Ascribing minds
In this paper, I explain how we just ascribe attribute to social actorsin a fast and automatic way and without complex reasoningmental representations on the basis of scripts, roles, role-signs, tool use and functions, categories and prejudices, and several heuristics; or by default. How scripts and roles must be filled in with the actors mental attitudes. How social interaction systematically requires assumptions about the others mind. How sometimes in the subject those mental attitudes are not only unconscious but actually implicit; just potential or tacit (non-activated), or just the non-intended or non-understood function of his behavior/role. However, what really matters is that we assume that those beliefs and goals are there, and we act as if it were so. I finally claim that this mechanism of mind ascription while reading the behavior or the signs of the roles and scripts is the basis of a fundamental form of communication: Behavioral Implicit Communication.
scripts communication social roles mental state ascription theory of mind