national pension schemes. As such, that provision has no effect, contrary to what the appellants claim, on the interpretation of Article 75(1) of the Implementing Measures.
99 Consequently, it is clear from the wording, context and purpose of the Parliament’s internal rules that, in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not err in law when it held that the Parliament was entitled to rely on its internal rules in order to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
100 The appellants submit that the General Court’s interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules infringes the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty, and the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.
101 In accordance with a general principle of interpretation, an EU act must be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and in conformity with primary law as a whole and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter. Thus, if the wording of secondary EU legislation is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with primary law rather than to the interpretation which leads to its being incompatible with primary law (judgment of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains, C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
102 As regards, first, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the appellants claim that the fact that they joined the pension scheme established by Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules guarantees them, by virtue of that principle, that the amount of their retirement pension is calculated in accordance with the rules in force at the time of their joining that scheme.
103 In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, a person may not validly plead infringement of that principle unless the administration has given that person precise assurances. Any person to whom an institution has given justified hopes may rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. In whatever form it is given, information which is precise, unconditional and consistent and comes from authorised and reliable sources constitutes assurances capable of giving rise to such hopes (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2019, Deza v ECHA, C‑419/17 P, EU:C:2019:52, paragraphs 69 and 70 and the case-law cited).
104 By contrast, if a prudent and alert person can foresee the adoption of an EU measure likely to affect his or her interests, that person cannot plead the principle of protection of legitimate expectations if that measure is adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 January 2019, Deza v ECHA, C‑419/17 P, EU:C:2019:52, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
105 The mere fact that the appellants joined the pension scheme established by Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules does not entitle them to receive a foreseeable, fixed and immutable amount of retirement pension when joining that scheme. As the General Court correctly held in paragraphs 211 and 212 of the judgment under appeal, the only assurance, precise and unconditional which the Parliament was in a position to give them was the assurance that, under its internal rules, they would receive a retirement pension the level and conditions of which would be identical to those applicable to members of the parliament of the Member State in which they were elected, in accordance with the dynamic system.
106 It follows that the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules to the effect that the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned is consistent with the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.
107 As regards, next, the right to property, the appellants claim that the General Court erred in law, in paragraph 171 of the judgment under appeal, when it held that the assessment of the objective of general interest pursued by the decisions at issue could not disregard the objectives underlying the adoption of Decision No 14/2018.
108 It must be borne in mind that, in paragraph 163 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held that, although the decisions at issue do not entail an outright deprivation of the appellants’ pensions, the fact remains that they reduce the amount thereof, thereby restricting their right to property.
109 Subsequently, in paragraphs 164 to 179 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court examined whether that restriction satisfied the requirements of Article 52(1) of the Charter, recalled in paragraph 157 of that judgment. In that regard, in paragraph 171 of that judgment, the General Court held that the public interest objective pursued by the decisions at issue could not be appraised without having regard to the objectives underlying the adoption of Decision No 14/2018. It is to that extent that, following the examination of the compatibility of those decisions with the right to property which it carried out, in paragraphs 172 to 178 of that judgment, taking account of those objectives, the General Court decided, in paragraph 180 thereof, that the complaint alleging infringement of the right to property had to be rejected.
110 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the scope of that right must, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, be determined having regard to Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, which enshrines that right (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph 49).
111 It follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that the rights resulting from the payment of contributions to a social security scheme constitute rights of property for the purposes of that article (judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph 50).
112 Moreover, a reduction in the amount of a retirement pension which is liable to have an effect on the quality of life of the person concerned constitutes a restriction of that person’s right to property (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 1 September 2015, Da Silva Carvalho Rico v. Portugal, CE:ECHR:2015:0901DEC001334114, § 33).
113 In so far as the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules to the effect that it is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned is liable to lead to such a reduction in the amounts of their pensions, that interpretation may lead to a restriction of the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.
114 The right to property is not absolute and its exercise may thus be subject to restrictions, provided, inter alia, that they are justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
115 Under Article 52(1) of the Charter, any limitation on the right to property enshrined in Article 17 thereof is compatible with that provision if it is provided for by law, it respects the essence of the right to property and, subject to the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
116 In that regard, it should be recalled, in the first place, that the requirement that any limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights must be provided for by law implies that the act which permits the interference with those rights must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned, bearing in mind, on the one hand, that that requirement does not preclude the limitation in question from being formulated in terms which are sufficiently open to be able to adapt to different scenarios and keep pace with changing circumstances and, on the other hand, that the Court may, where appropriate, specify, by means of interpretation, the actual scope of the limitation in the light of the very wording of the EU legislation in question as well as its general scheme and the objectives it pursues, as interpreted in view of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (judgment of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains, C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 114).
117 As noted in paragraph 99 above, it is clear from the wording, context and purpose of the Parliament’s internal rules, which are of general application with regard to Members of the European Parliament and may therefore be regarded as being the equivalent, internally, of a ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 52(1) of the Charter (see, by analogy, Opinion 1/15 (EU-Canada PNR Agreement) of 26 July 2017, EU:C:2017:592, paragraphs 145 and 146), that the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
118 In the second place, the General Court, in its capacity as the court ruling on the substance and without erring in law, found in paragraphs 160 and 179 of the judgment under appeal that the appellants had not adduced specific evidence capable of showing that the reduction in the amounts of their pensions adversely affected the essence of their right to property or had to be described as disproportionate.
119 As regards, in the third place, the question whether the dynamic system and the resulting reductions in the pension amounts are necessary and genuinely meet one or more objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union, it must be held that the General Court erred in law, in paragraph 171 of the judgment under appeal, when it held that, having regard to Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, the adoption of the decisions at issue was necessarily determined by the choices made by the competent Italian authorities, with the result that ‘the appraisal of the public interest objective pursued [by the decisions at issue could] not] disregard the objectives underlying the adoption of Decision No 14/2018’.
120 The objectives pursued by Decision No 14/2018, applicable to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned under the dynamic system, are purely national in nature. As such, they are not, therefore, capable of justifying a reduction in the amount of retirement pensions, since those sums are paid under a pension scheme established not under national law, but under EU law, and are charged to the EU budget.
121 Accordingly, the General Court was also wrong, in paragraphs 172 to 178 of the judgment under appeal, to take into consideration the objectives pursued by that national decision for the purpose of examining whether the adverse effect on the appellants’ right to property, brought about by the decisions at issue, was justified.
122 It must, however, be borne in mind that, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement cannot lead to the setting aside of that judgment, and a substitution of grounds must be made and the appeal dismissed (judgment of 14 December 2023, Commission v Amazon.com and Others, C‑457/21 P, EU:C:2023:985, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
123 It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether the rejection of the complaint alleging infringement of the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter is shown to be well founded on legal grounds other than those vitiated by the error identified in paragraphs 119 and 121 above.
124 In that regard, it should be noted that the application of the dynamic system to former Members of the European Parliament in the situation referred to in Article 1(2) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules pursues an objective of general interest recognised by the European Union, in so far as it seeks, as is apparent from paragraph 79 above, to treat in the same way, on the one hand, Members of the European Parliament who either are not entitled to a pension scheme in the Member State in which they were elected, or are covered by a pension scheme in which the level of and/or method of calculation of the pension were not identical to those applicable to members of the national parliament and, on the other hand, Members of the European Parliament whose national pension scheme provided for that level and/or a method of calculation of the pension identical to those applicable to members of the national parliament.
125 The application of the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned does indeed meet that objective of equal treatment, since it has the effect that the two categories of Members of the European Parliament referred to in the preceding paragraph are subject, at all times, to the national rules relating to the calculation of the retirement pensions of members of parliament of the Member State concerned.
126 That application was, moreover, necessary in order to achieve that objective, since only an alignment of the level of and/or method for calculating the pension such as that provided for in Article 2(1) of Annex III to the PEAM Rules, read in conjunction with Article 1(2) of that annex, could lead to equal treatment between those categories of Members of the European Parliament.
127 It is thus apparent that, notwithstanding the error of law identified in paragraphs 119 and 121 above, the rejection of the complaint alleging infringement of the right to property enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter is well founded, with the restriction of the right to property at issue satisfying all the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter.
128 As regards, lastly, the principle of legal certainty, the appellants submit that the distinction between ‘acquired pension rights’ and ‘amounts of pensions’, as drawn by the General Court, leads to the incorrect conclusion that the dynamic system complies with that principle.
129 In its examination of the compatibility of the decisions at issue with the principle of legal certainty, the General Court recalled, in paragraph 196 of the judgment under appeal, that it was already apparent from paragraphs 81 to 97 of that judgment that ‘acquired pension rights’ had to be distinguished from ‘the amounts of pensions’. The General Court stated, in that regard, that, although the ‘pension rights’ are acquired definitively and cannot be altered, and even though the retirement pensions continue to be paid, there was nothing to prevent the amounts of those pensions from being adjusted upwards or downwards, which the Parliament was required to do in the present case, having regard to its obligation to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned.
130 In paragraph 206 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court concluded its analysis by holding that the appellants had not shown that the principle of legal certainty had been infringed in that case. The Parliament’s internal rules meant that the new amounts of the appellants’ retirement pensions would enter into force on 1 January 2019. The General Court pointed out that those internal rules came largely predated, and did not post-date, 1 January 2019. Moreover, the appellants had neither established nor claimed that the Parliament had applied those new amounts before 1 January 2019, that is to say, before the date fixed for that purpose by Decision No 14/2018. Finally, according to the General Court, the Parliament had informed the appellants as early as January 2019 that the rules laid down in Decision No 14/2018 might apply to them, which the Parliament confirmed to them in February 2019. The General Court inferred from this that the appellants had been informed of the amendment of the rules applicable to the calculation of the amount of their retirement pensions before the decisions at issue were adopted.
131 It should be recalled in that regard that the principle of legal certainty requires that EU rules enable those concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are imposed on them, and that those persons must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly (judgment of 9 November 2023, Global Silicones Council and Others v Commission, C‑558/21 P, EU:C:2023:839, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
132 Thus, new laws, which amend the old law, apply, unless otherwise provided, to the future effects of situations which arose under that law. The position is different only in respect of situations originating and becoming definitive under the old legislation, which create acquired rights. A right is considered to be acquired when the event giving rise to it occurred before the legislative amendment. That is not the case when the event creating the right did not take place under the legislation that has been amended (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament, C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraph 84 and the case-law cited).
133 As regards, in particular, the right to receive a retirement pension, that right can be regarded as acquired, in principle, only when the event giving rise to that right occurs, that is to say, at the time when the pension becomes payable (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament, C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraphs 85 to 87).
134 That does not mean, however, that any amendment to the method for calculating a pension which leads to a reduction in that amount, applied on the basis of legislation adopted after that pension became payable, constitutes an infringement of those acquired rights.
135 It must be borne in mind, in that regard, that there is no principle in EU law that acquired rights may not be altered or reduced under any circumstances. It is possible, under certain conditions, to amend such rights (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 March 2023, Grossetête v Parliament, C‑714/21 P, EU:C:2023:187, paragraphs 88 and 89).
136 In the present case, the General Court was fully entitled to conclude, on the basis of the evidence referred to, inter alia, in paragraph 206 of the judgment under appeal, that the application of the dynamic system, as provided for in Annex III to the PEAM Rules and Article 75 of the Implementing Measures, is compatible with the principle of legal certainty.
137 In the light of all the foregoing, the first to fourth grounds of appeal must be rejected, in so far as, by those grounds, the appellants challenge the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules according to which the Parliament is required to apply the dynamic system to the former Members of the European Parliament concerned, as being in part unfounded and in part ineffective.
138 The appellants claim that, in paragraphs 70 to 72 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court wrongly concluded that the Head of Unit was competent to adopt the decisions at issue, since the relevant powers had been properly subdelegated to him.
139 First, it is apparent from the information provided at the hearing before the General Court that the decisions at issue were in fact adopted by the Parliament’s Legal Service, since the said Head of Unit relied on the assessment of that service and did not himself carry out any analysis or elaborate on any reasons of his own. Second, the decisions at issue should have been adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament, since they constitute acts outside the scope of ordinary administration. Given that those decisions refer to a new, complex and unforeseen situation, which is confirmed, moreover, by the involvement of the Parliament’s Legal Service, their compliance with the higher-ranking rules and principles of the legal order of the European Union should have been verified before they were adopted. Therefore, they are not purely technical decisions, capable of being delegated to a head of unit.
140 The Parliament contends that the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
141 By the fifth ground of appeal, the appellants dispute, inter alia, the power of the Head of Unit to adopt the decisions at issue. Having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraph 37 above, it is inappropriate to examine the merits of that ground, since, by that ground, the appellants rely on an unlawfulness that is likely to be repeated in the future.
142 By contrast, the complaint, also raised in the context of the fifth ground of appeal, by which the appellants criticise the Head of Unit for failing to develop any analysis or reasoning other than that contained in the Opinion of the Legal Service, amounts to submitting to the Court of Justice a factual assertion which, in the absence of an argument alleging distortion of the facts or an error of law committed by the General Court, cannot be examined in the context of the appeal.
143 In accordance with Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is limited to points of law. The General Court alone has jurisdiction to establish and assess the relevant facts and to evaluate the evidence. The assessment of those facts and evidence does not therefore constitute, save in the case of their distortion, a question of law subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (judgment of 28 September 2023, Changmao Biochemical Engineering v Commission, C‑123/21 P, EU:C:2023:708, paragraph 121 and the case-law cited).
144 It follows that the merits of the fifth ground of appeal must be examined in so far as that ground alleges the incompetence of the Head of Unit to adopt the decisions at issue, and that that ground is inadmissible as to the remainder.
145 It should be noted that the General Court found, in paragraph 71 of the judgment under appeal, that the Head of Unit had been appointed authorising officer by subdelegation for budget line 1030 relating to retirement pensions referred to in Annex III to the PEAM Rules, by Decision FINS/2019-01 of the Director-General for Finance of the Parliament of 23 November 2018 and that that decision expressly states that the Head of Unit is authorised, inter alia, to make legal and budgetary commitments, validate expenditure and authorise payments, and also draw up estimates of amounts receivable, establish entitlements to be recovered and issue recovery orders.
146 In paragraph 72 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court noted, inter alia, that the rules laid down by the Implementing Measures and the PEAM Rules, as adopted by the Bureau of the Parliament, were not altered, but merely implemented, by the Head of Unit.
147 In those circumstances, the General Court held, in paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, that the Head of Unit was competent to adopt the decisions at issue.
148 In so far as Decision FINS/2019-01 of the Director-General for Finance of the Parliament of 23 November 2018 authorises the Head of Unit, inter alia, to make legal and budgetary commitments, validate expenditure and authorise payments, and also draw up estimates of amounts receivable, establish entitlements to be recovered and issue recovery orders, it is drafted in sufficiently broad terms to cover the situations put forward by the appellants, namely new, complex and unforeseen situations in the delegated areas.
149 In addition, the appellants do not claim that that decision contains a reservation relating to the competence to apply EU primary law and, in particular, the provisions of the Charter, in the context of the adoption of decisions coming within those areas.
150 Moreover, Rule 25(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, contrary to what the appellants submit, does not contain any reservation of competence in that regard in favour of the Bureau of the Parliament. Indeed, according to that provision ‘the Bureau shall take financial, organisational and administrative decisions on matters concerning Members on a proposal of the Secretary-General or of a political group’. Nor can any purported distinction between acts outside the scope of ordinary administration, the adoption of which would be reserved for the Bureau of the Parliament and acts within the scope of ordinary administration, which would have been delegated to the Head of Unit, be inferred from this provision.
151 Accordingly, the ground alleging a lack of competence on the part of the Head of Unit is unfounded.
152 It follows that the fifth ground of appeal must be dismissed as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
153 The appellants complain that the General Court erred in law in its assessment of the statement of reasons for the decisions at issue.
154 Since the Parliament was under an obligation to examine the compatibility with higher-ranking rules of EU law, that examination should have been accompanied by a statement of reasons in that regard. The Opinion of the Legal Service, relied on by the Parliament, is not sufficient for that purpose, since, first, it is neither mentioned in the decisions at issue nor annexed thereto and, second, it contains only a very incomplete and brief examination of compliance with higher-ranking rules and fundamental principles of the European Union.
155 Furthermore, in paragraphs 57 and 178 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court erred in finding that Article 1(7) of Decision No 14/2018 guaranteed the overall proportionality of the action, by allowing the amount of the pension of persons who do not receive other annual income and who suffer from a serious illness to be increased. These increases are limited in scope and this provision of Decision No 14/2018 cannot amount to a valid safeguard clause in favour of other persons, not referred to in that decision. Additionally, that provision was annulled by the Judicial Council of the Chamber of Deputies, with the result that the General Court based its assessment of proportionality on an non-existent provision.
156 The Parliament contends that the sixth ground must be rejected as inadmissible and, in the alternative, as unfounded.
157 By the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants complain that the General Court failed to find that the Parliament failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons for the decisions at issue. According to the appellants, the Parliament was required not only to ascertain whether the application of Decision No 14/2018 was compatible with EU law, but also to state expressly, in the decisions at issue, the reasons why it considered that to be the case. The General Court wrongly classified as relevant the analysis of Decision No 14/2018 in the Opinion of the Legal Service concerning, in particular, the proportionality of that decision.
158 This ground concerns the interpretation of the Parliament’s internal rules, since it seeks to dispute that, under those rules, a national pension scheme can automatically be applied to former Members of the European Parliament, without a reasoned assessment of the compatibility of such an application with EU law.
159 Accordingly, the merits of the sixth ground of appeal must be examined.
160 As is apparent from the examination of the first to fourth grounds of the present appeal, the General Court was fully entitled to find, in paragraphs 86 and 89 of the judgment under appeal, that the Parliament was required to apply to the appellants the same rules relating to the level and conditions of the pensions as those laid down by Italian law.
161 The General Court was also right to state, in those same paragraphs, that the Parliament can be released from that obligation where such application would lead to a breach of a higher-ranking rule of EU law, such as a general principle of EU law or a provision of the Charter.
162 Although the appellants therefore rightly point out that it is for the Parliament to ensure that the application of its internal rules, consisting of adjusting the pensions of its former Members in line with changes in national schemes, does not conflict with the general principles of EU law or with the Charter, it does not follow that the decisions at issue had to set out the reasons why the Parliament considered that the adjustment in question was compatible with those principles and with the Charter.
163 It should be borne in mind, in that regard, that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons for legal acts of the European Union, laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU, depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is therefore not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the facts and points of law that could be considered to be relevant (judgment of 30 January 2024, Agentsia Patna infrastruktura (European funding of road infrastructure), C‑471/22, EU:C:2024:99, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
164 In the light of that case-law, it must indeed be held that it was for the author of the decisions at issue to set out in those decisions the reasons, relating to the Parliament’s internal rules, which led the Parliament to adjust the pensions of the addressees of those decisions.
165 However, that author could not be required to state, moreover, the reasons why the Parliament considered that neither the general principles of EU law nor the Charter precluded its decision. To endow such an effect to the requirement to state reasons would be tantamount to obliging the author of the act to state not only the reasons for its decision, but also the reasons why that author considered that there was no need to refrain from adopting the decision. Except in particular situations, which are not present in this case, it cannot be regarded as necessary for the purpose of understanding the reasoning of the author of the act, that the author provides an analysis of the compatibility of its decision with the general principles of EU law and with the Charter.
166 It follows that the sixth ground of appeal is unfounded.
167 Since all the grounds of appeal put forward by the appellants in support of their appeal have been rejected, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
168 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court shall make a decision as to the costs. Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
169 Since the appellants have been unsuccessful and the Parliament has applied for costs, the appellants must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Parliament.