Conglomerable coherence
We contrast Williams' and Walley's theories of coherent lower previsions in the light of conglomerability. These are two of the most credited approaches to a behavioural theory of imprecise probability. Conglomerability is the notion that distinguishes them most: Williams' theory does not consider it, while Walley aims at embedding it in his theory. This question is important, as conglomerability is a major point of disagreement at the foundations of probability, since it was first defined by de Finetti in 1930. We show that Walley's notion of joint coherence (which is the single axiom of his theory) for conditional lower previsions does not take all the implications of conglomerability into account. Considering also some previous results in the literature, we deduce that Williams' theory should be the one to use when conglomerability is not required; for the opposite case, we define the new theory of conglomerably coherent lower previsions, which is arguably the one to use, and of which Walley's theory can be understood as an approximation. We show that this approximation is exact in two important cases: when all conditioning events have positive lower probability, and when conditioning partitions are nested. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
conglomerability coherence williams' and walley's theories of coherent lower previsions sets of desirable gambles conglomerable natural extension infinite conditioning partitions