Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: UK Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025
Source: gov.uk (2025-11-20)

Delivered at the November 2025 IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna.

The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for the IAEA’s work in Ukraine, over a reporting period that has seen an alarming number of incidents that threaten the nuclear safety of Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).

The DG’s report highlights a number of concerning nuclear safety incidents:

On 1 October off-site power was lost at the Chornobyl site due to a strike on the Slavutych substation. This caused a blackout to the New Safe Confinement for three hours.

On 30 October, IAEA teams reported the disconnection of an off-site power line at Khmelnytskyi and South Ukraine NPPs, due to military activity.

On 8 November, IAEA teams reported the disconnection of one off-site power line at Khmelnytskyi and Rivne Nuclear Power Plants respectively, again due to military strikes.

That same day, the DG reported that Khmelnytskyi and Rivne NPPs had to reduce output of electricity following an overnight attack on an electrical substation.

Compounding an already precarious situation, the DG’s update of last night (19 November) reports that all three of Ukraine’s operating NPPs, were forced to reduce power output follow more attacks that further destabilised the electrical grid.

Chair, at the Agency’s General Conference, the Head of the Russian delegation stated that nuclear safety and security of nuclear facilities is Russia’s “utmost priority”. All these incidents tell a very different story. One of blatant disregard for the nuclear safety principles this Board is meant to uphold.

Chair,

As we have heard, during this reporting period Zaporizhzhia NPP lost off-site power for 30 days. The Russian Governor tried to downplay the risks of this prolonged loss of external power. The truth is that diesel generators are not designed for long-term operation; they are vulnerable to fuel shortages – which are foreseeable in a warzone – and mechanical failure – any of which could compromise reactor cooling and lead to a nuclear safety incident. Let me be clear: these risks would not exist if Russia had not invaded Ukraine. It is Russia’s aggression that poses the greatest threat to Ukraine’s nuclear safety and security.

Chair,

We therefore commend the Director General for engaging both sides to agree a period of silence to allow for repairs to take place to the 750kw Dniprovska and 330kw Ferosplavna lines, under the supervision of courageous IAEA staff.

However, less than one month after repairs were completed, on 17 November, the 750kw line was once again disconnected. We are grateful for the DG’s confirmation that the connections have now been restored.

Chair,

On Russia’s accusation of double standards, Russia’s ability to transform aggression into victimhood is world class. Fortunately this Board deals in fact not fiction.

Chair,

Again on double standards, I was encouraged to hear the Russian delegate yesterday refer to attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities as “irresponsible and aggressive actions”. I urge Russia to practice what it preaches, withdraw from its forcible takeover of ZNPP, and cease its unjustified attacks on Ukraine’s nuclear and energy infrastructure.

Thank you, Chair.