Distributed Relay Selection and Power Control for Multiuser Cooperative Communication Networks Using Stackelberg Game
The performance in cooperative communication depends on careful resource allocation such as relay selection and power control, but the traditional centralized resource allocation requires precise measurements of channel state information (CSI). In this paper, we propose a distributed game-theoretical framework over multiuser cooperative communication networks to achieve optimal relay selection and power allocation without knowledge of CSI. A two-level Stackelberg game is employed to jointly consider the benefits of the source node and the relay nodes in which the source node is modeled as a buyer and the relay nodes are modeled as sellers, respectively. The proposed approach not only helps the source find the relays at relatively better locations and "buy" an optimal amount of power from the relays, but also helps the competing relays maximize their own utilities by asking the optimal prices. The game is proved to converge to a unique optimal equilibrium. Moreover, the proposed resource allocation scheme with the distributed game can achieve comparable performance to that employing centralized schemes.
relay selection cooperative communication networks distributed power allocation game theory