English: Once the protocol to this agreement is in force, it is quite clear that the UK cannot leave except by a joint decision of the UK and the EU. And why would the EU want to put us in a position where we can leave at that point? Because they will have locked us into a permanent arrangement with them, whereby they have free access to our markets - and, of course, the reciprocal is that we have free access to theirs, but the imbalance in trade is £95 billion a year in the EU's favour - but, on the other hand, we give up our right to negotiate trade agreements with the rest of the world, which is one of the great advantages of Brexit in the first place. Eighty-five per cent of the global economy is outside the European Union, and it's the rest of the world that is growing, whilst the EU is sclerotic. And with another euro crisis in prospect in the course of the next year or so, then the problems of the European economy are going to become even greater. All that the European Union has agreed to in these negotiations is to use its best endeavours to negotiate a permanent trade agreement with us. But why would they want to do so? The transition agreement provides that any permanent trade arrangement that we have with the EU shall be based upon the existing single customs territory, so that, even if we were able to arrange a deal with the EU, that would in itself preclude us from doing deals with the rest of the world, because an essential element in any free trade agreement is that it provides for free trade between goods that are made, produced, in the two contracting parties' countries. And then there are rules of origin rules to apply to avoid third party countries getting around trade agreements by routing their goods through a territory that they are entering without the normal restrictions, if there isn't one. So, the consequence will be that, as article 24 of the GATT agreement requires rules of origin arrangements, where information is collected about the origin of the goods that are passing through, then we won't be able to satisfy any other country in the world about the origins of the goods that we are selling to them. And that undermines the very principle upon which free trade agreements are based. So, if there's a dispute that arises about the meaning of the agreements that the Government proposes, how is that going to be decided? Well, there's going to be an arbitration panel that is set up, but, under article 174 of the withdrawal agreement, the disputes are ultimately settled not by the arbitration panel itself, but by the European Court of Justice. And the consequence of that is, in effect, that the control of our laws will continue to be at the behest of the European Court of Justice. Carl Baudenbacher, who was the president of the court of justice to the European Free Trade Association, EFTA, says that this is not a real arbitration tribunal - behind it, the ECJ decides everything. And this is taken from the Ukraine agreement. It's absolutely unbelievable that a country like the UK, which was the first country to accept independent courts, would subject itself to this. So, this is vassalage in its true sense, whereby we have to take the rules and regulations that are decided by the European Union and we just have to abide by them. We have no voice or vote in how they are made - [ Interruption.] I didn't argue - [ Interruption.] No, no, I said - I argued for a free and independent sovereign Britain, whereby our own elected representatives, like we are in this place, should make our laws, and we don't just become rule takers via the EU, which is not only able to direct the terms upon which we trade with them, but also the rules under which we trade with the rest of the world. That is the reverse of Brexit - that is the reverse of what the people voted for in June 2016. When we went into the common market back in 1973, it was presented as purely a trade deal. It was not presented as part of a journey to a federal centralised European superstate, which is the journey that we are still on. Angela Merkel was talking only two weeks ago about a European army, and that's, of course, a very dangerous prospect indeed, and there is significant opposition within the federalists to NATO as an institution. They want to become a big player themselves on the world stage. That is something that could never be acceptable in my view to the United Kingdom Government, but, ultimately, we would have no control over it. If we are to deliver on the result of the Brexit referendum, we are going to have to face now a prospect that is more difficult than we could have imagined two years ago, and indeed much more difficult than was absolutely necessary. Theresa May has abjectly failed to play the good cards that were in her hand, which are of, course, the massive trade deficit that we have with the EU, the £10 billion a year that we have contributed net to the EU budget for the last 40 years, and our ability to negotiate trade deals with the rest of the world. If she were a bridge player, then she's deliberately chosen to be the dummy in these negotiations, laying out her cards on the table for others to see, whilst the EU has played its cards close to its chest. What she has done in this trade agreement is not to throw out the baby with the bath water, but actually to throw out the baby and keep the bath water.
Welsh: Unwaith y bydd protocol y cytundeb hwn mewn grym, mae'n eithaf amlwg na all y DU adael ac eithrio drwy benderfyniad ar y cyd gan y DU a'r UE. A pham fyddai'r UE eisiau ein rhoi mewn sefyllfa lle y gallem ni adael bryd hynny? Oherwydd byddan nhw wedi ein clymu i drefniant parhaol gyda nhw, lle mae ganddyn nhw fynediad am ddim i'n marchnadoedd ni - ac, wrth gwrs, yn gyfnewid, mae gennym ni fynediad am ddim i'w marchnadoedd nhw, ond mae'r anghydbwysedd mewn masnach yn £95 biliwn y flwyddyn o blaid yr UE - ond, ar y llaw arall, byddwn yn ildio ein hawl i negodi cytundebau masnach â gweddill y byd, sef un o fanteision mawr Brexit yn y lle cyntaf. Mae wyth deg pump y cant o'r economi fyd-eang y tu allan i'r Undeb Ewropeaidd, a gweddill y byd sy'n tyfu, tra bod yr UE yn aros yn ei hunfan. A chydag argyfwng arall i' r ewro yn yr arfaeth yn ystod y flwyddyn neu ddwy nesaf, yna bydd problemau economi Ewrop hyd yn oed yn fwy. Y cyfan y mae'r Undeb Ewropeaidd wedi cytuno iddo yn y trafodaethau hyn yw gwneud ei gorau glas i negodi cytundeb masnach parhaol gyda ni. Ond pam fyddai hi eisiau gwneud hynny? Amod o'r cytundeb pontio yw bod unrhyw drefniant masnach parhaol sydd gennym ni gyda'r UE yn seiliedig ar diriogaeth b resennol yr undeb tollau sengl. Felly, hyd yn oed pe gallem drefnu bargen â'r UE, byddai hynny ynddo'i hun yn ein hatal rhag llunio cytundebau â gweddill y byd, oherwydd elfen hanfodol o unrhyw gytundeb masnach rydd yw ei bod yn darparu ar gyfer masnach rydd rhwng nwyddau sy'n cael eu gwneud, neu eu cynhyrchu, yng ngwledydd y ddau endid sy'n llunio'r cytundeb. Ac wedyn mae yna reolau tarddiad sy'n berthnasol fel na all trydydd partïon osgoi telerau cytundebau masnach drwy gaffael eu nwyddau drwy diriogaeth y maen nhw'n mynd i mewn iddo heb y cyfyngiadau arferol, os nad oes un. Mae Erthygl 24 o'r cytundeb GATT yn ei gwneud yn ofynnol cael rheolau trefniadau tarddiad, lle cesglir gwybodaeth am darddiad y nwyddau sy'n tramwyo trwy diriogaeth. Felly o ganlyniad, ni fyddwn yn gallu bodloni unrhyw wlad arall yn y byd o ran tarddiad y nwyddau yr ydym ni'n eu gwerthu iddyn nhw. Ac mae hynny'n tanseilio'r union egwyddor y mae cytundebau masnach rydd yn seiliedig arni. Felly, os oes anghydfod ynglŷn ag ystyr y cytundebau y mae'r Llywodraeth yn eu cynnig, sut mae modd p enderfynu ar hynny? Wel, bydd panel cymrodeddu yn cael ei sefydlu, ond, dan erthygl 174 y cytundeb ymadael, caiff anghydfod ei ddatrys yn y pen draw nid gan y panel cymrodeddu ei hun, ond gan Lys Cyfiawnder Ewrop. A chanlyniad hynny, mewn gwirionedd, yw y bydd rheolaeth ein cyfreithiau yn parhau i fod yn seiliedig ar fympwy Llys Cyfiawnder Ewrop. Dywed Carl Baudenbacher, a oedd yn Llywydd Llys Cyfiawnder Cymdeithas Masnach Rydd Ewrop, EFTA, nad tribiwnlys cymrodeddu gwirioneddol yw hwn - y tu ôl iddo, mae Llys Cyfiawnder Ewrop yn penderfynu popeth. Ac mae hyn yn deillio o gytundeb yr Wcráin. Mae'n anghredadwy y byddai gwlad fel y DU, sef y wlad gyntaf i dderbyn llysoedd annibynnol, yn darostwng ei hun i hyn. Felly, dyma wladwriaeth gaeth yng ngwir ystyr y gair, lle mae'n rhaid inni dderbyn y rheolau a'r rheoliadau y penderfynir arnyn nhw gan yr Undeb Ewropeaidd, ac mae'n rhaid i ni ufuddhau iddyn nhw. Nid oes gennym lais na phleidlais yn y ffordd y maent yn cael eu gwneud - [ Torri ar draws.] Wnes i ddim dadlau - [ Torri ar draws.] Na, na, dywedais - dadleuais o blaid P rydain sofran ac annibynnol, lle dylai ein cynrychiolwyr etholedig ein hunain lunio ein cyfreithiau, fel y gwnawn ni yn y fan hon, ac nad ydym ond yn derbyn rheolau drwy'r UE, sydd nid yn unig yn gallu cyfarwyddo ein telerau masnachu â nhw, ond hefyd ein rheolau masnachu â gweddill y byd. Mae hynny'n groes i Brexit - mae hynny'n groes i'r hyn y pleidleisiodd pobl o'i blaid ym mis Mehefin 2016. Pan ymunwyd â'r farchnad gyffredin ym 1973, fe'i cyflwynwyd fel dim byd amgenach na bargen fasnach. Ni chafodd ei chyflwyno fel rhan o daith tuag at archwladwriaeth Ewropeaidd ganolog, ffederal, sef y daith yr ydym ni arni o hyd. Roedd Angela Merkel yn sôn dim ond bythefnos yn ôl am fyddin Ewropeaidd, ac mae hynny, wrth gwrs, yn bosibilrwydd peryglus iawn yn wir, ac mae gwrthwynebiad sylweddol ymysg y ffederalwyr i NATO fel sefydliad. Maen nhw eisiau bod yn un o brif gymeriadau llwyfan y byd. Mae hynny'n rhywbeth na allai fod yn dderbyniol, yn fy marn i, i Lywodraeth y Deyrnas Unedig byth, ond, yn y pen draw, ni fyddai gennym ni unrhyw reolaeth dros hynny. Os ydym yn mynd i anrhydeddu canlyniad refferendwm Brexit, rydym yn mynd i orfod wynebu posibilrwydd yn awr sy'n fwy anodd nag y gallem fod wedi ei ddychmygu dwy flynedd yn ôl, ac yn wir, yn llawer mwy anodd nag yr oedd ei angen. Mae Theresa May wedi methu'n llwyr â manteisio ar y cyfleoedd euraid a oedd ganddi, sef, wrth gwrs, y diffyg masnach enfawr sydd gennym ni â'r UE, y £10 biliwn net y flwyddyn yr ydym ni wedi ei gyfrannu i gyllideb y r UE dros y 40 mlynedd diwethaf, a'n gallu i negodi cytundebau masnach â gweddill y byd. Pe byddai hi'n chwarae bridge, yna dewisodd chwarae'r dymi yn fwriadol yn y trafodaethau hyn, gan roi ei chardiau ar y bwrdd i eraill eu gweld, tra bod yr UE wedi chwarae'n ofalus. Yr hyn a wnaeth hi yn y cytundeb masnach hwn yw nid lluchio'r babi gyda'r brych, ond mewn gwirionedd lluchio'r babi a chadw'r brych.