secure deletion from inverted indexes on compliance storage
Recent litigation and intense regulatory focus on secure retention of electronic records have spurred a rush to introduce Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) storage devices for retaining business records such as electronic mail. A file committed to a WORM device cannot be deleted even by a super-user and hence is secure from attacks originating from company insiders. Secure retention, however, is only a part of a document's lifecycle: It is often crucial to delete documents after its mandatory retention period is over. Since most of the modern WORM devices are built on top of magnetic media, they also support a secure deletion operation by associating expiration time with files. However, for the deleted document to be truly unrecoverable, it must also be deleted from any index structure built over it.This paper studies the problem of securely deleting entries from an inverted index. We first formalize the concept of secure deletion by defining two deletion semantics: strongly and weakly secure deletions. We then analyze some of the deletion schemes that have been proposed in literature and show that they only achieve weakly secure deletion. Furthermore, such schemes have poor space efficiency and/or are inflexibe. We then propose a novel technique for hiding index entries for deleted documents, based on the concept of ambiguating deleted entries. The proposed technique also achieves weakly secure deletion, but is more space efficient and flexible.
secure deletion inverted index regulatory compliance