第2次インティファーダ
With complete ground and air superiority, mass arrests were regularly conducted by Israeli military and police forces; at any given time, there were about 6,000 Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli prisons, about half of them held temporarily without a final indictment, in accordance with Israeli law.
The tactic of military "curfew" – long-term lockdown of civilian areas – was used extensively by Israel throughout the Intifada. The longest curfew was in Nablus, which was kept under curfew for over 100 consecutive days, with generally under two hours per day allowed for people to get food or conduct other business.
Security checkpoints and roadblocks were erected inside and between Palestinian cities, subjecting all people and vehicles to security inspection for free passage. Israel defended those checkpoints as being necessary to stop militants and limit the ability to move weapons around. However some Palestinian, Israeli and International observers and organizations have criticized the checkpoints as excessive, humiliating, and a major cause of the humanitarian situation in the Occupied Territories. Transit could be delayed by several hours, depending on the security situation in Israel. Sniper towers were used extensively in the Gaza Strip before the Israeli pullout.
The Israeli intelligence services Shin Bet and Mossad penetrated Palestinian militant organizations by relying on moles and sources within armed groups, tapping communication lines, and aerial reconnaissance. The intelligence gathered allowed the IDF, Israel Border Police, and Israel Police, including Yamam and Mistaravim special forces units, to thwart hundreds of planned suicide bombings. The intelligence gathered also helped create a list of Palestinians marked for targeted killings.
Israel extensively used targeted killings, the assassinations of Palestinians involved in organizing attacks against Israelis, to eliminate imminent threats and to deter others from following suit, relying primarily on airstrikes and covert operations by Shin Bet to carry them out. The strategy of targeted killings had been proposed by Shin Bet, which determined that while it was impossible to stop every single suicide bomber, suicide bombings could be stopped by directly attacking the conspiratorial infrastructure behind them by killing operational commanders, recruiters, couriers, weapons procurers, maintainers of safehouses, and smugglers of money which financed the bombings. Israel was criticized for the use of helicopter gunships in urban assassinations, which often resulted in civilian casualties. Israel criticized what it described as a practice of militant leaders hiding among civilians in densely populated areas, thus turning them into unwitting human shields. Throughout the Intifada, the Palestinian leadership suffered heavy losses through targeted killings.
The practice has been widely condemned as extrajudicial executions by the international community, while the Israeli High Court ruled that it is a legitimate measure of self-defense against terrorism. ManyMay 2010 criticize the targeted killings for placing civilians at risk, though its supporters believe it reduces civilian casualties on both sides.
In response to repeated rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli Navy imposed a maritime blockade on the area. Israel also sealed the border and closed Gaza's airspace in coordination with Egypt, and subjected all humanitarian supplies entering the Strip to security inspection before transferring them through land crossings. Construction materials were declared banned due to their possible use to build bunkers. The blockade has been internationally criticized as a form of "collective punishment" against Gaza's civilian population.
Although Israel's tactics also have been condemned internationally, Israel insists they are vital for security reasons in order to thwart terrorist attacks. Some cite figures, such as those published in Haaretz newspaper, to prove the effectiveness of these methods ( – ).
国際社会は長らくパレスチナ問題に関与しており、第2次インティファーダが勃発してからもひたすら拡大している。現在のイスラエルは、アメリカ合衆国から軍事支援として毎年30億ドルを融資保障なしに受けており、産業国家として発展しつつも、1976年以降、アメリカ合衆国による毎年の外国への支援で最大の規模を保っていて、かつ、唯一、用途の報告義務が存在しない。パレスチナ自治政府は、アメリカ合衆国からの軍事支援として毎年1億ドル、世界の財政支援として20億ドルを受けており、その中にはアラブ連盟からの5億2600万ドル、欧州連合からの6億5100万ドル、アメリカ合衆国からの3億ドル、世界銀行からの約2億3800万ドルが含まれる。国際連合によれば、パレスチナ自治区は人道支援の対象で上位に入っている。
さらに, International Solidarity Movement(パレスチナ側)、American Israel Public Affairs Committee(イスラエル側)といった民間団体が関与を深めつつある。
1980年代後半の第1次インティファーダを支援したのと同じように、2001年と2002年のアラブ連盟サミットで、アラブ国家は第2次インティファーダに対する支援を誓約した。
第2次インティファーダが勃発してから、バスなどの公共交通機関の利用者を意図的に狙った自爆攻撃が強調され、オスロ合意に対してイスラエル社会で不満が高まりつつある。2000年5月(オスロ合意から7年後、第2次インティファーダ勃発の5ヶ月前)、テルアビブ大学のthe Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Researchによる調査によれば、イスラエル人の39%が支持し、32%が数年以内に和平がなされると考えていたという。しかし、2004年5月では、26%がオスロ合意を支持し、18%が数年以内に和平がなされると考えていた(それぞれ13%、16%減少している)。さらに、その後の調査で、80%以上がイスラエル国防軍による第2次インティファーダへの軍事的な対処が成功であると考えていたことが判明した。
イスラエルの商業は、特に観光の激減で、莫大な悪影響を被った。イスラエルの商工会議所の代表の推計によれば、 イスラエル経済の累積損失は、2002年の年間GDP1220億ドルに対して、1500億から2000億シェケル(35億から45億ドル)の危機によるとされる。イスラエル国防軍やイスラエル総保安庁の取り組みの結果、自爆攻撃が大幅に減少して、2005年以降は回復している。
国際連合中東和平担当特別調整官の推計によれば、パレスチナ経済の損失は、年間のGDP45億ドルに対して、2002年の第1四半期で11億ドルとされる。