A Fully Secure Revocable ID-Based Encryption in the Standard Model
Revocation problem is a critical issue for key management of public key systems. Any certificate-based or identity (ID)-based public key systems must provide a revocation method to revoke misbehaving/compromised users from the public key systems. In the past, there was little work on studying the revocation problem of ID-based public key systems. Most recently, Tseng and Tsai presented a novel ID-based public key system with efficient revocation using a public channel, and proposed a practical revocable ID-based encryption (called RIBE). They proved that the proposed RIBE is semantically secure in the random oracle model. Although the ID-based encryption schemes based on the random oracle model can offer better performance, the resulting schemes could be insecure when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions. In this paper, we employ Tseng and Tsai's revocable concept to propose a new RIBE without random oracles to provide full security. We demonstrate that the proposed RIBE is semantically secure against adaptive-ID attacks in the standard model.
revocation standard model identity-based encryption bilinear pairing