Decision making in dynamic stochastic Cournot games
In this paper, the Cournot competition is modeled as a stochastic dynamic game. In the proposed model, a stochastic market price function and stochastic dynamic decision functions of the rivals are considered. Since the optimal decision of a player needs the estimation of the unknown parameters of the market and rivals' decisions, a combined estimation-optimization algorithm for decision making is proposed. The history of the rivals' output quantities (supplies) and the market clearing price (MCP) are the only available information to the players. The convergence of the algorithm (for both estimation and decision making processes) is discussed. In addition, the stability conditions of the equilibrium points are analyzed using the converse Lyapunov theorem. Through the case studies, which are performed based on the California Independent System Operator (CA-ISO) historical public data, the theoretical results and the applicability of the proposed method are verified. Moreover, a comparative study among the agents using the proposed method, naive expectation and adaptive expectation in the market is performed to show the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed method. (C) 2010 IMACS. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
cournot game estimation stochastic game oligopoly market nash equilibrium