the-french-artist/wikipedia_20220301.simple_sentence_split huggingface dataset:
A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner (if there is one); this is the candidate whom more voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time.
This candidate can be found by checking if there is a candidate who beats all other candidates; this can be done by using Copeland's method and then checking if the Copeland winner has the highest possible Copeland score.
Note that there are ½N(N−1) pairwise comparisons for N candidates.
For 10 candidates, this means there are 0.5*10*9=45 comparisons, which can make elections with many candidates hard to count the votes for.
In some situations, an election has no Condorcet winner.
This occurs as a result of a kind of tie known as a majority rule cycle, described by Condorcet's paradox.
Different Condorcet methods pick different winners in these situations.
Some Condorcet methods involve the basic procedure described below, coupled with a Condorcet completion method, which is used to find a winner when there is no Condorcet winner.
Other Condorcet methods involve an entirely different system of counting, but are classified as Condorcet methods because they will still elect the Condorcet winner if there is one.
It is important to note that not all single winner, ranked voting systems are Condorcet methods.
For example, instant-runoff voting and the Borda count are not Condorcet methods.
Basic procedure
Finding the winner
Condorcet methods use pairwise counting.
For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference.
The counts for all possible pairs of candidates show all the pairwise preferences of all the voters.
Pairwise counts are often displayed in a pairwise comparison matrix or outranking matrix such as those below.
In these matrices, each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'.
The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison.
Cells comparing a candidate to themselves are left blank.
Imagine there is an election between four candidates: A, B, C and D. The first matrix below records the preferences expressed on a single ballot paper, in which the voter's preferences are (B, C, A, D); that is, the voter ranked B first, C second, A third, and D fourth.
In the matrix a '1' indicates that the runner is preferred on this voter's ballot over the 'opponent', while a '0' indicates that the runner is defeated.
For example, in the following matrix, A beats D:
Using a matrix like the one above, one can find the overall results of an election.
Each ballot can be transformed into this style of matrix, and then added to all other ballot matrices using matrix addition.
The sum of all ballots in an election is called the sum matrix.
Suppose that in the imaginary election there are two other voters.
Their preferences are (D, A, C, B) and (A, C, B, D).
Added to the first voter, these ballots would give the following sum matrix:
When the sum matrix is found, the contest between each pair of candidates is considered.
The number of votes for runner over opponent (runner,opponent) is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner (opponent,runner) to find the Condorcet winner.
In the sum matrix above, A is the Condorcet winner because A beats every other candidate.
When there is no Condorcet winner, many Condorcet completion methods, such as Ranked Pairs and the Schulze method, use the information contained in the sum matrix to choose a winner.
Cells marked '—' in the matrices above have a numerical value of '0', but a dash is used since candidates are never preferred to themselves.
The first matrix, that represents a single ballot, is inversely symmetric: (runner,opponent) is ¬(opponent,runner).
Or (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = 1.
The sum matrix has this property: (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = N for N voters, if all runners were fully ranked by each voter.
Example: Voting on the location of Tennessee's capital
Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital.
The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state.
For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible.
Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities
Nashville, with 26% of the voters, near the center of the state
Knoxville, with 17% of the voters
Chattanooga, with 15% of the voters
To find the Condorcet winner every candidate must be matched against every other candidate in a series of one-on-one contests.
In each pairing the winner is the candidate preferred by a majority of voters.
The results for every possible pairing are as follows:
As can be seen from both of the tables above, Nashville beats every other candidate.
This means that Nashville is the Condorcet winner.
So Nashville would win an election held under any Condorcet method.
While any Condorcet method will elect Nashville as the winner, first-past-the-post and instant-runoff voting would select Memphis and Knoxville respectively, using the same ballots.
This would occur despite the fact that most people would have preferred Nashville to either of those options.
Condorcet methods make these preferences obvious rather than ignoring or discarding them.
On the other hand, note that in this example Chattanooga also defeats Knoxville and Memphis when paired against those cities.
If Memphis voters had preferred Chattanooga as a second choice rather than as a third choice, then Chattanooga would be the Condorcet winner even though finishing in last place in a first-past-the-post election.
An alternative way of thinking about this example if a Smith-efficient Condorcet method that passes ISDA is used to determine the winner is that 58% of the voters, a mutual majority, ranked Memphis last (making Memphis the majority loser and Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville above Memphis, ruling Memphis out.
At that point, the voters who preferred Memphis as their 1st choice could only help to choose a winner among Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville, and because they all preferred Nashville as their 1st choice among those three, Nashville would've had a 68% majority of 1st choices among the remaining candidates and won as the majority's 1st choice.
Two-method systems
Some Condorcet methods first do a series of pairwise comparisons and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, use an entirely different, non-Condorcet method to determine a winner.
The simplest such fall-back methods completely ignore the results of the pairwise comparisons.
For example, the Black method chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists, but uses the Borda count instead if there is a cycle (the method is named for Duncan Black).
A more complex two-stage process is, when there is a cycle, to first eliminate all candidates not in some group which is found by looking at the pairwise comparisons, and then use a separate voting system to find the winner.
Sets used for this purpose are defined so that they will always contain only the Condorcet winner if there is one, and will always, in any case, contain at least one candidate.
Such sets include the
Smith set: The smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such that every candidate in the set can beat all candidates outside the set.
It is easily shown that there is only one possible Smith set for each election.
Schwartz set: This is the innermost unbeaten set, and is usually the same as the Smith set.
It is defined as the union of all possible sets of candidates such that for every set:
Every candidate inside the set is pairwise unbeatable by any other candidate outside the set (i.e., ties are allowed).
No proper (smaller) subset of the set fulfills the first property.
Landau set (or uncovered set or Fishburn set): the set of candidates, such that each member, for every other candidate (including those inside the set), either beats this candidate or beats a third candidate that itself beats the candidate that is unbeaten by the member.
Single-method systems
Some Condorcet methods use a single procedure that meets the Condorcet criteria and, without any extra procedure, also pick winners when there are cycles.
In other words, these methods do not involve separate procedures for different situations.
Typically these methods base their calculations on pairwise counts.
These methods include:
Copeland's method: This simple method involves electing the candidate who wins the most pairwise matchings.
However, it often produces a tie.
Kemeny–Young method: This method ranks all the choices from most popular and second-most popular down to least popular.
Minimax: Also called Simpson, Simpson–Kramer, and Simple Condorcet, this method chooses the candidate whose worst pairwise defeat is better than that of all other candidates.
A possible improved modification to this method involves only allowing it to choose a winner from the Smith set; this has been called Smith/Minimax.
Nanson's method and Baldwin's method combine the Borda Count with an instant runoff procedure.
Dodgson's method extends the Condorcet method by swapping candidates until a Condorcet winner is found.
The winner is the candidate which requires the minimum number of swaps.
Ranked pairs breaks each cycle in the pairwise preference graph by dropping the weakest majority in the cycle, thereby yielding a complete ranking of the candidates.
This method is also known as Tideman, after its inventor Nicolaus Tideman.
Schulze method repeatedly drops the weakest majority in the pairwise preference graph until there is a Condorcet winner (unless there are ties).
This method is also known as Schwartz sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting and path winner.
Other terms related to the Condorcet method are:
Condorcet loser
the candidate who is less preferred than every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by fewer voters than any other candidate).
Weak Condorcet winner
a candidate who beats or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by at least as many voters as any other candidate).
There can be more than one weak Condorcet winner.
Weak Condorcet loser
a candidate who is defeated by or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup.
Similarly, there can be more than one weak Condorcet loser.
Condorcet ranking methods
Some Condorcet methods produce not just a single winner, but a ranking of all candidates from first to last place.
A Condorcet ranking is a list of candidates with the property that the Condorcet winner (if one exists) comes first and the Condorcet loser (if one exists) comes last, and the same holds for the candidates ranked between them.
Copeland's method, Kemeny–Young method, Ranked pairs, Schulze method
Though there won't always be a Condorcet winner or Condorcet loser, there is always a Smith set and "Smith loser set" (smallest group of candidates who lose to all candidates not in the set in head-to-head elections).
Some voting methods produce rankings that sort all candidates in the Smith set above all others, and all candidates in the Smith loser set below all others, with this also applying to all candidates ranked between them.
Because the Smith set and Smith loser set are equivalent to the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser when they exist, methods that always produce Smith set rankings also always produce Condorcet rankings.
Comparison with instant runoff and first-past-the-post (plurality)
Many proponents of instant-runoff voting (IRV) are attracted by the belief that if their first choice does not win, their vote will be given to their second choice; if their second choice does not win, their vote will be given to their third choice, etc.
This sounds perfect, but it is not true for every voter with IRV.
If someone voted for a strong candidate, and their 2nd and 3rd choices are eliminated before their first choice is eliminated, IRV gives their vote to their 4th choice candidate, not their 2nd choice.
Condorcet voting takes all rankings into account simultaneously, but this makes it fail the later-no-harm criterion and the later-no-help criterion.
With IRV, indicating a second choice will never hurt your first choice.
With Condorcet voting, it is possible that indicating a second choice will cause your first choice to lose.
Plurality voting is simple, and theoretically provides incentives for voters to compromise for centrist candidates rather than throw away their votes on candidates who can't win.
Opponents to plurality voting point out that voters often vote for the lesser of evils because they heard on the news that those two are the only two with a chance of winning, not necessarily because those two are the two good compromise candidates.
This gives the media significant election powers.
Condorcet runs each candidate against the other head to head, so that voters elect the candidate who would win the most sincere runoffs, instead of the one they thought they had to vote for.
There are circumstances, as in the examples above, when both instant-runoff voting and the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system wouldn't elect the Condorcet winner. (
In fact, FPTP can elect the Condorcet loser and IRV can elect the second-worst candidate, who would lose to every candidate except the Condorcet loser.)
When there is a Condorcet winner that IRV doesn't elect, a majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner.
Supporters of the Condorcet criterion see it as an important criterion when choosing a voting method.
They see the Condorcet criterion as a natural extension of majority rule.
Condorcet methods tend to encourage the selection of broadly supported candidates who appeal to the median voter.
Here is an example that is designed to support IRV while making Condorcet look bad:
B is preferred by a 501–499 majority to A, and by a 502–498 majority to C. So, according to the Condorcet criterion, B should win, despite the fact that very few voters rank B in first place.
By contrast, IRV elects C and plurality elects A. The goal of a ranked voting system is for voters to be able to vote sincerely and trust the system to protect their intent.
Potential for tactical voting
Like all voting methods, Condorcet methods are vulnerable to compromising.
That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely (strategically) raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot.
However, Condorcet methods are only vulnerable to compromising when there is a majority rule cycle, or when one can be created.
All Condorcet methods are at least somewhat vulnerable to burying.
That is, voters can sometimes help a more-preferred candidate by strategically lowering the ranking of a less-preferred candidate on their ballot.
Evaluation by criteria
Scholars of electoral systems often compare them using mathematically defined voting system criteria.
The criteria which Condorcet methods satisfy vary from one Condorcet method to another.
However, the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion, and thus is incompatible with independence of irrelevant alternatives (though it implies a weaker analagous form of the criterion: when there is a Condorcet winner, losing candidates can drop out of the election without changing the result), later-no-harm, the participation criterion, and the consistency criterion.
Use of Condorcet voting
Condorcet methods are not known to be currently in use in government elections anywhere in the world, but a Condorcet method known as Nanson's method was used in city elections in the U.S. town of Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s, and today Condorcet methods are used by a number of private organizations.
Organizations which currently use some variant of the Condorcet method are:
The Wikimedia Foundation used the Schulze method to elect its Board of Trustees until 2013, when it switched to a ratings ballot with Support/Neutral/Oppose ballots.
The Pirate Party of Sweden uses the Schulze method for its primaries
The Debian project uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its leader
The Software in the Public Interest corporation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Directors
The Gentoo Foundation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Trustees and its Council
The Free State Project used Minimax for choosing its target state
The uk.*
hierarchy of Usenet
The Student Society of the University of British Columbia uses ranked pairs for its executive elections.
Kingman Hall and Hillegass Parker House, two loosely affiliated student housing cooperatives, each use the Schulze method to elect their management teams.
Other considerations
If every seat in a legislature is elected (in separate elections, by the same pool of voters – use of districts will avoid this) by the Condorcet method, the legislators would all be centrists and might all agree with each on what laws to pass.
Some voters prefer to have opposites in the legislature so they can't pass laws easily.
These voters might prefer the Condorcet method for electing executive offices.
If 10 candidates run for governor in a Condorcet race, ballot counters may need to count 9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1 = 45 head to head runoffs to find the winner.
While this is doable, it might be more practical to still use ballot access laws or primaries, defeating some of the original intent of the Condorcet method.
Possible solutions:
Computers can be used to speed up the counts, though some voters fear computers can be hacked and used for ballot counting fraud.
Another option would be to allow several independent scanner owners count the ballots and compare results.
Volunteer hand counters could then spot check various candidates and ranks to make sure they match the subtotals reported by the scanners.
It is also possible to limit the number of ranks voters can use; for example, if every voter is only allowed to rank each candidate either 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, with equal rankings allowed, then only the runoffs between candidates ranked 1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, 1st and last, 2nd and 3rd, 2nd and last, and 3rd and last need be counted, as the runoffs between two candidates at the same rank will result in ties.
The negative vote-counting approach to pairwise counting may reduce the amount of work the vote-counters have to do.
For example, with 10 candidates, a voter who ranks candidate A as their 1st choice and doesn't rank any other candidate prefers A over 9 other candidates.
In the regular approach, this means recording those 9 preferences; but with negative counting, it can simply be recorded that A is marked on 1 voter's ballot, with this itself indicating that A is preferred in every match-up.
When a voter ranks a candidate 2nd, then a negative vote can be placed in the matchup between the 2nd choice and 1st choice to indicate that the 2nd choice is not preferred to the 1st choice, such that it will cancel out with the support the 2nd choice would receive against the 1st choice from being marked on the voter's ballot.
Negative votes can likewise be applied to matchups where both candidates are ranked equally.
If there are no more than 5 candidates ( or a larger number of candidates is short-listed to 5) then the amount of effort counting ballots could be reduced to normal acceptable levels by asking voters to select an order of preference from a predetermined list of the possibilities.
This would mean that the ballots would just require to be counted once to determine the number of votes cast for each order of preference.
The results would then be entered into a simple spreadsheet which would determine the Condorcet winner.
For example where there are candidates A, B and C, there are six orders of preference, so voters could be asked to choose which of the six they wish to vote for.
Counting would then be simply a matter of counting how votes were cast for each order of preference.
The results could then be applied to a simple spreadsheet which revealed the Condorcet winner.
If there were four candidates (options) then there would be 24 orders of preference; if there were five candidates then there would be 120 orders of preference and so on.
Voters make an economic trade-off in the amount of time invested in researching and ranking candidates.
If voters rank too few candidates or rank such as to inaccurately represent their preferences, the Condorcet candidate cannot be correctly discovered.
Nominating primaries reduce the number of candidates to avoid this, and the style of nominating primary can impact whether the Condorcet candidate—or at least a similar candidate—remains or if all such candidates are eliminated in favor of polarized options.
Ramon Llull (1232–1315) who, with the 2001 discovery of his lost manuscripts Ars notandi, Ars eleccionis, and Alia ars eleccionis, was given credit for discovering the Borda count and Condorcet criterion (Llull winner) in the 13th century
Multipage description of Condorcet method and Ranked Pairs from a Canadian perspective.
Demonstration and commentary on Condorcet method.
In voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, but also known as the top cycle, or as Generalized Top-Choice Assumption (GETCHA), is the smallest non-empty set of candidates in an election such that more voters prefer any candidate in the set over any candidate not in the set in head-to-head matchups.
The Smith set is one way to determine who the best candidates in an election are.
Voting systems that always elect a candidate from the Smith set pass the Smith criterion and are said to be "Smith-efficient".
The Smith set always exists.
There is only one smallest dominating set since dominating sets are nested and non-empty and there is a limited number of candidates.
The Smith set can have more than one candidate, either because of pairwise ties or because of cycles, such as in Condorcet's paradox.
The Condorcet winner, if one exists, is the only member of the Smith set.
If weak Condorcet winners exist then they are in the Smith set.
The Smith set only contains candidates who are also in the mutual majority-preferred set of candidates, if one exists.
The Smith set can be calculated with the Floyd–Warshall algorithm in time Θ.  It can also be calculated using a version of Kosaraju's algorithm or Tarjan's algorithm in time Θ.
A pairwise loses to C, so it is certain that all candidates from A through C (A, B, and C) are in the Smith set.
However, there is one matchup where a candidate who is known to be in the Smith set loses or ties someone who may or may not be in the Smith set: C loses to D; so D is confirmed to be in the Smith set.
Another such matchup can now be seen: D ties with E. So E is added into the Smith set.
Because all of A through E beat all candidates other than each other, the Smith set is A through E.
Condorcet criterion
Landau set
In an analysis of serial decision making based on majority rule, describes the Smith set and the Schwartz set.
Introduces a version of a generalized Condorcet Criterion that is satisfied when pairwise elections are based on simple majority choice, and for any dominating set, any candidate in the set is collectively preferred to any candidate not in the set.
But Smith does not discuss the idea of a smallest dominating set.
Narrows Smith's generalized Condorcet Criterion to the smallest dominating set and calls it Smith's Condorcet Principle.
Discusses the Smith set (named GETCHA) and the Schwartz set (named GOTCHA) as possible standards for optimal collective choice.
Example algorithms to calculate the Smith set
Tomás Felipe Carlovich (20 April 1949 – 8 May 2020) was an Argentine professional football player and coach.
He was born in Rosario, Argentina.
As a coach, he managed Central Córdoba.
As a player, he played for Rosario Central, Central Córdoba and Independiente Rivadavia.
On 6 May 2020, Carlovich was beaten with a shovel by a robber in Rosario while riding his bike.
He died two days later in a coma at a hospital from his injuries, aged 71.
Cécile Rol-Tanguy (10 April 1919 – 8 May 2020) was a French communist.
She was a Resistance fighter during World War II.
She was active in the liberation of Paris.
She was secretariat and a liaison officer, in charge of operations and confidential communications.
She was born in Royan, Saintonge.
Pairwise comparison is any process of comparing things in pairs to judge which of two things is preferred, or has a greater amount of some something, or whether or not the two things are identical.
The method of pairwise comparison is used in the scientific study of preferences, attitudes, voting systems, social choice, public choice, requirements engineering and multiagent AI systems.
In psychology literature, it is often referred to as paired comparison.
If someone shows what they like more between two options, this preference can be expressed as a pairwise comparison.
If the two alternatives are x and y, these three pairwise comparisons are possible:
The person prefers x over y: "x > y" or "xPy"
The person prefers y over x: "y > x" or "yPx"
The person has no preference between both alternatives: "x = y" or "xIy"
It is generally assumed that pairwise comparisons are transitive.
Most agree on what transitivity is, though there is debate about the transitivity of indifference.
The rules of transitivity are as follows.
If xPy and yPz, then xPz
If xPy and yIz, then xPz
If xIy and yPz, then xPz
If xIy and yIz, then xIz
Argument for intransitivity of indifference
Some believe that indifference (lack of preference) is not transitive.
Suppose you like apples and you prefer apples that are larger.
Now suppose there exists an apple A, an apple B, and an apple C that are the same except for the following.
Suppose B is larger than A, but it is not possible to see this without an extremely sensitive measuring device.
Also suppose C is larger than B, but this also can't be seen without a sensitive measuring device.
However, the difference in sizes between apples A and C is large enough that you can see it.
In psychophysical terms, the size difference between A and C is above the just noticeable difference ('jnd') while the size differences between A and B and B and C are below the jnd.
You are confronted with the three apples in pairs without a sensitive measuring device.
Because of this, when shown only A and B, you have no preference between apple A and apple B; and you are indifferent between apple B and apple C when shown only B and C.  However, when the pair A and C are shown, you prefer C over A.
Preference orders
If pairwise comparisons are transitive by the four rules shown above, then pairwise comparisons for a list of alternatives (A1, A2, A3, ..., An−1, and An) can take the form:
A1(>XOR=)A2(>XOR=)A3(>XOR=) ... (>XOR=)An−1(>XOR=)An
For example, if there are three alternatives a, b, and c, then the 13 possible preference orders are:
If the number of alternatives is n, and indifference is not allowed, then the number of possible preference orders for any given n-value is n!.
If indifference is allowed, then the number of possible preference orders is the number of total preorders.
It can be expressed as a function of n:
where S2(n, k) is the Stirling number of the second kind.
Law of comparative judgment
Potentially all pairwise rankings of all possible alternatives (PAPRIKA) method
PROMETHEE pairwise comparison method
Preference (economics)
Stochastic Transitivity
Y. Chevaleyre, P.E. Dunne, U. Endriss, J. Lang, M. Lemaître, N. Maudet, J. Padget, S. Phelps, J.A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, and P. Sousa.
Issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation.
Informatica, 30:3–31, 2006.
Bradley, R.A. and Terry, M.E. (1952).
Rank analysis of incomplete block designs, I. the method of paired comparisons.
Biometrika, 39, 324–345.
David, H.A. (1988).
The Method of Paired Comparisons.
Luce, R.D. (1959).
Individual Choice Behaviours: A Theoretical Analysis.
New York: J. Wiley.
Thurstone, L.L. (1927).
A law of comparative judgement.
Psychological Review, 34, 278–286.
Thurstone, L.L. (1929).
The Measurement of Psychological Value.
In T.V. Smith and W.K. Wright (Eds.),
Essays in Philosophy by Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy of the 	University of Chicago.
Chicago: Open Court.
Thurstone, L.L. (1959).
The Measurement of Values.
Zermelo, E. (1928).
Die Berechnung der Turnier-Ergebnisse als ein Maximumproblem der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Mathematische Zeitschrift 29, 1929, S. 436–460
Madeleine Riffaud (born 23 August 1924) is a French poet, journalist, war correspondent and a member of the French Resistance.
She was born in Arvillers, France.
Riffaud was awarded the National Order of Merit.
She began operating for the French Forces of the Interior at the age of 18 under the codename "Rainer".
On July 23, 1944, at age 19, she became known for the killing of a German officer, whom she shot dead.
Shortly afterwards, she was captured by the Gestapo and was nearly executed.
After the war ended in 1945, she became a journalist for Ce Soir, a French newspaper.
Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe (née Wilborts; born 31 May 1923) is a French sociologist, activist and World War II resistance fighter.
In 2008, she was honored with the Legion of Honour.
During World War II, she was arrested by the Gestapo to La Santé Prison.
She was nearly executed.
In 1954, she began working for the National Centre for Scientific Research.
In 1996, she became Chair of the Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation.
Portrait  de Marie-José Chombart de Lauwe
Irish Home Rule was a proposed system of government in Ireland, in which Ireland would have its own government inside the United Kingdom.
Until 1920, Ireland was ruled directly by the British government.
British members of parliament tried to pass bills for Home Rule in 1896, 1893, and 1912, but they never got enough votes to pass.
Irish Nationalists supported Home Rule, and Irish Unionists opposed it.
The 1886 bill was supported by the Liberal Party, but did not get enough votes in the House of Commons.
The 1893 bill got enough votes to pass in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords.
William Gladstone was an important supporter of both.
The 1912 bill also passed in the House of Commons, but not the House of Lords.
In 1912, Unionists in Ulster signed a document called the Ulster Covenant, and made an army called the Ulster Volunteers, to fight against Home Rule.
Although many Nationalists wanted Home Rule, some thought it was not good enough.
Most members of the party Sinn Féin wanted Ireland to be completely separate from Great Britain.
Sinn Féin became the most powerful party in 1916 and made their own government in Dublin, the Dáil Éireann.
Irish Nationalists fought in the Irish War of Independence against the British government from 1919-1921.
In 1920, Britain passed a law that said there would be two parliaments, one for Northern Ireland, and one for Southern Ireland.
This was a form of Home Rule.
However, the Southern Ireland parliament never met.
The war did not end until the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which created the Irish Free State.
The Irish Free State still had the same king as Britain, but had a separate government.
"Frinkcoin" is the 13th episode of the 31st season of The Simpsons.
It was first shown on television in the United States on the Fox network on February 23, 2020.
In the episode, Professor Frink makes a new cryptocurrency.
The episode was watched by 1.84 million people when it was first shown on television.
The Simpson family are eating at a vegan restaurant, wanting Lisa to pick them for a project at school.
She chooses Professor Frink because he wants to help the world with science.
At Springfield University, Lisa interviews Professor Frink.
Frink says he is making a new cryptocurrency called Frinkcoin.
Frinkcoin becomes well known, making Frink the richest man in Springfield.
Mr. Burns is angry because he is no longer the richest man in Springfield.
Frink feels lonely, so Marge says that he should go to Moe's Tavern.
Frink gets every question correct in Moe's trivia questions, so they become friends with Frink.
Frink shows his friends Springfield's best places.
Smithers gets a team of people to create a cryptocurrency for Mr. Burns.
The team creates an equation to make Frinkcoin worth nothing, but it will take thousands of years to calculate.
Instead, Mr. Burns tells Frink that his friends only like him because he is rich.
Burns brings the equation to Springfield for a crowdsourcing solution.
Frink finds out that his friends only like him because he is rich.
Frink solves the equation himself, but only Lisa knows.
Frink loses all of his money, but he is happy to be friends with Lisa and to go back to his university.
Dennis Perkins of The A.V. Club gave the episode a score of B and says that the episode "uses the cryptocurrency concept as an excuse for a largely successful exercise in side-character development."
Den of Geek gave the episode a 4 out of 5 stars and says "'Frinkcoin' is a satisfying episode" and  that Lisa and Frink's actions add up to a "solid half hour investment."
The Mephisto Waltz is a 1971 American horror movie directed by Paul Wendkos and based on the novel of the same name by Fred Mustard Stewart.
It stars Alan Alda, Jacqueline Bisset, Barbara Perkins, Bradford Dillman, Curd Jürgens and was distributed by 20th Century Fox.
Ace High (, literally translated as "The Four of the Hail Mary") is a 1968 Italian western movie directed by Giuseppe Colizzi and starring Eli Wallach, Bud Spencer, Terence Hill, Brock Peters, Kevin McCarthy, Bruno Corazzari, Rick Boyd.
It was distributed by Paramount Pictures and is the second part of the Italian western trilogy.
Movies directed by Giuseppe Colizzi
Postal Index Number is also called as Pincode.
It is used in India For Post office Numbering or post office system.
It is also used for couriering in India.
It is used by
India Post and many courier Company.
It is six digit long code to identify the city or area
Esme & Roy is an animated children's television series created by Dustin Ferrer and Amy Steinberg.
The series is produced by Canada-based animation studio Nelvana and Sesame Street creator Sesame Workshop, in association with Corus Entertainment.
The show follows a little girl named Esme and her best friend, a monster named Roy, who take care of all kinds of creatures when their regular guardians need aid.
Esme & Roy was broadcast simultaneously on HBO in the United States and Treehouse TV in Canada on August 18, 2018.
On May 6, 2019, it was announced that it was renewed for a second season.
It was also announced Summer 2019 that season one would premiere on PBS Kids Family Night on August 30 or August 31, 2019 depending on the local station, with regular airtime on Saturday and Sunday mornings on the 24/7 PBS Kids Channel only thereafter.
In September 2019, it was announced new episodes of the show would be moving from HBO to HBO Max starting with the second season.
The second season will also begin airing at an unknown date on PBS Kids.
Aurangabad is a Indian reservatory center in in the Aurangabad district in India.
It is famous for a cement plant and World Best Deo Surya Mandir.
There are two main languages spoken in Aurangabad - Marathi and Hindi.
Arie Slob (born November 16, 1961 in Nieuwerkerk aan den IJssel) is a Dutch politician of the ChristianUnion (CU).
Slob studied history and went into politics, first on behalf of the Reformed Political Alliance (GPV), later on of its successor the ChristianUnion.
Slob was a councillor of Zwolle and a member of the House of Representatives.
From 2017 to 2022, he was minister for education for children and teenagers in the Third Rutte cabinet.
Columbia County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon.
As of the 2010 census, the county has a population of 49,351 people.
The county seat is St. Helens.
It was named after the Columbia River, which forms its eastern and northern borders.
Grant County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon.
As of the 2010 census, the county has a population of 7,445 people.
The county seat is Canyon City.
Dallas is a city in Oregon in the United States.
Polk County is a county located in the U.S. state of Oregon.
As of the 2010 census, 75,403 people lived there which makes it the smallest populous county in the Willamette Valley.
Paraza is a commune of 622 people (2017).
Le Thor is a commune.
La Tour-d'Aigues is a commune.
Kangaroo is a 1952 American Australian western movie directed by Lewis Milestone and stars Maureen O'Hara, Peter Lawford, Finlay Currie, Richard Boone.
It was distributed by 20th Century Fox and was remade as The Jackals in 1967.
My Sister Eileen is a 1955 American musical comedy movie directed by Richard Quine and based on the autobiographical short stories by Ruth McKenney.
It stars Janet Leigh, Jack Lemmon, Betty Garrett, Bob Fosse, Dick York, Adelle August and was distributed by Columbia Pictures.
Ritva Valkama (real name Valkama-Palo, 13 November 1932 – 8 May 2020) was a Finnish actress.
She was known for her comic roles.
Harrell was known for her roles in Häpy Endkö?
Eli kuinka Uuno Turhapuro sai niin kauniin ja rikkaan vaimon, Herr Puntila and His Servant Matti and Borrowing Matchsticks.
Andre Harrell (September 26, 1960 – May 8, 2020) was an American record producer and hip hop musician.
Harrell was the founder of the record label, Uptown Records.
Harrell was president/CEO of Motown Records.
He was the first half of the hip hop duo Dr. Jeckyll & Mr. Hyde.
Harrell was most known as the man that turned Diddy into a music mogul.
Wikitongues is an American non-profit organization registered in New York.
Its goal is to document all the languages in the world.
It was founded by Frederico Andrade, Daniel Bogre Udell and Lindie Botes in 2014.
Oral histories
By May 2016, 329 videos in over 200 languages were recorded for Wikitongues.
As of 2018, the amount of languages increased to 350 languages, or 5% of the languages in the world, with plans to increase the amount of languages to 1000 in the coming years.
Poly is an open-source software program designed to be used to share and learn languages.
Wikitongues earned $52,716 USD combined from 429 backers on Kickstarter, which helped Poly be developed.
Poly is currently under development.
All videos recorded for Wikitongues are released under a CC-by-NC 4.0 license.
It was recently made possible to use a CC-by-SA 4.0 license instead.
Related players
The Mukai sisters (Kozue, Chiaki, Kaori) are her pupils, and all of them are professional players.
She also has two sisters: Kazuko Sugiuchi (Older sister, mentor of Tomoko Kato) and Teruko Kusunoki (Younger sister), both of them are professional players.
Go Seigen (Sachiko Honda visited Taiwan with him in 1952.
This visit was organized for the promotion of Go)
Masao Sugiuchi (Her brother in law)
Official profile at Nihon Ki-in
The majority criterion is a single-winner voting system criterion, used to compare these systems.
The criterion says that "if one candidate is liked more by a majority (more than 50%) of voters than all other candidates, then that candidate must win".
Supporters of other voting systems say that the majority criterion is actually bad, since it can lead to a tyranny of the majority where a candidate is elected who is loved by a little over half of the population and hated by everyone else.
Other systems may be better at electing consensus candidates who have broader support, which is argued to make them better representatives of the population as a whole.
These are described as "utilitarian" or "consensus-seeking" rather than "majoritarian".
Peter Emerson supports Borda count variants, and believes that majority rule is fundamentally flawed and leads to problems such as bitterness, division, and violence, citing Northern Ireland and Bosnia as examples.
Note however that in a utilitarian system, when no broadly supported candidate exists, that a minority can beat a majority because their candidate had slightly more support; because of this, utilitarian methods may not always increase consensus.
The mutual majority criterion is a more broad form of the majority criterion which allows a majority to prefer multiple candidates over all of the other candidates, rather than only one; voting methods which pass the majority criterion but fail mutual majority can encourage all but one of the majority's preferred candidates to exit the election so that one of the majority-preferred candidates wins, creating a spoiler effect.
The common choose-one First-past-the-post voting method is notable for this, because major political parties often attempt to prevent more than one of their candidates from running and splitting the vote, by using primary elections.
Comparison with the Condorcet criterion
The Condorcet criterion is stronger.
It says that a candidate X should win if for every other candidate Y, more voters agree that they prefer X over Y than the number of voters who prefer Y to X.
Satisfaction of the Condorcet criterion implies that of the majority criterion, but not vice versa.
With the Condorcet criterion there may be different majorities depending on who X and Y are, but the majority criterion only applies when there is a single majority which has X as their first choice, preferred over every other candidate.
(When saying that the Condorcet criterion is stronger than the majority criterion, the word criterion should be understood as a criterion that a voting system may or may not satisfy, not as a criterion that a candidate must pass in order to win the election.)
Voting system criterion
Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC) is a voting system criterion for ranked voting systems.
It is important for giving proportional representation for voters in multiple-winner ranked voting systems.
Solid coalitions
A group of voters  is a solid coalition for a group of candidates , if every voter in  ranks every candidate in  ahead of every candidate that is not in .
Let  be the number of voters,  be the number of seats to be filled and  be some positive number.
–PSC
–PSC is based on the Hare quota .
If  is a solid coalition for  and the number of voters in  is at least  Hare quotas, then at least  candidates from  must be elected (if  has less than  candidates at all, then all of them have to be elected).
This criterion was created by Michael Dummett.
–PSC is defined like –PSC, but is based on the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota  instead of the Hare quota, and the number of voters in  must exceed  Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas.
It is a more general form of the majority criterion because it allows for groups of supported candidates (solid coalitions) instead of just one candidate, and there may be more than one candidate that will be elected.
Because some authors call the fraction  a Droop quota, –PSC is also known as the Droop proportionality criterion.
Droop proportionality means that a majority-size solid coalition will always be able to elect at least half of the seats.
This is because a majority is always over n/2 voters, and that will contain half of the Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas (There are (k+1) Hagenbach-Bischoff quotas in an election, since (n/(k+1)) * (k+1) = n, so (k+1)/2, which is half of the quotas * n/(k+1), which is the quota, = n/2).
Notable achievements and contributions
Japanese Books
『石心之譜 ― 囲碁に生きるわれら五人の棋士』 in 1981,
『明解初級囲碁読本』 in 1994,
『囲碁 級位者のための本筋の打ち方』 in 1998,
『囲碁 級位者のための勝率アップの決め手』 in 2000,
Borrowing Matchsticks (, ) is a 1980 Finnish Russian comedy movie directed by Leonid Gaidai based on the novel by Algot Untola.
It stars Yevgeny Leonov, Ritva Valkama, Vyacheslav Nevinny, Georgy Vitsin, Rita Polster, and Sergey Filippov
Movies directed by Leonid Gaidai
Winchester '73 is a 1950 American western movie directed by Anthony Mann and starring James Stewart, Shelley Winters, Dan Duryea, Stephen McNally, Rock Hudson, Millard Mitchell, Tony Curtis.
It was distributed by Universal Pictures and was remade for television in 1967.
Two Flags West is a 1950 American western movie directed by Robert Wise and starring Cornel Wilde, Joseph Cotten, Linda Darnell, Jeff Chandler, Dale Robertson.
Born to Kill is a 1947 American crime drama movie directed by Robert Wise and based on the 1943 novel Deadlier than the Male by James Gunn.
It stars Lawrence Tierney, Walter Slezak, Claire Trevor, Isabel Jewell, Esther Howard and was distributed by RKO Radio Pictures.
1947 crime movies
Hangman's House is a 1928 American romantic drama movie directed by John Ford and based on the novel by Brian Oswald Donn-Byrne.
It stars Victor McLaglen, June Collyer, Larry Kent, Earle Fox, John Wayne and was distributed by 20th Century Fox.
Movies set in Ireland
Under My Skin is a 1950 American sports drama movie directed by Jean Negulesco and based on the short story by My Old Man by Ernest Hemingway.
It stars John Garfield, Micheline Presle, Noel Drayton, Luther Adler and was distributed by 20th Century Fox.
Never So Few is a 1959 American World War II action movie directed by John Sturges and based on the 1957 novel of the same name by Tom T. Chamales.
It stars Frank Sinatra, Gina Lollobrigida, Peter Lawford, Steve McQueen, Charles Bronson, Brian Donlevy and was distributed by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.
The cleansing of the Temple narrative tells of Jesus making people who sold animals leave the temple in Jerusalem.
These people provided animals used in the Jewish rituals of sacrifice.
Jesus also drove out the money changers.
The temple required that only special coins be used to buy the animals or donate to the temple.
Sometimes they were corrupt and cheated people who came to worship.
Jesus says they are turning the Temple into "a den of thieves".
The Synoptic Gospels tell of this happening near the end of Jesus' life.
It was one of the reasons that the Jewish leaders opposed Jesus.
The Gospel of John puts it near the beginning of the three year ministry of Jesus.
This makes some Bible scholars think this happened two times and others think it refers to a single time.
Châtelaudren is a former commune.
On 1 January 2019, it was merged into the new commune of Châtelaudren-Plouagat.
Labastide-en-Val is a commune of 92 people (2017).
Labécède-Lauragais is a commune of 412 people (2017).
It is in North Ohio.
It is just  east of Sandunsky and  west of Cleveland.
Lacombe is a commune of 172 people (2017).
Lafage is a commune of 89 people (2017).
Lairière is a commune of 52 people (2017).
Lanet is a commune of 50 people (2017).
Laroque-de-Fa is a commune of 151 people (2017).
Lasbordes is a commune of 788 people (2017).
Lagrasse is a commune of 545 people (2017).
Sougraigne is a commune of 112 people (2017).
Lastours is a commune of 159 people (2017).
Laurabuc is a commune of 412 people (2017).
Laurac is a commune of 175 people (2017).
Laure-Minervois is a commune of 1,055 people (2017).
Lavalette is a commune of 1,499 people (2017).
Lespinassière is a commune of 133 people (2017).
Les Martys is a commune of 293 people (2017).
Lézignan-Corbières is a commune of 11,168 people (2017).
Limousis is a commune of 129 people (2017).
Leucate is a commune of 4,428 people (2017) that is in the region Occitanie in the Aude department in the south of France.
It lies between the Mediterranean Sea and the lagoon Étang de Leucate.
Loei (Thai: เลย, ), is one of the least populated provinces (changwat) of Thailand.
It is in upper northeastern Thailand, also called Isan.
Neighboring provinces are (from east clockwise) Nong Khai, Udon Thani, Nongbua Lamphu, Khon Kaen, Phetchabun, Phitsanulok.
In the north it borders Xaignabouli and Vientiane Province of Laos.
, the provincial governor is Chaiwat Chuenkosum.
The province was given 225.6 million baht in the FY2019 Thailand budget.
Tradition says that Loei was created by people from Chiang Saen, the capital of Lan Na.
Khun Pha Muang created the village of Dan-kwa, and Bang Klang Hao created Dan Sai.
Drought and disease later made to the people move to the site of present-day Loei.
In 1907 King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) created the Loei Province.
The Loei Cultural Centre (ศูนย์วัฒนธรรมจังหวัดเลย) shows Loei's history, religions, and traditions.
The land has many mountains.
The seat of provincial government, Loei, is in a fertile basin where mountains are all around it.
The most famous mountains in the province are Phu Kradueng, Phu Luang, and Phu Ruea.