1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 13(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation.
2 The request has been made in the proceedings between the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) and Mutua Madrileña Automovilista, a Spanish insurance company, concerning a claim for compensation brought by that Member State concerning the remuneration which that Member State paid to one of its officials during her incapacity to work as a result of an accident involving a vehicle insured with that company.
3 Recitals 15, 16, 18 and 34 of Regulation No 1215/2012 read as follows:
4 Article 1(1) of that regulation provides: ‘This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters or to the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of State authority (acta iure imperii).’
5 Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, dealing with ‘Jurisdiction’, includes Section 1, entitled ‘General provisions’, which contains Articles 4 to 6 of that regulation.
6 Article 4(1) of that regulation provides: ‘Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.’
7 Under Article 5(1) of that regulation: ‘Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Chapter.’
8 Section 3 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, under the heading ‘Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance’, comprises Articles 10 to 16 of that regulation.
9 Article 10 of that regulation reads as follows: ‘In matters relating to insurance, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 6 and point 5 of Article 7.’
10 Article 11(1) of that regulation provides: ‘An insurer domiciled in a Member State may be sued:
11 Article 13(2) of that regulation provides: ‘Articles 10, 11 and 12 shall apply to actions brought by the injured party directly against the insurer, where such direct actions are permitted.’
12 Article 63(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its:
13 On 8 March 2020, a federal official, assigned to the Munich office (Germany) of the Deutsche Patent- und Markenamt (German Patent and Trade Mark Office) and domiciled in that city, was injured in a road traffic accident in Spain. A vehicle involved in that accident was insured against civil liability by the Spanish company Mutua Madrileña Automovilista.
14 For the period during which that official was unfit for work because of her injuries, her employer, the Federal Republic of Germany, continued to pay her remuneration. By letter of 25 January 2021, the latter sought reimbursement of the amount thus paid from the claims representative appointed in Germany by Mutua Madrileña Automovilista, who refused to pay that compensation, arguing that the official concerned had caused the accident.
15 The Federal Republic of Germany, acting in its capacity as an employer, brought a civil action before the Amtsgericht München (Local Court, Munich, Germany) seeking an order that Mutua Madrileña Automovilista pay it compensation for the damage resulting from the payment of the remuneration paid to the official concerned. Since that company had its seat in Spain, it argued that the court seised of the matter lacked international jurisdiction. In addition, it contested the merits of the action.
16 By judgment of 16 February 2022, that court declined international jurisdiction on the grounds that the Federal Republic of Germany could not benefit from the special rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance laid down in Article 11(1)(b) and Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012. After a categorising assessment of the need for protection, that court held that an employer which is a State, particularly if it also carries out functional activities as a social security institution, cannot rely on those rules, which, since they are derogations, must be interpreted strictly.
17 The Federal Republic of Germany brought an action against that judgment before the Landgericht München I (Regional Court Munich I, Germany), which is the referring court and which raises the question whether the court seised at first instance was right to decline jurisdiction, in the light of those provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012.
18 In that regard, the Federal Republic of Germany maintains that it acquired, by way of statutory subrogation and as a result of the continued payment, during her incapacity to work, of the remuneration of the injured official of which it is the employer, the rights to compensation which that official had against the insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident in which she had been injured. It argues that, in that capacity, it can, like the employee concerned, claim that the courts of the Member State in which the injured party is domiciled have jurisdiction. In its view, it follows from the Court’s case-law in that field that there is no need to carry out an assessment on a case-by-case basis and to apply a criterion relating to the weaker position of the claimant. On the contrary, in order to ensure predictability of jurisdiction, any transferee acting under such statutory subrogation, and not as a social security institution or an insurer, should have the option of starting proceedings before those courts, in its capacity as an injured party.
19 By contrast, Mutua Madrileña Automovilista contends that it follows from the objective of protection referred to in Article 11(1)(b) and Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 that only a claimant who is in a weaker position than the insurer which it is suing may benefit from those provisions in order not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled, which in principle have jurisdiction. The Court already thus denied that benefit both to a social security institution and to professionals in the insurance sector. The same should apply when the claimant is a State, especially where that State provides benefits which by their nature amount to social security benefits, which is the case with the Federal Republic of Germany.
20 According to the referring court, it is not disputed by the parties to the main proceedings that the Federal Republic of Germany intends to bring, in accordance with the applicable provisions of Spanish law, an action directly against Mutua Madrileña Automovilista, in its capacity as insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident in which the official concerned was injured. It is also common ground that that Member State initiated legal proceedings under a statutory subrogation of rights, which results from the provisions of German law under which, where an official is injured, the employer who paid that official his or her remuneration during that official’s incapacity to work due to those injuries is subrogated to the right to compensation which the law confers on that official against a third party.
21 In view of what can be drawn from the Court’s case-law and the German case-law, the referring court asks whether a Member State which, as an employer, brings an action directly against an insurer, on the basis of a statutory subrogation to the right to claim compensation of an official who has been injured in an accident, may rely on the special rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance provided, for the benefit of the ‘injured party’, by the combined provisions of Article 11(1)(b) and Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in the light of recitals 15 and 18 thereof. That court points out that those special rules of jurisdiction constitute a derogation and that such a claimant is a subject of public international law.
22 In those circumstances, the Landgericht München I (Regional Court Munich I) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 13(2) of Regulation [No 1215/2012], read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that a Member State of the European Union itself, in its capacity as an employer which has continued to pay the remuneration of its official who has (temporarily) become unfit for work as a result of a road traffic accident and which is subrogated to the official’s rights vis-à-vis the company, established in another Member State, that provides the civil liability insurance for the vehicle involved in that accident, may sue the insurance company as an “injured party” within the meaning of that [first] provision before the courts for the place where the official who is unfit for work is domiciled, where a direct action is permitted?’
23 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State acting as an employer subrogated to the rights of an official injured in a road traffic accident, which continued to pay the remuneration of that official during the official’s incapacity to work, may, in its capacity as an ‘injured party’ within the meaning of that Article 13(2), sue the company providing insurance against civil liability resulting from the use of the vehicle involved in that accident in the courts for the place where the official is domiciled, where direct actions are permitted.
24 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Brussels Convention and of those of Regulation No 44/2001 also applies to those of Regulation No 1215/2012, as is apparent from recital 34 thereof, whenever those provisions may be regarded as ‘equivalent’. Here, that is the case with, on the one hand, point 2 of the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Brussels Convention, Article 9(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012, and, on the other, Article 10(2) of the Brussels Convention, Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 and Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe, C‑106/17, EU:C:2018:50, paragraph 36, and of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraphs 20 to 24 and 30).
25 As regards the question referred, it should be recalled, in the first place, that Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in the light of recitals 15 and 16 thereof, lays down a general rule of jurisdiction according to which persons domiciled in a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that State, except in a few cases defined by that regulation.
26 Thus, Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that, by way of derogation from that general rule, persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of that regulation. In particular, Section 3 of Chapter II contains special rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance, which are set out in Articles 10 to 16 of that regulation and constitute an autonomous system for the allocation of jurisdiction in such matters (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited).
27 It is apparent from recital 18 of Regulation No 1215/2012 that actions in matters relating to insurance are characterised by a certain imbalance between the parties, which the provisions of Section 3 of Chapter II of that regulation are intended to correct by giving the weaker party the benefit of rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his or her interests than the general rules. Accordingly, those provisions are designed to ensure that that party may bring an action against a stronger party before a court of a Member State which is easily accessible (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 April 2023, A1 and A2 (Insurance of a pleasure craft), C‑352/21, EU:C:2023:344, paragraphs 48 and 49 and the case-law cited).
28 In particular, Article 11(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that an insurer domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of that Member State. Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 adds that that insurer may also be sued in another Member State, specifically in the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled, where the action is brought by the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary. Under Article 13(2) of that regulation, the provisions of Article 11 thereof apply to actions brought by the injured party directly against the insurer, where such actions are permitted.
29 In the second place, it follows from the Court’s case-law that the rules of jurisdiction derogating from the general rule that jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s domicile must be interpreted strictly, which precludes going beyond the cases expressly envisaged by Regulation No 1215/2012, particularly as regards the jurisdiction of the courts for the claimant’s domicile, as provided for in Article 11(1)(b) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraphs 46 and 47 and the case-law cited).
30 The Court also held that the protective role pursued by the special rules of jurisdiction in Section 3 of Chapter II of Regulation No 1215/2012, as previously those in Section 3 of Chapter II of Regulation No 44/2001, means that those rules are not to be extended to persons for whom that protection is not justified (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraphs 40 and 41, and of 21 October 2021, T.B. and D. (Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance), C‑393/20, EU:C:2021:871, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
31 In addition, the Court held that Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, read in conjunction with Article 9(1)(b) thereof, as well as Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) thereof, were to be interpreted as meaning that the special rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance benefit parties having suffered damage, without restricting the category of persons having suffered damage to those suffering it directly (see, to that effect, as regards the first one of those regulations, judgment of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraph 33, and, as regards the second one, judgment of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe, C‑106/17, EU:C:2018:50, paragraph 37).
32 Thus, certain categories of persons subrogated to the rights held by the party directly injured by damage may also rely on the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the combined provisions of Article 13(2) and Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 in order to sue an insurer in a court other than that of its domicile, where those subrogated persons may be classified as ‘injured parties’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of that regulation.
33 However, the Court stated that there is no need for a case-by-case assessment of the question whether the person who brought the action against the insurer concerned may be regarded as a ‘weaker party’ in order to be covered by the concept of ‘injured party’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012. As the Court previously pointed out, such an assessment would give rise to the risk of legal uncertainty and would be contrary to the objective of Regulation No 1215/2012, set out in recital 15 thereof, which is that the rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraph 34, and of 21 October 2021, T.B. and D. (Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance), C‑393/20, EU:C:2021:871, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
34 Within the framework thus defined, establishing that no special protection is justified where the parties concerned are professionals in the insurance sector, neither of whom may be presumed to be in a weaker position than the other, the Court ruled out the application of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) thereof, in cases where the assignee of the rights of the directly injured party is such a professional (see, to that effect, judgments of 31 January 2018, Hofsoe, C‑106/17, EU:C:2018:50, paragraphs 41 to 43 and 47, and of 20 May 2021, CNP, C‑913/19, EU:C:2021:399, paragraphs 40 to 43).
35 Similarly, the Court ruled out the application of Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, read in conjunction with Article 9(1)(b) thereof, which are equivalent to those provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012, where the assignee of the rights of the directly injured party is a social security institution acting for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of benefits provided to the person insured by it who has been injured in a road traffic accident (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2009, Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse, C‑347/08, EU:C:2009:561, paragraphs 33, 42, 43 and 47).
36 By contrast, the Court held, with regard to those provisions of Regulation No 44/2001, that an employer, to which the rights of its employee have passed in order to be reimbursed for the salary paid to the latter for the duration of a period of incapacity to work, which, solely in that capacity, has brought an action for the damage it has suffered may be regarded as weaker than the insurer that it sues (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraph 36).
37 It thus found that, pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation No 44/2001, employers to which the rights of their employees to compensation have passed may, as persons which have suffered damage and whatever their size and legal form, rely on the special rules of jurisdiction laid down in Articles 8 to 10 of that regulation (judgment of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraph 35).
38 In the present case, the referring court wishes to ascertain whether it follows from that case-law that a Member State acting as an employer subrogated to the rights to compensation of a directly injured official, in so far as that official was injured in an accident involving an insured vehicle, must itself be recognised as having the status of ‘injured party’, within the meaning of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, on account of the fact that it continued to pay the remuneration of that official during the official’s incapacity to work, with the result that such a State as an employer would be entitled to sue the insurer concerned in the courts for the place where the claimant is domiciled, under Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, where direct actions are permitted.
39 As the Advocate General stated in points 50 to 55 of his Opinion, the situation examined by the Court in the case that gave rise to the judgment of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD (C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576), is similar to that at issue in the main proceedings. That judgment was given in the context of an action brought by a body governed by public law acting in its capacity as an employer, just like the Member State bringing the claim in the main proceedings in the present case. Furthermore, that body was subrogated to the rights to compensation of one of its employees, in factual circumstances similar to those which gave rise to this dispute, in so far as it was also an action for compensation based on the continued remuneration of an employee, here an official, injured in a road traffic accident. Accordingly, the considerations adopted by the Court in that judgment can be transposed to the present case.
40 That analogy is all the more compelling since a Member State which acts with a view to compensation, not as a subject of public international law, but solely in its capacity as an employer subrogated to the rights of one of its employees, whether or not an official, is subject to the same substantive and procedural rules as a subject of private law.
41 Furthermore, having regard to the material scope of Regulation No 1215/2012, as defined in Article 1(1) thereof, in order for a Member State to be able to rely on the rules of jurisdiction laid down by that regulation, the dispute must by definition relate to ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of that provision, which excludes, inter alia, the exercise of public powers and therefore the exercise of powers falling outside the scope of the ordinary legal rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mahá, C‑494/23, EU:C:2024:848, paragraphs 30 to 32).
42 Accordingly, Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that an employer, which continued to pay the remuneration of its absent employee following a road traffic accident, and which is subrogated to the rights of that employee in respect of the insurer of the vehicle involved in that accident, must be regarded as an ‘injured party’ within the meaning of Article 13(2), including where, as in the present case, the applicant is a Member State acting in its capacity as an employer.
43 In that context, the fact, referred to by the defendant in the main proceedings, that such a Member State also performs the functions of a social security institution is irrelevant, given that the interpretation sought by the referring court is expressly limited to the situation in which the Member State concerned brings its action for compensation solely in its capacity as an employer subrogated to its employee’s rights to compensation, and not in its capacity as a social security institution.
44 In the third place, it should be noted that, having regard to the wording of the question referred, the referring court appears to take the view that, pursuant to the combined provisions of Article 13(2) and Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012, where the claimant who has sued an insurer is a Member State acting in its capacity as an employer subrogated to the rights of its directly injured employee, it is the court for the place where that employee is domiciled which has local jurisdiction.
45 That argument cannot be upheld. First, it must be borne in mind that, by designating ‘the court for the place where the claimant is domiciled’, Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 1215/2012 identifies a specific court within a Member State directly, without reference to the rules of allocation of local jurisdiction in force in that Member State, so that, where that provision is applicable, it determines both the international jurisdiction and the local jurisdiction of the court thus designated (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung, C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514, paragraphs 38 and 57).
46 Secondly, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that an employer subrogated to the rights of its employee, by reason of the fact that it has paid that employee’s remuneration, has suffered damage of its own and is therefore itself an ‘injured party’ within the meaning of Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, with the result that such an employer may benefit from the possibility, afforded by in Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, of bringing its action against an insurer before the courts for the place where it is domiciled (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 December 2007, FBTO Schadeverzekeringen, C‑463/06, EU:C:2007:792, paragraph 31, and of 20 July 2017, MMA IARD, C‑340/16, EU:C:2017:576, paragraphs 35 to 37 and 39).
47 Moreover, since that subrogated employer is the only one able to rely on the rights to compensation resulting from the subrogation, there is no need to require it to start proceedings before the courts for the place where its employee is domiciled in order to avoid the multiplication of courts having jurisdiction. In accordance with the finding made in paragraph 42 above, those considerations also apply where, as in the present case, that subrogated employer is a Member State.
48 Thirdly, as regards specifically the identification of the place where such a subrogated employer is domiciled where that employer is a Member State, it must be borne in mind that it follows from Article 63(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 that, for the purposes of the application of that regulation, legal persons are domiciled at the place where they have their statutory seat, central administration or principal place of business. In that case, it is appropriate to determine the place where such a Member State as an employer is domiciled as the place where the seat of the administrative body which employs the official concerned, and which, in practice, has suffered the damage linked to the absence of that official during his or her incapacity for work, is situated. That interpretation, in so far as it ensures a close connection between the court having jurisdiction and the dispute, is consistent with the objectives of foreseeability of the rules of jurisdiction, the sound administration of justice and legal certainty, which are referred to in recitals 15 and 16 of that regulation.
49 In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 11(1)(b) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State acting as an employer subrogated to the rights of an official injured in a road traffic accident, which continued to pay the remuneration of that official during the official’s incapacity to work, may, in its capacity as an ‘injured party’ within the meaning of that Article 13(2), sue the company providing insurance against civil liability resulting from the use of the vehicle involved in that accident not in the courts for the place where the official is domiciled, but in the courts for the place where the administrative body employing that official has its seat, where direct actions are permitted.
50 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.