Autor: regi | Publicado: 2013-01-21T04:38:00-08:00






Islâm,622 AD-present








Recite! In the name of your Lord! [Qur'ân, Sûra 96:1]

Islâm, , is the religion founded by the Prophet Muh.ammad.  The word is sometimes said to mean "peace," but it is salâm, , that is the word for peace.  Islâm means "submission, resignation," i.e. to the will of God.  Both are from the same root, slm, , "to be safe and sound, unharmed," and many other meanings.  This is related to Hebrew shalôm, "peace," and the Ancient Egyptian root snb, "health."  The Dâru-l'Islâm,
 the "House of Islâm," means the predominantly Islâmic part of the 
world, especially the part covered by Islâmic states.  Outside the Dâru-l'Islâm is the Dâru-lH.arb, the "House of War"; and it was the traditional duty of Islâmic rulers to extend the House of Islâm into the House of War.


This expansion of the Dâru-l'Islâm was the Jihâd, , the Holy War.  Someone who does the Jihâd is a Mujâhid,  (pl. Mujâhidûn, ).  Jihâd is now often said not to mean, or not primarily to mean, Holy War but merely a moral and spiritual "struggle" for perfection.  The root (jhd, ), indeed, does mean "to endeavor, struggle," etc., but also "to fight."  Different derivatives of the root, as with slm, are used for different purposes.  Ijtihâd, ,
 is from the same root and can also mean "struggle," but it is mainly 
used to mean "independent interpretation" on a point of Islâmic Law, 
i.e. independent of legal precedent (following precedent is taqlîd, ).  It is no distortion of Jihad
 to say that it means "Holy War."  Indeed, in the Middle Ages it was an 
important question whether Islâm could be properly practiced in a 
non-Muslim state.  Even though Islâm was supposed to tolerate "People of
 the Book," which originally meant Jews and Christians but in practice 
came to include Zoroastrians and even, unevenly, Hindus, this was only 
in a subordinate position (dhimma, the status of the dhimmî, the tolerated non-believer) -- Muslims being "tolerated" in a non-Muslim state was against the divine order.


The treatment of Jihâd in public discourse does not always
 seem honest.  Thus, the former History International cable channel (now
 "H2") recently (12/10/08) aired a show called "Secrets of the Koran."  
This was copyrighted 2006 and so perhaps was a repeat showing.  The show
 explained the ideology of Jihâd as the result of the Crusades,
 and otherwise positively affirmed that Muslims are only supposed to use
 force in self-defense.  But to suppose such a thing with any kind of 
superficial consistency, major events in Islamic history were then 
ignored or glossed over.  The Omayyads were never even mentioned
 during the show, and the original Islamic conquest of Syria, Palestine,
 Iraq, Iran, and Egypt, although illustrated with maps, was discussed in
 no detail and often only characterized as "spreading the Word of 
Islam."  This was a grave distortion when the original Islamic Conquest 
was not intended to "spread the Word" or obtain converts at all.  Islam 
was initially viewed as a religion just for Arabs.  


Most terrible evils has Romania suffered from the Arabs even until now.

Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (d.959) quoting The Chronicle of Theophanes (c.815) [De Administrando Imperio, Greek text edited by Gy. Moravcsik, Dumbarton Oaks Texts, 1967, 2008, p.94]

The earliest non-Arab coverts had to become affiliated with an Arab 
tribe, and their status was subordinate.  Equality for all Muslims was, 
in general, the achievement of the Abbasid
 Revolution.  The Islamic Conquest was therefore in the name of Islam, 
but its purpose was simply domination.  Later, the show mentioned that 
the Crusades were elicited by an appeal from the Roman/Byzantine Emperor
 Alexius Comnenus,
 and that this had something to do with the Turks.  Exactly what the 
Turks had been doing, however, was glossed over nearly as completely as 
the history of the Omayyads, and one might have derived the impression 
that Turkey had always been in Anatolia (they are not shown coming from 
anywhere else).  That the advent of the Turks
 represented a major surge in Islamic Conquest was not made obvious; and
 the viewer of the show might notice a hiatus between fending off the 
Crusaders and the Ottoman Turks arriving at the gates of Vienna.  In between, of course, there were rather serious events like the Fall of Constantinople, which gets ignored.  Obviously, if the ideology of Jihâd only exists because of the aggression of the Crusaders, and war in Islam is only supposed to be used for defense, things
 like the Arab Conquest of the Middle East or the Turkish Conquest of 
the Roman/Byzantine Empire and Hungary are going to be somewhat awkward 
to explain.  Hence the dishonesty.  It is as though Egyptians, Syrians, 
etc., on hearing the Word, spontaneously converted to Islam, with 
Christian counter-attacks constituting, in modern leftist
 terminology, "Imperialist Aggression."  No, the only thing about any 
Imperium that is really resented is that the wrong people possessed it. 
 "Secrets of the Koran," thus, unfortunately, constituted a dishonest 
apologetic, not truly informative history.

Islâmic rulers engaged in Jihâd were not secular rulers in
 the modern sense, but neither were Mediaeval Christian rulers.  In some
 ways Islâmic rulers seem more secular than Christian ones, since their 
military origin was usually recent and conspicuous (the Mamlûks are the most obvious), while Christian rulers (like the Kings of France)
 might claim authority directly from God.  More important were other 
differences.  European states had a legal tradition from Roman Law that 
was originally independent of Christianity, while Islâm had developed 
its own system of law.  European judges were thus secular officials, 
while Islâmic judges were religious jurists.  Europe even had parallel 
secular and eccelesiastical judicial systems, which is why King Henry II of England could be angry with Thomas à Becket,
 not for protecting the poor Saxons from oppression by the Norman King, 
but for protecting priests guilty of rape and murder from the full force
 of secular justice.  Islâmic jurists were the principal institutional 
existence of Islâm, which otherwise had no priests or religious 
hierarchy.  The Imâm in Orthdox Islâm might be learned (an 'Âlim, , "Knower," pl. 'Ulamâ', ), might even be a judge (a Qâd.î, ), but essentially is just the leader of the Prayer, with no particular religious authority.  ('Ulamâ'
 or "Ulema" is frequently used for jurists and learned religious opinion
 in general; and, strickly speaking, the indefinite citation form for Qâd.î is Qâd.in, .)
  The institutional distinction in the West between Church and State 
made it relatively easy to separate these institutions.  This separation
 was not only less easy in Islâm but the trend in recent years has 
actually reversed,
 with a reinstitution of Islâmic Law in states that had previously 
adopted secular law codes.  This reversal has, not surprisingly, 
accompanied a renewed militancy and a sense of Jihâd that owes nothing to mollifying apologetics.


Other comparisons have been made between the characters of 
Muh.ammad, Jesus, and Moses, since Muh.ammad commanded armies, had 
multiple marriages, etc.  Muh.ammad, indeed, had the responsibilities of
 rule, with a hostile enemy, Mecca, nearby.  This involved battles.  
Jesus wasn't in any such position.  His Kingdom, as he said, was not of 
this world.  Moses did have the responsibilities of rule, though actual 
fighting didn't begin until the Israelites crossed the Jordan.  Moses 
didn't go with them, and Joshua then handled the military business.  
Since Joshua was instructed by God to annihilate the people he found in 
the Promised Land, Muh.ammad comes off rather well in comparison, since 
the war with Mecca ended in a negotiated settlement where the only 
losers were the idols in the Ka'aba, 
 (though there had been a fair amount of killing in the conflict, and 
Muh.ammad had in the meantime expelled the Jews from Medina).  As for 
his marriages, Muh.ammad seemed to have been genuinely devoted to his 
wife Khadîja, an older widow whom he married after helping her run her 
business.  Khadîja was one of the first who believed that Muh.ammad was 
actually receiving a divine revelation.  He married no other until after
 she died.  I do not know how to judge the subsequent marriages.  At 
least some of them seem to have been honorary, with the widows of fallen
 companions.  His favorite wife, 'Â'isha, was betrothed to him at six.  
It was she who laid him to rest in the floor of their house in Medina, 
and the last person to set foot there for many centuries, as the 
Prophet's Mosque was built around it.  One might think the Prophet was 
simply heir to some of the understandable temptations of power, but this
 explanation is generally not allowed in Islâmic tradition, since the 
Prophet is viewed as necessarily morally perfect.  That is hardly 
necessary.  The Bible does not present Moses as morally perfect -- 
indeed, God prohibits his entry into the Promised Land as a punishment.


At right we have been seeing an image of the Angel Gabriel 
leading the Prophet Muh.ammad on the miraculous horse Buraq, from a 15th
 century Persian miniature.  I include this because of the recent 
controversy over cartoons of the Prophet published in October 2005 in 
the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten.  By early 2006, Islamic 
radicals managed to stir up riots in many Islâmic countries over the 
cartoons, featuring attacks on Denmark, the EU, and Christians.  It was 
positively affirmed by the radicals that images of the Prophet are 
absolutely forbidden in Islâm and that the cartoons were an intolerable 
slander against Islâm -- except that the Danish cartoons were really 
very mild and the radicals had included some other cartoons, nastier 
ones, that had nothing to do with the Danish newspaper.  They were 
obviously looking for a pretext, not honestly expressing any 
reasonable protest.  Not only that, but what they positively affirmed 
was not true.  Although images have definitely been frowned upon in 
Islâmic history, and often absent altogether, there is nevertheless no 
lack of them.  A favorite theme was the Prophet's "Night Journey," when 
he was taken up in a dream to heaven and hell, as we see in the image 
here.  The whole episode thus exposes the extremism of modern Islâmic 
fundamentalism.  This is not the Islâm of The Thousand and One Nights or 'Umar Khayyâm.  It is a fascism
 that derives from the least humane and tolerant varieties of Islâmic 
law, often that of the H.anbalî school favored by the Wahhâbîs of Sa'udi Arabia, not to mention the dangerous, militant, and reactionary insanity of revolutionary Irân.
  Apologists then accuse Westerners of hostile misunderstandings Islâm, 
when the disagreement of the apologists is with the radicals, whose own 
interpretations often have substantial support in Islâmic jurisprudence 
-- if indeed the apologists really do disagree with the radicals:  &nbsp;they often seem disingenuous to a suspicious degree.






A new political crime has been added to Leftist demonology.  This is "Islamophobia."
  The precedent for this term seems to be "homophobia," and both are 
about equally confused in their etymology.  A "phobia" is a fear,
 so "Islamophobia" should mean "fear of Islam," as "homophobia," with 
"homo" used as a prefix for "homosexual," should mean "fear of 
homosexuals."  This is not the way these words are used, however.  
"Homophobia" and "Islamophobia" are supposed to mean hatred of 
homosexuals, and of Islam, respectively, where this hatred is the 
morally (and perhaps legally) culpable expression of bigotry and 
hostility.


In "homophobia" this was already a tendentious reading of 
traditional attitudes towards homosexuality.  Certainly there are people
 who hate homosexuals, and are even willing to commit violence against 
them, and it might be reasonable to imagine people fearing homosexuals, 
if they think that the innocent can be "converted" to homosexuality, or 
that homosexuality is a decadent and disruptive influence in society.  But in general, "homophobia" is usually just applied to people who, largely for religious
 reasons, and without any particular personal hostility or tendency to 
violence, judge that homosexual practices are immoral.  This is rarely 
addressed in an honest way in public debate, where "liberal" opinion is 
in the business of smearing traditional religion (or at least 
traditional Christianity).  Instead, "homophobia" has become a political
 slogan and a slur, whose meaning and implications are left 
unarticulated, and which itself becomes an expression of hostility and 
contempt for religious traditionalists.


It is then ironic that "Islamophobia" should follow in the 
footsteps of this usage, taking advantage of its device as a political 
slogan and a slur, when in the modern world the source of some of the 
most intense persecution of homosexuals is from militant Islam.  When 
the President of Iran,
 Mahmud Ahmadinejad, was invited to speak at Columbia University (at the
 time of his appearance before the United Nations), many of the anti-American elite were certainly hopeful of hearing a good diatribe against Imperialism
 and the United States.  Unfortunately, a naive, or perhaps hopeful (or 
both), participant then asked Ahmadinejad about the status of 
homosexuals in Iran.  The answer was that there are no 
homosexuals in Iran.  An informed questioner would have already known 
that they are hanged as quickly as they can be identified.  The 
sentiment that homosexuals should be executed had also been previously 
expressed by a British Imam, without consequences, despite laws in 
Europe that could construe such an opinion as an incitement to a hate 
crime.


How absurd this can all get was revealed recently when a "gay 
pride" parade was cancelled in London, not because of anti-gay threats 
from Muslims -- which had actually been expressed -- but purportedly in 
"solidarity" with opposition to anti-Muslim "Islamophobia," which was 
said to be the moral equivalent of homophobia.  Why a desire to assert 
solidarity between anti-homophobia and anti-Islamophobia should result 
in a "gay pride" parade being cancelled was left unexplained -- 
as, indeed, one would expect the opposite reaction, that the "gay pride"
 parade, with an anti-homophobia theme, would be combined with a 
parade asserting an anti-Islamophobia theme.  Obviously, the fear of 
violence against the parade from Muslims led to its cancellation; but 
the organizers, in a sort of anticipatory Stockholm Syndrome, decided to
 dislay their political correctness by identifying with those from whom they feared violence.  There are few more bizarre contortions evident in contemporary politics.


Ironic or not, the use of "Islamophobia" is an attempt to demonize those who actually do fear Islam, 



Jihad against America is binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim.

Anwar al-Awlaki (d.2011)

when such a fear is well justified by recent events and by the behavior 
of people in the Islamic world.  Since Islamists, terrorists, and 
assorted tyrannical regimes and radicals like to justify their attitudes
 and actions in terms borrowed from the Qur'ân and from Islamic Law, one
 might think that honest defenders of Islam would acknowledge this, find
 it an embarrassment, and attempt to both combat the radicalism and 
assuage the fears of its victims.  But this is not done -- except among a
 few well meaning Muslims who do not receive nearly as much attention as
 their militant brethren.  Instead, public apologists for Islam seem to 
want to put the blame on the fearful victims, while discounting or 
ignoring the well-funded popularity of the terrorists.  When 
Palestinians danced in the streets on 9/11, it was not because 
they believed that the Jews or George Bush were behind the attack on 
America, or because they believed that Islamic terrorism was an 
embarrassment to Islam.  They were spontaneously celebrating a great 
heartfelt victory in the Jihad.  Apologists who do not acknowledge this 
are simply exposing their bad faith and ill will.

The conflicts, confusions, and deceptions in these attitudes came
 to a head with the proposal for building a mosque on Park Place, a 
couple of blocks from the site of the World
 Trade Center in New York -- the "ground zero mosque."  We see the 
building on the site at right, with modest New York City police 
protection.


There would have been a right way and a wrong way to do this 
project.  The right way would have reflected the concern of well-meaning
 Muslims to dissociate their religion from the 9/11 attacks and to 
express their dismay and mortification that the terrorists should have 
invoked Islam to justify the atrocities.  The mosque as an expression of
 contrition for the damage done by vicious co-religionists would have at least been a step in assuaging the justifiable fears of all the targets of terrorism.  Indeed, there should
 be such a mosque at Ground Zero, in conjunction with facilities related
 to the religions of all the victims of 9/11.  There were, after all, 
many innocent Muslims who were killed at the World Trade Center.  The 
project of the mosque should be making clear that the "martyrs" of 9/11 
were the victims of the terrorists, not the terrorists themselves (for 
whom, of course, a "martyrdom operation" means a suicide attack).


The wrong way to promote the project, however, is the way it has 
actually been done.  The leader of the effort, the Imam Feisal Abdul 
Rauf, himself was on record as blaming the United States for the 9/11 
attacks and refused to distance himself from terrorist organizations 
like Hamas.  He and his wife have responded to objections to the project
 with accusations of "Islamophobia," by which they clearly mean, not 
reasonable "fear of Islam," but a bigoted and intolerant hostility for 
Islam.  Thus, they give every indication of militancy and would leave 
any reasonable person with the impression that the mosque is not an 
attempt at reconciliation -- which would be ill served by calling most 
Americans bigots -- but is in fact a Jihad Victory Mosque whose 
purpose is to promote an Islamist agenda as close as possible to the 
place were militant Islamists killed almost 3000 victims.  This makes 
the project an insolent gesture that both insults America and makes use 
of the anti-American "useful idiots" who are eager to cooperate in their
 own destruction.


Imam Rauf appeared on "The O'Reilly Factor" on 8 May 2012 and 
announced that he was no longer involved with the Park Place mosque, 
citing some kind of disagreements with other backers.  It would be nice 
to know who those other backers are and what Rauf's differences were 
with them.  Nevertheless, in the interview Rauf keep talking as though 
he were still planning the project.  Perhaps he was just talking about 
his general goals.  Bill O'Reilly mentioned that he had long ago said 
that if Rauf would appear on "The Factor" and renounce Terrorism, 
O'Reilly himself would take up a hammer and help build the mosque.  Rauf
 brought along a drawing of a hammer, that he said was from his wife, 
and gave it to O'Reilly.  I did not notice, however, that Rauf ever did 
actually renounce Terrorism during the interview.  Perhaps my attention 
wandered and I missed it.


We need to begin to suspect the motives of anyone willing to use 
the term "Islamophobia."  The Left admires militant Islam for its 
expressions of hostility to America, capitalism, "imperialism," and 
democracy -- i.e. for something that apologists want to deny that Islam 
actually represents.  The Left, of course, has no respect for Islam as a
 religion or for its traditional religious or social values.  All of 
these, from the subordination of women to the ferocious treatment of 
homosexuals, are actually anathema to elite political correctness.  But 
opportunism trumps honesty, and this is as true for the Islamists as for
 Western Leftists.  Both are pleased with the alliance, however Unholy 
to either ideology, as the old Arab saying (from the days of tribal 
vendettas) is well remembered -- "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."


We see this alliance in various examples of what can only be 
called wishful thinking, if not outright delusion.  Thus, Hollywood 
personality Rosie O'Donnell, a homosexual herself, drew considerable 
attention to her assertion that Christian fundmentalists are as bad as 
Islamic terrorists (along with claims that the 9/11 attack was an 
"inside job," a favorite trope of the Left).  Since "just as bad" 
doesn't seem to square with the absence of Christian suicide bombers, 
mass terror attacks, or large popular organizations that preach 
Christian Holy War through terror and combat, O'Donnell seemed more than
 a little out of touch with reality.  Not as extreme but just as 
revealing was the speculation by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg that 
the perpetrator of the May 2010 attempted Times Square bombing was, 
"Homegrown, maybe a mentally deranged person or someone with a political
 agenda that doesn’t like the health care bill or something."  It looked
 like Bloomberg was hoping that the bomber was one of his 
political enemies (i.e. opposed to socialized medicine), rather than the
 kind of Muslim radical that he turned out in fact to be.  Bloomberg 
loudly supports the ground zero mosque.  Meanwhile, the City of New York
 has attempted to prevent the rebuilding of the St. Nicholas Greek 
Orthodox Church, which was actually crushed by the falling South Tower 
of the World Trade Center on 9/11.  Bloomberg has not spoken out on this
 issue.


The courageous Ayaan Hirsi Ali grew up in Somalia, lived 
in Saudi Arabia and Kenya, and fled an arranged marriage, and Islam, to 
the Netherlands.  There she worked with Theo van Gogh on the movie about
 women in Islam that got him assassinated on the street.  She was 
elected to the Dutch parliament before her citizenship was revoked, 
probably because of the embarrassment she was causing to spineless 
Dutchmen like Ian Buruma (a Professor of "Democracy and Human Rights" at
 Bard College), who has publicly said that Ali is as much a fanatic (for
 freedom, human rights, and tolerance?) as the Islamists (for murder, 
terror, and intolerance?).  If Buruma means that this is good, he has not done a good job of clarifying his intention.


Similarly, Ali has been confronted in interviews with the 
proposition that crimes are committed as much by Christians as by 
Muslims.  Since the common crimes of Christians are rarely framed in 
terms of a Holy War against infidels, Ali naturally found the 
proposition more puzzling than anything else; and we are left with the 
impression of a kind of desperation on the part of the 
interviewers to deflect blame from Islam and to create the kind of 
"moral equivalence" that the Left promoted, in relation to the United 
States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War.  Most people see 
through this easily, although, as George Orwell said, nothing is so 
preposterous that an intellectual will not believe it.  People like 
O'Donnell, Bloomberg, and Buruma know that they have the "useful idiot" 
intellectuals on their side.


Currently, the ugliest counter-examples to the good intentions of
 Muslims are the continuing attacks on Christians in Iraq, Pakistan, and
 especially in Egypt.
  Churches are looted, burned, demolished, and/or bombed.  Christians in
 Iraq and Egypt are kidnapped and ransomed or tortured and murdered.  
Women and girls are kidnapped, forcibly converted to Islam, and 
"married" to Muslims against their will.  Campaigns are conducted in 
Egypt that Christians families are holding their own girls "hostage" 
after they supposedly converted to Islam.  The government of Egypt does 
not even allow churches to be built or repaired without its permission, 
which is effecively never given.  Or, if it is, mobs often attack the 
churches, or even the whole Christian villages around them, during or 
after construction.  On 24 November 2010, Egypt security forces actually
 stormed the St. Mary and St. Michael churches, which were under 
construction in Giza, occupying them and firing live ammunition at 
Coptic demontrators, killing at least four. The official complaint was 
that a permit for the construction had not been obtained, although 
actually it had.  Either way, a paramilitary attack, shooting civilians,
 is not the reasonable response to people building churches.


The Western Press pays little attention to these atrocities, both because the Western secular elite,
 in the intelligentsia, academia, and the media, is hostile to 
Christianity, and generally kills stories about the persecution of 
Christians, and because the political Left is effectively an ally of Islamic Fascism.
  Since Egyptian state security forces fail to protect Christians and 
often appear to cooperate in their persecution, including this recent 
case of shooting Christian demonstrators, while the 
government-controlled Press promotes anti-Christian hysteria, this puts 
the lie to claims about the general tolerance, respect, and good-will 
that Islam is supposed to show towards other religions.  That is not the
 practice on the ground in most Islamic countries, whether the Western 
Press reports it or not.


The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew &amp; Babylonian
Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine
Philosophy of History
Political Economy








Index




Introduction

"Islamophobia"

The word "Allâh" in Arabic, with Cognates in Hebrew &amp; Babylonian

The Prophet, 622-632 AD

The Rightly Guided Caliphs, 632-661 AD

The Shi'ite Imâms, 632-878 AD

The Omayyad Caliphs, 661-750 AD

The Abbasid Caliphs, 750-1258 AD

The Aghlabids, 800-909 AD

The T.âhirids, 821-873 AD

The T.ûlûnids, 868-905 AD

The Sâmânids, 819-1005 AD

The S.affârid, 861-1003 AD

The Ikhshîdids, 935-969 AD

The H.amdânids of Aleppo, 944-1004 AD

The Buwayid Amirs of Iraq, 945-1055

The Qarakhânids, c.992-1212 AD

The Ghaznawids, 977-1186 AD

The Ghûrids, 1011-1215 AD



Islâmic Rulers of Spain, 756-1492 AD

The Omayyad Amirs, 756-912

The Omayyad Caliphs, 912-1031

The Mulûk at-T.awâ'if, 1010-1114

The Jahwarids of Cordova

Murcia

The 'Abbâdids of Seville

The H.ammûdids of Málaga

The Zîrids of Granada

Aft.asids of Badajoz

The 'Âmirids of Valencia

The Dhu'n-Nûnids of Toledo

The Banû Mujâhid of Denia and Majorca

The Tujîbids of Saragossa

The Hûdids of Saragossa



The Murabit (Almoravid) Sult.âns, 1067-1147 AD

The Mulûk at-T.awâ'if, 1144-1266

Cordova

Valencia

Murcia

The Banû Ghâniya of Majorca



The Muwahid (Almohad) Caliphs, 1147-1238 AD

The Nas.rid Sult.âns of Granada, 1232-1492 AD

The Hûdids of Murcia





Islâmic Rulers of North Africa, 789-1163 AD

The Idrîsids of Morocco, 789-985 AD

The Rustamids of Algeria, 778-909 AD

The Aghlabids, 800-909 AD

The Shi'ite Fatimid Caliphs, 909-1171 AD

The Zîrids of Tunisia, 947-1163 AD

The Hammâdids of Algeria, 1015-1152 AD

The Murabit (Almoravid) Sult.âns, 1067-1147 AD

The Muwahid (Almohad) Caliphs, 1147-1238 AD



The Seljuk Great Sult.âns, 1037-1157 AD

Seljuk Sult.âns of Rûm, 1078-1307 AD

The Zangid Atabegs of Mosul, Aleppo, &amp; Damascus, 1127-1262 AD

The Khwârazm Shâhs, 1097-1231 AD

The Oghullar of Rûm

Aydïn Oghullarï

Sarukhân Oghullarï

Menteshe Oghullarï

Germiyân Oghullarï

H.amîd Oghullarï

Tekke Oghullarï

Jândâr Oghullarï

Qaramân Oghullarï

Eretna Oghullarï

Dulghadïr Oghullarï

Osmanli Oghullarï





The Il Khâns, 1256-1353

The Jalâyirids, 1340-1432

The Qara Qoyunlu, 1351-1469

The Timurids, 1370-1500

The Aq Qoyunlu, 1396-1508



The Khâns of the Golden Horde

The Khâns of the White Horde

The Khâns of Kazan

The Khâns of Astrakhan

The Khâns of the Crimea



The Ayyûbid Sult.âns, 1169-1252 AD

Islâmic Rulers of North Africa, 1217-1659 AD

The Marînid Amîrs of Morocco, 1195-1465

The Wat.t.âsid Amîrs of Morocco, 1472-1554

The Sa'did Sharîfs of Morocco, 1510-1659

The H.afs.id Amirs, Caliphs, or Sult.âns of Tunisia, 1229-1574

The Zayyânid or Ziyânid Amîrs of Algeria, 1236-1555

The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, &amp; Kings of Morocco, 1640-present

The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia, 1705-1957



The Keita Kings of Mali, 1230-1390

The Si &amp; Askiya Kings of Songhay, 1464-1592

The Mamlûk Sult.âns of Egypt, 1252-1517 AD

The Abbasid Puppet Caliphs of Egypt, 1261-1517 AD



The Ottoman Sultâns &amp; Caliphs, 1290-1924 AD, Maps and List of Emperors

The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD

The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD

The Sanûsî Amîrs &amp; Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD



Shibânid Özbegs, 1438-1599

Kazakhs, 1394-1748

Toqay Temürids, 1599-1758

Mangïts of Bukhara, 1747-1920

The Shâhs of Iran, 1501-1979 AD

The Safavids, 1501-1736

The Afsharids, 1736-1750

The Zands, 1750-1794

The Qajars, 1794-1924

The Pahlavis, 1924-1979



Sult.âns of Delhi, 1206-1555

Mu'izzî or Shamsî Slave Kings, 1206-1290

Khaljîs, 1290-1320

Tughluqids, 1320-1414

Sayyids, 1414-1451

Lôdîs, 1451-1526

Sûrîs, 1540-1555



Moghul Emperors, 1526-1540, 1555-1858

Nawwâbs of Bengal, 1704-1765

Nawwâbs of Oudh, 1722-1856

Niz.âms of Hyderabad, 1720-1948



Sult.âns of Malacca, 1403-1528

Sult.âns of Johor, 1528-present

Sult.âns of Acheh, c.1450-1903


Yemen, 1230 BC-1962 AD

at-Tababi'a, 1230 BC-533 AD

Saba/Sheba, 755 BC-100 AD

Dhu-Raydan &amp; Himyar, 120 BC-629 AD

Rassids, 860-1226

Ayyûbids, 1173-1229

Rasûlids, 1229-1454

T.âhirids, 1454-1517

Qâsimids, 1597-1962



Modern Islâm

The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD

The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD

The Sanûsî Amîrs &amp; Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD

The Sult.âns of Oman and Zanzibar, 1754-present

The Hâshimites, 1827-present

The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, &amp; Kings of Morocco, 1640-present

The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia, 1705-1957

The House of Sa'ûd, 1735-present

The Sultans of Brunei, 1405-present

The Rajahs of Sarawak, 1841-1946



Afghanistan, 1747-1973

Prime Ministers &amp; Presidents of Pakistan

Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine




My thanks to Professor Shaun Marmon of Princeton University for drawing my attention to Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties
 [Edinburgh University Press, 1996].  This remarkable and invaluble work
 is, strangely enough, already out of print.  Also of great use was Classical Islam, a History 600-1258, by G.E. von Grunebaum [Aldine Publishing, 1970], The Arabs, by Anthony Nutting [Mentor, 1964], The Arab Awakening, by George Antonius [Capricorn Books, 1965], The Cambridge History of Islam,
 edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis [Vols. 1A, 1B,
 2A, &amp; 2B, Cambridge, 1977], and other historical sources credited elsewhere in these pages.


Philosophy of History
Home Page


Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved




Islâm, 622 AD-present

The advent of Islâm, with Arab armies coming 
out of the practical equivalent of nowhere, was unforeseen and 
unforeseeable.  It dramatically and permanently altered the history of 
both the Middle East and the Mediterranean world.  Persia was eliminated for many years as an independent political or cultural force, and the revival of Romania was ended, with the Empire reduced from about 3/4 of its original extent, as restored by Justinian, to little more than 1/4, all that was left by the reign of Leo III.  




THE PROPHET
THE H.IJRAH ERA,
THE ISLÂMIC
HISTORICAL ERA16 July 622 AD
28 April 1998 AD = 1419 Annô Hegirae
Muh.ammad,
Peace Upon Him622-632

The Arabs were the first Semitic speaking people since the Assyrians to dominate the Middle East.  This broke up the cultural oecumene that had been created by the conquests of Alexander the Great
 and reinforced by Rome, and it reduced Western Europe for some time to a
 cultural and economic backwater.  The poverty and ignorance of the 
"Dark Ages" was in fact a side show to the prosperity and learning of 
the Islâmic Middle East.  In European eyes, this made Islâm the 
successor to what Persia had been for the Greeks, the great looming 
threat of Oriental Despotism, now including North Africa (where, after 
all, the earlier threat of Carthage had been) and with the added twist 
of religious Unbelief.  This polarization, however, obscures the fact 
that Greece itself was essentially a Middle Eastern civilization, and 
that Islâm itself had nothing else to build upon but a common heritage 
of Greece, Rome, Irân, Judaism, and Christianity.  
Although perhaps alienated cousins, Christendom and Islâm could have 
nearly equal claim as standard bearers of "Western Civilization," and 
the revival of European learning after the 11th Century undeniably owed a
 heavy debt to what Islâm had been doing with Classical philosophy and 
science in the previous centuries.

Although the Arabs tend to be thought of as desert nomads, the 
origin of Muh.ammad was urban and mercantile.  His home town of Mecca 
became increasingly hostile to his attacks on polytheism and idolatry, 
until he was invited to the nearby Yathrib as a mediator -- later marked
 as the beginning of the Islâmic Era in 622.  Soon the virtual ruler of 
Yathrib, which then became Madinatu-nNabî', the "City of the Prophet," or just Madina
 (Medina), Muh.ammad seemed to pose an even greater threat, and the 
Meccans resorted to military force.  Since the results of this were 
inconclusive, and warfare was very bad for business, the Meccans decided
 that if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.  Under a treaty, Muh.ammad 
returned to Mecca and smashed the idols.  Since the House of God, the Ka'aba,
 then became the goal of universal Moslem pilgrimage, the Meccans ended 
up doing very well out of the transaction.  Muh.ammad did not long 
survive this triumph and was buried in his house in Medina, around which
 the Prophet's Mosque was built.


The Islâmic Era accompanies the Islâmic Calendar,
 which is purely lunar and cycles through the seasons every 32 or 33 
years, a convenient provision when fasting is required during the 
daylight hours in the month of Ramad.ân -- neither Northern nor Southern
 hemispheres are stuck with Ramad.ân at times of either long or short 
days.  Curiously, the 30 year cycle of the Islâmic calendar commensurates with the 19 year cycle of the Jewish calendar after 1368 solar or 1410 lunar Islâmic years.  This puts the Islâmic Era in 622 at one full cycle after the beginning of the Era of Nabonassar
 in 747 BC.  Another full cycle comes down to our time, in 1990.  Anyone
 disposed to numerological portents are welcome to make of this what 
they will.




THE RIGHTLY
GUIDED CALIPHS
'Abû Bakr632-634
assumes title Khalîfah,
"successor," to the Prophet
'Umar634-644
Roman Emperor Heraclius
defeated at Yarmûk, 636; fall of Gaza, Antioch, Mesopotamia conquered from Persians, 637; Jerusalem surrendered, 638; Egypt invaded, 639; fall of Caesarea in Palestine, 640; Persians defeated, 642
'Utman644-656
attacks in India, 644; Roman army destroyed in North Africa, but army withdraws, 647; Persia overrun, by 651
'Alî656-661



With the death of the Prophet, some Arabs thought that the House of 
Islâm had ended.  They were soon persuaded of the error of their ways, 
and the armies of united Arabia were turned on Romania and Persia, which
 were both exhausted from the longest and harshest war they had ever 
fought against each other.  The Roman position in Syria and Egypt was 
also compromised by the Monophysite heresy of the locals, and its 
suppression by Imperial authorities.

  The tolerance of the Arabs for any "People of the Book" seemed 
preferable, especially after the respect and consideration shown by the 
Caliph 'Umar when he entered Jersualem.  The period of the "Rightly 
Guided Caliphs," who were all either fathers-in-law or sons-in-law of 
Muh.ammad, however, ended in some confusion.  The murder of 'Uthman was 
blamed by his powerful Meccan relatives on 'Alî, who was unable to exert
 authority against them over all Islâmic territories.  The "bloody shirt
 of 'Uthman" was thereafter considered a largely cynical ploy by the 
Omayyads to further their own cause, which soon did triumph at the death
 of 'Alî, whose sons were either bought off (H.asan) or killed 
(H.usayn).
Although the Omayyads were cousins of Muh.ammad, they definitely 
had the greater status at Mecca and were originally quite hostile 
(except for 'Uthman) to Islâm.  The symbolic crowns in the diagram are for the Prophet and the Caliphs (Khalifah,
 "successor").  Only that for the Prophet is given with a nimbus, since 
for the Orthodox only he was divinely inspired and authoritative.  The 
light blue nimbus for 'Alî indicates the Shi'ite belief that he and his 
descendants were divinely inspired and authoritative also (the Imâms).  Modern families that trace descent to the Prophet or his family, like Kings of Hijaz, Iraq, and Jordan, call themselves Hâshemites.



THE SHÎ'ITE IMÂMS
1'Alî632-661
First Cousin &amp; Son-In-Law
of the Prophet
&amp; Fourth Rightly Guided Caliph
2H.asan661-669
3H.usayn669-680
Martyred at Karbalâ', 680
4'Alî Zayn al-'Âbidîn680-712
5Muh.ammad al-Bâqir712-731
6Ja'far al-S.âdiq731-765
7Ismâ'îl765-760
Schism -- followers of Isma'il
become the "Seveners" or
"Ismailis," basis of Shî'ism
of the Fatimids, the Assassins,
and in India
7Mûsâ al-Kâz.im765-799
8'Alî al-Rid.â799-818
9Muh.ammad al-Jawâd818-835
10'Alî al-Hâdî835-868
11al-H.asan al-'Askarî868-874
12Muh.ammad
al-Muntazar al-Mahdî874-878
Disappears, 878 --
becomes the "Hidden Imâm,"
basis of "Twelver"
&amp; Iranian Shi'ism



The Shî'a, or "Faction" of 'Alî
 held that he was the proper Successor to the Prophet and that only his 
descendants qualified for the office.  Soon, he and his successors were 
also believed to have a unique divinely inspired understanding of the 
meaning of the Qur'ân.  Thus, the Shî'ite office of Imâm became a
 source of doctrinal authority such as was missing from Orthodox Islâm, 
which relied on tradition and consensus to establish Islâmic law and 
doctrine.  The line of Imâms splits, however, when the Seventh, Ismâ'îl,
 is rejected by much of the community.  The Seveners, nevertheless, had 
the most spectacular successes of Shî'ism in the Middle Ages.  Today, 
the Agha Khan heads a Sevener community in India.  The collateral line 
ended with the Twelfth Imâm, who disappeared in 878.  Although probably 
kidnapped and murdered by the Abbasid Caliph, he was believed by his 
followers to have gone into deathless "Occultation," preparing to return
 as the "Rightly Guided One," the Mahdî, to usher in the Apocalypse.  In time, this Twelver Shî'ism was used by the Safavids to establish a durable national monarchy in Irân.  In 1848, it had been 1000 Islâmic lunar years
 since the Occultation, and the return of the Hidden Imâm was widely 
expected.  Various figures appeared as the Imâm, including the Bâb ("Gate"), from whom the Bâbî and Bahâ'î faiths derive.  The source of doctrinal authority in Irânian Shi'ism became the Ayatollâhs, who were not individually believed to be the Hidden Imâm but were thought to communicate with him.  The Ayatollâh Khomeini was able to use his position to overthrow the last Shâh in 1979 and establish a theocratic "Islâmic Republic."








OMAYYAD CALIPHS
Mu'âwiya I661-680
assumes caliphate at death of 'Alî, moves capital to Damascus; Arab aristocratic government; Siege of Constantinople, 674-677; attacks in India, 677
Yazîd I680-683
Mu'âwiya II683-684
Marwân I684-685
Uqba ibn Nâfi' founds Qayrawân, 663/4; reaches the Atlantic, killed &amp; Army annihilated by Berber Kusayla, 683
'Abd 'al-Malik685-705
Builds the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, finished 691/692; Conquest of Armenia, 693; silver dirham &amp; gold dinar
 first minted, 695; Fall of Carthage, 698, 705; H.assân ibn al-Nu'mân 
defeated by Berber (possibly Jewish) prophetess al-Kâhina (Dahiyah, 
Dahia, or Dhabba), driven out of North Africa, after 698; Kâhina 
defeated, Berbers convert, 702
al-Walîd I705-715
Builds the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus, 706-715; Spain falls to Islâm, end of Visigoths, invasion of India, 711
Sulaymân715-717
Siege of Constantinople, 717-718
'Umar II717-720
Yazîd II720-724
Hishâm724-743
defeat, 725, &amp; explusion, 737, from India; defeated by Khazars, Ardebil, 730; but defeated and subjected Khazars, 737-c.740
al-Walîd II743-744
Yazîd III744
'Ibrâhîm744
Marwân II744-750
Abbasid revolution, Omayyads overthrown and massacred (except in Spain); end of Arab empire, 750; Battle of Talas, 751, T'ang Dynasty Chinese defeated, but no further advance into Central Asia



Under the Omayyads the House of Islâm was undoubtedly an Arab Empire, 
with only a very secondary interest in winning converts to the Faith.  
Indeed, many Arabs believed that Muh.ammad had simply been a Prophet for
 the Arabs, as Moses had been the Prophet for the Israelites, and this 
view was reflected in the practice that newly converted Moslems needed 
to be affiliated with an Arab tribe.  Despite the seemingly half-hearted
 religious mission, the zeal of the Arab armies nevertheless permanently
 altered the linguistic and religious map of lands from the Hindu Kush 
to the Atlantic.  Of the major territories won in this period, only 
Spain would later return to Christendom, while in our own time a 
precarious Jewish state has been established in Palestine.  The 
principal disappointment, the failure to take Constantinople and 
overthrow Romania, had to wait 800 years for the Ottomans.

The high water mark of the Omayyad realm was certainly under 'Abd
 al-Malik and al-Walîd, as North Africa, Spain, Transoxania, and part of
 the Indus Valley fell to Islâm.  Permanent monuments to the period were
 'Abd al-Malik's Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and al-Walîd's Omayyad 
Mosque in Damascus.  Since both these buildings are now some 1300 years 
old, it is an oversight of many treatments of history that they are not 
more celebrated as monuments from a period that is otherwise considered 
an obscure part of the "Dark Ages."  Never before had Damascus been, and
 never again would it be, the center of such power and civilization.


In time, hostility against the Omayyads began to mount.  The 
resentment of the non-Arabic second-class Moslems joined with the cause 
of the partisans of 'Alî, questioning the legitimacy of the regime and 
agitating against it.  Also, later Omayyads sometimes seemed 
insufficiently interested in Islâm.  Desert hunting lodges contained 
images much more Roman than Arab in inspiration, and one Caliph is 
supposed to have shot a copy of the Qur'ân to pieces out of resentment 
for its prohibition of wine.


When the storm broke, it was with astonishing ferocity.  The entire Omayyad clan was exterminated.  Only one prince escaped, to Spain,
 where an Omayyad regime endured.  Elsewhere, the rebellion succeeded 
completely, bringing to power distant cousins of the Omayyads, the 
descendants of Muh.ammad's uncle 'Abbâs.


All Moslems now became (more or less) equal, and when the capital
 shifted to Baghbad, the influence of Persian civilization began to 
predominate over Roman.  The Arabs lost their preeminence, and soon it 
was the rare Caliph who was not the child of a Persian or Turkish 
mother.  As the Abbasids later declined, Arabia itself slipped from 
their hold, to become once again a political, if not a religious, 
backwater.  The Arabs had bestowed their religion and their language on 
the civilization of the Middle East, but true Arabian Arabs would be 
politically insignificant until the discovery of oil in the 20th century
 gave them a geopolitical status beyond what any other asset would 
warrant.


The defeat of the Chinese at Talas was probably 
still a function of the momentum of Omayyad conquest.  However, the 
overthrow of the Omayyads immediately deflated this momentum, and no 
further advantage was taken of the Chinese embarrassment -- at a time 
when the T'ang Dynasty
 had seen its best days and was on the verge of decline.  Curiously, 
there seems to have been one long-term consequence of the battle of a 
very different sort.  Reportedly, among the Chinese prisoners taken at 
Talas were artisans who knew how to make paper.
  What they were doing with a Chinese army in Central Asia, I don't 
know; but the significance of their craft was quickly recognized.  Soon,
 the Abbasids founded paper mills in Baghdad and the industry quickly spread to Romania.  Since parchment
 is more durable than paper, surviving books tend to be in that 
material; and the role of paper books in the Mediaeval book market is 
thus a matter of some uncertainty.  That they existed, however, at least
 in Islam and Romania, is beyond doubt.  Paper mills in Francia are first attested in Aragón in 1282.

The Arabic title , amîr,
 is important.  Originally this just means "commander" and would be used
 for a general military officer, or even for the Caliph himself, the Amîru 'lMu'minîn, "Commander of the Faithful."  The military commanders then become governors, and so amîr comes to mean "governor."  The governors then drift into independence, and amîr then can reasonably be translated "prince."  The first truly independent Amirs were the Omayyads in Spain,
 who were content with the title for a century and a half.  Later many 
Abbasid governors drifted into independence, and the "Emirate" becomes 
the basic domain of independent Islâmic statehood.  A title that is 
mostly not seen for many centuries is malik, "king."  This
 is not really an Islâmic title of rule, though it can be a proper name 
and is very close to one of the Names of God, Mâlik, "Owner, Master, Possessor."  Every day, Muslims invoke God as the Mâliku lYaumi dDîni, "Possessor the of the Day of Judgment."  Malik has largely been a post-colonial title, often an ephemeral one.  The old Persian word for King, however, Shâh, occurred with some frequently in Iran and India.  What becomes the classic Islâmic title of rule, Sult.ân, "Power, Dominion, Authority," begins with the Seljuks.









ABBASID CALIPHS


'Abdullâh
asSaffâh.
750-754


'Abdullâh
al-Mans.ûr
754-775


Muh.ammad
al-Mahdî
775-785


Mûsâ
al-Hâdî
785-786


Hârûn
arRashîd
786-809
mythic and cultural height of Abbasid Caliphate; Idrîsids break away in Morocco, 789; 
first paper mill established in Baghbad, 794-795; great earthquake in Egypt, Alexandria &amp; Pharos Lighthouse damaged, 797


Muh.ammad
al-'Amîn
809-813


'Abdullâh
al-Ma'mûn
813-833


Muh.ammad
al-Mu'tas.im
833-842

&nbsp;moved to Samarra with
Turkish guard



Hârûn
al-Wâtiq
842-847


Ja'far
al-Mutawakkil
847-861

&nbsp;assassinated
by Turkish guard



Muh.ammad
al-Muntas.ir
861-862


Ah.mad
al-Musta'în
862-866


Muh.ammad
al-Mu'tazz
866-869


Muh.ammad
al-Muhtadî
869-870
Zanj Rebellion,
869-883


Ah.mad
al-Mu'tamid
870-892
returned to Baghdad

Recognizes King
of Armenia, 885


Ah.mad
al-Mu'tad.id
892-902


'Alî
Muktafî
902-908


Ja'far
al-Muqtadir
908,
908-929,
929-932


Muh.ammad
al-Qâhir
929,
932-934


Ah.mad
arRâdî
934-940

&nbsp;loss of authority



Ibrâhîm
al-Muttaqî
940-944


'Adbullâh
al-Mustakfî
944-946
d. 949

under Shi'ite
Buwayids, 945



al-Fad.l
al-Mut.î'
946-974


'AdulKarîm
at.T.â'î'
974-991






Ah.mad
al-Qâdir








991-1031









'Abdullâh
al-Qâ'im








1031-1075

under Seljuks; 1055,
grants title of Sult.ân






'Abdullâh
al-Muqtadî



1075-1094


Ah.mad
al-Mustaz.hir
1094-1118


al-Fad.l
al-Mustarshid
1118-1135


al-Mans.ûr
arRâshid
1135-1136


Muh.ammad
al-Muqtafî
1136-1160


Yûsuf
al-Mustanjid
1160-1170


al-H.asan
al-Mustad.î'
1170-1180




Ah.mad
anNâs.ir



1180-1225

Independent
from Seljuks, 1194



Muh.ammad
az.Z.âhir

1225-1226



al-Mans.ûr
al-Mustans.ir

1226-1242



'Abdullâh
al-Musta's.im

1242-1258


1258, killed by
Mongol Khân Hülägü;
end of Abbasid Caliphate;
Mamlûks set up
Abbasid puppet
caliphate in Egypt;
continues until
Ottoman conquest




Military expansion of the Caliphate ceased under the Abbasids.  Instead 
there soon was, in effect, a turning inward and an examination and 
definition of what Islâm and Islâmic civilization were going to mean, 
especially in relation to the rival religions and the heritage of 
Classical civilization.  Thus, we find the beginning of philosophy in Islâm, especially when al-Ma'mûn creates the Dâru-lH.ikmah, the "House of Wisdom," principally to translate Greek texts into Arabic.  This gives rise to the Hellenizing tradition of falsafah, .  On the other hand, we also get the independent, or antagonistic, development of Islamic theology, or Kalâm, 
 ("Talk") -- which often displays more original ideas than the strictly 
philosophical tradition.  The height of the Abbasid period in legendary 
hindsight is the reign of Hârûn arRashîd.  There are several stories 
about him in the One Thousand and One Nights (Alf Layla waLayla), often with him visiting the public incognito.
  It is hard to know how much of a historical basis there is for most of
 those stories.  It does lend, however, a magical air to the early 
culture of Baghdâd.

As noted above,
 Chinese artisans with knowledge of paper making are supposed to have 
been captured in 751.  They were first put to work making paper in 
nearby Samarkand.  By 794-795, the Wazîr of Hârûn arRashîd, Jafar 
al-Barmak, founded a paper mill in Baghbad.  The relative cheapness and 
convenience of paper over the alternatives (parchment,
 papyrus, stone, clay, bone, shells, ostraca) transformed literate 
culture, with the drawback, however, that the medium, like papyrus, is 
less durable than parchment, let alone stone or ostraca.  The technology
 was soon exported to Romania,
 where we get notable developments in the literate culture of the 9th 
century, such as the introduction of "miniscule" script and punctuation 
-- things that are often noted as features of the Carolingian "Renaissance" but certainly derive from the innovations apparent in Islam and Romania.


Politically, the Abbasid era then becomes a story of 
fragmentation, as governors become autonomous and then rival powers 
arise.  At first, only Spain escaped the Abbasid revolution.





OMAYYAD AMIRS OF SPAIN
'AbdurRah.mân I756-788
grandson of the Caliph
Hishâm; escapes to Spain from
the massacre of the Omayyads
Hishâm I788-799
al-H.akam I799-822
'AbdurRah.mân II822-852
Muh.ammad I852-886
al-Mundhir886-888
'Abdullâh888-912
Line continues with the
Omayyad Caliphs, 912-1031



After the Abbasid overthrow and massacre of the Omayyads, Spain
 was a place where their authority was never asserted.  Instead, the 
Omayyad prince 'Abd-urRah.mân, escaping the massacre, established 
himself and his line.  Islâm had little trouble in Spain these days.  Charlemagne
 pushed the Omayyads back from the Pyrenees and established the Marches 
there that grew into later kingdoms, but he was defeated at Roncesvalles
 in 778 and the heart of Spain was little effected.  Eventually, in 
response to the Fatimid Shi'ite Caliphate, the Spanish Omayyads proclaimed their own Caliphate.







THE AGHLABID AMIRS
OF TUNISIA, ALGERIA,
&amp; SICILY
Ibrâhîm I800-812
'Adbullâh I812-817
Ziyâdat Allâh I817-838
Invasion of Sicily, 827
al-Aghlab838-841
Muh.ammad I841-856
Sack of Ostia &amp; Rome, 846
Ah.mad856-863
Ziyâdat Allâh II863
Muh.ammad II863-875
Capture of Malta, 870
Ibrâhîm II875-902
Capture of Syracuse, 878
'Abdullâh II902-903
Ziyâdat Allâh III903-909
Conquest by the Fatimids, 909



The Aghlabids were originally the faithful 
Abbasid governors of Tunisia and only gradually drifted out of central 
supervision and control.  Their greatest independent project was the 
conquest of Sicily, 827-878, which remained in Islâm until the arrival 
of the Normans.




THE T.ÂHIRID AMIRS OF KHURÂSÂN
T.âhir I821-822
T.alh.a822-845
T.âhir II845-862
Muh.ammad862-873
Occupied by S.affârids



The T.âhirids were the faithful Abbasid 
governors of Khurâsân, only beginning the process of drifting out of 
central control when the area was seized by the S.affârids.
  T.âhirids were also governors of Baghdad and Iraq under the Abbasids. 
 For many years, Muh.ammad continued as the nominal governor of Khurâsân
 while living in Iraq.  His brother al-H.usayn briefly returned in 876.



THE T.ÛLÛNID AMIRS OF EGYPT
Ah.mad ibn T.ûlûn868-884
Khumârawayh884-896
Jaysh896
Hârûn896-904
Shaybân904-905
Recovered by Abbasids

Egypt first drifted out of Abbasid control under its originally 
faithful T.ûlûnid governors, while the Caliphate was distracted by the 
Zanj Rebellion (869-883).  Ah.mad built one of the oldest monuments in 
Cairo (at the time still called Fust.ât.), the Ibn T.ûlûn Mosque.  The dynasty fell victim to the brief revival of Abbasid power at the beginning of the 10th century.




THE SÂMÂNID AMIRS
OF TRANSOXANIAAND KHURASAN
Ah.mad Igovernor
of Farghâna
&amp; Soghdia,
819-864
Nas.r I864-892
Ismâ'îl892-907
Ah.mad II907-914
Nas.r II914-943
Nûh. I943-954
'Abd al-Malik I954-961
Mans.ûr I961-976
Nûh. II976-997
patron of Ibn Sîna (d.1037)
Mans.ûr II997-999
'Abd al-Malik II999-1000
Ismâ'îl II1000-1005
Conquest by Qarakhanids
&amp; Ghaznawids, 1005

The Sâmânids, like many other Abbasid successors, were originally duly 
appointed governors, but the S.affârids started as aggressive rebels, 
overthrowing the Tâhirids and launching an invasion of Iraq that reached
 the Tigris in 876.




THE S.AFFÂRID AMIRS
OF SÎSTÂN
Ya'qûb861-879
Overthrow T.âhirids, 873
'Amr ibn al-Layth879-900
T.âhir900-909
al-Layth909-910
Muh.ammad910
al-Mu'addal910-911
Sâmânid Occupation, 911-912
'Amr ibn Ya'qûb912
Sâmânid Occupation, 912-914
[local commanders]914-923
Ah.mad923-963
Khalaf963-1003,
d.1009
Tâhirregent,
963-969
Ghaznawid Occupation, 1003



Although Orthodox, the S.affârids rejected the need for recognition
 by the Caliphal authority -- but the second amir was eventually 
recognized as governor of several Irânian provinces.  S.affârid power, 
however, was soon checked by the Sâmanîds, who themselves claimed 
descent from the Sassanid Shâhs and patronized the revival of Persian as a literary language in the epic of Firdawsî (940-1020), the Shâh-nâma (Book of Kings -- nâma is today used to mean "letter" or "paper," while Arabic kitâb
 is used for "book").  This is now regarded as the Irânian National Epic
 and is noteworthy for the dignity accorded to Zoroaster as a Prophet of
 God.  The
 book contains a striking dream image, of four men pulling at the 
corners of a square cloth, but not tearing it.  This is interpreted to 
mean that the four men are the Prophets Moses, Zoroaster, Jesus, and 
Muhammad, while the cloth is the Religion of God.  That Zoroaster 
figures along with Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad is an unmistakable clue 
that we are dealing with a Persian source.  Otherwise, Muslims do not go
 out of their way to include Zoroaster, certainly not on equal footing, 
with the other three.  Also, as a statement about religion it is 
un-Islâmic and subversive in that it implies an equality, despite the 
conflict, between the four attendant religions.  The Islâmic view is 
that only Muhammad delivers an uncorrupted revelation.

Both the S.affârids and Sâmanîds eventually fell to the coming 
wave of Turkish regimes.  The Sâmânids were thus the last Irânian domain
 in Transoxania.






THE IKHSHÎDID AMIRS OF EGYPT
Muh.ammad ibn T.ughj al-Ikhshîd935-946
Ûnûjûr946-961
'Alî961-966
Kâfûr al-Lâbî, Regent966-968
Ah.mad968-969
Conquest by the Fatimids, 969


After the Abbasid revival, the Ikhshîdids began the process 
of drifting out of Abbasid control again but then found themselves 
trying to stop the triumphant Fatimids, ultimately unsuccessfully.



THE H.AMDÂNIDSOF ALEPP0
'Alî I
SayfudDawla944-967
patron of al-Fârâbî (d.950)
Sharîf I
Sa'dudDawla967-991
Antioch lost to Romania, 969
Sa'îd
Sa'îdudDawla991-1002
'Alî II &amp; Sharîf II1002-1004
Lu'lu'Regent,
1002-1004
1004-1009
Vassal of Fatimids, 1004
Mans.ûr
Murtad.âdDawla1009-1015
Fled to Romania, 1015

As the Ikhshîdids drifted out of Abbasid control, Northern Syria 
broke away from them, beginning an era of considerable fragmentation.  
Sayf-udDawla ("Sword of the State") became a celebrated foe of Romania,
 but he was largely unsuccessful against the revival of Roman power, and
 his son experienced devastating defeats, at one point with Aleppo and 
H.oms themselves falling, though retained with the payment of tribute.





THE BUWAYID (BÛYID)
AMIRS OF IRAQ
Ah.mad ibn Bûya945-967
Bakhtiyâr967-978
Fanâ Khusraw978-983
Marzubân983-987
Shîrzîl I987-989
Fîrûz989-1012
Abû Shujâ'1012-1021
H.asan1021-1025
Shîrzîl II1025-1044
Marzubân1044-1048
Khusraw Fîrûz1048-1055
Overthrown by Seljuk
Great Sult.âns, 1055



The Buwayids were Shi'ite Princes who dominated the Abbasid Caliphs for a
 century.  Although they fostered a flourishing of Shi'ite scholarship 
and theology, they never tried to suppress the Orthodox Caliphs 
altogether, so the Abbasids continued to exercise their minimal 
religious authority under the regime.  Nevertheless, the Caliphs and the
 Orthodox were not too happy about this and so, at least initially, 
welcomed the coming of the Orthodox Seljuks.  The appeal of Shi'ism in 
Irân, evident here, later becomes the basis of Irânian nationalism in 
the Safavids.  This is the nadir of the Abbasid Caliphate, with its secular power and prestige completely eclipsed.



The origin of the name of Baghdâd, , is itself obscure.  The dâd element looks like it is from the Indo-European verb "give," which we also see in Persian names like Mehrdâd, "given by Mithra."  With the first element, it could be Middle Persian "god," bag (Sanskrit bhaga), or Middle Persian "garden," bâgh (also bâgh in Punjabi, which looks like a borrowing from Persian -- the "gh" is not a voiced aspirate stop, as in Sanskrit or Hindi, but the fricative that is indicated, but not always pronounced, in Indian, i.e. Hindi and Urdu,
 borrowings from Persian or Arabic).  My guess is that "garden" is more 
likely right, so that the meaning is probably "a garden is given," 
rather than "given by God."


&nbsp;


The complete genealogy of the Alids, Omayyads, and Abbasids is in The Cambridge History of Islam,
 Volume 1B, [edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, &amp; Bernard Lewis,
 Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp.731-733].  Unfortunately, the 
diagrams contain no dates.  Much the same information, with dates, is in
 The Arabs by Anthony Nutting [Mentor Books, 1964, p.202-203].  I have not found a complete genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasids.  According to Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties
 [pp.7 &amp; 9], the relationship of the two lines is uncertain anyway. 
 Now, however, I have received from Derek Whaley a genealogy of the 
Egyptian Abbasids which he has assembled, with a connection to the main 
Abbasid line.  Much of this can be confirmed in Bosworth, and I provide 
it, with a couple of additions and corrections, here, formerly just in a
 popup,
 but now connected up with the rest of the Abbasids.  There is no reason
 why the Abbasid line should not have continued in Constantinople, but 
instead they disappear from history.  I do not know whether they died 
out, the Ottomans exterminated them, or they just disappeared into obscurity.


Below we see Islâm in the year 1000 AD.  The days of secular 
authority of the Abbasid Caliphs are now gone.  The Caliphs are 
dominated by the Buwayid princes.  The center of Islamic power and 
culture now seems to be in Egypt, with the Caliphate of the Shi'ite Fatimids.
  The Fatimids even control the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina.  
Representing Orthodoxy, the Omayyads in Spain have also declared a 
Caliphate.  In the East, we now have the advent of the Turks, with the Ghaznawids
 beginning their inroads into India.  This will permanently introduce 
Islam into India, even as these Turkish states mean the disappearance of
 Iranian people from Central Asia.






THE IDRÎSID CALIPHS OF MOROCCO, 789-985 AD
Idrîs I789-791
Idrîs II791-828
Muh.ammad al-Muntas.ir828-836
'Alî I H.aydara836-849
Yah.yâ I849-863
Yah.yâ II863-866
'Alî II866-?
Yah.yâ III al-Miqdâm al-Jût.î?-905
Yah.yâ IV905-925
Tributary to Fatimids, 917
al-H.asan al-H.ajjâm925-938
al-Qâsim Gannûn938-948
Ah.mad Abu'l-'Aysh948-954
al-H.asan954-974,
985
Annexed by Fatimids, 985






The Rustamids of Algeria, 778-909 AD
'Abd ar-Rah.mân778-788
'Abd al-Wahhâb788-824
Aflah. Abû Sa'îd824-872
Abû Bakr872-874
Muh.ammad Abû'l-Yaqz.ân874-894
Yûsuf Abû H.âtim894-895, 899-?
Ya'qûb895-899, ?-907
Yaqz.ân907-909
Fatimid Conquest, 909
The Hammâdids of Algeria, 1015-1152 AD
H.ammâd1015-1028
al-Qâ'id Sharaf ad-Dawla1028-1054
Muh.sin1054-1055
Buluggîn II1055-1062
al-Nâs.ir1062-1088
al-Mans.ûr1088-1105
Bâdîs1105
al-'Azîz1105-
1121/24
Yah.yâ1121/24-
1152
Almohad Conquest, 1152



After the Ommayads
 prevented the imposition of Abbasid authority in Spain, the first 
territories to be wholly alienated from the Caliphate were in North 
Africa -- the Maghrib, the "West."  This was mostly a matter of heterodoxy.  The Rustamids were Khârijites.



The Zîrids of Tunisia, 947-1163 AD
ZîrîGovernor,
947-972
Yûsuf Buluggîn I972-984
al-Mans.ûr984-996
Bâdîs Nâs.ir ad-Dawla996-1016
Division of Tunisia &amp; Algeria, 1015
al-Mu'izz1016-1062
Breaks with Shi'ism &amp; Fatimids, 1049; invasion of Banu Sulaym and Hilâli, 1051
Tamîm1062-1108
conquest of Sicily by Normans, 1061-1091
Yah.yâ1108-1116
'Alî1116-1121
al-H.asan1121-1148;
Governor,
1148-1163,
d.1168
conquest by Normans then Almohads, 1148



In the East the Khârijites had been a violent and revolutionary heresy, 
denying that those who violated the moral strictures of Islâm were even 
Muslims.  In the East, they were suppressed amid great slaughter.  In 
North Africa, the sect finds a nationalistic base among the Berbers, 
creating a mass movement, beginning with the Rustamids, such as didn't 
exist in the East.

In Morocco, under Idrîs I ibn 'Abdallâh, a great-grandson of H.asan, the son of 'Alî,
 we get another movement.  With his background, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Idrîs both claimed the Caliphate and established 
Shi'ism.  He also founded the Madînat Fâs, the city of Fez.  Eventually 
the Idrîsids fragmented and then fell to the Fatimids, who inherited the
 mantle of the Shi'ite Caliphate.  Years later, an Idrîsid branch, the H.ammûdids became one of the Reyes de Taifas of Spain.


The other two North African dynasties given here (perhaps a bit 
out of sequence) were successors to the Fatimids.  These began with Zîri
 ibn Manâd, a Berber retainer of the Fatimids.  His son, Buluggîn, was 
appointed Fatimid governor of Ifrîqiya.  As with the Abbasids, so with 
the Zîrids.  They began to drift away into autonomy.  In 1015, Bâdîs 
ceded the western part of the territory to his uncle H.ammâd, after a 
falling out over H.ammâd's shift in allegiance to the Abbasids.  Thus we
 get a division between Algeria and Tunisia.  The Fatimids didn't much 
worry about autonomy in North Africa, but they were outraged when the 
Amîr al-Mu'izz changed his own allegiance to the Abbasids -- even while 
the Hammâdids had returned to Shi'ism.  The Fatimids were too weak at 
this point (1049) to visit their own vengeance, so they directed instead
 two Arab tribes, the Banu Hilâl and the Banu Sulaym, to do the job for 
them (1051).  The result was an unorganized pillaging, which mainly just
 ruined the countryside and hinterland.  The Zîrids and Hammâdids moved 
down to the coast and built fleets.  This was useful against the Norman
 conquest of Sicily but ultimately, by 1091, the Normans succeeded, 
ending the history of Islamic Sicily that had begun with the Aghlabids.  Eventually the Almohads ended both regimes and unified North Africa again.




THE FATIMID CALIPHS
al-Mah.dî909-934
Shi'ite (Sevener) Caliphate established in North Africa to rival Orthodox Abbasid Caliphate
al-Qâ'im934-946
al-Mans.ûr946-952
al-Mu'izz952-975
Egypt occupied, Caliphate removed to new city, al-Qâhirah -- Cairo -- 969
al-'Azîz975-996
al-H.âkim996-1021
az.Z.âhir1021-1035
al-Mustans.ir1035-1094
al-Musta'lî1094-1101
al-'Âmir1101-1130
collateral line assumes throne; no longer considered to be Shi'ite Imâms
al-H.âfiz.1130-1149
az.Z.âfir1149-1154
Apostacy of &amp; Zirids, 1049; dispatch of Banu Sulaym and Hilali into Tunisia, 1051
al-Fâ'iz1154-1160
al-'Âd.id1160-1171
dies natural death as Egypt passes to Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb S.alâhu dDîn





OMAYYAD CALIPHS OF SPAIN
'AbdurRah.mân III912-961
al-H.akam II961-976
Hishâm II976-1008
&amp; 1010-1012
Muh.ammad II1008-1009
Sulaymân1009 &amp;
1012-1017
('Alî ibn Hamûd)1017-1021
'AbdurRah.mân IV1021-1022
(al-Qasim)1022
'AbdurRah.mân V1022-1023
Muh.ammad III1023-1024
(Yahya ibn 'Alî)1024-1027
Hishâm III1027-1031

The glorious culmination of Omayyad rule in Spain, when 'AbdurRah.mân 
III proclaims himself Caliph, ends up leading to a surprisingly rapid 
collapse of the regime.  'AbdurRah.mân's great grandchildren became the 
pawns of slave troups from Europe (the S.aqâliba) and North Africa.  Leadership devolved onto the H.âjib
 or Chief Minister, like Ibn Abî 'Amir Al-Mans.ûr (Almanzor), who 
captured Barcelona and sacked the shrine of St. James of Compostella in 
Galicia, hitherto the most sacred site of Christian Spain, but the 
situation soon escaped even this kind of control.  Islâmic Spain broke 
into petty states and permanently lost its ability to maintain its own 
unity or resist the Christian Reconquista.

One reason that 'AbdurRah.mân III may have proclaimed himself Caliph, 
besides the general decline of the Abbasids in power the prestige, was 
the new Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa.  While the Fatimids claimed 
descent from the Prophet's daughter Fât.ima, as descendants of the 
Seventh Imâm, Ismâ'îl, there is little confidence and less evidence for 
this genealogy.  What it gave the Fatimids, however, was a claim to the 
Shi'ite Imâmate.  This was an Apocalyptic movement, coincidentally 
approaching the Millennium on the Christian calendar.  When the Fatimids
 occupied Egypt in 969, it did look like they might be the heirs of all 
of Islâm.  The new capital founded in Egypt, al-Qâhirah, "the 
Victorious," although at the place of the Roman fortress of Babylon (of 
all things) and the Omayyad city of Fust.ât. (Old Cairo), now becomes 
the classic Islâmic capital of Egypt, Cairo.  While Fatimid control soon
 extended into the Levant and to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, this 
proved to be the Fatimid high water mark.  In the Fatimid decline, North
 Africa broke away, the Crusaders
 arrived in the Levant, and the Fatimid succession itself passed to a 
collateral line that lost the numinous status of Shi'ite Imâm.  The last
 Fatimid Caliph, a sickly child, was allowed to die a natural death by 
the occupier of Egypt, Saladin, before the regime was deposed.





THE MULÛK AT-T.AWÂ'IF,REYES DE TAIFAS
The Jahwarids of Cordova, Qurt.ubah
Jahwar ibn Muh.ammad
ibn Jahwar1031-1043
Muh.ammad ar-Rashîd1043-1058
'Abd al-Malik
Dhu's-Siyâdatayn al-Mans.ur1058-1069
'Abbâdid conquest, 1069

Omayyad Spain broke up into a chaos of petty states, like the period of the Oghullar in Anatolia.  In Arabic, the rulers were called the mulûk at.-T.awâ'if, or the "kings of the bands/factions/parties [t.â'ifa]."  This was adapted into Spanish as the Reyes de Taifas.

The map shows 21 Reyes de Taifas
 in 1030, but at different times there were up to 39 of them.  Only some
 of the more significant and durable are listed in the tables here.  
Already, both León and Navarre are larger than any Islamic state.  Spain
 would never again be unified by a native Islamic state.  This disunity 
was, of course, a golden opportunity for the Christian kingdoms; and the
 fall of Toledo to León and Castille in 1085 is significantly considered the beginning of the Christian Reconquista.
  The Moslem position was restored by the advent of the Almoravids, who 
then absorbed all the Taifa states.  Toledo, however, which had been the
 capital of the Visigoths and was still considered the heart of Spain, was never recovered.




Murcia, Mursiyah
Khayrân as.-S.aqlabî1012/13-1028
Zuhayr as.-S.aqlabî1028-1038
'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir
al-Mans.ûr of Valencia1038-1045
Mujâhid al-'Âmirî1045-c.1049
The T.ahirids
Ah.mad ibn T.âhirc.1049-1063
Muh.ammad ibn T.âhir1063-1078
'Abbâdid conquest, 1078
The 'Abbâdids of Seville, Ishbîlyah
Muh.ammad I ibn Ismâ'îl
ibn 'Abbâd1023-1042
'Abbâd Fakhr ad-Dawla
al-Mu'tad.id1042-1069
Muh.ammad II al-Mu'tamid1069-1091,
d.1095
Almoravid conquest, 1091
The H.ammûdids of Málaga, Malaka
'Alî ibn H.ammûd1014/15-1017
al-Qâsim I al-Ma'mûn1017-1021,
1022-1026
Yah.yâ I al-Mu'talî1021-1022,
1026-1036
Idrîs I al-Muta'ayyad1036-1039
Yah.yâ II al-Qâ'im1039-1040
al-H.asan al-Mustans.ir1040-1043
Idrîs II al-'Alî1043-1046,
1053-1056
Muh.ammad I al-Mahdî1046-1052
Idrîs III as-Sâmî1052-1053
Muh.ammad II al-Musta'lî1056
Zîrid conquest, 1056
The Zîrids of Granada, Gharnât.ah
Zâwî ibn Zîrî
as.-S.anhâjî1013-1019
H.abbûs ibn Mâksan1019-1038
Bâdîs al-Muz.affar
an-Nâs.ir1038-1073
'Abdallâh ibn BuluggînGranada,
1073-1090
Tamîm
ibn BuluggînMálaga,
1073-1090,
d.1095
Almoravid conquest, 1090



Aft.asids of Badajoz, Bat.alyaws
'Abdallâh ibn Muh.ammad
ibn al-Aft.as1022-1045
Muh.ammad al-Muz.affar1045-1068
Yah.yâ1068
'Umar al-Mutawakkil1068-1094
Almoravid conquest, 1091
The 'Âmirids of Valencia, Balansiyyah
'Abd al'Azîz ibn Abî'Âmir
al-Mans.ûr (Sanchuelo)1021-1060
'Abd al-Malik Niz.âm ad-Dawla1060-1065
Occupied by Dhu'n-Nûnids, 1065-1076
Abû Bakr al-Mans.ûr1076-1085
'Uthmân al-Qâd.î1085
Yah.yâ II Dhu'n-Nûnid1085-1092
Rodrigo Díaz, El Cid1094-1099
Almoravid conquest, 1102
The Dhu'n-Nûnids of Toledo, T.ulayt.ulah
Ismâ'îl Dhu'r-Riyâsatayn
az.-Z.âfir1018-1043
Yah.yâ I Sharaf ad-Dawla
al-Ma'mûn1043-1075
Yah.yâ II al-Qâdir1075-1080,
1081-1085,
d.1092
Occupied by Aft.asids, 1080-1081;
Conquest by Leon &amp; Castille, 1085
The Banû Mujâhidof Denia and Majorca
Mujâhid al-'Âmirî
al-Muwaffaqc.1012-1045
'Alî Iqbâl ad-Dawla1045-1076
conquest by Hûdids, 1076
The Tujîbids of Saragossa, Saraqus.tah
al-Mundhir I al-Tujîbîgovernor,
1010-1023
Yah.yâ al-Muz.affar1023-1029
al-Mundhir II
Mu'izz ad-Dawla1029-1039
'Abdallâh al-Muz.affar1039-1040
The Hûdids of Saragossa
Sulaymân ibn Hûd
al-Judhâmî1040-c.1047
Sulaymân Tâj ad-Dawlac.1047-1049
Ah.mad I Sayf ad-Dawla1049-1082
Yûsuf al-Mu'tamin1081-1083
Ah.mad II al-Musta'în1083-1110
'Abd al-Malik
'Imâd ad-Dawla1110
Almoravid occupation, 1110-1118;
occupation by Aragón, 1118-1130
Ah.mad III
Sayf ad-Dawla1130-1146
Conquest by Aragón, 1146


&nbsp;




MURÂBIT. (ALMORAVID) SULT.ÂNS
Yûsuf ibn Tâshufîn1061-1107
Crosses over into Spain,
defeat of Alfonso VI at Zallâqa, 1086
'Alî ibn Yûsuf1107-1142
Tâshufîn ibn 'Alî1142-1146
Ibrâhîm ibn Tâshufîn1146
Ish.âq ibn 'Alî1146-1147
Almohad conquest, 1147

The Murâbit.ûn, or Spanish Almorávides, began as a Berber religious movement, named after a ribât.
 or "hermitage" at the mouth of the Senegal River from which, perhaps 
spuriously, its militants originally derived.  Be that as it may, the 
movement began with a local chief, Yah.yâ ibn Ibrâhîm, who returned from
 Mecca with a Moroccan scholar, 'Abdallâh ibn Yâsîn, both ready to fire 
up a rivalist and militant movement.  The warriors moved north, under 
multiple leadership.  Since they wore veils, as do the Tuaregs today, 
they are also known as the mutalaththimûn, "veiled ones."  A 
state was founded in Morocco and Algeria by Yûsuf ibn Tâshufîn, who 
established himself at a new capital, Marrakech.  Intervention in Spain 
followed shortly (1086), largely restoring the Islâmic position there.  
The Almoravids were Orthodox and acknowledged the Abbasid Caliph.  They 
ended up getting overwhelmed by a new religious movement, less 
conservative, the Almohads.


THE GHAZNAWIDS
Sebûktigingovernor
in Ghazna
for Sâmânids,
977-997
Ismâ'îl997-998
Mah.mûdof Ghazna998-1030
Invasions of India, 1001-1024
Muh.ammad1030-1031,
1040-1041
Mus'ûd I1031-1040
Mawdûd1041-1048
Mus'ûd II1048
'Alî1048-1049
'Abd ar-Rashîd1049-1052
Farrukhzâd1052-1059
Ibrâhîm1059-1099
Mas'ûd III1099-1115
Shîrzâd1115-1116
Malik Arslan Shâh1116-1117
Seljuk Occupation, 1117
Bahrâm Shâh1117-1150,
c.1152-1157
Ghûrid Occupation, 1150-c.1152
Khusraw Shâhin Lahore,
1157-1160
Khusraw Malik1160-1186,
c.1191
Ghûrid Conquest, 1186

With the Ghaznawids, Turkish leaders first appear as a major power in Islâm.  With the celebrated Mah.mûd,
 Islâm also becomes for the first time a permanent factor in Indian 
history.  Mah.mûd's invasions of India involved looting temples and 
smashing idols.  This was long remembered in anger by Hindus; but it was
 the first time in the history of Islâm, since the Prophet Muh.ammad's reoccupation of Mecca, that idols could be smashed in real pagan temples.




THE QARAKHÂNIDS
'Alî Arslan KhânGreat Qaghan
Ah.mad Arslan Qara Khân998-1017
Overthrow of Sâmânids, 1005
Mans.ûr Arslan Khân1017-1024
Muh.ammad Toghan Khân1024-1026
Yûsuf Qadïr Khân1026-32
'Alî Tigin Bughra KhânGreat Qaghan
in Samarkand,
c.1020-1034
Muh.ammad Arslan Qara Khânc.1042-c.1052
Ibrâhîm Tabghach Bughra Khânc.1052-1068
Nas.r Shams al-Mulk1068-1080
Khid.r1080-1081
Ah.mad1081-1089
Ya'qûb Qadïr Khân1089-1095
Mas'ûd1095-1097
Sulaymân Qadïr Tamghach1097
Mah.mûd Arslan Khân1097-1099
Jibrâ'îl Arslan Khân1099-1102
Muh.ammad Arlsan Khân1102-1129
Nas.r1129
Ah.mad Qadïr Khân1129-1130
H.asan Jalâl ad-Dunyâ1130-1132
Ibrâhîm Rukn ad-Dunyâ1132
Mah.mûd1132-1141
Defeat of Seljuks,
Qara-Khitaï Occupation, 1141
Ibrâhîm Tabghach Khân1141-1156
'Alî Chaghrï Khân1156-1161
Mas'ûd Tabghach Khân1161-1171
Muh.ammad Tabghach Khân1171-1178
Ibrâhîm Arslan Khân1178-1204
'Uthmân Ulugh Sult.ân1204-1212
Khwârazm Conquest, 1212

Apart from the iconoclasm, however, Mah.mûd does not seem to have 
displayed any hostility or persecution of Hindus themselves, whom he 
actually recruited for his army.  This began a long history of 
ambiguity, or worse, in the relations of Hindus and Moslems in India.  
Islâm always did best in India when tolerant, as under the Moghul Akbar, but could forfeit its strength suddenly with persecution.  Note that the Arabic "w" in Ghaznawid is usually pronounced as a "v," as it would be in Persian or Turkish.



The "Black" (Turkish qara) Khâns displace the Sâmânids in 
Transoxania and begin the process whereby the region, now Turkestan, 
becomes predominately Turkish.  Vassals of the Seljuks and then of the 
Buddhist Qara-Khitaï, the khâns survive until absorbed in the brief empire of the Khwârazm Shâhs.



SELJUK GREAT SULT.ÂNS
T.ughrul I Beg1037-1063
1055 frees Caliphs
from Shi'ite Buwayids;
granted title of Sult.ân
Alp Arslan1063-1073
Destroys Roman army, captures
Emperor Romanus IV,
Battle of Manzikert, 1071
Malik Shâh I1073-1092
Sult.âns of Rûm independent, 1092
Mah.mûd I1092-1094
Berk Yaruq
(Barkiyâruq)1094-1105
Malik Shâh II1105
Muh.ammad I Tapar1105-1118
Ah.mad Sanjarin Khurâsân
1097-1157
1118-1157
Defeat by Qara-Khitaï,
driven out of Transoxania, 1141
Mah.mûd IIin Iraq
1118-1131
Dâwûdin Iraq
1131-1132
T.ughril IIin Iraq
1132-1134
Mas'ûdin Iraq
1134-1152
Malik Shâh IIIin Iraq
1152-1153
Muh.ammad IIin Iraq
1153-1160
Great Sultanate
breaks up, 1157
Sulaymân Shâhin Iraq
1160-1161
Arslan Shâhin Iraq
1161-1176
T.ughril IIIin Iraq
1176-1194
Conquest by Khwârazm Shahs, 1194

The Sejuks created a great empire in Central Asia and profoundly 
transformed the politics and even the ethnology (with the spread of Turkic
 peoples) of the Middle East.  After being freed from the Buwayids by 
the Orthodox Seljuks, the Caliph bestows a new title on T.ughrul Beg: &nbsp;Sult.ân
 -- "Power, Dominion, Authority."  This looked like it might divide the 
ultimate authority in Islâm into secular and divine halves, between the Sult.ân and the Caliph.  It might have, had the Seljuk domain maintained its unity and its power, which it didn't.  The title of Sult.ân,
 rather than signifying unique and universal authority, henceforth 
becomes the title of choice for successor states.  The greatest long 
term consequence, however, of the Seljuk state was the destruction of Roman
 power in Anatolia.  There was no way of knowing it at the time, but the
 battle of Manzikert in 1071 was the end of Mediaeval Romania and the 
beginning of modern Turkey.


Under Alp Arslan and Malik Shâh there was considerable 
intellectual and cultural achievement, in part encouraged by their great
 Vizir, Niz.âm al-Mulk.  This included the greatest of Islamic philosophers, al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111), and the mathematician, astronomer, and poet 'Umar Khayyâm
 (d.1122).  Khayyâm's fatalism, although with its Islamic overtones, may
 owe more to an Iranian sensibility, as would what seems to be his 
worldiness and even cynicism ("Of all that one should care to fathom, I 
was never deep in anything but Wine," as FitzGerald translated it).  
Harsher times and considerably less intellectual daring were ahead.


The map below shows Islâm at the death of Malik Shâh I (1092).  
The Seljuk Great Sultanate, so vast (at least in Asia) and formidable, 
will now fragment, weaken, and disappear.  When the First Crusade
 arrives in 1098, neither Seljuks nor Fatimids are in any shape to 
resist it.  There is some irony in this, since the Crusades were 
initiated in response to the Seljuk conquest of Anatolia, which was then
 partially recovered for Romania.  The extent of Seljuk control over the
 Ghaznawids is unclear, but the Ghûrids
 are just beginning their rise against their suzerains, whom they will 
replace (1186).  While the Ghûrids fall to the Khwârazm Shâhs (1215), 
their slave vassals in India found the Sultanate of Delhi.  The Almoravids have crossed over to Spain, defeated the Christians (1086), and delayed the Reconquista.
  When the Fatimid vassals, the Zirids of Tunisia, converted to Orthodox
 Islâm (1049), the Fatimids rid themselves of some troublesome Arab 
tribes by directing them to North Africa.  This was a sterile revenge 
which gained the Fatimids nothing, but did contribute to an Arabization 
of North Africa.





THE GHÛRIDS
Abû 'AlîGhaznawid vassal,
1011-c.1035
'Abbâs
Muh.ammadc.1059
H.asan
H.usayn I1100-1146
Sûrî1146-1149
Sâm I1149
H.usayn II1149-1161
Muh.ammad
Sayf ad-Dîn1161-1163
Muh.ammad
Bahâ' ad-DînSult.ân,
1163-1203
Muh.ammad
Mu'izz ad-DînGhazna,
1173-1203

Sult.ân in
Ghûr &amp; India,
1203-1206
Mah.mûd
Ghiyâth ad-Dîn1206-1212
Yïldïz Mu'izzî
Tâj ad-Dîngovernor
of Ghazna,
1206-1215
Sâm II
Bahâ ad-Dîn1212-1213
Khwârazm Vassals
Atsïz 'Alâ ad-Dîn1213-1214
Muh.ammad
Shujâ' ad-Dîn1214-1215
Khwârazm Conquest, 1215

The Ghaznawids eventually came under the suzerainty of the 
Sejuks, and about the same time start displaying Persian rather than 
just Arabic (or Turkish) names.  Their end came from the Ghûrids, one 
time vassals and now aggressive conquerers in their own right, following
 the last Ghaznawids to their last refuge in the Punjab.  Thus the first
 permanent Islâmic state in Northern India became established, with the 
Ghûrids own vassals beginning the line of the Sult.âns of Delhi -- we even see a title with a word that will become very famous in India, Tâj ad-Dîn,
 "Crown of the Religion."  Soon, however, the power of the Khwârazm 
Shâhs began to overtake the Ghûrids -- though the Mongols were not far 
behind.



THE KHWÂRAZM SHÂHS
Ekinchi ibn QochqarSeljuk governor, 1097
Arslan Tigin Muh.ammad Qut.b adDîn1097-1127
Qïzïl Arslan Atsïz 'Alâ' adDîn1127-1156
Vassal of Qara Khitaï, 1141
Il Arslan1156-1172
Tekish Tâj adDunyâ wadDîn1172-1200
Overthrows last Sejuks in Iraq, 1194
Muh.ammad 'Alâ' adDîn1200-1220
Conquest of Qarakhânids, 1212, of Ghûrids, 1215
Mengübirti Jalâl adDîn1220-1231
Thrown out of Transoxanian by Mongols, 1220-1221; Mongol conquest, 1231

For a while, the Seljuk successors, the Khwârazm Shâhs, seemed on the 
way to restoring the Seljuk empire, and more.  By 1215, it looked like 
they had.  From Central Asia to Iraq to India, the Shâhs held sway.  
Unfortunately for them, Genghis Khan
 was on the move.  He arrived in 1220.  The Shâh was crushed, but 
lingered in a rump of western Irân until 1231.  In that twilight period 
Shâh Jalâl adDîn actually expanded into Azerbaijan and Georgia, but 
there was little he could do about the Mongols.

Jalâl adDîn was deposed without a major expenditure of Mongol 
effort.  Greater effort came in 1256, when Qubilai Khan's brother Hülägü
 arrived with full Mongol force and the intention to conquer the whole 
Middle East.  The long Abbasid Caliphate ended when Hülägü killed the 
last Caliph, perhaps at the urging of his Christian wife.  The Seljuks 
of Rûm were subjugated, but then the Great Khan
 Möngke died in 1259.  Hülägü returned to Mongolia to elect Qubilai 
Great Khan.  This permanently redirected the main force of the Mongols, 
now against China.  When the Mamlûks
 defeated a Mongol party in 1260, this was the practical end of Mongol 
expansion in the Middle East.  Nevertheless, what was left was the 
massive state of the Il Khâns, which survived until collapsing in confusion in 1338.  This was a brief ascendancy; and the great traveler Ibn Battuta,
 who visited the Khân Abû Sa'îd in 1327, at the flood tide of Mongol 
power, found upon his return from China and India, in 1348, that the 
realm had already disintegrated.  Mongol successors, like the Jalayirids and the Black Sheep Turks, are followed on the Mongol page.






THE ZANGID ATABEGS
OF MOSUL, ALEPPO, &amp; DAMASCUS
Zangî I 'Imâd adDînappointed by Seljuk Sult.ân
Mah.mûd II, 1127; Atabeg
of Mosul, 1127-1146
Capture of the County
of Edessa from Crusaders, 1144
MOSULALEPPO, &amp;
DAMASCUS
Ghâzî I
Sayf adDîn1146-1149Mah.mûd
Nûr adDîn1147-1174
Mawdûd
Qut.b adDîn1149-1170Second Crusade,
1147-1149;
captures Damascus,
1154; sends Shîrkûh to
conquer Egypt, 1169;
Shîrkûh dies, command
passes to Saladin, 1169
Ghâzî II
Sayf adDîn1170-1180Ismâ'îl
Nûr adDîn1174-1181
Mas'ûd I
'Izz adDîn1180-1193SINJÂR
Zangî II
'Imâd adDînSinjâr,
1171-1197
JAZÎRADamascus
&amp; Aleppo,
1181-1183
Sanjar Shâh
Mu'izz adDîn1180-1208Conquest of
Damacus
&amp; Aleppo
by Saladin,
1183
Arslan Shâh I
Nûr adDînMosul,
1193-1211Muh.ammad
Qut.b adDîn1197-1219
Mah.mûd
Mu
'izz adDînJazîra,
1208-1241
Mas'ûd II
'Izz adDînMosul,
1211-1218
Arslan Shâh II
Nûr adDîn1218-1219
Mah.mûd
Nâs.ir adDîn1219-1234Shâhanshâh
'Imad adDîn,
Mah.mûd
Jalâl adDîn,
&amp; 'Umar
Fat.h adDîn1219-1220
Conquest
by Ayyûbids,
1220
Lu'lu'
Badr adDînMosul,
Lu'lu'id,
1234-1259Mas'ûd
al-Malik
al-Z.âhirJazîra,
1241-1250
Ismâ'îl
Rukn adDînLu'lu'id,
1259-1262Conquest by
Ayyûbids, 1250,
then Lu'lu'ids
Mongol dominion, 1254, conquest, 1262



An atabeg (ata="father"; beg or bey a title 
that now can just mean "mister") was a guardian for a minor Seljuk 
prince.  The princes tended to disappear and the atabegs to become 
independent rulers.  In no case was this process as fateful as with 
Zangî 'Imâd ad-Dîn, who took Edessa from the Crusaders in 1144.

This began what might be called the Islâmic Reconquista of the 
Crusader states in the Middle East.  The vigor of Zangî's house seemed 
to promise the complete defeat of the Crusaders, but Mah.mûd Nûr ad-Dîn 
chose his own lieutenants far too well for the preservation of Zangid 
authority.  His Kurdish general Shîrkûh completed the conquest of Egypt;
 but Shîrkûh then died, leaving authority to his nephew Yûsuf ibn 
'Ayyûb, who became S.alâh.ud-Dîn.  Nûr ad-Dîn soon discovered 
that S.alâh.ud-Dîn had his own ideas about governing Egypt, like 
ignoring orders to depose the last Fatimid Caliph (who then died a 
natural death in 1171).  The insubordination of the subordinate soon was
 a practical independence that Nûr ad-Dîn could not contest before his 
death (1174).  The tables were soon turned, as S.alâh.ud-Dîn returned to
 take Damascus from the Zangids (1183) and then Jerusalem from the 
Crusaders (1187).  The Islâmic Reconquista thus had passed to the Ayyûbids, as would eventually most of the rest of the Zangid possessions.  What the Ayyûbids didn't get, the Mongol Il Khâns did.



THE AYYÛBID SULT.ÂNS
EGYPTDAMASCUS
1169-1193anNâs.ir I
S.alâh.udDîn (Saladin)
Yûsuf ibn Ayyûb1183-1186
Battle of the Horns of Hattin, Capture of King Guy
of Jerusalem; Fall of Jerusalem, 1187;
Third Crusade, led by King Richard I, 1189-1192
al-'Azîz
Imad adDîn1193-1198al-'Afd.al
Nûr adDîn1186-1196
al-Mansûr
Nâs.ir adDîn1198-1200al-'Adil I
Sayf adDîn1196-1201
1200-1218

Fourth Crusade, 1202-1204
1218-1238al-Kamil I
Nâs.ir adDînal-Mu'az.z.am
Sharaf adDînGovernor
1201-1218
1218-1227
al-Nâs.ir II
S.alâh. adDîn1227-1229
al-Ashraf I
Muz.affar adDîn1229-1237
asS.âlih. I
'Imad adDîn1237-1238
1239-1245
1238
Fifth Crusade, 1228-1229;
Jerusalem turned over to Emperor Frederick II;
remained in Crusader Hands, 1229-1244
1238-1240al-'Adil II
Sayf adDîn1238-1239
1240-1249asS.âlih. II
Najm adDîn1239, 1245-1249
1249-1250al-Mu'az.z.am
Tûrân-Shâh
Ghiyât adDîn1249-1250
Sixth Crusade, 1248-1254;
St. Louis IX captured and held for ranson, 1250-1254
Shajar adDurr,
widow of
Najm adDîn1250anNâs.ir II
S.alâh. adDîn1250-1260
al-Ashraf II
Muz.affar adDîn1250-1252,
nominally
until 1254
Sult.ânate of Egypt
seized by the
Mamlûk Slave-soldier
Aybak, 1252
Damascus occupied
by Mongols,
then seized by the
Mamlûk Baybars, 1260



The immortal Saladin (S.alâh.udDîn, the "Righteousness of 
the Religion"), who defeated and drove the Crusaders from Jerusalem, set
 up his sons and relatives in several subsidiary lines, in Damascus, 
Aleppo, H.ims., H.amât, Diyâr Bakr, and Yemen.  Most of these were ended
 by 1260 by the Mamlûks or fell to the Mamlûks after Mongol conquest.  
The line in H.amâh (or H.amât) was a little more durable, only falling 
to the Mamlûks in 1332; and the line in Diyâr Bakr, with some 
interruptions, survived until conquest by the White Sheep Turks in the later 15th century.  Only the lines in Egypt and Damascus are given in the table -- genealogies of the others are below.


Although originally ruling from Egypt, Saladin spent the last 
years of his life fighting in Syria and Palestine and was buried in 
Damascus, next to the Omayyad Mosque.  The Ayyubid family still survives
 in Lebanon and retains Saladin's sword.  His tomb is intact and open to
 visitors of the Omayyad Mosque.  It was even visited by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany.


Under Saladin, Cairo replaces Baghdad as the intellectual center of the Central Islâmic lands.  The great Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and the Sûfî 'Ibn 'Arabî (1165-1240) both relocated from Spain to Egypt.  This climate became the subject of the play Nathan der Weise (1779) by Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781).  Saladin's toleration, however, had its limits, since he executed another Sûfî, Suhrawardî (1153-1191) for heterodoxy -- less of a danger for Islâmic mystics than for Christian, but still a problem.


The genealogy of the Ayyûbids that follows is from The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.70-73] and A History of the Crusades, Volume III, The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades
 by Steven Runciman [Cambridge University Press, 1951, 1993, p.532].  
Since Bosworth simply gives names, and the genealogy there must be 
reconstructed from the patronymics, about which there are minor but 
confusing variations, some uncertainties occur.  Some of these can be 
confirmed or corrected with Runciman's chart, which otherwise is 
innocent of dates and of diacritics for Arabic.  The chart below 
includes the Ayyubid lines for Aleppo and H.ims. (Homs) that are not 
included in the table above.  A larger popup
 table also includes the lines of H.amâh, Yaman (Yemen), and Diyâr Bakr.
  The continuation of the Ayyubids in Diyâr Bakr under the Mongols, 
until annexation by the White Sheep Turks, is covered in a separate popup.
  Dïyarbakir is today a city in Turkey, on the upper Tigris near where 
the Tigris and Euphrates approach each other before diverging courses.  
South of this, the broad area between the rivers came to be called the Nahrain, the "Two Rivers," or the Jazîra,
 the "Island."  Today, the northern part lies in Turkey and the southern
 part in Syria.  A corner of it lies in Iraq northwest of Mosul.  
Edessa, long the principal city of the area and a Crusader County, is now the city of Urfa in Turkey.  It is not clear from the sources who actually used the title Sult.ân.
  I have restricted it to the rulers in Egypt and Damascus.  Other 
rulers are simply "Lords," except Yemen, whose ruler Rucimen calls 
"King."  As a matter of fact, every single one of these sovereigns 
employs the title al-Malik, i.e. "the King" -- so I have at least used it for Yemen.







THE MULÛK AT-TAWÂ'IF,
REYES DE TAIFAS
Cordova, Qurt.ubah
H.amdîn al-Mans.ûr1144-1145,
1146
Ah.mad III Sayf
ad-Dawla Hûdid1145-1146
Yah.yâ ibn Ghâniya1146-1148
Almohad conquest, 1148
Valencia, Balansiyyah
Mans.ûr ibn 'Abdallâh Qâd.î1144-1147
Abû 'Abdallâh Muh.ammad
(Rey Lobo/Lope)1147-1172
Hilâl1172
Almohad conquest, 1172






Murcia, Mursiyah
'Abdallâh ibn 'Iyâd.1145-1148
'Abdallâh ibn Faraj ath-Thaghrî1145-1148
Abû 'Abdallâh Muh.ammad
of Valencia1148-1172
Almohad conquest, 1172
The Banû Ghâniya of Majorca
Muh.ammad al-Mussûfî
ibn Ghâniya1126-1155
'Abdallâh1155
Abû Ibrâhîm Ish.âq1155-1183
Muh.ammad ibn Ish.âq1183-1184
'Alî ibn Ish.âq1184-1187
'Abdallâh ibn Ish.âq1187-1203
Almohad conquest, 1203



The rapid decline and fall of the Almoravids allowed a revival of the Reyes de Taifas.
  These were overtaken by the Almohads soon enough, although in the 
Balaerics the kings of Majorca held out until few days were even left 
for the Almohads.  Aragón had the islands by 1231.


MUWAH.ID (ALMOHAD) CALIPHS
OF SPAIN &amp; NORTH AFRICA
'Abdul-Mu'min1130-1163
Yûsuf I abû Yaqûb1163-1184
Ya'qûb ibn Yûsuf al-Mans.ûr1184-1199
Muh.ammad ibn Ya'qûb1199-1213
devastating defeat by Christian
Spain at Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212
Yûsuf II Abû Yaqûb1213-1224
'Abdul-Wâh.id
Abû Muh.ammad1224
'Abdallâh Abû Muh.ammad1224-1227
Yah.yâ Abû Zakariyyâ'1227-1235
Idrîs I ibn Ya'qûb1227-1232
abandonment of Spain, 1228-1229
'Abdul-Wâh.id ibn Idrîs I1232-1242
'Alî ibn Idrîs I1242-1248
'Umar ibn Ish.âq1248-1266
Idrîs II ibn Muh.ammad1266-1269
North Africa breaks up
between H.afs.ids, Marînids,
&amp; 'Abdul-Wâdids (Zayyânids)

Almohad Spain ironically was distinguished by intellectual brilliance 
and by intolerant oppression.  Some of the most important Islâmic and 
Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages lived during the Almohad period.  The principal Islâmic figures were Ibn Bâjja (Avempace, d. 1138), Ibn T.ufayl (Abubacer, d. 1185), and especially, Ibn Rushd (Averroës, 1126-1198).  The great Jewish philosophers were Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) and Moses Nahmanides
 (1194-1270).  Ibn Rushd was probably one of the two or three greatest 
Islâmic philosophers ever, and was certainly the most influential on 
subsequent thought in 13th Century Europe.  Maimonides was definitely 
the most important Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages.  Both men 
suffered from the religious fanaticism of the Almohad regime.  Ibn Rushd
 was the last Islâmic philosopher to rigorously defend Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian principles that had come to be regarded as un-Islâmic.  
However, it was his skill as a physician that helped in his ultimate 
rehabilitation with the Caliph.  Maimonides, on the other hand, fled the
 Almohad persecution of Christians and Jews all the way to Egypt, where 
he found refuge at the court of Saladin.
  Nahmanides, on the other hand, was already a denizen of Christian 
Spain as, in his lifetime, the Almohads lost most of the Spain, 
abandoned the peninsula, and then were even overthrown in North Africa.


The Almohads styled themselves Caliphs, something not always 
noted in historical summaries of the area.  Since they were Orthodox and
 the Abbasid line in Baghbad had not ended yet (though it would by the 
end of the dynasty), the precedent must have been the Omayyad Caliphate 
in Spain -- if there was even a concern with precedent.





The Marînid Amîrs of Morocco
'Abd al-H.aqq I1195-1217
'Uthmân I1217-1240
Muh.ammad I1240-1244
Abû Bakr1244-1258
'Umar1258-1259
Ya'qûb1259-1286
Yûsuf1286-1307
'Âmir1307-1308
Sulaymân1308-1310
'Uthmân II1310-1331
'Alî1331-1351
Fâris1351-1358
Muh.ammad II1358-1359
Ibrâhîm1359-1361
Tâshufîn1361
'Abd al-H.alîm1361-1362
Muh.ammad III1362-1366
'Abd al-'Azîz I1366-1372
Muh.ammad IV1372-1374
Ah.mad1374-1384,
1387-1393
Mûsâ1384-1386
Muh.ammad V1386
Muh.ammad VI1386-1387
'Abd al-'Azîz II1393-1396
'Abd Allâh1396-1398
'Uthmân III1398-1420
'Abd al-H.aqq II1420-1465
The Wat.t.âsid Amîrs of Morocco
Yah.yâ I
al-Wat.t.âsîregent,
1428-1448
'Alîregent,
1448-1458
Yah.yâ IIregent,
1458-1459
interregnum, Idrîsid Shurafâ, 1465-1471
Muh.ammad I1472-1504
Muh.ammad II1504-1526
'Alî1526, 1554
Ah.mad1526-1545,
1547-1549
Muh.ammad III1545-1547
The Sa'did Sharîfs of Morocco
Muh.ammad I al-Qâ'im al-Mahdî1510-1517
Ah.mad al-A'raj1517-1543
Mah.ammad ash-Shaykh1517-1557
'Abdallâh1557-1574
Muh.ammad II1574-1576
'Abd al-Malik1576-1578
Ah.mad1578-1603
ZaydânFez, 1603-1604;
Marrakech, 1609-1627
'AbdallâhMarrakech, 1603-1606; Fez, 1606-1609
Mah.ammadFex, 1606-1613
'AbdallâhMarrakech, 1606-1609; Fex, 1609-1623
'Abd al-Malik ash-ShaykhFez, 1623-1627
'Abd al-Malik an-Nâs.irMarrakech, 1627-1631
Muh.ammad al-WalîdMarrakech, 1631-1636
Mah.ammad ash-Shaykh1636-1655
Ah.mad ash-Shaykh1655-1659
The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, &amp; Kings of Morocco, 1640-present



With the decline of the Almohads, we get North Africa breaking up into 
familiar parts, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.  These modern divisions 
may not be perfectly natural, and the borders ebb and flow, but we are 
not that far from the modern divisions.  Morocco originally looks the 
most likely to retain the unity of the region, and briefly holds it, but
 otherwise is the most durable unit, with a continuous succession of 
rulers, despite some moments of anarchy or transition, down to the 
present.



The H.afs.id Amirs, Caliphs, or Sult.âns of Tunisia
Yah.yâ I1229-1249
Muh.ammad I1249-1277
Seventh Crusade by St. Louis IX, 1270
Yah.yâ II1277-1279
Ibrâhîm I1279-1283
'Abd al-'Azîz1283
Ah.mad1283-1284
'Umar I1284-1295
Muh.ammad II1295-1309
Abû Bakr I1309
Khâlid I1309-1311, d.1313
Zakariyâ' I1311-1317
Muh.ammad III1317-1318
Abû Bakr II1318-1346
Ah.mad I1346-1347
'Umar II1347
Marînid rule, 1347-1350
al-Fad.l1350
Ibrâhîm II1350-1369
Khâlid II1369-1370
Ah.mad II1370-1394
'Abd al-'Azîz1394-1434
Muh.ammad IV1434-1435
'Uthmân1435-1488
Yah.yâ III1488-1489
'Abd al-Mu'min1489-1490
Zkariyâ' II1490-1494
Muh.ammad V1494-1526
Muh.ammad VI1526-1534, 1535-1542
Ottoman occupation, 1534-1535; vassal of Charles V, 1635-1569
Ah.mad III1542-1569
Ottoman rule, 1569-1573
Muh.ammad VII1573-1574
vassal of Spain, 1573-1574; Ottoman conquest
&amp; direct rule, 1574-1705




The Zayyânid or Ziyânid Amîrs of Algeria
Yaghmurâsan ibn Ziyân or Zayyân1236-1283
'Uthmân I1283-1304
Muh.ammad I1304-1308
Mûsâ I1308-1318
'Abd ar-Rah.mân I1318-1337
Marînid rule, 1337-1348
'Uthmân II &amp; al-Zaîm1348-1352
Marînid rule, 1352-1359
Mûsâ II1359-1389
'Abd ar-Rah.mân II1389-1394
Yûsuf I1394
Yûsuf I1394-1395
Muh.ammad II1395-1400
'Abdallâh I1400-1402
Muh.ammad III1402-1411
'Abd ar-Rah.mân III1411
Sa'îd1411
'Abd al-Wâh.id1411-1424, 1428-1430
Muh.ammad IV1424-1428
Ah.mad I1430-1462
Muh.ammad V1462-1469
Abû Tâshufîn1469
Muh.ammad VI1469-1504
Muh.ammad VII1504-1517
vassal of Spain, 1512
Mûsâ III1517-1528
Ottoman presence, 1518
'Abdallâh1528-1540
Muh.ammad VIII1540-1541
Ah.mad II1541-1543, 1544-1550
Spanish occupation, 1543-1544
al-H.asan1550-1555
Ottoman conquest, 1555; Barbary States
French occupation, 1830-1871; French annexation; 1871-1962; Republic of Algeria, 1962-present

&nbsp;

These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World
 by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002].  Bosworth has 
all of the rulers listed, while Morby gives only the Marînids [p.183] 
and H.afs.ids [p.185].  Morby has a clearer presentation, but Bosworth 
also has a brief discussion of the history.


With the Crusades, Francia begins to 
develop the seapower that enables it to return to North Africa.  On the 
Seventh Crusade in 1270, St. Louis IX
 of France lands in Tunisia, formally as a preparation to return to 
Egypt but apparently simply at the self-interested urging of his 
brother, Charles of Anjou,
 who wanted to enlarge his Mediterranean empire.  He dies instead and 
accomplishes nothing for Charles -- it is also the last Crusade.


After completing the expulsion of Islâm from Spain, both Spain 
and Portugal become intent on expanding into North Africa.  Various 
cities get taken and held for a time, and local rulers become temporary 
vassals, but nothing permanent gets accomplished and it seems impossible
 to establish a durable or extensive presence on the continent.


It is not Europe but Turkey that actually does this.  Both the 
H.afs.ids and Ziyânds come to an end with the Turkish conquest.  Indeed,
 in the last stages, the local rulers sometimes relied on the Christians
 as allies against the Turks.  North Africa thus became a theater of the
 larger conflict between Christendom and the Ottomans.


North Africa, however, was a long way from Constantinople.  And 
as the Turkish reach slackened with time, local governors and princes 
began to run their own operations.  This came to mean piracy and 
slaving.  We enter the period of the Barbary States, a good three
 hundred years, when corsairs, from Algeria especially, were a plague on
 the surrounding seas, with ship after ship taken, and Christian crews 
and passengers sold on the slave markets.  After 1604, when English 
pirates taught them Atlantic navigation, Barbary ships ranged as far as 
Newfoundland and even captured ships in Plymouth harbor.  Between 1609 
and 1616, they captured 446 English ships and sold more than 7000 
English captives as slaves.  Some such captives might be ransomed, but 
many others were lost the rest of their lives.  Christian states were 
scandalized by this, but punitive expeditions were usually no more 
successful than they had been since St. Louis.  An English expedition 
against Algeria in 1620 was a failure, but one in 1637 was more 
successful, seizing the city of Salee, with 300 captives freed.  
Nevertheless, it was easier to pay for "protection" and buy off the 
pirates (who also sometimes could be used as allies against other 
European powers).  This was never more than partially effective, since, 
as the saying goes, once you pay the Danegeld, you can't get rid of the Dane (very similar kinds of pirates and slavers, as pagans, in their day).


The situation became especially infuriating to the new but 
distant United States of America.  After paying $2,000,000 in extortion 
money, Thomas Jefferson
 had had enough and in 1801 sent the U.S. Navy and Marines against the 
city of Tripoli (actually just east of Tunisia, in modern Libya).
  This brought at least a temporary respite, and contributed a phrase 
("the shores of Tripoli") to the Marine Hymn.  The piracy and slaving 
did not really and fully end, however, until the French landed in 
Algeria, intent upon conquest, in 1830.  They had a hard fight against 
the local charismatic leader, Abd al-Kader, from 1832 to 1847, but they 
accomplished the task.  Fighting there would often be in French Algeria,
 for which the legendary Foreign Legion would be created, but local pirates would no longer plague the seas or harvest Christian merchants and travellers for slaves.
&nbsp;


Islâmic Index




The Keita Kings of Mali
Mari Sun Dayâta (Mârî Jât.â) I1230-1255
Mansâ Ulî/Ule1255-1270
Mansâ Wâtî1270-1274
Mansâ Khalîfa1274-1275
Mansâ Abû Bakr I,
Bata-Mande-Bori1275-1285
Sabakura/Sâkûrafreedman,
1285-1300
Mansâ Gaw/Qû1300-1305
Mansâ Mamadu/Muh.ammad1305-1310,
d.1312
Mansâ Abû Bakr II1310-1312
Mansâ Mûsâ I1312-1337
Mansâ Maghan/Maghâ I1337-1341
Mansâ Sulaymân1341-1360
Mansâ Kamba/Qanba/Qâsâ1360-1361
Mansâ Mari Dyâta/Mârî Jât.a II1361-1374
Mansâ Mûsâ II1374-1382
Mansâ Maghan II1382-1388/89
Sandigi/S.andikiusurper,
1288/89-1390
Mansâ Maghan III, Mah.mûd1390
succession strife, ascendancy of Songhay



Mali was the first literate sub-Saharan African kingdom since Abyssinia, and the first Islâmic one.  The city of Timbuktu
 on the Niger River, although not the capital of Mali, was nevertheless 
probably the most famous city of the area (and now of the region), at 
the end of the caravan routes from North Africa.  Pilgrimages of the 
Kings of Mali to Mecca, passing through Cairo, drew considerable 
attention, especially that of Mansâ Mûsâ I, whose attendants, 
walking by camels, all carried staffs covered in gold.  His reign also 
saw a visit to the Kingdom from the great traveller Ibn Bat.t.ût.a, who 
observed, among other things, that the sexual mores of the people were 
somewhat less rigorous than required by Islam.  Indeed, some 
accommodation with pre-Islamic practices long persisted.

The Islam that the Kings of Mali did want rigorously 
enforced was the prohibition of taking Muslims as slaves.  Slavers from 
North Africa usually regarded all black people, Muslims or not, as fair 
game, and this became a matter of continuing annoyance, outrage, and 
reproach over time.  The recent self-righteous expressing indignation 
over the European slave trade from the coast of West Africa usually 
forget that the trade began and long continued, in much the same volume,
 across the Sahara to the Arab north.  There are few descendants of 
those slaves in Arab countries today, reflecting the harshness of their 
treatment, including the castration of the men.


Today this area suffers from an advance of the desert that has 
continued through all historical time.  The Sahara has only gotten worse
 in the last five thousand years and more.  The mediaeval kingdom thus 
enjoyed considerable rainfall and arable land now lost.  The modern 
Republic of Mali, although encompassing some of the same territory as 
the old Kingdom, nevertheless has no direct connection to it and is 
named just in commemoration of it.



The fury and anaesthesia of Islamic Fascism
 have now come to historic and fabled Timbuktu.  In late June, 2012, 
Islamist fanatics, such as the "Ansar Dine" group, have by pick-axes, 
hoes, and fire destroyed the tombs of the Mediaeval Muslim Saints Sidi 
Mahmoud, Sidi Moctar, and Alpha Moya in Timbuktu, previously called the 
"city of 333 Saints."  This
 is consistent with the vandalism visited on cultural and religious 
artifacts by Jihadists, as most notoriously seen in the destruction of 
Buddhist art and monuments in Afghanistan; but it may surprise some that Islamic monuments, in this case ones designated by UNESCO as "world-heritage" sites, are now the target.  But the Wahhabist
 inspired Islam of modern zealots regards the veneration or even 
commemoration of saints as un-Islamic, and they scruple at no death or 
destruction to enforce their particular fundamentalism.  Since their 
fire also burned priceless manuscripts in the tombs, they are also 
indifferent to traditions of Islamic literature and historiography.  In 
short, they are savages and barbarians, in the fullest senses of those 
terms.  It is extraordinary that the modern world still has to deal with
 people like this.



The Si &amp; Askiya Kings of Songhay
Sonni 'Alî Ber, the Great1464/1465-1492
Abû Bakr/Bakari/Baru1492-1493
Muh.ammad I Ture
Askiya/Sikiya1493-1528,
d.1538
Mûsâ1528-1531
Muh.ammad II Benkan1531-1537
Ismâ'îl1537-1539
Ish.âq I1539-1549
Dâwûd1549-1582
Muh.ammad III1582-1586
Muh.ammad IV Bani1586-1588
Ish.âq II1588-1591
Muh.ammad V
Gao/Kawkaw1591-1592
conquest by Morocco, 1591-1592



Mali was the scene of an attempted coup in 
March, and this has unleashed the anarchy and fanaticism that now are in
 play in the north of the country.  Many more tombs in Timbuktu are 
vulnerable to destruction.





The successor to Mali on the Niger River, Songhay had begun a good 
bit earlier, back in the 9th century.  However, there really are no 
dates before the Si (or Sonni) dynasty, beginning with 'Alî Golom (or 
Kolon) around 1275.  Songhay is then a vassal of Mali.  After that, 
things are still obscure, with few dates and even poorly attested names 
for the rulers until Sonni 'Alî "the Great," who definitively 
established the ascendency of Songhay in the area.  In short order 
Muh.ammad I Ture Askiya founds a new dynasty, which continues until the 
Morocco conquest.  The Moroccans had the advantage at this point of 
firearms, but their ability to hold the area was limited.  Even the 
presence of a Moroccan governor in Timbuktu seems to have lapsed around 
1660.  The region fell into disorder.


The kings of both Mali and Songhay are from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, pp.122-125].




THE MAMLÛK SULT.ÂNS
OF EGYPT, 1252-1517
Bah.rî line, 1252-1390
(usually Turkish)
Aybak al-Turkumânî1250,
1252-1257
'Alî I1257-1259
Qutuz al-Mu'izzî1259-1260
Baybars I al-Bunduqdârî1260-1277
Defeats Mongols, 1260
Baraka/Berke Khân1277-1279
Salâmish/Süleymish1279
Qalâwûn al-Alfî1279-1290
Khalîl1290-1293
Fall of Acre, 1291;
End of Outremer
Baydarâ(?)1293
Muh.ammad I1293-1294,
1299-1309,
1310-1341
Kitbughâ1294-1296
Lâchîn/Lâjîn al-Ashqar1296-1299
Pharos Lighthouse collapses
after earthquake, 1303
Baybars II al-Jâshnakîr
(Burjî)1309-1310
Abû Bakr1341
Kûjûk/Küchük1341-1342
Ah.mad I1342
Ismâ'îl1342-1345
Sha'bân I1345-1346
H.âjjî I1346-1347
al-H.asan1347-1351,
1354-1361
S.âlih.1351-1354
Muh.ammad II1361-1363
Sha'bân II1363-1377
'Alî II1377-1382
H.âjjî II1382,
1389-1390
Burjî line, 1382-1517
(usually Circassian)
Barqûq al-Yalburghâwî1382-1398,
1390-1399
Faraj1399-1405,
1405-1412
'Abd al-'Aziz1405
al-Musta'în1412
1406-1414,
Caliph
Shaykh al-Mah.mûdî
al-Z.âhirî1412-1421
Ah.mad II1421
T.ât.âr1421
Muh.ammad III1421-1422
Barsbay1422-1438
Yûsuf1438
Chaqmaq/Jaqmaq1438-1453
'Uthmân1453
Inâl al-'Alâ'î al-Z.âhirî1453-1461
Ah.mad III1461
Khushqadam1461-1467
Yalbay1467
Timurbughâ1467-1468
Qâyit Bay al-Z.âhirî1468-1496
Muh.ammad IV1496-1498
Qâns.awh I1498-1500
Jânbulât.1500-1501
T.ûmân Bay I1501
Qâns.awh II al-Ghawrî1501-1516
T.ûmân Bay II1516-1517
Ottoman Conquest by
Selîm I Yavuz;
line of Mamlûks actually
continues until 1811



The Mamlûks, literally "possessed," i.e. "slaves," represent one of the 
strangest political institutions in world history, compared by Machiavelli to nothing so much as the Papacy.
  This was because of the non-hereditary nature of the succession, 
though the Mamlûks were by no means celibate -- that would be foreign to
 Islâm.  




THE ABBASID PUPPET
CALIPHS OF EGYPT,
1261-1517 AD,
UNDER THE MAMLÛKS
Ah.mad
al-Mustans.ir1261



Ah.mad
al-H.âkim I



1261-1262
in Aleppo
1262-1302
in Cairo


Sulaymân
al-Mustakfî I
1302-1340


Ibrâhîm
al-Wâthiq I
1340-1341


Ah.mad
al-H.akîm II

1341-1352


Abû Bakr
al-Mu'tad.id I

1352-1362


Muh.ammad
al-Mutawakkil I


1362-1377,
1377-1383,
1389-1406


Zakariyyâ'
al-Mu'tas.im
1377,
1386-1389


'Umar
al-Wâthiq II
1383-1386


'Abbâs or Ya'qûb
al-Musta'în
1406-1414
Sult.ân, 1412


Dâwûd
al-Mu'tad.id II
1414-1441

Sulaymân
al-Mustakfî II
1441-1451

H.amza
al-Qâ'im
1451-1455

Yûsuf
al-Mustanjid
1455-1479

'Abdul'Azîz
al-Mutawakkil II

1479-1497

Ya'qûb
al-Mustamsik
1497-1508,
1516-1517

al-Mutawakkil III
1508-1516,
1517
1517, Caliph removed
to I.stanbul by Ottoman
Sult.ân Selîm I Yavuz,
later credited with
assuming Caliphate

The pool of candidates for the Sultanate was from the ranks of the 
soldiers bought as slaves when children and then raised to rule Egypt.  
This force originated under the Ayyûbids, as a similar practice created 
an elite army, the Janissaries, under the Ottomans.
  While the Janissaries were eventually massacred (1826) for their 
practice of king-making, the Mamlûks were successful at replacing the 
Ayyûbid Sult.âns of Egypt completely, with themselves (1252).  Slave 
troops at first were Turkish, but then preference shifted, as it did 
with the Ottomans, to originally Christian boys from the Caucasus.  
Although Cairo was a major terminus for the African slave trade, black 
boys were not used for this purpose.  Although the Mamlûk Sult.ânate 
formally and by reputation was non-hereditary, it does turn out that 
many of the Sult.âns were sons or brothers of others.  This can be seen 
in Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [pp.76-78] and, rather more clearly, in the Oxford Dynasties of the World by John. E. Morby [Oxford, 2002, pp.189-190] -- note that a genealogy of the Egyptian Abbasid Caliphs is given above.

Mamlûk Egypt for many years was the principal state of Islâm.  
The defeat of the Mongols in 1260 and then the establishment of an 
Abbasid line of Caliphs in Cairo gave the regime a respect and status 
that others could not match.  The architectural monuments of Mamlûk 
Cairo are still impressive, and it is noteworthy that the great 
collection of Mediaeval Islâmic stories, the Alf Layla wa Layla (Thousand Nights and a Night, i.e. the Thousand and One Nights), achieved definitive form in Cairo around 1400.


This collection, including stories that must have been 
circulating for many centuries, is noteworthy for the social, cultural, 
and religious attitudes it reveals.  While fiercely pro-Islâmic, with 
stories even about questions of Islâmic Law, and a very long and boring 
one about fighting the Romans
 (with nice touches like the notion that Christian incense is made from 
the excrement of Bishops), we find things that now seem rather 
un-Islâmic.  For instance, there is a great deal of wine drinking, which
 seems to be casually accepted, even while its irreligion, strictly 
speaking, is noted.  Thus, in one story, a character swears off wine in 
order to purify himself for the Pilgrimage.  In another story, a man 
discovers that his wife has been having sex with a gorilla.  With a 
shocking touch of racism, this affair is said to have commenced after a previous black
 lover had died (which fits the surviving stereotype of black sexual 
prowess but betrays ignorance of the anatomy of gorillas, which actually
 have smaller genitals than humans).  We might expect that the proper 
thing to do about this would be to kill the wife.  However, the wife's 
unnatural lust is extraordinarily treated as a medical disorder, 
and a physician is employed to cure her, which he does.  Besides the 
wine drinking, there seems to be considerable ease and interest in 
unsanctioned sexual activities.  Even those eunuchs who have been 
deprived of their testicles but not their penises boast of their ability
 to have sex with their mistresses.  One real world consequence of that 
was the custom of only using black eunuchs, who typically had amputated 
penises, in the harîm.


Although the story of the Mamlûks is easily thought to end in 
1517 with the Ottoman conquest, the amazing truth is that the Mamlûk 
garrison was not abolished by the Turks and that, as Ottoman authority 
weakened, Egypt ended up again under the de facto rule of the 
same "peculiar institution."  Thus, when Napoleon arrived in Egypt in 
1798, it was the Mamlûks with whom he had to contend.  When he defeated 
them at the Battle of the Pyramids, he may not have stopped to think (so
 distracted by all the Egyptian stuff) that he had beaten victors over 
the Mongols.  Nevertheless, this was still not the end of the Mamlûk 
story.  They retreated up the Nile from the French and were again 
contesting the rule of Egypt when Muh.ammad 'Alî deceived, trapped, and exterminated them in 1811.


What did end in 1517 was the line of Abbasid Caliphs.  The last 
was taken off to Constantinople.  Ironically, this was al-Mutawakkil III
 -- the same title as the Caliph who was assassinated by his own Turkish
 guard in 861.  It is not clear whether the Ottomans had any intention 
of continuing the line, as useful figureheads, as the Mamlûks had, for 
the Caliph and any possible descendants simply disappear from history.  
Later, when the Sult.âns got to thinking about it, they claimed the 
Caliphate for themselves.

&nbsp;




The Hûdids of Murcia
Muh.ammad ibn Hûd
al-Mutawakkil1228-1238
Conquest of Valencia
by Aragón, 1238
Muh.ammad al-Wâthiq1238-1239,
1264-?
al-'Azîz D.iyâ'ad-Dawla1239-1241
Muh.ammad Abû Ja'far
Bahâ'ad-Dawla1241-1262
Muh.ammad ibn Abî
J'afar Muh.ammad1262-1264
occupation by Granada, ?-1266
Conquest by Aragón, 1266




THE NAS.RID SULT.ÂNS
OF GRANADA
Muh.ammad I al-Ghâlib,
ibn al-Ah.mar1232-1273
Muh.ammad II al-Faqîh1273-1302
Muh.ammad III al-Makhlû'1302-1309
Nas.r1309-1314
Ismâ'îl I1314-1325
Muh.ammad IV1325-1333
Yûsuf I al-Mu'ayyad1333-1354
Muh.ammad V al-Ghani1354-1359,
1362-1391
Ismâ'îl II1359-1360
Muh.ammad VI al-Ghâlib,
el Bermejo1360-1362
Yûsuf II al-Mustahgnî1391-1392
Muh.ammad VII
al-Mustâ'în1392-1408
Yûsuf III an-Nâs.ir1408-1417
Muh.ammad VIII
al-Mustamassik,
al-S.aghîr, el Pequeño1417-1419,
1427-1429
Muh.ammad IX al-Ghâlib,
al-Aysar, el Zurdo1419-1427,
1429-1432,
1432-1445,
1447-1453
Yûsuf IV, Abenalmao1432
Muh.ammad X al-Ah.naf,
el Cojo1445,
1446-1447
Yûsuf V, Aben Ismael1445-1446,
1462
Muh.ammad XI,
el Chiquito1451-1455
Sa'd al-Musta'în,
Ciriza, Muley Zad1454-1464
'Alî, Muley Hácen1464-1482,
1483-1485
Muh.ammad XII
al-Zughûbî,
Boabdil el Chico1482-1483,
1486-1492,
d. 1533
Mu.hammad ibn Sa'd
al-Zaghal1485-1490
Conquest by Castile &amp; Aragón,
end of Islamic Spain, 1492



The end of Islâmic Spain turned out to be a very protracted business, 
260 years to be exact.  In the course of this, one of the architectural 
jewels of the world was created, the Alhambra (al-H.amrâ',
 "the Red").  When the real end came, it was by no means easy for the 
Christians.  A long and tough campaign finally resulted in a negotiated 
surrender.  Muh.ammad XII (Boabdil), left for North Africa, and freedom 
of religion was supposedly obtained for Granadan Moslems (1492).  
Frustration with this incomplete victory may have helped Ferdinand and Isabella
 with their resolve to expel the Jews from Spain.  Toleration for 
Moslems, however, was revoked as soon as 1499.  Actions against the Moriscos, Christian converts from Islâm, led to a great revolt in 1568-1570.  Dispersed through Spain, the remaining Moriscos
 nevertheless were enough of a worry that it was determined in 1609 to 
expel them from Spain altogether.  By 1614, they were gone, and with 
them the last link with the 700 years of Islâmic Spain.

The Alhambra (a redundant expression, since "al" already means 
"the") survives out of its time as a living fossil of Islâmic Spain -- 
with its name transported to a city in Southern California,
 where at least the climate is similar.  Another echo of Islamic Spain 
lives in California, however, where the Mission San Gabriel Arcángel reflects,
 on a more humble scale, architectural elements of the Great Mosque of 
Cordova (which survived through its conversion into the church).  The 
builder of the Mission, it seems, was from Cordova.  The buttresses 
unique to California Missions, unfortunately, have not always preserved 
San Gabriel from earthquake damage.  An image of San Gabriel has 
recently been proposed for the Seal of the County of Los Angeles, since 
the City of Los Angeles was originally founded in 1781 as an asistencia or outlier of the Mission.




THE SULT.ÂNS
OF MALACCA/MELAKA
Parameshvara1403-1414
Chinese suzerainty, 1409
Megat Iskandar Shâh1414-1424
Shri Maharâjâ Sult.ân Muhammad Shâh1424-1445
last Chinese fleet visit, 1433
Râjâ Ibrâhîm Shri Paramesvara Deva Shâh1445-1446
Râjâ Qâsim Sult.ân Maz.affar Shâh1446-1459
Râjâ 'Abdallâh Sult.ân Mans.ûr Shâh1459-1477
Sult.ân 'Alâ' ad-Dîn Ri'âyat1477-1488
Sult.ân Mah.mud Shâh1488-1510, 1510-1528
Sult.ân Ah.mad Shâh1510
Portuguese conquest, 1511; dynasty continues in Johor, 1528; Dutch, 1641; British, 1824



Islâm in Southeast Asia is the counterexample to the notion sometimes 
affirmed that the religion has never spread except by the sword.  
Instead, Islâm arrived in Malaya and Indonesia by sea and by trade.  It 
took hold gradually against Hinduism and Buddhism, which had previously 
arrived by sea and by trade.  One result of this was gradual and 
incomplete Islamicization, i.e. the previous civilization was not simply
 superseded and the social rigors of Islâmic law only adopted 
imperfectly.  This can be seen in the very names of the Sult.âns of 
Malacca, which begin with Sanskrit, including titles like shri, râjâ, and maharâjâ, and shift over to Arabic and Persian, including titles like sult.ân and shâh.
  With the last three rulers before the Portuguese, the Sanskrit titles 
and names have disappeared entirely.  The most remarkable name/title is 
undoubtedly deva, "god."  This is familiar from an early date in India
 but would be absolutely anathema in Islâm -- its implication of 
polytheism would even be punishable by death under Islamic Law.  Indeed,
 it only occurs once, and that with a ruler whose name otherwise seems 
to put more emphasis on the Indian elements.



At the beginning of the line of the Sult.âns of Malacca, it was Siam
 that exerted influence.  But then in 1409 the Chinese arrived.  Admiral
 Zheng He and his great fleets, projecting the new power of the Ming Dynasty,
 established a base at Malacca, and the Sult.ân became a tributary of 
China.  He even sailed to China to pay homage to the Emperor.  A Chinese
 cantonment protected, stored, and shipped goods from China and those 
obtained on the further expeditions into the Indian Ocean.  On nearby 
Sumatra, a Chinese governor was installed at Palembang after a Chinese 
pirate was defeated, captured, and sent back to China for execution.  In
 northern Sumatra (near Acheh), troops were put ashore to install one 
king and execute his rival.  A king in Ceylon
 was defeated and sent to China, but then the Emperor returned him to 
his kingdom (thought he evidently was unable to recover his throne).  
Some of Zheng He's detachments went into the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, 
and even down the coast of Africa, perhaps as far as Zanzibar.  This 
impressive exercise ended abruptly in 1433, when the xenophobic Confucian
 faction became dominant at the Chinese Court.  China was cut off from 
the external world and began to lose its ability to deal with that 
world, either culturally, economically, or militarily.


Arriving next by sea and by trade would be the Portuguese (led by Afonso de Albuquerque), Dutch, and British,
 all of whom were also interested in secure bases for their activities. 
 So Malacca became a European colony.  Under the British, it became part
 of the Straits Settlements, which was a string of cities along, 
indeed, the Straits of Malacca, between Malaya and Sumatra.  British 
Malaya was otherwise a group of client kingdoms, including some whose 
rulers were actually descendants of the Sult.âns of Malacca.





In 1972 I was looking through some books that 
were on sale at the University of Hawai'i bookstore.  Among them I found
 two small pamphlets that looked like children's primers written entirely in the Arabic alphabet.  I had no idea what these could be, or what they were doing in Hawai'i.  They were, however, published in Singapore
 by the "Malaysia Press Ltd."  This was the clue; for, as I soon 
learned, and as is generally characteristic in Mediaeval Islamic 
converts, the Arabic alphabet is adopted to write the local language, 
which was Malay.  This grew up as a trade language of Malaya and Indonesia, 




THE SULT.ÂNS
OF ACHEH/ATJEH/ACEH
'Inâyat Shâhc.1450-?
Muz.affar Shâhd.1497
Shams ad-Dîn Shâh?-c.1496
'Alî Mughâyat Shâhc.1496-c.1530
S.alâh. ad-Dînc.1530-c.1537
Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn al-Qahhârc.1537-1571
appeals to Ottoman Sult.ân for aid against the Portuguese, 1563
'Alî/H.usayn Ri'âyat Shâh1571-1579
Sultan Muda1579
Sultan Shri 'Âlam1579
Zayn al-'Âbidîn1579
Mans.ûr Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1579-c.1586
'Alî Ri'âyat Shâh Râjâ Buyungc.1586-c.1588
Ri'âyat Shâh 'Alâ' ad-Dînc.1588-1604
'Alî Ri'âyat Shah/Sultan Muda1604-1607
Iskandar Muda Makota 'Âlam1607-1636
Mughâyat Shâh, Iskandar Thânî 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1636-1641
S.afiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh Tâj al-'Âlam 1641-1675
Naqiyyat ad-Dîn Shâ'h Nûr al-'Âlam 1675-1678
Zakiyyat ad-Dîn Shâh 'Inâyat 1678-1688
Zînat ad-Dîn Kamâlat Shâh 1688-1699
Sharîf Hâ'shim Jamâl ad-Dîn Badr al-'Âlam1699-1702
Perkasa 'Âlam Sharîf Lamtuy1702-1703
Badr al-Munîr, Jamâl al-'Âlam1703-1726
Amîn ad-Dîn Shâh, Jawhar al-'Âlam1726
Shams al-'Âlam, Wandi Tebing1726-1727
Ah.mad Shâh, Maharâjâ Lela Melayu, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1727-1735
Jahân Shâh, Potjut Auk, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1735-1760
Mah.mûd Shâh, Tuanku Raja1760-1781
Muh.ammad Shâh, Taunku Muh.ammad, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1781-1795
Jawhar al-'Âlam Shâh, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1795-1824
Muh.ammad Shâh1824-1836
Mans.ûr Shâh1836-1870
Mah.mûd Shâh1870-1874
capital at Kutaraja captured by Dutch, 1874
Muhammad Dawud Shah, 'Alâ' ad-Dîn1874-1903
Dutch conquest of Acheh, 1903



a linga franca, like Swahili in East Africa and Hindi-Urdu in 
India.  Like those languages, Malay has a strong element of Arabic in 
it, though this is often obscured by the pronunciation.  Thus, a basic 
greeting in Malay is Apa kabar?  This simply means "What's new?"  Apa is a Malay word, but kabar is from Arabic khabar, "news, information, report."  Malay is now the national language of Malaysia (Bahasa Malaysia), Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia), and Singapore (Bahasa Melayu).
  The British and the Dutch introduced systems of Romanization -- e.g. 
"u" in Malaya was "oe" in Indonesia -- which now have been reconciled to
 a universal standard, with the Dutch idiosyncrasies eliminated.  The use of the Arabic alphabet had been dying out, but not entirely.

As initially in Persian,
 it was necessary to introduce some extra letters into the alphabet to 
write all the sounds of Malay.  These would be, most importantly, 
letters for the velar nasal "ng" and the palatal nasal "ny" (or "ñ").  A
 small problem arose with writing three dots over the "chair" for an "n"
 with "ny."  In the final or independent position, the letter would be 
distinctive.  Written initially or medially, however, the letter would 
look like the Arabic "th."  Thus, in the initial or medial positions, 
the three dots for "ny" are written under rather than over the "chair." 
 This, however, would then look like the Persian "p."  Malay also needed
 a "p," so the "chair" of Arabic "f" was used, with three dots, for the 
"p."  Otherwise, we get the variation that "g," borrowed from Persian, 
might be written with a dot rather than an extra line; and Arabic "w," 
pronounced "v" in Persian, could be left alone to mean "w" in Malay or 
written with a dot to mean "v."  Otherwise, "ch" was also borrowed from 
Persian.


The way things are going in Islâm, it may well be that the use of
 the Arabic alphabet will increase; but little of it had been left in 
public life.



Acheh at the northern end of Sumatra, just across the Straits from 
Malacca, was a larger and more durable realm.  We see less in the way of
 Sanskrit names and titles, though there are some local names and 
references, as with Ah.mad Shâh (1727-1735), who is called Maharâjâ Lela
 Melayu -- i.e. "the Malay."  We also see something very unusual in 
Islam, a number of female rulers.


In 1563 Sult.ân Ri'âyat Shâh of Acheh wrote to the Ottoman Sult.ân, in this case no less than Suleiman the Magnificent,
 requesting help against the Portuguese.  This episode reveals the 
extent of the Oecumene of Islâm, and the recognition of the common 
enemy.  Turkey at the height of its power, and willing to help, 
nevertheless had some difficulty projecting that power as far as 
Indonesia.  After a delay of some years, and not until after the death 
of Suleiman, an Ottoman fleet of 19 ships sailed from Egypt.  Only two 
ships reached Acheh, however, the rest having been diverted to bolster 
Ottoman authority in Yemen.  The aid finally delivered to Acheh was thus minimal and, as it happened, ineffective.


While it is tempting now to think of Indonesia as a unified 
realm, not only were there multiple sovereignties in earlier days, but 
their subjugation by the Dutch
 was a process that took some time.  Thus, the last Sult.ân of Acheh 
held out for many years, and the Dutch conquest was not complete until 
1903.  We see much the same process in Bali, where Dutch conquest was 
not complete until 1906, amid scenes of great slaughter, something like 
3600 Balinese falling.


Acheh entered the news late in 2004 with a 
great earthquake, magnitude 9.0, the largest on Earth in forty years, 
off the coast of Sumatra.  This was bad enough, but the tsunami, ,
 generated by the earthquake inundated coasts as far away as Sri Lanka 
and Thailand.  The death toll overall is estimated up to 200,000 people.


We are thus unpleasantly reminded of the 
geological forces at work under Indonesia, where many great earthquakes 
and some of the largest volcanic eruptions in the geological record have
 occurred.  For instance, the eruption of Mt. Tambora in 1815 put so 
much material into the atmosphere that it darkened the sky world wide 
and produced "the year without summer" in 1816.  Not as large but better
 known was the eruption of Karakatoa (Krakatau, between Java and 
Sumatra) in 1883.  This blew away the small island of Karakatoa itself, 
with a blast that was actually heard as far as 1000 miles away.  There 
have been few such eruptions anywhere in historical times.  Ice cores 
show a spike of volcanic gasses for 535 AD.  It is not known if this was
 one of the Indonesian volcanoes, but they are the best candidates.  It 
may even have been Karakatoa.  It would have been an eruption as large 
or larger than Tambora.  It did have some serious historical 
consequences.  There is much comment in European records
 of the time about the dim sunlight of 536 AD and the failure of crops 
thereafter.  The cooling may have precipitated the plague that arrived 
in Egypt in 541.  The "Dark Ages Cooling" was thus another heavy blow 
against the diminishing Roman Empire.


Prehistorically, Sumatra may have been the place of the largest 
volcanic eruption in the history of the human species.  When Mt. Toba 
erupted 74,000 years ago, it was perhaps 10,000 times the size of the 
Mt. St. Helens eruption in 1980.  This could have caused a 5o Celsius (9o
 Fahrenheit) global drop in temperature around the world.  The "year 
without summer" might have become months or years without summer.  There
 is some evidence that this caused a "genetic bottleneck" in human 
evolution, which means a large portion of human beings may have died.  
This was before the advent of fully modern humans, about 30,000 years ago; so, literally, people like us have not seen its like.


Islâmic Index
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Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved








YEMEN, 1230 BC-1962 AD






The State of at-Tababi'a
al-Harith ar-Raish1230-1105 BC
Abrahah Dhul Manar1105-922
Afrikis ibn Abrahah922-758
al-'Abd Dhu al-Adh'ar758-733
al-Hedhed ibn Sharahil733-658
Balkis (Bilqis) bint al-Hedhed  "Queen of Sheba"?658-638
Nashir an-Ni'am638-553
Shammar Yar'ish553-516
Abu Malik516-461
Tubba' ibn al-Akran461-408
Dhu Jaychan408-338
al-Akran ibn Abu Malik338-175
Kalikarib175-140
Ass'ad Abu Karib140-20
Hassan ibn Tubba'20 BC-50 AD
'Amr ibn Tubba'50-113
'Abid Kilel113-187
Tubba' ibn Hassan187-265
Marthid ibn 'Abid265-306
Wali'a ibn Marthid306-343
Abrahah ibn as-Sabbah343-416
Sahban ibn Muhrath416-431
Hassan ibn 'Amr ibn Tubba'431-488
Dhu Shanatir488-515
Yusuf Ash'ar Dhu-NuwasKing of Himyar, 515-525
convert to Judaism; Ethiopian invasion, 525-c.533
Dhu Jadan525-533
Ethiopian rule, 533-575; to Himyar, 575-577; to Persia, 577-631; to Islam, 629



Yemen is an ancient and noteworthy 
center of civilization.  It was long off the beaten track, at the 
entrance to the Red Sea, and rarely the focus, or the target, of major 
political events; but it certainly deserves more attention than it 
customarily receives.  For instance, the recent and enormous (911 pages)
 Ancient History, from the First Civilizations to the Renaissance,
 by J.M. Roberts [Duncan Baird Publishers, London, 2004], contains 
nothing whatsoever about Yemen, and neither the name, nor "Saba," nor 
"Sheba," even appear in the index.  This is a grotesque but not unusual 
oversight.


If there were no ruins or no records, this 
neglect might be expected; but there are both.  South Arabia, indeed, 
has its own derived version of the alphabet, which survives today in its
 Ethiopian version.  As for inscriptions and literature, Joan Copeland Biella says, in her Dictionary of Old South Arabic [Harvard Semitic Museum Studies 25, 1982]:




....thousands of texts in 
Sabaean, Minnaean, Qatabanian and H.ad.ramitic have been published, 
ranging in type from brief graffiti to substantial historical annals. 
[p.vii]


One would never know this from treatments of ancient history like Roberts' book.


The ruins are extensive and include unique structures, like the extraordinary Ma'rib Dam (Sadd Ma'rib
 in Arabic), built from cut stone in the Wadî Sadd (or Wadi Saba').  
This was 1,800 feet long and was not alone, except in scale and fame, in
 the irrigation of the region.  Much is left of the structure, including
 its spillway system.  This should have rated as one of the Seven Wonders of the World.
  Its final and catastrophic break, however, which entered into Islâmic 
legend, represented the definitive decline of the area and also the 
uncertainties of Yemeni history, since the event cannot be well dated --
 just between the 5th and the 7th centuries AD.


The name of Yemen itself is of interest.  The Romans called the area Arabia Felix, "happy" or "fortunate" Arabia, in contrast to Arabia Deserta, "desert" Arabia, and Arabia Petraea, "rocky" Arabia (where the Romans annexed the remarkable city of Petra).  As it happens, Yemen in Arabic, Yaman, is from a verb, yamana, that can mean "to be lucky, fortunate."  Yaman can also mean "right side or hand" and "south."  This can be contrasted with shâm,
 which can mean "north," "Syria," and "Damascus" but from a root that 
can also mean "evil omen," "ominous," "calamity," and "misfortune."  The
 actual word for left in Arabic is different, shamâl -- which can
 also mean north (we don't get the sinister associations with this 
root).  Indeed, if one faces east, the south is on one's right and the 
north on the left.  And Arabic is not the only language in which right (dexter) is lucky and left (sinister) threatening.


The only proper history book in print that I have found for South Arabia is Robert G. Hoyland's Arabia and the Arabs, From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam [Routledge, 2001].  For the historiography of South Arabia, he says:



....we are equipped with some ten thousand 
inscriptions.  Unfortunately, however, these are not dated according to 
an absolute era until the first century AD and they almost never allude 
to events outside south Arabia.  Scholars have tried to arrange them in 
chronological order according to the style of their script, but with 
hardly any firmly dated examples to provide a fixed point this method 
can offer no more than a rough indication. [p.36]



Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba
Samahu 'Alic.750 BC
Yada'-il Dharih
Yathi'-amar Watar I
Yada'-il Bayin I
Yathi'-amar Watar II
Kariba-il Bayin
Dhamar 'Ali Watar
Samahu 'Ali Yanif I
Yathi'-amar Bayin I
Kariba-il Watar Ic.450 BC
Samahu 'Ali Darih
Kariba-il Watar II
Il-Sharah I
Yada
Yakrib
Yathi'
Karib-il
Samah
Il-Sharah II
Dhamar
Yada'
Dhamar
Karib-il Watar IV
Il-Karib Yuhan'im
Karib-il Watar V
Wahb-il
Anmar Yuhan'im
Dhamar 'Ali Darih
Nash'a-Karib Yuhamin
Nasir Yuhan'im
Wahb-il Yahuz
Karib-il Watar Yuhan'im
Yarim Ayman Ic.80-c.60 BC
'Alhan Nahfanc60-?
Far'um Yanhab
Yarim Ayman IIc.35-c.25
Sha'irum Awtarc.25 BC-?
Yazil Bayinc.25 BC-?
Ilasharah Yahdubc.25 BC-?
To Himyar



Kingdom of Saba'/Sheba
Yada'il Yanif ben Kariba-ilc.755-c.740
Samahu 'Ali Darih I ben Yada'il Yanufc.740-715
Yathi'-amar Bayin I
Dhamar 'Ali I
Kariba-il Watar Ic.685-c.675
tribute paid to Assyria, 685
Samahu'Ali I
Yada'il Darih I
Samahu 'Ali Yanuf I
Darih
Yathi'-amar Watar
Yada'il Bayin I
Karib-il Bayin I
Dhamar 'Ali Watar
Samahu'Ali Yanuf IIc.545-c.525
Yathi'-amar Bayin IIc.525-c.495
Kariba-il I
Yada'il I
Yathi'-amar I
Kariba-il II
Samahu'Ali II
Yada'il II
Yathi'amar II
Yada'il Bayin II
Samahu'Ali Yanuf IIIc.410-c.380
Yathi'-amar Watar I
Yaqrub Malik Darih
Samahu'Ali Yanuf IV
Yada'il Bayin III
Yaqrub Malik Watar I
Yathi'-amar Bayin III
Karib-il Watar IIc.320-c.270
Yada'il Bayin IV
Yaqrub Malik Watar II
Dhamar'Ali Yanuf
Yathi'-amar Bayin IV
Samahu'Ali Darih IIc.200-c.175
Karib-il Bayin II
Yathi'-amar III
unknown, c.140-c.116; to Himyar, 116-55
Samahu'Ali Yanuf Vc.55
Yada'il Watar Ic.30
Dhamar'Ali Bayin Ic.25
Yadail Darih IIc.10 BC-c.10 AD
Yathi'-amar Watar IIc.10-20
Yada'il Watar IIc.20-30
Dhamar 'Ali Bayin IIc.30-60
Karib-il Watar Yuhan'imc.60-75
Dhamar'Ali Darihc.75-85
Ilasharah Yahdubc.85-100
to Himyar, Gurat, &amp; Marib

With the neglect and uncertainties of Yemeni history, I have found 
little to go on for displaying the chronology.  Hoyland refers to "lists
 of Sabaean rulers," but then doesn't mention if these are provided by 
the Sabaeans (like the Egyptian
 king lists), assembled by modern scholars, or found in Arab legend.  He
 certainly doesn't provide any such list.  The only lists of kings I 
have found are in Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies.
  Where Bruce gets this stuff, I would like to know.  He does say that 
the earliest material is "culled entirely from traditional sources," 
apparently meaning that it is legendary in nature and of doubtful 
historical value.  Indeed, the earliest list he gives includes "a son of
 the eponymous ancestor of the Habiru (Hebrew) nomadic peoples."  This 
is part of legendary genealogy, not history.  I have skipped that list. 
 But what I do give first, the list of kings of Tababi'a above, begins with reigns that are more than a century long.  When it comes to the kings of Saba',
 the classic kingdom of Yemen, Gordon says, "sources I have for early 
Yemeni states disagree to a large extent, and cannot be reconciled with 
any clarity."  Thus, he simply gives two different lists for Saba'.  
They are presented side by side here.  They both do end with the same 
king, Ilasharah Yahdub, but one dates him close to the beginning of the 
Christian Era, the other a good century later.  This is like the degree 
of uncertainty and variation that one gets with thinly historical 
material like that of nearby early Ethiopia or even the (contemporary and equally remote) Greek Kingdom of Bactria.
  It is also noteworthy that Old South Arabic did not write vowels.  
Genuine Sabaean texts are without vowels.  The names of the kings given 
in these lists thus cannot have been derived directly from Yemeni 
epigraphy or annals.  I am left wondering how much of Sabaean history 
actually can be reconstructed from contemporary sources, and how much of
 this derives from later texts and legends.  Although Hoyland mentions 
the latter, he does not discuss the nature of their use or value.

The legends, indeed, extend to the Old Testament.  The kingdom of Saba' is the Biblical Sheba.  Here the reign of Solomon is dated 970-931 BC.  This antedates the beginning of either list here for Saba', and all the reasonable reigns even for at-Tababi'a
 -- though Balkis is the candidate for the Biblical "Queen of Sheba."  
Hoyland suspects that the reference to Sheba "may only have been slipped
 in at a later date" [p.39].  It was long doubtful that developed states
 even existed in that era; but Hoyland says that now it seems more 
likely that things were happening by Solomon's 10th century, though we 
don't have texts appearing until the 8th.  The rulers of Saba' were 
kings (mlk, Arabic malik) or "unifiers" (mkrb, Arabized rendering mukarrib).  It is not clear what the relationship was between these titles, and the mukarribs
 are often regarded as early priest-kings or as later "emperors."  There
 are a couple of female rulers given in the lists, so it is conceivable 
that there was a Queen of Sheba as in the Biblical story.  Her visit to 
Jerusalem, of course, is also part of Ethiopian
 legend, since her son by Solomon is supposed to have been Menelik, the 
founder of the Abyssinian state.  There is little doubt that these 
stories, whatever their historicity, reflect the existence and 
development, even if in later periods, of sophisticated states in South 
Arabia and adjacent Africa.


The early development of Saba' and the other states in the area was on the inland slopes of the mountains.  The wadî
 dammed at Ma'rib thus flows into a desert basin; and the city of Ma'rib
 itself, capital of the Sabaeans, is at the foot of the mountains.  
Development occurred in this way because the caravan routes headed up 
inland.  Even from later history it is noteworthy that Mecca, a caravan 
center itself, is well in from the coast.  In three voyages between 117 
and 109 BC, however, Eudoxus of Cyzicus is supposed to have learned how to use the monsoons to sail all the way from (Ptolemaic)
 Egypt to India and back.  One might have suspected South Arabians to 
have known about this already, but the evidence that they didn't may be 
that the seaports in the region only developed subsequently.  The 
caravan routes continued, but a sea trade developed that continued into 
the modern era -- later the lifeblood of realms like Oman.


Toward the end of this period, or right at the end, depending on the chronology, the Roman Emperor Augustus is supposed to have sent an expedition down to Arabia Felix under Gaius Aelius Gallus.
  According to Strabo, this was launched in 26 BC, but was treacherously
 guided by the Nabataean Syllaeus.  The Romans suffered in the desert 
and did not arrive until the year 24.  They were sick and wasted but 
nevertheless captured some cities and began besieging the city of 
Marsiaba.  Lack of water prevented success, however, and Gallus had to 
retreat.  No effort was made again to project Roman power or impose 
Roman sovereignty -- until Justinian found an ally nearby.





Dhu-Raydan/Himyar
Haris ar-Ra'ishc.120-c.90 BC
Zu-l-Karnainc.90-?
Abrahah Zu-l-Mamur
Africis
Zu-l-Adjarc.20 BC-10 AD
Sharah-bil
Bilkis 
Shammar Zarash
Abu Malik
Yasir Yuhasdiqc.80-c.100
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir Ic.100-c.120
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im
Shammar Yuharish I?-c.160
To Saba, c.160-c.195
Laziz Yuhnaf Yuhasdiqc.195-c.200
Yasir Yuhan'im I
Shammar Yuharish II
Kariba'il Yuhan'im
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'imc.230-c.250
Dhamar 'Ali Watar Yuhabir II
Amdan Bayin Yuhagbid
Yasir Yuhanim II
Shamir Yuhar'ish IIIc.290





Kingdom of Himyar &amp; Saba'
Nash'a-Karib Yamin Yuharhibc.1 AD
Watar YuhaminEra of Himyar, year
1 = 110 BC
= -109 AD
Yasir Yuhasdiq
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir I
Tharan Ya'ubb Yuhan'im
Dhamar 'Ali Yuhabir II
Dhamar 'Ali Bayin
Karib-il Watar
Halk-amar
Dhamar 'Ali Dharih
Yada'-il Watarc.200-?
Il-Adhdh Naufan Yuhasdiqc.245-?
Yasir Yuhan'im II
Shamir Yuhar'ish IIIc.290
conquers Hadramawt; "King of Saba and Dhu Raydan and Hadramawt and Yamanat," 299 AD = 409 Era of Himyar
Yarim Yarhab
To Abyssinia, c.310-c.378
Ela Amida of Axumc.340-c.378
Malik-Karib Yuhaminc.378-c.385
Abi-Karib As'ad (Kamil ut-Tubba)c.385-c.420
accepts Judaism
Warau-amar Ayman (Hasan Yuhan'im)c.420-c.433
Sharah-bil Ya'furc.433-?
Ma'ad-Karib
'Abd-Kilal
Sharah-bil Yakuf464-?
Nauf
Lahi-'Athra Yanuf
Marthad-ilan Yanuf496-?
Ma'adi-Karib Ya'furc.500-c.517
invasion by Abyssinia
Masruq Dhu-Nuwas (Yusuf Ash'ar)c.517-525
convert to Judaism, occupation by Abyssinia, 525-c.533
Sumu-Yafa' Ashwa' (Esimfey, Esimiphaeus)526-c.533
Dhu Jadan of Himyar525-533
Abrahah (al-Ashram) of Abyssiniac.533-570
Era of Himyar 669, 559 AD, last dated South Arabian text
Yaksum570-577
Masruq ibn Abraha (Ma'adi-Karib)577-587
Sayf ibn Dhi-Yazan (Abu Murra)587-599
installed by Persia;
Persia rule, 599-629
Khorre-Khusrau599-620
Badanc.620-629
To Islam, 629

The kingdom of Saba' as the principal state of the area is followed by 
Himyar.  However, according to Hoyland [p.47], Saba', in "strained 
circumstances", formed a "united monarchy" with the Himyarite Dhu 
Raydan.  In the 2nd century AD, Saba' became the dominant state again, 
but then by the end of the 3rd had simply disappeared.  This confused 
process is reflected in conflicting lists from Gordon, who says of 
Dhu-Raydan (Zu-Raidan) that it is, "An earlier core of Himyar.  As with 
Saba above, this list is inconsistent with other sources for Himyar, and
 so I show both."  His list for Dhu-Raydan ends with Shamir Yuhar'ish 
III, who can be found at a similar date (c.290 AD) in the list for 
Himyar.  What we may have is one list of strictly Himyarite rulers, and 
another consisting of many from Saba', until with Shamir Yuhar'ish the 
Sabaean line is gone.

Shamir Yuhar'ish, indeed, appears to be the 
first fully historical ruler in the region, and we even get absolute 
dating in a Himyarite Era, whose Year 1 Benchmark would have been 110 
BC.  This also happens to be the era in which Abyssinia, centered at 
Axum, converts to Christianity (c.305 AD) and helps, at least, in ending
 the long running kingdom of Kushite Ethiopia
 (c.355).  Indeed, Abyssinia begins to intervene in South Arabia itself.
  The list for Himyar notes an Abyssinian occupation c.310-c.378 AD.


We now begin to get political events on a larger scale that 
impact South Arabia.  While Abyssinia, apparently, hardly needed 
encouragement to project its power, it got some anyway.  Its own 
conversion to Christianity went along with a process in which tribes and
 domains in Arabia converted both to Christianity and to Judaism.  A 
number of Yemeni Kings converted to Judaism.  This was annoying to the 
distant Roman Emperor Justinian,
 who encouraged the Ethiopians to do something about it.  The complaint 
was that the Yemenis were persecuting Christians, but then persecution 
often accompanied perceptions that Christian were agents of Rome.  Who 
was initially to blame for this is anyone's guess.  Under the Sassanids,
 Armenians and other Christians were often suspect also.

The Ethiopian Emperor Ella Asbeha
 responded by invading Yemen, 523-525.  The occupation lasted a few 
years longer, and an Abyssinian governor, Abrahah, later established 
himself in his own right -- though Hoyland describes him as installed by
 the Himyarites and merely tributary to Ethiopia.  Attracting distant 
Roman attention, Yemen even became an object of more distant Persian 
interest.  According to Hoyland, discontent with Ethiopian rule (by the 
son of Abrahah), let to solicitations of the Sassanid Shâh Khusro II to intervene.  Where Alexander the Great
 had planned to conquer Arabia by sea, Khusro actually did so.  At first
 installing his own candidate, outright conquest and Persian governors 
then followed (599).  With this wrapped up, Khusro  (temporarily) occupied Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor in a great (and foolish) war against Rome.  While Heraclius
 defeated Khusro in the north, Persian domination in Yemen was brought 
to an end from a very different and portentous quarter -- the forces of 
the Prophet Muh.ammad.


No more profound a change would happen in the history of Yemen 
and South Arabia than would now happen.  The language, the alphabet, the
 age old civilization of the happy South would disappear as the area 
would be assimilated to the ecumenical civilization of Islâm.  
Fortunately, much of what was distinctive would survive, under constant 
siege from Islâm, in the daughter civilization of Ethiopia.  In its 
homeland, the Yemeni past would survive in legend, in ruins, and in some
 practices, but it would become something alien to the new values and 
beliefs.


In the final group of Yemeni Kings, the sequence of events 
narrated by Hoyland does not match very well the sequence in Gordon's 
king list.  I have tried to tidy things up, but Hoyland's description 
isn't complete enough to know what all is going on in the list -- 
another case where I find myself frustrated and annoyed with historians 
who apparently don't think that their narrative histories need to be 
supplemented with chronological framework in tables or lists (or, when 
possible, genealogies).  As already noted, Hoyland's opaque reference to
 "lists of Sabaean rulers" raises more questions than it answers.


The neglect this civilization still suffers is tragic.  Part of 
the problem was the self-imposed isolation of the later Yemeni Kingdom, 
and then many years of political instability and civil war.  Recently, 
however, a great deal of archaeology has been undertaken, and I have 
noticed much more about Yemen in documentaries at places like The History Channel
 than I have in accessible scholarly history books.  Travel is now 
easier, despite some terrorism, and I have a friend who has inspected 
the ruins of the Ma'rib Dam.  I trust that the archaeologists in the 
documentaries will eventually begin to fill in the gaps, clarify the 
uncertainties, and in general provide definitive histories of the area.





RASSIDS, 860-1226
al-Qâsim al-H.asanî ar-Rassîd.860
al-H.usayn
Yah.yâ al-Hâdî ilâ 'l-H.aqq897-911
Muh.ammad al-Murtad.â911-913, d.922
Ah.mad an-Nâs.ir913-934
Yah.yâ934-956
Yûsuf al-Mans.ûr al-Dâ'î968-998,d.1012
al-Qâsim al-Mansur998-1003
al-H.usayn al-Mahdî1010-1013
Ja'far1022-1035
al-H.asan1035-1040
Abu'l-Fath. al-Daylamî an-Nâs.ir1045-1062?
S.an'â' captured by S.ulayh.ids, 1062
H.amza?-1066
al-Fâd.il1067-1068
Muh.ammad?-1085
Yah.yâ1117-1137
'Alî1137-1138
Ah.mad al-Mutawakkil1138-1171
Hamdânid occupation, 1171-1174, Ayyûbid occupation, 1174-1229
'Abdallâh al-Mans.ûr1187-1217
Yah.yâ Najm ad-Dîn al-Hâdî ilâ'l-H.aqq1217
Muh.ammad 'Izz ad-Dîn an-Nâs.ir1217-1226
Rasûlids
Ah.mad al-Mahdî al-Mût.i'1248-1258



The history of Yemen under Islâm, at first submerged in the triumphant Caliphates, assumes a distinctive form and enters into its own characteristic history as the result of the Shi'ite movement and the breakup of the Abbasid
 Caliphate.  The Zaydî branch of Shi'ism held that Zayd, the brother of 
the Fifth Imâm, al-Bâqir, murdered by the Omayyad Caliph al-Hishâm, was 
the true Imâm.  Zaydî doctrine, nevertheless, was that the proper Imâm 
was not necessarily a descendant of the Prophet, but was qualified by 
his own personal moral and spiritual qualities.  Also, they did not 
believe that the Imâm possessed the divine spark and the intuition for 
authoritative doctrinal pronouncements that other Shi'ites believed was 
the mark of the Imâm.

Despite this egalitarian doctrine, the Zaydî sect in Yemen began 
with al-Qâsim al-H.asanî, who claimed descent from Alî's eldest son 
Hassan.  During the reign of al-Ma'mûn (813-833), Al-Qâsim moved from 
Medina and established himself at S.a'da in northern Yemen.  This became
 the center of the Zaydî Mission, whose work (for a while) was far 
ranging, and in time assumed secular authority in competition with other
 local rulers.  Thus, the Imâms by no means dominated Yemen.  Their rule
 became seriously compromised when the S.ulayh.id dynasty occupied 
S.an'â' (which has become the modern capital of Yemen) in 1062 and then 
the Hamdânids in 1171.  After 1258, the line of Imâms continued without 
any political role.  Nevertheless, the Imâms reemerged with secular 
authority in the later Qâsimid
 line.  The name of his initial line, the Rassids, derived from ar-Rass 
in the Hijaz, is used more by Western scholars than by Yemenis.


I have not given the dynasty of Hamdânids here because their predominance is brief.  




AYYÛBIDS
al-Mu'az.z.am Shams udDîn Tûrân Shâh1173-1181 d. 1186/7
al-'Azîz Zahir udDîn Tughtigin1181-1197
Mu'izz udDîn Ismâ'îl1197-1202
anNâs.ir1202-1214
alMu'az.z.am (alMuz.affar) Sulaymân1214-1215 d. 1251/2
al-Mas'ûd S.alâh. adDîn Yûsuf1215-1229



Just as they might have become established, Yemen suddenly became the 
target again of larger political events.  Forces from the powerful Ayyûbid
 dynasty of Egypt now arrive and establish a Ayyûbid collateral line as 
Kings of Yemen -- though the Rassids continued to hold strategic 
positions, including S.an'â' itself.  The genealogy of the Ayyûbid Kings
 of Yemen is given in a popup at the Ayyûbid entry, but for convenience I
 reproduce the link here.
  It will be noted that the affinity of the second to the last king is 
uncertain., and that last one, al-Mas'ûd, is a son of the Sult.ân of 
Egypt, al-Kâmil I -- his own son would be the last Ayyûbid Sult.ân of 
Egypt.




RASÛLIDS, at Ta'izz
al-Mans.ûr 'Umar I Nûr adDîn1229-1250
al-Muz.affar Shams adDîn Yûsuf I1250-1295
al-Ashraf Mumahhid adDîn 'Umar II1295-1296
al-Mu'ayyad H.izabr adDîn Dâwûd1296-1322
al-Mujâhid Sayf ad-Dîn 'Alî1322-1363
al-Afd.al D.irghâm adDîn al-'Abbâs1363-1377
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl I1377-1400
an-Nâs.ir Salâh. adDîn Ah.mad1400-1424
al-Mans.ûr 'Abdallâh1424-1427
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl II1427-1428
az-Z.âhir Yah.yâ1428-1439
al-Ashraf Ismâ'îl III1439-1442
al-Muz.affar Yûsuf II1442-1450/1
al-Afd.al Muh.ammad1442
an-Nâs.ir Ah.mad1442
al-Mas'ûd Salâh. adDîn1443-1454
al-Mu'ayyad al-H.usayn1451-1454



Well before the fall of the Ayyûbids in Egypt (1252), they are replaced 
in Yemen.  This is not done by a local dynasty, but by a Turkish deputy 
left in charge by al-Mas'ûd, who left for Syria.  A genealogy was 
manufactured for al-Mans.ûr from the pre-Islamic Ghassânids, but his 
family had already come to notice as Seljuk envoys (rasûl) of the Abbasid Caliphs.

Although, like the Ayyûbids, the Rasûlids 
were Sunnis, and we might expect local opposition of a religious nature,
 they nevertheless endured more than two centuries with a prosperous and
 culturally productive realm.  From the port of Aden trade extended as 
far as East Africa, India, and China.  Indeed, we arrive at the era in 
which Chinese fleets
 sailed in the Indian Ocean (1405-1433), and a Rasûlid embassy to China 
itself is recorded.  Chinese ships undoubtedly called at Aden.  But the 
Chinese disappeared, soon to be followed by an equally unexpected power.


The chronology of the Rassids is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p.96].  The subsequent Islâmic dynasties are given by Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, which were initially transcribed but are here corrected and supplemented (as with diacritics) from Bosworth.  The New Islamic Dynasties gives many other local dynasties, but here I have tried to confine things to a central succession.





T.ÂHIRIDS, at al-Miqrâna and Juban
az-Z.âfir 'Âmir I Salâh. adDîn1454-1460
al-Mujâhid 'Alî Shams adDîn1454-1478
al-Mans.ûr 'Abd al-Wahhâb Tâj adDîn1478-1489
az-Z.âfir 'Âmir II Salâh. adDîn1489-1517
to Mamlûks, 1517, then Ottomans, 1517-1635



The Rasûlids are ultimately overthrown by a local, but still Sunni,
 family, the T.âhirids, a name that recalls an important family of the 
early days of the Abbasids.  The T.âhirids now witness the epic arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean (1498).  Afonso d'Albuquerque sieged Aden in 1513.  This alarmed the Mamlûks,
 who realized that their trade monopoly from the Mediterranean to India 
had been bypassed.  They began moving against Yemen in 1515 and had 
occupied most of the country by 1517.  Some T.âhirid princes survived in
 fortresses until 1538.  However, it was not to be the Mamlûks who 
eliminated the holdouts.  Just as the Mamlûks completed their conquest 
in South Arabia, Egypt itself was conquered by the Ottoman
 Sult.ân Selim I, "the Grim."  Equally alert to the Portuguese threat, 
the Ottomans inherited the Mamlûk position in Yemen and, for a while, 
vigorously enlarged it.  This also included intervention in the Horn of 
Africa, where the Portuguese had made contact with the long isolated 
Christian Emperors of Ethiopia.
  Portuguese firearms, delivered after an appeal for help by the Emperor
 Lebna Dengel in 1535, enabled the Emperor Galawedos to defeat and kill 
the Imâm of Harer, Ah.mad ibn Ibrahim, at the battle of Lake Tana in 
1543.  Like Ella Asbeha and Justinian many centuries earlier, in 
reverse, Ah.mad had been encouraged and supported by Süleymân the 
Magnificent to move against Ethiopia.  After this epic event, Ottoman 
interest began to wane and the Turkish grip in Yemen slacken -- though 
they only entered S.an'â' itself in 1547.



QÂSIMIDS
al-Qâsim I al-Mans.ûrc.1592/97-1620
Muh.ammad I al-Mu'ayyad1620-1644
S.an'â' occupied, 1629; Ottomans ejected, 1635
Ismâ'îl al-Mutawakkil1644-1676
Ah.mad I al-Mahdî1676-1681
Muh.ammad II al-Mutawakkil1681-1686
Muh.ammed III an-Nâs.ir al-Hâdi1686-1718
al-Qâsim II al-Wutawakkil1718-1727
al-H.usayn al-Mans.ûr1727-1748
al-'Abbâs I al-Mahdî1748-1775
'Alî I al-Mans.ûr1775-1806
Ah.mad II al-Mahdî1806-1808
Ah.mad III al-Mutawakkil1808-1816
'Abdallâh I al-Mahdî1816-1835
'Alî II al-Mans.ûr1835-1837, 1844-1845, 1849-1850, 1857
'Abdallâh II an-Nâs.ir1837-1840
Muh.ammed IV al-Hâdî1840-1844
Muh.ammed V al-Mutawakkil1845-1849
Ottoman attack on S.an'â', 1849
'Abbâs II al-Mu'ayyad1850
Ghâlib al-Hâdî1850-1857
Civil War, 1857-1871; to Ottomans, 1871-1918
Muh.ammed VI al-Mans.ûr1890-1904
Yah.yâ al-Mutawakkil1904-1948
Independent Kingdom, 1918
'Abdallâh (III) al-Hâdî1948
Ah.mad (III) an-Nâs.ir1948-1962
Muh.ammad al-Mans.ûr al-Badr1962, d. 1996
the United Arab Republic, 1958-1961; Civil War, 1962-1970; Republic, 1962-present



Thus, we get the return of the Zaydî Imâms.  At first this was as 
vassals of the Turks, but in short order (1635) the conquerors were 
ejected and Yemen achieved independence.  However, this would be an 
obscure and isolated independence.  Distant power again returned when 
the British seized
 Aden in 1839 to put down pirates and the slave trade.  Aden remained a 
British possession until 1967, and gradually a British Protectorate was 
extended inland and to the east.  Yemen lost its coast on the Indian 
Ocean.

As with the early days of Sheba, there is a conflict between sources for some of the Qâsimi Imâms.  Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996, p.96-97] leaves out several rulers given by Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies -- but also adds a few.  Where Gordon does not give diacritics or honorifics (laqab, like "al-Mans.ûr"), and Bosworth creates confusion by only giving the first year of a reign, I have followed the Oxford Dynasties of the World
 by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002, p.194], which 
may in fact be Gordon's source, but does give diacritics and honorifics.
  I have retained one feature in Bosworth, that there are two Ah.mads 
between 1806 and 1816, not just one.


By the middle of the 19th century there are serious problems.  The Turks, despite their general lethargy, are back, and the Wahhâbîs,
 no doubt taking strong objection to Yemeni Shi'ism, are intervening 
also.  Between civil war and invasion, the Ottomans end up annexing the 
country again by 1871.  But, again, their rule tends to lapse into local
 control, and the Imâms, whose hold on the countryside had never been 
entirely broken, reemerged, at least as vassals, in 1890.  This was the 
situation when World War I shattered Ottoman power at its source.  Yemen
 was simply cut loose, and the Imâm becomes the King of Yemen.


After another bit of conservative and Tibetan isolation, the 
winds of change arrive again.  Yemen joined the Arab League in 1945 and 
then the United Arab Republic, with Egypt and Syria, in 1958.  
Meanwhile, the substantial Jewish population of Yemen, under increasing 
persecution, largely decamped to Palestine and then Israel.
  The King withdrew from the UAR in 1961 but then was overthrown by the 
Nassarite army the following year.  As before, this did not break the 
power of the dynasty, and a long civil war followed, with the King 
supported by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Nassarites by, naturally, the Egypt
 of Gamal Abdel Nasser.  Nasser died in 1970, but, with 150,000 dead, 
the King gave up and went into exile.  Meanwhile, things got more 
complicated when the British left Aden in 1967.  The new People's 
Republic of South Yemen soon lapsed into civil war itself and was 
restyled the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen when the more radical
 Marxists, i.e. the Communists, won the war in 1970.  Bubbling with 
violence, the radicals kept attacking the Yemen Arab Republic, to which 
300,000 refugees, disillusioned with Marxism, fled, and war broke out 
between them in 1979.  In 1990 this got resolved by the actual 
unification of North and South -- now simply known as the Republic of 
Yemen.  The unification came apart in another brief civil war, 1994-95, 
but things got patched back together again.  Although now friendly with 
the West, the country became the scene for one of the Islamist terror attacks leading up to 9/11 -- the bombing of the United States destroyer Cole
 on 12 October 2000 in Aden harbor.  Where the "Democratic Republic" had
 invited Soviet troops in during the 1970's, American forces now help 
hunt down al-Qaeda members.


Index of Mesopotamian and Ancient Middle Eastern History
Hellenistic Index
Islâmic Index
Philosophy of History
Home Page


Copyright (c) 2005 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved








MODERN ISLÂM





The Sultans of Brunei, 1405-present

The Rajahs of Sarawak, 1841-1946



The Shâhs of Irân, 1501-1979

Qâsimids Imâms of Yemen, 1597-1962

The Shihâbî Amîrs of Lebanon, 1697-1842 AD

The House of Sa'ûd, 1735-present

Afghanistan, 1747-1973

The Sult.âns of Oman and Zanzibar, 1754-present

The House of Muh.ammad 'Alî in Egypt, 1805-1953 AD

The Sanûsî Amîrs &amp; Kings of Libya, 1837-1969 AD

The Hâshimites, 1827-present

The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, &amp; Kings of Morocco, 1640-present

The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia, 1705-1957

Prime Ministers &amp; Presidents of Pakistan

Islâmic Fascism and Satyagraha in Palestine




"Modern Islam" here means Ottoman
 successor regimes in the Central Islamic lands, with some states that 
were never Ottoman (like Oman) but rode out the Colonial period into 
significant contemporary roles.  Iran is listed separately, though it 
definitely falls into the latter category.  Morocco alone of the Arab 
world retains a genuinely Mediaeval monarchy.



SULT.ÂNS OF OMAN AND ZANZIBAR
Ah.mad ibn Sa'îdc. 1754-1783
Sa'îd ibn Ah.mad1783-1786
H.âmid ibn Sa'îd1786-1792
Sult.ân ibn Ah.mad1792-1806
Treaty with British East India Company, 1798
Sâlim ibn Sult.ân1806-1821
Sa'îd ibn Sult.ân1806-1856
OMANZANZIBAR
Thuwaynî ibn Sa'îd1856-1866Majîd ibn Sa'îd1856-1870
Sâlim ibn Thuwaynî1866-1868
'Azzân ibn Qays1868-1870
Turkî ibn Sa'îd1870-1888Barghash ibn Sa'îd1870-1888
Fays.al ibn Turkî1888-1913Khalîfa ibn Barghash1888-1890
British Protectorate, 1890
'Alî ibn Sa'îd1890-1893
H.âmid ibn Thuwaynî1893-1896
H.ammûd
ibn Muh.ammad1896-1902
'Alî ibn H.ammûd1902-1911
Taymûr ibn Fays.al1913-1932Khalîfa ibn Kharûb1911-1960
Sa'îd ibn Taymûr1932-1970
'Abdallâh ibn Khalîfa1960-1963
Jamshîd ibn 'Abdallâh1963-1964
Independent, 1963;
Sult.ân Overthown in Coup,
1964
End of British Protection, 1967linked to Tanganyika
as Republic of Tanzania,
1964-present
Qâbûs ibn Sa'îd1970-present



The Âl Bû Sa'îd dynasty, of Muscat, Zanzibar, and Oman, 
essentially exercised Arab sea power in the Indian Ocean until the 
domination of Europe became overwhelming.  After fighting off the 
Portuguese and Dutch, the Omani position was strengthened by an alliance
 with Britain -- which lasted until Britain withdrew from commitments 
East of Suez in 1967.  Sa'îd ibn Sult.ân came to dominate the 
east coast of Africa south of Mogadishu, and mostly ruled from Zanzibar 
after 1827, permanently after 1840.  After his death the Sult.ânate was 
divided.  The British connection proved the ultimate undoing of this 
empire, since Britain began to suppress the slave trade, which was the 
principal business of the Arabs in East Africa, and both Britain and 
Germany began to annex the mainland areas (Kenya and Tanganyika).  
Reduced to British "protection," the Sult.âns of Zanzibar then did 
survive until independence, but after that were promptly overthrown.  
Zanzibar was then absorbed with Tanganyika into the socialist republic 
of Julius Nyerere (1962-1985), a darling of the Left, whose 
harebrained economics managed to dig the country further and further 
into poverty all the years of his rule, despite (more like because of) 
some of the highest levels of foreign aid in the world.  Meanwhile, Oman
 was eventually cut loose by the British and emerged from Mediaeval 
isolation with the Sult.ân still in charge.  Qâbûs ibn Sa'îd is now the last Sult.ân in the Middle East, and the last in Islâm apart from Brunei.&nbsp;




BRUNEI,
Bendaharas

Muhammadc.1514
Ahmadc.1521
Sharif 'Alic.1526
Sulaiman
Bolkiah
Abdul Qahhard.1578
Saif ur-Rijalc.1578-c.1590
Shah Bruneic.1590
Raja Ghafurc.1600
Muhammad Hassanregent,
1601-1617
Abdul-Jalil Akbar1617-c.1637
Abdul-Jalilul Jabbarc.1637-c.1642
Haji Muhammed 'Alic.1642-c.1648
Abdul Hakk Mubinc.1648-1655
Muhyid-Din1655-c.1670
Nasrud-Din
Husin Kamaluddin1670-1680
Muhammad Aliud-Dinc.1680-c.1690
civil war, c.1690-c.1750
Omar 'Ali Saif ud-Din Ic.1750-1780,
d.1795
Muhammed Tajud-Din1780-1792,
1793-1806
Muhammed Jamal ul-'Alam1792-1793
Muhammed Khanzul Alam1806-1822
Raja Api1822
Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din II
Djamal ul-Din1822-1852
Abdul-Mumin1852-1885
Hashim Jalilul 'Alam
Akam ud-Din1885-1906
British Protectorate, 1888-1984,
British Resident, 1906
Muhammed
Jamalul 'Alam II1906-1924
Ahmad Tajud-Din1924-1941,
1945-1950
Japanese occupation, 1941-1945
Sir Omar 'Ali Saifud-Din III1950-1967, d. 1986
Sir Hassanul-Bolkiah1967-present



A sultanate on the
 northeast coast of Borneo, and one of the wealthiest states on Earth, 
due to oil revenues.  Formerly in control over much of the island, it 
became a British Protectorate 1888-1984.  The present Sultan, one of the
 richest men in the world, is well known, if not infamous, for his 
luxuriant lifestyle.  Good looking foreign girls and women recruited for
 innocent sounding jobs have reported some bad experiences.

Some details here are from Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies, but the list is largely based on Clifford Edmund Bosworth's The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996].






&nbsp;





SARAWAK, BROOKE
James1841-1868
Charles Anthony1868-1917
Charles Vyner1917-1942,
1945-1946,
d.1963
Japanese occupation, 1942-1945; Great Britain, 1946-1957; Malaya, 1957-1963; Malaysia, 1963-present





One of the stranger domains in the British Empire,
 perhaps the fantasy of many English boys in the 1890's.  Sarawak was 
granted by the Sultan of Brunei to a British adventurer, James Brooke, 
the "White Rajah of Sarawak," who used it as a base from which to 
eradicate piracy in the South China Sea and headhunting in the interior.
  His successors continued as Rajahs until after the World War II, with a
 domain that ended up larger than the original Sultanate of Brunei.

Then,
 since the place had been so thoroughly trashed by the Japanese, C.V. 
Brooke ceded it to Britain.  Although the Brookes were not Moslems, 
their subjects were, and Sarawak eventually became part of the very 
Moslem country of Malaysia.


The list is from Bruce R. Gordon's Regnal Chronologies and Chester L. Krause and Clifford Mishler, the Standard Catalog of World Coins [Colin R. Bruce II, editor, Krause Publications, Iola, Wisconsin, 1982, p.1227].


Islâmic Index


&nbsp;





The Hashemites, 1827-present

When I lived in Beirut in
 1969-70, one of the principal locations in the city was a large square 
downtown.  It was a transportation hub.  Busses and taxis left from 
there for Damascus and elsewhere.  The place itself was commonly called 
the "Bourj," which means "tower."  There was no tower, but evidently 
there had been, and the name had stuck.  The official name was 
the "Places des Martyrs," which at the time seemed to be about something
 else equally non-existent, since my fellow students and I could not 
imagine what kind of "martyrs" there ever could have been in Lebanese 
history.  As it turned out, there were indeed martyrs, but it was not 
just in Lebanese history.  On August 21, 1915, eleven suspected Arab 
nationalist leaders were hung on that very site in Beirut, oddly called 
"Liberty Square" at the time, by the Turkish military authorities, under
 Jemal Pasha.  On May 6, 1916, the Turks executed twenty-one others, 
seven in Damascus and fourteen in Beirut.  On hearing the news of the latter, Prince Fays.al, son of the Sharîf H.usayn
 of Mecca, who was visiting near Damascus, is supposed to have thrown 
down his headress and exclaimed, "Death has become sweet, Oh Arabs!"  
Fays.al returned to Mecca, and the Arab Revolt against the Turks, long 
in preparation by Fays.al's father, commenced on the 5th of June.


Prince Fays.al and the Sharîf H.usayn were Hashemites, 
i.e. were supposed to be descendants of the Prophet Muh.ammad.  At right
 is the complete genealogy of this descent, as reported by the family 
itself.  I have derived this from a curious source, a book called A Prince of Arabia, the Amir Shereef Ali Haider, by George Stitt [George Allen &amp; Unwin, London, 1948 -- this is from the personal historical library of my friend Tom Dunlap].
  Ali Haider was from the senior or Zaidi branch of the Hashemite 
family, who had supplied most of the Amirs or Sharifs of Mecca until 
1882, when the junior or 'Awni branch took over.  When H.usayn revolted 
against the Turks in 1916, Ali Haider was appointed in his place by the 
Ottoman Sultân.  Ali Haider was never able to go to Mecca and exercised 
no real authority under the Turks.  His son did end up marrying the 
granddaughter of the Ottoman Sultân Murad V (1876).  Histories of the 
period or the area rarely mention him.  Unfortunately, the book about 
him from 1948 uses Anglicized versions of the Arabic names.  I have not 
supplied the proper transcriptions for all the names.  Other information
 here is from Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties [Edinburgh University Press, 1996], and from George Antonius, The Arab Awakening [1946, Capricorn Books, New York, 1965]. 


The romance of the Arab Revolt, with Lawrence of Arabia and all, 
and its success in sweeping all the way to Damascus, as the British 
advanced into Palestine, came to be fully balanced by bitterness at the 
British betrayal of assurances for Arab independence after the war.  The
 British had made promises elsewhere, to the French and to the Zionists,
 and not a lot of care had been taken in the desperate days of the war 
to keep all these undertakings consistent with each other.  Initially, 
the worse betrayal seemed to be over Syria.  With Fays.al in possession 
of Damascus, he was elected King of Syria in 1920; but in short order 
the French, to whom the British had handed control of Lebanon, as they 
had honestly warned the Arabs they would, moved in force to occupy 
Damascus and the rest of Syria, which the British had agreed with them, 
but not with the Arabs, that they could do.  Fays.al was tossed out.  
The French commemorated this victory by carving a stele in the rock at 
the Nahr al-Kalb (the Dog River) in Lebanon, joining earlier stelae by 
the Egyptians, Assyrians, and others.  After the Vichy French were 
overthrown in Lebanon and Syria, in turn, in World War II, the stele 
naturally was attacked and mutilated beyond recognition.




The Hâshimites, 1827 AD-present
Mecca and H.ijâz
'Abd al-Mut.t.alibSharîf of Mecca,
1827, 1851-1856,
1880-1882
Muh.ammad1827-1851, 1856-1858
'Abdullâh1858-1877
al-H.usayn1877-1880
'Awn al-Rafîq1882-1905
'Alî1905-1908
H.usayn1908-1916
Arab Revolt
against Turkey,
1916-1918
King, 1916-1925
Caliph, 1924-1925,
d. 1931
'AliKing, 1925,
d. 1934
Overthrown by Ibn Sa'ûd
"Greater Syria"
Fays.alKing, 1920
Overthrown by France
Iraq, British Mandate
Fays.al IKing, 1921-1933
Independence,
end of British Mandate, 1932
Ghâzî1933-1939
Fays.al II1939-1958
pro-German coup suppressed, 1941;
King overthrown &amp; killed
in Coup, 1958
Transjordan, British Mandate
'Abdullâh IAmîr, 1921-1946
End of British
Mandate, 1946
King, 1946-1951,
assassinated
Arab Legion enters Palestine, 1948;
Kingdom of Jordan,
annexation of the West Bank, 1949
T.alâl1951-1952, d. 1972
H.usayn1952-1999
Six Day War, Israeli Occupation of the
West Bank, 1967; "Black September,"
Palestinian guerrillas ousted from
Jordan, 1970; peace treaty with
Israel, 1994
'Abdullâh II1999-

The British sense of fair play in such circumstances manifested 
itself as a desire to compensate individuals.  There was rarely a sense 
in British policy that popular sentiment might be something to reckon 
with.  Thus, Fays.al was personally compensated with the throne of Iraq,
 which for a decade was maintained as a British Mandate.  This may or 
may not have reconciled Fays.al to all that had happened.  But it 
certainly did not reconcile his father, the old Sharîf of Mecca, now 
King of the H.ijâz, H.usayn.  Nothing could reconcile H.usayn to what 
had happened, and his attitude resulted in a dangerous break with the 
British -- very dangerous for H.usayn because his ambitious neighbor, Ibn Sa'ûd, remained on good terms with the British and was supported by subsidies.


One of H.usayn's other sons, 'Abdullâh, even led a small 
force north, evidently to contest Syria with the French.  However, 
before 'Abdullâh crossed the French border, he was persuaded that 
perhaps he should stay where he was, just across the Jordan River, in a 
area of vague jurisdiction.  This was at the time considered part of 
Syria, but the French evidently had no use for it, and its proximity to 
Palestine put it more or less in the British sphere of influence.  So 
'Abdullâh settled down as the Amîr of the Transjordan, filling in the 
space between British Palestine and British Iraq.


This did not improve the humor of 'Abdullâh's father, whose 
leadership turned out to be not much better than his diplomacy.  When Kemal Attatürk abolished the Ottoman Caliphate
 in 1924 (the Sult.ânate had already been abolished in 1922), H.usayn 
decided that if it was anyone's business to be Caliph, it was his.  
Indeed, the last bona fide Abbasid
 Caliph had been carted off to Constantinople in 1517, and it was only 
after three hundred years or so that the Ottoman Sult.âns began to claim
 that the office had been passed on to them.  This unlikely and 
irregular transmission, however, eventually came to be accepted by many 
Moslems, and the abolition of the office left Islâm without somebody
 to claim it for the first time in Islâmic history.  From a dynasty that
 had served as the Guardians of the Holy Cities for some time, and which
 was accepted as belonging to the Hashimite clan of the Prophet himself,
 it must have seemed quite reasonable to H.usayn, as it still seems 
fairly reasonable in retrospect, that the office should fall to him.


At the time, however, nobody was buying this, and H.usayn's 
reputation was badly damaged.  Ibn Sa'ûd and his Wahhabi fundamentalists
 began protesting and threatening, and H.usayn had put himself in no 
good position to resist them.  When consensus is so important in 
the tradition of Islâmic Law, H.usayn would have been better advised to 
first solicit opinions from respected jurists about whether there needed
 to be a Caliph, who would be appropriate for it, etc.  In 1925 he 
abdicated in favor of his eldest son 'Alî, but this did not stop Ibn Sa'ûd.  The H.ijâz soon joined the Sa'ûdî central Arabian domain of Najd in the new Kingdom of Sa'ûdî Arabia.
  Then Ibn Sa'ûd's British subsidies soon gave way to income of a 
different sort, when vast oil reserves were discovered under the Arabian
 sands.  But H.usayn and 'Alî could only flee to the welcome of 
'Abdullâh's court in the Transjordan to live out the rest of their 
lives.


Britain's other conflicting promises, over Palestine, prepared 
the way for the most dangerous and intractable problem in all of 20th 
Century politics, diplomacy, and war, as Jewish colonists sought, and 
achieved, the creation of a Jewish State, Israel, in Palestine.  The 
best showing by an Arab army in the 1948 war was, ironically, the 
British commanded Arab Legion of 'Abdullâh, at that point King of the 
Transjordan.  Yet 'Abdullâh had no particular animus against either Jews
 or Zionists, and rumor maintains that in a secret meeting with Golda 
Meir he actually proposed some kind of condominium over Palestine 
between the Zionists and himself.  This was rejected, but then 'Abdullâh
 subsequently annexed the Palestinian territory that he ended up 
occupying, creating simply the Kingdom of (the) Jordan.  Since 
the Palestinian fire-eaters were all ready to found their own radical 
Palestinian republic in the land preserved from Israel, this move earned
 'Abdullâh his own assassination.  Now, ironically, by conquering 
Jordanian Palestine in 1967, the Israelis have ended up with the 
fire-eaters in their own house, setting off bombs.


The throne of Jordan soon passed over 'Abdullâh's mentally incompetent son T.alâl to his grandson H.usayn.
  In 1999, H.usayn, having endured every war, revolution, and upheaval 
since, died after a long fight with cancer.  Thus passed a man of 
astonishing durability in the merciless politics of the Middle East, 
although hated by many Arabs for his suppression of armed Palestinian 
organizations in Jordan (in "Black September").  H.usayn, the namesake 
of his great-grandfather and eyewitness to his grandfather's 
assassination, was the last living link to the Arab Revolt.  Although he
 was long denigrated as a reactionary, who wasn't in tune with all the 
great new Marxist Arab Nationalism of the 50's, 60's, and 70's, H.usayn 
survived into a era when it is hard to tell the Marxists from the 
Mujâhidûn (Islâmic fighters in the Holy War), and where the folly of 
each is, or should be, fairly obvious.  To everyone's surprise, H.usayn 
had, just a couple weeks before his death, disinherited his brother 
H.assan, the Crown Prince for 34 years, and left the Throne to his son 
'Abdullâh, who thus becomes King 'Abdullâh II of Jordan.  (One hopes this was not entirely a surprise to H.assan.)  H.usayn's second cousin, King Fays.al II
 of Iraq, unfortunately, was overthrown and murdered in 1958, sending 
Iraq down a path to a despotism which it was doomed to long endure.  
Only now, in 2003, after three wars, has the dictator of Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein, been overthrown, thanks to an American and British invasion of 
the country.


The 1st Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1980, hoping to 
seize the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab (the confluence of the Tigris 
and Euphrates) from Irân,
 whose military had been weakened by purges of the Shah's officers.  By 
1982 the Iranians managed, with suicidal "human wave" attacks, to throw 
Hussein back, and he was willing to call it quits; but the Ayatollah 
Khomeini refused to let up.  It didn't do much good, and, even though 
Khomeini said he would rather "drink poison," he finally accepted a 
ceasefire in 1988.  The 2nd Gulf War was initiated by Hussein in 1990, 
invading and occupying Kuwait.  Just a year later a coalition of 
American, Arab, and European forces threw Hussein out of Kuwait.  
Although warned that it might precipitate a global ecological disaster, 
Hussein ordered the torching of over 600 oil wells as Iraqi forces 
retreated from Kuwait.  Fortunately, although it was a terrible mess, 
the disaster was of more limited consequence.  Iraqi territory itself 
was not occupied, and revolts by Shi'ites in the south of Iraq and Kurds
 in the north were brutally suppressed by Hussein.  Iraq subsequently 
was under UN sanctions until the destruction of its nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons programs could be certified.  American and 
British air power patrolled "no fly zones" in the north and south of the
 country.  This didn't really make much difference in the south, but in 
the north it protected what had become an autonomous Kurdish domain.  UN
 inspectors could not certify that Hussein had destroyed his 
unconventional weapons, and they even left the country in 1998 after 
Iraqi non-cooperation.  In 2003, the 3rd Gulf War was initiated by the 
United States and Britain, principally, with the determination, 
apparently, that it was simply high time to resolve the matter and get 
rid of Hussein -- especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
United States.  Hussein was overthrown, later captured, tried, and 
finally executed -- shamefully taunted at his hanging by Shi'ite 
executioners.


Iraq itself, however, although now (2007) with a democratically 
elected government, in which all groups managed to participate, 
nevertheless is a place of constant violence.  The Sunni minority, with 
Baathist diehards, began an "uprising" rather than live under 
governments dominated by the Shi'ite majority.  Although this is 
portrayed, often by Western sympathizers, as a national struggle against
 American occupation, most of the casualties have been civilian victims 
of suicide bombers and car bombs.  There have also been attacks against 
Islamic sites, like the Golden Mosque in Samara, which was associated 
with Shi'ism.  These tactics in part are the inspiration of al-Qa'ida 
and effected by an influx of foreign Jihadists.  Substantial parts of 
the Sunni community are now tiring of this, especially since the 
Shi'ites have answered in kind, with help from the Shi'ite motherland, 
Iran.  Since the Shi'ites and Iran have little more sympathy for America
 than they do for the Sunnis, American (and British) forces tend to get 
caught in the middle.  Nevertheless, it is the interest of the West, the
 International Community, and Iraq that neither Sunnis nor Shi'ites have
 an outright victory, and the only way to prevent that and mediate a 
settlement is for a third party (the Americans) to maintain the balance.
  Meanwhile, the Kurds, although provoking Turkey by supporting Kurdish 
terrorists there, have been relatively safe and prosperous in their part
 of Iraq -- now behind a dike to inhibit terrorist infiltration.  They 
have even paid for commercials on American television with thanks for 
American efforts.  With many in American politics cynically and 
opportunistically hoping to benefit from a defeat in Iraq, however, as 
they benefited from defeat in Vietnam (along with Isolationists and simple anti-American Leftists),
 those efforts may not continue much longer.  Meanwhile, all the major 
communities seem to have joined in an ethnic purge of Iraqi Christians, 
the Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, Chaldeans and Assyrians.
  As with the persecution of Christians anywhere, this draws little 
attention from the Western Press (whose template is that Christians are 
as bad as Muslim Jihadists), and the numbers of Iraqi Christians are too
 small to figure in most geopolitical calculations.


Note on the modern Assyrians


The whole area around the Bourj in Beirut was destroyed in the 
Lebanese civil war of the 70's and 80's.  Plenty of new martyrs were 
created, though it is not clear what the cause was supposed to be
 when the Lebanese largely destroyed their own country and slaughtered 
each other, opening the door to a Syrian occupation of much of the 
country, something that no Lebanese of any faction really wanted.  After
 some years of relative peace, chaos has returned as Syria evidently 
continues to promote its interests (starting with key assassinations) 
and both radicalized Shi'ites and Sunni Jihadists display little desire 
to live peaceful, ordinary lives.


Islâmic Index





Modern Morocco and Tunisia1640-present



The 'Alawid Sharîfs, Sult.âns, &amp; Kings of Morocco
Muh.ammad ash-Sharîf1631-1659
Muh.ammad I1635-1664
ar-Rashîd1666-1672
Ismâ'îlSult.ân, 1672-1727
Ah.mad1727-1728, 1728-1729
'Abd al-Malik1728
'Abd Allâh1729-1734, 1736, 1740-1741, 1741-1742, 1743-1747, 1748-1757
'Alî1734-1736
Muh.ammad II1736-1738
al-Mustad.î'1738-1740, 1742-1743, 1747-1748, d.1760
Zayn al-'Abidîn1741
Muh.ammad III1757-1790
Yazîd1790-1792
Hishâm1792-1798, d.1799
Sulaymân1798-1822
'Abd ar-Rahmân1822-1859
Muh.ammad IV1859-1873
al-H.asan I1873-1894
'Abd al-'Azîz1894-1908, d.1943
'Abd al-H.âfiz.1908-1912, d.1937
French Protectorate, 1912-1956
Yûsuf1912-1927
Muh.ammad V1927-1953, 1955-1957, King, 1957-1961
Muh.ammad VI1953-1955, d.1976
al-H.asan II1961-1999
Muh.ammad VII1999-present

Morocco continues more or less as it had from the Middle Ages, 
even exerting some influence south of the Sahara.  As the Turkish 
presence waned in Algeria and Tunisia, the area lapsed into a chaos of 
small states, whose principal business became piracy and slaving.  This 
provoked the occasional sharp response from the European powers, but 
nothing got settled until in 1830 the French arrived to subdue Algeria. 
 This ended the piracy and makes Algeria the most important French 
colony for the next 132 years, with a large population of French 
colonial farmers, the pieds noirs.  While colonialism became the bête noire of Marxism, 




The H.usaynid Beys of Tunisia
H.usayn I1705-1735
'Alî I1735-1756
Muh.ammad I1756-1759
'Alî II1759-1782
H.amûda1782-1814
'Uthmân1814
Mah.mûd1814-1824
H.usayn II1824-1835
Mus.t.afâ1835-1837
Ah.mad I1837-1855
Muh.ammad II1855-1859
Muh.ammad III as-S.âdiq1859-1882
French Occupation, 1881-1883; Protectorate, 1883-1956
'Alî III1882-1902
Muh.ammad IV1902-1906
Muh.ammad V1906-1922
Muh.ammad VI al-H.abîb1922-1929
Ah.mad II1929-1942
Muh.ammad VII al-Muns.if1942-1943, d.1948
Muh.ammad VIII1943-1957, d.1962
Rashâd al-MahdîKing, 1957
Republic of Tunisia, 1957-present



the problem of these French colonials wracked France, brought down the Fourth Republic, and provoked an attempted coup against the founder of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle.

From the colonial foundation of Algeria, France began to lean on 
Morocco and Tunisia.  As Britain embarked on a long term occupation of Egypt
 in 1882, France, which had backed off joining the British move, 
consolidated control over Tunisia instead.  The H.usaynid Beys then 
lasted, as French clients, all the way to independence.  Briefly, it 
looked like the dynasty might survive independence, but the nationalist 
leader, Habib Bourgiba (H.abîb Bû Ruqayba), in the tradition of many other familiar dictators, did not need a tradtionalistic rival to his authority.


The Moroccan experience was different.  While France moved 
steadily to consolidate its influence, this was not without complaint 
from other European powers.  World War I nearly started early with the 
Agadir incident in 1911, as Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II
 offered hope that Germany would dispute any French designs on the 
Sultânate.  As it happened, the War waited a couple more years and a 
French Protectorate was nevertheless imposed in 1912.  Morocco then 
later became the scene of the mythic presence of "Rick" in the classic 
movie Casblanca, not far from the real life drama of American 
troops landing in November 1942, to precipitate French North Africa back
 into World War II against Germany.  The Germans chased out, Morocco 
became the first French possession to regain independence, not in the 
dangerous grip of nationalist ideology, but still under the control of 
the traditional monarchy, the only such traditional national monarchy 
surviving in the Arab world from the Middle Ages.


Morocco and Tunisia now look like islands of bliss in comparison 
to Algeria, where dictatorship was supposed to end with elections, but 
then, when the elections went to Islâmic fundamentalists, the army set 
them aside in favor of a more moderate dictatorship.  The result has 
been a particularly nasty kind of civil war, in which whole villages 
have been massacred by forces that don't even acknowledge which side 
they are fighting for.  This frightening and perplexing dilemma is 
beginning to seem all too common in the Islâmic world, where the most 
vicious radicals nevertheless seem to command genuine popularity and 
prestige.  It is thus an example of the challenge of Islamic Fascism that is beginning to characterize our era.


These tables are based on both The New Islamic Dynasties by Clifford Edmund Bosworth [Edinburgh University Press, 1996] and the Oxford Dynasties of the World
 by John E. Morby [Oxford University Press, 1989, 2002].  The 'Alawid 
Sharîfs and H.usaynid Beys are treated by both sources.  Morby has a 
clearer presentation, but Bosworth also has a brief discussion of the 
history.
&nbsp;


Islâmic Index





The House of Su'ûd &amp; Saudi Arabia,1735-present



The House of Su'ûd
Su'ûd ibn Muh.ammadAmîr of Dir'iyya,
d.1735
Muh.ammad I1735-1765
'Abd al-'Azîz I1765-1803
Su'ûd I1803-1814
'Abdallâh I1814-1819
Egyptian Occupation, 1818-1822
Turkî1822-1834
Mushârî1834
Fays.al I1834-1838,
1843-1865
Egyptian Occupation, 1838-1843
Khâlid IVassal of Egypt,
1838-1841
'Abdallâh IIVassal of Egypt,
1841-1843
'Abdallâh III1865-1871,
1874?-1887
governor,
1887-1889
Su'ûd II1871-1874
Muh.ammad II1887
Conquest and rule by Rashîdîs,
1887-1902
'Abd al-Rah.mângovernor,
1889-1891
Muh.ammad IIIgovernor,
1891
Direct rule by Rashîdîs,
1891-1902
'Abd al-'Azîz IIAmîr, 1902-1926;
King of Najd
and H.ijâz, 1926-1932;
King of Sa'ûdî
Arabia, 1932-1952
Su'ûd III1952-1964
Fays.al II1964-1975
Khâlid II1975-1982
Fahd1982-2005
'Abdallâh IV2005-

The central lands of the Arabian peninsula, the Najd ("highland, 
upland"), is not a place of much significance in world history -- until 
recently.  The House of Su'ûd has made it significant.  At first this 
was just for religious reasons.  The amirs allied themselves with a 
fundamentalist religious movement, the Wahhâbîs; and at the 
beginning of the 19th century, they began to trouble the Ottoman 
authorities at Mecca and Medina for the insufficient orthodoxy and 
purity of their institutions.  Since the Wahhabis did not believe that 
graves should be marked, lest individuals receive respect and devotion 
that is only owing to God, even the Prophet's Tomb in Medina was not 
above suspicion.  The threat became so serious that the Sult.ân asked Muh.ammad 'Alî
 of Egypt to intervene.  The Su'ûdîs were sharply defeated and driven 
out of the Hijaz (1818).  The job, however, had to be done all over 
again twenty years later (1838).  This time the Egyptians maintained 
indirect control for a few years subsequently.  Freed from Egyptian 
control, the Su'ûdis soon were more permanently subordinated to other 
Arabian princes, the Rashîdîs.

The realm was permanently liberated from outside control by a 
formidable ruler, 'Abd al-'Azîz (II) ibn Su'ûd.  In his long reign 
(1902-1952), 'Abd al-'Azîz transformed the fortunes of his realm, by 
diplomacy, by war, and by extraordinary good fortune.  Thus, a cash 
subsidy from the British meant that he was in the right place and at the
 right time to take advantage of the falling out between the British and
 the new king H.ussayn
 of the Hijaz, the erstwhile leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks
 in World War I.  By deposing H.usayn in 1925, 'Abd al-'Azîz was soon 
able to unify the central Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf right 
across to the Red Sea.  This then became the Kingdom of Sa'ûdî Arabia.
  Before long the British subsidies were no longer necessary, since the 
discovery of vast oil reserves in the Persian Gulf soon brought in 
wealth such as the bare lands of Arabia had never seen before.  The 
Najdi capital of Riyadh was at first so miserable that foreign embassies
 had been confined to Jiddah.  Now "Arab" became a byword for "wealth."


Despite incredible wealth, kicked into overdrive by the Arab oil 
boycott in 1973, Sa'ûdî Arabia remained deeply conservative and 
religiously fundamentalist, as in the early days of the Wahhâbîs.  
Alcohol is prohibited in the Kingdom.  Women cannot drive cars without 
the company of a man.  Nor can women work in mixed company or appear on 
television without a veil.  The full rigors of Islâmic law mean that 
fornication (let alone adultery) can be punished by death (beheading) 
and theft by the amputation of a hand.  A special religious police force
 looks after moral improprieties, including even excessive laughter in 
one's home.


The rigors of Islâm, however, did not necessarily strike other 
Arabs as the most objectionable thing about Sa'ûdî Arabia.  Revolutions 
in Iraq, Syria, and especially Egypt, with promulgation of ideologies 
like Nasser's "Arab socialism," led to the desire and expectation that 
the "reactionary regimes," i.e. monarchies and pro-Western governments, 
would eventually all be swept away.  The Sa'ûdîs had some natural 
advantages against this.  'Abd al-'Azîz begat literally dozens of 
children, and this formed a tight family corporation for the control of 
the country.  At the same time, the Nasserites and socialists, by their 
close association with the Soviet Union, handed the Sa'ûdîs a powerful 
card:  &nbsp;the atheism of the Communists, of no particular concern to 
Nasser, was anathema to the fundamentalists.  For many years beyond the 
time it made the slightest bit of sense, the Kingdom always linked 
Israel and the Soviets as the twin pillars of Communist atheism.


In more institutional terms, since a military coup was always the
 most serious threat to a Middle Eastern state, the Sa'ûdîs created two 
entirely separate military establishments, the regular military and a 
national guard, that could serve as checks on each other.  The Kingdom 
thus rode out the high tide of Arab revolution.  As Egypt and Jordan 
made peace with Israel, and then Iraq threatened the Sa'ûdîs with a 
surprise conquest of Kuwait (another "reactionary" Emirate), the Kingdom
 found itself in a grand alliance of Egypt, Syria, Britain, France, and 
the United States to liberate Kuwait.  Meanwhile, a threat to the 
Sa'ûdîs had come from a very different kind of revolution, the Iranian upheaval of the Ayatollah Khomeini.  With the beginning of the Islamic year 1400, in December 1979, Iranian inspired fanatics took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, which houses the Ka'aba,
 the House of God, built by Abraham, the most sacred place in all of 
Islâm.  A bloody firefight, damaging the building, was necessary to 
defeat the fanatics.  Henceforth, Iranians were closely watched and 
controlled while on pilgrimage (nothing new, actually, in Orthodox 
Mecca, where Richard Burton, impersonating a Moslem, observed much the 
same thing in the 19th century).


In 2001, the Sa'ûdîs, still ruled by sons of 'Abd al-'Azîz
 (he had 43 of them, from 1900 to 1947), seemed secure enough.  When 
OPEC drives up oil prices, the Kingdom wins browny points with the West 
(and makes extra money) by underselling Cartel prices.  Conservative 
Islâm is under no threat from any non-Western sources, though the 
occasional wild Prince, like the one with the nude statuary with painted
 pubic hair at his house in Beverly Hills, must be intensely 
embarrassing.  I always wonder about the Sa'ûdî girls I knew in Beirut 
in 1969-1970, who used to change into see-through blouses on the flights
 from Jiddah to Beirut.  Either they live a private life secure from the
 religious police (police invasions of domestic privacy common in the 
West would provoke serious bloodshed in Arabia), or they have moved to 
the West.  As conservative guardians of the Holy Cities of Islâm, Sa'ûdî
 Arabia is probably in an ideologically position stronger than for most 
of the 20th century.  Islâm everywhere has tended to gravitate toward 
the Wahhâbî positions, rather than away from them.


The terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11/2001 put 
conservative Islâm in a somewhat different light.  Sa'ûdî subsidies to 
Islamic schools in countries like Pakistan have helped breed a 
generation of fanatics with a great hatred of modernity and the West.  
The mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Osama ben Ladin, was himself a 
Sa'ûdî millionaire, stripped of his citizenship, who had created a 
state-within-a-state in T.âlibân Afghanistian.  T.âlibân
 itself ominously means "students," i.e. students from the Pakistani 
Islâmic schools.  The Sa'ûdîs are (officially) mortified by all this; 
but many Americans, particularly but not exclusively those sympathetic 
to Israel, are
 suddenly suspicious of a presumably friendly regime whose consistent 
actions have tended, not surprisingly, to promote anti-Americanism.  
There is undoubtedly an inner inconistency in Sa'ûdî policy, which is 
overtly friendly, indeed dependent (with American troups stationed in 
the country), with the country whose culture represents the whole threat
 of freedom and modernity to Wahhâbî conservatism and the theocratic 
aspect of the Sa'ûdî state.  Where previously the threat to the Sa'ûdî 
state had been from the Left, things like Nasser's "Arab Socialism," now
 the threat may be from the Right, from people who view any remnant of 
secular pragmatism and Realpolitik in Sa'ûdî policy as irreligious -- the people who have created the present ideology of Islamic Fascism.  This is an unusual position for the House of Su'ûd, and it may force some unpleasant choices upon them.


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Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved