Report 02/2025: Derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands
Source: gov.uk (2025-01-28)

RAIB has today released its report into a derailment of a passenger train at Grange-over-Sands, Cumbria, 22 March 2024.

(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ae11966e6c8d18118acd94/R022025_250128_Grange-over-Sands.pdf)

R022025_250128_Grange-over-Sands (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/67ae11966e6c8d18118acd94/R022025_250128_Grange-over-Sands.pdf)

PDF, 11.7 MB, 57 pages

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Video summary of the derailment (opens in YouTube)RAIB Grange-over-Sands, 22 March 2024 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v62kzDb_DW0)

Summary

At around 06:05 on 22 March 2024, a passenger train travelling at 56 mph (90 km/h) derailed on the approach to Grange-over-Sands station. The derailment occurred because a void had opened in the embankment on which the train was travelling, leading to the rails under the train losing support. The train was carrying four train crew and four passengers when it derailed. Nobody was injured, but significant damage was caused to both the train and the railway infrastructure.

RAIB’s investigation found that the void had been created because water had dislodged embankment material and carried it away. The water came from a pipe partially buried beneath the railway, which had been damaged during routine maintenance around 2 days before the derailment.

The damage to the pipe had been reported immediately to the railway control room by the maintenance staff involved. However, as a result of ineffective communications, no action was taken to stop the consequent leak. The pipe had been installed by Network Rail in 2016 as a temporary measure to assist in managing flood water in the surrounding areas, but on-call engineering staff were unaware that it was in use and carrying water at the time it was damaged.

Underlying factors to the accident were that those responsible for managing flood water at this location had not done so effectively, leading to the prolonged need to rely on temporary pumping arrangements. RAIB also identified that staffing levels at Network Rail’s Carnforth maintenance delivery unit did not provide sufficient resilience and had allowed non-compliance with the standards relating to the management of tamping to become normalised. In addition, Network Rail had allowed a temporary pumping arrangement to become permanent without applying the relevant asset management procedures.

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations. The first three recommendations are made to Network Rail. The first of these aims to reduce the risk associated with temporary drainage solutions which remain in place for longer than anticipated. The second asks Network Rail to review how it can improve the ability of tamper operators to detect buried services. The third aims to reduce the likelihood that buried services are struck during maintenance by ensuring staffing levels are adequate to comply with Network Rail’s own procedures. The fourth recommendation is made to the Environment Agency, and other local stakeholders, and aims to encourage timely decision-making in relation to the future of this area so that the management of flood water does not manifest in another risk to the railway. The final recommendation is addressed to Eversholt Rail Leasing Limited, the owner of the train involved, and aims to reduce the risk of a derailed train being struck by a train on the adjacent line due to a failure of communications and warning systems.

Additionally, RAIB has identified three learning points. The first of these reminds track workers of the importance of completing required site visits ahead of planned work to mark up obstructions. The second reminds staff of the importance of being readily contactable when on call, and the final learning point encourages railway controllers to escalate issues where the first line on-call staff are not available.

Andrew Hall, Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents said:

Derailments of passenger trains are thankfully rare. The elements that came together and led to the derailment at Grange-over-Sands include some factors that have been seen in previous RAIB investigations. In this case Victorian infrastructure, increasing rainfall, a known flood water management problem which multiple parties had not fully resolved over years, ineffective communication and a short-term fix effectively becoming the permanent solution, all played a part. As the railway’s infrastructure will continue to age, and given the challenges of climate change, the importance of avoiding the other factors is ever more vital if such derailments are to remain a rarity.

Notes to editors

The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.

RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.

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Newsdate: 28 January 2025