Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind
The embodied and situated approach to artificial intelligence (Al) has matured and become a viable alternative to traditional computationalist approaches with respect to the practical goal of building artificial agents, which can behave in a robust and flexible manner under changing real-world conditions. Nevertheless, some concerns have recently been raised with regard to the sufficiency of current embodied Al for advancing our scientific understanding of intentional agency. While from an engineering or computer science perspective this limitation might not be relevant, it is of course highly relevant for Al researchers striving to build accurate models of natural cognition. We argue that the biological foundations of enactive cognitive science can provide the conceptual tools that are needed to diagnose more clearly the shortcomings of current embodied Al. In particular, taking an enactive perspective points to the need for Al to take seriously the organismic roots of autonomous agency and sense-making. We identify two necessary systemic requirements, namely constitutive autonomy and adaptivity, which lead us to introduce two design principles of enactive Al. It is argued that the development of such enactive Al poses a significant challenge to current methodologies. However, it also provides a promising way of eventually overcoming the current limitations of embodied Al, especially in terms of providing fuller models of natural embodied cognition. Finally, some practical implications and examples of the two design principles of enactive Al are also discussed. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
enactive embodied situated agency modeling natural cognition cognitive science autonomy design principles intentionality