On the irrationality of mind-uploading: a rely to Neil Levy
In a paper in this journal, Neil Levy challenges Nicholas Agars argument for the irrationality of mind-uploading. Mind-uploading is a futuristic process that involves scanning brains and recording relevant information which is then transferred into a computer. Its advocates suppose that mind-uploading transfers both human minds and identities from biological brains into computers. According to Agars original argument, mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AIthe view that it may someday be possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. Strong AI may in fact be false, an eventuality with dire consequences for mind-uploading. Levy argues that Agars argument relies on mistakes about the probability of failed mind-uploading and underestimates what is to be gained from successfully mind-uploading. This paper clarifies Agars original claims about the likelihood of mind-uploading failure and offers further defense of a pessimistic evaluation of success.
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