On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices ?
In this paper, we characterize the games in which Johnston, ShapleyShubik and PenroseBanzhafColeman indices are ordinally equivalent, meaning that they rank players in the same way. We prove that these three indices are ordinally equivalent in semicomplete simple games, which is a newly defined class that contains complete games and includes most of the realworld examples of binary voting systems. This result constitutes a twofold extension of Diffo Lambo and Moulens result (Diffo Lambo and Moulen, 2002) in the sense that ordinal equivalence emerges for three power indices (not just for the ShapleyShubik and PenroseBanzhafColeman indices), and it holds for a class of games strictly larger than the class of complete games.
ordinal equivalence power indices simple games game theory decision support systems complete simple games