Australia's naval nuclear propulsion: AUKUS update to IAEA Board of Governors, November 2025
Source: gov.uk (2025-11-20)

Update by Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme

Chair,

I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

We thank the Director General for his latest report on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, following on from his previous reports in September 2022, June 2023 and November 2024. We welcome the Director General’s continued commitment to report to the Board, as appropriate, on the Agency’s engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs, in line with its statutory mandate.

As outlined in the report, detailed technical discussions are continuing between Australia and the IAEA in order to develop a robust safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program, including an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Topics under discussion include: the structure of the Material Balance Area, the facility and the site for the new facilities related to Australia’s planned naval nuclear propulsion program; as well as technical discussion of safeguards by design.

The report again confirms that, once the Article 14 arrangement is finalised, the Director General will transmit it to the Board of Governors for appropriate action. AUKUS partners fully support this approach.

We reiterate our commitment to ensuring that the safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program sets the highest non-proliferation standard. As we have stated previously, this does not mean imposing a ‘one size fits all’ model for verifying naval nuclear propulsion – given state specific variations between programs, such an approach would not be effective. Rather, it means enabling the IAEA to continue to meet its technical objectives at all stages of the lifecycle of Australia’s future submarines – so that the IAEA will be able to confirm that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material; no misuse of declared nuclear facilities; and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia.

Chair,

AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and to regularly updating the Board as we work towards supporting Australia’s acquisition, from the early 2030s onwards, of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

As the Director General’s report again indicates, Australia has continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under its CSA, Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangements. And the IAEA has continued to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia’s NNP program, within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements. These activities have included complementary access and the collection of environmental samples at relevant locations.

Chair,

The leaders of our three countries continue to reaffirm our shared commitment to the AUKUS partnership. AUKUS partners are working together to assist Australia as it develops the necessary workforce skills to safely and securely operate and maintain its future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

On 29 October, a US Navy Virginia Class submarine arrived at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia for a scheduled Submarine Maintenance Period. The Submarine Maintenance Period reflects Australia’s growing responsibility and capability and represents a key step in preparing our workforce to support the rotational presence at HMAS Stirling, from 2027 on, of US and UK submarines and, in time, Australia’s own nuclear-powered submarine fleet. It builds on the activities conducted during last year’s Submarine Tendered Maintenance Period, which we noted in our September 2024 update to the Board.

Together with our AUKUS partners, Australian personnel have taken on responsibility for coordinating, supporting, and delivering a significant package of maintenance work as part of this year’s activity.

There will be no nuclear or radiological work conducted by Australians on board the SSN or ashore at HMAS Stirling during the SMP. AUKUS partners informed the Agency of this activity before it occurred.

All SMP-related activities are being undertaken in full compliance with our respective non-proliferation obligations, including under the NPT, and Australia’s safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and Australia’s obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Chair,

As the Director General’s reporting to this Board has repeatedly confirmed, the IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute, and extensive precedent, to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements under their safeguards agreements. The Director General has also made clear that the IAEA has the technical capacity to develop safeguards approaches for NNP.

Interference in the negotiation and implementation of bilateral safeguards arrangements between a State and the IAEA, including in relation to NNP, would politicise the IAEA’s independence, mandate and technical authority and establish a deeply harmful precedent. It is important that all Member States continue to support and respect the IAEA’s ability to carry out its mandate and undertake its technical work independently and impartially – something on which we all rely.

Chair,

We continue to welcome Board discussion of NNP programs under this agenda item, placed on the Board’s agenda by the Director General as he judges appropriate. Such apolitical agenda items allow for technical, constructive discussion of this matter – informed by the Director General’s independent reporting. AUKUS partners will continue to provide updates at future Board meetings and in other fora as appropriate.

We again thank the Director General and his team for his report – GOV/INF/2025/12 – and in the interest of openness and transparency, we request that it be made public.

Thank you, Chair.