Cryptanalysis and improvement of an efficient mutual authentication RFID scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a wireless technology for automatic identification and data capture. Security and privacy issues in the RFID systems have attracted much attention. Many approaches have been proposed to achieve the security and privacy goals. One of these approaches is RFID authentication protocols by which a server and tags can authorize each other through an intracity process. Recently, Chou proposed a RFID authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. However, this paper demonstrates that the Chous protocol does not satisfy tag privacy, forward privacy and authentication, and server authentication. Based on these security and privacy problems, we also show that Chous protocol is defenseless to impersonation attacks, tag cloning attacks and location tracking attacks. Therefore, we propose a more secure and efficient scheme, which does not only cover all the security flaws and weaknesses of related previous protocols, but also provides more functionality. We prove the security of the proposed improved protocol in the random oracle model.
rfid elliptic curve authentication protocol random oracle model untraceable privacy