the-french-artist/wikipedia_20220301.simple_sentence_split huggingface dataset:
Many tales claim that the incubus is bisexual, but some indicate that it is strictly heterosexual and finds attacking a male victim either unpleasant or detrimental.
There are also many stories involving the attempted exorcism of incubi or succubi who have taken refuge in the bodies of men or women.
Incubi are sometimes said to be able to conceive children.
The half-human offspring of such a union is sometimes referred to as a cambion.
The most famous legend of such a case includes that of Merlin, the famous wizard from Arthurian legend.
According to the Malleus Maleficarum, exorcism is one of the five ways to overcome the attacks of Incubi, the others being Sacramental Confession, the Sign of the Cross (or recital of the Angelic Salutation), moving the afflicted to another location, and by excommunication of the attacking entity, "which is perhaps the same as exorcism."
On the other hand, the Franciscan friar Ludovico Maria Sinistrari stated that incubi "do not obey exorcists, have no dread of exorcisms, show no reverence for holy things, at the approach of which they are not in the least overawed."
A Commonwealth realm is a country in the Commonwealth of Nations which has Queen Elizabeth II as monarch.
It includes her home country of the United Kingdom and many of its former colonies or territories, including:
In each of the countries outside the UK, the Queen appoints a Governor-General to represent her, who, after consulting with the government of the realm, has all of the powers and duties of the queen.
Usually the Governor-General signs all acts of parliament into law, but can wait and ask the Queen for advice or wait for her to sign the act herself.
This happened in 1982 when Queen Elizabeth signed the important Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms during a visit to Ottawa, and the Australia Act 1986 in Canberra.
Although Queen Elizabeth II is monarch of many countries, the British government has no power in the other realms, just as the governments of the other realms have no power in the UK.
This is why each realm decides on the Queen's official title.
Usually it is "Queen of (realm) and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth".
But two countries mention the UK in their title for the Queen: Grenada uses "Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Grenada and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth", while Canada uses the old fashioned form, which reads "by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith."
Not all countries use the title Defender of the Faith.
The Commonwealth Secretariat official site
United Commonwealth  Main all-Commonwealth group
Australian Monarchist League (traditionalist constitutional monarchists)
No Republic - Australians for Constitutional Monarchy (Moderate constitutional monarchists)
Canadian Monarchy - The Official Site
Canadian Monarchist ONLINE
Monarchist League of Canada
Monarchist League of New Zealand
A Dashiki is a loose fitting, brightly coloured garment associated with African culture.
It is also associated with the counterculture of the 1960s in the United States.
The most popular styles cover the top half of the body.
It originated in West Africa.
A common form is a loose-fitting pullover garment, with an ornate V-shaped collar.
It often has an embroidered neck and sleeve lines.
There are both casual and formal versions.
The dashiki originated in West Africa and East Africa.
Twelfth and thirteenth centuries burial mounds in Mali (West Africa) have revealed versions of dashikis.
Dashikis were worn by both men and women.
They may have been influenced by the thawb worn by Arabs who came to the region.
Both garments keep the wearer cool in the hot African climate.
The dashiki was worn as a work shirt in the shorter version.
Another much longer version was called the grand boubou.
It is also similar to the kaftan.
All three are common to West Africa.
1960s US counterculture
The dashiki became popular in the hippie culture of the 1960s.
Peace Corps members returning from Africa brought back dashikis.
African diplomats to the United Nations in New York were often seen and photographed wearing colorful dashikis.
Dashikis were seen as a symbol of support for black racial struggles.
Groups like the Black Panthers wore the Dashiki as a symbol of their black heritage.
The Afro hairstyle, faded blue jeans and the Dashiki were all popular expressions of the Black is beautiful cultural movement.
Many of the rock groups of the 60s and 70s wore Dashikis.
But black performers of the 60s 70s preferred the more conventional suit and tie look.
But in the 80s several black groups wore the dashiki to show their heritage.
One South African vocal group, 'Ladysmith Black Mambazo', wore dashikis extensively.
This identified them more as Africans than Zulus.
Dashikis
The Colorado Avalanche are an American ice hockey in the National Hockey League (NHL).
They play their home games at Ball Arena in Denver, Colorado.
They play in the Central Division of the Western Conference.
The team has won the Stanley Cup championship two times, in 1996 and in 2001.
The Battle of Midway was an important naval battle of World War II, between the United States and the Empire of Japan.
It took place from 4 June 1942 to 7 June 1942.
This was about a month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The battle was a decisive victory for the Americans.
It was the most important naval battle of the Pacific area in World War II.
The battle weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy for the rest of the war.
Japan could not build up its forces again.
The United States replaced their lost ships and planes with better ones very quickly.
Japan could only make a few poor quality replacements.
The Japanese planned to bring America's carriers into a trap and sink them.
The Japanese also tried to take Midway Atoll to build defenses far from their homeland and prepare to invade Fiji, Samoa, and Hawaii.
The Midway operation, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, was made to destroy the American strength in the Pacific Ocean.
This way, Japan could become the biggest power in the area and unify Asia under its control.
It was also hoped that another defeat would force the U.S. to ask for peace soon.
After the defeat, Imperial Japanese Navy forces retired.
Japan lost four out of their six carriers, and hundreds of their best air pilots.
This stopped the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific, and the Americans began to slowly advance towards Japan.
Japan had reached its first goals quickly, taking the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia).
This gave Japan petroleum, which it needed to make more war.
Planning for a second part of the operations started in January 1942.
However, disagreements between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, and among naval commanders, prevented finishing the plan until April 1942.
Admiral Yamamoto said he would quit if his plan for the Central Pacific was not accepted.
Yamamoto's main goal was to destroy America's carrier forces, which he saw as the main threat to the Pacific campaign.
This concern was increased by the Doolittle Raid on 18 April 1942.
In this raid, 16 US Army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from  bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities.
The raid, while militarily unimportant, showed that American bombers could reach Japanese territory.
This and other successful raids by American carriers showed that they were still a threat.
Yamamoto thought that another attack on the U.S Naval base at Pearl Harbor would make all of the American fleet to sail out to fight, including the carriers.
However, because of the many American land-based airplanes on Hawaii, he thought that it was too risky to attack directly.
Instead, he decided to attack Midway, a tiny atoll at the northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, approximately  from Oahu.
The Japanese didn't need Midway but they felt the Americans would try hard to defend it.
The U.S. did consider Midway to be important.
After the battle, they set up a submarine base on Midway.
That meant submarines operating from Pearl Harbor could refuel and get new supplies, so they could go  farther west.
Midway's airstrips were also used for bomber attacks on Wake Island.
Yamamoto's plan: Operation MI
Like most Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan was very complex.
His was also based on incorrect (wrong) information.
He thought that  and  were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
In May 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea,  had been sunk and  so badly damaged that the Japanese thought she had been sunk.
The Japanese also knew that  was being repaired on the US West Coast after getting torpedo damage from a submarine.
and  were in the Atlantic, but the Japanese were not sure this was so.
Yamamoto thought that the Americans had been demoralized by their defeats in the last six months.
He thought a trick would lure the U.S. fleet into a dangerous situation.
He spread out his ships, especially his battleships, so that they would be hard to find.
Yamamoto's battleships and cruisers went behind Vice-Admiral Chūichi Nagumo's carrier force by several hundred miles.
Japan's heavy surface forces would wait for the U.S. ships to come to defend Midway, and destroy them.
Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code.
Yamamoto's choice to spread out his ships meant that none of his groups of ships could support each other.
The only warships larger than the 12 destroyers that protected Nagumo's fleet were two battleships, two heavy cruisers, and one light cruiser.
Aleutian invasion
The Japanese attacks in the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) took away yet more ships that could have attacked Midway.
Many histories once saw the Aleutians attack as a feint to draw American forces away.
Early twenty-first century research shows that AL was supposed to be launched at the same time as the attack on Midway.
However, a one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's ships resulted in Operation AL beginning a day before the Midway attack.
Prelude to battle
American reinforcements
To battle with an enemy expected to have four or five carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, needed every U.S. carrier he could get.
He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) force.
Halsey was sick with psoriasis and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance.
Nimitz also called back Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's force, including the carrier Yorktown (which had major damage at Coral Sea), from the South West Pacific Area.
It reached Pearl Harbor just in time to sail.
The damaged Yorktown however, was not completely crippled.
The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked all day and all night, and in 72 hours she was ready to battle for two or three weeks.
Her flight deck was patched, sections of internal frames were replaced, and several squadrons of aircraft were taken from Saratoga.
The pilots did not get time to train.
Repairs on Yorktown continued even as she sailed out.
On Midway, by 4 June the USN had stationed four groups of PBYs—31 aircraft in total—for long-range reconnaissance duties, and six new Grumman TBF-1 Avengers.
The Avengers were taken from Hornets VT-8.
The Marine Corps had 19 Douglas SBD Dauntlesses, seven Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators, and 21 Brewster F2A-3s.
The USAAF sent a group of 17 B-17 Flying Fortresses and eight B-26 Marauders with torpedoes: in total 126 aircraft.
Japanese shortcomings
During the Battle of the Coral Sea one month earlier, the Japanese light carrier Shōhō had been sunk and the fleet carrier  had three bomb hits, and was in drydock undergoing repairs.
Although the carrier  was undamaged, she had lost almost half her airplanes and was in port in Kure awaiting new planes and pilots.
No new pilots were available because none had been trained.
Flight instructors were used in an effort to make up the missing aircrew.
Japan's two most advanced aircraft carriers were not available and Admiral Nagumo would therefore have only four fleet carriers:  and ;  and .
At least part of this was due to overwork; Japanese carriers had been constantly operating since 7 December 1941, including raids on Darwin and Colombo.
The main Japanese carrier-based aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2, which was used either as a torpedo bomber or as a bomber.
However, production of the D3A had been reduced, while production of the B5N had been stopped.
None were available to replace losses.
In addition many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operating since late November 1941; many were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable.
These factors meant that all carriers of the Kido Butai had fewer aircraft than normal and there were not enough spare aircraft or parts.
Japanese scouting before the battle was disorganized.
A line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position.
This let the American carriers reach their meeting point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being found by the subs.
A second attempt at scouting, using four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying boats to fly to Pearl Harbor prior to the battle and see whether the American carriers were there did not work out because Japanese subs could not refuel the planes.
Japan did not know where the American carriers were before the battle.
Japanese radios did pick up more American submarine activity and messages.
Yamamoto knew this before the battle, but Japanese plans were not changed.
Yamamoto, at sea on , assumed that Nagumo had received the same message from Tokyo, and he did not send the message, because he did not want the US to hear the message.
Nagumo's radio antennas could not get the message from Tokyo.
Allied code-breaking
Admiral Nimitz had one advantage: code experts had broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code.
Since the early spring of 1942, the US had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an operation at objective "AF".
They guessed that it was Midway and sent an uncoded radio message that Midway needed fresh water.
The code breakers then picked up a Japanese message that "AF was short on water."
HYPO was also able to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to tell Nimitz exactly which Japanese ships were coming.
Japan had a new codebook, but it was not used for several days.
The new code, which had not yet been figured out, was used shortly before the attack began, but the important information had already been figured out.
Americans knew where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would arrive at Midway.
Nimitz knew that the Japanese had ruined their advantage in number of ships by dividing their ships into four groups, all too separated to be able to support each other.
Nimitz calculated that the aircraft on his three carriers, plus those on Midway Island, gave the U.S. rough parity with Yamamoto's four carriers, mainly because American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones.
The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began.
Initial air attacks
At about 09:00 on 3 June, a US Navy patrol plane spotted the Japanese Occupation Force  to the west-southwest of Midway.
Three hours later, the Americans found the Japanese transport group  to the west.
They attacked, but none of the bombs hit and no major damage resulted.
Early the following morning the Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru was hit by a torpedo from an attacking PBY.
This was the only successful air-launched torpedo attack by the U.S. during the entire battle.
At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his attack on Midway.
It consisted of 36 dive bombers 36 torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Mitsubishi Zero fighters.
At the same time he launched a defensive combat air patrol.
His eight search planes launched 30 minutes late.
Japanese reconnaissance plans were poor, with too few aircraft to cover the search areas.
Yamamoto's decisions had now become a serious problem.
As Nagumo's bombers and fighters were taking off, 11 PBYs were leaving Midway to search for Japanese ships.
They reported sighting two Japanese carriers with empty decks, which meant an air strike was on its way.
American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and planes were sent off to defend Midway.
Bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet.
US fighters remained behind to defend Midway.
At 06:20 Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base.
Midway-based Marine fighter pilots, flying F4Fs and obsolescent F2As, intercepted the Japanese and had many losses.
Most of the U.S. planes were shot down in the first few minutes; several were damaged, and only two could fly.
In all, 3 F4Fs and 13 F2As were shot down.
American anti-aircraft fire was accurate damaging many Japanese aircraft and destroying four.
Of the 108 Japanese aircraft involved in this attack, 11 were destroyed, 14 were heavily damaged, and 29 were damaged.
The initial Japanese attack did not destroy Midway: American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force.
Most of Midway's land-based defenses were intact.
Another air attack to destroy Midway's defences would be necessary if troops were to be able to go ashore by 7 June.
American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet.
These included six Grumman Avengers from the s VT-8 (Midway was the first combat mission for the VT-8 airmen, and it was the first combat of the TBF), Marine Scout-Bombing Squadron 241 (VMSB-241), consisting of eleven SB2U-3s and sixteen SBDs, plus four USAAF B-26s, armed with torpedoes, and fifteen B-17s.
The Japanese fought off these attacks.
The US lost two fighters, five TBFs, two SB2Us, eight SBDs and two B-26s.
One B-26, after being seriously damaged by anti-aircraft fire, dove straight toward the Akagi.
The plane just missed the carrier's bridge, which could have killed Nagumo and his command staff.
This may have made Nagumo decide to launch another attack on Midway, against Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve force for anti-ship operations.
Nagumo's decision
Admiral Nagumo had kept half of his aircraft in reserve.
These were two squadrons of dive bombers and torpedo bombers.
At 07:15 Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with bombs for use against land targets.
At 07:40 a scout plane from Tone saw a big American naval force to the east.
It seems that Nagumo did not receive the report until 08:00.
Nagumo reversed his order, but it took 40 minutes before Tones scout finally radioed that there was a carrier in the American force.
This was one of the carriers from TF 16; the other carrier was not sighted.
Nagumo was now unsure of what to do.
Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi recommended that Nagumo strike with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the cover patrol aircraft.
Nagumo's opportunity to hit the American ships, however, was now limited.
The Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needed to land or crash into the sea.
Because of the constant flight deck activity, the Japanese did not get their reserve planes on the flight deck for launch.
The few aircraft that were ready were defensive Fighter aircraft.
Launching aircraft would have required at least 30 to 45 minutes.
By launching right away, Nagumo would be using some of his reserve without proper anti-ship weapons.
He had just seen how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down.
Poor discipline caused many of the Japanese bombers to get rid of their bombs and attempt to fight intercepting F4Fs.
Japanese carrier rules preferred full strikes, and since Nagumo did not know the American force included a carrier, his response followed Japanese rules.
In addition, the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 made Nagumo want to attack the island again.
Nagumo decided to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be armed and ready.
Fletcher's carriers had launched their planes beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft that attacked Nagumo were already on their way.
There was nothing Nagumo could do about it.
This was the flaw with Yamamoto's plans.
Attacks on the Japanese fleet
Admiral Fletcher, in command aboard Yorktown, and having PBY sighting reports from the early morning, ordered an attack on the Japanese as soon as possible.
He held Yorktown in reserve in case any other Japanese carriers were found. (
Fletcher's directions to Spruance were sent by Nimitz, who had remained ashore.)
Spruance thought that even though the range was far, an attack could succeed.
He gave the order to launch the attack at around 06:00.
Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed at 08:00 from Yorktown.
Admiral Fletcher, commanding the Yorktown task force, along with Captain Elliott Buckmaster,Yorktowns commanding officer, and their staffs had experience in doing a full strike against an enemy force in the Coral Sea.
But they could not pass on what they had learned to Enterprise and Hornet which were ordered to launch the first strike.
Spruance ordered the aircraft to go to the target right away, since destroying enemy carriers was important to the safety of his ships.
Spruance decided it was more important to attack as soon as possible, rather than coordinate the attack by aircraft of different types and speeds (fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers).
American squadrons went to the target in several different groups.
He hoped that he would find Nagumo with his flight decks full of planes.
American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target.
The strike from Hornet, led by Commander Stanhope C. Ring, did not fly in the right direction.
Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers.
Torpedo Squadron 8 flew in the correct direction.
However, the 10 F4Fs from Hornet had run out of fuel and had to crash into the ocean.
Waldron's squadron saw the enemy carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed by Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6, from Enterprise) whose Wildcat fighter escorts also ran low on fuel and had to turn back at 09:40.
Without fighter escort, all fifteen TBD Devastators of VT-8 were shot down without being able to do any damage, with Ensign George Gay the only survivor.
VT-6 lost 10 of their 14 Devastators, and 10 of Yorktown's VT-3's 12 Devastators were shot down with no hits.
Part of the problem was the poor performance of the Mark 13 torpedoes.
Senior Navy and Bureau of Ordnance officers never asked why six torpedoes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no hits.
The Japanese combat air patrol, flying Mitsubishi A6M2 Zeros shot down the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs.
A few TBDs managed to get close enough to drop their torpedoes and shoot their machine guns at the enemy ships.
This made the Japanese carriers to make sharp turns.
The TBD Devastator was never again used in combat.
Despite their failure to get any hits, the American torpedo attacks made the Japanese carriers unable to prepare and launch their own strike.
They also pulled the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) out of position.
As well, many Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.
The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by Torpedo Squadron 3 (VT-3 from Yorktown) at 10:00 made the Japanese CAP fly to the southeast corner of the fleet.
Better discipline and using more Zeroes for the CAP might have enabled Nagumo to prevent the damage caused by the coming American attacks.
Three squadrons of SBDs from Enterprise and Yorktown (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3, respectively) were approaching from the southwest and northeast.
The two squadrons from Enterprise were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy.
However, the squadron commander decided to continue the search.
He spotted the Japanese destroyer Arashi.
It was moving to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine .
Nautilus had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship .
Some bombers were lost from lack of fuel before the attack started.
McClusky's decision to continue the search was a great help to the US carrier task force and the forces at Midway.
All three American dive-bombers squadrons (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3) arrived at the right time to attack.
Most of the Japanese CAP were looking for the torpedo planes.
Armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses lay on the decks and bombs and torpedoes were near the hangars, making the Japanese carriers very at risk of being damaged.
Beginning at 10:22, the two squadrons of Enterprises air group split up and attacked two targets.
By accident, both groups attacked the Kaga.
Lieutenant Commander Richard Halsey Best and two other planes headed north to attack Akagi.
Coming under an attack from almost two full squadrons, Kaga was hit by four or five bombs, which caused heavy damage and starting fires that could not be put out.
One of the bombs landed near the bridge, killing most of the senior officers.
Several minutes later, Best and two planes dove on the Akagi.
Although Akagi getting one direct hit (dropped by Lieutenant Commander Best).
It struck the deck elevator and went all the way through to the upper hangar deck.
It exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft.
Another bomb exploded underwater which bent the flight deck and caused rudder damage.
Yorktowns VB-3, commanded by Max Leslie, attacked Sōryū.
They got at least three hits and caused a lot of damage.
VT-3 targeted Hiryū, but got no hits.
Within six minutes, Sōryū and Kaga were on fire.
Akagi was also seriously damaged.
The Japanese hoped that Akagi could be saved or towed back to Japan.
Eventually, all three carriers were eventually abandoned and sunk.
Japanese counterattacks
Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier attacked.
Hiryū'''s first attack consisted of 18 dive bombers and six fighter escorts.
They followed the retreating American aircraft and attacked the Yorktown, hitting her with three bombs, which blew a hole in the deck, put out her boilers, and destroyed several anti-aircraft guns.
Despite the damage, repair teams were able to fix the flight deck and fix several boilers in an hour.
Twelve Japanese dive bombers and four escorting fighters were lost in this attack.
Approximately one hour later, Hiryūs second attack was made.
It consisted of ten torpedo bombers and six escorting A6Ms.
The US repair efforts had been so well done that the Japanese assumed she must be a different, undamaged carrier.
In the attack, Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes; she lost all power and developed a tilt to port, which put her out of action.
Admiral Fletcher moved his command staff to the heavy cruiser .
Neither of the carriers of Spruance's Task Force 16 was damaged.
News of the two strikes, with the reports each had sunk an American carrier (actually Yorktown in both cases), greatly improved morale in the Kido Butai.
Its few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard Hiryū where they were prepared for an attack against what was believed to be the only remaining American carrier.
American counterattack
Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū.
Enterprise launched a strike of dive bombers (including 10 SBDs from Yorktown).
Despite Hiryū being defended by more than a dozen Zero fighters, the attack by Enterprise was successful: four, possibly five bombs hit Hiryū, leaving her on fire and unable to operate aircraft. (
Hornets strike aimed at the escort ships but it did not get any hits.)
After hopeless attempts to control the fire, most of the crew remaining on Hiryū were taken off the ship.
The rest of the fleet continued sailing northeast to catch the American carriers.
Hiryū stayed afloat for several more hours.
She was discovered by an aircraft from the light carrier Hōshō.
This led to hopes she could be saved or towed back to Japan.
However, soon after being spotted, Hiryū sank.
Rear Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, costing Japan her best carrier officer.
As darkness fell, both sides thought about the situation and made plans for action.
Admiral Fletcher had to abandon the Yorktown.
He felt he could not command from a cruiser.
He gave command to Spruance.
Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained.
He wanted to protect Midway and his carriers.
He followed Nagumo during the day and continued to follow as night fell.
Finally, fearing a possible night battle with Japanese ships and believing Yamamoto still intended to invade, Spruance pulled back to the east.
He turned back west towards the enemy at midnight.
Yamamoto decided to continue the attacks and sent his remaining ships searching eastward for the American carriers.
He also sent a cruiser raiding force to bomb the island.
The Japanese ships failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance's decision to pull back eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a withdrawal to the west.
Spruance failed to regain contact with Yamamoto's forces on 5 June even though he made many searches.
Towards the end of the day he launched an attack on any ships from Nagumo's carrier force.
This strike missed Yamamoto's main group of ships.
It did not hit a Japanese destroyer.
The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall.
Spruance to ordered Enterprise and Hornet to turn on their lights to aid the landings.
At 02:15 on the night of 5/6 June, Commander John Murphy's , in the water  west of Midway, made the second of the submarine force's major contributions to the battle's outcome.
Sighting several ships, neither Murphy nor his executive officer, Ray Spruance, Jr., could identify them.
Considering that they might be US ships, Murphy did not fire, but reported the ships to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC).
This report was sent to Nimitz, who then sent it to Spruance.
Spruance assumed this was the invasion force and moved to block it while staying  northeast of Midway.
The ships sighted by Tambor were the four cruisers and two destroyers Yamamoto had sent to bomb Midway.
At 02:55 these ships received Yamamoto's order to pull back and changed course.
At about the same time as the course change, Tambor was sighted, and to avoid a submarine attack  and  hit into each other, causing serious damage to Mogamis bow.
The less severely damaged Mikuma slowed to .
This was the most damage any of the 18 submarines deployed for the battle achieved.
Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was hazardous, and he dived to approach for an attack.
The attack was unsuccessful, and at around 06:00 he finally reported two westbound Mogami-class cruisers.
Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several attacks.
Mikuma was sunk by Dauntlesses, while Mogami survived damage and returned home for repairs.
The destroyers Arashio and Asashio were also bombed and machine-gunned during the last of these attacks.
The Yorktown was towed by USS Vireo.
In the late afternoon of 6 June, however,  fired torpedoes; two struck Yorktown, but a third struck and sank destroyer , which had been providing power to Yorktown.
Hammann broke in two with the loss of 80 lives.
Yorktown sank just after 05:00 on 7 June.
Japanese casualties
By the time the battle ended, 3,057 Japanese had died.
Casualties aboard the four carriers were:Akagi: 267; Kaga: 811; Hiryu: 392; Soryu: 711; a total of 2,181.
The heavy cruisers Mikuma (sunk; 700 casualties) and Mogami (badly damaged; 92) accounted for another 792 deaths.
In addition, the destroyers Arashio (bombed; 35) and Asashio (strafed by aircraft; 21) were both damaged during the air attacks which sank Mikuma and caused further damage to Mogami.
Floatplanes were lost from the cruisers Chikuma (3) and Tone (2).
Dead aboard the destroyers Tanikaze (11), Arashi (1), Kazagumo (1) and the fleet oiler Akebono Maru (10) made up the remaining 23 casualties.
After winning a victory, and as pursuing the Japanese ships became too dangerous near Wake, The American forces pulled back.
Spruance pulled back to the east to refuel his destroyers and meet with the carrier Saratoga, which was carrying replacement aircraft.
The American carriers eventually returned to Pearl Harbor.
Historian Samuel E. Morison wrote in 1949 that Spruance was criticized for not pursuing the retreating Japanese, allowing their fleet to escape.
Clay Blair argued in 1975 that had Spruance followed Yamamoto, he would have been unable to launch his aircraft after nightfall, and his cruiser escorts would have been destroyed by Yamamoto's larger and more powerful ships, including the battleship , with 18-inch guns.
On 10 June, the Japanese Navy gave an account of the results of the battle that did not tell the whole story.
Nagumo's battle report was given to the high command on 15 June.
It was intended only for the highest officers in the Japanese Navy and government.
It was guarded closely throughout the war.
Nagumo stated that the enemy was not aware of our plans.
The Japanese public, and much of the military, were not told about the defeat: Japanese news announced a great victory.
Only Emperor Hirohito and the highest Navy officers were told about the carrier and pilot losses.
Army planners continued to believe that the fleet was in good condition.
On the return of the Japanese fleet to Hashirajima on 14 June the wounded were transferred to naval hospitals.
Most were called "secret patients" and kept away from other patients and their families.
The Navy did this to keep this major defeat secret.
The remaining officers and men were quickly spread out to other units of the fleet and sent to the South Pacific, where the majority were killed.
None of the flag officers or staff of the Combined Fleet was penalized, with Nagumo later being placed in command of the rebuilt carrier force.
The Japanese Navy learned some lessons from Midway.
Aircraft were refueled and re-armed on the flight deck, rather than in the hangars.
All unused fuel lines were drained.
The new carriers being built with only two flight deck elevators and new firefighting equipment.
More carrier crew members were trained in damage-control and firefighting techniques.
The losses later in the war of , , and  showed that there were still problems in this area.
Replacement pilots went through a short training program, meeting the short-term needs of the fleet.
This led to a decline in the quality of training.
These inexperienced pilots were sent into front-line units, while the veterans who remained after Midway and the Solomons campaign were kept flying continually.
As a result, Japanese naval air groups declined in quality during the war.
Three U.S. airmen, Ensign Wesley Osmus (pilot, Yorktown), Ensign Frank O'Flaherty (pilot, Enterprise) and Aviation Machinist's Mate B. F. (or B. P.) Bruno Gaido (radioman-gunner of O'Flaherty's SBD) were captured by the Japanese during the battle.
Osmus was held on the Arashi, with O'Flaherty and Gaido on the cruiser Nagara (or destroyer Makigumo, sources vary), and later killed.
O'Flaherty and Gaido were tied to five-gallon kerosene cans filled with water and dumped overboard several days after the battle.
The Battle of Midway has been called "the turning point of the Pacific".
However, even after Midway, the Japanese continued to try to get more territory in the South Pacific.
The U.S. did not become the more powerful navy until after several more months of hard combat.
Midway was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese.
However, it did not change the course of the war by itself.
It was the combined effects of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway that reduced Japan's ability to do major attacks.
In addition Midway helped make US landings on Guadalcanal possible.
The prolonged attrition warfare (a type of battle in which each side tries to wear down the other side) of the Solomon Islands campaign allowed the Allies to take an offensive stance for the rest of the Pacific War.
Finally, Midway bought the United States time until the first of the new Essex-class fleet carriers became available at the end of 1942.
The battle also showed the worth of pre-war naval code breaking and intelligence-gathering.
These efforts continued in both the Pacific and Atlantic areas of war.
There were many successes.
Navy code breaking made possible the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto's airplane.
Some authors have stated heavy losses in carriers and veteran aircrews at Midway permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Parshall and Tully, however, have stated that the losses in veteran aircrew, while heavy (110, just under 25% of the aircrew embarked on the four carriers), were not as bad for the Japanese naval air-corps as a whole.
The Japanese navy had 2,000 carrier-qualified aircrew at the start of the Pacific war.
A few months after Midway, the JNAF sustained similar casualty rates at both the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and Battle of Santa Cruz.
It was these battles, combined with the constant death of veterans during the Solomons campaign, which weakened Japan.
However, the loss of four large fleet carriers, and over 40% of the carriers' aircraft mechanics and technicians, plus the flight-deck crews were very damaging to the Japanese carrier fleet.
After the battle  and  were the only large carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike-force left for offensive actions.
Of Japan's other carriers,  was the only Fleet carrier that could be used with Shōkaku and Zuikaku, while , , and , were second-rate ships.
By the time of the Battle of the Philippine Sea, while the Japanese had somewhat rebuilt their carrier forces, the planes were flown by inexperienced pilots.
In the time it took Japan to build three carriers, the U.S. Navy commissioned more than two dozen fleet and light fleet carriers, and numerous escort carriers.
By 1942 the United States was already three years into a shipbuilding plan which aimed make the navy larger than Japan's.
The greater number of USN aviators survived the Battle of Midway and subsequent battles of 1942, and combined with growing pilot training programs, the US had many skilled pilots.
Codebreaking success
Yamamoto did not know that the U.S. had broken the main Japanese naval code (JN-25).
This let the U.S. fleet go to the right place at the right time.
Yamamoto scattered his forces to keep the attack secret, but that meant his formations could not help each other.
For instance, Nagumo's fleet had few big ships.
When the carrier planes were carrying out the strikes, the carriers were relatively undefended.
By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had more big ships, none of which saw any action at Midway''.
Their distance from Nagumo's carriers also meant he could not use their reconnaissance planes, so he knew little of what was happening.
WW2DB: Battle of Midway
The course to Midway: turning point in the Pacific
After Midway: the fates of the U.S. and Japanese warships by Bryan J. Dickerson
Animated history of The Battle of Midway
Midway, Battle of
The Minnesota Wild are a NHL team based in Saint Paul, Minnesota.
The team's name was chosen by a fans' contest.
The logo suggests the "wild" lands of northern Minnesota.
It includes trees, the moon, stars and a river.
Those things are surrounded by the outline of the head of a wild animal, possibly a bear.
The Wild joined the NHL in 2000.
They play at the Xcel Energy Center in downtown St. Paul.
Ghassanids, are an Arab clan who came to the Levant from Yemen before Islam.
Ghassanids were Christians.
Some of them remain  Christians until modern days especially in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel.
The Ghassanids were a puppet of the Byzantine Empire during the Byzantine-Sassanid wars during the war they fought against the Lakhmids.
The Ghassanids were annexed by the Muslim Caliphate in the mid 600s AD.
Yemeni people
The Boeing B-29 Superfortress was a heavy bomber aircraft with four engines used by the United States Army Air Forces in World War II, and by other countries' military after that.
The name "Superfortress" came from its famous previous model, the B-17 Flying Fortress.
The B-29 Boeing Model 345 was one of the biggest aircraft to serve during World War II.
It was one of the most advanced bombers of its time.
It was the most used aircraft in the U.S. bombing against Japan in the final months of World War II, and B-29s carried the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The B-29 stayed in service for a long time after the war ended.
By the time it was retired in the 1960s, some 3,900 planes had been built.
Sewing is stitching cloth, leather, furs, or other materials, using a needle and thread.
Sewing can be done on a sewing machine, or by hand.
"Plain" sewing is mostly done to make or mend clothing and household furnishings such as curtains, sheets, upholstery, and table linens.
It is also used for sails, bellows, skin boats, banners and other items shaped out of flexible materials.
Sewing is an important part of shoemaking and bookbinding.
Wounds are often sewn shut.
If a thread becomes loose in a sewn item, the stitches may unravel and require restitching to repair them.
In repair sewing, pulling the threaded needle in and out of the fabric at the same lengths and places as the other remaining stitches can make a repair nearly invisible.
Replacing a missing button on a garment follows the same procedure, although there are different possible ways to place the thread to sew on a button.
While repairs are usually sewn by hand, most garments are created using a machine, which can range from simple to complex.
Saipan (IPA:  in English) is the largest island and capital of the United States Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), a chain of 15 tropical islands which are part of the Marianas archipelago in the western Pacific Ocean (15°10’51”N, 145°45’21”E) with a total area of 115.39 km² (44.55 sq mi).
At the 2000 census, there were more than 62,392 people.
Saipan is at latitude of 15.25° north and longitudeof 145.75° east, about 200 km (120 mi) north of Guam.
Saipan is about 20 km (12.5 mi) long and 9 km (5.5 mi) wide.
It is a popular tourist destination in the Pacific.
Saipan Municipality, United States Census Bureau
Department of the Interior, Office of Insular Affairs  Links to cultural and informational sites about the CNMI as well as to government sites
Saipan Tribune
KSPN Channel 2
Marianas Variety
Types of knitting
Flat knitting
Patterns called cables are typically used on sweaters, particularly on fancy Aran sweaters from Ireland.
Different kinds of stitches create different patterns in knitting.
For example, the stretchy ends of knitted sleeves are called ribbing.
Yarn for knitting can be made from any number of natural or synthetic (man made) fibers such as wool, cotton, silk, or acrylic.
Some yarns are made from a blend of several kinds of fibers.
Yarns come in many thicknesses or weights from fine to thick: lace, fingering, sock, sport, double-knit (or DK), worsted, Aran, bulky, and super-bulky.
Thinner yarns are generally used with smaller knitting needles, and thicker yarns are used with larger knitting needles.
Knitting needles come in various shapes: straight, double-pointed, cable, and circular.
They can be made from bamboo, aluminum, steel, or plastic.
oc:Tricot
Yarn is a long, continuous length of fibers that have been spun or felted together.
Yarn is used to make cloth or different wearable accessories including shoes, hats, scarfs, etc.
by knitting, crocheting or weaving.
Yarn is sold in a shape called a skein to prevent the yarn from becoming tangled or knotted.
Yarn can be made from any number of natural or synthetic fibers such as wool, cotton, silk, or acrylic.
Yarns come in many thicknesses or weights from fine to thick: lace, fingering, sock, sport, double-knit (or DK), worsted, aran, bulky, and super-bulky.
Very fine yarn is called thread and is used in sewing and embroidery.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is the navy of Australia.
It is part of the Australian Defence Force.
It was created in 1901, and was formed out of the Commonwealth Naval Forces to become the small navy of Australia.
The Royal Navy of the United Kingdom continued to defend Australia in the Pacific Ocean until World War II, when the RAN became much bigger and modern, adding many ships including aircraft carriers.
Today the RAN is one of the largest naval forces in the Pacific region and the Indian Ocean.
As of December 2011, the RAN fleet consisted of 54 vessels.
This includes frigates, submarines, patrol boats and auxiliary ships.
Ships commissioned into the RAN are given the prefix "Her Majesty's Australian ships" (Or HMAS for short), because by constitution the Queen owns them and has command over them.
The head of the Royal Australian Navy is the Monarch presently Queen Elizabeth II.
The professional head of the force is the Chief of the Navy who holds the rank Vice-Admiral.
The present Chief is Vice-Admiral Ray Griggs.
He was appointed in 2011.
The Navy is ran by the Department of Defence and the Naval Headquarters (NHQ).
Fleet Command – fleet command is led by Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT).
COMAUSFLT holds the rank of Rear Admiral; previously, this post was Flag Officer Commanding HM's Australian Fleet (FOCAF), created in 1911, but the title was changed in 1988 to the Maritime Commander Australia.
On 1 February 2007, the title changed again, becoming Commander Australian Fleet.
The nominated at-sea commander is Commodore Flotillas (COMFLOT), a one-star deployable task group commander.
Fleet command has responsibility to CN for the full command of assigned assets, and to Joint Operations command for the provision of operationally ready forces.
Navy Strategic Command – the administrative element overseeing the RAN's training, engineering and logistical support needs.
Instituted in 2000, the Systems Commander was appointed at the rank of Commodore; in June 2008, the position was upgraded to the rank of Rear Admiral.
Fleet Command was previously made up of seven Force Element Groups.
Due to changes it was made into four Force Commands:
Surface Force, covering the RAN's surface combatants (generally ships of frigate size or larger)
Submarine Force, operating the Collins class submarines
Mine Warfare, Hydrographic and Patrol Boat Force, an amalgamation of the previous Patrol Boat, Hydrographic, and Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving Forces, operating what are collectively termed the RAN's "minor war vessels"
Fleet Air Arm, responsible for the navy's aviation assets
Operation Anode – Australia's contribution to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands.
Operation Slipper – Australia's commitment to the International Coalition forces in Afghanistan and against Terrorism (ICAT).
The RAN's contribution is normally one ship in the Persian Gulf.
Operation Resolute – the ADF's contribution to patrolling Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone.
The RAN's contribution to Resolute is at least seven Armidale class patrol boats, plus a large surface combatant on standby.
Fleet Base East, located at HMAS Kuttabul, Sydney
Fleet Base West, located at HMAS Stirling, near Perth.
HMAS Coonawarra, Darwin;
HMAS Cairns, Cairns
HMAS Waterhen, Sydney.
HMAS Moreton, Brisbane.
As of June 2011, the RAN has 14,215 permanent full time personnel, 161 gap year personnel, and 2,150 reserve personnel.
The permanent full time force consisted of 3,357 commissioned officers, and 10,697 enlisted personnel.
As of June 2010 male personnel make up 82% of the permanent full time force, while female personnel make up 18%.
The RAN has the highest percentage of women in the ADF, compared to the RAAF's 17.8% and the Army's 9.7%.
Royal Australian Navy home page
Historical listing of RAN ships and badges
'Virtual Fleet'  - on-line computer based 'tour' of ships and aircraft
Maritimequest Royal Australian Navy photo gallery
Official Biographies:
Chief of Navy
Maritime Commander
Commander Australian Navy Systems Command
Royal and Dominion Navies in World War II, Campaigns, Battles, Warship losses
Royal and Dominion Navies, Victoria Cross at Sea, 1940-45
Military of Australia
was a Vice-Admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II, who came to known as the father of the kamikaze.