UK Right of Reply on behalf of AUKUS partners to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025
Source: gov.uk (2025-11-21)

Agenda Item 7: Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects of the NPT

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to misleading claims about Australia’s acquisition of a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability through the AUKUS partnership. Once again, we are compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise the nature of our collaboration.

Australia’s cooperation with the UK and US on this matter is being undertaken in full compliance with our respective obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons (NPT), South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), and Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

The repeated attempts by one member state to add this item to this meeting’s agenda falsely implies an active compliance problem where none exists and shows a clear intent to manipulate the Board’s agenda solely for political purposes.

It is particularly disappointing that this agenda item has been insisted upon at this particular Board of Governors, given we have already discussed this matter under the DG’s dedicated item on Naval Nuclear Propulsion: Australia. This unnecessary agenda item does not, and has never, enjoyed consensus support. Given that the Board has other important business and that the DG is reporting under his own agenda item as appropriate, it may soon be time to seriously consider the utility of this agenda item.

Chair,

Under this item, the Board continues to hear unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent information AUKUS partners have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General. There are plenty of issues I could respond to here today, but in the interests of time I will focus on reminding the Board that:

Naval Nuclear Propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model CSA (INFCIRC/153) – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific provision enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in NNP, within the safeguards framework.

The IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. Interference would politicise the IAEA’s independence, mandate and technical authority and establish a deeply harmful precedent.

Attempts to legitimise ‘intergovernmental discussions’ outside of the well-established, and appropriate mechanisms for inter-state dialogue in the Board on all safeguards matters undermines the right of all states to engage the Agency bilaterally, and confidentially, on their safeguards arrangements.

Furthermore, the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion programme will be subject to a robust package of verification measures consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.

Under Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will be enabled to continue meeting its technical objectives at all stages of the submarines’ lifecycle, verifying that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.

Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, the Director General has stated that he will transmit it to the Board for ‘appropriate action’. To suggest that the Board will somehow be bypassed is false.

The bilateral Geelong Treaty – signed by Australia and the UK on 26 July – reflects and restates our long-standing commitment to set the highest non-proliferation standard for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered, conventionally-armed submarines. It specifically reaffirms that all activities under the Treaty must be carried out in accordance with the UK and Australia’s respective nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

Chair,

We continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item, or any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent, technical mandate of the Agency.

All three AUKUS partners continue to take seriously our commitment to openness and transparency with member states on this matter. We will continue to engage in good faith, as we have done by providing an update under the DG’s item earlier in this meeting.

We welcome the Director General’s continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.