The Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospitals That Serve Poor Patients
Authors: Ishak A. Mansi
Journal: Annals of Internal Medicine (2011)

Letters1 March 2011The Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospitals That Serve Poor PatientsIshak A. Mansi, MDIshak A. Mansi, MDFrom Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234.Search for more papers by this authorAuthor, Article, and Disclosure Informationhttps://doi.org/10.7326/0003-4819-154-5-201103010-00013 SectionsAboutFull TextPDF ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail TO THE EDITOR:Jha and colleagues (1) made excellent efforts to define the effects of the pay-for-performance Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration program (referred to hereafter as the “Premier program”) on hospitals that serve poor patients. However, they missed the essence of the question in their methodology, interpretation, conclusion, and discussion. The disproportionate-share index, which these authors used to identify hospitals caring for poorer populations, is also used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to compensate hospitals for caring for poorer Medicare patients and has never been validated as a marker for hospitals that care for “poor” patients ...References1. Jha AK, Orav EJ, Epstein AM. The effect of financial incentives on hospitals that serve poor patients. Ann Intern Med. 2010;153:299-306. [PMID: 20820039] LinkGoogle Scholar2. Mansi IA, Shi R, Khan M, Huang J, Carden D. Effect of compliance with quality performance measures for heart failure on clinical outcomes in high-risk patients. J Natl Med Assoc. 2010;102:898-905. [PMID: 21053704] CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar3. Mansi IA. Public reporting and pay for performance [Letter]. N Engl J Med. 2007;356:1783. [PMID: 17465041] MedlineGoogle Scholar4. Ko DT, Tu JV, Masoudi FA, Wang Y, Havranek EP, Rathore SS, et al. Quality of care and outcomes of older patients with heart failure hospitalized in the United States and Canada. Arch Intern Med. 2005;165:2486-92. [PMID: 16314545] CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar5. Ofri D. Quality measures and the individual physician. N Engl J Med. 2010;363:606-7. [PMID: 20818853] CrossrefMedlineGoogle Scholar Author, Article, and Disclosure InformationAuthors: Ishak A. Mansi, MDAffiliations: From Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234.Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Brooke Army Medical Center, the U.S. Army Medical Department, the U.S. Army Office of the Surgeon General, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.Disclosures: None disclosed. PreviousarticleNextarticle Advertisement FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsSee AlsoThe Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospitals That Serve Poor Patients Ashish K. Jha , E. John Orav , and Arnold M. Epstein The Effect of Financial Incentives on Hospitals That Serve Poor Patients Ashish K. Jha , Arnold Epstein , and E. John Orav Metrics 1 March 2011Volume 154, Issue 5Page: 370KeywordsConflicts of interestHealth careHealth care qualityHealth statisticsHeart failureMedicareMotivationPatientsPopulation statisticsSurgeons ePublished: 1 March 2011 Issue Published: 1 March 2011 Copyright & PermissionsCopyright © 2011 by American College of Physicians. All Rights Reserved.PDF downloadLoading ...