Equilibrium analysis of supply chain structures under power imbalance
This paper investigates the implications of channel power on supply chain stability in a setting where multiple suppliers sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Such supply chains have been traditionally analyzed as one- or two-stage Stackelberg non-cooperative games with all suppliers sharing balanced (equal) decision-making power. In this paper, we relax this assumption and formulate game-theoretic models to examine scenarios where one supplier can act as the Stackelberg leader. Consequently, we analyze new supply chain structures and introduce the notion of structure dominance, a novel approach to analyze the performance of supply chains that has practical implications. Thus, a decision maker can employ the concepts of structure dominance to determine whether there exist supply chain scenarios that are more stable than others, i.e., less prone to power reconfigurations, at both agent and group level. We find that power imbalance causes significant declines in supply chain profits, and the more balanced the agents are the higher their profits when demand is linear, regardless of product competition. It develops that neither the Manufacturer Stackelberg nor the Retailer Stackelberg supply chains are stable structures in our generalized setting, but that structures where power is equally split between agents provide for best stability and performance.
supply chain stability power dominance game theory