Funding basic sciences: a solid structure is built from the ground up
Authors: None The Lancet Microbe
Journal: The Lancet Microbe (2021)

In January, WHO held a meeting of scientists from around the world “to discuss critical knowledge gaps and research priorities for emerging variants of [SARS-CoV-2]”. Naturally, this discussion centred on moving analyses of the new variants into the centre of global research. But there is a deeper message here: the fields that have done the heavy lifting in monitoring the spread and shifts of this pandemic and uncovering the nature of the virus are among the so-called basic sciences. These fields have historically struggled to attract funding and support. This struggle exists, in part, because the impacts of applied sciences are much easier to see. The error here seems to be that more value is given to outputs than to the knowledge that guides us to them. In an era where information is a key commodity, is misguided. Much of the early knowledge-gathering done during the COVID-19 pandemic lacked dedicated funding, and, before this, there was limited support for research into what would prove to be directly relevant areas, such as coronaviruses. In May, we published a Comment highlighting the need to support research into zoonotic viruses and, more broadly, study of the wildlife virome. Some areas that have proved crucial in tackling this pandemic will probably find it easier to attract funding for the next few years. However, using the current pandemic as a template for future research priorities might not leave the world sufficiently prepared for the next one. This pandemic should be the wake-up call that basic research has direct and significant relevance for health and as such should be prioritised. Although the nature of this pandemic was not completely unexpected, the world still found itself unprepared. In this issue, Kristian Forbes and colleagues discuss the need for a coordinated and targeted strategy for early detection of virus spillover and emergence in humans in Africa. In their strategy, there is a key statement that is reminiscent of the sort of things that sometimes lead to proposals falling foul of shortsightedness: “should include viruses that might not pose immediate or widespread public health threats”. Research with this sort of broad-ranging scope is essential for preparedness but is often a difficult sell in non-pandemic times. There is also the risk that the enthusiasm of authorities and funders for this type of open-ended project would wane over time. This happens regularly to long-term projects when their funds are reallocated to the newest priority that authorities find themselves unprepared for. Unfortunately, the fixation with so-called productivity has meant that most research exists to fulfil predefined short-term goals and therefore does little to prepare society for the unexpected. It is unclear whether this approach to research is anything more than an exercise in business management, and it is not really the ideal structure for supporting work on identifying future hazards. In pandemic preparedness, it is dangerous to assume that we know where the next challenge is coming from. We need to prepare for a wide range of loosely defined risks, so there is little value in strictly prescribing the type of work that will contribute value. Therefore, authorities and funders need to find a way to better support the basic sciences as they push back the frontiers of our knowledge. But, more fully, there needs to be a cultural shift in how basic research is characterised. Somewhere along the way the popular understanding of the sciences as basic versus applied seems to have been clouded. It is important to emphasise that the basic sciences are referred to in this way not because they are simple or introductory, but because they form the base, the foundation on which other work builds. With this in mind, the fundamental importance of the basic sciences is clear, and so they should attract much more funding and support and not be the poor relation of applied fields that are potentially built on unsteady foundations given the neglect of the base. For more on WHO's meeting on SARS-CoV-2 variants research see https://www.who.int/news/item/12-01-2021-global-scientists-double-down-on-sars-cov-2-variants-research-at-who-hosted-forum For more on WHO's meeting on SARS-CoV-2 variants research see https://www.who.int/news/item/12-01-2021-global-scientists-double-down-on-sars-cov-2-variants-research-at-who-hosted-forum From PREDICT to prevention, one pandemic laterThe severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic began only a few weeks after the end of PREDICT-2, the last-standing United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Emerging Pandemic Threats funding programme, which supported a decade of virology, ecology, and epidemiology around the world. Since 2009, PREDICT worked with more than 60 countries to build capacity and strengthen zoonotic pathogen surveillance, and identified at least 931 novel virus species from 145 000 samples of wildlife, livestock, and humans. Full-Text PDF Open AccessTowards a coordinated strategy for intercepting human disease emergence in AfricaEmerging zoonotic viruses are one of the greatest threats to human health and security, as evidenced by the increasing frequency of disease outbreaks.1 To date, the main pre-emptive response to these outbreaks has been extensive, cost-heavy efforts to document virus diversity in wildlife (eg, PREDICT and the Global Virome Projects).2,3 Although these efforts have resulted in the identification of thousands of novel viruses, fewer than 1% are described to date, substantial challenges remain around access and benefit sharing from viral discovery programmes, and—perhaps most problematic for public health application—the spillover hazard of these viruses can only be coarsely inferred at present. Full-Text PDF Open Access