the-french-artist/wikipedia_20220301.simple_sentence_embeddings huggingface dataset:
Richard Jantz 
 He writes that he found no significant difference between the bones of American and European children, but his study receives criticism from many other anthropologists.
Richard Jantz 
 A well-respected anthropologist, Jonathan Marks, said that Jantz's new research "has the ring of desperation to it (if not obfuscation), and has been quickly rebutted by more mainstream biological anthropology."
Richard Jantz 
 Later, other anthropologists also looked back over Boas' study and found that he was actually correct.
Richard Jantz 
 Jantz played a large role in the discovery and legal battle over a prehistoric skeleton called the Kennewick Man, suing the government to get more access to it for research.
Richard Jantz 
 He argued that since the skeleton was radiocarbon dated to about 9,000 years old, no modern-day Native American tribes could really claim the skeletons as their own under the NAGPRA law.
Richard Jantz 
 He worked to identify the crew of a confederate shipwreck found near South Carolina, and was part of a reexamination of the Nikumaroro bones to determine if they could have belonged to Amelia Earhart.
Roquetaillade-et-Conilhac 
 The municipality was created on 1 January 2019 and consists of the former communes of Roquetaillade (the seat) and Conilhac-de-la-Montagne.
Speech disorder 
 A speech disorder or speech impairment is a persistent communication problem, caused by problems with speaking.
Speech disorder 
 People with speech impairments have problems making certain sounds, forming words, or combining these words into sentences.
Condorcet method 
 A Condorcet method (; ) is one of many election methods that elects the candidate that is preferred by more voters than their opponent in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate.
Condorcet method 
 This candidate, known as the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner.
Condorcet method 
 A Condorcet winner might not always exist in a particular election because the preference of a group of voters selecting from more than two options can possibly be cyclic — that is, it is possible (but very rare) that every candidate has an opponent that defeats them in a two-candidate contest. (
Condorcet method 
 This is similar to the game rock paper scissors, where each hand shape wins against only one opponent and loses to another).
Condorcet method 
 However, there always exists a smallest group of candidates that beats all candidates not in the group, known as the Smith set, which is guaranteed to only have the Condorcet winner in it when one exists; many Condorcet methods always elect a candidate who is in the Smith set when there is no Condorcet winner, and are thus said to be "Smith-efficient".
Condorcet method 
 The Condorcet winner is also usually but not necessarily the utilitarian winner (the one which maximizes social welfare).
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet voting methods are named for the 18th-century French mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, who championed such voting systems.
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet methods usually use preferential (ranked) voting, though they can be done with separate rounds of runoff elections.
Condorcet method 
 Most Condorcet methods have a single round of preferential voting, in which each voter ranks the candidates from most preferred (marked as number 1) to least preferred (marked with a higher number).
Condorcet method 
 They can also elect a winner when there is no Condorcet winner, and different Condorcet-compliant methods may elect different winners in the case of a cycle.
Condorcet method 
 The procedure given in Robert's Rules of Order for voting on motions and amendments is also a Condorcet method, even though the voters do not vote by ranking the candidates.
Condorcet method 
 The loser (by majority rule) of a pairing is eliminated, and the winner of a pairing is paired in a later round against another alternative.
Condorcet method 
 This is similar to a single-winner or round-robin tournament; the total number of pairings is one less than the number of alternatives.
Condorcet method 
 Since a Condorcet winner will win by majority rule in each of its pairings, it will never be eliminated by Robert's Rules.
Condorcet method 
 But this method cannot reveal a voting paradox in which there is no Condorcet winner and a majority prefer an early loser over the eventual winner (though it will always elect someone in the Smith set).
Condorcet method 
 A lot of the literature on social choice theory is about this method since it is widely used and is used by important organizations (legislatures, councils, committees, etc.).
Condorcet method 
 It is not practical for use in public elections, however, since its multiple rounds of voting would be very expensive for voters, for candidates, and for governments.
Condorcet method 
 In a competition between candidates A and B where voters have ranked the candidates, if more voters mark their ballots that they prefer candidate A over candidate B than the number of voters who mark their ballots to the contrary, then Candidate B is not (supposed to be) elected.
Condorcet method 
 However, because of the possibility of the Condorcet paradox, it is possible, but unlikely, that this can't be done.
Condorcet method 
 This is sometimes called a Condorcet cycle or just cycle and can be thought of as Candidate Rock beating Candidate Scissors, Candidate Scissors beating Candidate Paper, and Candidate Paper beating Candidate Rock.
Condorcet method 
 Each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference (top-to-bottom, or best-to-worst, or 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.).
Condorcet method 
 The voter may be allowed to rank candidates as equals, to express indifference (no preference) between them.
Condorcet method 
 To save time, candidates omitted by a voter may be treated as if the voter ranked them at the bottom.
Condorcet method 
 For each pairing of candidates (as in a round-robin tournament) count how many votes rank each candidate over the other candidate.
Condorcet method 
 Thus each pairing will have two totals: the size of its majority and the size of its minority (or there will be a tie).
Condorcet method 
 For most Condorcet methods, the pairwise counts are all that is necessary to figure out who won, who came in 2nd place, etc.
Condorcet method 
 A Condorcet method is a voting system that will always elect the Condorcet winner (if there is one); this is the candidate whom more voters prefer to each other candidate, when compared to them one at a time.
Condorcet method 
 This candidate can be found by checking if there is a candidate who beats all other candidates; this can be done by using Copeland's method and then checking if the Copeland winner has the highest possible Copeland score.
Condorcet method 
 For 10 candidates, this means there are 0.5*10*9=45 comparisons, which can make elections with many candidates hard to count the votes for.
Condorcet method 
 This occurs as a result of a kind of tie known as a majority rule cycle, described by Condorcet's paradox.
Condorcet method 
 Some Condorcet methods involve the basic procedure described below, coupled with a Condorcet completion method, which is used to find a winner when there is no Condorcet winner.
Condorcet method 
 Other Condorcet methods involve an entirely different system of counting, but are classified as Condorcet methods because they will still elect the Condorcet winner if there is one.
Condorcet method 
 In any Condorcet method that passes Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, it can sometimes help to identify the Smith set from the head-to-head matchups, and eliminate all candidates not in the set before doing the procedure for that Condorcet method.
Condorcet method 
 For each possible pair of candidates, one pairwise count indicates how many voters prefer one of the paired candidates over the other candidate, and another pairwise count indicates how many voters have the opposite preference.
Condorcet method 
 The counts for all possible pairs of candidates show all the pairwise preferences of all the voters.
Condorcet method 
 Pairwise counts are often displayed in a pairwise comparison matrix or outranking matrix such as those below.
Condorcet method 
 In these matrices, each row represents each candidate as a 'runner', while each column represents each candidate as an 'opponent'.
Condorcet method 
 The cells at the intersection of rows and columns each show the result of a particular pairwise comparison.
Condorcet method 
 Imagine there is an election between four candidates: A, B, C and D. The first matrix below records the preferences expressed on a single ballot paper, in which the voter's preferences are (B, C, A, D); that is, the voter ranked B first, C second, A third, and D fourth.
Condorcet method 
 In the matrix a '1' indicates that the runner is preferred on this voter's ballot over the 'opponent', while a '0' indicates that the runner is defeated.
Condorcet method 
 Each ballot can be transformed into this style of matrix, and then added to all other ballot matrices using matrix addition.
Condorcet method 
 The number of votes for runner over opponent (runner,opponent) is compared with the number of votes for opponent over runner (opponent,runner) to find the Condorcet winner.
Condorcet method 
 When there is no Condorcet winner, many Condorcet completion methods, such as Ranked Pairs and the Schulze method, use the information contained in the sum matrix to choose a winner.
Condorcet method 
 Cells marked '—' in the matrices above have a numerical value of '0', but a dash is used since candidates are never preferred to themselves.
Condorcet method 
 The first matrix, that represents a single ballot, is inversely symmetric: (runner,opponent) is ¬(opponent,runner).
Condorcet method 
 The sum matrix has this property: (runner,opponent) + (opponent,runner) = N for N voters, if all runners were fully ranked by each voter.
Condorcet method 
 The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state.
Condorcet method 
 For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible.
Condorcet method 
 To find the Condorcet winner every candidate must be matched against every other candidate in a series of one-on-one contests.
Condorcet method 
 While any Condorcet method will elect Nashville as the winner, first-past-the-post and instant-runoff voting would select Memphis and Knoxville respectively, using the same ballots.
Condorcet method 
 This would occur despite the fact that most people would have preferred Nashville to either of those options.
Condorcet method 
 On the other hand, note that in this example Chattanooga also defeats Knoxville and Memphis when paired against those cities.
Condorcet method 
 If Memphis voters had preferred Chattanooga as a second choice rather than as a third choice, then Chattanooga would be the Condorcet winner even though finishing in last place in a first-past-the-post election.
Condorcet method 
 An alternative way of thinking about this example if a Smith-efficient Condorcet method that passes ISDA is used to determine the winner is that 58% of the voters, a mutual majority, ranked Memphis last (making Memphis the majority loser and Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville above Memphis, ruling Memphis out.
Condorcet method 
 At that point, the voters who preferred Memphis as their 1st choice could only help to choose a winner among Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville, and because they all preferred Nashville as their 1st choice among those three, Nashville would've had a 68% majority of 1st choices among the remaining candidates and won as the majority's 1st choice.
Condorcet method 
 Some Condorcet methods first do a series of pairwise comparisons and then, if there is no Condorcet winner, use an entirely different, non-Condorcet method to determine a winner.
Condorcet method 
 For example, the Black method chooses the Condorcet winner if it exists, but uses the Borda count instead if there is a cycle (the method is named for Duncan Black).
Condorcet method 
 A more complex two-stage process is, when there is a cycle, to first eliminate all candidates not in some group which is found by looking at the pairwise comparisons, and then use a separate voting system to find the winner.
Condorcet method 
 Sets used for this purpose are defined so that they will always contain only the Condorcet winner if there is one, and will always, in any case, contain at least one candidate.
Condorcet method 
 Smith set: The smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such that every candidate in the set can beat all candidates outside the set.
Condorcet method 
 Every candidate inside the set is pairwise unbeatable by any other candidate outside the set (i.e., ties are allowed).
Condorcet method 
 Landau set (or uncovered set or Fishburn set): the set of candidates, such that each member, for every other candidate (including those inside the set), either beats this candidate or beats a third candidate that itself beats the candidate that is unbeaten by the member.
Condorcet method 
 Some Condorcet methods use a single procedure that meets the Condorcet criteria and, without any extra procedure, also pick winners when there are cycles.
Condorcet method 
 Copeland's method: This simple method involves electing the candidate who wins the most pairwise matchings.
Condorcet method 
 Kemeny–Young method: This method ranks all the choices from most popular and second-most popular down to least popular.
Condorcet method 
 Minimax: Also called Simpson, Simpson–Kramer, and Simple Condorcet, this method chooses the candidate whose worst pairwise defeat is better than that of all other candidates.
Condorcet method 
 A possible improved modification to this method involves only allowing it to choose a winner from the Smith set; this has been called Smith/Minimax.
Condorcet method 
 Dodgson's method extends the Condorcet method by swapping candidates until a Condorcet winner is found.
Condorcet method 
 Ranked pairs breaks each cycle in the pairwise preference graph by dropping the weakest majority in the cycle, thereby yielding a complete ranking of the candidates.
Condorcet method 
 Schulze method repeatedly drops the weakest majority in the pairwise preference graph until there is a Condorcet winner (unless there are ties).
Condorcet method 
 This method is also known as Schwartz sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting and path winner.
Condorcet method 
 the candidate who is less preferred than every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by fewer voters than any other candidate).
Condorcet method 
 a candidate who beats or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by at least as many voters as any other candidate).
Condorcet method 
 Some Condorcet methods produce not just a single winner, but a ranking of all candidates from first to last place.
Condorcet method 
 A Condorcet ranking is a list of candidates with the property that the Condorcet winner (if one exists) comes first and the Condorcet loser (if one exists) comes last, and the same holds for the candidates ranked between them.
Condorcet method 
 Though there won't always be a Condorcet winner or Condorcet loser, there is always a Smith set and "Smith loser set" (smallest group of candidates who lose to all candidates not in the set in head-to-head elections).
Condorcet method 
 Some voting methods produce rankings that sort all candidates in the Smith set above all others, and all candidates in the Smith loser set below all others, with this also applying to all candidates ranked between them.
Condorcet method 
 Because the Smith set and Smith loser set are equivalent to the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser when they exist, methods that always produce Smith set rankings also always produce Condorcet rankings.
Condorcet method 
 Many proponents of instant-runoff voting (IRV) are attracted by the belief that if their first choice does not win, their vote will be given to their second choice; if their second choice does not win, their vote will be given to their third choice, etc.
Condorcet method 
 If someone voted for a strong candidate, and their 2nd and 3rd choices are eliminated before their first choice is eliminated, IRV gives their vote to their 4th choice candidate, not their 2nd choice.
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet voting takes all rankings into account simultaneously, but this makes it fail the later-no-harm criterion and the later-no-help criterion.
Condorcet method 
 With Condorcet voting, it is possible that indicating a second choice will cause your first choice to lose.
Condorcet method 
 Plurality voting is simple, and theoretically provides incentives for voters to compromise for centrist candidates rather than throw away their votes on candidates who can't win.
Condorcet method 
 Opponents to plurality voting point out that voters often vote for the lesser of evils because they heard on the news that those two are the only two with a chance of winning, not necessarily because those two are the two good compromise candidates.
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet runs each candidate against the other head to head, so that voters elect the candidate who would win the most sincere runoffs, instead of the one they thought they had to vote for.
Condorcet method 
 There are circumstances, as in the examples above, when both instant-runoff voting and the 'first-past-the-post' plurality system wouldn't elect the Condorcet winner. (
Condorcet method 
 In fact, FPTP can elect the Condorcet loser and IRV can elect the second-worst candidate, who would lose to every candidate except the Condorcet loser.)
Condorcet method 
 When there is a Condorcet winner that IRV doesn't elect, a majority would by definition prefer the Condorcet Winner to the IRV winner.
Condorcet method 
 Supporters of the Condorcet criterion see it as an important criterion when choosing a voting method.
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet methods tend to encourage the selection of broadly supported candidates who appeal to the median voter.
Condorcet method 
 B is preferred by a 501–499 majority to A, and by a 502–498 majority to C. So, according to the Condorcet criterion, B should win, despite the fact that very few voters rank B in first place.
Condorcet method 
 By contrast, IRV elects C and plurality elects A. The goal of a ranked voting system is for voters to be able to vote sincerely and trust the system to protect their intent.
Condorcet method 
 The importance of this scenario, of two parties with strong support, and the one with weak support being the Condorcet winner, may be less than one would expect, though, as it is common in plurality voting systems (see Duverger's law), but much less likely to occur in Condorcet or IRV elections, which unlike Plurality voting, punish candidates who are opposed by a significant block of voters.
Condorcet method 
 B would win against either A or C by more than a 65–35 margin in a one-on-one election, but IRV eliminates B first, leaving a contest between the more "polar" candidates, A and C. Proponents of plurality voting state that their system is simpler than any other and more easily understood.
Condorcet method 
 All three systems are susceptible to tactical voting, but the types of strategy used and how often there is value in voting strategically differ in each method.
Condorcet method 
 That is, voters can help avoid the election of a less-preferred candidate by insincerely (strategically) raising the position of a more-preferred candidate on their ballot.
Condorcet method 
 However, Condorcet methods are only vulnerable to compromising when there is a majority rule cycle, or when one can be created.
Condorcet method 
 That is, voters can sometimes help a more-preferred candidate by strategically lowering the ranking of a less-preferred candidate on their ballot.
Condorcet method 
 Scholars of electoral systems often compare them using mathematically defined voting system criteria.
Condorcet method 
 However, the Condorcet criterion implies the majority criterion, and thus is incompatible with independence of irrelevant alternatives (though it implies a weaker analagous form of the criterion: when there is a Condorcet winner, losing candidates can drop out of the election without changing the result), later-no-harm, the participation criterion, and the consistency criterion.
Condorcet method 
 Condorcet methods are not known to be currently in use in government elections anywhere in the world, but a Condorcet method known as Nanson's method was used in city elections in the U.S. town of Marquette, Michigan in the 1920s, and today Condorcet methods are used by a number of private organizations.
Condorcet method 
 The Wikimedia Foundation used the Schulze method to elect its Board of Trustees until 2013, when it switched to a ratings ballot with Support/Neutral/Oppose ballots.
Condorcet method 
 The Software in the Public Interest corporation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Directors
Condorcet method 
 The Gentoo Foundation uses the Schulze method for internal referendums and to elect its Board of Trustees and its Council
Condorcet method 
 The Student Society of the University of British Columbia uses ranked pairs for its executive elections.
Condorcet method 
 Kingman Hall and Hillegass Parker House, two loosely affiliated student housing cooperatives, each use the Schulze method to elect their management teams.
Condorcet method 
 If every seat in a legislature is elected (in separate elections, by the same pool of voters – use of districts will avoid this) by the Condorcet method, the legislators would all be centrists and might all agree with each on what laws to pass.
Condorcet method 
 If 10 candidates run for governor in a Condorcet race, ballot counters may need to count 9+8+7+6+5+4+3+2+1 = 45 head to head runoffs to find the winner.
Condorcet method 
 While this is doable, it might be more practical to still use ballot access laws or primaries, defeating some of the original intent of the Condorcet method.
Condorcet method 
 Computers can be used to speed up the counts, though some voters fear computers can be hacked and used for ballot counting fraud.
Condorcet method 
 Another option would be to allow several independent scanner owners count the ballots and compare results.
Condorcet method 
 Volunteer hand counters could then spot check various candidates and ranks to make sure they match the subtotals reported by the scanners.
Condorcet method 
 It is also possible to limit the number of ranks voters can use; for example, if every voter is only allowed to rank each candidate either 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, with equal rankings allowed, then only the runoffs between candidates ranked 1st and 2nd, 1st and 3rd, 1st and last, 2nd and 3rd, 2nd and last, and 3rd and last need be counted, as the runoffs between two candidates at the same rank will result in ties.
Condorcet method 
 The negative vote-counting approach to pairwise counting may reduce the amount of work the vote-counters have to do.
Condorcet method 
 For example, with 10 candidates, a voter who ranks candidate A as their 1st choice and doesn't rank any other candidate prefers A over 9 other candidates.
Condorcet method 
 In the regular approach, this means recording those 9 preferences; but with negative counting, it can simply be recorded that A is marked on 1 voter's ballot, with this itself indicating that A is preferred in every match-up.
Condorcet method 
 When a voter ranks a candidate 2nd, then a negative vote can be placed in the matchup between the 2nd choice and 1st choice to indicate that the 2nd choice is not preferred to the 1st choice, such that it will cancel out with the support the 2nd choice would receive against the 1st choice from being marked on the voter's ballot.