1 By their appeal, Penya Barça Lyon: Plus que des supporters (PBL) and Mr Issam Abdelmouine ask the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 February 2023, PBL and WA v Commission (T‑538/21, the judgment under appeal, EU:T:2023:53), by which the General Court dismissed their action for annulment of Decision COMP/C.4/AH/mdr 2021(092342) of the Commission of 1 September 2021 on the status of a complaint submitted in connection with alleged State aid granted to the Paris Saint-Germain football club (SA.64489).
2 Recitals 32 and 33 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9, and corrigendum OJ 2017 L 186, p. 17) state: ‘(32) Complaints are an essential source of information for detecting infringements of the Union rules on State aid. To ensure the quality of the complaints submitted to the Commission, and at the same time transparency and legal certainty, it is appropriate to lay down the conditions that a complaint should [fulfil] in order to put the Commission in possession of information regarding alleged unlawful aid and set in motion the preliminary examination. Submissions not meeting those conditions should be treated as general market information, and should not necessarily lead to ex officio investigations. (33) Complainants should be required to demonstrate that they are interested parties within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU and of Article 1(h) of this Regulation. They should also be required to provide a certain amount of information in a form that the Commission should be empowered to set out in an implementing provision. In order not to discourage prospective complainants, that implementing provision should take into account that the demands on interested parties for lodging a complaint should not be burdensome.’
3 Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 provides that, for the purposes of that regulation, ‘interested party’ means ‘any Member State and any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade associations.’
4 Article 12 of that regulation, entitled ‘Examination, request for information and information injunction’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Without prejudice to Article 24, the Commission may on its own initiative examine information regarding alleged unlawful aid from whatever source. The Commission shall examine without undue delay any complaint submitted by any interested party in accordance with Article 24(2) and shall ensure that the Member State concerned is kept fully and regularly informed of the progress and outcome of the examination.’
5 Article 24 of that regulation, entitled ‘Rights of interested parties’, states: ‘1. Any interested party may submit comments … following a Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure. Any interested party which has submitted such comments and any beneficiary of individual aid shall be sent a copy of the decision taken by the Commission … 2. Any interested party may submit a complaint to inform the Commission of any alleged unlawful aid or any alleged misuse of aid. To that effect, the interested party shall duly complete a form … and shall provide the mandatory information requested therein. …’
6 The background to the dispute, as set out by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, may be summarised as follows.
7 PBL is an association whose purpose is to ‘bring together supporters’ of Fútbol Club Barcelona (‘the FCB’), a professional football club based in Barcelona (Spain) and constituted as a not-for-profit association.
8 Mr Abdelmouine is a member of PBL. Since 3 March 2020, he is also a socio (contributing member) of the FCB.
9 On 8 August 2021, Mr Lionel Messi, a football player working for the FCB, announced his departure from that club and his recruitment by the Paris Saint-Germain Football Club (PSG), a professional football club established in Paris (France).
10 On the same day, Mr Abdelmouine lodged a complaint with the Commission, in which he, first, informed the Commission of the existence of alleged aid enabling the PSG to recruit Mr Messi and, secondly, asked the Commission to adopt measures under Article 116 TFEU.
11 On 1 September 2021, the Commission sent Mr Abdelmouine a letter in which it stated, in essence, that he could not be classified as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 and that, consequently, the information provided concerning the alleged aid granted to the PSG could not be regarded as a complaint under Article 24(2) of that regulation.
12 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 24 September 2021, PBL and Mr Abdelmouine brought an action, first, for annulment of the decision contained in that letter not to treat Mr Abdelmouine as an interested party entitled to lodge a complaint with the Commission, within the meaning of Regulation 2015/1589 (‘the contested decision’), and, secondly, for the adoption of directions.
13 On the day of the hearing, which was held on 18 October 2022, the appellants also lodged at the Court Registry a body of evidence pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of that court.
14 In paragraphs 9 to 13 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court rejected the appellants’ second head of claim, seeking the adoption of directions, on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to issue such directions.
15 As regards the appellants’ first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision, the General Court held, in paragraphs 14 to 18 of the judgment under appeal, that it had to be rejected as inadmissible in part, in so far as it related to the Commission’s failure to take PBL into account in the contested decision. In that regard, the General Court held that it had not been established that PBL had associated itself with the complaint which had been lodged by Mr Abdelmouine and which was the subject of that decision, with the result that he had to be regarded as the sole complainant. Accordingly, that head of claim was considered on its merits only in so far as it related to the handling of the complaint thus made by Mr Abdelmouine, acting as a socio of the FCB.
16 As to the merits, the General Court took the view, in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment under appeal, that, in support of that head of claim, the appellants raised a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 and comprising two parts.
17 As regards the first part, alleging an error in the legal characterisation of the facts, the General Court held, in essence, in paragraphs 22 to 47 of the judgment under appeal, that the various interests relied on by the appellants in order to show that Mr Abdelmouine had to be classified, in his capacity as socio of the FCB, as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, had not been established, in the case of some, and were ‘purely general or indirect’, in the case of others. On those grounds, the General Court concluded that Mr Abdelmouine could not be regarded as such an ‘interested party’.
18 As regards the second part, alleging an error of assessment of the facts, the General Court rejected it, in paragraphs 48 to 53 of the judgment under appeal, on the ground that it was ineffective, after pointing out, in essence, that it related to a purely illustrative and, therefore, ancillary aspect of the reasoning on which the Commission had relied, in the contested decision, in order to rule on the status of the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine.
19 Furthermore, the General Court held, in paragraphs 54 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, that it was not necessary to rule on the admissibility of the evidence submitted to it by the appellants on the day of the hearing, since that evidence was, in any event, irrelevant for the purposes of assessing, inter alia, the admissibility and merits of their action.
20 In the light of all those grounds, the General Court dismissed the action.
21 The appellants claim that the Court should: - set aside the judgment under appeal; and, in essence, - uphold the pleas in law submitted at first instance.
22 The Commission contends that the Court should: - dismiss the appeal; and - order the appellants to pay the costs.
23 In support of their appeal, the appellants rely essentially on six grounds of appeal.
24 By their first ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 14 to 18 of the judgment under appeal and which consists, in essence, of two parts, the appellants challenge the General Court’s rejection, as inadmissible in part, of their first head of claim seeking annulment of the contested decision.
25 By the first part of that ground of appeal, they submit, in essence, that, contrary to what the General Court held in the paragraphs in question, the evidence which they submitted to that court on the day of the hearing sufficiently establishes that PBL associated itself with the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine and that the Commission was aware of that situation when it adopted the contested decision.
26 By the second part of that ground of appeal, they submit that, in any event, the General Court failed to have regard to its case-law according to which, where an action for annulment is brought by several persons, a finding that one of those persons has standing to bring proceedings is sufficient to render that action admissible in its entirety and therefore renders it unnecessary to examine whether the other persons concerned have standing to bring proceedings. According to the applicants, in the light of that case-law, it was for that court to rule that their first head of claim was admissible in its entirety.
27 The Commission disputes the admissibility of the first part of the ground of appeal and the merits of the second part.
28 As regards the first part of the present ground of appeal, it must be recalled that it follows from settled case-law that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to find and appraise the relevant facts and to assess the evidence submitted to it. The appraisal of those facts and the assessment of that evidence thus do not, save where the facts or evidence are distorted, constitute a point of law which may be subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal. With the exception of a plea of misrepresentation, any argument calling into question that assessment in such a context must therefore be rejected as inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraphs 157 and 158 and the case-law cited).
29 Moreover, where a party alleges a distortion of the evidence by the General Court, that party must, pursuant to Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors which led the General Court to make that distortion. Furthermore, that distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence (judgment of 21 September 2023, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission, C‑478/21 P, EU:C:2023:685, paragraph 219 and the case-law cited).
30 In the present case, it follows that the appellants, who do not claim or establish any distortion of the facts in that regard, are not entitled to challenge, in the present appeal, the findings of the General Court that, in essence, it had not been established that PBL associated itself with the complaint which had been lodged with the Commission by Mr Abdelmouine and which was the subject of the contested decision.
31 Furthermore, the arguments which the appellants submit to the Court do not make it possible to identify or, a fortiori, to establish clearly, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 29 of the present judgment, that the General Court distorted the evidence submitted to it on the day of the hearing, such distortion not, moreover, being formally alleged. The only specific piece of evidence to which the applicants refer in that regard is an email from the Commission which, contrary to what they claim, indicates not that the Commission received a complaint from PBL, but, on the contrary, that the Commission is not in possession of such a complaint. As to the remainder, the applicants merely refer to peremptory, general or insufficiently substantiated arguments.
32 As regards the second part of the present ground of appeal, it must be held that the appellants are not justified in complaining that the General Court failed to have regard to its case-law according to which, where an action for annulment is brought by several persons, a finding that one of those persons has standing to bring proceedings is sufficient to render that action admissible in its entirety and therefore renders unnecessary an examination of the standing of the other persons in question to bring proceedings.
33 In paragraphs 14 to 18 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court did not rule on the standing of PBL to bring proceedings, but on the admissibility of the appellants’ first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision. In that regard, the General Court held that that head of claim was admissible only in so far as it called into question the content of that decision, by which the Commission had ruled on the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine. Accordingly, that court rejected as inadmissible, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 15, 30 and 31 of this judgment, that head of claim in so far as it essentially called into question the failure to take into account, in the contested decision, the alleged fact that PBL had associated itself with the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine.
34 In that context, the case-law to which the applicants refer was of no relevance, having regard to its purpose and scope.
35 Accordingly, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as partially inadmissible and partially unfounded.
36 By their second ground of appeal, the appellants submit, in essence, that the General Court failed to fulfil its obligations by failing to respond, in the judgment under appeal, to one of the two pleas in law set out in their action, which concerned the infringement of Article 116 TFEU.
37 The Commission disputes the merits of that line of argument.
38 As is apparent from paragraphs 9 to 13 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellants’ second head of claim, seeking that the Commission be ordered to exercise the powers which that institution holds, inter alia, under Article 116 TFEU.
39 That finding of lack of jurisdiction, which is not criticised by the appeal and which, moreover, is free from any error of law for the reasons set out by the General Court in the judgment under appeal, precluded any form of examination, by that court, of the admissibility or the merits of any plea which may have been put forward by the appellants in support of the head of claim in question. That finding therefore justifies, implicitly but necessarily, the General Court’s failure to respond, in the judgment under appeal, to the arguments alleging infringement of Article 116 TFEU which the appellants claim to have submitted to it.
40 Therefore, the second ground of appeal is unfounded.
41 By their third ground of appeal, which relates to paragraphs 22 to 47 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants criticise the General Court’s rejection of the first part of their plea for annulment alleging infringement of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589.
42 In the first place, they submit that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the concept of ‘interested party’ to which that provision refers is defined broadly, since it refers to an indeterminate group of persons including all those whose interests might be affected by the grant of aid, in that that aid is likely to have a specific effect on their situation.
43 In the second place, in the present case, the appellants observe, first of all, that the alleged aid challenged by the complaint which is the subject of the contested decision is, in their view, aid which benefited the PSG, a professional football club established in France, and which caused damage to the FCB, a competing football club established in Spain.
44 Next, they maintain that that aid has already had and, in any event, is likely to have a specific negative impact on the economic, financial and legal situation not only of the FCB but also, in view of the structure as a not-for-profit association, and the very specific activities that are its own, of the socios which own it and democratically control its governance, decisions and activities.
45 Finally, the appellants claim, in essence, that they set out in a clear, precise and substantiated manner, both before the Commission and before the General Court, the various reasons why it had to be considered that, in his capacity as socio of the FCB and taking account of the rights, powers and obligations specifically attached to that status, as are stipulated in the FCB’s articles of association, Mr Abdelmouine was a person whose moral, financial and economic interests and actual situation could be affected by the grant of the aid complained of.
46 In the third and last place, the appellants submit, in essence, that the reasoning which led the General Court to conclude that the Commission had rightly denied Mr Abdelmouine the status of ‘interested party’ is vitiated by several errors of law.
47 First, the General Court adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the concept of ‘interested party’ by excluding, on the basis of its earlier case-law, that interest which is not only ‘general’ but also ‘indirect’ may be sufficient to establish the status of ‘interested party’ of the person relying on it.
48 Secondly, on the basis of that unduly restrictive interpretation, the General Court committed errors in the legal characterisation of the facts and errors of assessment in concluding that the various interests on which the applicants had relied in order to establish Mr Abdelmouine’s status as an ‘interested party’ were insufficiently substantiated, in part, and ‘purely general or indirect’ as to the remainder.
49 In response, the Commission submits, in the first place, that the case-law of the Court of Justice must be understood, like that of the General Court, as meaning that it is not sufficient to rely on ‘purely general or indirect’ interest in order to be regarded as an ‘interested party’.
50 In the second place, the appellants, to a large extent, merely reiterate the arguments which they put forward before the General Court and call into question the assessments made by that court, without, however, pleading the existence of any distortion. To that extent, their plea is inadmissible.
51 In the third and last place, none of the appellants’ arguments permits the inference that the General Court erred in its legal characterisation of the facts. On the contrary, in the light of the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice and the General Court, it must be held that the General Court was right to conclude, in the judgment under appeal, that the contested decision was not vitiated by any illegality in so far as it denied Mr Abdelmouine the status of ‘interested party’, in the light of the arguments and evidence submitted to it by the appellants.
52 By their third ground of appeal, the appellants complain that the General Court erred in law in its review of the legality of the contested decision, in so far as the Commission therein denied Mr Abdelmouine the status of ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589. In essence, the General Court carried out that review in the light of a legally incorrect interpretation of that concept. On that basis, that court also erred in its legal characterisation and assessment of the facts in holding that the Commission had rightly concluded that Mr Abdelmouine had not established the reasons why he had to be regarded as such an interested party.
53 In that regard, it should, in the first place, be recalled, first of all, that Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, which codifies the Court’s case-law on the concept of ‘party concerned’ referred to in Article 108(2) TFEU, states that the concept of ‘interested party’ includes ‘any Member State and any person, undertaking or association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, in particular the beneficiary of the aid, competing undertakings and trade associations’ (judgment of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
54 Next, as follows from Article 24 of that regulation, the status of ‘interested party’ enables the person who is granted that status to benefit from certain procedural rights, including the right to lodge a complaint to inform the Commission of any alleged unlawful aid or any alleged misuse of aid, to submit comments following a Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure and, where that person has submitted such comments, to receive a copy of the decision taken by the Commission at the end of the procedure.
55 Accordingly, the second subparagraph of Article 12(1) of that regulation requires the Commission, inter alia, to examine without undue delay any complaint submitted by any interested party in accordance with Article 24(2) thereof.
56 Lastly, the implementation of the provisions laying down those rights and that obligation respectively presupposes, as is apparent from recital 33 of Regulation 2015/1589, in the light of which those provisions must be read, that the person who lodged a complaint with the Commission has demonstrated, in that complaint, that he or she is an interested party within the meaning of Article 1(h) of that regulation.
57 In the second place, it follows from the clear wording of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 that that concept of ‘interested party’ does not include only the Member States, the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the alleged aid which is called into question by the complaint, undertakings competing with that beneficiary or those beneficiaries and the trade associations concerned. Beyond those specified categories of legal or natural persons, that concept also includes any other person whose interests might be affected by the grant of that aid.
58 To that extent, the concept of ‘interested party’ refers, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court, to an indeterminate group of addressees, which may include any person claiming that his or her interests may be affected by the grant of alleged aid (judgments of 14 November 1984, Intermills v Commission, 323/82, EU:C:1984:345, paragraph 16, and of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraphs 59 and 60), provided, however, that that person demonstrates, to the requisite legal standard, that the requirements for it to be regarded as an ‘interested party’ are satisfied and, in particular, that the alleged aid is likely to have a specific effect on his or her situation (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).
59 To that end, the person who relies, in a given case, on the status of ‘interested party’ must demonstrate to the requisite legal standard, first, that it is indeed the grant of the alleged aid, as such, which may affect his or her interests, to the exclusion of any other conduct or measure, in particular any legally distinct measure which may have been adopted by the Member State granting that aid, even if such a measure is in fact linked to that aid. It is only where some of the procedures for implementing such aid are so inextricably linked to its purpose that it would not be possible to assess them in isolation that those inextricably linked procedures may be relied on in order to demonstrate that the person in question is an ‘interested party’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraphs 81, 97 to 99, 103 and 106, and the case-law cited, and order of 14 December 2023, CAPA and Others v Commission, C‑742/21 P, EU:C:2023:1000, paragraphs 40, 79, 93 and 95).
60 Secondly, that person must show to the requisite legal standard that it is indeed ‘his’ or ‘her’ interests, that is to say, interests which are personal to him or her, which may be affected by the grant of the alleged aid (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 May 2011, Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex, C‑83/09 P, EU:C:2011:341, paragraph 64, and of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 60).
61 That said, that requirement does not exclude the possibility, for certain types of legal persons, such as those constituted in the form of trade unions or associations, of relying on interests of a categorical or even general nature, such as the promotion or defence of the interests of the members of a trade union in the context of collective bargaining or the general interest in ensuring that a sports facility is operated under economic conditions which ensure that it is accessible to both amateur and professional sportsmen and women, provided that such interests fall within the objects of those legal persons and therefore overlap with a personal interest of those legal persons (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2009, 3F v Commission, C‑319/07 P, EU:C:2009:435, paragraphs 33, 45, 46, 52, 57 to 59, 65 and 104, and of 2 September 2021, Ja zum Nürburgring v Commission, C‑647/19 P, EU:C:2021:666, paragraphs 59, 64, 66 and 67).
62 Thirdly, as the Advocate General observed in points 72 and 74 of her Opinion, the person in question must demonstrate, to the requisite legal standard, that the grant of the alleged aid actually has or, at the very least, is potentially likely to have a specific effect on his or her interests (judgments of 7 April 2022, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, C‑429/20 P, EU:C:2022:282, paragraph 35, and of 31 January 2023, Commission v Braesch and Others, C‑284/21 P, EU:C:2023:58, paragraph 60), by highlighting both that actual or potential impact itself and the causal link which it has with the grant of the aid at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 April 2022, Solar Ileias Bompaina v Commission, C‑429/20 P, EU:C:2022:282, paragraph 43).
63 In the third place, in the present case, it should be borne in mind that, in paragraphs 22 to 47 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court held, in essence, that the Commission had rightly considered, in the contested decision, that the various interests relied on by the appellants in order to show that Mr Abdelmouine had to be regarded, in his capacity as a socio of the FCB, as an ‘interested party’ in the light of the alleged aid referred to in his complaint had not been established, in some cases, and were ‘purely general or indirect’ in the case of the others.
64 The General Court’s conclusion is based on four sets of grounds. In paragraphs 29 to 31 of the judgment under appeal, that court held, in response to a first argument put forward by the appellants, that the evidence submitted by them did not demonstrate that a socio of the FCB, such as Mr Abdelmouine, could incur financial liability in the event of the club’s losses and, on that basis, had a direct financial interest in the preservation of the FCB’s financial situation. In paragraphs 32 to 34 of that judgment, that court held, in response to a second argument put forward by the appellants, that the public interest in the defence of a sport such as football and its values could not validly be relied on by a natural person such as Mr Abdelmouine in order to show that he is an ‘interested party’. In paragraphs 35 to 38 of that judgment, the General Court rejected as inadmissible, on the ground that it was insufficiently clear and precise, a third argument of the appellants, alleging, in essence, that Mr Abdelmouine had an interest in the defence of his moral rights and his right to freedom of association. In paragraphs 39 to 45 of the same judgment, it rejected a fourth argument put forward by the appellants, relating to Mr Abdelmouine’s interest in retaining the various rights he held in his capacity as a socio of the FCB.
65 As is apparent from their arguments before the Court of Justice, as they are summarised in paragraphs 41 to 48 of the present judgment, the appellants do not dispute the General Court’s rejection of their third argument as inadmissible. On that point, they merely set out in their appeal factual and legal considerations relating to the rights and obligations held by entities such as PBL and socios such as Mr Abdelmouine, since those substantive considerations show, in their view, that their interests and situation may be affected by the grant of alleged aid such as that referred to in the complaint which is the subject of the contested decision. Accordingly, the rejection of that third argument as inadmissible must be regarded as final.
66 As regards the grounds of the judgment under appeal by which the General Court ruled on the merits of their first, second and fourth arguments, it must be borne in mind, first, that, as is apparent from paragraph 28 of the present judgment, an appellant is not entitled, in the context of an appeal, to request the Court of Justice to assess the facts and evidence and to call into question the General Court’s assessment of those facts and that evidence, unless he or she alleges distortion of those facts and that evidence.
67 In the present case, as regards the appellants’ first argument, it follows that the appellants, who do not rely on any distortion of the evidence submitted in support of their action, are not entitled to challenge the findings of the General Court in paragraphs 29 to 31 of the judgment under appeal, according to which the evidence referred to in those paragraphs does not demonstrate that a socio of the FCB, such as Mr Abdelmouine, may incur financial liability in the event of the club’s losses and, on that basis, has a direct financial interest in preserving its financial situation. For the same reason, the appellants are also not entitled to ask the Court of Justice to assess other evidence, such as certain provisions of the FCB’s articles of association showing, in their view, the existence of a series of other direct moral, financial or economic interests held by the socios of that club.
68 Secondly, where the General Court has established the facts and assessed them and the evidence submitted to it, an appellant is entitled to challenge, in an appeal, the legal characterisation of those facts by that court and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (judgments of 17 December 1998, Baustahlgewebe v Commission, C‑185/95 P, EU:C:1998:608, paragraph 23, and of 27 October 2011, Austria v Scheucher-Fleisch and Others, C‑47/10 P, EU:C:2011:698, paragraph 57).
69 In the present case, it should be noted, as regards the appellants’ second argument, that, contrary to what they claim, the General Court did not err in law in holding, in essence, in paragraphs 32 to 34 of the judgment under appeal, that the general interest in the defence of a sport such as football and its values cannot validly be relied on by a natural person such as Mr Abdelmouine in order to demonstrate that he is an ‘interested party’.
70 As is apparent from the clear wording of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 and the settled case-law referred to in paragraphs 58 and 60 of the present judgment, it is solely because, and in so far as, the grant of aid may affect a person in ‘his’ or ‘her’ interests, that is to say, interests which are personal to him or her, as opposed to the interests of other persons and a fortiori public interests, that person must be classified as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of that provision. Thus, it is solely because, and in so far as, the grant of certain aid could affect categorical interests or a general interest which certain legal persons had as their corporate object to defend, and, consequently, because, and in so far as, those categorical interests or that public interest overlapped with the personal interest of those legal persons, that it has been accepted that they may rely on such interests in order to be recognised as having the status of ‘interested party’, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 61 of the present judgment.
71 Finally, as regards the appellants’ fourth argument, the appellants are, on the other hand, correct in claiming that the General Court misinterpreted Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 and erred in the legal characterisation of the facts, in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment under appeal, by holding, in essence, that, in order to demonstrate that his or her interests may be affected by the grant of aid and that he or she is therefore an ‘interested party’, a person must prove that the grant of that aid has a direct impact on his or her interests, and then by taking the view that the applicants did not adduce such proof since they merely referred to the indirect consequences which the grant of the aid referred to in the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine could have on his interests.
72 As is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 62 of the present judgment, it is both necessary and sufficient that the person seeking to be classified as an ‘interested party’ demonstrates, to the requisite legal standard, that the grant of the aid referred to in his or her complaint actually has, or at the very least is potentially likely to have, a specific effect on his or her interests, by highlighting both that actual or potential effect itself and the causal link which it has with the grant of that aid. That demonstration may, in particular, be carried out by adducing evidence of the actual impact which that aid has or may have, directly or indirectly, as a result of a chain of linked events which have already materialised or which are called upon to materialise in a sufficiently foreseeable and certain manner.
73 Nevertheless, those errors of law are not capable of leading to the judgment under appeal being set aside, since the General Court held, in parallel, in paragraph 45 of that judgment, that the evidence relied on by the appellants in support of their fourth argument was, moreover, uncertain and did not therefore establish that the grant of the alleged aid referred to in the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine was likely to have an actual impact on his interests, assessments which are free from any errors of law in the light of the case-law referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment and which, as is apparent from paragraphs 28 and 66 of the present judgment, cannot be called into question on appeal.
74 Accordingly, the third ground of appeal must be rejected.
75 By their fourth ground of appeal, which relates to paragraphs 48 to 53 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants criticise the General Court’s rejection of the second part of their plea for annulment alleging infringement of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589.
76 In essence, they criticise the General Court for having rejected that part on the ground that it was ineffective in so far as it concerned an ‘ancillary’ aspect of the contested decision and, consequently, for not having examined the substance of their detailed argument that persons who, like Mr Abdelmouine, have the very particular status of socio of a professional football club which has opted for a model of a not-for-profit association, like the FCB, are not in a situation comparable to that of a shareholder of a company and must not therefore be regarded, by analogy with such a situation, as being incapable of being affected as regards their interests by the grant of aid such as that which was granted in the present case to the PSG.
77 The Commission submits that the General Court was right to find that the second part of the appellants’ plea for annulment was ineffective and that, consequently, that court cannot be criticised on the ground that it did not examine the substance of that part.
78 It should be noted, at the outset, that the findings of fact made by the General Court referred to in paragraphs 67, 69 and 73 of the present judgment and the legal conclusions drawn from them by that court as to the unfounded nature of the first part of the appellants’ plea for annulment, alleging infringement of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, are sufficient in themselves to justify the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismissed as being unfounded the action brought by the appellants.
79 Those factual and legal considerations justify the finding that Mr Abdelmouine cannot be regarded as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, since the appellants have not established, with sufficient certainty, that the aid referred to in his complaint could affect the interests which he may have in his capacity as a socio of the FCB. Furthermore, those considerations cannot be called into question by the separate and independent considerations which the General Court and, before it, the Commission, devoted to a possible analogy or lack of analogy between the situation of a socio such as Mr Abdelmouine and that of a company shareholder.
80 Consequently, the fourth ground of appeal concerns elements of the reasoning of the judgment under appeal which, even if vitiated by an error of law, are included for the sake of completeness, as the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 96 of her Opinion.
81 Accordingly, the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected as being ineffective.
82 By their fifth ground of appeal, which relates to paragraphs 54 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, the appellants complain that the General Court rejected the evidence which they had submitted to it on the day of the hearing, pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of that court, on the ground that that evidence, even if it were admissible, was, in any event, irrelevant.
83 In that regard, they observe, first, that the relevance of that evidence is demonstrated by the fact that it was the subject of substantial exchanges at that hearing.
84 Secondly, examination of that evidence also shows that it was relevant as regards, in particular, the admissibility and merits of the action which the appellants had brought before the General Court. They show that, when the Commission adopted the contested decision, it was aware of the fact that PBL had associated itself, in good time, with the complaint lodged by Mr Abdelmouine. They also establish the specific impact which the State aid complained of by Mr Abdelmouine might have on the legal, economic, financial and competitive situation of the FCB and the way in which that aid could affect Mr Abdelmouine’s interests and those of PBL.
85 The Parliament disputes the admissibility and the merits of that line of argument.
86 It must be stated that the present ground of appeal, like the first part of the first ground of appeal, the content of which, moreover, it reproduces in part, concerns the assessment made by the General Court of the relevance of certain evidence produced by the appellants.
87 As such, this ground of appeal must, for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 28 to 31 of the present judgment, be rejected as inadmissible.
88 In their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants claim, in essence, in the first place, that one of the persons who participated in the preparation of their action integrated the team of the member of the General Court who exercised the role of Judge-Rapporteur in the case giving rise to the judgment under appeal, before or immediately after the delivery of that judgment.
89 In the second place, they submit that that situation must be regarded as constituting an irrebuttable conflict of interest rendering unlawful the procedure which preceded that judgment.
90 The Commission disputes the admissibility and the merits of that line of argument.
91 It follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal, failing which the appeal or ground of appeal in question will be inadmissible (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 46, and order of 20 July 2016, Staelen v Ombudsman, C‑338/15 P, EU:C:2016:599, paragraph 15).
92 A ground of appeal does not satisfy those requirements and must therefore be declared inadmissible if its content is not sufficiently clear and precise to enable the Court to exercise its review, in particular because the essential elements on which the ground of appeal is based are not sufficiently clear and precise in the appeal (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2014, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission, C‑295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 30, and order of 20 July 2016, Staelen v Ombudsman, C‑338/15 P, EU:C:2016:599, paragraph 16).
93 In the present case, the ground of appeal clearly does not meet those requirements.
94 As regards the essential facts on which that ground of appeal is based, the appeal is confined to asserting, vaguely and without being supported by any evidence, that ‘it appears that one of the persons involved in the preparation of the action integrated the team [of the member of the General Court who exercised the role of Judge-Rapporteur in the case], before or immediately [after]’ the delivery of the judgment under appeal.
95 In so doing, the appeal does not specify nor, a fortiori, does it establish either the identity of the person concerned or in what capacity and to what extent that person participated in the development of the action, even though that information may reasonably be regarded as being available to the lawyer who brought, and therefore a priori developed, that action and who now represents the appellants before the Court of Justice. The assertion that that person joined the Judge-Rapporteur’s team ‘before or immediately [after]’ the delivery of the judgment under appeal is also very imprecise.
96 In those circumstances, in the absence of any information making it possible to understand, clearly and precisely, the alleged factual situation and of any evidence enabling its veracity to be established, the appellants do not put the Court of Justice in a position to carry out any review in that regard and, a fortiori, to give a ruling on the possible legal consequences to be drawn from it, even though their claims, if proved, would attest to the existence of a factual situation raising undeniable and serious legal issues.
97 Accordingly, the sixth ground of appeal must be dismissed as inadmissible.
98 Under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) of those rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
99 In the present case, since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.