Effect of individual opinions on group interactions
We have evaluated the effectiveness of a probabilistic reciprocity scheme for promoting co-operation among self-interested agents. The probabilistic reciprocity mechanism is used to determine whether an agent should co-operate when approached for help by another agent. The situation becomes more complex when a group of agents seeks help from another group. The opinions of the members of the helping group about each of the asking group members can be combined to evaluate such a request for help. Exploitative agents would want to be part of groups that receive help from other groups, but will try to prevent its group from helping other groups. Such agents, revealing false opinion about the reputation of others, can cause unwarranted rejection of help requests from other groups. This leads to global performance degradation in terms of reduced inter-group co-operation and increased cost for the individual agents. We study the viability of reciprocative agents in randomly formed groups and when groups are formed by agents contracting other helpful agents. Group helping decisions are based on both average and worst combined ratings of group members. A key result from our study is that lying exploitative agents, who provide false opinions about other agents, become ineffective when focused group selection is enabled.
group reciprocative agents lazy liar agents