Cryptanalysis of a remote user authentication scheme for mobile client-server environment based on ECC
Understanding security failures of cryptographic protocols is the key to both patching existing protocols and designing future schemes. The design of secure remote user authentication schemes based on elliptic curve crypto-graphy (ECC) for mobile applications is still quite a challenging problem, though many schemes have been published lately. In this paper, we analyze an efficient ID-based scheme for mobile client server environment without the MapToPoint function introduced by He et al. in 2012. This proposal attempts to overcome many of the well known security and efficiency shortcomings of previous schemes, and it also carries a claimed proof of security in the random oracle model. However, notwithstanding its formal security arguments, we show that He et al.'s protocol even cannot attain the basic goal of mutual authentication by demonstrating its vulnerabilities to reflection attack and parallel session attack. Besides these two security vulnerabilities, their scheme also suffers from some practical pitfalls such as user anonymity violation and clock synchronization problem. In addition, we carry out an investigation into their security proof and propose some changes to the scheme so that it can achieve at least its basic security goal, in the hope that similar mistakes are no longer made in the future. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
cryptanalysis random oracle model authentication protocol mobile device elliptic curve cryptography