1 These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of points (c) and (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste (OJ 2006 L 190, p. 1), as well as the validity of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation in the light of the right to property enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
2 The requests have been made in two sets of proceedings between the Naturvårdsverket (Environmental Protection Agency, Sweden) (‘the agency’), on the one hand, and UQ (Case C‑221/24) and IC (Case C‑222/24), on the other, concerning the agency taking charge of waste contained in containers dispatched by UQ and IC.
3 The preamble to the Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, signed at Basel on 22 March 1989, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 93/98/EEC of 1 February 1993 (OJ 1993 L 39, p. 1) (‘the Basel Convention’), states that the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes should be permitted only when the transport and the ultimate disposal of such wastes is environmentally sound.
4 Article 9 of the Basel Convention, entitled ‘Illegal traffic’, states, in paragraph 2 thereof: ‘In case of a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes deemed to be illegal traffic as the result of conduct on the part of the exporter or generator, the State of export shall ensure that the wastes in question are: (a) taken back by the exporter or the generator or, if necessary, by itself into the State of export, or, if impracticable, (b) are otherwise disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, within 30 days from the time the State of export has been informed about the illegal traffic or such other period of time as States concerned may agree. To this end the Parties concerned shall not oppose, hinder or prevent the return of those wastes to the State of export.’
5 Article 17 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to property’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.’
6 Article 52 of the Charter, entitled ‘Scope and interpretation’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the [European] Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’
7 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L 312, p. 3) (‘Directive 2008/98’), to which reference is made by Regulation No 1013/2006, as amended by Regulation (EU) No 660/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ 2014 L 189, p. 135), introduces a legal framework for waste treatment in the European Union.
8 As is apparent from recital 6 of Directive 2008/98, ‘the first objective of any waste policy should be to minimise the negative effects of the generation and management of waste on human health and the environment’.
9 Article 3 of that directive, entitled ‘Definitions’, is worded as follows: ‘For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: 1. “waste” means any substance or object which the holder discards or intends or is required to discard; …’
10 Article 15 of Directive 2008/98, entitled ‘Responsibility for waste management’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof: ‘1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that any original waste producer or other holder carries out the treatment of waste himself or has the treatment handled by a dealer or an establishment or undertaking which carries out waste treatment operations or arranged by a private or public waste collector in accordance with Articles 4 and 13. 2. When the waste is transferred from the original producer or holder to one of the natural or legal persons referred to in paragraph 1 for preliminary treatment, the responsibility for carrying out a complete recovery or disposal operation shall not be discharged as a general rule. …’
11 Under Article 16(1) of that directive, ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures … to establish an integrated and adequate network of waste disposal installations …’.
12 As is apparent from recital 1 thereof, the main and predominant objective and component of Regulation No 1013/2006 is the protection of the environment. In addition, under recitals 3, 7 and 8 of that regulation: ‘(3) [Decision 93/98] concerned the conclusion, on behalf of the Community, of [the Basel Convention], to which the [European] Community has been a Party since 1994. By adopting [Council Regulation (EEC) No 259/93 of 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European Community (OJ 1993 L 30, p. 1)], the Council [of the European Union] has established rules to curtail and to control [transboundary] movements [of wastes] designed, inter alia, to make the existing Community system for the supervision and control of waste movements comply with the requirements of the Basel Convention. … (7) It is important to organise and regulate the supervision and control of shipments of waste in a way which takes account of the need to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment and human health and which promotes a more uniform application of the Regulation throughout the Community. (8) It is also important to bear in mind the requirement laid down in Article 4(2)(d) of the Basel Convention that shipments of hazardous waste are to be reduced to a minimum, consistent with environmentally sound and efficient management of such waste.’
13 Article 1 of Regulation No 1013/2006, entitled ‘Scope’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘This Regulation establishes procedures and control regimes for the shipment of waste …’
14 Article 2 of that regulation defines, in point 34 thereof, the concept of ‘shipment’ as meaning, in essence, ‘the transport of waste destined for recovery or disposal’ between two or more countries or within a single country.
15 Article 3 of Regulation No 1013/2006 sets out the ‘overall procedural framework’ for such shipments, providing, inter alia, for a notification procedure in respect of those shipments, with the scope of the notification being defined in point 6 of the second paragraph of Article 4 thereof as covering ‘the shipment of waste from its initial place of dispatch and including its … recovery or disposal’.
16 Article 24 of that regulation, entitled ‘Take-back when a shipment is illegal’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof: ‘1. Where a competent authority discovers a shipment that it considers to be an illegal shipment, it shall immediately inform the other competent authorities concerned. 2. If an illegal shipment is the responsibility of the notifier, the competent authority of dispatch shall ensure that the waste in question is: (a) taken back by the notifier de facto; or, if no notification has been submitted; (b) taken back by the notifier de jure; or, if impracticable; (c) taken back by the competent authority of dispatch itself or by a natural or legal person on its behalf; or, if impracticable; (d) alternatively recovered or disposed of in the country of destination or dispatch by the competent authority of dispatch itself or by a natural or legal person on its behalf; or, if impracticable; (e) alternatively recovered or disposed of in another country by the competent authority of dispatch itself or by a natural or legal person on its behalf if all the competent authorities concerned agree. This take-back, recovery or disposal shall take place within 30 days, or such other period as may be agreed between the competent authorities concerned after the competent authority of dispatch becomes aware of or has been advised in writing by the competent authorities of destination or transit of the illegal shipment and informed of the reason(s) therefor. Such advice may result from information submitted to the competent authorities of destination or transit, inter alia, by other competent authorities. In cases of take-back as referred to in (a), (b) and (c), a new notification shall be submitted, unless the competent authorities concerned agree that a duly reasoned request by the initial competent authority of dispatch is sufficient. The new notification shall be submitted by the person or authority listed in (a), (b) or (c) and in accordance with that order. No competent authority shall oppose or object to the return of waste of an illegal shipment. …’
17 Article 25 of Regulation No 1013/2006, entitled ‘Costs for take-back when a shipment is illegal’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Costs arising from the take-back of waste of an illegal shipment, including costs of its transport, recovery or disposal pursuant to Article 24(2) and, from the date on which the competent authority of dispatch becomes aware that a shipment is illegal, storage costs pursuant to Article 24(7), shall be charged to: (a) the notifier de facto, as identified in accordance with the ranking established in point 15 of Article 2; or, if no notification has been submitted; (b) the notifier de jure or other natural or legal persons as appropriate; or, if impracticable; (c) the competent authority of dispatch.’
18 The agency, which is the competent authority tasked with implementing Regulation No 1013/2006 in Sweden, informed the Belgian authorities on 26 August 2022 that a container suspected of containing waste, including two vehicles, tyres and electronic goods, had left Sweden and was on its way to Cameroon via Belgium, and asked them to stop that container.
19 On 17 October 2022, the agency informed the dispatcher, namely UQ, that the container had to be returned to Sweden, in so far as it contained waste, and asked him if he intended to ensure that return or if the agency should do so, at UQ’s expense. UQ disputed that the container contained waste and asked the agency to arrange for the return of the container to Sweden, stating that he was not sure that he was in a position to satisfy the necessary conditions for taking back the container himself.
20 The agency decided, on 14 December 2022, to arrange for the return of the container to Sweden. That decision was based on the fact that - according to the agency - the container contained waste, including hazardous waste. The agency also specified in its decision that the take-back or treatment of the waste by UQ was not a conceivable option, given that UQ had not availed himself of the possibility he had been given to take back the content of the container and had not provided any evidence showing that he would be in a position to treat the waste in an environmentally sound manner.
21 With a view to the return of the container to Sweden, the agency submitted a notification under the third subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, in which it named itself as the notifier and person responsible for the shipment. A licensed waste reception facility in Sweden was designated as the consignee of the waste, and it was stated that that waste was being shipped with a view to its recovery. The notification was approved by the competent Belgian authority.
22 The content of the container was subsequently brought back to Sweden to the reception facility stated in the notification and was stored at that facility. That content was also inspected by the Länsstyrelsen i Norrbottens län (Norrbotten County Administrative Board, Sweden) which considered that it consisted of mixed waste, some of which constituted hazardous waste. The Länsstyrelsen i Norrbottens län concurred with the Belgian authorities’ and the agency’s analysis that this constituted an illegal shipment of waste, which had to be taken charge of in an environmentally sound manner.
23 UQ brought an action against the agency’s decision before the Nacka tingsrätt, Mark- och miljödomstolen (District Court, Land and Environment Court, Nacka, Sweden), which annulled that decision in part inasmuch as it provided for the treatment by the agency of the content of the container. According to that court, the agency’s decision could be understood in no other way than as meaning that goods belonging to UQ would be taken away from him and would be recovered, and found that, inasmuch as it concerned the recovery of those goods, that decision was in breach of the fundamental right to the protection of property under, inter alia, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), and that a clear legal basis was therefore necessary in order to proceed in that manner. It stated that nothing in the wording of the provisions of Regulation No 1013/2006 authorised the agency to decide that the goods belonging to UQ, which had been classified by the agency as ‘waste’, had to be recovered after being returned to Sweden, contrary to UQ’s wishes.
24 The agency has brought an appeal against that judgment before the Svea hovrätt, Mark- och miljööverdomstolen (Svea Court of Appeal, Land and Environment Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Sweden), which is the referring court in Case C‑221/24.
25 The context and national judicial proceedings in this case are very similar to the context and proceedings in Case C‑221/24.
26 On 25 November 2021, the German authorities inspected the content of a container originating from Sweden and on its way to the Congo. According to the German authorities, the container contained waste, including a vehicle, furniture, clothing and toys.
27 The German authorities stayed the dispatch of that container owing to a suspicion of illegal shipment of waste. They also asked the agency, as the responsible authority in Sweden, to ensure that the content of the container be returned to Sweden and treated in an environmentally sound manner.
28 Concurring with the German authorities’ analysis, the agency contacted the dispatcher, namely IC, offering him the possibility to arrange for the return of the content of the container to Sweden himself. IC informed the agency that he did not have the means to finance shipment of the container from Germany to Sweden and that he was seeking the agency’s assistance in order to do so.
29 The agency thus decided, being of the view, in addition, that IC’s intentions as regards the content of the container were not clear, that that content had to be returned to Sweden so as to ensure that it would be treated in an environmentally sound manner.
30 IC brought an action against the agency’s decision before the Nacka tingsrätt, Mark- och miljödomstolen (District Court, Land and Environment Court, Nacka), which annulled that decision inasmuch as it provided for the recovery of the content of the container for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 23 of the present judgment concerning Case C‑221/24.
31 The agency has brought an appeal against that judgment before the Svea hovrätt, Mark- och miljööverdomstolen (Svea Court of Appeal, Land and Environment Court of Appeal, Stockholm), which is also the referring court in Case C‑222/24.
32 In support of its appeal in each of the two cases which it has brought before the referring court, the agency submits that, if point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 were to be interpreted as not permitting the authority of dispatch to recover waste in the country of dispatch where the exporter is considered not to be in a position to treat the waste in an appropriate manner after its take-back, point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation would then be the appropriate legal basis therefor. For their part, UQ and IC dispute the classification of the content of the containers as ‘waste’. UQ adds that he never gave his consent to the recovery of the waste in question. IC disputes the need for recovery of the waste and seeks to reclaim it in order to dispatch it again to Africa for humanitarian purposes.
33 The referring court in each of those two cases has doubts as to the way in which the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 should be interpreted in a situation where the competent authority of dispatch has (i) taken back waste which has been the subject of an illegal shipment on the basis of point (c) of that subparagraph and (ii) submitted the notification which, under the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 24(2) of that regulation, must precede that take-back. Thus, the referring court considers that the question arises as to whether, in such a situation, that authority may be regarded as being the ‘holder of the waste’ and whether it may or must, under that regulation, recover or dispose of the waste even though the initial dispatcher is opposed to it. Furthermore, if so, that court wishes to ascertain whether such an interpretation of that provision, which does not provide for the possibility of depriving the owner of the waste of his or her right to property following that take-back, is compatible with the protection of that right, as enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter.
34 In those circumstances, the Svea hovrätt, Mark- och miljööverdomstolen (Svea Court of Appeal, Land and Environment Court of Appeal, Stockholm), decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑221/24 and C‑222/24, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Does a take-back under [point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2)] of [Regulation No 1013/2006] include a requirement or possibility for the authority of dispatch to recover or dispose of the waste after take-back, where a notification and a movement document stating how the waste is to be treated in the country of destination have been drawn up for the return shipment? (2) Under what circumstances may [point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation] be applied by the authority of dispatch to recover or dispose of the waste in an illegal shipment of waste in the country of dispatch? How does point (d) [of that subparagraph] relate to point (c) [of that subparagraph?] For example may take-back and recovery/disposal be effected pursuant to points (c) and (d) together or does the application of one point require that the procedure under the immediately preceding point has not been possible? (3) If Article 24(2) of [Regulation No 1013/2006] may be interpreted as meaning that, following take-back, the authority of dispatch has the ultimate power of disposal over the waste, even where the original sender wishes to regain the waste, is such an interpretation compatible with the protection of property under Article 17 of [the Charter] and Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to [the ECHR]?’
35 By its first and second questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 is to be interpreted as meaning that (i) points (c) and (d) of that subparagraph are to be applied alternatively and (ii) point (c) of that subparagraph requires the competent authority of the country of dispatch, where it discovers a shipment which it considers to be illegal, to recover or dispose of the waste taken back following such a shipment.
36 As is apparent from its heading ‘Take-back when a shipment is illegal’, Article 24 of Regulation No 1013/2006 governs the take-back of waste where that waste has been the subject of an illegal shipment under that regulation. Reference is made to, inter alia, a scenario (which is the situation in the disputes in the main proceedings) where the shipment has been made in breach of Article 36 of the regulation - which prohibits the export of certain types of waste to third countries such as Cameroon or the Congo - and without notifying all the competent authorities concerned.
37 The first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 designates, according to the order of precedence established in points (a) to (c) thereof, the authorities and natural or legal persons who are required, in turn, to take back waste when a shipment is illegal, that is to say, first, the authority or person who notified the shipment, known as the ‘notifier de facto’, next, the authority or person who should have notified that shipment, but who did not do so, known as the ‘notifier de jure’, and, lastly, the competent authority of dispatch or its representative. That order is apparent from the linking phrases used in points (a) and (b), respectively, of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, namely ‘or, if no notification has been submitted’ and ‘or, if impracticable’ (see, by analogy, judgment of 16 February 2006, Pedersen, C‑215/04, EU:C:2006:108, paragraph 16). That order is confirmed by the third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 24(2) of that regulation, which provide that, in cases of take-back as referred to in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph of that provision, a new notification is to be submitted, in accordance with the order indicated in those points.
38 As the linking phrase ‘or, if impracticable’ is also used at the end of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, it follows that the recovery or disposal of the waste concerned, as provided for in point (d) of that subparagraph, can take place only if there is no take-back of the waste by the authority of dispatch under point (c) thereof.
39 As was noted, in essence, by the Advocate General in points 36 and 37 of her Opinion, points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, on the one hand, and points (d) and (e) thereof, on the other, concern different situations. Thus, points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph concern situations where the waste in question has left the country of dispatch, requiring a ‘return’ to that country. By contrast, points (d) and (e) thereof concern situations where the waste has never left the country of dispatch, has already arrived in the country of destination, or is located in another country but cannot be redirected to the country of dispatch. In those cases, the waste in question must be recovered or disposed of in the country in which that waste is located, whether this is the country of dispatch, the country of destination, or another country.
40 That conclusion is borne out by the third subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, which requires, in principle, a new notification which is, under Article 4 thereof, compulsory for any shipment and thus for any transport of waste, only in the cases referred to in points (a) to (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation and not in those provided for in points (d) and (e) of that subparagraph.
41 It follows from the foregoing that (i) points (c) and (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 can only be applied alternatively, with point (d) being applied where point (c) is not applicable, and (ii) the scenario referred to in point (d) of that subparagraph corresponds to a situation where the waste concerned is located in the territory of the country of destination or the country of dispatch and may therefore be recovered or disposed of there by the competent authority of dispatch or the entity which it has authorised to act for that purpose.
42 It also follows from the foregoing that, in situations, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, where, according to the information provided by the referring court, the waste has left the country of dispatch, has been the subject of an illegal shipment to a Member State, and has not been taken back by its dispatchers, it is point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 which is to be applied.
43 The referring court, emphasising that that provision does not, unlike point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation, explicitly state that the waste is to be recovered or disposed of, has questions as to the consequences deriving from the take-back of waste, the shipment of which is considered to be illegal, by the agency under point (c) of that subparagraph and, in particular, as to whether that take-back necessarily involves the recovery or disposal of that waste.
44 In the first place, as was noted, in essence, by the Advocate General in point 49 of her Opinion, unlike, inter alia, the Spanish (‘valorizados o eliminados de forma alternativa’), French (‘valorisés ou éliminés d’une autre manière’) and Italian (‘recuperati o smaltiti in modo alternativo’) language versions of point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, in the German (‘auf andere Weise verwertet oder beseitigt werden’) and English (‘alternatively recovered or disposed of’) language versions of that provision, the term ‘alternatively’ (‘d’une autre manière’) could be understood as referring to the recovery or disposal of waste by means of a process which does not involve that waste being taken back beforehand. That provision would thus mean that recovery and disposal must always take place after take-back, but that, in the alternative, they may take place without the waste being taken back beforehand, where take-back proves to be impracticable.
45 According to settled case-law, where there is divergence between the various language versions of a European Union text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 15 April 2010, Heinrich Heine, C‑511/08, EU:C:2010:189, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
46 To that end, in the second place, it should be borne in mind that, by Decision 93/98, the Community became a party to the Basel Convention, meaning that that convention has been an integral part of the EU legal order since 1994 (judgment of 21 January 2025, Conti 11. Container Schiffahrt II, C‑188/23, EU:C:2025:26, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
47 As is stated in recital 3 of Regulation No 1013/2006, by adopting Regulation No 259/93, which has been repealed and replaced by Regulation No 1013/2006, the EU legislature established rules to curtail and control shipments of waste; rules designed, inter alia, to make the existing Community system for the supervision and control of waste movements comply with the requirements of the Basel Convention.
48 In that context, Article 9(2) of the Basel Convention refers, in points (a) and (b) thereof, respectively, to waste being taken back or, if impracticable, to that waste being ‘otherwise’ disposed of. Such wording tends to suggest, like the German and English language versions of point (d) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 and as is indicated, in essence, by paragraphs 101 and 102 of the Guidance on the implementation of the Basel Convention provisions dealing with illegal traffic (paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 9), that the take-back obligation implies in itself the disposal of the waste concerned and that, where this is impracticable, the waste may be ‘otherwise’ disposed of. Consequently, disposal or recovery, whether following the take-back of waste or ‘otherwise’ where the take-back of that waste proves to be impracticable, appears to be the aim to be achieved following a finding of an illegal shipment of waste.
49 Furthermore, echoing the objective of the protection of the environment and human health pursued by Regulation No 1013/2006, as set out in recitals 1 and 7 thereof (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 September 2009, Commission v Parliament and Council, C‑411/06, EU:C:2009:518, paragraph 62, and of 28 May 2020, Interseroh, C‑654/18, EU:C:2020:398, paragraph 51), as well as the environmentally sound management of waste involved, as defined in point 8 of Article 2 of that regulation, it is apparent from point 34 of Article 2 of the regulation, as well as Article 3 thereof, which set out the procedural framework for all shipments of waste, that the shipment of waste - whether legal or illegal - is to take place only so that that waste may be recovered or disposed of.
50 This is why the form, set out in Annex IA to Regulation No 1013/2006, for notification, which is, in principle, compulsory, as has been recalled in paragraph 40 of the present judgment, in the case of the take-back of waste under point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, includes a section requiring the notifier to tick the ‘disposal’ or ‘recovery’ box, which implies that that disposal or recovery will necessarily follow from that take-back.
51 In the same vein, it follows from the wording of paragraph 1 of Article 25 of Regulation No 1013/2006, an article relating to the costs for take-back when a shipment is illegal, that those costs include costs connected with the recovery or disposal of the waste under Article 24(2) thereof, which also implies that take-back includes recovery or disposal.
52 That conclusion is also borne out by Article 15 of Directive 2008/98, to which Regulation No 1013/2006 refers, which provides for responsibility for waste management and, in particular, lays down an obligation for the producer or holder of the waste to carry out treatment - that is to say, a complete recovery or disposal operation - or to have treatment carried out in respect of that waste. Article 16 of Directive 2008/98 has, in addition, provided that the Member States are required to put in place dedicated facilities which are capable of disposing of waste, including where that waste originates from or is on its way to third countries.
53 Such an interpretation of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 is necessary, in the third place, in the light of the main objective pursued by that regulation, namely the protection of the environment and human health, as well as in the light of the environmentally sound management of waste involved, as recalled in paragraph 49 of the present judgment.
54 If, following the redirection of illegally shipped waste, the competent authority were to return that waste to its owner, who, as is the situation in the cases in the main proceedings, may wish to reclaim the waste while having refused to arrange for its return him-, her- or itself, there would be a risk of that waste being shipped illegally again and, in any event, of that waste not being treated, which would undermine the objective of the environmentally sound management of waste, as well as the requirement to reduce shipments of waste to a minimum, consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient management of such waste, laid down in Article 4(2)(d) of the Basel Convention and recalled in recital 8 of Regulation No 1013/2006.
55 Lastly, it may be noted that Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) No 1257/2013 and (EU) 2020/1056 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (OJ L, 2024/1157), which is to replace Article 24 of Regulation No 1013/2006 as from 21 May 2026, now expressly states, in paragraph 2 thereof, that waste is to be taken back by one of the authorities or one of the natural or legal persons referred to in points (a) to (c) of that paragraph ‘in order to arrange for its disposal or recovery’.
56 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first and second questions is that the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 must be interpreted as meaning that (i) points (c) and (d) of that subparagraph are to be applied alternatively, with point (d) being applied where point (c) is not applicable, and (ii) point (c) of that subparagraph requires the competent authority of the country of dispatch, where it discovers a shipment which it considers to be illegal, to recover or dispose of the waste taken back following such a shipment.
57 By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, inasmuch as it requires the recovery or disposal of waste taken back by the competent authority of the country of dispatch, despite opposition by the initial dispatcher, is valid in the light of the protection of the right to property enshrined in Article 17(1) of the Charter.
58 In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights are to be the same as those laid down by that convention. That provision does not, however, prevent EU law from providing more extensive protection. It follows that, for the purpose of interpreting Article 17(1) of the Charter, it is necessary to take into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR, which establishes the protection of the right to property (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 September 2024, Neves 77 Solutions, C‑351/22, EU:C:2024:723, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
59 Article 17(1) of the Charter contains three distinct rules. The first rule, which is set out in the first sentence of that provision and is of a general nature, gives concrete expression to the principle of respect for property. The second rule, which is set out in the second sentence of that provision, refers to a person being deprived of his or her possessions and makes that deprivation subject to certain conditions. As regards the third rule, which is set out in the third sentence of that provision, it recognises that the Member States have the power to regulate the use of property in so far as is necessary for the general interest. Those rules are not, however, unrelated to each other. Indeed, the second and third rules relate to specific examples of infringements of the right to property and must be interpreted in the light of the principle enshrined in the first rule (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited).
60 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the existence of a deprivation of possessions presupposes a formal dispossession or expropriation of property or that the situation at issue amounted to a de facto expropriation (judgment of 5 May 2022, BPC Lux 2 and Others, C‑83/20, EU:C:2022:346, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).
61 In this instance, it is apparent from the very wording of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 that the measure in question, namely the take-back, by the competent authority of the country of dispatch, of waste which has been the subject of an illegal shipment with a view to the recovery or disposal of that waste, is to be applied alternatively, with that authority intervening only if the illegal shipment of waste is the responsibility of the notifier, whether that notifier is the owner of the waste or has been authorised by that owner to carry out the shipment, and the notifier has neither taken back the waste nor, a fortiori, shown that he, she or it is willing or able to manage that waste in an environmentally sound manner, or that notifier is likely to make another attempt to ship the waste illegally.
62 In those circumstances, it cannot be held, in view of the alternative nature of the intervention by the competent authority, that the take-back, by that competent authority, of waste which has been the subject of an illegal shipment constitutes a person being ‘deprived of his or her possessions’ for the purposes of Article 17(1) of the Charter. Indeed, the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 gives the notifier precedence in respect of the take-back of the waste.
63 The fact remains that such a measure constitutes a limitation on the exercise of the right to property which forms part of the regulation of the use of property within the meaning of the third sentence of Article 17(1) of the Charter, given that the fate of that waste must necessarily be recovery or disposal.
64 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the right to property guaranteed by Article 17(1) of the Charter is not absolute and that the exercise of that right may, under the conditions laid down in Article 52(1) thereof, be subject to restrictions which are justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 108 and the case-law cited).
65 In the first place, it must be pointed out that, in this instance, the requirement laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter that restrictions of the exercise of the right to property must ‘be provided for by law’ is met, because it is apparent from the answer to the first two questions referred that point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 must be interpreted as requiring the competent authority of dispatch to recover or dispose of the waste taken back, which may restrict the right to property of the owners of that waste. While an act which permits interference with the exercise of fundamental rights must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned, the Court may, where appropriate, specify, by means of interpretation, the actual scope of the limitation in the light of the very wording of the EU legislation in question, as well as its general scheme and the objectives it pursues (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 June 2022, Ligue des droits humains, C‑817/19, EU:C:2022:491, paragraph 114 and the case-law cited).
66 In the second place, it follows from settled case-law that the protection of the environment and human health is one of the objectives of general interest capable of justifying restrictions that may be imposed on the right to property (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 March 2010, ERG and Others, C‑379/08 and C‑380/08, EU:C:2010:127, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 152). As has been recalled in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, the main objective of Regulation No 1013/2006 is the protection of the environment and human health. Article 175 EC (now Article 192 TFEU), which forms the legal basis of Regulation No 1013/2006, refers to the objectives pursued by Article 174 EC (now Article 191 TFEU), which provides that Union policy on the environment is to contribute to, inter alia, preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, as well as protecting human health, and that that policy is to aim at a high level of protection.
67 In the third place, as regards whether the consequences resulting from the take-back of waste which has been the subject of an illegal shipment under point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 are proportionate, it should be borne in mind that the principle of proportionality requires that acts of the institutions of the Union be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and that they not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those objectives, on the understanding that, where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 September 2017, Slovakia and Hungary v Council, C‑643/15 and C‑647/15, EU:C:2017:631, paragraph 206 and the case-law cited, and of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others, C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 109).
68 In that regard, it must be pointed out that the take-back of waste by the competent authority of the country of dispatch for the purposes of the recovery or disposal of that waste following an illegal shipment, inasmuch as it guarantees the treatment of that waste, is appropriate for preserving the environment and human health.
69 By contrast, a less restrictive measure, such as that referred to during the hearing before the Court, which would have consisted in entrusting the waste to the notifiers de facto or de jure after the take-back of that waste by the authority of dispatch, so that those notifiers could themselves have recovered or disposed of the waste, as appropriate, under the supervision of the authority of dispatch, would not have constituted an appropriate measure for the purpose of preserving the environment and human health. The fact that the notifiers were unwilling or unable to take back the waste, highlighted by the referring court, as well as the illegal nature of the shipments concerned, give rise to serious doubts as to the willingness or ability of the notifiers to recover or dispose of that waste, with the result that the less restrictive measure referred to at the hearing would not have guaranteed the preservation of the environment and human health.
70 Moreover, the disadvantages caused, namely - in this instance - the restrictions imposed on the right to property, are not disproportionate in relation to the objective of the protection of the environment and human health.
71 In that regard, first, according to the case-law of the Court, the protection of human health takes precedence over economic considerations, with the result that it may justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 December 2008, Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and Others, C‑127/07, EU:C:2008:728, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). In the same vein, under Article 35 of the Charter, a high level of human health protection is to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities and, under Article 37 thereof, a high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.
72 Second, the restrictions concerned are limited and controlled.
73 As has been noted in paragraph 62 of the present judgment, Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006 does not require the owner of the waste, whether or not that owner is the notifier under that provision, to lose all of his, her or its rights over that waste; nor does it require that he, she or it be entirely deprived of those rights in practice.
74 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the right to effective judicial protection, decisions to recover or dispose of waste taken back that are taken by the authority of dispatch are subject to appeal (see, to that effect, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 28 June 2018, G.I.E.M. S.R.L. and Others v. Italy, CE:ECHR:2018:0628JUD000182806, § 302 and the case-law cited, and judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, Neves 77 Solutions, C‑351/22, EU:C:2024:723, paragraphs 95 and 96 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, the cases in the main proceedings are evidence of the judicial review to which the restrictions on the right to property at issue are subject, which enables those restrictions to be challenged by arguing, as the case may be, that there is an irregularity, including with regard to the classification of the property concerned as ‘waste’, or by pleading arbitrary or unreasonable conduct. For the purposes of that judicial review, those decisions to recover or dispose of waste must, moreover, provide reasons; in this instance, reasons were provided for those decisions, namely the inability of UQ and IC to ensure the take-back and treatment of the waste. Such reasoning involves the competent authority making sure that the notifier falls short on two fronts, as regards both the transport and the treatment of the waste, which requires exchanges with the notifier - which did indeed take place in the cases in the main proceedings - and may, as appropriate, enable the notifier to reclaim the waste in question if he, she or it can demonstrate his, her or its ability to treat that waste.
75 Consequently, the interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006, as derived from the answer given to the first and second questions referred, enables a high level of protection of the environment and human health to be guaranteed - an objective also pursued by the Charter - and is thus consistent with Article 17(1) of the Charter.
76 In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that consideration of the third question has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of point (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1013/2006.
77 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.