NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: E3 Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, September 2025
Source: gov.uk (2025-09-09)

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) delivered a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board on Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement

Chair,

France, Germany and the United Kingdom commend the IAEA for its efforts to restore the full implementation of Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, despite Iran’s serious curtailing of its cooperation with the Agency since June 2025. The IAEA’s ability to conduct its verification work in Iran remains critical to understanding the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and we thank the Director General for his report and efforts.

The report points out that in June 2025, a number of Iran’s nuclear facilities were the target of military attacks. We have been clear that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom were not involved.

For the entire reporting period, Iran practically ended cooperation with the IAEA. On 2 July 2025, an Iranian law suspending IAEA inspector access was brought into force. The Director General’s report observes that since 13 June 2025, the Agency has had no access to any of the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, except for Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, nor has it received any of the legally required reports from Iran on its nuclear programme. We sincerely hope this is about to change.

The Director General has also reported that the IAEA has now also lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including High Enriched Uranium. In its letter of 30 July, the Agency reminded Iran that verification of Iran’s stockpile of High Enriched Uranium was overdue. This should be of utmost concern to all states: Iran’s stockpile of High Enriched Uranium has remained unaccounted for for over two and a half months. As the report recalls, Iran remains the only state without nuclear weapons to have produced such material, for which there is no credible civilian justification.

The report also states, for the first time, that the IAEA is not in a position to provide any conclusion or assurance regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

Chair,

We recognise that military strikes have complicated access to affected facilities. However, as the Director General reminded Iran in his 15 August letter, these events do not constitute legal grounds for suspending the implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. There was never a reason for Iran not to allow inspections to resume at all unaffected facilities or to withhold legally required reports.

Instead of upholding its obligations, for several months Iran demanded “separate” and “new” arrangements with the IAEA with conditions outside the IAEA’s verification mandate. Iran does not need a separate arrangement – Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has provisions for the implementation of safeguards under special circumstances, and the IAEA is well equipped to conduct its work in difficult conditions. The report makes clear that: “any new arrangement should be implemented in the framework of the NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement”.

Chair,

As the report notes, and the Director General emphasised this morning, the IAEA has repeatedly reached out to Iran and expressed his readiness to take into account Iran’s security concerns. We are grateful to the Director General for his update to the Board this morning regarding an agreement on modalities for the full reimplementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including all necessary accesses, inspections and reporting at all nuclear facilities and installations of Iran. We take note of the DG’s statement that this agreement will neither amend nor modify Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement. We will await further reporting regarding these new practical arrangements, as well as their full implementation.

Now is the time to see action from Iran, not words. The Agency’s verification activities are already long overdue. As such, we hope that Iran will seize this opportunity to urgently implement the measures requested by the Director General, including: preparation by Iran of special reports for high and low enriched uranium for the affected facilities, updated Design Information Questionnaires, and full resumption of Agency inspections at all safeguarded nuclear sites and facilities in Iran, affected or unaffected.

Chair,

It must also be recalled that Iran has refused for more than six years to resolve questions regarding nuclear material detected at multiple undeclared locations in Iran. The Director General and the Board have made clear repeatedly that Iran is legally required to clarify these issues. Iran failed to do so despite the concerted efforts of the Director General and this Board to provide Iran every opportunity. Therefore, following the publication of the Director General’s ‘comprehensive assessment’ on the outstanding safeguards issues, this Board adopted a resolution which found that Iran’s many failures to uphold its obligations constituted non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.

This Board has been patient. Iran has had nearly three months to resume full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement, and address safety and security concerns regarding nuclear facilities affected by military strikes.

But this Board cannot ignore the serious conclusions in this report. The near total cessation of safeguards implementation in Iran for two and half months is unacceptable and unsustainable, and gave clear grounds for this Board to act. There is now an opportunity to see if Iran will implement its legal safeguards obligations fully, urgently and without reservation. We sincerely hope it does.

We regret that, already, Iran has chosen to make public threats to suspend these practical steps based on irrelevant, political considerations, and underline once more that Iran’s legally-binding safeguards obligations flow from the NPT and its CSA, and no other source. Once again, we sincerely hope a change of approach is upon us.

However, we must also take our previous experience into account. If this Board does not see the full and complete resumption of the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement by its next meeting, we must be prepared to hold Iran to account, and provide the report as required by the IAEA Statue and the June resolution finding Iran non-compliant with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

Chair,

We fully support the IAEA and the Director General’s ongoing efforts to engage Iran. We reiterate the Director General’s message to Iran that it is “indispensable and urgent to restart safeguards activities in Iran”. Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA, and full implementation of its legal safeguards obligations, is a necessary foundation if we are to achieve an enduring agreement to address concerns around Iran’s nuclear activities – which the E3 have long worked towards.

Thank you, Chair.