Opium production in Afghanistan
Authors: Mark Malloch-Brown
Journal: BMJ (2008)

The case for allowing Afghanistan to cultivate poppies to combat the alleged shortage of opiate medicines has been reported in the BMJ.1 Around 90% of the world’s opium comes from Afghanistan, and most of it is destined for the illicit market. Counter narcotics is at the heart of the United Kingdom’s involvement in Afghanistan, not just because it is a major source of finance for the Taliban, but also because of its impact on our streets and neighbourhoods. The UK has repeatedly considered legal poppy cultivation—the first time in a report by David Mansfield that was commissioned in 2001.2 The findings of the Mansfield report remain true today; unless the Afghan government can control the size of the crop, legal opium will supplement and not substitute illegal opium production.

The Afghan government lacks the necessary resources, institutional capacity, and control mechanisms to guarantee that opium is only purchased legally. Those cultivating and purchasing opium for medical usage would be in direct competition with illegal traffickers, which could drive up the price of opium and encourage increased cultivation. Farmers who do not currently grow poppies would abandon legal crops to meet the market’s demand. Ultimately, the area of land under poppy cultivation could increase. Quite simply, farmers would grow more to supply an additional purchaser.

Demand for legal opium is therefore better met by established sources of production from countries like Turkey and Australia. These countries have far greater security, stability, and government capacity. With opium production up to six times cheaper in these countries than in Afghanistan, supply is more economically viable too.

The UK government’s approach in Afghanistan is based on the recognition that poverty and instability continue to drive farmers to produce opium. The insurgency in the south prevents access to agricultural commodity and labour markets, so crops other than opium are not practical to produce.3 With a swift turnover and high returns, opium gets farmers the best credit, access, and influence. But it is precisely because of these benefits that opium production continues to drive instability, and therefore insurgency. Opium production fuels corruption and undermines the rule of law. And only by breaking the vicious cycle, by reducing the flow of illegal opium, will the goals of establishing security and good governance in Afghanistan be met. As the G8’s partner nation leading on counter narcotics, the UK provided more than £290m (€360m; $570m) between 2005 and 2008 to support the Afghan government’s national drug control strategy to try and break this cycle.

Half of the UK’s approach uses the stick. Prohibition actions are being intensified against drug traders, opium processing plants, and people in government who are associated with the opium industry. Institutions of law enforcement are being developed. The tireless efforts of our troops on the ground are fighting the insurgency that is so intertwined with opium production.

The other half is supplying the carrots. The challenge is to create development initiatives and economic incentives that provide attractive alternatives for farmers—ones that allow them to pursue sustainable and legal livelihoods. Infrastructure and local government capacity must be further developed so that farmers’ access to markets, land, water, credit, food security, and employment can be improved. Where these conditions are in place, some real successes have been reported—poppy-free provinces doubled from six to 13 in 2007. In 2008, the Afghan government aims to increase this to half of all provinces.

The arguments regarding legal opium production stretch beyond Afghanistan’s borders. The question of demand is key. The International Narcotics Control Board, the independent body that monitors the implementation of international drug control conventions, recently reported that global demand for opiates for medical purposes is fully satisfied. Over the past five years, total supply (production and stocks) of opiate raw materials has exceeded the total amount of opiates needed for medical and scientific purposes.4 However, the opposite may be true—that because of poor medical infrastructure and awareness in many countries, the global market for opiates for medical usage is underdeveloped.

Ultimately, however, the solution to the global problem of illicit opium production lies not just in Afghanistan but in every country that suffers the blight of heroin usage, including the UK. The Home Office drugs strategy 2008-18 aims to restrict the supply of illegal drugs to the UK and reduce demand. It will do so through tackling drug supply and drug related crime, preventing harm to children and families affected by drug misuse, delivering new approaches to drug treatment and social reintegration, and delivering targeted public information campaigns. But the UK is responsible for around only 4% of global demand for heroin. Only by reducing demand on the streets everywhere will the producers and traffickers on the streets of Afghanistan be given the best reason to follow their alternative livelihoods.