Analysis of Relay Attacks on RFiD Systems
Today Radio-Frequency identification (RFiD) systems are widely used in a variety of security-sensitive applications such as access control, the payment industry and many others. An important class of attacks on these types of systems is that of relay attacks, due to the orthogonality of such attacks to the existing security and cryptographic solutions. In this paper we address the open question of the maximum distance between the rogue Reader and the victim TAG under which a relay attack can be successful. We determine that interference is the largest confounding factor, but that with proper interference cancelation, a distance of up to 10m is possible. This paper provides an analysis of the maximum distance for successful communication between the rogue Reader and the legitimate TAG (herein called the victim distance). We also propose several countermeasures to the relay attack.
relay attacks rfid systems relay distance activation distance read range medium access controller (mac)