Single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain coordination: Incorporating buyers expectations under vertical information sharing
We address the coordination problem in a single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain. The supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts. To obtain their complete cost information, the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing. The supplier thinks that the buyers, as they have access to suppliers setup and holding cost information, may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain. We model each buyers expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only. These expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain, which results in a generalization of the traditional Stackelberg type models. We discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms, and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers expectations into account. In designing the discount schemes, we consider both price discriminatory and non-price discriminatory approaches. The study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers expectations into a constrained Stackelberg structure, and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the suppliers replenishment period in choosing their order quantities. The numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels, and retain a significant portion of the net savings.
supply chain coordination discount schemes inventory management