English: First of all, yes, in terms of the UK frameworks, UK plus 1, we believe, is a reasonable way of resolving disputes. We'd hope, of course, that there would be unanimity, but in the absence of unanimity, there has to be a process in place that deals with how to get decisions done. In terms of binding frameworks, those frameworks wouldn't be binding by statute, but they would be binding by agreement. Now, that would mean, for example, that if a business felt that state aid rules were being breached by one Government, it would have the confidence to go to the adjudication body in order for their complaint to be dealt with. So, it's not so much a question of one Government complaining about another; it's more to do with businesses taking issues to court that they feel breach state aid rules, much as is the case now. In terms of what the court itself would do, it would be an adjudicator, rather than an arbitrator. It has to be a decision maker in that regard. It would simply be the case that the parties agree that that court should be the independent court that binds them. It's common in internal single markets. The US Supreme Court acts as the regulator for interstate commerce within the US, so preserving the United States' single market in terms of goods and services. As far as the EFTA Court is concerned, it does the same for EFTA; the ECJ does the same for the European single market. There has to be, in any single market, if there are going to be rules, an independent adjudicator that polices those rules, as I've said before. In terms of the council of Ministers, he raises an intriguing point: should it have statutory underpinning? I suppose that statutory underpinning would be via joint legislation that would have to be taken through all four parliaments at the same time in order for it to have the kind of statutory underpinning that would be required. That's an interesting idea. The co-ordination of it would present a challenge, but nevertheless it's one that certainly is worthy of examination. But ultimately, an internal single market can only work if there is agreement between the parties that exist within that market and if there is a body to police those rules. Otherwise it ceases to be an internal single market, and it then becomes a market where it's possible, effectively, to have trade wars within that market, and that's not something, surely, that we would welcome, particularly given our size and the chaos it would cause within that market.
Welsh: Yn gyntaf oll, ydy, o ran fframweithiau'r DU, mae'r DU adio 1, yn ein barn ni, yn ffordd resymol o ddatrys anghydfodau. Byddem yn gobeithio, wrth gwrs, y byddai yna unfrydedd, ond yn absenoldeb unfrydedd, mae'n rhaid cael proses ar waith sy'n ymdrin â sut i wneud penderfyniadau. O ran fframweithiau rhwymol, ni fyddai'r fframweithiau hynny'n rhwymol drwy statud, ond byddent yn rhwymol drwy gytundeb. Nawr, byddai hynny'n golygu, er enghraifft, pe bai busnes yn teimlo bod un Llywodraeth yn torri rheolau cymorth gwladwriaethol, y byddai ganddo'r hyder i fynd at y corff dyfarnu er mwyn i'w cwyn gael sylw. Felly, nid yw'n gymaint o fater o un Llywodraeth yn cwyno am un arall; mae'n fwy o fater o fusnesau'n mynd â materion i'r llys os ydynt yn teimlo eu bod yn torri'r rheolau cymorth gwladwriaethol, yn debyg i'r hyn sy'n digwydd nawr. O ran yr hyn y byddai'r llys ei hun yn ei wneud, byddai'n ddyfarnwr, yn hytrach nag yn gyflafareddwr. Mae'n rhaid iddo wneud penderfyniadau yn hynny o beth. Yn syml, byddai'r partïon yn cytuno y dylai'r llys hwnnw fod y llys annibynnol sy'n eu rhwymo. Mae'n gyffredin mewn marchnadoedd unigol mewnol. Mae Goruchaf Lys yr Unol Daleithiau yn gweithredu fel rheoleiddiwr ar gyfer masnach rhwng taleithiau o fewn yr Unol Daleithiau, sy'n cynnal marchnad sengl yr Unol Daleithiau o ran nwyddau a gwasanaethau. Cyn belled ag y mae'r Llys EFTA dan sylw, mae'n gwneud yr un peth ar gyfer EFTA; mae Llys Cyfiawnder Ewrop yn gwneud yr un peth ar gyfer y farchnad sengl Ewropeaidd. Mewn unrhyw farchnad sengl, os bydd yna reolau, mae angen dyfarnwr annibynnol sy'n plismona'r rheolau hynny, fel yr wyf wedi'i ddweud o'r blaen. O ran y cyngor Gweinidogion, mae'n codi pwynt diddorol: a ddylid cael sail statudol? Mae'n debyg y byddai'r sail statudol honno'n dod drwy ddeddfwriaeth ar y cyd a fyddai'n gorfod mynd drwy'r pedair senedd ar yr un pryd er mwyn iddi gael y math o sail statudol y byddai ei hangen. Dyna syniad diddorol. Byddai cydlynu hynny'n her, ond serch hynny mae'n un sydd yn sicr yn werth ei harchwilio. Ond yn y pen draw, ni all marchnad sengl fewnol weithio oni bai bod cytundeb rhwng y partïon sy'n bodoli o fewn y farchnad honno a bod yna gorff i blismona'r rheolau hynny. Fel arall mae'n peidio â bod yn farchnad sengl fewnol, ac yna mae'n dod yn farchnad lle y mae'n bosibl, i bob diben, cael rhyfeloedd masnach o fewn y farchnad, ac nid yw hynny'n rhywbeth, does bosib, y byddem yn ei groesawu, yn enwedig o ystyried ein maint a'r anhrefn y byddai'n ei achosi o fewn y farchnad honno.