Decision for Ligo Trans Ltd (OD2009961) and Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes (Transport Manager)
Source: gov.uk (2025-08-05)

Written decision of the Traffic Commissioner for the West Midlands for Ligo Trans Ltd (OD2009961) and Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes (Transport Manager)

IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA

DECISION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER FOR THE WEST MIDLANDS

PUBLIC INQUIRY HELD AT BIRMINGHAM ON 15 JULY 2025

Ligo Trans Ltd (OD2009961) and Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes (Transport Manager)

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS MADE

The standard national goods vehicle operator’s licence held by Ligo Trans Ltd, under reference OD2009961, is revoked from 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 under sections 27(1)(a), 27(1)(b), 26(1)(c)(iii), 26(1)(e), 26(1)(f) and 26(1)(h) of the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (the “Act”).

Ligo Trans Ltd (the “operator”) is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area from 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 until 14 February 2027 (18 months) under sections 28(1), 28(3) and 28(4) of the Act.

The sole director, Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any capacity and in any traffic area from 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 until 14 February 2027 (18 months) under sections 28(1), 28(3) and 28(4) of the Act.

The transport manager, Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes, has lost his good repute as a transport manager with immediate effect. He is disqualified as a transport manager for 18 months effective from 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 until 14 February 2027. This order is made under paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 3 of the Act. Given his fundamental failure to act with integrity as a transport manager I cannot think of any rehabilitation measure that I can require of him.

BACKGROUND

The operator received two “S” marked and immediate prohibitions on 31 December 2024 and 15 January 2025. This triggered the DVSA to undertake a maintenance investigation which was carried out on 26 February 2025. The resulting maintenance investigation visit report (“MIVR”) alleged a significant level of non-compliance and as a result a decision was made to call the operator and transport manager to a public inquiry.

PUBLIC INQUIRY ON 15 JUNE 2025

The sole director, Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes attended on behalf of the operator. He also attended as the transport manager for the operator. Both the operator and Mr Gordes were represented by Mr Jones of counsel.

Present on behalf of the DVSA was vehicle examiner Smith.

A driver conduct hearing was conjoined to the public inquiry. That was dealt with separately.

The MIVR had been accepted in its entirety by the operator (see paragraph 35 of counsel’s submissions) and counsel confirmed that the findings in the supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Smith were accepted but there was a difference between the stated cause of those findings which his client would address in evidence.

Vehicle examiner Smith then proved his MIVR and supplemental statement and was then questioned by counsel and myself.

I then heard from Mr Gordes in evidence. I questioned him and there was no re-examination. I then recalled vehicle examiner Smith to answer one further question that I had.

After hearing closing submissions I initially retired to consider whether I could make a decision on the day. After considering matters for a short period of time I decided I could not, and my clerk communicated the same to everyone who had attended and that my decision was reserved to writing.

EVIDENCE

I have taken into account all of the evidence that was within the electronic bundle and all of the oral evidence that I heard.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

The burden of proof was upon the DVSA to prove any allegations that it had made. The standard of proof is the civil law standard; the balance of probabilities. In other words what is more likely than not to have occurred.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following findings of fact have been made after applying the correct burden and standard of proof to the evidence before me. For the avoidance of any doubt every finding of fact can be taken as read to start with the words “It is more likely than not that…”

The “S” marked and immediate prohibition imposed on 31 December 2024 to vehicle YN65 LMM was road safety critical in nature because the tyre tread was less than the legal limit and therefore the tyre was at risk of failure. The “S” marking was added because there was a significant failure of roadworthiness compliance. The vehicle was clearly being operated in an unroadworthy condition. Tyres do not wear out overnight so that they are beyond the legal minimum tread depth of 1mm. Wear to tyres takes time. The fact that no driver, having undertaken an effective first use inspection of that vehicle either on the day of the prohibition, or previously, had spotted the wear to the tyre satisfies me that there was no, or no effective, driver defect reporting system in place at the time.

The “S” marked and immediate prohibition imposed on 15 January 2025 to vehicle YN65 LMM for an oil leak was road safety critical, especially to motorcyclists and cyclists. The “S” marking was correctly imposed because there was a significant failure of roadworthiness compliance both by the operator and the driver.

None of the allegations in the MIVR were contested. That evidence from vehicle examiner Smith was highly credible, cogent and persuasive and it was accepted as such. All of the allegations in the MIVR are found to be proven. I repeat them all and adopt them all as my own findings of fact. There were so many proven allegations that I do not repeat them all here but amongst them were the following:

(a) 90% of the 31 PMI records looked at by vehicle examiner Smith did not have the roadworthiness declaration signed. The roadworthiness declaration is there for one reason only; to confirm that the vehicle is, or is not, roadworthy. If it is not signed then the vehicle has not been declared as being roadworthy and it should not be put into service on a public road. It is that simple. Mr Gordes should have, and he is deemed would have, known that as the transport manager. What other purpose does the roadworthiness declaration serve if it is not as I have stated which is the same view as DVSA takes; and

(b) Only 35% of PMIs showed evidence that a brake test had been undertaken. Every PMI should have evidence that a metered brake test has been undertaken otherwise how can the roadworthiness declaration be signed to say the vehicle is roadworthy if such a brake test has not been completed? It cannot. There is no argument about whether a metered brake test should be completed because (a) all sections of a PMI sheet have to be filled in (and brakes and brake testing makes up a large part of the second page of a PMI sheet) and (b) legislation requires brakes to be properly checked at a PMI – regulation 18 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 requires an operator to know that every part of every braking system works properly. That requirement can only be met if a metered brake test is completed. Merely looking at the brakes, or doing a road test, will not tell you that every part of every braking system works properly when the vehicle is in service; and

(c) Paragraph 5.3 of the DVSA publication “A Guide To Maintaining Roadworthiness” (“GTMR”) in its present 2025 iteration and in its previous, 2024, version explains how brakes should be tested but it also explains regulation 18 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986. All operators, and transport managers, are deemed to know/have read the GTMR. In that respect I rely on the Upper Tribunal appeal case authorities of LA & Z Leonida T/A ETS 2014/024 and MGM Haulage and Recycling Ltd 2012/030; and

(d) The failure to properly, or at all, test brakes for 65% of the time created a very real risk to road safety; and

(e) Dangerous defects were identified across consecutive PMIs with no evidence of rectification. Cleary this created a significant risk to road safety as the vehicle would have been in service with those known dangerous defects present; and

(f) Dangerous defects were present, per se, on 19 of the 31 PMI sheets looked at by vehicle examiner Smith. Clearly road safety was put at a significant risk for the same reason given above; and

(g) Driver spottable defects were present on 18 of the 31 PMI sheets looked at by vehicle examiner Smith. No driver spottable defects should be present on a PMI if drivers are undertaking an effective first use inspection each day. The presence of driver spottable defects means those defects were present when the vehicle was in service previously to the PMI. That created an obvious, and avoidable, real risk to road safety; and

(h) The driver defect reporting sheets showed vehicles were being used with reported safety defects. This clearly put road safety at a real risk; and

(i) Only 19 of over 1,000 driver defect reporting sheets recorded a defect. That was completely out of alignment with driver spottable defects being found on 18 PMI sheets. There should have been many more defects identified by drivers; and

(j) There was clearly a very ineffective driver defect reporting system in place at the time of the MIVR; a matter that any transport manager should have spotted had they been effective in their role. An effective driver defect reporting system is required as a final check upon a vehicle to see if clear and obvious road safety defects are present before the vehicle goes into service for the day. A failure to have an effective driver defect reporting system (as is the case here) created a real risk to road safety; and

(k) The final failure rate at MOT was extremely poor and yet an MOT is the one day of the year, known about in advance, when a vehicle must meet the bare minimum standard of roadworthiness. The final fail rate for this operator was 28.5% against the national average of 8.2%. A shocking disparity. It shows that vehicles were (a) poorly maintained, (b) poorly prepared for MOT and (c) were clearly in service before the MOT with the defects present for which it then failed the MOT; in other words was in service in an unroadworthy condition. If it was not in an unroadworthy condition before the MOT then it would have passed the MOT. Road safety was clearly put at risk; and

(l) Dangerous defects were being identified at MOT. That should never, ever, happen. Four MOT failure notices that show this appear at pages 130, 132, 134 and 135 of the electronic bundle; and

(m) Two road safety “S” marked prohibitions were issued at the roadside and then a third and a fourth “S” marked prohibition were issued at the fleet inspection undertaken by vehicle examiner Smith. The facts speak for themselves in that respect; and

(n) There was an unsatisfactory response to the MIVR from the operator; and from the MIVR and prohibitions issued it is clear that the following general undertakings that are recorded on this operator’s licence were breached:

(i) Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition; and

(ii) Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing; and

(iii) Records are kept (for a minimum of 15 months) of all driver reports which recorded defects, all safety inspections, routine maintenance and repairs to vehicles and that these are made available upon request.

Assurances were given in response to the MIVR. They were unsatisfactory in nature. However, with so many areas of serious non-compliance being brought to the operator’s attention significant and immediate changes were expected such that the operator was expected to dedicated its time in addressing all shortcomings in order to be compliant and to remain compliant.

That did not happen.

The supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Smith dated 26 June 2025 (120 days after the date of the MIVR visit by vehicle examiner Smith) was evidence based, credible, cogent and persuasive. It was accepted as such. In combination with vehicle examiner Smith’s oral evidence I was satisfied that all of the allegations made within it were proven. I repeat all of those proven allegations and adopt them all as my own findings of fact. There many proven allegations, amongst them are the following:

(a) An immediate prohibition was issued on 03 June 2025 for a tyre worn below the legal limit. This is a repeat of the prohibition being issued on 31 December 2024 for a tyre worn below the legal limit. Clearly lessons had not been learned. Clearly significant improvements had not been made to driver defect reporting since 31 December 2024 or the MIVR of 26 February 2025. Road safety was once again placed at a real risk from a tyre that could fail at any moment; and

(b) Tyres pressures were still not being recorded on PMI sheets; and

(c) No evidence of defect rectification was provided to vehicle examiner Smith; and

(d) 3 of 9 PMIs received still did not have the roadworthiness declaration signed; and

(e) Many maintenance records were not fully completed; and

(f) A brake test was dated five days after a vehicle was signed off as being roadworthy. That is clearly a false roadworthiness declaration because the vehicle could not be signed off as roadworthy five days before brakes had been tested; and

(g) Driver defect reporting sheets showed the same defect as being present for multiple days; vehicle YN65 LMM showed for 13 consecutive days (from 28 May to 13 June) “brake pads uneven wear”. The vehicle covered 7,118km in that condition; and

(h) Many defects recorded by drivers did not show any detail to demonstrate the defect had been rectified; and

(i) Some driver defect first use inspections were completed in less than 1 minute. It is simply impossible to complete any effective walk round inspection in that time. The GMTR suggests that 15 minutes is, on average, the minimum time it should take; and

(j) Of the 9 PMI records presented, 3 of them (33%) contained driver spottable defects; and

(k) The forward planner was not listing all MOTs, road tax due dates and PMIs; and

It was therefore clear that vehicles with known defects remained in service, vehicles were in service when not in a roadworthy condition, vehicles were put back into service when they had not been declared as being roadworthy, there was still a wholly ineffective driver defect reporting system in place and maintenance records were not being properly completed. Looking at this operator in the rounds, road safety was still being put at a real risk on a daily basis.

As at the date of vehicle examiner Smith’s supplemental statement (26 June 2025) the following general undertakings that attach to this operator’s licence were still being breached:

(i) Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition; and

(ii) Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing; and

(iii) Records are kept (for a minimum of 15 months) of all driver reports which recorded defects, all safety inspections, routine maintenance and repairs to vehicles and that these are made available upon request.

I fully agree with the summary of what vehicle examiner Smith said; “…The operator is still failing to reach a basic level of compliance let alone maintain compliance…the operator gave many assurances in their response to the MIVR which clearly have not been adhered to.”

At page 390 of the bundle is a part of a PMI dated 12 April 2025 (the full document appears at page 392). The signature in the green box is the true signature of Mr Dickinson, mechanic. This document, in the red box, has a false signature underneath the roadworthiness declaration which was created by Mr Gordes with the intent to deceive or mislead a reader into thinking it was signed by the mechanic Mr Dickinson when it was not. Mr Gordes explanation to me as to why he filled in the section in the red box and signed it to look like Mr Dickinson; that he did not know what to do at the time, was totally unbelievable and was not in any way persuasive.

I reach this finding because (a) Mr Dickinson confirmed that he did not sign that declaration, (b) Mr Gordes told me that he signed that declaration and because (c) there is only one credible and persuasive reason why Mr Gordes signed that declaration as Mr Dickinson in a manner to make the signature look like Mr Dickinson’s signature; because he wanted it to look like Mr Dickinson had signed it himself. Had he acted with any integrity at all he would have signed it himself as Mr Gordes and added a note next to it to explain why he had done that; for example “signed by myself on behalf of Mr Dickinson after he confirmed to me that the vehicle was roadworthy”. Or he might have taken the PMI back to Mr Dickinson to sign the declaration. Or he might have signed it in some other way such as “PP Mr Dickinson” and used writing that did not attempt to look like that used by Mr Dickinson.

At page 391 of the bundle is a part of a PMI dated 25 May 2025 (the full document appears at page 395). The signature in the green box is the true signature of Mr Dickinson, mechanic. This document, in the red box, has a false signature underneath the roadworthiness declaration which was created by Mr Gordes with the intent to deceive or mislead a reader into thinking it was signed by the mechanic Mr Dickinson when it was not. Mr Gordes explanation to me as to why he filled in the section in the red box and signed it to look like Mr Dickinson; that he did not know what to do at the time, was totally unbelievable and was not in any way persuasive.

I reach this finding because of the same reasons given in paragraph 26 above; because (a) Mr Dickinson confirmed that he did not sign that declaration, (b) Mr Gordes told me that he signed that declaration and because (c) there is only one credible and persuasive reason why Mr Gordes signed that declaration as Mr Dickinson in a manner to make the signature look like Mr Dickinson’s signature; because he wanted it to look like Mr Dickinson had signed it himself. Had he acted with any integrity at all he would have signed it himself as Mr Gordes and added a note next to it to explain why he had done that; for example “signed by myself on behalf of Mr Dickinson after he confirmed to me that the vehicle was roadworthy”. Or he might have taken the PMI back to Mr Dickinson to sign the declaration. Or he might have signed it in some other way such as “PP Mr Dickinson” and used writing that did not attempt to look like that used by Mr Dickinson.

I am in no doubt whatsoever that Mr Gordes knew what he was doing when he carefully attempted to copy Mr Dickinson’s writing and signature on those two documents. Creating any false document and/or declaration is extremely serious misconduct that cuts to the very heart of the operator licensing system; trust.

BALANCING EXERCISE

There were some positives in this case; Mr Gordes had undertaken transport manager CPC refresher training in April this year, he intended (in the future) to engage the services of another transport manager, that from 01 August (in the future) all drivers will be employed on a PAYE basis only, an app was now being used by drivers to undertake their walk round inspection (but contrary to Mr Gordes assertion I am satisfied that it is possible to demonstrate, show or supply any repair records contained within that app, as per the evidence of vehicle examiner Smith), greater pre-MOT inspections were promised in the future, Mr Gordes had stopped re-cutting tyres and would not do so again after the prohibitions to tyres showed how precarious re-cutting tyres was, the PMI roadworthiness declaration will now be signed by the mechanic, drivers will receive training going forward from an accredited provider that will also assist the operator.

I have given as much credit as I can for the positives that have already happened. I have given little weight to promises made into the future and after the date of the public inquiry. There has been a significant amount of time (139 days) from the day vehicle examiner Smith visited the operator to undertake the maintenance investigation to the date of the public inquiry for this operator to have put everything in place before the date of the public inquiry in order to demonstrate that full compliance had been restored and would remain in place on a permanent basis.

I have given significant weight to each, and all, of the negative findings in this case that resulted in road safety being put at a real risk. I have given significant weight to the two proven instances where Mr Gordes created false signatures on the roadworthiness declarations with the intend to deceive/mislead.

Looking at the operator as at the date of the public inquiry, and after giving as much credit (evidential weight) to the positives in this case I still determine that the weight given to the negatives vastly outweighs that of the positives.

STATUTORY DOCUMENT NUMBER 10, ANNEX 4 CONSIDERATION

I have then considered Statutory Document number 10, Annex 4, issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner.

Counsel for the operator accepted in his submissions that this case fell within the “Severe to Serious” category for consideration of regulatory action. I agree with that.

Even after applying as much credit as I can to the positives, as I have found them to be, this is still a bad case because:

(a) Road safety has been put at continual risk for a long time; and

(b) As at the date of the public inquiry the operator was still a very long way from being compliant with the general, maintenance related, undertakings that attach to this operator’s licence; and

(c) The operator’s sole director and transport manager deliberately created two false signatures on two separate maintenance documents with the intent to deceive/mislead.

Looking at this case in the rounds I have determined that it falls towards the top end of the “Severe to Serious” range.

DECISIONS

I repeat all of my findings of fact. I remind myself of the credit that I have given to the operator. I have then asked myself the question posed in the Upper Tribunal appeal case of Priority Freight. I answer that question in the negative; I do not trust this operator to be compliant in the future because of the significant and ongoing risk to road safety it has caused, its failure to deliver on assurances made in response to the MIVR, its failure to be anywhere near compliant as at the date of the public inquiry and because the operator’s sole director (the heart and mind of the company) and transport manager has acted without integrity by creating two false signatures with the intent to deceive/mislead.

I repeat all of my findings fact. I remind myself of the credit that I have given to the operator. I have then asked myself the question posed in the Transport Tribunal (as it was then) appeal case of Bryan Haulage number 2; is the conduct of this operator such that it ought to be put out of business? In answering that question I have reminded myself that road safety is the overriding objective of operator licencing and of this jurisdiction. I have reminded myself that trust is the bedrock of the jurisdiction. In this case this operator has put road safety at significant and ongoing risk for a long time and this operator has deliberately acted without integrity on two occasions which has cut to the very heart of the issue of trust. Either of those two matters is enough for me to determine that it is proportionate to answer the Bryan Haulage question in affirmative. Both together is enough for me to determine that it is proportionate to answer this question in the affirmative. Taking all of my findings as a whole I also determine it is proportionate to answer this question in the affirmative. As a result, this operator has lost its good repute and that determination is with immediate effect. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I revoke this operator’s licence under section 27(1)(a) of the Act.

I repeat all of my findings of fact and I again remind myself of the credit that I have given in this case. Having done so I am in no doubt whatsoever that Mr Gordes has failed to be “effective” as a transport manager and that his failure to ensure that the day-to-day transport operation acted in a compliant and safe manner was long standing and continued right up to the date of the public inquiry. He also acted without integrity by creating the two false signatures on two separate maintenance documents with the intent to deceive/mislead. There is no doubt at all that it is proportionate for me to determine that he lost his good repute as a transport manager at the time the MIVR was undertaken, it remained lost at the time of the supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Smith and it remained lost as at the date of the public inquiry. The determination that Mr Gordes is no longer of good repute as a transport manager is with immediate effect. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I must disqualify him as a transport manager.

Annex 4 in Statutory Document 10 gives a range of 1-3 years where disqualification is considered at a first public inquiry. With the credit that I can give in this case I determine that the proportionate length of disqualification is 18 months. Under paragraph 16(2) of schedule 3 of the Act I disqualify Mr Gordes as a transport manager from 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 until 14 February 2027. Given his fundamental failure to act with integrity as a transport manager I cannot think of any rehabilitation measure that I can require of him. It will be a matter for him how he goes about demonstrating that he has restored his good repute as a transport manager should he ever wish to enter the profession again after his period of disqualification ends. I add that the mere passage of time will not suffice to do that.

The operator is now without a transport manager who is of good repute. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I revoke this operator’s licence under section 27(1)(b) of the Act as well as under section 27(1)(a) of the Act as the operator is also no longer professionally competent.

I repeat all of my findings of fact and remind myself of the credit that I have given. Having done so, and looking at this case in the rounds, I determine that it is proportionate to revoke this operator’s licence under my discretionary powers pursuant to sections 26(1)(c)(iii), 26(1)(e), 26(1)(f) and 26(1)(h) of the Act.

All orders of revocation take effect at 2359 hours on 14 August 2025.

From that time and date this operator has no lawful authority to operate any vehicle over 3,500kg. Were it to do so the DVSA have the power to impound any vehicle so operated and the operator is now given actual knowledge of that power. In that respect this written decision is regarded as a pre-impounding letter by the DVSA and will be used as such.

DISQUALIFICATION OF THE OPERATOR

I repeat all of my findings of fact and I remind myself again of all of the credit that I have given to this operator.

I have considered the Transport Tribunal (as it was before the Upper Tribunal) appeal case of 2006/27 Fenlon where it was held that:

‘trust is one of the foundation stones of operator licensing. Trafﬁc, commissioners must be able to trust operators to comply with all the relevant laws, rules and regulations because it would be a physical and ﬁnancial impossibility to police every aspect of the licensing system all day and every day. In addition, operators must be able to trust other operators to observe the relevant laws, rules and regulations. If trust between operators breaks down and some operators believe that others are obtaining an unfair commercial advantage by ignoring laws, rules or regulations then standards will inevitably slip and the public will suffer.”

I have also considered the Upper Tribunal appeal cases on the subject of disqualification including 2018/072 St Mikalos Company Ltd & M Timinis and 2010/029 David Finch Haulage.

This was a bad case where there have been four “S” marked prohibitions, where road safety was put at real (and sometimes significant) risk for a long period of time, where assurances made in response to a MIVR were not fulfilled, where the sole director had acted without any integrity when he deliberately created two false signatures on two maintenance documents with the intent to deceive/mislead and where I have determined that as a result of the acts and omissions of Mr Gordes I have no trust in this operator being compliant in the future.

There is no legal requirement for there to be a special feature in order for a Traffic Commissioner to disqualify an operator and/or director. However, here there are several such features in any event; four “S” marked prohibitions, the length and extent of road safety being put at a real risk and lack of integrity of the sole director, Mr Gordes, on two occasions.

I am more than satisfied that this is a case where disqualification of both the operator and its sole director is both proportionate and also necessary in order to send the right message out to the public at large and to compliant operators so that they see that robust regulatory action will be taken in the most serious of cases.

Statutory document number 10, Annex 4, gives a range of 1-3 years when disqualification is directed after a first public inquiry.

In this case I have determined that the proportionate length of disqualification is 18 months to mark the serious nature of this case balanced against the credit that I have been able to give.

Ligo Trans Ltd is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any traffic area under sections 28(1), 28(3) and 28(4) of the Act and the period of disqualification starts at 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 and ends on 14 February 2027.

Mr Eugen-Liviu Gordes is disqualified from holding or obtaining any type of operator’s licence in any capacity and in any traffic area under sections 28(1), 28(3) and 28(4) of the Act and the period of disqualification starts at 2359 hours on 14 August 2025 and ends on 14 February 2027.

Traffic Commissioner Mr M Dorrington 23 July 2025