NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: E3 statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025
Source: gov.uk (2025-11-20)

France, Germany and the UK (the E3) delivered a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board on Iran's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement

Chair,

France, Germany and the United Kingdom thank the IAEA Director General for his latest reports on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement and on the verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We commend the Agency’s professional, independent and impartial work providing objective reporting on Iran’s nuclear programme.

This Board of Governors session comes at a critical time for the implementation of safeguards in Iran and for the non-proliferation architecture overall.

The Director General’s report on UNSC Resolution 2231 lays out the extent of Iran’s non-performance of its commitments under the JCPoA over the last six years. As of 13 June 2025, Iran’s overall enriched uranium stockpile was nearly 50 times the JCPoA limit; Iran had more than 440 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 percent. This means Iran had more than ten IAEA “significant quantities” of Highly Enriched Uranium. We should all be concerned that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, in particular its high-enriched material, has remained unaccounted for, for over five months, which increases the risk of diversion of nuclear material.

It is in light of Iran’s significant non-performance of its JCPoA commitments that France, Germany and the United Kingdom, on 28 August, triggered the snapback procedure set out in UNSC Resolution 2231, after intensive diplomatic efforts. This decision was supported by a majority of UNSC members. The completion of the procedure led to the reinstatement of six UNSC resolutions on 28 September 2025, as notified by the United Nations Secretariat. This decision sent a clear signal from the UNSC that Iran must abide by its legal obligations regarding nuclear non-proliferation.

Under the reinstated resolutions, Iran now has a legal obligation to suspend all its activities related to uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water, and to discontinue the construction of related facilities.

The UNSC resolutions explicitly request the IAEA to implement and verify Iran’s compliance with these obligations. Therefore, the E3 and the United States have tabled a resolution to provide the DG with the necessary clarity and direction from the Board to implement the verification mandate set out in the UNSC resolutions.

Chair,

The DG’s report on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement shows that Iran is not implementing its most fundamental obligations under its safeguards agreement.

In particular, the IAEA highlights that the verification of enriched nuclear material in Iran is “long overdue”. As the report recalls, Iran remains the only State without nuclear weapons to have produced such material, for which there is no credible civilian justification.

Iran has likewise failed to provide the special report on the affected facilities and associated nuclear material that is required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, there have been no inspections of the key sites that present a significant proliferation risk.

We reiterate the DG’s statement that the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. The DG’s report shows that the Agency has repeatedly reached out to Iran and expressed its willingness to consider Iran’s concerns in order to urgently address the issue. As clearly indicated by the Agency, there is no technical reason preventing IAEA inspectors from returning to the affected sites.

As a result of Iran’s actions, the Agency has stated in several reports that it has lost continuity of knowledge of the inventories of nuclear material in Iran. The DG’s most recent report concludes by stating that it is “a matter of serious concern and a matter of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement” that the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s HEU stockpile since mid-June 2025.

We urge Iran to return to full compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations and to provide the IAEA with the information and access it needs to assure that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. We call on Iran to implement without delay the measures requested by the Director General, namely:

providing without delay a special report for the affected facilities and the associated nuclear material, as required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement;

allowing the Agency to conduct inspections and design information verifications at the affected facilities;

implementing modified Code 3.1; and

engaging the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues.

Chair,

This Board cannot ignore the serious conclusions of the DG’s report.

While noting that Iran has begun to facilitate Agency access to unaffected facilities, we are extremely concerned that Iran has not taken measures to restore confidence and transparency, namely on the status and whereabouts of its enriched uranium stockpiles. As the DG’s report clearly indicates, it is critical that the Agency is able to verify the inventories of nuclear material in Iran as soon as possible in order to allay its concerns and ensure compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement regarding the possible diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful uses.

No state can be allowed to pick and choose when and how to implement its safeguards agreement. Iran’s continued disregard and manipulation of its safeguards obligations poses a serious threat to the integrity of the safeguards system itself. This should be of utmost concern to all States.

Chair,

Iran returning to full compliance with its safeguards agreement would be a significant step towards establishing confidence in its nuclear programme, and would demonstrate Iran’s commitment to its non-proliferation obligations. On the other hand, continued Iranian obstruction would force this Board to take further action.

The E3 remain committed to achieving a durable, long-term diplomatic solution to address this issue. We call on Iran to engage meaningfully in diplomacy. We call on all UN member states to adhere to their obligations under the six UNSC resolutions reinstated following the legal implementation of the snapback mechanism.

Thank you Chair.