A synthetic indifferentiability analysis of some block-cipher-based hash functions
At ASIACRYPT'06, Chang et al. analyzed the indifferentiability of some popular hash functions based on block ciphers, namely, the twenty collision resistant PGV, the MDC2 and the PBGV hash functions, etc. In particular, two indifferentiable attacks were presented on the four of the twenty collision resistant PGV and the PBGV hash functions with the prefix-free padding. In this article, a synthetic indifferentiability analysis of some block-cipher-based hash functions is considered. First, a more precise definition is proposed on the indifferentiability adversary in block-cipher-based hash functions. Next, the advantage of indifferentiability is separately analyzed by considering whether the hash function is keyed or not. Finally, a limitation is observed in Chang et al.'s indifferentiable attacks on the four PGV and the PBGV hash functions. The formal proofs show the fact that those hash functions are indifferentiable from a random oracle in the ideal cipher model with the prefix-free padding, the NMAC/HMAC and the chop construction.
indifferentiability block-cipher-based hash function provable security