1 These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Articles 36 to 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180 p. 60), read in conjunction with recitals 42, 46 and 48 of, and Annex I to, that directive and in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).
2 The requests have been made in proceedings between respectively, LC and CP, on the one hand, nationals of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, and, on the other hand, the Commissione territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale di Roma - sezione procedure alla frontiera II (Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection, Rome - Border Procedures Section II, Italy) concerning the lawfulness of the decisions by which that commission rejected LC’s and CP’s applications for international protection as manifestly unfounded, following accelerated at-the-border procedures.
3 Recitals 18, 20, 40, 42, 46 and 48 of Directive 2013/32 state: … … … …
4 Article 10 of Directive 2003/32, entitled ‘Requirements for the examination of applications’, provides, in paragraphs 3(b) and 4: ‘3. Member States shall ensure that decisions by the determining authority on applications for international protection are taken after an appropriate examination. To that end, Member States shall ensure that: … 4. The authorities referred to in Chapter V shall, through the determining authority or the applicant or otherwise, have access to the general information referred to in paragraph 3(b), necessary for the fulfilment of their task.’
5 Under the title ‘Guarantees for applicants’, Article 12 of Directive 2003/32 states, in paragraph 1(d): ‘With respect to the procedures provided for in Chapter III, Member States shall ensure that all applicants enjoy the following guarantees: … …’
6 Article 24 of that directive, entitled ‘Applicants in need of special procedural guarantees’, concerns the support that must be provided to such applicants throughout the duration of the asylum procedure.
7 Article 31 of that directive, entitled ‘Examination procedure’, provides, in paragraph 8(b): ‘Member States may provide that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II be accelerated and/or conducted at the border or in transit zones in accordance with Article 43 if: …
8 Article 32 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Unfounded applications’, provides: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 27, Member States may only consider an application to be unfounded if the determining authority has established that the applicant does not qualify for international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9)]. 2. In cases of unfounded applications in which any of the circumstances listed in Article 31(8) apply, Member States may also consider an application to be manifestly unfounded, where it is defined as such in the national legislation.’
9 Article 36 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘The concept of safe country of origin’, provides: ‘1. A third country designated as a safe country of origin in accordance with this Directive may, after an individual examination of the application, be considered as a safe country of origin for a particular applicant only if: and he or she has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her qualification as a beneficiary of international protection in accordance with Directive [2011/95]. 2. Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and modalities for the application of the safe country of origin concept.’
10 Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘National designation of third countries as safe countries of origin’, provides: ‘1. Member States may retain or introduce legislation that allows, in accordance with Annex I, for the national designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for international protection. 2. Member States shall regularly review the situation in third countries designated as safe countries of origin in accordance with this Article. 3. The assessment of whether a country is a safe country of origin in accordance with this Article shall be based on a range of sources of information, including in particular information from other Member States, EASO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations. 4. Member States shall notify to the Commission the countries that are designated as safe countries of origin in accordance with this Article.’
11 Article 38 of that directive concerns the concept of safe third country.
12 Article 43 of that directive, entitled ‘Border procedures’, provides, in paragraph 1: ‘Member States may provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II, in order to decide at the border or transit zones of the Member State on: …
13 Article 46 of that directive, entitled ‘The right to an effective remedy’, provides: ‘1. Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following: … 3. In order to comply with paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95], at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance. … 5. Without prejudice to paragraph 6, Member States shall allow applicants to remain in the territory until the time limit within which to exercise their right to an effective remedy has expired and, when such a right has been exercised within the time limit, pending the outcome of the remedy. 6. In the case of a decision: … a court or tribunal shall have the power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State, either upon the applicant’s request or acting ex officio, if such a decision results in ending the applicant’s right to remain in the Member State and where in such cases the right to remain in the Member State pending the outcome of the remedy is not provided for in national law. …’
14 Annex I to Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of Article 37(1)’, reads as follows: ‘A country is considered as a safe country of origin where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Article 9 of Directive [2011/95], no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. In making this assessment, account shall be taken, inter alia, of the extent to which protection is provided against persecution or mistreatment by:
15 Article 61 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU (OJ L, 2024/1348), entitled ‘The concept of safe country of origin’, provides, in paragraph 2: ‘The designation of a third country as a safe country of origin both at [European] Union and national level may be made with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons.’
16 Article 78 of that regulation, entitled ‘Repeal’, provides, in paragraph 1: ‘Directive [2013/32] is repealed with effect from the date referred to in Article 79(2), without prejudice to Article 79(3).’
17 Article 79 of Regulation 2024/1348, entitled ‘Entry into force and application’, provides, in paragraphs 2 and 3: ‘2. This Regulation shall apply from 12 June 2026. 3. This Regulation shall apply to the procedure for granting international protection in relation to applications lodged as from 12 June 2026. Applications for international protection lodged before that date shall be governed by Directive [2013/32]. This Regulation shall apply to the procedure for withdrawing international protection where the examination to withdraw international protection started as from 12 June 2026. Where the examination to withdraw international protection started before 12 June 2026, the procedure for withdrawing international protection shall be governed by Directive [2013/32].’
18 The preamble of decreto-legge n. 158 - Disposizioni urgenti in materia di procedure per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale (Decree-Law No. 158 - Urgent provisions regarding procedures for granting international protection) of 23 October 2024 (GURI No 249 of 23 October 2024; ‘Decree-Law No 158/2024’) provides: ‘… [in view of] the extraordinary and urgent need to designate safe countries of origin, taking into account the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 October 2024, (Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841), excluding countries in which the conditions are not met for certain parts of their territory (Cameroon, Colombia and Nigeria); [having regard to] Regulation [2024/1348] and, in particular, Article 61(2) of that regulation, according to which “the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin both at Union and national level may be made with exceptions for specific parts of its territory or clearly identifiable categories of persons”, which, although taking effect from 12 June 2026 onwards, has indicated the shared position of the Member States of the European Union; …’
19 Decree-Law No 158/2024 amended in particular Article 2bis of decreto legislativo n. 25 - Attuazione della direttiva 2005/85/CE recante norme minime per le procedure applicate negli Stati membri ai fini del riconoscimento e della revoca dello status di rifugiato (Legislative decree No 25, implementing Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status) of 28 January 2008 (GURI No 40 of 16 February 2008; ‘Legislative Decree No 25/2008’). Following that amendment, Article 2bis(1) to (4bis) of Legislative Decree No 25/2008 provides: ‘1. In accordance with the qualification criteria laid down by European legislation and data obtained from information sources provided by the relevant international organisations, the following countries are considered safe countries of origin: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Morocco, Montenegro, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia. 2. A State which is not a member of the European Union may be considered as a safe country of origin if, on the basis of its legal situation, the application of the law within a democratic system and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that there is generally and consistently no persecution … no torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. Designation as a safe country of origin may be made with exceptions for categories of persons. 3. For the purposes of the assessment referred to in paragraph 2, account shall be taken, inter alia, of the extent to which protection is offered against persecution and mistreatment by: 4. The assessment of whether a State which is not a member of the [European Union] is a safe country of origin shall be based on information provided by the National Commission for the Right of Asylum, which shall also use the information compiled by the documentation centre … as well as other sources of information, in particular information provided by other Member States of the European Union, the European Union Agency for Asylum [(EUAA)], the [UNHCR], the Council of Europe and other competent international organisations. 4bis. The list of safe countries of origin shall be updated periodically by a legislative act and shall be notified to the European Commission. For the purposes of updating the list referred to in paragraph 1, the Council of Ministers shall adopt, by 15 January of each year, a report describing, with due regard for the overriding requirements of security and the continuity of international relations, and taking into account the information referred to in paragraph 4, the situation of the countries on the current list and that of the countries it intends to recommend for inclusion. The government shall forward the report to the relevant parliamentary committees.’
20 LC and CP are two nationals of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. After being rescued at sea by the Italian authorities, they were taken to Albania, where they were placed in the Gjadër detention centre. Those measures were taken pursuant to the protocollo tra il Governo della Repubblica italiana e il Consiglio dei ministri della Repubblica di Albania per il rafforzamento della collaborazione in materia migratoria (Protocol concluded between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on strengthening cooperation in the field of migration), under which the Albanian Government made available to the Italian Republic two areas of Albanian territory, which fall entirely within the competence of the Italian authorities and which are treated in the same way as border or transit zones in which asylum seekers may be detained.
21 On 16 October 2024, LC and CP each lodged an application for international protection with the Italian authorities from that detention centre.
22 By decisions of 17 October 2024, the Territorial Commission for the Recognition of International Protection, Rome - Border Procedures Section II, rejected those applications under an accelerated border procedure, on the ground that LC and CP came from a safe country of origin. The detention orders were not validated by the court having jurisdiction and the applicants were, therefore, released.
23 Having arrived in Italy, LC and CP brought actions, on 25 October 2024, before the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome, Italy), which is the referring court, against the decisions rejecting their applications for international protection referred to in the preceding paragraph.
24 That court has doubts regarding the designation of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh as a safe country of origin.
25 In the first place, the referring court observes that, until the adoption of Decree-Law No 158/2024, the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin took place in two stages. During the first stage, the Italian legislature defined, by means of an ordinary law, the legal framework for such designations. During the second stage, the Italian administration designated, by means of an interministerial decree, safe countries of origin on the basis of the information sheets relating to those countries. The Italian courts were empowered to review the compatibility of such interministerial decrees with that legal framework. However, following the entry into force of the abovementioned decree-law, the list of safe countries of origin now appeared in a legislative act, namely in Article 2bis(1) of Legislative Decree No 25/2008, as amended by Decree-Law No 158/2024. The Italian legislature would thus now be empowered both to establish the general legal framework governing the detailed rules and criteria for designating a third country as a safe country of origin and to make that designation itself. The referring court is uncertain whether such a designation by an act of a legislative nature is consistent with the requirements of Directive 2013/32.
26 In the second place, the referring court notes that, following the amendment of Article 2bis of Legislative Decree No 25/2008 by Decree-Law No 158/2024, the Italian legislation no longer contains any reference to the information sheets on the third countries in question with a view to their inclusion on the list of safe countries of origin, nor does it refer to the need to cite the sources from which such information is drawn. In particular, paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 2bis of Legislative Decree No 25/2008 as amended by Decree-Law No 158/2024 are in no way mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 2bis as amended. The latter provision establishes the list of safe countries of origin by referring, in general terms, to ‘data obtained from information sources provided by the relevant international organisations’, without identifying those data or sources. In addition, the new paragraph 4bis of that article merely provides that, for the purposes of the periodic updating of that list, the Government is to adopt a report describing the situation of the third countries in question. Consequently, applicants for international protection, on the one hand, and courts hearing actions brought by them, on the other hand, are prevented, respectively, from challenging and reviewing the origin, authoritativeness, reliability, relevance, topicality, completeness and content of the information which led to the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin, in breach of the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
27 In the third place, the referring court asks whether Member States must allow national courts or tribunals to use all the relevant information available to them in order to verify whether the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin is well founded, irrespective of whether or not the national authority which made that designation revealed the information on which it relied. The referring court considers that that question must be answered in the affirmative, in order to ensure effective judicial protection for applicants for international protection whose applications have been rejected in an accelerated procedure on the ground that they are from such a safe country of origin.
28 In the fourth place, the referring court asks, in essence, what consequences are to be drawn from the judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky (C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841). It states in that regard that it follows from the preamble to Decree-Law No 158/2024 that, by adopting that decree-law, the Italian Government intended to comply with that judgment by removing, in the second sentence of Article 2bis(2) of Legislative Decree No 25/2008, the possibility of designating as a safe country of origin a third country which does not fulfil, in respect of certain parts of its territory, the conditions for such a designation. However, that government retained, under that provision, the possibility of designating as a safe country of origin a third country with the exception of certain categories of persons. The referring court considers that the latter possibility must be rejected on the basis of reasoning similar to that adopted by the Court of Justice in the aforementioned judgment. Since an exclusion of categories of persons more often than not concerns the entire territory of a third country, it is even more serious than the territorial exclusion examined in that same judgment. In those circumstances, the referring court considers it necessary to make a reference to the Court of Justice in that regard, before drawing any appropriate conclusions from the principle of the primacy of EU law.
29 In those circumstances the Tribunale ordinario di Roma (District Court, Rome) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, worded identically in both of the cases, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
30 The referring court requested that the cases be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
31 On 19 November 2024, the Second Chamber of the Court, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decided not to grant that request.
32 By decision of the President of the Court of 21 November 2024, the present cases were joined for the purposes of the written and oral parts of the procedure and of the judgment.
33 By order of the President of the Court of 29 November 2024, it was decided that the present cases be determined pursuant to the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
34 In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Italian Republic requested that the present cases be heard in the Grand Chamber, of which the Court took cognisance on 11 February 2025.
35 The Italian and Slovak Governments challenge the admissibility of the first, second and fourth questions.
36 As regards the first and second questions, the Italian Government contends that the referring court has failed to state the reasons why Decree-Law No 158/2024 would be incompatible with EU law and the reasons why those questions would be relevant to the resolution of the disputes in the main proceedings. That government adds that, in the present case, the detailed rules for designating safe countries of origin are irrelevant in that respect, since the People’s Republic of Bangladesh had already been designated as a safe country of origin even before the adoption of that decree-law.
37 As regards the fourth questions, the Italian and Slovak Governments maintain that those questions are abstract and hypothetical. In their view, the referring court failed to verify whether the People’s Republic of Bangladesh is not a safe country of origin for certain categories of persons and whether LC and CP fall within those categories.
38 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred for a preliminary ruling from a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 19 December 2024, Tudmur, C‑185/24 and C‑189/24, EU:C:2024:1036, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
39 In the present case, it is apparent from the requests for a preliminary ruling that actions have been brought before the referring court by two nationals of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh against decisions rejecting their applications for international protection as manifestly unfounded on the ground that they are from a safe country of origin. That court explains, in those requests, that it is uncertain as to the compatibility, with EU law, of the designation of that third country as a safe country of origin, essentially on the grounds that that designation stems from a legislative act, that the Italian legislature did not disclose its sources of information and that it maintained the option to make that designation even though that third country may not be ‘safe’ for certain categories of its population. In that regard, that court refers to the information sheet of 3 May 2024 drawn up by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, on which the designation of Bangladesh as a safe country of origin was based before the adoption of Decree-Law No 158/2024, and which had concluded that that third country could be considered a safe country of origin only with the exception of certain categories of persons.
40 It is in that context that, by its first, second and fourth questions, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, about the interpretation of several provisions of Directive 2013/32, governing the concept of safe countries of origin and the designation of such countries by the Member States, and about the detailed rules for the judicial review of such a designation.
41 Those questions do indeed therefore concern the interpretation of provisions of EU law relevant to the resolution of the disputes in the main proceedings. Since the referring court is responsible for establishing the national legal framework and the factual context of the disputes in the main proceedings, it is not for the Court to verify the premisses on which those questions are based.
42 Furthermore, it follows from the requests for a preliminary ruling that, by its questions, the referring court ultimately seeks to determine whether the designation, as such, of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh as a safe country of origin is compatible with EU law, in order, if necessary, to disregard the presumption of safety arising from the application of the safe country of origin concept in the disputes in the main proceedings. Accordingly, the fact that it has not been established that LC and CP fall within one of the categories of persons in respect of whom, in that court’s view, that country does not constitute a safe country of origin, has no bearing on the admissibility of those questions.
43 It follows that the first, second and fourth questions are admissible.
44 It should be noted as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court should, where necessary, reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court may also find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions (see judgments of 20 March 1986, Tissier, 35/85, EU:C:1986:143, paragraph 9, and of 19 December 2024, Khan Yunis and Baabda, C‑123/23 and C‑202/23, EU:C:2024:1042, paragraph 63).
45 The fact that the referring court has formally referred, in its questions, to certain specific provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing it with all the elements of interpretation which may be useful for the judgment in the main proceedings, by extracting from the body of material provided by that court, and in particular from the statement of reasons for the order for reference, the elements of EU law which require interpretation in the light of the subject matter of the dispute (see judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 26, and of 19 December 2024, Khan Yunis and Baabda, C‑123/23 and C‑202/23, EU:C:2024:1042, paragraph 64).
46 By its questions, the referring court asks the Court, in particular, about the interpretation of Articles 36 to 38 of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter.
47 In the first place, it should be recalled that Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32 concern, respectively, the concept of safe country of origin and the designation by Member States of third countries as safe countries of origin.
48 Those articles establish a special examination scheme to which Member States may subject applications for international protection. That scheme is based on a rebuttable presumption of adequate protection in the country of origin, which can be rebutted by the applicant where he or she submits serious grounds relating to his or her particular circumstances (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2018, A, C‑404/17, EU:C:2018:588, paragraph 25, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
49 As part of the specific features of that special examination scheme, Member States may decide, in accordance with Article 31(8)(b) of that directive, first, to accelerate the examination procedure and, second, to conduct it at the border or in the transit zones, in accordance with Article 43 of that directive (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 48).
50 In addition, where an application for international protection lodged by an applicant from a safe country of origin has been held to be unfounded, in so far as, in accordance with Article 32(1) of Directive 2013/32, the determining authority has established that the applicant does not qualify for international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95, Member States may also consider such an application to be manifestly unfounded pursuant to Article 32(2) of Directive 2013/32, if it is defined as such in the national legislation (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 49).
51 Furthermore, one of the consequences for the person whose application is rejected on the basis of the implementation of the safe country of origin concept is that, contrary to what is provided for in the case of a simple rejection, that person may not be allowed to remain, pending the outcome of his or her action against the decision rejecting that application, in the territory of the Member State in which that application was lodged, as is clear from the provisions of Article 46(5) and (6) of Directive 2013/32 (judgments of 25 July 2018, A, C‑404/17, EU:C:2018:588, paragraph 27, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 50).
52 In the second place, it should be noted that, unlike Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32, Article 38 of that directive does not concern the concept of ‘safe country of origin’, but that of ‘safe third country’. However, the disputes in the main proceedings concern the application of the ‘safe country of origin’ concept alone. Accordingly, it is not necessary to rule on the interpretation of Article 38 of that directive in the present cases.
53 In the third place, it should be noted that the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 to provide for a right to an effective judicial remedy for applicants for international protection, the scope of which is defined in Article 46(3) of that directive, corresponds to the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 60, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, account must also be taken of that provision of Directive 2013/32, even though the referring court did not make reference to it in its questions.
54 By its first questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from designating third countries as safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act.
55 As recalled in paragraph 48 above, Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32 establish a special examination scheme to which Member States may subject applications for international protection from nationals of countries designated as safe countries of origin.
56 To that end, Article 37(1) of Directive 2013/32 specifies that ‘Member States may retain or introduce legislation that allows, in accordance with Annex I [to that directive], for the national designation of safe countries of origin for the purposes of examining applications for international protection’. As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 36 of his Opinion, it is apparent from a comparison of the various language versions of that provision that the concept of ‘legislation’ must be understood in its broadest sense, as being capable of encompassing acts of a legislative, regulatory or administrative nature.
57 To that effect, the Court has also held that, in order to be able to rely on the special examination scheme and the rebuttable presumption laid down by the rules of Directive 2013/32 relating to procedures based on the concept of safe country of origin, the Member States must have fully implemented those rules with regard to the laws, regulations and administrative provisions which it is for them to adopt (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, A, C‑404/17, EU:C:2018:588, paragraph 31).
58 According to settled case-law, the provisions of a directive must be implemented with unquestionable binding force and with the specificity, precision and clarity necessary to satisfy the requirements of legal certainty (judgment of 3 September 2020, Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona (Long-term residents), C‑503/19 and C‑592/19, EU:C:2020:629, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
59 In that context, it is for each Member State to designate safe countries of origin in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 36 and 37 of, and in Annex I to, Directive 2013/32, namely, in particular, the adoption of a list of third countries in accordance with the criteria laid down in Annex I, the enactment of additional implementation rules and modalities, and the notification to the Commission of the list of safe countries of origin, or its periodic review (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 July 2018, A, C‑404/17, EU:C:2018:588, paragraph 28).
60 That said, neither those provisions, nor indeed any other provision of Directive 2013/32, establish the authority or authorities of the Member States which should be responsible for designating safe countries of origin at national level or the relevant legal instrument for that purpose.
61 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that it follows from the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU that, when transposing a directive, Member States enjoy discretion as to the choice of ways and means of ensuring that a directive is implemented. Thus, as regards the choice of the competent authorities and of the relevant legal instruments for the purposes of designating, at national level, third countries as safe countries of origin, there is nothing to preclude a decision being taken, within a Member State, to confer on the national legislature the responsibility for designating safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act.
62 However, that discretion of the Member States in implementing the provisions of Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32 does not affect the obligation, imposed on each of those States, to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure that that directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it pursues (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 April 1984, von Colson and Kamann, 14/83, EU:C:1984:153, paragraph 15, and of 31 March 2022, Lombard Lízing, C‑472/20, EU:C:2022:242, paragraph 35).
63 In particular, that discretion does not affect the obligation of every national court to give full effect to the provisions of Directive 2013/32, by disapplying as required, of its own motion, any provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, which is contrary to the provisions of that directive with direct effect, without it having to request or await the prior setting aside of the provision of national legislation at issue by legislative or other constitutional means (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraphs 21 and 24, and of 28 January 2025, ASG 2, C‑253/23, EU:C:2025:40, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).
64 In addition, although, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy of Member States and subject to the observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing remedies for ensuring that individual rights derived from the EU legal order are safeguarded, Member States nevertheless have the responsibility to ensure observance in every case of the right to effective judicial protection of those rights as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, the scope of that right being clarified, in the present case, by Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 July 2025, Al Nasiria, C‑610/23, EU:C:2025:514, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
65 It follows that the choice, by a Member State, of the competent authority and the legal instrument effecting the designation, at national level, of safe countries of origin, in accordance with Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32, cannot affect its obligations under that directive. It is thus for each Member State, inter alia, to ensure respect for the right to an effective judicial remedy which Article 46(1) of that directive confers on applicants for international protection against decisions taken on their applications, the scope of which is defined by Article 46(3) of that directive.
66 In that regard, the Court has held that, in accordance with Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, where an action is brought before a national court or tribunal against a decision taken on an application for international protection - examined in the context of the special scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants from third countries designated, in accordance with Article 37 of that directive, as safe countries of origin - that court or tribunal must, as part of the full and ex nunc examination required by Article 46(3) of that directive, raise, on the basis of the information in the file and the information brought to its attention during the proceedings before it, a failure to have regard to the material conditions for such designation, set out in Annex I to that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 98).
67 Consequently, and having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 62 and 63 above, the fact that a Member State has chosen to designate safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act cannot be such as to preclude the national court or tribunal seised in the circumstances set out in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment from reviewing, even if only indirectly, whether the designation of the third country in question as a safe country of origin complies with the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to Directive 2013/32.
68 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first questions is that Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as not precluding a Member State from designating third countries as safe countries of origin by means of a legislative act, provided that that designation can be subject to judicial review as regards compliance with the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive, by any national court or tribunal hearing an action brought against a decision taken on an application for international protection, which had been examined under the special scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants who are from third countries designated as safe countries of origin.
69 By its second and third questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, first, a Member State which designates a third country as a safe country of origin must make accessible the sources of information, within the meaning of Article 37(3) of that directive, on which that designation is based and, second, the national court or tribunal hearing an action brought against a decision taken on an application for international protection, which had been examined in the context of the special examination scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants from third countries designated as safe countries of origin, may, when it verifies whether that designation complies with the material conditions for such a designation set out in Annex I to that directive, take account of the information which it has itself gathered.
70 Article 37(3) of Directive 2013/32 provides that the assessment of whether a third country is a safe country of origin must be based on a range of sources of information, including in particular information from other Member States, the EUAA, successor to the EASO, the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations.
71 It is true that neither that provision nor any other provision of Directive 2013/32 expressly states that the national authority which designates safe countries of origin at national level must make accessible the sources of information on the basis of which it made such a designation.
72 However, the fact remains, in the first place, that the designation, by a Member State, of a third country as a safe country of origin makes the special scheme for examining applications for international protection applicable to applicants from that country. In particular, that scheme, set out in paragraphs 48 to 51 above, enables Member States to accelerate the procedure for examining those applications and is based on a form of rebuttable presumption of adequate protection in the country of origin, which may, in accordance with Article 36(1) of Directive 2013/32, be rebutted by the applicant if he or she submits serious grounds relating to his or her particular circumstances.
73 As the Advocate General stated in point 55 of his Opinion, the possibility for an applicant to rebut that presumption requires, in order to be effective, that the applicant be put in a position to know the reasons why his or her country of origin is presumed to be safe. Accordingly, that applicant must, on that basis, have access to the sources of information on the basis of which his or her country of origin was designated as a safe country of origin.
74 In the second place, it should be noted that, under Article 12(1)(d) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 10(3)(b) of that directive, applicants for international protection are to have, during the examination procedure, access to precise and up-to-date information - gathered by the Member States from various sources, such as the EASO and the UNHCR and relevant international human rights organisations - as to the general situation prevailing in their countries of origin. Similarly, it follows from Article 10(4) of that directive that national courts or tribunals are also to have access to the general information necessary for the fulfilment of their task.
75 These are sources of information similar to those on which the Member States may rely, in accordance with Article 37(3) of Directive 2013/32, to designate a third country as a safe country of origin.
76 In the third place, it must be recalled that Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 guarantees applicants for international protection a right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against decisions taken on their application. Article 46(3) of that directive defines the scope of the right to an effective remedy by specifying that Member States bound by that directive must ensure that the court or tribunal before which the decision relating to the application for international protection concerned is contested carries out ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95]’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited).
77 Furthermore, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the characteristics of the remedy provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 must be determined in a manner that is consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection. Article 47 of the Charter is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law in order to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such. The same must hold true for Article 46(3) of that directive, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter (see judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).
78 From that point of view, first, it should be borne in mind that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, if the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, in the light of which Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted, is to be effective, on the one hand, the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons upon which the decision taken in relation to him or her is based, either by reading the decision itself or by requesting and obtaining notification of those reasons, so as to make it possible for him or her to defend his or her rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his or her applying to the court or tribunal with jurisdiction. On the other hand, the latter must have the power to require the authority concerned to provide those reasons, in order to be fully in a position in which it may carry out the review of the lawfulness of the national decision in question (judgments of 4 June 2013, ZZ, C‑300/11, EU:C:2013:363, paragraph 53, and of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).
79 Where, as in the disputes in the main proceedings, an application for international protection is rejected as manifestly unfounded on the ground that the applicant is from a safe country of origin, within the meaning of Articles 36 and 37 of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Annex I thereto, that ground for rejection overlaps, in essence, with the grounds on which the presumption of adequate protection, entailed by the designation of the country concerned as a safe country of origin, is based.
80 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 78 above, it must, therefore, be held that, in order for the judicial protection to be effective, both the applicant concerned and the court or tribunal seised must be able to have not only knowledge of the grounds for such a rejection, but also access to the sources of information on the basis of which the third country in question was designated as a safe country of origin.
81 Second, as regards the scope of the right to an effective remedy, as defined in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, the Court has held that the words ‘shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’ must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are required, by virtue of that provision, to order their national law in such a way that the processing of the actions referred to includes an examination, by the court or tribunal, of all the facts and points of law necessary in order to make an up-to-date assessment of the case at hand (see judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 110, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 87).
82 In that regard, first of all, the expression ‘ex nunc’ points to the court or tribunal’s obligation to make an assessment that takes into account, should the need arise, new evidence that has come to light after the adoption of the decision which is being challenged (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 111; of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 52; and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 88).
83 Next, the adjective ‘full’ used in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 confirms that the court or tribunal is required to examine both the evidence which the determining authority took into account, or should have taken into account, and that which has arisen following the adoption of the decision by that authority (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 113; of 29 July 2019, Torubarov, C‑556/17, EU:C:2019:626, paragraph 52; and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 89).
84 Lastly, the words ‘where applicable’, contained in the limb of the sentence ‘including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95]’, underline the fact that the full and ex nunc examination to be carried out by the court or tribunal need not necessarily involve a substantive examination of the international protection needs and may accordingly concern the procedural aspects of an application for international protection, which include the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraphs 90 and 91 and the case-law cited).
85 As follows from the Court’s case-law cited in paragraph 66 above, in accordance with Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, where an action is brought before a national court or tribunal against a decision taken on an application for international protection examined in the context of the special examination scheme mentioned in paragraph 48 above, that court or tribunal must, as part of the full and ex nunc examination required by Article 46(3) of that directive, raise, on the basis of the information in the file and the information brought to its attention during the proceedings before it, a possible failure to have regard to the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive.
86 The effectiveness of judicial review of compliance with the material conditions set out in Annex I to Directive 2013/32 presupposes that the court or tribunal seised may have access to the sources of information on the basis of which the competent national authority designated the third country in question as a safe country of origin. That requirement of effectiveness also implies that that court or tribunal may verify whether that designation complies with the material conditions laid down in Annex I to that directive, by taking into account other information which it may itself have gathered, whether from public sources or from sources which it has requested one of the parties to the proceedings before it to produce, provided that, first, it has satisfied itself as to the reliability of that information and, second, in accordance with the adversarial principle, those parties have the opportunity to submit their observations on that information.
87 It follows that Member States are required, pursuant to Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, to order their national law in such a way that sufficient and adequate access is ensured to the sources of information on which they have relied in order to designate safe countries of origin. That access must enable an applicant for international protection who is from such a country, and the national court or tribunal hearing an action against a decision taken on the application for international protection, properly to acquaint themselves with those sources of information in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 78 above.
88 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second and third questions is that Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that: - a Member State, which designates a third country as a safe country of origin, must ensure that there is, in respect of the sources of information, within the meaning of Article 37(3) of that directive, on which that designation is based, sufficient and adequate access that must, on the one hand, enable the applicant for international protection concerned, who is from that third country, to defend his or rights under the best possible conditions and to decide with full knowledge of the facts whether it is useful to bring his or her case before the court or tribunal having jurisdiction and, on the other hand, enable that court or tribunal to review a decision taken on the application for international protection; - the national court or tribunal hearing an action brought against a decision taken on an application for international protection, which had been examined under the special examination scheme applicable to applications lodged by applicants who are from third countries designated as safe countries of origin, may, when it verifies, even indirectly, whether that designation complies with the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive, take account of the information which it has itself gathered, provided, first, that it satisfies itself that that information is reliable and, second, that it guarantees the parties to the dispute that the adversarial principle is observed.
89 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the fourth questions do not concern the review that the referring court must carry out as regards the implementation of Article 36(1) of Directive 2013/32, which provides for the rebuttal of the presumption of adequate protection in the country of origin where the applicant submits serious grounds relating to his or her particular circumstances. The fourth questions relate solely to the review that that court must carry out as regards the designation, as such, of the third country of origin of the applicant as a safe country of origin, in accordance with Article 37 of that directive.
90 In those circumstances, it must be held that, by its fourth questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Annex I to that directive, must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from designating as a safe country of origin a third country which does not satisfy, for certain categories of persons, the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive.
91 In accordance with the settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider its wording, the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 6 July 2023, Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Refugee who has committed a serious crime), C‑8/22, EU:C:2023:542, paragraph 29).
92 As regards, in the first place, the wording of Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, which, in accordance with its title, relates to the designation by a Member State of third countries as safe countries of origin, reference is made therein, on several occasions, to the terms ‘countries’ and ‘third countries’. There is nothing in the wording of that provision to indicate that, for the purposes of such a designation, those terms may be understood as referring only to a part - which may be the majority - of the population of the third country concerned, to the exclusion of another part of that population or of certain categories of persons.
93 As regards, in the second place, the context of Article 37 of that Directive 2013/32, it is apparent, first, from Article 37 that Member States may designate safe countries of origin in accordance with Annex I to that directive. However, like the wording of that article, the criteria set out in that annex provide no indication that Member States may designate a third country as a safe country of origin where, for certain categories of persons within the population of that country, the material criteria laid down in Annex I are not met.
94 On the contrary, as set out in that annex, the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin is dependent on its being possible to demonstrate that there is ‘generally’ and ‘consistently’ no persecution, no torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.
95 In that regard, it is true that the language versions of Annex I to Directive 2013/32 differ. Thus, only the French-language version of that annex refers to the adverb ‘uniformly’. The other language versions of that annex, such as Bulgarian (‘за всеки отделен случай’), Spanish (‘sistemática’), Czech (‘soustavně’), Danish (‘til stadighed’), German (‘durchgängig’), Estonian (‘järjekindlat’), Greek (‘μόνιμα’), English (‘consistently’), Croatian (‘trajno’), Italian (‘costantemente’), Latvian (‘konsekventi’), Lithuanian (‘sistemingai’), Hungarian (‘következetesen’), Maltese (‘konsistentement’), Dutch (‘duurzame’), Polish (‘konsekwentnie’), Portuguese (‘sistemático’), Romanian (‘consecvent’), Slovakian (‘sústavne’), Slovenian (‘redno’), Finnish (‘jatkuvasti’) and Swedish (‘genomgående’), correspond to expressions such as ‘in a constant’, ‘systematic’, ‘lasting’, ‘continuous’ or ‘consistent’ manner.
96 However, beyond those semantic differences, those terms all refer to a concept of ‘invariability’. They tend therefore, in the absence of any reference to part of the population of the third country concerned, in Article 37 of, or Annex I to, Directive 2013/32, to indicate that the conditions referred to in that annex must be satisfied with regard to the entire population of the third country concerned, in order for that country to be capable of being designated as a safe country of origin. They thus express the choice of the EU legislature to make the designation of a safe country of origin subject to the condition that the third country is generally safe for its entire population and not only for a part of it.
97 Moreover, even in a country which is generally safe for its entire population, there is no absolute guarantee of safety for each individual. It is for that reason that the EU legislature provided, in Article 36(1) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of recitals 40 and 42 of that directive, for the possibility for any applicant for international protection who is from a country designated as a safe country of origin to disprove the rebuttable presumption of adequate protection, by submitting serious grounds relating to his or her particular circumstances.
98 Second, as regards the argument based on Article 24 of Directive 2013/32, it should be noted that that article, which, in accordance with its title, concerns ‘applicants in need of special procedural guarantees’, has no connection with the designation of a third country as a ‘safe country of origin’ within the meaning of Article 37 of, and Annex I to, that directive.
99 Third, as has been set out in paragraphs 48 to 51 above, the designation by a Member State of third countries as safe countries of origin makes it possible to subject the applications for international protection of applicants who are from those third countries to a special examination scheme that is exceptional in nature.
100 In that regard, to interpret Article 37 of Directive 2013/32 as allowing third countries to be designated as safe countries of origin, where, for certain categories of persons, the substantive criteria laid down in Annex I are not met by those countries, would have the effect of extending the scope of that special examination scheme. Since there is no support for such an interpretation in the wording of Article 37 or, more generally, in that directive, to recognise such an option would fail to have regard to the strict interpretation to which provisions having an exceptional character must be subject (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 March 2015, Commission v Luxembourg, C‑502/13, EU:C:2015:143, paragraph 61, and of 8 February 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Admissibility of a subsequent application), C‑216/22, EU:C:2024:122, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
101 As regards, in the third place, the objectives of Directive 2013/32, it must be recalled that, apart from the fact that that directive pursues the overall purpose of establishing common procedural standards, it seeks in particular, as is apparent inter alia from recital 18 thereof, to ensure that applications for international protection are dealt with ‘as soon as possible …, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out’ (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 109, and of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 78).
102 In that perspective, recital 20 of that directive states that, in well-defined circumstances, where, inter alia, a request is likely to be unfounded, Member States should be able to accelerate the examination procedure, in particular by introducing shorter, but reasonable, time limits for certain procedural steps, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out and to the applicant’s effective access to the basic principles and guarantees provided for in that directive (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 79).
103 That is why, as stated in paragraphs 48 to 51 above, a Member State may subject applications for international protection lodged by applicants who are from a third country which that Member State has designated as a safe country of origin to a special examination scheme, under which it is possible, inter alia, to accelerate the procedure for examining those applications (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 80).
104 In so far as, as has been noted in paragraph 101 above, the EU legislature seeks to ensure, through Directive 2013/32, that applications for international protection are examined in a manner that is both rapid and complete, it is for that legislature, when exercising the discretion it enjoys for the purposes of establishing common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, to strike a balance between those two objectives when determining the conditions under which Member States may designate a third country as a safe country of origin (judgment of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 81).
105 Thus, the fact that that legislature did not provide, in the context of that directive, for the option for Member States to exclude categories of persons for the purposes of such a designation reflects that balancing exercise as well as its choice to favour a complete examination of applications for international protection lodged by applicants whose country of origin does not satisfy, for the whole of its population, the material conditions set out in Annex I to that directive.
106 Although Article 61(2) of Regulation 2024/1348, Article 78 of which is to repeal Directive 2013/32 with effect from 12 June 2026, introduces such an option, by providing that the designation of a third country as a safe country of origin, both at EU level and at national level, may provide for exceptions for clearly identifiable categories of persons, it is the prerogative of the EU legislature to reconsider that choice, by striking a fresh balance of the interests at issue.
107 In that context, it should also be noted that it is for the EU legislature to choose the date from which a new provision, such as Article 61(2) of Regulation 2024/1348, becomes applicable, a choice which it made in Article 79(2) and (3) of that regulation. In addition, it is open to that legislature to reconsider that choice by amending the latter provision, as has moreover been proposed by the Commission. Thus, the Commission’s proposal of 16 April 2025 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 2024/1348 (COM(2025) 186 final) provides in Article 1(2) thereof for the amendment of Article 79(2) and (3) of Regulation 2024/1348 in order to bring forward the application, inter alia, of Article 61(2) thereof.
108 Consequently, in the light of the requirements referred to in paragraphs 66 and 85 above, and since it is Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, and not Article 61(2) of Regulation 2024/1348, which applies to the disputes in the main proceedings, it is for the referring court, in accordance with Article 46(3) of that directive, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, to verify, on the basis of the information in the file and that brought to its attention during the proceedings before it, whether the designation of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh as a safe country of origin - provided for in Article 2bis(1) of Legislative Decree No 25/2008 following its amendment by Decree-Law No 158/2024 - satisfies the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive, with regard to the entire population of that third country.
109 In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the fourth questions is that Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Annex I to that directive, must be interpreted as precluding a Member State from designating as a safe country of origin a third country which does not satisfy, for certain categories of persons, the material conditions for such a designation, set out in Annex I to that directive.
110 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. 1. Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2. Articles 36 and 37 and Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that: 3. Article 37 of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Annex I to that directive,