Teleonomic functions and intrinsic intentionality: Dretskes theory as a test case
Fred Dretskes theory of indicatory functions [Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford; Dretske, F. (1994). A recipe for thought. Originally published as If You Cant Make One, You Dont Know How It Works. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy: Vol. 19. Reprinted in D. J. Chalmers (2002) (pp. 468482).] is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory of intentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretskes explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test  that of accounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psychological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither indication, nor function, as used by Dretske, can be consistently applied. Dretskes theory of indicatory functions is, thus, doubly incoherent. It is then argued that the problems identified here stretch far beyond Dretskes specific theory  covering the better part of contemporary attempts to naturalize content. I conclude by suggesting that these general problems of representation, exemplified so vividly in Dretskes theory, also testify to the inadequacy of the quest to reduce teleological phenomena (function and purpose) to predominantly mechanistic variables.
function intrinsic intentionality dretske indication teleology epiphenomenalism self-organization teleonomy