1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 5(1) of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties (OJ 2005 L 76, p. 16), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘Framework Decision 2005/214’).
2 The request has been made in the context of proceedings instituted by the Bezirkshauptmannschaft Weiz (administrative authority of the district of Weiz, Austria) concerning the recognition and execution, in Hungary, of a decision imposing a financial penalty on LU, a Hungarian national, on account of an offence committed by her in Austria.
3 Under recitals 1, 2 and 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214: ‘(1) The European Council meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999 endorsed the principle of mutual recognition, which should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. (2) The principle of mutual recognition should apply to financial penalties imposed by judicial or administrative authorities for the purpose of facilitating the enforcement of such penalties in a Member State other than the State in which the penalties are imposed. … (4) This Framework Decision should also cover financial penalties imposed in respect of road traffic offences.’
4 Article 1 of that framework decision, which is entitled ‘Definitions’, provides: ‘For the purposes of this Framework Decision: (a) “decision” shall mean a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural or legal person where the decision was made by: … (ii) an authority of the issuing State other than a court in respect of a criminal offence under the law of the issuing State, provided that the person concerned has had an opportunity to have the case tried by a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters; (iii) an authority of the issuing State other than a court in respect of acts which are punishable under the national law of the issuing State by virtue of being infringements of the rules of law, provided that the person concerned has had an opportunity to have the case tried by a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters; …’
5 Under Article 4(1) of the framework decision: ‘A decision, together with a certificate as provided for in this Article, may be transmitted to the competent authorities of a Member State in which the natural or legal person against whom a decision has been passed has property or income, is normally resident or, in the case of a legal person, has its registered seat.’
6 Article 5 of Framework Decision 2005/214, which is entitled ‘Scope’, states, in the thirty-third indent of paragraph 1 and in paragraph 3 thereof: ‘1. The following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing State and as they are defined by the law of the issuing State, shall, under the terms of this Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to recognition and enforcement of decisions: … - conduct which infringes road traffic regulations, including breaches of regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest periods and regulations on hazardous goods, … 3. For offences other than those covered by paragraph 1, the executing State may make the recognition and execution of a decision subject to the condition that the decision is related to conduct which would constitute an offence under the law of the executing State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is described.’
7 Article 6 of that framework decision provides: ‘The competent authorities in the executing State shall recognise a decision which has been transmitted in accordance with Article 4 without any further formality being required and shall forthwith take all the necessary measures for its execution, unless the competent authority decides to invoke one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution provided for in Article 7.’
8 Under Article 7 of the framework decision, which is entitled ‘Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution’: ‘1. The competent authorities in the executing State may refuse to recognise and execute the decision if the certificate provided for in Article 4 is not produced, is incomplete or manifestly does not correspond to the decision. 2. The competent authority in the executing State may also refuse to recognise and execute the decision if it is established that: … (b) in one of the cases referred to in Article 5(3), the decision relates to acts which would not constitute an offence under the law of the executing State; … 3. In cases referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2(c), (g), (i) and (j), before deciding not to recognise and to execute a decision, either totally or in part, the competent authority in the executing State shall consult the competent authority in the issuing State, by any appropriate means, and shall, where appropriate, ask it to supply any necessary information without delay.’
9 Article 20 of Framework Decision 2005/214, which is entitled ‘Implementation’, states, in paragraph 3 thereof: ‘Each Member State may, where the certificate referred to in Article 4 gives rise to an issue that fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty may have been infringed, oppose the recognition and the execution of decisions. The procedure referred to in Article 7(3) shall apply.’
10 The certificate referred to in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214 and contained in the annex thereto contains, inter alia, a heading (g), in which the issuing authority is required to state the nature of the decision imposing the penalty (point 1), provide a summary of the facts and a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed (point 2) and, where that offence constitutes one of the offences mentioned in Article 5(1) of that framework decision, tick the relevant box.
11 Paragraph 112 of az Európai Unió tagállamaival folytatott bűnügyi együttműködésről szóló 2012. évi CLXXX. törvény (Law No CLXXX of 2012 on cooperation between the Member States of the European Union in criminal matters), in the version thereof applicable to the facts in the main proceedings, states: ‘Legal assistance in relation to enforcement [shall include:] … (c) legal assistance for the execution of financial penalties or other financial obligations; …’
12 Under Paragraph 113 of that law, execution of the penalty or measure can be undertaken if the judgment of the Member State can be taken into account.
13 Paragraph 140/A(3) and (4) of the law provides: ‘3. In the case of the types of offence defined in Annex 12, the court may not refuse to execute a financial penalty imposed by a Member State on the ground that the decision of that Member State cannot be taken into account because the double criminality condition is not satisfied. 4. The provisions of paragraph 3 shall also apply mutatis mutandis where the authority of the Member State seeks the execution of a financial penalty imposed in that State in respect of an act constituting an administrative offence in that State. …’
14 Paragraph 103(2) of the Bundesgesetz vom 23. Juni 1967 über das Kraftfahrwesen (Kraftfahrgesetz 1967 - KFG. 1967) (Federal Law on Motor Vehicles of 1967) of 23 June 1967 (BGBl. 267/1967), in the version thereof applicable to the facts of the main proceedings (‘the KFG 1967’), provides: ‘The authority may request information about the identity of the person who, at a particular time, drove a vehicle identified by its registration or who used a trailer identified by its registration or who last parked the vehicle or trailer in a specific place before a particular time. That information, which must include the name and the address of the person concerned, must be provided by the registered owner - in the case of test drives or driving connected with a vehicle transfer, by the holder of the relevant authorisation; if that owner or holder is unable to provide that information, he is required to nominate the person who is able to do so and who, therefore, is subject to the duty to provide information; the information provided by the person subject to the duty to provide information shall not exempt the authority from verifying that information where it appears necessary to do so in the light of the circumstances of the case. The information must be provided immediately and, if requested in writing, within two weeks from notification; if that information cannot be provided without corresponding registrations, such registrations must be carried out. The power of the authority to require that information shall take precedence over the right to silence.’
15 Pursuant to Paragraph 134(1) of the KFG 1967: ‘Any person who infringes this federal law … shall commit an administrative offence and be punishable by a fine of up to EUR 5000 and, if that fine cannot be recovered, a term of imprisonment of up to six weeks.’
16 By a notice of infringement of 6 June 2018, which became final on 1 January 2019, the administrative authority of the district of Weiz imposed on LU, pursuant to Paragraph 103(2) in conjunction with Paragraph 134(1) of the KFG 1967, a financial penalty of EUR 80 because she, as the registered owner of a vehicle involved in a road traffic offence committed on 28 December 2017 in the territory of the municipality of Gleisdorf (Austria), had committed an administrative offence by not responding, within the period laid down in Austrian law, to the request made by that administrative authority to provide the name of the person who was driving that vehicle or who had parked it.
17 The administrative authority of the district of Weiz, as the competent authority in the issuing State, transmitted the decision imposing the financial penalty to the Zalaegerszegi Járásbíróság (District Court, Zalaegerszeg, Hungary), the competent authority in the executing State, for the purpose of the enforcement of that decision. In the certificate referred to in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214 accompanying that decision, the administrative authority in the issuing State had indicated that the administrative offence that gave rise to the notice of infringement of 6 June 2018 fell within the category of offences of ‘conduct which infringes road traffic regulations’, as provided for in the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
18 The Zalaegerszegi Járásbíróság (District Court, Zalaegerszeg) has doubts whether it is possible to comply with the request made by the issuing authority to enforce the decision imposing the penalty in Hungary, having regard to the legal classification of the offence that gave rise to the notice of infringement of 6 June 2018 of ‘conduct which infringes road traffic regulations’ assigned by that authority. That court asks whether that offence does indeed come under the category of offences provided for in the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
19 The referring court acknowledges that, in the judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties) (C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054), the Court held that the competent authority in the executing State may not refuse to recognise and execute a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty in respect of a road traffic offence, within the meaning of that provision of that framework decision, where such a penalty has been imposed on the person in whose name the vehicle in question is registered on the basis of a presumption of liability laid down in the legislation of the issuing State, provided that that presumption may be rebutted.
20 However, that court observes that, in the case that led to that judgment, the penalty had been adopted further to an infringement of road traffic rules.
21 In its view, the situation is, however, different in the case in the main proceedings because the facts alleged against LU relate rather to a refusal to comply with an order made by the competent Austrian authorities to identify the driver of the vehicle when the offence was committed than to ‘conduct which infringes road traffic regulations’, within the meaning of the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
22 In those circumstances, the offence at issue in the main proceedings may not come under any of those which give rise to recognition and enforcement of decisions imposing penalties without verification of the double criminality of the act.
23 Moreover, according to the referring court, classifying that offence as ‘conduct which infringes road traffic regulations’ amounts to an excessively broad interpretation of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214 and is contrary to the objective of that framework decision.
24 In the light of those considerations, the Zalaegerszegi Járásbíróság (District Court, Zalaegerszeg) decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1) Must the rule laid down in Article 5(1) of [Framework Decision 2005/214] be interpreted as meaning that, where the issuing Member State indicates one of the types of conduct listed in that provision, the authority of the executing Member State has no additional discretion to refuse execution and must execute the [decision imposing the penalty]? (2) If that question is answered in the negative, can the authority of the executing Member State argue that the conduct indicated in the decision of the issuing Member State does not correspond to the conduct described in the list?’
25 The Austrian Government argues that the request for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible because it does not allow the Court to determine whether it is necessary to answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in order to settle the dispute in the main proceedings.
26 According to that government, the purpose of those questions is to determine whether the referring court may refuse to enforce the decision imposing the penalty at issue in the main proceedings pursuant to Article 5(3) and Article 7(2)(b) of Framework Decision 2005/214, which first entails determining whether the offence that LU is alleged to have committed comes under one of those mentioned in the list contained in Article 5(1) of that framework decision and, if not, whether it constitutes an offence under the law of the executing State, within the meaning of Article 5(3) of that framework decision.
27 However, it is not possible to verify, on the basis of the request for a preliminary ruling, whether the latter condition is satisfied, since the referring court has not indicated whether the offence committed by LU constitutes an offence under Hungarian law.
28 In that regard, it is true that, as is apparent from the actual wording of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny, C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 45).
29 However, in the context of the cooperation between the Court and the national courts provided for in Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is in principle required to give a ruling (judgment of 12 May 2021, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, C‑70/20, EU:C:2021:379, paragraph 25).
30 It follows that questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 12 May 2021, Altenrhein Luftfahrt, C‑70/20, EU:C:2021:379, paragraph 26).
31 In the present case, first, it must be observed that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of a provision of EU law.
32 Second, it must be recalled that, since the preliminary ruling procedure is not concerned with the interpretation of national laws or regulations, the fact that the description of the national law contained in the order for reference is not perfectly precise cannot have the effect of depriving the Court of jurisdiction to reply to the question referred to it by the national court (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 December 2005, Burtscher, C‑213/04, EU:C:2005:731, paragraph 33).
33 Third, it must be stated that, regardless of the question concerning the conditions for application of Article 5(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214, the Court’s reply will help to clarify the question whether the authority in the executing State has discretion to call into question the legal classification of an offence assigned by the issuing authority, namely that that offence is covered by the list laid down in Article 5(1) of that framework decision.
34 In those circumstances, and in the light of the case-law recalled in paragraphs 28 to 30 of this judgment, the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
35 By its questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which should be examined together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214 is to be interpreted as meaning that the competent authority in the executing State may refuse to recognise and execute a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid when it considers that the offence at issue, as classified and described by the authority in the issuing Member State in the certificate referred to in Article 4 of that framework decision, does not come under one of the categories in respect of which Article 5(1) of the framework decision does not provide for the verification of the double criminality of the act.
36 In that regard, it must be recalled, first of all, that, as is apparent in particular from Articles 1 and 6, and from recitals 1 and 2, Framework Decision 2005/214 is intended to establish an effective mechanism for cross-border recognition and execution of final decisions requiring a financial penalty to be paid by a natural or legal person following the commission of one of the offences listed in Article 5 of that framework decision (judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
37 That framework decision, while not harmonising the legislation of the Member States in the field of criminal law, seeks to ensure the enforcement of financial penalties in those States by virtue of the principle of mutual recognition (judgment of 4 March 2020, Bank BGŻ BNP Paribas, C‑183/18, EU:C:2020:153, paragraph 49).
38 The principle underlying the scheme of Framework Decision 2005/214 is therefore the principle of mutual recognition. That principle means that, in accordance with Article 6 of that framework decision, the Member States are, as a rule, obliged to recognise a decision requiring payment of a financial penalty which has been transmitted in accordance with Article 4 of the framework decision without any further formality being required, and to take without delay all the measures necessary for its enforcement, and that the grounds for refusal to recognise or enforce such a decision must be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
39 Furthermore, it must be recalled that both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter, are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained (judgment of 10 January 2019, ET, C‑97/18, EU:C:2019:7, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
40 In that context, the competent authority in the executing Member State is required, in principle, to recognise and execute the decision transmitted and may refuse, by way of derogation from the general rule, solely on one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution expressly provided for by Framework Decision 2005/214 (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraph 33).
41 With regard to the classification of the offence that gave rise to the decision imposing the penalty concerned, it must be observed that, in accordance with the wording of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214, the offences included in the list laid down in that provision, if they are punishable in the issuing State and ‘as they are defined by the law of the issuing State’ are, without verification of the double criminality of the act, to give rise to recognition and enforcement of decisions.
42 Accordingly, the authority in the executing State is, in principle, bound by the assessment made by the authority in the issuing State regarding the classification of the offence at issue, in particular in relation to whether that offence comes under one of the categories of offences included in the list provided for in Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
43 Thus, where the authority in the issuing State classifies an offence as coming under one of the categories of offences included in the list provided for in Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214, and transmits the decision penalising the offence in accordance with Article 4 of that framework decision, the authority in the executing State is, in principle, obliged to recognise and enforce that decision.
44 A conclusion to that effect is borne out by analysis of the context in which Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/2014 appears. First, it is clear from the wording of Article 7(1) of that framework decision that the grounds for non-recognition and non-execution are expressly laid down in that provision. Second, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the framework decision, in cases referred to in Article 7(1) thereof, the competent authority in the executing State is obliged, before deciding not to recognise and to execute the decision, to consult the competent authority in the issuing State, by any appropriate means, and is to, where appropriate, ask it to provide any necessary information without delay.
45 Furthermore, an interpretation of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214 which would permit the authority in the executing State to make its own classification of the offence at issue in the light of its national law would be contrary to the principle of mutual trust upon which that framework decision is based and which is of fundamental importance in EU law, as well as to the requirements relating to the smooth functioning and the effectiveness of the system of mutual assistance established by the framework decision.
46 In the present case, the referring court doubts that the offence committed by LU can come under the category of offences covered by the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214. Specifically, that court considers that the authority in the issuing Member State interpreted that category too broadly, since that category cannot include offences which are only indirectly connected with road safety and which, like the offence at issue in the main proceedings, constitute in fact a refusal to comply with an order made by the authority rather than ‘conduct which infringes road traffic regulations’.
47 However, it is apparent from the information available to the Court, first, that, on the basis of Paragraph 103(2) of the KFG 1967, the authority in the issuing Member Stated classified the offence at issue in the main proceedings as conduct which infringes road traffic regulations within the meaning of the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214.
48 Next, the order for reference, first, does not provide any information to support the view that the certificate referred to in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2005/214 manifestly does not correspond to the decision imposing the penalty for the road traffic offence committed on 28 December 2017 and, second, simply states that the issuing authority interpreted the category of offences covered by the thirty-third indent of Article 5(1) of that framework decision too broadly. Thus, it does not appear that the present case falls within the scope of one of the situations provided for in Article 7(1) of the framework decision, in which the authorities in the executing State may refuse to recognise and execute the decision imposing the penalty.
49 In those circumstances, the authority in the executing Member State cannot refuse to recognise and execute the decision imposing the penalty that has been transmitted to it.
50 It must, however, be recalled that, according to Article 20(3) of Framework Decision 2005/214, the competent authority in the executing Member State may, where the certificate referred to in Article 4 gives rise to an issue that fundamental rights or fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU may have been infringed, oppose the recognition and the execution of decisions. In such a situation, it is required, before so doing, to request all the necessary information from the authority in the issuing Member State, in accordance with Article 7(3) of that framework decision. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the framework decision and, in particular, respect for fundamental rights, the authority in the issuing Member State is obliged to provide that information (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 December 2019, Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau (Recognition and enforcement of financial penalties), C‑671/18, EU:C:2019:1054, paragraphs 44 and 45).
51 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the questions referred must be answered to the effect that Article 5(1) of Framework Decision 2005/214 is to be interpreted as meaning that, other than on one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution expressly provided for in that framework decision, the authority in the executing State may not, in principle, refuse to recognise and execute a final decision requiring a financial penalty to be paid where the authority in the issuing State has classified the offence at issue, in the certificate provided for in Article 4 of the framework decision, as coming under one of the categories of offences for which Article 5(1) of the framework decision has not provided for verification of the double criminality of the act.
52 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.