the-french-artist/wikipedia_20220301.simple_sentence_embeddings huggingface dataset:
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered Kawaguchi's main supply depot, including large stockpiles of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful shortwave radio.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The captured documents informed the Marines that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and planning an attack.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Edson, along with Colonel Gerald C. Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, thought that the Japanese attack would come at a narrow, grassy, -long, coral ridge south of Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On the night of 12 September, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raiders between the Lunga River and ridge.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 One Marine company had to fall back to the ridge before the Japanese stopped their attack for the night.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The next night Kawaguchi had to battle Edson's 830 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade and artillery.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese attack began just after nightfall with Kawaguchi's 1st battalion attacking Edson's right side to the west of the ridge.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 After breaking through the Marine defences, the attack was eventually stopped by Marine units guarding the northern part of the ridge.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion moved up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123 on the center part of the ridge.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Throughout the night the Marines fought against Japanese attacks, some of which resulted in hand-to-hand fighting.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 14 September Kawaguchi led the survivors on a five-day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 15 September Hyakutake at Rabaul learned of Kawaguchi's loss and sent the news to Imperial General Headquarters in Japan.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In an emergency meeting, the top Japanese IJA and IJN command staffs decided that, Guadalcanal might develop into the most important battle of the war.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Hyakutake realized that to send sufficient troops and supplies to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal he could not support the major ongoing Japanese attacks on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Hyakutake, with the agreement of General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea who were within  of their goal of Port Moresby to pull back until the Guadalcanal battle was finished.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 As the Japanese troops gathered west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces strengthened their Lunga defenses.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 14 September Vandegrift moved another battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (3/2), from Tulagi to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 18 September an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the 7th Marine Regiment plus a battalion from the 11th Marine Regiment and some additional support units).
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The convoy also delivered 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 These new soldiers enabled Vandegrift, beginning on 19 September, to establish an unbroken defence around the Lunga perimeter.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 While protecting this convoy the aircraft carrier  was sunk by the Japanese submarine  southeast of Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Vandegrift also removed several officers who did not meet his standards and promoted junior officers who had done well in the battles.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese delivered 85 fighters and bombers to their air units at Rabaul while the U.S. brought 23 fighters and attack aircraft to Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 20 September the Japanese had 117 aircraft at Rabaul while the Allies had 71 aircraft at Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The 3rd Battalion, 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on 11 September.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Deliveries by destroyers on 14, 20, 21 and 24 September brought food and ammunition as well as 280 men from the 1st Battalion, Aoba Regiment, to Kamimbo on Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions were transported from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul beginning on 13 September.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese planned to transport 17,500 troops from these two divisions to Guadalcanal for the next major attack on the Lunga Perimeter set for 20 October 1942.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Vandegrift was aware that Kawaguchi's troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese troops were in the area between the Lunga Perimeter and the Matanikau River.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 He also wanted to prevent the main group of Japanese soldiers from strengthening their positions so close to the main Marine defenses at Lunga Point.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The first U.S. Marine attack between 23 and 27 September used soldiers from three U.S. Marine battalions.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The attack on Japanese forces west of the Matanikau, was defeated by Kawaguchi's troops under Akinosuke Oka's command.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 During the fight, three Marine companies were surrounded by Japanese forces and they had many dead and wounded.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In the second attack between 6 and 9 October a larger force of Marines crossed the Matanikau River, attacked newly landed Japanese forces from the 2nd Infantry Division under the command of generals Masao Maruyama and Yumio Nasu.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Between 9 and 11 October the U.S. 1st Battalion 2nd Marines attacked two small Japanese outposts about  east of the Lunga perimeter at Gurabusu and Koilotumaria near Aola Bay.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Throughout the last week of September and the first week of October, Japanese destroyers delivered troops from the Japanese 2nd Infantry Division to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese Navy promised to support the Army's attack by  delivering troops, equipment, and supplies to the island and doing more air attacks on Henderson Field and sending warships to bomb the airfield.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Millard F. Harmon, commander of United States Army forces in the South Pacific, thought that U.S. Marine forces on Guadalcanal needed new soldiers if the Allies were to defend the island from the next Japanese attack.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 8 October, the 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. Army's Americal Division boarded ships to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 To protect the transports carrying the 164th to Guadalcanal, Task Force 64 was told to go with the transports.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 This task force consisted of four cruisers and five destroyers under U.S. Rear Admiral Norman Scott.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Mikawa's 8th Fleet staff scheduled a large and important destroyer delivery for the night of 11 October.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Two seaplane tenders and six destroyers were to deliver 728 soldiers plus artillery and ammunition to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 At the same time, three heavy cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō were to bomb Henderson Field to destroy the CAF and the airfield.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Because U.S. Navy warships had never tried to stop any Tokyo Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from Allied naval ships that night.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Opening fire, Scott's warships sank one of Gotō's cruisers and one of his destroyers, heavily damaged another cruiser, seriously wounded Gotō, and forced the rest of Gotō's warships to abandon the bombing mission and retreat.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese supply convoy unloaded at Guadalcanal and began its return journey without being discovered by Scott's force.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Later on the morning of 12 October, four Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned back to help Gotō's damaged warships.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The convoy of U.S. Army troops reached Guadalcanal as scheduled the next day and delivered its cargo and passengers to the island.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Even after the U.S. victory off Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued with plans for a large attack later in October.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese decided to risk not using fast warships to deliver their men and supplies to the island.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 13 October, a convoy of six cargo ships with eight destroyers left the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The convoy carried 4,500 troops from the 16th and 230th Infantry Regiments, some naval marines, two batteries of heavy artillery, and one company of tanks.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 To protect the approaching convoy from attack by CAF aircraft, Yamamoto sent two battleships from Truk to bombard Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 At 01:33 on 14 October,  and , protected by one light cruiser and nine destroyers, reached Guadalcanal and fired at Henderson Field from a distance of .
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Over the next one hour and 23 minutes, the two battleships fired 973  shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of them falling in the area of the airfield.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The bombing heavily damaged both runways, burned almost all of the available airplane fuel, destroyed 48 of the CAF's 90 aircraft, and killed 41 men, including six CAF pilots.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In spite of the heavy damage, Henderson soldiers were able to fix one of the runways within a few hours.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Seventeen SBDs and 20 Wildcats at Espiritu Santo were flown to Henderson and U.S. Army and Marine transport aircraft began to transport airplane gasoline to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Now that the US was aware of the approach of the large Japanese convoy, the US tried to think of a way to attack the convoy before it could reach Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Using fuel drained from destroyed aircraft and from a hidden fuel tank in the jungle, the CAF attacked the convoy twice on the 14th, but caused no damage.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Throughout the day of 15 October, CAF aircraft from Henderson bombed and machine-gunned the unloading convoy, destroying three of the cargo ships.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The remainder of the convoy departed that night, having unloaded all of the troops and about two-thirds of the supplies and equipment.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Several Japanese heavy cruisers also bombed Henderson on the nights of 14 and 15 October, destroying a few additional CAF aircraft, but not damaging the airfield.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Between 1 and 17 October, the Japanese delivered 15,000 troops to Guadalcanal, giving Hyakutake 20,000 troops for his planned attack.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Because they had lost their positions on the east side of the Matanikau, the Japanese decided that an attack on the U.S. defenses along the coast would be too hard.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 His 2nd Division (with troops from the 38th Division), under Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama and 7,000 soldiers in three infantry regiments was ordered to attack the American defences from the south near the east bank of the Lunga River.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 To try and trick the Americans from knowing about the planned attack from the south, Hyakutake's heavy artillery plus five battalions of infantry (about 2,900 men) under Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi attacked the American defenses from the west.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese thought that there were 10,000 American troops on the island, when in there were really 23,000.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 12 October, a group of Japanese engineers began to cut a trail, called the "Maruyama Road", from the Matanikau towards the southern portion of the U.S. Lunga perimeter.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 By 23 October, Maruyama's forces were finding it hard to get through the jungle to reach the American forces.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Thus, at dusk on 23 October, two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the nine tanks of the 1st Independent Tank Company attacked on the U.S. Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matanikau.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 U.S. Marine artillery, cannon, and rifle fire defeated the attacks, destroying all the tanks and killing many of the Japanese soldiers.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Over two nights Maruyama's troops attacked positions defended by troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller and the U.S. Army's 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hall.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 U.S. Marine and Army units armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and fire from 37 mm anti-tank guns did terrible damage to the Japanese.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 A few small groups of Japanese that broke through the American defenses, were all killed over the next several days.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 More than 1,500 of Maruyama's troops were killed in the attacks while the Americans lost about 60 killed.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Over the same two days American aircraft from Henderson Field destroying 14 Japanese aircraft and sunk a light cruiser.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Further Japanese attacks near the Matanikau on 26 October were also defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 As a result, by 08:00 on 26 October, Hyakutake stopped the attacks and ordered his forces to retreat.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The 230th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Toshinari Shōji was told to go to Koli Point, east of the Lunga perimeter.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Soldiers from the 2nd Division reached the 17th Army headquarters area at Kokumbona, west of the Matanikau on 4 November.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 At the same time that Hyakutake's troops were attacking the Lunga perimeter, Japanese aircraft carriers and other large warships led by  Isoroku Yamamoto moved near the southern Solomon Islands.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 From this location, the Japanese naval forces hoped to defeat any Allied (primarily U.S.) naval forces, especially carrier forces.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Allied naval carrier forces in the area, now under the command of William Halsey, Jr., also hoped to meet the Japanese naval forces in battle.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Nimitz had replaced Ghormley with Halsey on 18 October after deciding that Ghormley had become too negative to lead Allied forces in the South Pacific area.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The two opposing carrier forces battled each other on the morning of 26 October, in what became known as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Allied ships had to retreat from the battle after one carrier was sunk () and another () heavily damaged.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese carrier forces, however, also pulled back because of high aircraft and aircrew losses and major damage to two carriers.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 However, the loss by the Japanese of many experienced aircrews helped the Allies, who did not lose many aircrew.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 To strengthen his victory in the Battle for Henderson Field, Vandegrift sent six Marine battalions, later joined by one U.S. Army battalion, on an attack west of the Matanikau.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The attack was commanded by Merritt Edson and its goal was to capture Kokumbona, headquarters of the 17th Army, west of Point Cruz.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Defending the Point Cruz area were Japanese army troops from the 4th Infantry Regiment commanded by Nomasu Nakaguma.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The 4th Infantry was in poor condition because of battle deaths and injuries, tropical disease, and malnutrition.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Then American forces found newly landed Japanese troops near Koli Point on the eastern side of the Lunga perimeter.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 To deal with these newly landed Japanese troops, Vandegrift stopped the Matanikau attack on 4 November.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 They were sent to help Shōji and his troops who were going to Koli Point after the Battle for Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 When Vandegrift found out about the Japanese landing, he sent a battalion of Marines under Herman H. Hanneken to attack the Japanese at Koli.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Soon after landing, the Japanese soldiers pushed Hanneken's battalion back towards the Lunga perimeter.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In response, Vandegrift ordered Puller's Marine battalion plus two of the 164th infantry battalions, along with Hanneken's battalion, to attack the Japanese forces there.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Beginning on 8 November, the American troops tried to surround Shōji's forces at Gavaga Creek near Koli Point.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Hyakutake ordered Shōji to leave his positions at Koli and rejoin Japanese forces at Kokumbona in the Matanikau area.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Between 9 and 11 November, Shōji and between 2,000 and 3,000 of his men escaped into the jungle to the south.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Americans counted the bodies of 450–475 Japanese dead in the Koli Point area and captured most of Shōji's heavy weapons and supplies.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 4 November, two companies from the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Evans Carlson landed by boat at Aola Bay,  east of Lunga Point.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Carlson's raiders, along with troops from the U.S. Army's 147th Infantry Regiment, were told to protect 500 Seabees as they constructed an airfield at that location.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Aola airfield construction was stopped at the end of November because the land was not good for building an airfield.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 5 November, Vandegrift ordered Carlson to attack any of Shōji's forces that had escaped from Koli Point.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 During the patrol, Carlson's soldierz fought several battles with Shōji's retreating forces, killing almost 500 of them, while having 16 killed themselves.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In addition to the deaths from attacks by Carlson's raiders, tropical diseases and a lack of food caused more of Shōji's men to die.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 By the time Shōji's forces reached the Lunga River in mid-November, about halfway to the Matanikau, only 1,300 men remained.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 When Shōji reached the 17th Army positions west of the Matanikau, only 700 to 800 survivors were still with him.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Most of the survivors from Shōji's force joined other Japanese units defending the Mount Austen and upper Matanikau River area.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Japanese destroyer trips on 5, 7 and 9 November, delivered additional troops from the Japanese 38th Infantry Division, including most of the 228th Infantry Regiment to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 These fresh troops were put in the Point Cruz and Matanikau area, and they stopped attacks by American forces on 10 and 18 November.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Americans and Japanese remained facing each other along a line west of Point Cruz for the next six weeks.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 After the defeat in the Battle for Henderson Field, the IJA planned to try again to capture the airfield in November 1942.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The IJA requested help from Yamamoto to deliver the new troops to the island and to support the next attack.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Yamamoto provided 11 large transport ships to carry the remaining 7,000 troops from the 38th Infantry Division, their ammunition, food, and heavy equipment from Rabaul to Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The two battleships,  and , with special fragmentation shells, were to bomb Henderson Field on the night of 12–13 November and destroy it and the aircraft stationed there.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In early November, Allied forces learned that the Japanese were preparing again to try to capture Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Therefore, the U.S. sent Task Force 67, a convoy carrying Marines, two U.S. Army infantry battalions, and ammunition and food to Guadalcanal on 11 November.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The supply ships were protected by two task groups, commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott, and aircraft from Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The ships were attacked several times on 11 and 12 November by Japanese aircraft but most were unloaded without serious damage.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Turner sent all usable combat ships under Callaghan to protect the troops ashore from the expected Japanese naval attack and troop landing.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Around 01:30 on 13 November, Callaghan's force met Abe's bombing group between Guadalcanal and Savo Island.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Abe's warships sank or severely damaged all but one cruiser and one destroyer in Callaghan's force and both Callaghan and Scott were killed.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In spite of his defeat of Callaghan's force, Abe ordered his warships to pull back without bombing Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Because of Abe's failure to destroyHenderson Field, Yamamoto ordered the troop transport convoy to wait an additional day before heading towards Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Yamamoto ordered Nobutake Kondō to assemble another bombing force using warships from Truk and Abe's force to attack Henderson Field on 15 November.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 As Mikawa's force went back to Rabaul, Tanaka's transport convoy, thinking that Henderson Field was now destroyed began its trip towards Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Throughout 14 November, aircraft from Henderson Field and Enterprise attacked Mikawa's and Tanaka's ships, sinking one heavy cruiser and seven of the transports.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Most of the troops were rescued from the transports by Tanaka's escorting destroyers and returned to the Shortlands.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 After dark, Tanaka and the remaining four transports continued towards Guadalcanal as Kondo's force approached to bomb Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 In order to attack Kondo's force, Halsey, who was low on undamaged ships, sent two battleships,  and , and four destroyers from the Enterprise task force.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The U.S. force, under the command of Willis A. Lee aboard Washington, reached Guadalcanal and Savo Island just before midnight on 14 November, shortly before Kondo's bombing force arrived.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Kondo's force consisted of Kirishima plus two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 After the two forces met, Kondo's force quickly sank three of the U.S. destroyers and heavily damaged the fourth.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 As Kondo's warships concentrated on South Dakota, Washington approached the Japanese ships and opened fire on Kirishima, hitting the Japanese battleship and causing serious damage.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 After chasing Washington towards the Russell Islands, Kondo ordered his warships to pull back without bombing Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 As Kondo's ships pulled back, the four Japanese transports landed near Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal at 04:00 and began unloading.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 At 05:55, U.S. aircraft and artillery began attacking the transports, destroying all four transports along with most of the supplies that they carried.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Because of the failure to deliver most of the troops and supplies, the Japanese were forced to cancel their planned November attack  on Henderson Field.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 On 26 November, Japanese Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura took command of the newly formed Eighth Area Army at Rabaul.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Because the Allied attempt to take Buna was considered a more severe threat to Rabaul, Imamura delayed sending new troops to Guadalcanal to concentrate on the situation in New Guinea.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 The Japanese continued to have problems in delivering enough supplies to their troops on Guadalcanal.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 Attempts to use only submarines the last two weeks in November did not provide enough food for Hyakutake's forces.
Guadalcanal Campaign 
 A separate attempt to establish bases in the central Solomons to use to send barge convoys to Guadalcanal also failed because of Allied air attacks.