New receipt-free voting scheme using double-trapdoor commitment
It is considered to be the most suitable solution for large scale elections to design an electronic voting scheme using blind signatures and anonymous channels. Based on this framework. Okamoto first proposed a receipt-free voting scheme [30] for large scale elections. However, in the following paper, Okamoto [31] proved that the scheme [30] was not receipt-free and presented two improved schemes. One scheme requires the help of the parameter registration committee and the other needs a stronger physical assumption of the voting booth. In this paper, we utilize the double-trapdoor commitment to propose a new receipt-free voting scheme based on blind signatures for large scale elections. Neither the parameter registration committee nor the voting booth is required in our scheme. We also present a more efficient zero-knowledge proof for secret permutation. Therefore, our scheme is much more efficient than Okamoto's schemes [30,31] with the weaker physical assumptions. Moreover, we prove that our scheme can achieve the desired security properties. (c) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
receipt-freeness double-trapdoor commitment electronic voting blind signature