O N THE T RADE -O FF BETWEEN A CTIONABLE E XPLANATIONS AND THE R IGHT TO BE F ORGOTTEN
Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review
A BSTRACT
As machine learning (ML) models are increasingly being deployed in high-stakes applications, policymakers have suggested tighter data protection regulations (e.g.,
GDPR, CCPA).
One key principle is the “right to be forgotten” which gives users the right to have their data deleted.
Another key principle is the right to an actionable explanation, also known as algorithmic recourse, allowing users to reverse unfavorable decisions.
To date, it is unknown whether these two principles can be operationalized simultaneously.
Therefore, we introduce and study the problem of recourse invalidation in the context of data deletion requests.
More speciﬁcally, we theoretically and empirically analyze the behavior of popular state-of-the-art algorithms and demonstrate that the recourses generated by these algorithms are likely to be invalidated if a small number of data deletion requests (e.g., 1 or 2) warrant updates of the predictive model.
For the setting of linear models and overparameterized neural networks – studied through the lens of neural tangent kernels (NTKs) – we suggest a framework to identify a minimal subset of critical training points which, when removed, maximize the fraction of invalidated recourses.
Using our framework, we empirically show that the removal of as little as 2 data instances from the training set can invalidate up to 95 percent of all recourses output by popular state-of-the-art algorithms.
Thus, our work raises fundamental questions about the compatibility of “the right to an actionable explanation” in the context of the “right to be forgotten”.
I NTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models make a variety of consequential decisions in domains such as ﬁnance, healthcare, and policy.
To protect users, laws such as the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) (GDPR, 2016) or the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (OAG, 2021) constrain the usage of personal data and ML model deployments.
For example, individuals who have been adversely impacted by the predictions of these models have the right to recourse (Voigt &
Von dem Bussche, 2017), i.e., a constructive instruction on how to act to arrive at a more desirable outcome (e.g., change a model prediction from “loan denied” to “approved”).
Several approaches in recent literature tackled the problem of providing recourses by generating instance level counterfactual explanations (Wachter et al., 2018; Ustun et al., 2019; Karimi et al., 2020; Pawelczyk et al., 2020a).
Complementarily, data protection laws provide users with greater authority over their personal data.
For instance, users are granted the right to withdraw consent to the usage of their data at any time (Biega & Finck, 2021).
These regulations affect technology platforms that train their ML models on personal user data under the respective legal regime.
Law scholars have argued that the continued use of ML models relying on deleted data instances could be deemed illegal (Villaronga et al., 2018).
Irrespective of the underlying mandate, data deletion has raised a number of algorithmic research questions.
In particular, recent literature has focused on the efﬁciency of deletion (i.e., how to delete individual data points without retraining the model (Ginart et al., 2019; Golatkar et al., 2020a)) and model accuracy aspects of data deletion (i.e., how to remove data without compromising model accuracy (Biega et al., 2020; Goldsteen et al., 2021)).
An aspect of data deletion which has not been examined before is whether and how data deletion may impact model explanation frameworks .
Thus, there is a need to understand and systematically characterize the limitations of recourse algorithms when personal user data may need to be deleted from trained ML models.
Indeed, deletion of certain data instances might invalidate actionable model explanations – both for the deleting user and, critically, unsuspecting other users.
Such invalidations can be especially problematic in cases where users have already started to take costly actions to change their model outcomes based on previously received explanations.
In this paper, we formally examine the problem of algorithmic recourse in the context of data deletion requests.
We consider the setting where a small set of individuals has decided to withdraw their data and, as a consequence of the deletion request, the model needs to be updated (Ginart et al., 2019).
In particular, this work tackles the subsequent pressing question:
What is the worst impact that a deleted data instance can have on the recourse validity?
We approach this question by considering two distinct scenarios.
The ﬁrst setting considers to what extent the outdated recourses still lead to a desirable prediction (e.g., loan approval) on the updated model.
For this scenario, we suggest a robustness measure called recourse outcome instability to quantify the fragility of recourse methods.
Second, we consider the setting where the recourse action is being updated as a consequence of the prediction model update.
In this case, we study what maximal change in recourse will be required to maintain the desirable prediction.
To quantify the extent of this second problem, we suggest the notion of recourse action instability .
Given these robustness measures, we derive and analyze theoretical worst-case guarantees of the maximal instability induced for linear models and neural networks in the overparameterized regime, which we study through the lens of neural tangent kernels.
We furthermore deﬁne an optimization problem for empirically quantifying recourse instability under data deletion.
For a given trained
ML model, we identify small sets of data points that maximize the proposed instability measures when deleted.
Since the resulting brute-force approach (i.e., retraining models for every possible removal set) is NP-hard, we propose two relaxations for recourse instability maximization that can be optimized using (i) end-to-end gradient descent or (ii) via a greedy approximation algorithm.
To summarize, in this work we make the following key contributions:
• Novel recourse robustness problem.
We introduce the problem of recourse invalidation under the right to be forgotten by deﬁning two new recourse instability measures.
• Theoretical analysis.
Through rigorous theoretical analysis, we identify the factors that determine the instability of recourses when users whose data is part of the training set submit deletion requests.
• Tractable algorithms.
Using our instability measures, we present an optimization framework to identify a small set of critical training data points which, when removed, invalidates most of the issued recourses.
• Comprehensive experiments.
We conduct extensive experiments on multiple real-world data sets for both regression and classiﬁcation tasks with our proposed algorithms, showing that the removal of even one point from the training set can invalidate up to 95 percent of all recourses output by state-of-the-art methods
Our results also have practical implications for system designers.
First, our analysis and algorithms help identify parameters and model classes leading to higher stability when a trained ML model is subjected to deletion requests.
Furthermore, our proposed methods can provide an informed way towards practical implementations of data minimization (Finck & Biega, 2021), as one could argue that data points contributing to recourse instability could be minimized out.
Hence, our methods could increase designer’s awareness and the compliance of their trained models.
R ELATED W ORK
Algorithmic Approaches to Recourse.
Several approaches in recent literature have been suggested to generate recourse for users who have been negatively impacted by model predictions (Tolomei et al., 2017;
Laugel et al., 2017; Dhurandhar et al., 2018; Wachter et al., 2018; Ustun et al., 2019;
Van Looveren & Klaise, 2019; Pawelczyk et al., 2020a; Mahajan et al., 2019; Mothilal et al., 2020;
Karimi et al., 2020; Rawal & Lakkaraju, 2020; Dandl et al., 2020; Antorán et al., 2021;
Spooner et al., 2021; Albini et al., 2022).
These approaches generate recourses assuming a static environment without data deletion requests, where both the model and the recourse remain stable.
A related line of work has focused on determining the extent to which recourses remain invariant to the model choice (Pawelczyk et al., 2020b;
Black et al., 2021), to data distribution shifts (Rawal et al., 2021; Upadhyay et al., 2021), perturbations to the input instances (Artelt et al., 2021;
DominguezOlmedo et al., 2022; Slack et al., 2021), or perturbations to the recourses (Pawelczyk et al., 2022b).
Sample Deletion in Predictive Models.
Since according to EU’s GDPR individuals can request to have their data deleted, several approaches in recent literature have been focusing on updating a machine learning model without the need of retraining the entire model from scratch (Wu et al., 2020;
Ginart et al., 2019; Izzo et al., 2021; Golatkar et al., 2020a;b; Cawley & Talbot, 2004).
A related line of work considers the problem of data valuation (Ghorbani et al., 2020; Ghorbani & Zou, 2019).
Finally, removing subsets of training data is an ingredient used for model debugging (Doshi-Velez &
Kim, 2017) or the evaluation of explanation techniques (Hooker et al., 2019; Rong et al., 2022).
Contribution.
While we do not suggest a new recourse algorithm, our work addresses the problem of recourse fragility in the presence of data deletion requests, which has previously not been studied.
To expose this fragility, we suggest effective algorithms to delete a minimal subset of critical training points so that the fraction of invalidated recourses due to a required model update is maximized.
Moreover, while prior research in the data deletion literature has primarily focused on effective data removal strategies for predictive models, there is no prior work that studies to what extent recourses output by state-of-the-art methods are affected by data deletion requests.
Our work is the ﬁrst to tackle these important problems and thereby paves the way for recourse providers to evaluate and rethink their recourse strategies in light of the right to be forgotten.
P RELIMINARIES
The Predictive Model and the Data Deletion Mechanism.
We consider prediction problems from some input space R d to an output space Y , where d is the number of input dimensions.
We denote a sample by z = ( x , y ) , and denote the training data set by D
= { z 1 , . .
z n } .
Consider the weighted empirical risk minimization problem (ERM), which gives rise to the optimal model parameters:
[Equation]
(1) where (cid:96) ( · , · ) is an instance-wise loss function (e.g., binary cross-entropy, mean-squared-error (MSE) loss, etc.)
and ω ∈ { 0 , 1 } n are data weights that are ﬁxed at training time .
If ω i = 1 , then the point z i =
( x i , y i ) is part of the training data set, otherwise it is not.
During model training, we set ω
i = 1 ∀ i , that is, the decision maker uses all available training instances at training time.
In the optimization expressed in equation 1, the model parameters w are usually an implicit function of the data weight vector ω and we write w ω to highlight this fact; in particular, when all training instances are used we write w 1 , where 1 ∈ R n is a vector of 1s.
In summary, we have introduced the weighted ERM problem since it allows us to understand the impact of arbitrary data deletion patterns on actionable explanations as we allow users to withdraw their entire input
z i =
( y i , x i ) from the training set used to train the model f w 1 .
Next, we present the recourse model we consider.
The Recourse Problem in the Context of the Data Deletion Mechanism.
We follow an established deﬁnition of counterfactual explanations originally proposed by Wachter et al.
For a given model f w ω : R d −→ R parameterized by w and a distance function d ( · , · ) :
X × X → R + , the problem of ﬁnding a recourse ˇ x = x + δ for a factual instance x is given by:
[Equation]
where λ ≥ 0 is a scalar tradeoff parameter and s denotes the target score.
In the optimization from equation 2, the optimal recourse action δ usually depends on the model parameters and since the model parameters themselves depend on the exact data weights conﬁguration we write δ ω , x to highlight this fact.
The ﬁrst term in the objective on the right-hand-side of equation 2 encourages the outcome f w ω (ˇ x ) to become close to the user-deﬁned target score s , while the second term encourages the distance between the factual instance x and the recourse ˇ x ω := x + δ ω , x to be low.
The set of constraints A d ensures that only admissible changes are made to the factual x .
Recourse Robustness Through the Lens of the Right to be Forgotten.
We ﬁrst introduce several key terms, namely, prescribed recourses and recourse outcomes .
A prescribed recourse ˇ x refers to a recourse that was provided to an end user by a recourse method (e.g., salary was increased by $500).
The recourse outcome f (ˇ x ) is the model’s prediction evaluated at the recourse.
With these concepts in place, we develop two recourse instability deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1.
(Recourse outcome instability)
The recourse outcome instability with respect to a factual instance x , where at least one data weight is set to 0 , is deﬁned as follows:
[Equation]
(3) where f w 1 (ˇ x 1 ) is the prediction at the prescribed recourse ˇ x 1 based on the model that uses the full training set (i.e., f w 1 ) and f w ω (ˇ x 1 ) is the prediction at the prescribed recourse for an updated model and data deletion requests have been incorporated into the predictive model (i.e., f w ω ).
xf (cid:48)
=
f (cid:48) =
Originalboundary: f w
Updatedboundary: f w ω
Invalidatedrecourse x ˜ xx(a) Recourse Outcome Instability xf (cid:48)
=
f (cid:48) =
Originalboundary: f w
Updatedboundary: f w ω
Invalidatedrecourse
Updatedrecourse ˜ x ω x ˜ xx
[Figure]
1a, recourse ˜ x 1 for an input x is invalidated due to a model update.
In Fig.
1b, recourse is additionally recomputed (i.e., ˜ x ω ) to avoid recourse invalidation.
The above deﬁnition concisely describes the effect of applying “outdated” recourses to the updated model.
We assume that only the model parameters are being updated while the prescribed recourses remain unchanged.
For a discrete model with Y = { 0 , 1 } , Deﬁnition 1 captures whether the prescribed recourses will be invalid ( ∆ x = 1 ) after deletion of training instances (see Fig. 1a).
To obtain invalidation rates of recourses for a continuous-score model with target value s , we can also apply Deﬁnition 1 with a discretized f (cid:48)
( x ) = I [ f ( x ) > s ] , where I denotes the indicator function.
In Deﬁnition 2, consistent with related work (e.g., Wachter et al.
(2018)), the distance function d is speciﬁed to be a p-norm and the recourse is allowed to change due to model parameter updates.
Deﬁnition 2.
(Recourse action instability)
The Recourse action instability with respect to a factual input x , where at least one data weight is set to 0 , is deﬁned as follows:
[Equation]
where p ∈ [1 , ∞ ) , and ˇ x ω is the recourse obtained for the model trained on the data instances that remain present in the data set after the deletion request.
Deﬁnition 2 quantiﬁes the extent to which the prescribed recourses would have to additionally change to still achieve the desired recourse outcome after data deletion requests (i.e., ˇ x ω , see Fig. 1b).
Note that we are interested in how the optimal low cost recourse changes even if the outdated recourse would remain valid.
Using our invalidation measures deﬁned above, in the next section, we formally study the trade-offs between actionable explanations and the right to be forgotten.
To do so, we provide data dependent upper bounds on the invalidation measures from Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, which practitioners can use to probe the worst-case vulnerability of their algorithmic recourse to data deletion requests.
T RADE - OFFS B ETW . A LG . R ECOURSE AND THE R IGHT TO BE F ORGOTTEN
Here we relate the two notions of recourse instability presented in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 to the vulnerability of the underlying predictive model with respect to data deletion requests.
We show that the introduced instability measures are directly related to data points with a high inﬂuence on the parameters after deletion.
Analyzing the Instability Measures.
With the basic terminology in place, we provide upper bounds for the recourse instability notions deﬁned in the previous section when the underlying models are linear or overparameterized neural networks.
Throughout our analysis, we the term d i :=
w 1 − w − i has an important impact.
It measures the difference from the original parameters w 1 to the parameter vector w − i obtained after deleting the i -th instance ( x i , y i ) from the model.
In the statistics literature, this term is also known as the empirical inﬂuence function (Cook & Weisberg, 1980).
Below we provide an upper bound for recourse outcome instability in linear models.
Proposition 1 (Upper bound on recourse outcome instability for linear models) .
For the linear regression model f ( x ) = w (cid:62) L x with model parameters w L =
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 X (cid:62) Y , an upper bound for the recourse invalidation from Deﬁnition 1 by removing an instance from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
where d [Equation]
ii , r [Equation] = y
[Equation]
(cid:62) [Equation] x i and h ii =
x (cid:62) i
( X (cid:62) X ) [Equation] 1 x i .
The term ( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 x i =
d w L dy i describes how sensitive the model parameters are to y i , while the residual r i captures how well y i can be ﬁt by the model.
On the contrary, the term h ii from the denominator is known as the leverage and describes how atypical x i is with respect to all training inputs X .
In summary, data instances that have inﬂuential labels, are atypical, and cannot be well ﬁt by the model will have the highest impact when deleted.
Next, we provide a generic upper bound on recourse action instability.
Proposition 2 (Upper bound on recourse action instability) .
For any predictive model with scoring function f : R d → R , an upper bound for the recourse instability from Deﬁnition 2 by removing an instance z i = ( x , y ) from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
where D δ Dw denotes the Jacobian of optimal recourse with the corresponding operator matrix norm, ˜ w :
= γ w +(1 − γ ) w − i with w − i being the optimal model parameters with the i-th training instance removed from the training set, and d i = w − w − i .
The norm of the Jacobian of optimal recourse indicates the local sensitivity of optimal recourse with respect to changes in model parameters w .
High magnitudes indicate that a small change in the parameters may require a fundamentally different recourse action.
The total change can be bounded by the integral over these local sensitivities, which means that low local sensitivities along the path will result in a low overall change.
Next, we specialize this result to the case of linear models.
Corollary 1 (Upper bound on recourse action instability for linear models) .
For the linear model f ( x ) = w (cid:62) L x with model parameters w L =
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 X (cid:62) Y , an upper bound for the recourse action instability when s = 0 , λ → 0 by removing an instance from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
(7) under the condition that w (cid:62) L w L , − i ≥
(no diametrical weight changes), where w L , − i =
w L − d L i is the weight after removal of training instance i and d L i =
( X T X ) − 1 x
i
( y i − w (cid:62) L x i ) 1 − h ii .
For models trained on large data sets, the absolute value of the model parameters’ norm (cid:107) w L (cid:107) will not change much under deletion of a single instance.
Therefore we argue that the denominator min( (cid:107) w L (cid:107) 2 , min i ∈ [ n ] (cid:107) w L , − i (cid:107) 2 ) ≈ (cid:107) w L (cid:107) .
Thus, recourse action instability is mainly determined by the sensitivity of model parameters to deletion, max i ∈ [ n ] (cid:107)
d L i (cid:107) 2 , scaled by the ratio of (cid:107) x (cid:107) 2 (cid:107) w L (cid:107) 2 .
Neural Tangent Kernels.
Studying the relation between deletion requests and the robustness of algorithmic recourse for models as complex as neural networks requires recent results from computational learning theory.
In particular, we also rely on insights on the behaviour of overparameterized neural networks from the theory of Neural Tangent Kernels (NTKs), which we will now brieﬂy introduce.
Thus we study our robustness notions for neural network models in the overparameterized regime with ReLU activation functions that take the following form: [Equation] where W = [ w 1 , . . w k ] ∈ R d × k and a =
[ a 1 , . .
. , a k ] ∈ R k .
To concretely study the impact of data deletion on recourses in non-linear models such as neural networks, we leverage ideas from the neural tangent kernel (NTK) literature (Jacot et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2019; Arora et al., 2019; Du et al.,
The key insight from this literature for the purpose of our work is that inﬁnitely wide neural networks can be expressed as a kernel ridge regression problem with the NTK under appropriate parameter initialization, and gradient descent training dynamics.
In particular, in the limit as the number of hidden nodes k → ∞ , the neural tangent kernel associated with a two-layer ReLU network has a closed-form expression (Chen & Xu, 2021; Zhang & Zhang, 2021) (see Appendix A.5):
[Equation]
Thus, the network’s prediction at an input x can be described by:
[Equation]
where X ∈ R n × d is the input data matrix, K ∞ ( X , X ) ∈ R n × n is the NTK matrix evaluated on the training data points:
[ K ∞ ( X , X )] ij = K ∞ ( x i , x j ) and w NTK = (cid:0) K ∞ ( X , X ) + β I n (cid:1) − 1 Y solves the (cid:96) 2 regularized minimization problem with MSE loss where Y ∈ R n are the prediction targets.
With this appropriate terminology in place we provide an upper bound on recourse outcome instability of wide neural network models.
Proposition 3 (Upper bound on recourse outcome instability for wide neural networks) .
For the
NTK model with w NTK = (cid:0) K ∞ ( X , X ) + β I n (cid:1) − 1 Y , an upper bound for the recourse invalidation from Deﬁnition 1 by removing an instance ( x , y ) from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
where d NTK i = 1 k ii k
i k (cid:62) i Y , where k i is the i -th column of the matrix (cid:0) K ∞ ( X , X )
+ β I n (cid:1) − 1 ,
and k ii is its i -th diagonal element.
Intuitively, d NTK i is the linear model analog to d L i and d NTK i represents the importance that the point z i =
( x i , y i ) has on the model parameters w NTK .
In practical use-cases, when trying to comply with both the right to data deletion and the right to actionable explanations, our results have practical implications.
For example, instances with high inﬂuence captured by d i should be encountered with caution during model training in order to provide reliable recourses to the individuals who seek recourse.
In summary, our results suggest that the right to data deletion may be fundamentally at odds with reliable state-of-the-art actionable explanations as the removal of an inﬂuential data instance can induce a large change in the recourse robustness, the extent to which is primarily measured by the empirical inﬂuence function d i .
F INDING THE S ET OF M OST C RITICAL D ATA P OINTS
The Objective Function.
In this section, we present optimization procedures that can be readily used to assess recourses’ vulnerability to deletion requests.
On this way, we start by formulating our optimization objective.
We denote by m ∈ { ∆ , Φ (2) } the measure we want to optimize for.
We consider the summed instability of over the data set by omitting the subscript x , e.g., ∆ = (cid:80) x ∈D test ∆ x .
Our goal is to ﬁnd the smallest number of deletion requests that leads to a maximum impact on the instability measure m .
To formalize this objective, we deﬁne the set of possible data weight conﬁgurations:
[Equation]
entries of ω are 0 and the remainder is 1. } .
In equation 12, the parameter α controls the fraction of instances that are being removed from the training set.
For a ﬁxed fraction α , our problem of interest becomes:
[Equation]
Fundamental Problems.
When optimizing the above objective we face two fundamental problems: (i) evaluating m ( ω ) for many weight conﬁgurations ω can be prohibitively expensive as the objective is deﬁned implicitly through solutions of several non-linear optimization problems (i.e., model ﬁtting and ﬁnding recourses).
Further, (ii) even for an objective m ( ω ) which can be computed in constant or polynomial time optimizing this objective can still be NP-hard (a proof is given in Appendix A.3).
Practical Algorithms.
We devise two practical algorithms which approach the problem in equation 13 in different ways.
As for the problem of computing m ( ω ) in (i), we can either solve this by (a) using a closed-form expression indicating the dependency of m on ω or (b) by using an approximation of m that is differentiable with respect to ω .
As for the optimization in (ii), once we have established the dependency of m on ω we can either (a) use a gradient descent approach or (b) we use a greedy method.
Below we explain the individual steps required for the construction of our algorithms.
5. C OMPUTING THE O BJECTIVE
In the objective m ( ω ) , notice the dependencies ∆ x ( ω ) =
∆ x ( f ( w ( ω ) , ˇ x )) for the recourse outcome instability, and Φ (2) x ( ω ) =
Φ (2) x ( δ ( w ( ω ) , x ))) for the recourse action instability.
In the following, we brieﬂy discuss how we efﬁciently compute each of these functions without numerical optimization.
Model parameters from data weights w ( ω ) .
For the linear model, an analytical solution can be obtained, w L ( ω ) =
(cid:0) X (cid:62) ΩX (cid:1) − 1 X (cid:62) ΩY , where Ω = diag ( ω ) .
The same goes for the NTK model where w NTK ( ω ) =
Ω 12 (cid:0) Ω 12 K ∞ ( X , X ) Ω
+ β I (cid:1) − 1 Ω 12 Y (Busuttil & Kalnishkan, 2007, Eqn. 3).
When no closed-form expressions for the model parameters exist, we can resort to the inﬁnitesimal jackknife (IJ) (Jaeckel, 1972; Efron, 1982; Giordano et al., 2019b;a), that can be seen as a linear approximation to this implicit function.
We refer to Appendix C for additional details on this matter.
Model prediction from model parameters f ( w , ˇ x ) .
Having established the model parameters, evaluating the prediction at a given point can be quickly done even in a differentiable manner with respect to w for the models we consider in this work.
Recourse action from model parameters δ ( w , ˇ x ) .
Estimating the recourse action is more challenging as it requires solving equation 2.
However, a differentiable solution exists for linear models, where the optimal recourse action is given by δ L = s − w L ( ω ) (cid:62) x
λ + (cid:107) w L ( ω ) (cid:107) 22 w L ( ω ) .
When the underlying predictor is a wide neural network we can approximate the recourse expression of the corresponding NTK, δ NTK ≈ s − f ω , NTK ( x ) λ
+ (cid:107) ¯ w NTK (¯ ω ) (cid:107) 22 ¯ w NTK ( ω ) , which stems from the ﬁrst-order taylor expansion f ω , NTK ( x + δ ) ≈ f ω , NTK ( x ) + δ (cid:62) ¯ w NTK ( ω ) with ¯ w NTK ( ω ) =
∇ x K ( x , X ) w NTK ( ω ) .
5. O PTIMIZING THE O BJECTIVE F UNCTION
The Greedy Algorithm.
We consider the model on the full data set and compute the objective function m ( ω ) under deletion of every instance (alone).
We then select the instance that leads to the highest increase in the objective.
We add this instance to the set of deleted points.
Subsequently, we reﬁt the model and compute the impact of deletion for every second instance, when deleted in combination with the ﬁrst one.
Again, we add the instance that results in the largest increase to the set.
Iteratively repeating these steps, we identify more instances to be deleted.
Computational complexity depends on the implementation of the model weight recomputation, which is required O ( αn 2 ) times.
The Gradient Descent Algorithm.
Because our developed computation of m ( ω ) can be made differentiable, we also propose a gradient-based optimization framework.
We consider the relaxation of the problem in equation 13,
[Equation]
where the (cid:96) [-
-]0 norm encourages to change as few data weights from 1 to 0 as possible while few removals of training instances should have maximum impact on the robustness measure.
The problem in equation 14 can be further relaxed to a continuous and unconstrained optimization problem.
To do so we use a recently suggested stochastic surrogate loss for the (cid:96) 0 term (Yamada et al., 2020).
Using this technique, a surrogate loss for equation 14 can be optimized using stochastic gradient descent (SGD).
We refer to Appendix C for more details and pseudo-code of the two algorithms.
E XPERIMENTAL E VALUATION
We experimentally evaluate our framework in terms of its ability to ﬁnd signiﬁcant recourse invalidations using the instability measures presented in Section 3. [Figure]
between recourse outcome instability and the number of deletion requests for both the Admission and the Heloc data sets for regression and NTK models and various recourse methods.
Results were obtained by greedy optimization; see Appendix B for SGD results.
Data Sets.
For our experiments on regression tasks we use two real-world data sets.
In addition, we provide results for two classiﬁcation datasets in the Appendix B. First, we use law school data from the Law School Admission Council ( Admission ).
The council carried out surveys acrosslaw schools in the US, in which they collected information from 21,790 law students across the US (Wightman, 1998).
The data contains information on the students’ prior performances.
The task is to predict the students’ ﬁrst-year law-school average grades.
Second, we use the Home Equity Line of
Credit (Heloc) data set.
Here, the target variable is a score indicating whether individuals will repay the Heloc account within a ﬁxed time window.
Across both tasks we consider individuals in need of recourse if their scores lie below the median score across the data set.
Recourse Methods.
We apply our techniques to four different methods which aim to generate low-cost recourses using different principles: SCFE was suggested by Wachter et al.
(Wachter et al., 2018) and uses a gradient-based objective to ﬁnd recourses, DICE (Mothilal et al., 2020) uses a gradient-based objective to ﬁnd recourses subject to a diversity constraint, and CEM (Dhurandhar et al., 2018) uses a generative model to encourage recourses to lie on the data manifold.
For all methods, we used the recourse method implementations from the CARLA library (Pawelczyk et al., 2021) and specify the (cid:96) 1 cost constraint.
Further details on these algorithms are provided in App.
C.
Evaluation Measures.
For the purpose of our evaluation, we use both the recourse outcome instability measure and the recourse action instability measure presented in Deﬁnitions 1 and 2.
We evaluate the efﬁcacy of our framework to destabilize a large fraction of recourses using a small number of deletion requests (up to 14).
To ﬁnd critical instances, we use the greedy and the gradient-based algorithms described in Sec. 5.
After having established a set of critical points, we recompute the metrics with the reﬁtted models and recourses to obtain a ground truth result.
For the recourse outcome instability , our metric ∆ counts the number of invalidated recourses.
We use the median as the target score s , i.e., if the recourse outcome ﬂips back from a positive leaning prediction (above median) to a negative one (below median) it is considered invalidated.
When evaluating recourse action instability , we identify a set of critical points, delete these points from the train set and reﬁt the predictive model.
In this case, we also have to recompute the recourses to evaluate Φ p .
We then measure the recourse instability using Deﬁnition 2 with p = 2 .
Additionally, we compare with a random baseline, which deletes points uniformly at random from the train set.
We compute these measures for all individuals from the test set who require algorithmic recourse.
To obtain standard errors, we split the test set into 5 folds and report averaged results over these 5 folds.
Results.
In Figure 2, we measure the tradeoff between recourse outcome instability and the number of deletion requests.
We plot the number of deletion requests against the fraction of all recourses that become invalidated when up to k ∈ { 1 , . .
, 14 } training points are removed from the training set of the predictive model.
When the underlying model is linear, we observe that the removal of as few as 5 training points induces invalidation rates of all recourses that are as high as 95 % percent – [Figure] A v [Figure]
a b s o l u t e c h
a n g e scfe [Figure] we observe a similar trend across all recourse methods. Note that a similar trend is present for the
NTK model; however, a larger number of deletion requests (roughly 9) is required to achieve similar invalidation rates.
Finally, also note that our approach is always much more effective at deleting instances than the random baseline.
In Figure 3, we measure the tradeoff between recourse action instability and the number of deletion requests with respect to the SCFE recourse method when the underlying predictive model is linear or an NTK model.
For this complex objective, we use the more efﬁcient SGD optimization.
Again, we observe that our optimization method signiﬁcantly outperforms the random baselines at ﬁnding the most inﬂuential points to be removed.
[-a n g e scfe s g d , linreg random, linreg s g d , ntk random, ntk (a) Admission 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314 Number Training Instances Removed
-]
Factors of Recourse Robustness.
Our empirical results shed light on which factors are inﬂuential in determining robustness of trained ML models with respect to deletion requests.
In combination with results from Fig. 4 (see Appendix B), our results suggest that linear models are more susceptible to invalidation in the worst-case but are slightly more robust when it comes to random removals.
Furthermore, the characteristics of the data set play a key role; in particular those of the critical points.
We perform an additional experiment where we consider modiﬁed data sets without the most inﬂuential points identiﬁed by our optimization approaches.
In Appendix B, initial results show that this simple technique decreases the invalidation probabilities by up to 6 percentage points.
D ISCUSSION AND C ONCLUSION
In this work, we made the ﬁrst step towards understanding the tradeoffs between actionable model explanations and the right to be forgotten.
We theoretically analyzed the robustness of state-of-the-art recourse methods under data deletion requests and suggested (i) a greedy and (ii) a gradient-based algorithm to efﬁciently identify a small subset of individuals, whose data, when removed, would lead to invalidation of a large number of recourses for unsuspecting other users.
Our experimental evaluation with multiple real-world data sets on both regression and classiﬁcation tasks demonstrates that the right to be forgotten presents a signiﬁcant challenge to the reliability of actionable explanations.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings raise compelling questions on the deployment of counterfactual explanations in practice.
First of all, Are the two requirements of actionable explanations and the right to be forgotten fundamentally at odds with one another?
The theoretical and empirical results in this work indicate that for many model and recourse method pairs, this might indeed be the case.
This ﬁnding leads to the pressing follow-up question: How can practitioners make sure that their recourses stay valid under deletion requests?
A ﬁrst take might be to implement the principle of data minimization (Biega et al., 2020; Biega & Finck, 2021;
Shanmugam et al., 2022) in the ﬁrst place, i.e., exclude the k most critical data points from model training.
Finally, our theoretical results suggest that the robustness to deletion increases when the model parameter changes under data deletion remain small.
This formulation closely resembles the deﬁnition of Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006;
Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Dwork et al., 2014).
We therefore conjecture that the reliability of actionable recourse could beneﬁt from models that have been trained under DP constraints As the ﬁeld of AI rapidly evolves, data protection authorities will further reﬁne the precise interpretations of general principles in regulations such as GDPR.
The present paper contributes towards this goal theoretically, algorithmically, and empirically by providing evidence of tensions between different data protection principles.
A PPENDIX A T HEORETICAL R ESULTS A. U PPER B OUNDS ON R ECOURSE O UTCOME I NSTABILITY
Proposition 1 (Upper Bound on Output Robustness for Linear Models) .
For the linear regression model f ( x ) = w (cid:62) x with weights given by w =
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 X (cid:62) Y , an upper bound for the output robustness by removing an instance ( x , y ) from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
15) where d i =
( X (cid:62) X
[Equation]
x
[Equation]
r i 1 − h ii , r i =
y i − w (cid:62) x
i and h ii = x (cid:62) i
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 x i .
Proof.
By Deﬁnition
[Equation]
we have:
[Equation]
where d i = ( X T X ) − 1 x i
( y i − w T x i ) 1 − h ii .
This completes our proof.
Proposition 2 (Upper Bound on Output Robustness for NTK) .
For the NTK model with w NTK = (cid:0)
K ∞ ( X , X ) + λ I n (cid:1) − 1 Y , an upper bound for the output robustness by removing an instance ( x , y ) from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
where d i = 1 k ii k
i k (cid:62) i Y , where k i is the i -th column of the matrix (cid:0) K ∞ ( X , X )
+ β I n (cid:1) − 1 ,
and k ii is its i -th diagonal element.
Proof.
By Deﬁnition 1 and the weight-update theorem by Zhang & Zhang (2021) (see Appendix
A.4) and the assumption of the over-parameterized regime, we have:
[Equation]
[Equation]
where d i = 1 k ii k
i k (cid:62) i
Y which completes our proof.
A. U PPER B OUNDS ON R ECOURSE A CTION I NSTABILITY
Proposition 3 (Upper Bound on Input Robustness) .
For the linear regression model f ( x ) = w (cid:62) x with weights given by w =
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 X (cid:62) Y , an upper bound for the input robustness in the setting s = 0 , λ
=
by removing the i -th instance ( x i , y i ) from the training set is given by:
[Equation]
under the condition that w (cid:62) w − i ≤ 0 (no diametrical weight changes), where w − i =
w − d i is the weight after removal of training instance i and d i =
( X T X ) − 1 x
i
( y i − w (cid:62) x i ) 1 − h ii .
Proof.
For a linear scoring function f ( x ) =
w (cid:48)(cid:62) x with given parameters w (cid:48) , under the squared (cid:96)norm constraint with balance parameter λ , the optimal recourse action is given by (Pawelczyk et al., 2022a):
[Equation]
Using Deﬁnition 2, we can express the total change in δ as a path integral over changes in w , times the change D δ
Dw they entail:
[Equation]
[Equation]
(27) where D δ Dw denotes the Jacobian, with the corresponding operator matrix norm.
Deﬁning ˜ w := γ w + (1 − γ ) w − i and using (cid:107) w − w −
i
(cid:107)
= (cid:107) d
i (cid:107) 2 , we obtain Φ [Equation] ≤ [Equation]
i
[Equation]
(cid:13)(cid:13)(cid:13)(cid:13)
[Equation]
Because of the form δ ( w (cid:48) )
=
f ( w (cid:48) )
w (cid:48) , where f ( w (cid:48) ) :
=
s − w (cid:48)(cid:62) x
(cid:107) w (cid:48) (cid:107)
+ λ is a scalar function, its Jacobian has the form D δ Dw (cid:48) =
w (cid:48) ( ∇ f ( w (cid:48) ))
(cid:62) + f ( w (cid:48) )
I .
We will now derive a bound on the Jacobian’s operator norm:
[Equation]
[Equation] Additionally, we know that for s = 0 , | f ( w (cid:48) ) | ≤ (cid:107) x
[Equation]
The gradient is given by
[Equation]
λ → 0 ,
[Equation]
[Equation]
In summary,
[Equation]
Because ˜ w is a line between w and w − i , its norm is bounded from below by (cid:107) ˜ w (cid:107) 2 ≥ 1 √ 2 min(
[Equation]
w
[Equation]
i
[Equation]
d i
[Equation]
We can thus uniformly bound the integral and plug in the bound because of its positivity,
[Equation]
which completes the proof.
A. C ALCULATING R ECOURSE O UTCOME I NSTABILITY FOR K D ELETIONS IS NP- HARD
We can show that, for a general scoring function f , the problem deﬁned in equation 13 is NP-hard.
We make this proof by providing a function f for which solving the recourse outcome invalidity problem is as hard as solving the well-known Knapsack problem, that has been shown to be NP-hard (Karp, 1972).
The knapsack problem is deﬁned as follows:
[Equation]
where the problem considers n ﬁxed items ( v i , y i ) i
=1 ...
n with a value v i and knapsack weight y i > 0 , and W is a ﬁxed weight budget.
The optimization problem consists of choosing the items that maximize the summed values but have a weight lower than W .
To solve this problem through the recourse outcome invalidation problem, we suppose there is a data point for each item.
We can choose any k >
W min y i of points to be deleted, where this condition ensures that we can remove the number of samples maximally required to solve the corresponding knapsack problem.
Note that we can always add a number of dummy points that have no effect such that the total number of data points is at least k .
Suppose there is a classiﬁer function:
[Equation] [Equation]
In this case, solving Eqn. 13 comes down to ﬁnding the set of items (i.e., removing the data points) that have maximum value, but stay under the threshold W .
Thus, if we can solve Eqn. 13, the solution to the equivalent knapsack problem is given by q = ( 1 − ω ) .
A. A UXILIARY T HEORETICAL R ESULTS
We state the following classic result by Miller Jr (1974) without proof.
Theorem 1.
(Leave-One-Out Estimator, Miller Jr (1974))
Deﬁne ( x i , y i ) as the point to be removed from the training set.
Given the optimal weight vector w =
( X (cid:62) X ) − 1 X (cid:62) Y which solves for a linear model under mean-squared-error loss, the leave-one-out estimator is given by:
[Equation]
We restate the analtical solution for the NTK weights in case of a single deletion from Zhang &
Zhang (2021).
Theorem 2.
(Leave-One-Out weights for NTK models, Zhang & Zhang (2021)) Let w NTK = (cid:0)
K ∞ ( X , X ) + λ I n (cid:1) − 1 Y be the weight for the NTK model on the full data Kernel model, where
K ∞ ( X , X ) is the NTK matrix evaluated on the training data points:
[ K ∞ ( X , X )] ij = K ∞ ( x i , x j ) .
Then, the NTK model that would be obtained when removing instance i , could be equivalently described by
[Equation]
where q − i is the i -th column of the matrix Q − 1 = (cid:0) K ∞ ( X , X )
+ β I n (cid:1) − 1 , and q − ii is its i -th diagonal element of this inverse.
Proof.
We begin by introducing some notation. Deﬁne: [Equation] then the analytical NTK model when considering the dataset with one instance x i removed is given by
[Equation]
where X − i denotes the data matrix with row i missing and Y − i denotes the label vector with the i -th label missing.
We have to show that this expression is equivalent to that stated in the theorem.
Without loss of generality, we can assume the i is the last point in the dataset (otherwise, we just permute the data set accordingly).
Therefore, we can write the matrix Q in block form:
[Equation]
Through the block matrix inversion formula (see for example Csató & Opper (2002) (eqn. 52))
we can write Q ’s inverse as
[Equation]
with γ = q ii − q (cid:62) i R − 1 q i .
We denote the i -th (and last) column of Q − 1 as q − i =
(cid:20) γ
[Equation]
1 R
[Equation]
1 q i
[Equation]
(cid:21) and the i -th and last diagonal element of the inverse as q − ii = γ − 1 . We will now show, that the form of the weights given in the theorem (i.e., the weights for the points not removed) are equivalent to the weights that would have been computed by plugging in the smaller kernel matrix K ∞ ( X − i , X − i ) in the analytical solution and the weight for the point deleted will have a value of zero, i.e., [Equation] To show this
[Equation]
we plug in the inversion formula Q − 1 from equation 44 into equation 45 and using
[Equation]
Therefore, we have equivalence between equation 42 and the formulation in the theorem.
A. A N A NALYTICAL NTK K ERNEL
In this section, we provide theoretical results that allow deriving the closed form solution of the NTK for the two-layer ReLU network.
First, see the paper by Jacot et al.
Jacot et al.
(2018) for the original derivation of the neural tangent kernel.
A closed-form solution for two-layer ReLU networks.
From (Zhang & Zhang, 2021; Du et al., 2019, Assumption 3.1) we obtain the deﬁnition of the Kernel matrix K ∞ (termed Gram matrix in the paper Du et al.
for ReLU networks:
[Equation]
[Equation]
The last reformulation uses an analytical result by Cho & Saul (2009).
The derived result matches the one by Xie et al.
(2017), which however does not provide a comprehensive derivation.
B A DDITIONAL E XPERIMENTAL R ESULTS
Data sets for the Classiﬁcation Tasks When considering classiﬁcation tasks on the heloc and admission data sets, we threshold the scores based on the median to obtain binary target labels.
On the Admission data set (in the classiﬁcation setting), a counterfactual is found when the predicted ﬁrstyear average score switches from ‘below median’ to ‘above median’.
We then count an invalidation if, after the model update, the score of a counterfactual switches back to ‘below median’.
In addition to the aforementioned data sets, we use both the Diabetes and the Compas data sets.
The Diabetes data set which contains information on diabetic patients from 130 different US hospitals (Strack et al., 2014).
The patients are described using administrative (e.g., length of stay) and medical records (e.g., test results), and the prediction task is concerned with identifying whether a patient will be readmitted within the next 30 days.
We sub sampled a smaller data sets of 10000 points from this dataset.points are left to train the model, while 2000 points are left for the test set.
The Compas data set
Angwin et al.
(2016) contains data for more than 10,000 criminal defendants in Florida.
It is used by the jurisdiction to score defendant’s likelihood of reoffending.
We kept a small part of the raw data as features like name , id , casenumbers or date-time were dropped.
The classiﬁcation task consists of classifying an instance into high risk of recidivism.
Across all data sets, we dropped duplicate instances.
Discussing the Results As suggested in Section 6, here we are discussing the remaining recourse outcome invalidation results.
We show these results for two settings.
In Figure 4, we demonstrate the efﬁcacy of our greedy deletion algorithm across 4 data sets on the classiﬁcation tasks using different classiﬁcation models (ANN, logistic regression, Kernel-SVM).
For the logistic regression and the
ANN model, we use the inﬁnitesimal jackknife approximation to calculate the probitively expensive retraining step as described in Section 5.
We observe that our method well outperforms random guessing.
The results also highlight that while the NTK theory allows to study the deletion effects from a theoretical point of view, if one is interested in empirical worst-case approximations, the inﬁnitesimal jackknife can be a method of choice.
As we observe this pattern across all recourse methods, we hypothesize that this is related to the instability of the trained ANN models, and we leave an investigation of this interesting phenomenon for future work.
Additionally, in Figure 5, we compare our SGD-based deletion algorithm to the greedy algorithm.
For the SGD-based deletion results, we observe inverse-u-shaped curves on some method-datamodel combinations.
The reason for this phenomenon can be explained as follows: when the (cid:96)regularization strength (i.e., η ) is not strong enough, then the importance weights for the k -th removal with k > 5 become more variable (i.e., SGD does not always select the most important data weight for larger k ).
This drop in performance can be mitigated by increasing the strength of the (cid:96) 0 regularizer within our SGD-based deletion algorithm.
In Figure 6, we study a simple removal strategy aimed at increasing the stability of algorithmic recourse.
To this end, we identiﬁed the 15 points that lead to the highest invalidation on the NTK and linear regression models when the underlying recourse method is SCFE .
Using our greedy method, we remove these 15 points from the training data set, and we then then rerun our proposed greedy removal algorithm.
This strategy leads to an improvement of up to 6 percentage points over the initial model where the 15 most critical points were included, suggesting that the removal of these critical points can be used to alleviate the recourse instability issue.
In future work, we plan to investigate strategies that increase the robustness of algorithmic recourse even further.
Finally, in Figure 7 we study how well the critical points identiﬁed for the NTK model would invalidate a wide 2-layer ReLU network with 10000 hidden nodes.
To study that question, we identiﬁed the points that lead to the highest invalidation on the NTK using our greedy method, and we then use these identiﬁed training points to invalidate the recourses suggested by the wide ANN.
As before, we are running these experiments on the full data set across 5 folds.
Figure 7 demonstrates the results of this strategy for the SCFE recourse method.
We see that this strategy increases the robustness of up to 30 percentage points over the random baseline, suggesting that critical points under NTK can be used to estimate recourse invalidation for wide ANN models [Figure] a t [Figure]
c o u r s e s I n v a li d a t e d [Figure] kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,ann random,ann greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,ann random,ann greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,ann random,ann (c ) Compas
[Table]
NumberTrainingInstancesRemoved
[Table]
c o u r s e s I n
[Table]
li d a
[Table]
e d dice
[Table]
NumberTrainingInstancesRemoved
[Table]
[Table]
d scfe
[Table]
[Table]
d cem greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm greedy,ann random,ann greedy,logreg greedy,kernellssvm random,logreg random,kernellssvm
[Figure]
C I MPLEMENTATION D ETAILS C. D ETAILS ON M ODEL T RAINING
We train the classiﬁcation models using the hyperparameters given in Table 1.
The ANN and the
Logistic regression models are ﬁt using the quasi-newton lbgfs solver.
We add L2-regularization to the ANN weights.
The other methods are trained via their analytical solutions.
Below, in Algorithms 1 and 2, we show pseudocodes for both our greedy and sgd-based deletion methods to invalidate the recourse outcome.
In order to do the optimization with respect to the recourse action stability measure, we slightly adjust Algorithm 2 to optimize the right metric from Deﬁnition 2.
[Table]
[Figure]
[Table]
n
[Table]
a [Table] [Figure] [Table]
[Figure]
[Table]
r
[Table]
I n
[Table]
a li d a t e d
[Table]
[Figure]
C. D ETAILS ON G ENERATING THE C OUNTERFACTUALS
For DICE , for every test input, we generate two different counterfactual explanations.
Then we randomly pick either the ﬁrst or second counterfactual to be the counterfactual assigned to the given input.
Across all recourse methods the success rates lie above 95%, i.e., for 95% of recourse seeking individuals the algorithms can identify recourses.
The only exception is admission data set for the
NTK model, where the success rate lies at 60%.
Across all recourse methods we set λ → 0 .
Note that the default implementations use early stopping once a feasible recourse has been identiﬁed.
C. D ETAILS ON THE (cid:96) 0 R EGULARIZER
Since an (cid:96) 0 regularizer is computationally intractable for high-dimensional optimization problems, we have to resort to approximations.
One such approximation approach was recently suggested by
Yamada et al.
The underlying idea consists of converting the combinatorial search problem to a continuous search problem over distribution parameters.
To this end, recall our optimization
[Figure] [Figure]
the problem from the main text:
[Equation]
We will now introduce Bernoulli random variables Z i ∈ { 0 , 1 } with corresponding parameters
π i to model the individual ω i .
Instead of optimizing the objective above with respect to ω we will optimize
Model
Parameters
Linear Regression
OLS, no hyperparameters.
NTK Regression β
= 2 (Admission), β
= 5 (other data sets)
Logistic Regression
L2-Regularization with C = 1 .
Kernel-LSSVM
Gaussian Kernel with γ = 1 .
(see Cawley & Talbot (2004))
ANN 2-Layer, 30 Hidden units, Sigmoid, α = 10 (
[Table]
[Table]
Required: Model: f w ( 1 ) ; Matrix of Recourses: ˇ X 1 ∈ R q × d ; d : input dimension; q number of recourse points on test set; n : # train points; M : max # deleted train points; s : invalidation target ω (0)
=
1 n (cid:46)
All training instances present for m = 1 : M do ω ( m ) ← ω ( m − 1) ˜
Y =
n × q (cid:46) Recourse outcomes
J = 0 n × q (cid:46) Invalidations present
S ( m ) ← (cid:110) i (cid:12)(cid:12)(cid:12) ω ( m ) i (cid:54) = 0 (cid:111) (cid:46) of instances present at iteration m for i ∈ S ( m ) do w ( i ) new = update_w ( ω ( m ) − i )
(cid:46)
− additionally weight i to 0.
(cid:46) analytical or
˜ Y
[ i, :] =
f w ( i ) new ( ˇ X 1 ) (cid:46)
New recourse outcomes
J [ i, :]
=
I (˜ Y
[ i, :] < s ) (cid:46) Invalidation present end for index ← arg max i ∈ S ( m ) (cid:107) J
[ i, :] (cid:107)(cid:46) leads to highest invalidation ω ( m ) [ index ]
=(cid:46)
Remove training point end for return : ω ( M ) (cid:46) data weights indicating M removals with respect to distribution parameters π : [Equation]
Since the above optimization problem is known to suffer from high-variance solutions, (Yamada et al., 2020) suggest to use a Gaussian-based continuous relaxation of the Bernoulli variables: [Equation] 54) where (cid:15) i = N (0 , σ 2 ) , resulting in the following optimization problem: [Equation]
At inference time, the optimal weights are then given by ˜ Z ∗ i = max(0 , min(1 , µ ∗ i ))
∀ i ∈ [ n ] .
To obtain discrete weights, we take the argmax over each individual ˜
Z i . C. D ETAILS ON THE J ACKKNIFE A PPROXIMATION When the model parameters w are a function of the data weights by solving equation 1 we can approximate w ( ω ) using the inﬁnitesimal Jackknife (IJ) without having to optimize equationrepeatedly (Jaeckel, 1972; Efron, 1982; Giordano et al., 2019b;a):
[Equation]
(56) where G and H 1 are the Jacobian and the Hessian matrices of the loss function with respect to the data weights evaluated at the optimal model parameters w , i.e., G ω − 1 = 1 n (cid:80) ni
=1 ( ω i − 1) · ∂(cid:96)
( f w ( x i ) ,y i ) ∂ w and H 1 = 1 n (cid:80) ni =
[Equation]
2 (cid:96) ( f w ( x i ) ,y i ) ∂ w ∂ w (cid:62) .
Note that this technique computes the Hessian matrix
H 1 only once.
Using this Jackknife approximation, the Jacobian term G ω − 1 becomes an explicit function of the data weights which makes the Jackknife approximation amenable to optimization.
Required: Model: f w ( 1 ) ; Matrix of Recourses: ˇ X 1 ∈ R q × d ; d : input dimension; q number of recourse points on test set; n : # train points; M : max # deleted train points; s : invalidation target µ (1) =
1 n (cid:46)
Mu are soft data weights that are opimized.
for m = 1 : Step do (cid:46) Perform Step number of updates.
δ − loss =0 .for
k
= 1 : K do (cid:46)
Use K Monte-Carlo Samples for the approximation
Sample (cid:15)
[Equation]
(cid:16)
[Equation]
(cid:16)
[Equation]
(cid:15)
[Equation]
(cid:17)(cid:17) (cid:46)
Sample (soft) data weights as in Yamada et al.
[Equation] [Equation]
(cid:46) Compute
IJ
[Equation]
(cid:46) Predict with new weights and compute soft invalidation.
[Equation]
(cid:46) Add up soft inval.
loss end for
[Equation]
(cid:46) Sparsity Regularizer from Yamada et al
[Equation] [Equation]
(cid:46) Grad.
Descent with lr.
γ end for removed_ind = argsort ( µ ( Step +1) )
(cid:46) Sort indices ascendingly j =ω = 1 n while j < M do (cid:46) Binarize and fulﬁl max number M ω
[removed_ind[j]]=j =
j +end while return : ω (cid:46) data weights indicating M removals