Decision for Lugg Valley Travel Ltd (PD0001646)
Source: gov.uk (2025-12-10)

Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the West Midlands for Lugg Valley Travel Ltd and transport manager Ian Davies

OFFICE OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER IN BIRMINGHAM

IN THE MATTERS OF LUGG VALLEY TRAVEL LTD – PD0001646

IAN DAVIES – TRANSPORT MANAGER

WRITTEN DECISION OF TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER MR M DORRINGTON

PUBLIC INQUIRY ON 06 NOVEMBER 2025

SUMMARY OF MY DECISIONS

The public service vehicle operator’s licence, reference PD0001646, held by Lugg Valley Travel Ltd, is revoked under sections 17(1)(a) [loss of good repute], 17(1)(b) [transport manager no longer of good repute], 17(1)(a) [no longer professionally competent], 17(3)(aa) [breaches of the general undertakings], 17(3)(b) [breaches of the licence conditions], 17(3)(c) [prohibitions] and 17(3)(e)[material changes] of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (the “Act”). Revocation takes effect at 2359 hours on 31 December 2025.

Transport manager Mr Ian Davies has lost his good repute as a transport manager and is disqualified as a transport manager for four years from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 until 30 December 2029 under Schedule 3 paragraph 7B(2) of the Act. His two rehabilitation measures are detailed later in this written decision.

Lugg Valley Travel Ltd is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area for four years from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 until 30 December 2029. This order is made under section 28 of the Transport Act 1985.

The sole director of Lugg Valley Travel Ltd, Mr Nigel David Yeomans, is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area and is further disqualified from being a director of a company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area. These orders of disqualification are made under section 28 of the Transport Act 1985 and start at 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 and end on 30 December 2029, a four year order.

BACKGROUND

Lugg Valley Travel Ltd (the “operator”) was granted this operator’s licence in 1998. There is currently one director Mr Nigel David Yeomans and the transport manager is Mr Ian Davies.

As a result of serious incident involving vehicle YJ58CCZ when that vehicle caught fire whilst transporting students an unannounced maintenance investigation visit report (“MIVR”) was undertaken by the DVSA on 09 January 2025 by Vehicle Examiner Mr Terry Baker. This scored both the operator’s and transport manager’s maintenance compliance as “Report to OTC”. Upon receipt of this report a decision was made to call the operator and transport manager to a public inquiry.

The operator subsequently applied to surrender the operator’s licence but I refused that application given the gravity of the findings made by the DVSA in the MIVR.

The calling in letter for both the operator and transport manager dated 24 September 2025 made it clear that I did not intend to ask Vehicle Examiner Baker to attend the public inquiry as a witness and if the operator or transport manager wanted him to attend then they had to make a request to my office not less than 7 days before the date of the public inquiry. No request was received.

THE PUBLIC INQUIRY ON 06 NOVEMBER 2025

In attendance for the operator was the sole director Mr Nigel Yeomans and transport manager Mr Ian Davies. Neither were represented.

Since no request had been made for Vehicle Examiner Terry Baker to attend the public inquiry he was not present on behalf of the DVSA.

I explained how the hearing would be undertaken and both Mr Yeomans and Mr Davies confirmed that the DVSA evidence was accepted and not challenged.

I then heard from both individuals in oral evidence before asking them about what effect each type of regulatory action would have including disqualification. I then reserved my decision into writing.

EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE

In reaching my decisions I have taken into account all of the evidence in the electronic case bundle and all of the oral evidence I heard in the public inquiry. I have also reminded myself of what each person said about the effect of regulatory action and what was said in closing submissions.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

The burden of proof is upon the DVSA to prove any allegations that have been made. The standard of proof is the civil law standard; the balance of probabilities. In other words what is more likely than not to have occurred.

FINDINGS OF FACT

After carefully considering all of the evidence, and submissions made on behalf of the operator and transport manager, I have made the following findings of fact after applying the correct burden and standard of proof:

The operator and the transport manager accepted the DVSA evidence and did not dispute it or materially dispute it. The evidence contained in the MIVR and Supplemental Statement from Vehicle Examiner Baker dated 30 October 2025, prepared for the public inquiry, was evidence based, very detailed, credible, cogent and highly persuasive and I accepted it as such. As a result of the operator and transport manager accepting this evidence, and from my own assessment of that evidence, all of the allegations made by the DVSA are found to be proven.

I repeat all of the proven allegations made by the DVSA and repeat them all as my own findings of fact. Principle amongst those findings of fact are the following.

All six vehicles inspected at the fleet check that was undertaken as part of the MIVR received a prohibition notice. In all three of those six vehicles received a prohibition notice that was “S” marked that proves a significant failure in maintenance compliance. Five immediate prohibitions were issued, proving the vehicles subject to them were not in a fit and roadworthy condition. One vehicle out of the six had a delayed prohibition. This meant three of the six vehicles received an “S” marked and “Immediate” prohibition which is the most serious grading.

All six vehicles inspected at the fleet inspection were in service and not marked “VOR”.

This meant that five out of six vehicles had been in service in an unroadworthy condition previously to the immediate prohibition being issued. It also meant that for three out of the six vehicles the condition of the defect(s) identified were such that there was a proven significant failure in maintenance by this operator.

In completing a MIVR the DVSA look at the previous 15 months of maintenance records. In this case 59 PMI records were looked at by VE Baker. Of those every single one (100%) were not fully compliant and every PMI record looked at did not record a satisfactory brake test.

Brakes are an extremely important part of any PSV. The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 applies to PSVs as well as HGVs. Regulation 18 requires an operator to know that every part of every braking system works properly.

The DVSA publication, “A Guide To Maintaining Roadworthiness” details brake testing at paragraph 5.3 and did so in the same paragraph in the edition relevant to this MIVR. That guide has been in the public domain for over 15 years. The Upper Tribunal appeal case of MGM Haulage and Recycling Ltd 2012/030 makes it clear that all operators are deemed to know the advice and guidance that is in the public domain. Therefore, that would include this DVSA publication.

Added to that is the fact that this is a very experienced PSV operator and a very experienced PSV transport manager who cannot plead ignorance to what is required to ensure basic compliance.

The fact that a satisfactory brake test was not undertaken in any PMI looked at by VE Baker is deeply worrying and in the absence of a satisfactory brake test being undertaken the operator and the transport manager cannot demonstrate that they had complied with regulation 18 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986.

For the avoidance of any doubt; you cannot know if every part of every braking system works properly by undertaking a skid test or a road test or merely by looking at the braking system and its components. That is why paragraph 5.3 to the Guide to Maintaining Roadworthiness is so detailed; to stop people relying on such out of date and no longer accepted means of assessing braking performance.

A failure to demonstrate compliance with regulation 18 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 clearly puts road safety at risk.

Of the 59 PMI sheets examined, 10% recorded dangerous defects present; therefore the vehicle would have been in service previously to the PMI with those dangerous defects present – a clear risk to road and passenger safety.

Of the 59 PMI sheets examined, 39% (therefore 23 records) proved that the stated PMI inspection frequency had been exceeded. If preventative maintenance is not undertaken on time this creates a real risk to road safety. Had the records been looked at properly, or at all, by the transport manager then seeing dangerous defects present at a previous PMI(s) would have brought into sharp focus (a) the need to ensure vehicles were presented for PMI on time and (b) the need to review the inspection frequency to reduce the risk of dangerous defects developing between PMIs.

The driver defect reporting system was ineffective with not all defects being recorded in writing, contrary to the clear general undertaking that attaches to all PSV operator licences. The most serious failing was clear evidence of vehicles being used with reported safety defects with examples given on pages 61-4 of the bundle for example. A very serious example concerns the “S” marked and immediate prohibition (I will deal with the prohibition in more detail later on) imposed on 21 January 2025 where the driver had noted on four previous occasions on days leading up to the prohibition the defect was present. In that time the vehicle travelled more than 500KM carrying passengers.

It was therefore proven that vehicles remained in service with known safety defects present.

The maintenance and inspection arrangements were inadequate and failing to ensure vehicles were properly maintained and only in service in a roadworthy condition.

There was an ineffective wheel and tyre management system in place. I detail a specific example of this involving a vehicle that received an “S” marked and immediate prohibition in due course.

Serious incident and Prohibitions imposed at the MIVR

Serious incident

The start to this section of my decision concerns vehicle YJ58CCZ that caught fire whilst carrying passengers on 28 November 2024. This operator was the registered keeper of this vehicle and this vehicle was being operated by this operator on the day in question. The incident is detailed at page 59 of the bundle. On balance the fire was caused by a binding rear brake that overheated to the point of combustion following, on balance, the failure of the driver to spot the binding brake which should have been obvious to them.

All PSV operators, especially experienced ones such as this, know they must fill in and submit a PSV112 form to report any serious incident. My office was contacted about this by email but no PSV112 form was ever completed never mind submitted to the DVSA. As a result of the failure to complete a PSV112 form the DVSA were not notified of the fire and were unable to carry out a through investigation or inspection of the vehicle prior to its disposal.

Whilst this operator did not maintain that vehicle and whilst this operator had not specified the vehicle on its licence there is no legal requirement to specify a vehicle on a PSV licence. What is relevant is the operator disc displayed in the windscreen because you cannot lend a disc to anyone else; the operator of the PSV must display their disc in the windscreen.

In this case VE Baker was satisfied that this operator was operating that vehicle on the day in question. This evidence was not disputed by the operator or the transport manager and I am therefore satisfied that this operator was operating that vehicle.

It is worth noting that whilst vehicle YJ58CCZ was recorded on the operator licence for Yeomans Canyon Travel Ltd, Mr Nigel David Yeomans is the sole director of that company and he is the only person recorded at Companies House as having significant control of that company.

I accept no excuses for the failure to submit a PSV112 form by this experienced director and experienced transport manager. The failure to report such a serious incident is serious misconduct by this operator and this transport manager alike.

Most notable prohibitions imposed at the fleet check as part of the MIVR

Vehicle YG52DGY – The prohibition notice appears at page 94 of the bundle – “S” marked delayed prohibition. The “S” marking proves a significant failure in maintenance because the defect should have been spotted by the driver.

Vehicle YN60BYZ – The immediate prohibition notice appears at page 98 of the bundle and full explanation at page 65. The vehicle was not in a roadworthy condition. The air leak was very loud and likely obvious to the driver. The air leak was so bad that air pressure could not be sustained even with the engine running at fast idle. No driver defect reporting sheet was available to VE Baker after 2022 for this vehicle and the previous driver should have spotted and reported this defect and the vehicle should not have been used in the unroadworthy condition it was in. Passenger and road safety were put at an obvious risk by this defect.

Vehicle YJ64DXV – “S” marked and immediate prohibition notice appears at page 97 of the bundle and the full DVSA explanation appears at page 66. This prohibition was for 3 out of 6 wheel nuts being loose to the nearside wheel on axle 2. The wheel re-torque tag was dated 21 November 2024 and notes were added to it by the tyre fitter that stated “New wheels needed!!! Customer use at their own risk!!!” No evidence was provided to show that this wheel was replaced between the date of that note on 21 November 2024 and the prohibition being imposed at the fleet check on 09 January 2025.

Not only was a very serious maintenance and passenger safety related risk brought to the operator’s attention some 6 weeks before the prohibition was imposed but the operator failed to act upon that clear and unequivocal warning and the driver who first used the vehicle immediately before the prohibition was imposed failed to undertake any, or any effective, first use inspection of the vehicle because had they done so the loose wheel nuts would have been identified.

From my 17 years as a Traffic Commissioner (full time and Deputy) I can fully, and properly, gauge the severity of this maintenance failure – it was very serious. This maintenance failure proves that there was an ineffective wheel and tyre management system in place, it proves there was an ineffective driver defect reporting system in place, it proves that the director and transport manager were ignoring the clear and obvious warning that had been given and it proves that passenger and road safety were put at a very significant risk not only immediately before this prohibition was imposed but also from the time of the warning given by the tyre fitter back in November 2024. The “S” marking therefore proves a significant failure in maintenance.

This was a serious accident waiting to happen.

Vehicle M22LVT – The immediate and “S” marked prohibition notice appears at page 92 of the bundle and the full DVSA explanation appears at page 53 of the bundle. A wholly insufficient repair had been made to the driver’s main mirror glass such that the driver’s view in that mirror would have been impaired to the extent the driver would not have had an adequate view to the rear of the vehicle creating a clear and obvious risk to road and passenger safety. With this defect present the driver should not have driven this vehicle, or continued to drive this vehicle, on a public road.

The tailgate was checked several times by VE Baker and would not be secured in the closed position even if slammed. It was able to fly open inadvertently. The previous driver should have spotted and reported this defect. There was a clear significant failure in maintenance proven by the defects that gave rise to this prohibition.

Pulling everything together, when looking at these prohibitions issued at the fleet inspection I can say with absolute certainty that this is the worst PSV fleet inspection that I have ever seen.

Further “S” marked and immediate prohibition issued on 21 January 2025

There can be absolutely no doubt by the number, and gravity, of prohibitions issued by the DVSA at the fleet inspection on 09 January 2025 that the extent of the operator’s and transport manager’s failings were brought firmly to their attention there and then. An immediate root and branch assessment of every aspect of the maintenance systems and procedures should have been undertaken.

It is therefore with deep, and serious, concern I turn to the prohibition imposed for vehicle YJ58CCY that was inspected at Wigmore School on 21 January 2025 after carrying school children as passengers.

The immediate and “S” marked prohibition notice appears at page 95 of the bundle and the DVSA’s full explanation appears at page 63 and continues on page 67. The bulge to the tyre was road and passenger safety critical as it could have failed at any time. The “significant fuel leak” was so serious that the DVSA concluded (and I formally find the DVSA are correct) that there was a fire risk to the travelling children caused by the fuel leak and a serious safety risk caused to cyclists and motorcyclists by fuel dripping onto the road which, particularly in wet conditions, created a slipping risk on corners and a skid risk were the cycle or motorcycle to brake when the fuel leak was encountered. From the evidence before me the “S” marking proved a significant failure in maintenance.

This was another serious accident waiting to happen to passengers on this vehicle and/or cyclists/motorcyclists on the road.

Delayed prohibitable items were also recorded on the prohibition notice. This included the emissions lamp on the day of the prohibition being “ON” and that defect noted by the driver on that day’s first use inspection. The driver had recorded the defect on four occasions during the days leading up to the encounter, with the vehicle covering more than 500KM in that time transporting passengers, with no record of the defect being assessed or repaired. Another clear example of how poor the driver defect reporting system was and the lack of any, or any effective, management control by the operator and transport manager.

After the DVSA visit and fleet inspection on the 09 January 2025 the defects giving rise to this prohibition should not have been present.

Operator and transport manager’s response to the prohibitions

Mr Yeomans and Mr Davies confirmed to me that they jointly wrote the response to the MIVR that appears at page 126 of the bundle onwards. That document is undated and deals with the prohibitions at the very top of page 129. That response totals just 26 words (excluding VRMs).

That response is anything but what should have been written and anything but what was expected. It gave no details at all about why any of the prohibitions occurred, who was at fault, what had been done to address the serious areas of concern, how the relevant maintenance systems and procedures were changed, and would be changed, and what assurances could be given to prevent future occurrences.

I am left making a formal finding that the failure to address the serious safety prohibitions in any proper way in that response to the MIVR reflects the operator and transport manager’s lack of insight and understanding as to just how serious the situation was – they were transporting children, peoples sons and daughters, and those children were being subject to real safety risks but the operator and transport manager failed to deal with the clearest examples of where those risks had been brought to their attention with any detailed explanation as to why those risks came about and what had been done to stop them occurring again. I am staggered by that lack of a proper response to the DVSA about the prohibitions that I have detailed in this decision as I am sure any reader of this decision will be too.

Management control by the operator at the time of the MIVR

Mr Nigel Yeomans, as the sole statutory director, was the heart and mind of the company and he, and he alone, bore the responsibility to ensure that the general undertakings on the operator’s licence were fulfilled. He accepted, in his oral evidence, that he had not been effective in doing that and that his biggest failure was trusting the mechanics and not checking thoroughly.

All directors of a company that holds an operator’s licence must “constantly monitor and supervise” the people to whom compliance responsibility is delegated. So held the Transport Tribunal, as it was then, in the appeal case of L56 1999 Alison Jones T/A Jones Motors. That appeal decision, which is still good law today as it is founded on basic company law, made it clear that to “constantly monitor and supervise” did not mean taking things at face value or on trust; it meant checking, scrutinising and challenging what was said or put before a director in writing. Had Mr Yeomans done any of that he would have seen from the PMI records, the tyre changing and (re)torquing records, the driver defect reporting sheets, and lack thereof in some cases, clear and obvious failures in maintenance compliance that was creating a clear and obvious risk to road and passenger safety.

There can be no excuses when passenger and road safety has been put at such a significant risk and for so long. Whilst the operator holds an operator’s licence it is legally required to fulfil all of the conditions and undertakings recorded upon the operator’s licence all of the time. Those conditions and undertakings are there for one overriding reason only; to ensure passenger and road safety.

If circumstances are present that prevent, for whatever reason, an operator from fulfilling those extremely serious and onerous conditions and undertakings such that passenger and/or road safety are put at risk then any effected services/PSV operations must cease immediately because passenger and/or road safety overrides everything else. The operator must, as legally required by the conditions and undertakings on the operator’s licence, inform the Traffic Commissioner about what has happened to prevent passenger and road safety being maintained at all times. Mr Yeomans did not do that.

Looking at the case in the rounds, up to the date of the MIVR and prohibition on 21 January 2025 at Wigmore School, Mr Yeomans:
- Failed to have any, or any regular, meaningful meetings with his transport manager where maintenance records were scrutinised in detail and issues arising from the same were discussed, acted upon and minuted; and
- Mr Yeomans failed to check, or properly check, maintenance records on his own volition; and
- Mr Yeomans took his mechanics on trust and failed to properly manage them as a result; and
- Mr Yeomans took his drivers on trust and failed to properly check they were undertaking any, or any effective, first use inspection - that defects were properly identified, properly reported and properly and promptly repaired and any vehicle with a known safety defect was not kept in service as a result; and
- Mr Yeomans took his transport manager on trust with no, or no effective, management control over him as a result.
Mr Yeomans did not “constantly monitor and supervise” anyone who was involved in maintenance compliance. As a result, and on his watch as the sole director, passenger and road safety was repeatedly put at real, and sometimes very serious, risk over a long period of time. This meant that wholly avoidable safety related incidents occurred.

Effective management control by the transport manager up to the date of the MIVR

All transport managers must, at all times, be “effective” in ensuring day to day compliance within the transport operation. That is the onerous statutory duty that they cannot abrogate to anyone else and any delegation of that responsibility comes with the requirement of effective management oversight to ensure the people delegated to are doing exactly what they should be doing and to a compliant standard.

Mr Davies explained numerous reasons, some personal and some not, for the failings as evidenced by the DVSA that he fully accepted. But the thread that ran through all of those excuses, because that is all they were, was the fact that Mr Davies (a) remained specified on the operator’s licence as the only statutory transport manager and (b) he had never written to me to explain why, for whatever reason, he was unable to be “effective” in his role and as a result there was not compliance within the day to day running of the transport operation. Since he remained on the licence, and since he had not written to me as he was required to do, he remained 100% responsible for discharging his statutory duty as a transport manager at all times.

Mr Davies, from the findings I have made, failed to:
- Check, or properly check, any of the maintenance documents for over 12 months. Had he done so he would have seen that 100% of PMIs were not filled in correctly, no proper brake test was being recorded, dangerous defects were present at 1 in 10 PMIs, PMI intervals were not being kept, drivers were repeatedly recording defects but the vehicle remained in service with them present, drivers were not spotting defects they should have and those defects were then recorded at a PMI when they should have been spotted and repaired before the PMI, the wheel for vehicle YJ64DXV was marked by the notes recorded by the tyre fitter on 21 November 2024 as stating “New wheels needed!!! Customer use at their own risk!!!” but by failing to see or act upon this the wheel remained fitted to the vehicle right up to the fleet check on 09 January 2025 when 3/6 wheel nuts were loose and an “S” marked and immediate prohibition was issued…and so I could go on; and
- He took everyone on trust and as a result allowed, caused or permitted the serious failings that people created to both happen and become; and
- He failed to properly engage with the director on a regular basis or at all. He described the meetings with Mr Yeomans as being ad hoc but clearly they were not at all in depth or effective otherwise the DVSA fleet inspection and MIVR would not have been as damning as they were; and
- He failed, categorically, to protect passenger and road safety again and again and again as demonstrated by the findings of fact I have already made.
And to make matters even worse, if that was at all possible, despite the gravity of his failings being brought directly to his attention at the fleet inspection and DVSA visit on 09 January 2025, only 12 days later vehicle YJ58CCY was inspected at Wigmore School and was found to be in such a poor state of maintenance that it posed a fire risk to the passengers aboard it and a real risk to the safety of cyclists and motorcyclists on the road.

All of the adverse findings I have made in this decision so far are a direct result, either individually or collectively with Mr Yeomans, of Mr Davies failing to be effective as the statutory transport manager

Supplemental statement from VE Baker dated 30 October 2025

The case management directions that attached to the calling in letter requested various maintenance related documents from the operator (see page 13 of the bundle) dated from 09 January 2025 (date of the MIVR) to be sent to VE Baker.

From the evidence I heard from Mr Yeomans and Mr Davies the operator began to wind down the transport operation from the date of the MIVR after liaising with the local authority. In reality they moved work across to Mr Yeoman’s other transport company, Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited.

I was told that by the end of July all work had ceased with this operator. That would make sense as that time corresponded with the end of the school/college summer term.

The peak vehicle use for this operator, I was told, was three vehicles a day up to the end of July. I was further told that the other vehicles could not be removed from the licence because the licence surrender application had not been accepted and as a result VOL would not allow the vehicles to be removed. The vehicles that were transferred to Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited (but still remained recorded on this operator’s licence) were maintained by Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited and had that operator’s disc displayed in the windscreen.

I remind myself that for PSV licensing there is no legal requirement to record vehicle registration numbers against the operator licence. It can be done voluntarily, there may be an agreed undertaking by the operator to record the registration numbers, but there is no legislative requirement to do so. Therefore, what is important is the disc displayed in the windscreen because that disc should always be the disc that records the name of the transport entity that is operating the vehicle on any given day. And I further remind myself that unlike large goods vehicle operator licence discs, which are vehicle registration number and operator licence number specific, for a PSV disc only the operator licence details are specified. In other words those PSV discs do not record any vehicle registration number which is why they can be moved from PSV to PSV within an operator’s fleet.

Both Mr Yeomans and Mr Davies accepted, on their own evidence, that the supplemental report prepared by VE Davies still covered this operator but it was also covering the maintenance documents for vehicles actually operated by Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited.

I have therefore taken a broad brush approach to this supplemental report. However, I remind myself that Mr Yeomans is the sole director, and only person of significant control, for Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited and therefore regardless of which entity operated what vehicle it is entirely reasonable, under his control as the sole director for both companies, to have expected significant improvements in compliance after the MIVR and serious “S” marked and immediate prohibition on 21 January 2025.

The reality is that the supplemental report demonstrates anything but a significant improvement in compliance even when looking at it on a broad brush basis.

The broad brush areas of non-compliance (none of which have been contested by the operator or Mr Davies) are:
- PMI records were still unsatisfactory with a significant number (18 records or 62% of records looked at) not being compliant with 12 records (41%) still not containing evidence of an acceptable brake assessment and 5 records recording brake repairs but with no subsequent record of a supplemental brake test being carried out after completion of the repairs; and
- Roller road brake tests reports were unsatisfactory with only 59% of the 19 PMIs looked at contained a brake report, 13 of the 19 reports used the wrong DTP brake code – if the wrong code is used for the vehicle then the brake testing results will also be wrong, and 11 brake tests were undertaken prior to the date of the PMI but were not signed by the roller road brake tester so the process had no accountability; and
- Driver defect reporting (“DDR”) and rectification was still unsatisfactory with 39/162 reports detailing some kind of defect but in each case there is no name of the person the defect was reported to, some do not contain rectification detail and some DDR sheets are not completed correctly. Some 26 sheets report an issue with the Anti-lock Braking System but none of those 26 records show evidence of the defect being reported or repaired.
Looking at the broad picture I find that the significant improvements I expected to see had not been made and I am therefore in agreement with VE Baker’s conclusion, even when looking at this on a broad brush basis, which states “…the shortcomings identified in the original Maintenance Investigation Visit report (MIVR) continue to persist, despite the operator having received and responded to that report. Of the 29 inspection records reviewed – most of which are signed as being audited by the transport manager – every single one contained errors or omissions, ranging from minor clerical oversights to serious procedural failings…defect reporting and rectification processes remain inadequate especially in relation to ABS warning lamps.”

I therefore find that the transport manager was still failing, right up to the cessation of operations at the end of July, to be “effective” in ensuring compliance within the day-to-day transport operation.

Even looking at the supplemental evidence of VE Baker in broad terms I further find that the director, Mr Yeomans, was still failing to constantly monitor and supervise the transport manager, the mechanics and the drivers – had he properly managed them then the supplemental statement of VE Baker would not have found that 100% of PMI records contained errors and many of the heads of compliance failings identified by the vehicle examiner would not have had any examples, or so many examples, of non-compliance.

Overview of all of the evidence and my findings made from that evidence.

By pulling everything together the simple reality is that at every touch point by the DVSA since the vehicle fire in November 2024 there has been clear evidence of non-compliance by the operator and transport manager and a failure to learn lessons from past mistakes that had had an adverse impact on passenger and road safety in order to prevent the same mistakes occurring again. This occurred right up to this operator ceasing all of its PSV operations at the end of July 2025.

Breaches of the general undertakings recorded on the operator’s licence

I repeat all of the findings that I have made. Having done so I find that the following general undertakings that attach to this operator’s licence were breached:
- The laws relating to the driving and operation of vehicles used under the licence are observed
- Vehicles, including hired vehicles, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition
- Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing
- Records are kept (for a minimum of 15 months) of all driver reports which recorded defects, all safety inspections, routine maintenance and repairs to vehicles and that these are made available upon request
Positives

I start by making it clear that several of the positives I record below are tempered by the findings I have made in relation to the supplemental report from VE Baker. In other words promises and changes were made by this operator and transport manager but the tangible results that relate to compliance being restored (or not being restored) carry more weight than words or intentions.

The operator, immediately after the MIVR, approached the local authority to explain that it had made the decision to immediately wind down this transport operation and transfer work to Yeoman Canyon Travel Limited. This operator did carry on operating up to three vehicles a day until the end of July and then ceased all operations.

The transport manager undertook a virtual transport manager refresher training course after the MIVR.

The transport manager had, previously to the period of time covered by the MIVR, had a clean record for the previous 10+ years.

The MIVR prompted drivers to be given new instructions about how to record defects and who to report them to after the DDR system was reviewed and revised (this is tempered by the findings made from the supplemental statement of VE Baker on this subject).

A new forward planner was created after the MIVR to ensure that vehicles were presented at PMI on time with the inspection frequency reduced from 6 to 4 weeks.

New PMI sheets started to be used after the MIVR and brake testing was brought within the operator’s workshop (but this is heavily tempered by the findings made from the evidence on this subject in the supplemental report of VE Baker).

The VOR system was revised and thoroughly discussed with workshop staff to ensue that it was properly adhered to.

A senior member of staff was dismissed as a result of the MIVR findings.

A new wheel management and tyre removal policy was put in place

The transport manager, after vehicle fire and the subsequent MIVR, educated himself on the use of a PSV112 form and to whom such a form had to be sent.

Mr Yeomans was apologetic for what had happened.

Mr Davies was apologetic for what had happened.

Both Mr Yeomans and Mr Davies fully accepted their failings.

There had been some improvements found by VE Baker as evidenced in his supplemental statement.

The operator and transport manager co-operated with the DVSA.

I have given as much credit (evidential weight) as I can for all of the positives in this case.

Balancing exercise

The numerous, and sometimes longstanding, examples of where passenger and road safety were put at real and sometimes very serious risk carry the maximum evidential weight that I can give, especially the incident on 21 January at Wigmore School as that vehicle, just 12 days after the MIVR, should never have been on the road in that extremely poor state of roadworthiness. The other negative findings I have made carry significant evidential weight. Balanced against that is the evidential weight that I have given to the positives in this case, albeit some of those positives are tempered by the subsequent findings made from VE Baker’s supplemental statement. The tangible evidence is one of non-compliance lessening in severity over time but still a picture of non-compliance up to the cessation of operations at the end of July by which point there had been improvements in some areas of maintenance compliance but not in all areas of maintenance compliance. I have therefore given moderate evidential weight to the positives in this case.

Looking at the operator as it appeared before me at the public inquiry, and after undertaking a careful balancing exercise, it is clear that the evidential weight given to the negatives in this case significantly outweighs the evidential weight given to all of the positives. The scale therefore tips heavily in favour of the negatives.

Statutory document 10, Annex 4 consideration

After repeating all of my findings I have then considered Statutory Document 10, Annex 4, March 2025 PDF version issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner. In doing so I have found the following positive and negative features to be present (see page 40 of that Statutory Document):

Positive features
- Operator co-operated with the enforcement investigation
Negative features
- Reckless acts by the operator and/or drivers that led to undue risk to road safety
- Ineffective management control and insufficient or no systems and procedures in place to prevent operator licence compliance failings
- Ineffective or insufficient driver training with insufficient or ineffective monitoring and disciplinary procedures in place
- Insufficient and/or ineffective changes made to ensure future compliance
- Road safety critical defects on any vehicle in service or any “S” prohibition
- High prohibition rate
I have then considered which category was the correct starting point for consideration of regulatory action from the non-exhaustive list detailed at page 41 of Statutory Document 10.

The definition of “Severe” for a regulatory starting point includes “Deliberate or reckless acts that compromised road safety.” Here the operator’s and transport manager’s failure to manage, effectively or at all, numerous aspects of the transport operation resulting in vehicles being put into service in a mechanical condition that adversely affected passenger and road safety were reckless acts as defined in law; by that failure they knew, or ought to have known, there was a risk but they went ahead and took that risk anyway or they simply buried their heads in the sand to an obvious risk.

The definition of “Severe to Serious” for a regulatory starting point is “Persistent operator licence failures with inadequate response or previous public inquiry.” The wording for this starting point is devoid of any reference to road safety being affected and so it is clear that the higher stating point for consideration of regulatory action includes the risk to road safety whereas this lower starting point does not.

From the reckless acts or omissions of this operator and transport manager that put road and passenger safety at real, and sometimes serious, risk on so many occasions and from the failure to promptly react and stop any further repeat and from only the single positive feature being found in the list recorded on page 40 of Statutory Document 10, whereas six negative features are found from that list, I have determined that this case clearly falls into the “Severe” category for consideration of regulatory action.

I have then looked at the suggested regulatory action within the “Severe” category. This is detailed at page 42 of Statutory Document 10. Severe action includes:
- Revocation with detailed consideration of disqualification
- Revocation
- Suspension for an extended time period that materially affects the transport operation
- Significant indefinite curtailment that materially affects the transport operation
DECISIONS

I have then repeated all of my findings and again reminded myself of the credit that I have given to this operator. I have also reminded myself about what the operator and transport manager told me regarding the effect of regulatory action. I have then asked myself the Priority Freight question, put simply do I trust this operator to be compliant in the future? From the findings of fact I have made, the operator’s failure to fulfil the promises made in response to the MIVR and the significant risk this operator put its passengers and road users to I have absolutely no trust or confidence in this operator being compliant in the future. I have therefore determined that it is proportionate to answer the Priority Freight question in the negative.

I have then repeated all of my findings and once again reminded myself of the credit that that I have given to this operator. I have then asked myself the Bryan Haulage question; is the conduct of this operator such that it ought to be put out of business? From the risk this operator caused to passengers and road users, the failure to avoid the incident at Wigmore School just 12 days after the MIVR and the failure to fulfil the promises made in response to the MIVR and the failure to demonstrate full compliance even at the end of July when this transport operation ceased I have no hesitation at all in determining that it is proportionate to answer that question in the affirmative. There is absolutely no place in the passenger service industry for an operator like this. This operator has lost its good repute. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I revoke this operator’s licence under section 17(1)(a) of the Act. Revocation of this licence takes effect at 2359 hours on 31 December 2025.

Having repeated, again, all of my findings and the credit that I can give to Mr Davies the transport manager, it is clear that from his acts and omissions he failed in a fundamental way to be “effective” as a transport manager and as a result he allowed, caused or permitted passenger and road safety to be put at repeated, and sometimes serious, risk. His failures, as I have detailed in this decision, cut to the very core of the issue of trust. I now have zero trust in Mr Davies being effective as a transport manager. I have never seen, in 17 years as a Deputy Traffic Commissioner and full time Traffic Commissioner, a PSV fleet inspection as bad as this. But the root cause of that is the failure of Mr Davies to do his job as a transport manager and that failure persisted by what happened 12 days later at Wigmore school and then by the fact that every single PMI sheet looked at from then until the end of July by VE Baker had some form of error on it despite Mr Davies signing most of them to say he had audited them, the driver defect reporting system still had serious errors, particularly in relation to issues surrounding the ABS braking system and brake testing was not being completed properly.

Despite the moderate credit that I have given for the positives in this case that attach to Mr Davies I have determined that it is proportionate for me to find that Mr Davies lost his good repute as a transport manager at the time of the MIVR and incident at Wigmore School and since then it has not been restored.

As Mr Davies has lost his good repute as a transport manager it is a mandatory requirement under Schedule 3 paragraph 7B(2) of the Act that I disqualify him as a transport manager. Taking into account the moderate credit I have given to him, and in particular his clean record for over 10 years as a transport manager before the evidence that was considered in the MIVR, I have determined that the proportionate length of disqualification is one of four years to reflect the severity of his failings and the risk he put passengers and other road users to. His disqualification starts from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 until 30 December 2029.

There are two rehabilitation measures that he must undertaken were he minded to apply for his good repute as a transport manager to be restored at the end of his period of disqualification. First, he must complete a two-day classroom (not virtual) transport manager refresher training course. The one day virtual course he undertook is not sufficient. Second, he must have shadowed an experienced PSV transport manager in an established and OCRS green/green PSV operator for not less than 20 days in total during the last 6 months of his period of disqualification and proof from that other transport manager on headed paper that details what Mr Davies shadowed and the dates he attended must be provided.

The operator’s transport manager has lost his good repute. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I revoke this operator’s licence under section 17(1)(b) of the Act with effect from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025.

The operator’s transport manager will be disqualified from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025. The operator is therefore without a transport manager from that time and date and as a result will no longer be professionally competent. It is a further mandatory requirement that I revoke this operator’s licence under section 17(1)(a) of the Act from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025.

I now turn to my discretionary powers. In doing so I first repeated all of my findings including the credit that I have given to this operator. Having done that that I have determined that it is proportionate to revoke this operator’s licence under each of the following sections of the Act:
- 17(3)(b) Breach of the licence condition to notify the Traffic Commissioner within 28 days that the operator may no longer be of good repute and/or the transport manager may no longer be of good repute; and/or
- 17(3)(c) The numerous road safety related and often “S” marked prohibitions; and/or
- 17(3)(e) Material changes that occurred since the licence was granted, for example the failure to present PSVs to PMI as per the stated inspection frequency; and/or
- 17(3)(aa) The general undertakings that I have particularised in this written decision that were breached.
All orders of revocation under my discretionary powers take effect at 2359 hours on 31 December 2025.

DISQUALIFICATION

This is a very bad case no matter how it is looked at. As a result, and in line with the definition of “Severe” as an entry point for consideration of regulatory action, I now consider the issue of disqualification for the operator and for Mr Yeomans as the sole director of the operator licence holding company.

I have re-read, and reminded myself, of all the findings of fact made in this case including the credit that I have given.

I have then considered the Transport Tribunal (as it was before the Upper Tribunal) appeal case of 2006/27 Fenlon where it was held that:
- ‘trust is one of the foundation stones of operator licensing. Trafﬁc, commissioners must be able to trust operators to comply with all the relevant laws, rules and regulations because it would be a physical and ﬁnancial impossibility to police every aspect of the licensing system all day and every day. In addition, operators must be able to trust other operators to observe the relevant laws, rules and regulations. If trust between operators breaks down and some operators believe that others are obtaining an unfair commercial advantage by ignoring laws, rules or regulations then standards will inevitably slip and the public will suffer.”
I have also considered the appeal cases on the subject of disqualification including 2018/072 St Mickalos Company Ltd & M Timinis and 2010/29 David Finch Haulage.

This was a very bad case where a vehicle operated by this operator caught fire, due to its mechanical condition and failure of the driver to spot a defect that he should have been aware of, whilst passengers were on board. In the subsequent fleet inspection six vehicles were inspected and all six received a prohibition notice of which three prohibitions were “S” marked and immediate in nature and where just 12 days later at Wigmore School this operator’s vehicle, carrying school children, was found to be so mechanically defective that it posed a fire risk to the passengers and a real safety risk to cyclists/motorcyclists and a further “S” marked and immediate prohibition was imposed. This all happened because of the clear failure of the sole director and transport manager to effectively manage the transport operation and the people within it. And yet despite, this happening before and in January 2025, over the next six months until the end of July 2025 the subsequent evidence from the DVSA demonstrated serious failings in many of the same areas identified six months previously at the time of the MIVR. The sole director and transport manager were still unable to manage the transport operation to a compliant standard or, as it seems to me, to even get close to doing so.

There is no legal requirement for there to be a special feature in order for a Traffic Commissioner to disqualify an operator and/or director. However, there are several such features here not least the significant risk this operator has put its passengers and other road users to, the number of prohibitions imposed at a fleet inspection and the clear failure to keep an unsafe vehicle off the road immediately after that fleet inspection was undertaken. I have also found as fact that on at least two occasions the condition of the vehicle in question was so bad that it was a serious accident just waiting to happen.

Merely revoking this operator’s licence would not protect the public and other road users. It would not send the right message out to compliant operators who were sufficiently aware of the facts in this case; indeed failing to go one step further than revocation would put at real risk those compliant operators thinking along the lines of “what is the point of spending all of this time and effort to be compliant and to ensure passenger and road safety when I can save that time and effort, even if doing so puts passenger and road users at risk, knowing that the worst that will happen is loss of my licence and the inconvenience of having to apply for a new one.” It would also send out the entirely wrong message to well informed members of the public where, in very bad cases such as this, they saw the regulator, the person there to protect the public as passengers and road users alike, step back from using a statutory power that was designed to protect them. Merely revoking the operator’s licence would fail to properly reflect the gravity of this case.

Disqualification of both the operator, and the heart and mind of that operator Mr Yeomans, is both proportionate and necessary to protect passengers and road users alike for all of the reasons I have already given.

Statutory document number 10, Annex 4, gives a range of 1-3 years when disqualification is directed after a first public inquiry. That is just guidance and is not set in stone.

Despite the credit that I have given, this case is so serious that I find there are very strong and compelling reasons to step away from that guidance. The proportionate regulatory action is to disqualify this operator and the sole director, Mr Nigel Yeomans, for a period of five years. I have then reduced that period of disqualification by one year to reflect the credit that I have given resulting in a total period of disqualification of four years.

Mr Nigel David Yeomans is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area and is further disqualified from being a director of a company that holds or applies to obtain any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area. These orders of disqualification are made under section 28 of the Transport Act 1985 and start at 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 and end on 30 December 2029, a four year order.

Lugg Valley Travel Ltd is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area for four years from 2359 hours on 31 December 2025 until 30 December 2029. This order is made under section 28 of the Transport Act 1985.

In making the order of disqualification for Mr Nigel Yeomans I am fully aware of the impact that order will have on his other transport company, Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited, and the people that work there.

Any breach of my orders of revocation and/or disqualification by Mr Yeomans or Lugg Valley Travel Ltd empowers the DVSA to impound that vehicle and Mr Yeomans has now been given actual knowledge of that power.

ADDENDUM

Having written my first draft of this written decision a caseworker in my office received an email from a DVSA Vehicle Examiner concerning dates that various vehicles from this operator were said to have started service for Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited in August 2025. At that point I stopped work on this written decision asked for that new evidence to be sent to the operator for comment and directed that the DVSA ceased sending any further evidence to my office that may directly, or indirectly, concern this operator until I had promulgated my written decision. The operator then promptly replied to the new evidence and agreed the dates put forward by the DVSA Vehicle Examiner. I have formally found that those agreed dates have made no difference at all to any findings of fact that I have made because they do not disprove that this operator ceased all operations from the end of July 2025, the dates merely demonstrate when the vehicles started service for Yeomans Canyon Travel Limited.

Traffic Commissioner Mr M Dorrington

Traffic Commissioner for the West Midlands

03 December 2025