Censorship of Scientific Publications: A Bad Idea
Authors: Inder M. Verma
Journal: Molecular Therapy (2002)

Imagine developing a new vector that can efficiently deliver its payload to any cell, tissue, or organ. Your next step is to write a manuscript detailing the vector and submit it to Molecular Therapy. But there is a catch—you cannot give the name or design of the vector for fear that it will fall into the “wrong” hands, which can use it to deliver a “lethal payload.” Although this sounds far-fetched, the Bush administration is trying to tighten scientific secrecy with the hope of keeping it away from those bent on making weapons of mass destruction. According to Tom Ridge, the United States Director of Homeland Security, the administration is “working hard for a set of guidelines so terrorists can't use information that this country produces against us.” The administration has sought to clamp down on the flow of information on several fronts since September 11, 2001. The White House has asked the American Society of Microbiology to limit potentially dangerous information in the 11 journals they publish, including the Journal of Virology, in which several gene-therapy-related articles have been published. Last month the administration began to withdraw from public release over 6000 technical documents that deal mainly with the production of germ and chemical weapons. Policies are being drafted that will lead to more documents being withdrawn from public circulation. In principle this seems reasonable, but in practice it means selective elimination of experimental details, removal of some figures, tables, and perhaps certain references—a selective censorship. Who will serve as censor? The editors, following government guidelines? An official censorship committee? A computer program that sanitizes manuscripts by removing dangerous words? Future manuscripts may read: “We have developed a ___- based vector which can deliver ____ in the ____ to produce ____, which can cure ____…” Selective censorship of scientific publications is a slippery slope, and undermines the foundation of science. I am surprised that some scientific societies and scientists are even willing to discuss publication limits. Mr. Ridge says that he can understand the scientists’ concern, but adds that they “have to remember what we are up against: terrorism with exotic weapons that could maim or kill millions of people.” “It comes down to a risk-to-benefit ratio,” says Robert R. Rich, President of the Federation of American Society of Experimental Biologists, adding that the “risk of foregone advances is much greater than the information getting in the wrong hands.” A foundation of experimental science is the ability to replicate other scientists’ work. In fact, most scientific journals require that methods be described adequately so that other scientists can attempt to duplicate the results. I fear that US officials eager to protect secrecy will overlook the fact that open research on potentially dangerous substances can produce a wealth of cures and surprising discoveries. After all, a majority of currently used viral vectors for gene delivery are based on known disease-causing viruses. We live in an age in which access to information is a way of life. Terrorists use “Internet cafés” to send coded signals, but no one has yet suggested that we stop using the Internet or close Internet cafés. There is always going to be evil, but the good far outweighs it. Science has flourished from open scientific communication and exchange of scientific materials, despite its occasional, even tragic, misuse. But the advances have far outweighed the misuses. We cannot give in to irrational decisions, no matter how well intentioned.