Book of the month: The Ethical Brain
Authors: Richard E Ashcroft, Medical Ethics Unit
Journal: Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine (2005)

The sciences of mind and brain are today attracting almost as much hype and hope as genetics. And just as genetics gave rise to ‘genethics’ through the study of its ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI), so too we are seeing the invention of ‘neuroethics’. At the forefront of this development is the Dana Foundation, which published the book here reviewed; and among others who have debated the subject is the (US) President's Council on Bioethics, of which Professor Gazzaniga is a member. Books such as Gazzaniga's are generally to be welcomed, in providing tools to help the non-neuroscientist grasp the ethical, social, legal and indeed philosophical aspects of this subject. (Others who have trodden this path are Steven Rose, Susan Greenfield and the Dana Foundation itself.) In The Ethical Brain Gazzaniga discusses four of the central topics of concern—life-span neuroethics, brain enhancement, free will and personal responsibility, and the relationship between brain structure and moral decision-making. The first two of these were examined in detail by the President's Council on Bioethics, and readers familiar with the resultant publications may take a ‘kremlinological’ interest in his departures from the Council's corporate line. But for most readers the book will be valued for its clear and straightforward accounts of current neuroscientific thinking on such topics as when an embryo acquires personhood, what brainstem death is, how far neuroscience under-mines the possibility of free will, and what kind of cognitive enhancements or behavioural modifications will be possible. Gazzaniga has little to say about psychiatry or neurosurgery.

The focus of his attention is largely on the policy implications of neuroscientific knowledge. However, much of what he discusses lies properly within the domain of philosophy. Empirical evidence from the neurosciences constrains what conceptual frameworks we may use to make sense of brain and mind, but it does not actually fix which of those frameworks makes most consistent and coherent sense. For example, how much does knowledge of the early development of the nervous system help in determining whether an embryo is a human being, or indeed a human person, and when it becomes so? If a priori we have decided that sentience and the capacity for developing self-consciousness are the necessary conditions for personhood, then neuroscience data will help us decide what operational or diagnostic criteria need to be met for these conditions to be satisfied. This conceptual clarification is necessary and is independent of the neuroscience research, on pain of circularity in reasoning. Yet in public debates on neuroethics we are tending to look to neuroscientists as the experts who will tell us whether a 3-day, a 30-day or a 130-day embryo or fetus is a person or not. I am not suggesting that we should turn to philosophers (or theologians) instead; rather that a genuinely inter-disciplinary discussion is necessary. Similar difficulties arise with the discussion of responsibility as understood by neuroscientists, philosophers, and the courts, and with discussions of the nature and legitimate limits to cognitive enhancement. Gazzaniga provides much useful information and material for discussion, but for enlightenment on the deep philosophical and ethical issues salient to the neurosciences, the reader needs to go elsewhere.

While noting that the philosophical level is not high, I did enjoy this book, and can warmly recommend it as an introduction for the non-neuroscientist. Gazzaniga's writing style is pleasantly informal, and how refreshing it is to read a scientist who engages in debate without hyping up either promise or perils.