IAEA Board of Governors on the JCPoA, June 2025: E3 statement
Source: gov.uk (2025-06-11)

France, Germany and the UK (E3) gave a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPoA

Chair,

On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director General Grossi for his latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme, which once again demonstrates the Agency’s professional, independent and impartial work providing objective reporting on Iran’s nuclear programme and its implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under UN Security Council resolution 2231.

The content of this latest report is far from positive. As we have heard many times before, it details more escalation in Iran’s nuclear programme, moving Iran even further from its JCPoA commitments, while at the same time Iran fails to improve its cooperation with the IAEA, despite the Board’s appeals. As the DG notes, Iran’s enrichment to 60% is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons, and has no credible civilian justification. The IAEA is currently unable to verify that Iran’s escalating nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. That must be a concern for us all.

Since the last report, Iran has continued expanding its enriched uranium stockpile, particularly its production of high enriched uranium, far exceeding its JCPoA commitments. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 % has increased by roughly 50 % since the last Board and now is more than 400 kg. This is very concerning. Iran now has more than nine IAEA significant quantities of high enriched uranium and is producing just under one significant quantity of high enriched uranium per month. As a reminder, a significant quantity is the approximate amount required, as defined by the IAEA, of material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Iran’s overall stockpile exceeds the limits laid out in the JCPoA by more than 40 times. We echo the DG’s “serious concern” with this issue.

And Iran is not stopping there. In his latest report, the DG points out that Iran has continued to expand its enrichment infrastructure by installing and partly operating new advanced centrifuges. Iran’s installed enrichment capacity is over ten times the limits Iran agreed in the JCPoA. Likewise, Iran’s continued operation of the Fordow underground facility is another breach of Iran’s JCPoA commitments and is alarming given Fordow’s status as a former undeclared enrichment facility.

Meanwhile, Iran refuses to re-designate several experienced Agency inspectors. This is a politically motivated decision which seriously affects the IAEA’s ability to conduct its verification in Iran, particularly at its enrichment facilities.

As a result of Iran’s continued non-cooperation and lack of implementation of almost all transparency commitments made under the JCPoA, the DG’s latest report restates that the Agency has permanently lost the continuity of knowledge on key parts of Iran’s nuclear programme that relate to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.

The DG also observes that it has been four years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, thus denying the Agency complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.

As a result of all these shortcomings, the Agency is yet again not able to ascertain whether Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. This fact, taken together with continued rhetoric from Iranian officials about Iran’s capability to assemble a nuclear weapon and about the option to change Iran’s so-called ‘nuclear doctrine’, as well as Iran’s threats to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, pose a serious threat to international security, and the non-proliferation regime.

Chair,

The E3 have consistently worked towards a diplomatic solution to address Iran’s nuclear programme and to remove all doubts about its exclusively peaceful nature. Yet, in 2022, Iran twice refused a viable deal that would have brought it back into compliance with the JCPoA, with a return to United States participation, and instead Iran chose to continue to expand its nuclear activities. And this year, while engaging in dialogue with the United States and the E3, Iran has continued its nuclear escalation unabatedly, even further beyond any credible civilian justification.

We therefore call again on Iran to urgently change course:

Iran must halt and reverse its nuclear escalation and refrain from making threats regarding a change of its nuclear doctrine, which are in themselves highly destabilising and not consistent with Iran’s status as a state without nuclear weapons under the NPT;

Iran must return to compliance with its JCPoA commitments;

Iran must restore full transparency with its nuclear programme and implement the verification measures it committed to under the JCPoA and other transparency commitments, in particular its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It must also reverse its September 2023 decision to de-designate several experienced IAEA inspectors in order to allow the Agency to fully implement its mandate; and finally:

Iran must urgently re-implement and ratify the Additional Protocol.

Chair,

We, the IAEA, and many in this Board have repeated this message for years now – this matter is urgent, Iran must demonstrate its commitment to a diplomatic solution by taking concrete steps to address the international community’s concerns. The E3 wants to see a diplomatic solution. We welcome the ongoing efforts to achieve this. Through our engagement there is a clear, common message: Iran cannot be allowed to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The E3 will spare no efforts to work towards a diplomatic solution to achieve this goal. Absent a satisfying deal, the E3 will consider triggering the snapback mechanism to address threats to international peace and security arising from Iran’s nuclear programme.

We ask the Director General to keep the Board informed on all relevant activities and developments relating to Iran’s nuclear programme by regular and, if necessary, extraordinary reporting.

Finally, we ask for this report to be made public.

Thank you.