English: The First Minister admonishes the leader of the opposition about respect for the rule of law, but I do recall, last week, what he and his Counsel General said about the then binding judgment of the High Court in our jurisdiction, and they decided they would prefer to take the ruling of the court from another jurisdiction. What I would ask Members to think about - [ Interruption.] - if I may continue - in responding to this judgment today, I think all of us would see it as being far stronger and greater in scope than had been anticipated prior to the judgment. The corollary of that is that the Supreme Court has gone further than what we expected in light of the prior constitutional norms. And I just think, in terms of considering how exorbitant the judgment is, we should focus a bit on paragraphs 49 and 50 of the judgment, which does most of the heavy lifting, where the court says, 'a prerogative power is only effective to the extent that it is recognised by the common law: as was said in the Case of Proclamations, "the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him." A prerogative power is therefore limited by statute and the common law'. The Case of Proclamations was about the Crown unmaking a law that had been passed by Parliament, and what the common law found then was that the executive could not act against the law or unmake laws where the legislature had restricted the prerogative through passing a law. That is not the case here. Parliament has had over 400 years since then to restrict the prerogative and control how it could be used. It has chosen not to, yet the Supreme Court has done so itself through the principles that it has discerned today. Similarly, in the previous Miller judgment, on the treaty on the functioning of the European Union we saw that Parliament had restricted the use of article 49 - the passerelle clause - but did not restrict the use of article 50. Yet, the court departed from previous principles of statutory interpretation to impose its own restrictions on article 50. One area - [ Interruption. ]. I'm describing how its judgment is exorbitant. Exorbitant is not the same as wrong. I am a lawyer and I would be cautious before going in the direction that the Member heckles to the effect of. In paragraph 60 of the judgment, quite rightly, the court doesn't stray into the areas of parliamentary procedure, but it does presume that Parliament controls its own timetable. Yet, it doesn't. It doesn't have a business of the house committee. The Government allocates days to the opposition or to a backbench business committee, but the Government controls the agenda. Standing Orders say it does. Standing Orders say votes must be forthwith, and there is a mechanism for Parliament - the House of Commons - to revise that on a motion from the Procedure Committee, but the Speaker didn't do that, because the Procedure Committee has a majority that backed Brexit. It's elected by the House. So, instead the Speaker ignored Standing Orders, read something into them that was not there and did things that way, contrary to the rules of the Commons in order to drive forward the law. We have a very important judgment today. I just about managed to read it since it came out, but I think we should all take further time to reflect, and I would encourage people to approach this very calmly, because, while I respect the rule of law, and I'd be cautious about criticising judges, I fear that many, many people out there see this through the prism of 'leave' and 'remain'.
Welsh: Mae'r Prif Weinidog yn ceryddu arweinydd yr wrthblaid ynghylch parch at reolaeth y gyfraith, ond rwy'n cofio, yr wythnos diwethaf, yr hyn a ddywedodd ef a'i Gwnsler Cyffredinol am ddyfarniad rhwymol yr Uchel Lys ar y pryd yn ein hawdurdodaeth ni, a phenderfynasant y byddai'n well ganddynt dderbyn dyfarniad y llys o awdurdodaeth arall. Yr hyn y byddwn yn ei ofyn i'r Aelodau ei ystyried - [ Torri ar draws.] - os caf i barhau - wrth ymateb i'r dyfarniad hwn heddiw, rwy'n credu y byddai pob un ohonom ni'n ei weld yn llawer cryfach ac ehangach ei gwmpas nag y rhagwelwyd cyn y dyfarniad. Canlyneb hynny yw bod y Goruchaf Lys wedi mynd ymhellach nag yr oeddem ni'n ei ddisgwyl yng ngoleuni arferion cyfansoddiadol blaenorol. Ac rwy'n meddwl, o ran ystyried pa mor afresymol yw'r dyfarniad, y dylem ni ganolbwyntio ychydig ar baragraffau 49 a 50 y dyfarniad, sy'n gwneud y rhan fwyaf o gwaith trwm, lle dywed y llys, mae grym uchelfreiniol yn effeithiol dim ond i'r graddau y mae'n cael ei gydnabod gan y gyfraith gyffredin: fel y dywedwyd yn y Case of Proclamations, "nid oes gan y Brenin uchelfraint, ond yr hyn y mae cyfraith y wlad yn ei chaniatáu iddo". Mae grym uchelfreiniol wedi ei gyfyngu felly gan gyfraith statud a'r gyfraith gyffredin. Roedd Achos y Proclamasiynau yn ymwneud â'r Goron yn dadwneud deddf a basiwyd gan y Senedd, a'r hyn a ganfu'r gyfraith gyffredin bryd hynny oedd na allai'r weithrediaeth weithredu yn groes i'r gyfraith na dadwneud cyfreithiau pan oedd y ddeddfwrfa wedi cyfyngu'r uchelfraint trwy basio deddf. Nid yw hynny'n wir yn y fan yma. Mae'r Senedd wedi cael dros 400 o flynyddoedd ers hynny i gyfyngu'r uchelfraint a rheoli sut y gellid ei defnyddio. Mae wedi dewis peidio â gwneud hynny, ac eto mae'r Goruchaf Lys wedi gwneud hynny ei hun drwy'r egwyddorion y mae wedi eu dehongli heddiw. Yn yr un modd, yn nyfarniad blaenorol Miller, ar y cytuniad ar weithrediad yr Undeb Ewropeaidd, gwelsom fod y Senedd wedi cyfyngu'r defnydd o erthygl 49 - cymal passerelle - ond ni chyfyngodd ar y defnydd o erthygl 50. Ac eto, aeth y llys yn groes i'r egwyddorion dehongli statudol blaenorol i orfodi ei gyfyngiadau ei hun ar erthygl 50. Un maes - [ Torri ar draws. ]. Rwy'n disgrifio sut mae ei ddyfarniad yn afresymol. Nid yw afresymol yr un fath ag anghywir. Rwy'n gyfreithiwr a byddwn yn ofalus cyn mynd i'r cyfeiriad y mae'r Aelod yn gweiddi i'w berwyl. Ym mharagraff 60 y dyfarniad, yn gwbl briodol, nid yw'r llys yn crwydro i feysydd gweithdrefn seneddol, ond mae'n rhagdybio bod y Senedd yn rheoli ei hamserlen ei hun. Ac eto nid yw'n gwneud hynny. Nid oes ganddi bwyllgor busnes y tŷ. Mae'r Llywodraeth yn neilltuo diwrnodau i'r gwrthbleidiau neu i bwyllgor busnes y meinciau cefn, ond y Llywodraeth sy'n rheoli'r agenda. Mae Rheolau Sefydlog yn dweud ei bod. Mae Rheolau Sefydlog yn dweud bod yn rhaid i bleidleisiau gael eu bwrw ar unwaith, a cheir dull i'r Senedd - Tŷ'r Cyffredin - ddiwygio hynny trwy gynnig gan y Pwyllgor Gweithdrefnau, ond ni wnaeth y Llefarydd hynny, oherwydd bod gan y Pwyllgor Gweithdrefnau fwyafrif a gefnogodd Brexit. Mae'n cael ei ethol gan y Tŷ. Felly, yn hytrach, anwybyddodd y Llefarydd y Rheolau Sefydlog, gan ddehongli rhywbeth ohonynt nad oedd yn bodoli a gwneud pethau yn y ffordd honno, yn groes i reolau Tŷ'r Cyffredin er mwyn symud y gyfraith yn ei blaen. Mae gennym ni ddyfarniad pwysig iawn heddiw. Cael a chael oedd hi i mi ei ddarllen ers ei gyhoeddi, ond rwy'n credu y dylai pob un ohonom gymryd mwy o amser i feddwl, ac rwy'n annog pobl i ymdrin â'r mater mewn ffordd bwyllog iawn oherwydd, er fy mod i'n parchu'r gyfraith, a byddwn yn gochel rhag beirniadu barnwyr, rwy'n ofni bod llawer iawn o bobl yn gweld hyn drwy brism 'gadael' ac 'aros'.