The I and the Me in self-referential awareness: a neurocognitive hypothesis
The nature of the self and self-referential awareness has been one of the most debated issues in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Understanding the neurocognitive bases of self-related representation and processing is also crucial to research on the neural correlates of consciousness. The distinction between an I, corresponding to a subjective sense of the self as a thinker and causal agent, and a Me, as the objective sense of the self with the unique and identifiable features constituting ones self-image or self-concept, suggested by William James, has been re-elaborated by authors from different theoretical perspectives. In this article, empirical studies and theories about the I and the Me in cognition and self-related awareness are reviewed, including the relationships between self and perception, self and memory, the development of the self, self-referential stimulus processing, as well as related neuroimaging studies. Subsequently, the relations between self and different aspects of consciousness are considered. On the basis of the reviewed literature and with reference to Blocks distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, a neurocognitive hypothesis is formulated about I-related and Me-related self-referential awareness. This hypothesis is extended to metacognitive awareness and a form of non-transitive consciousness, characteristic of meditation experiences and studies, with particular reference to the notion of mindfulness and other Buddhist constructs.
self awareness mindfulness phenomenal consciousness self-referential processing