Reasoning about coalitional games
We develop, investigate, and compare two logic-based knowledge representation formalisms for reasoning about coalitional games. The main constructs of Coalitional Game Logic (CGL) are expressions for representing the ability of coalitions, which may be combined with expressions for representing the preferences that agents have over outcomes. Modal Coalitional Game Logic (MCGL) is a normal modal logic, in which the main construct is a modality for expressing the preferences of groups of agents. For both frameworks, we give complete axiomatisations, and show how they can be used to characterise solution concepts for coalitional games. We show that, while CGL is more expressive than MCCL, the former can only be used to reason about coalitional games with finitely many outcomes, while MCGL can be used to reason also about games with infinitely many outcomes, and is in addition more succinct. We characterise the computational complexity of satisfiability for CGL, and give a tableaux-based decision procedure. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
coalitional games knowledge representation modal logic multi-agent systems