Sanctions on Syria
Authors: Aula Abbara, Abdulkarim Ekzayez, Ahmad Tarakji, Munzer Khalil, Richard Sullivan
Journal: The Lancet Global Health (2020)

Hamid Yahiya Hussain and Kasturi Sen1Hussain HY Sen K EU guidance impedes humanitarian action to prevent COVID-19 in Syria.Lancet Glob Health. 2020; 8: e1112-e1113Summary Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (8) Google Scholar (September, 2020) present a biased perspective on the impact of EU and US sanction legislation in Syria. Western sanctions were introduced to promote accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Syrian conflict, the vast majority of which have been perpetrated by the Syrian Government and its allies against civilian populations.2US Department of StateCaesar Syria civilian protection act: fact sheet.https://www.state.gov/caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/Date: June, 2020Date accessed: July 14, 2020Google Scholar The implication that sanctions (including exemptions for humanitarian aid) have prevented the Syrian Government from responding to the COVID-19 pandemic is erroneous and does not reflect the widespread politicisation of humanitarian aid, nor the economic and humanitarian context. Evidence suggests that the Syrian Government has developed a political and legal framework that has allowed it to co-opt billions of dollars of aid and reconstruction funding in Syria.3Haid HaidPrincipled Aid in Syria: a framework for international agencies. Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme.https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/principled-aid-syria-framework-international-agenciesDate: July, 2019Date accessed: July 14, 2020Google Scholar, 4Human Rights WatchRigging the system: government policies co-opt aid and reconstruction funding in Syria.https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syriaDate: June 28, 2019Date accessed: July 14, 2020Google Scholar In practice, the Syrian Government restricts the access of humanitarian organisations to communities in need, withholds medical supplies, provides selective approval for humanitarian projects, and mandates partnership with its own selection of security-vetted local partners; as such, it uses humanitarian aid as a weapon of war.4Human Rights WatchRigging the system: government policies co-opt aid and reconstruction funding in Syria.https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syriaDate: June 28, 2019Date accessed: July 14, 2020Google Scholar Financing the Syrian Government's activities supports a system that diverts aid from civilians who are perceived to be disloyal to it, including in retaken areas. Syria's health system is indeed fragmented and politicised. However, it is misleading to describe these fractures as solely due to sanctions. Health care in Syria has been weaponised since 2011 with deliberate attacks on health care; more than 90% of such attacks have been by the Syrian Government.5Fouad FM Sparrow A Tarakji A et al.Health workers and the weaponisation of health care in Syria: a preliminary inquiry for The Lancet-American University of Beirut Commission on Syria.Lancet. 2017; 390: 2516-2526Summary Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (168) Google Scholar These actions have directly affected COVID-19 preparedness across the country, particularly in areas outside of the Syrian Government's control. Though training and resources have been provided to the Ministry of Health, these have predominantly supported areas under government control. Vulnerable areas outside of Syrian Government control include the northeast and northwest of Syria, which first reported cases on April 22 and July 9, 2020, respectively. Key issues related to the COVID-19 response in Syria are as follows: first, the Syrian Government's response to this pandemic (and previous epidemics—eg, polio) have been characterised by numerous short-fallings and have not provided for the whole population. Second, there have been reports of threats to, and forced disappearances of, health-care workers who had reported suspected COVID-19 cases, subsequently impeding COVID-19 response and violating international humanitarian law. Lastly, closure of the border crossing for humanitarian access to northeast Syria in January, 2020, and further border closures affecting the northwest agreed in July, 2020, has a greater potential to harm civilians than the sanctions placed on the Syrian Government. We declare no competing interests. EU guidance impedes humanitarian action to prevent COVID-19 in SyriaAt the Global Vaccine Summit on June 4, 2020, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson called for a united front from all nations. He described the need for a NATO-style alliance to defend humanity from the common enemy of COVID-19. This type of statement has become a familiar cry of multiple Western leaders. It is also a message that is undermined by the actions of many of those same politicians. Full-Text PDF Open AccessSanctions on SyriaThe Comment by Hamid Yahiya Hussain and Kasturi Sen (September, 2020)1 rightly drew attention to the damage being inflicted on Syria by EU and US sanctions. However, by concentrating on the impact of sanctions on humanitarian interventions, their Comment did not illustrate the full extent of that damage. Full-Text PDF Open Access