English: May I just carry on for a little while? I think there was probably much to and fro between the UK Government and the European Council in terms of seeing each other's drafts and commenting, and already a degree of, if not of negotiation, at least mutual feedback. That doesn't appear to have happened with the devolved administrations, and I share some of the First Minister's regrets about that. But he must understand that there is no Government in Northern Ireland, and that the Scottish Government is an SNP Government whose leader is committed to breaking up the United Kingdom. I urge him once more to protect the interests of Wales: please seek substantive, wide-ranging, bilateral discussions, in private, between the Welsh Government and the UK Government, to try and push some of these issues in the interests of Wales. I'd also encourage him to take up Julie Morgan's plea that not just UK Ministers but key Members of these Assemblies, who have made commitments or at least suggested certain things would happen for the benefit of Wales outside the European Union, particularly on the financial side - I would urge him to work with those people who campaigned for 'leave', not just those who campaigned for 'remain', including those who may have influence with the UK negotiating partner. I'm encouraged by the draft negotiating mandate that came back from the European Council, as well as by the article 50 letter. It refers to the fact that negotiations under article 50 will be conducted as a single package. It then says that the framework for the future relationship could be identified during the second phase of the negotiations under article 50, as soon as sufficient progress has been made in the first phase. And yes, financial discussions are part of that, but there's a whole range of issues, including the rights of EU nationals in this country, which we're very keen to settle and push forward and show good progress on. So, I think the link of those is encouraging. I also think, in terms of the role of the European Court of Justice - . The relevant paragraph on that is paragraph 16: 'The withdrawal agreement should include appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms'. But the council then refers to these 'bearing in mind' the union's interests, and the ECJ, which I think is something we can work with in discussing what would be an appropriate settlement procedure. We then have the section on Gibraltar, which there's been a lot of coverage of. I actually think people may be missing quite a key implication of this paragraph 22 of the negotiating mandate: that, after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, no agreement may apply to Gibraltar without the agreement of Spain. Now, that phrase would be otiose, unnecessary, unless it were considered that agreement would be by qualified majority, at the European Union. If it is to be, as the First Minister is afraid, a mixed negotiation, post-exit, that would leave the unanimous agreement to member states, and, potentially, of regional parliaments, then there would be no need to give that specific protection to Spain, who would already have a veto over such agreement. So, I think it is encouraging that the European Union is looking at those trade and related arrangements post Brexit as potentially being negotiated by qualified majority. And I think the fact that these negotiations, at least after a bit, can proceed in parallel is good, to the extent, say, the Canada agreement was a mixed agreement that had to go the regional parliaments and be unanimity. But the mixed elements in any trade agreement we could potentially deal with with article 50, and the trade one would be where the European Commission had exclusive competence. So, again, that would be by qualified majority voting. I think that does make agreement potentially easier. I also think it's interesting that the EU is saying that it's the successor to all the agreements. Even where we as 28 or 27 member states negotiated on behalf of the EU because it lacked legal personality, the EU says, well, that's its agreement and it doesn't bind us. So, for example, on the WTO EU commitment in terms of the quota free of tariff for New Zealand lamb, they are implying that that's a matter for the EU, and they want us to take our share of international agreements, but that's for us to agree with them, and isn't something that they consider to be binding on us. So, I think that's promising.
Welsh: A gaf i barhau am ychydig bach? Mae'n siŵr gen i y bu llawer o gyswllt rhwng Llywodraeth y DU a'r Cyngor Ewropeaidd o ran gweld eu drafftiau ei gilydd a rhoi sylwadau, ac eisoes rhywfaint, os nad o drafod, o adborth gan y naill ochr i'r llall o leiaf. Nid yw'n ymddangos bod hynny wedi digwydd gyda'r gweinyddiaethau datganoledig, ac rwy'n rhannu rhywfaint o edifeirwch y Prif Weinidog am hynny. Ond mae'n rhaid iddo ddeall nad oes Llywodraeth yng Ngogledd Iwerddon, a bod Llywodraeth yr Alban yn Llywodraeth SNP sydd ag arweinydd sy'n ymroddedig i chwalu'r Deyrnas Unedig. Rwy'n ei annog unwaith yn rhagor i ddiogelu buddiannau Cymru: os gwelwch yn dda, ceisiwch drafodaethau sylweddol, eang, dwyochrog, preifat, rhwng Llywodraeth Cymru a Llywodraeth y DU, i geisio gwthio rhai o'r materion hyn er budd Cymru. Byddwn hefyd yn ei annog i dderbyn ple Julie Morgan nad dim ond Gweinidogion y DU, ond Aelodau allweddol o'r Cynulliadau hyn, sydd wedi gwneud ymrwymiadau neu o leiaf wedi awgrymu y byddai rhai pethau'n digwydd er budd Cymru y tu allan i'r Undeb Ewropeaidd, yn enwedig ar yr ochr ariannol - byddwn yn ei annog i weithio gyda'r bobl hynny a ymgyrchodd dros 'gadael', nid dim ond y rhai a ymgyrchodd dros 'aros', gan gynnwys y rhai a allai ddylanwadu ar bartner negodi'r DU. Mae'r mandad trafod drafft a ddaeth yn ôl o'r Cyngor Ewropeaidd yn fy nghalonogi, yn ogystal â llythyr erthygl 50. Mae'n cyfeirio at y ffaith y bydd trafodaethau o dan erthygl 50 yn cael eu cynnal fel un pecyn. Mae wedyn yn dweud y gellid nodi'r fframwaith ar gyfer y berthynas yn y dyfodol yn ystod ail gyfnod y trafodaethau o dan erthygl 50, cyn gynted â bod digon o gynnydd wedi'i wneud yn y cam cyntaf. Ac ydynt, mae trafodaethau ariannol yn rhan o hynny, ond mae amrywiaeth eang o faterion, gan gynnwys hawliau dinasyddion yr UE yn y wlad hon, yr ydym yn awyddus iawn i'w setlo a'u gwthio ymlaen a dangos cynnydd da arnynt. Felly, rwy'n meddwl bod cysylltu'r rheini'n rhywbeth calonogol. Rwyf hefyd yn meddwl, o ran swyddogaeth Llys Cyfiawnder Ewrop - . Y paragraff perthnasol am hwnnw yw paragraff 16: Dylai'r cytundeb tynnu'n ôl gynnwys mecanweithiau priodol i ddatrys anghydfodau. Ond mae'r cyngor wedyn yn cyfeirio at y rhain 'gan gofio' budd yr undeb, a Llys Cyfiawnder Ewrop, sy'n rhywbeth yr wyf yn meddwl y gallwn weithio gydag ef wrth drafod yr hyn a fyddai'n weithdrefn setlo briodol. Yna, mae gennym yr adran am Gibraltar, sydd wedi cael llawer o sylw. Rwyf wir yn meddwl y gallai fod pobl yn colli un o oblygiadau eithaf allweddol y paragraff 22 hwn yn y mandad negodi: sef, ar ôl i'r Deyrnas Unedig adael yr Undeb Ewropeaidd, na all unrhyw gytundeb fod yn gymwys i Gibraltar heb gytundeb Sbaen. Nawr, byddai'r frawddeg honno'n ddianghenraid, yn ddiangen, oni bai bod rhywun yn ystyried y byddai'r cytundeb hwnnw'n golygu mwyafrif cymwysedig, yn yr Undeb Ewropeaidd. Os bydd, fel y mae'r Prif Weinidog Cymru yn ei ofni, yn drafodaeth gymysg, ar ôl gadael, byddai hynny'n gadael y cytundeb unfrydol i aelod-wladwriaethau, ac, o bosibl, i seneddau rhanbarthol, ac felly ni fyddai angen rhoi'r warchodaeth benodol honno i Sbaen, gan y byddai ganddi eisoes feto dros gytundeb o'r fath. Felly, rwy'n meddwl ei bod yn galonogol bod yr Undeb Ewropeaidd yn edrych ar drefniadau masnach a threfniadau eraill cysylltiedig ar ôl Brexit fel rhai y gellid trafod drwy fwyafrif cymwysedig. Ac rwy'n meddwl bod y ffaith bod y trafodaethau hyn, o leiaf ar ôl ychydig, yn gallu symud ymlaen ochr yn ochr yn dda, i'r graddau, dyweder, yr oedd cytundeb Canada yn gytundeb cymysg a oedd yn gorfod mynd i'r seneddau rhanbarthol a bod yn unfrydol. Ond mae'r elfennau cymysg mewn unrhyw gytundeb masnach yn rhai y gallem o bosibl ymdrin â nhw gydag erthygl 50, a'r un o ran masnach fyddai'r un lle'r oedd gan y Comisiwn Ewropeaidd gymhwysedd unigryw. Felly, unwaith eto, byddai hynny drwy bleidleisio mwyafrif cymwysedig. Rwy'n meddwl bod hynny o bosibl yn gwneud cytundeb yn haws. Rwyf hefyd yn meddwl ei bod yn ddiddorol bod yr UE yn dweud mai hwn yw'r olynydd i'r holl gytundebau. Hyd yn oed pan fyddem fel 28 neu 27 o aelod-wladwriaethau yn trafod ar ran yr Undeb Ewropeaidd oherwydd bod ganddo ddiffyg personoliaeth gyfreithiol, mae'r UE yn dweud, wel, dyna ei gytundeb ac nid yw'n ein rhwymo ni. Felly, er enghraifft, ar yr ymrwymiad WTO UE o ran y cwota di-dariff ar gyfer cig oen o Seland Newydd, maent yn awgrymu mai mater i'r UE yw hwnnw, ac maen nhw eisiau i ni gymryd ein cyfran o gytundebau rhyngwladol, ond mae hynny'n rhywbeth i ni gytuno arno â nhw, ac nid yw'n rhywbeth y maen nhw'n ei ystyried yn rhwymol arnom ni. Felly, rwy'n meddwl bod hynny'n addawol.