Question: – The Senate Intelligence Committee has dropped its long-awaited report on the CIA's use of torture, and it pulls no punches in its 528 pages, detailing a "brutal and far worse than the CIA represented" program that ultimately was "not an effective means of acquiring intelligence," reports the Washington Post. The report unveils tactics such as "rectal hydration" that were designed to gain "total control over the detainee," notes the New York Times, as well as waterboarding that was really a "series of near drownings." Some key details: The CIA lied: The agency "provided inaccurate information to the White House, Congress, the Justice Department, the CIA inspector general, the media, and the American public," as per NPR. The Post notes that one memo ordered the program be hidden from Colin Powell, because he would "blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what’s going on." The brutality: Detainees were subjected to "slaps and 'wallings' (slamming detainees against a wall) ... frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation" for up to 180 hours, nudity, and ice baths. One interrogator told a detainee he could never go to court because "we can never let the world know what I have done to you." Detainees exhibited "hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation." The fallout: The program "damaged the United States' standing in the world," "created tensions with US partners and allies," and cost America its "longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and torture in particular," the report says. The CIA's response: In a statement, Director John Brennan admits the program "had shortcomings and that the Agency made mistakes," but contends that it "did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives." President Obama's response: He hopes we can now leave the tactics "where they belong—in the past," he says, per the AP. They "were not only inconsistent with our values as nation, they did not serve our broader counterterrorism efforts or our national security interests." The Washington Post highlights 20 key findings.

Expand this summary.
Answer: The report is more than 6,000 pages long, but the committee voted in April to declassify only its 524-page executive summary and a rebuttal by Republican members of the committee. The investigation was conducted by the committee’s Democratic majority and their staffs. Many of the C.I.A.'s most extreme interrogation methods, including waterboarding, were authorized by Justice Department lawyers during the Bush administration. But the report also found evidence that a number of detainees had been subjected to other, unapproved methods while in C.I.A. custody. 
  
 The torture of prisoners at times was so extreme that some C.I.A. personnel tried to put a halt to the techniques, but were told by senior agency officials to continue the interrogation sessions. 
  
 Image The Senate report describes the waterboarding of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as a "series of near drownings." Credit Associated Press 
  
 The Senate report quotes a series of August 2002 cables from a C.I.A. facility in Thailand, where the agency’s first prisoner was held. Within days of the Justice Department’s approval to begin waterboarding the prisoner, Abu Zubaydah, the sessions became so extreme that some C.I.A. officers were “to the point of tears and choking up,” and several said they would elect to be transferred out of the facility if the brutal interrogations continued. 
  
 Questions From Within 
  
 During one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah became “completely unresponsive with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” The interrogations lasted for weeks, and some C.I.A. officers began sending messages to the agency’s headquarters in Virginia questioning the utility — and the legality — of what they were doing. But such questions were rejected. 
  
 “Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-à-vis operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable traffic),” wrote Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., then the head of the C.I.A.'s Counterterrorism Center. 
  
 Image Abu Zubaydah’s torture moved some C.I.A. officers to tears. Credit U.S. Central Command, via Associated Press 
  
 “Such language is not helpful.” 
  
 The Senate report found that the detention and interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah and dozens of other prisoners were ineffective in giving the government “unique” intelligence information that the C.I.A. or other intelligence agencies could not get from other means. 
  
 The report also said that the C.I.A.'s leadership for years gave false information about the total number of prisoners held by the C.I.A., saying there had been 98 prisoners when C.I.A. records showed that 119 men had been held. In late 2008, according to one internal email, a C.I.A. official giving a briefing expressed concern about the discrepancy and was told by Mr. Hayden, then the agency’s director, “to keep the number at 98” and not to count any additional detainees. ||||| Statement from Director Brennan on the SSCI Study on the Former Detention and Interrogation Program 
  
 December 9, 2014 
  
 Over the past several decades, and especially since the terrible tragedy of 9/11, the CIA has been at the forefront of our Nation’s campaign against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations worldwide. The women and men of the CIA have operated around the globe, 24-hours-a-day, working with their U.S. colleagues as well as with foreign partners to prevent terrorist attacks. As a result of these efforts, including the many sacrifices made by CIA officers and their families, countless lives have been saved and our Homeland is more secure. 
  
 As part of the CIA’s global effort to dismantle al-Qa’ida and to prevent future terrorist attacks, the Agency was directed by President Bush six days after 9/11 to carry out a program to detain terrorist suspects around the world. Certain detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), which the Department of Justice determined at the time to be lawful and which were duly authorized by the Bush Administration. These techniques, which were last used by the CIA in December 2007, subsequently were prohibited by an Executive Order issued by President Obama when he took office in January 2009. 
  
 Today, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a redacted version of the Executive Summary, Findings, and Conclusions of its Study on CIA’s former detention and interrogation program, along with Minority Views and the Additional Views of a number of Committee members on the same subject. The CIA has also released its redacted June 2013 response to the Study, which is being posted on our website, www.cia.gov. 
  
 As noted in CIA’s response to the study, we acknowledge that the detention and interrogation program had shortcomings and that the Agency made mistakes. The most serious problems occurred early on and stemmed from the fact that the Agency was unprepared and lacked the core competencies required to carry out an unprecedented, worldwide program of detaining and interrogating suspected al-Qa’ida and affiliated terrorists. In carrying out that program, we did not always live up to the high standards that we set for ourselves and that the American people expect of us. As an Agency, we have learned from these mistakes, which is why my predecessors and I have implemented various remedial measures over the years to address institutional deficiencies. 
  
 Yet, despite common ground with some of the findings of the Committee’s Study, we part ways with the Committee on some key points. Our review indicates that interrogations of detainees on whom EITs were used did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives. The intelligence gained from the program was critical to our understanding of al-Qa’ida and continues to inform our counterterrorism efforts to this day. 
  
 We also disagree with the Study’s characterization of how CIA briefed the program to the Congress, various entities within the Executive Branch, and the public. While we made mistakes, the record does not support the Study’s inference that the Agency systematically and intentionally misled each of these audiences on the effectiveness of the program. Moreover, the process undertaken by the Committee when investigating the program provided an incomplete and selective picture of what occurred. As noted in the Minority views and in a number of additional views of Members, no interviews were conducted of any CIA officers involved in the program, which would have provided Members with valuable context and perspective surrounding these events. 
  
 Throughout its 67-year history, CIA has played a critical role keeping our Nation secure, and CIA officers are rightly proud and honored to be part of an organization that is indispensable to our national security. The numerous challenges on the world stage demand the full attention, focus, and capabilities of the women and men of the CIA so that our country can stay strong and our fellow Americans remain safe. To be successful, the CIA needs to work closely with its Congressional oversight committees as we confront these challenges. With today’s release of Committee documents and the CIA response, we look forward to the way ahead. 
  
 Related Documents: 
  
 * Adobe® Reader® is needed to view Adobe PDF files. If you don't already have Adobe Reader installed, you may download the current version at www.adobe.com (opens in a new window). [external link disclaimer] ||||| The Washington Post's Greg Miller lists the important takeaways from the CIA interrogation report and explains why it is being released now. (The Washington Post) 
  
 The Washington Post's Greg Miller lists the important takeaways from the CIA interrogation report and explains why it is being released now. (The Washington Post) 
  
 An exhaustive five-year Senate investigation of the CIA’s secret interrogations of terrorism suspects renders a strikingly bleak verdict on a program launched in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, describing levels of brutality, dishonesty and seemingly arbitrary violence that at times brought even agency employees to moments of anguish. 
  
 The report by the Senate Intelligence Committee delivers new allegations of cruelty in a program whose severe tactics have been abundantly documented, revealing that agency medical personnel voiced alarm that waterboarding methods had deteriorated to “a series of near drownings” and that agency employees subjected detainees to “rectal rehydration” and other painful procedures that were never approved. 
  
 [Read: Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the CIA program] 
  
 The 528-page document catalogues dozens of cases in which CIA officials allegedly deceived their superiors at the White House, members of Congress and even sometimes their peers about how the interrogation program was being run and what it had achieved. In one case, an internal CIA memo relays instructions from the White House to keep the program secret from then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell out of concern that he would “blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what’s been going on.” 
  
 A declassified summary of the committee’s work discloses for the first time a complete roster of the 119 prisoners held in CIA custody and indicates that at least 26 were held because of mistaken identities or bad intelligence. The publicly released summary is drawn from a longer, classified study that exceeds 6,000 pages. 
  
 [View timeline: The CIA’s use of enhanced interrogation] 
  
 The report’s central conclusion is that harsh interrogation measures, deemed torture by program critics including President Obama, did not work. The panel deconstructs prominent claims about the value of the “enhanced” measures, including that they produced breakthrough intelligence in the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and dismisses them all as exaggerated if not utterly false — assertions that the CIA and former officers involved in the program vehemently dispute. 
  
 In a statement from the White House, Obama said the Senate report “documents a troubling program” and “reinforces my long-held view that these harsh methods were not only inconsistent with our values as [a] nation, they did not serve our broader counterterrorism efforts or our national security interests.” Obama praised the CIA’s work to degrade al-Qaeda over the past 13 years but said the agency’s interrogation program “did significant damage to America’s standing in the world and made it harder to pursue our interests with allies and partners.” 
  
 The CIA issued a 112-page response to the Senate report, acknowledging failings in the interrogation program but denying that it intentionally misled the public or policymakers about an effort that it maintains delivered critical intelligence. 
  
 “The intelligence gained from the program was critical to our understanding of al-Qa’ida and continues to inform our counterterrorism efforts to this day,” CIA Director John Brennan, who was a senior officer at the agency when it set up secret prisons for al-Qaeda suspects, said in a written statement. The program “did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives,” he said. 
  
 The release of the report comes at an unnerving time in the country’s conflict with al-Qaeda and its offshoots. The Islamic State has beheaded three Americans in recent months and seized control of territory across Iraq and Syria. Fears that the report could ignite new overseas violence against American interests prompted Secretary of State John F. Kerry to appeal to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), the chairman of the Senate committee, to consider a delay. The report has also been at the center of intense bureaucratic and political fights that erupted this year in accusations that the CIA surreptitiously monitored the computers used by committee aides involved in the investigation. 
  
 Many of the most haunting sections of the Senate document are passages taken from internal CIA memos and e-mails as agency employees described their visceral reactions to searing interrogation scenes. At one point in 2002, CIA employees at a secret site in Thailand broke down emotionally after witnessing the harrowing treatment of Abu Zubaida, a high-profile facilitator for ­al-Qaeda. 
  
 “Several on the team profoundly affected,” one agency employee wrote at the time, “. . . some to the point of tears and choking up.” The passage is contrasted with closed-door testimony from high-ranking CIA officials, including then-CIA Director Michael V. Hayden, who when asked by a senator in 2007 whether agency personnel had expressed reservations replied: “I’m not aware of any. These guys are more experienced. No.” 
  
 The investigation was conducted exclusively by the Senate committee’s Democratic staff. Its release Tuesday is certain to stir new debate over a program that has been a source of contention since the first details about the CIA’s secret prison network began to surface publicly a decade ago. Even so, the report is unlikely to lead to new sanctions or structural change. 
  
 The document names only a handful of high-ranking CIA employees and does not call for any further investigation of those involved or even offer any formal recommendations. It steers clear of scrutinizing the involvement of the White House and Justice Department, which two years ago ruled out the possibility that CIA employees would face prosecution. 
  
 Instead, the Senate text is largely aimed at shaping how the interrogation program will be regarded by history. The inquiry was driven by Feinstein and her frequently stated determination to foreclose any prospect that the United States might contemplate such tactics again. Rather than argue their morality, Feinstein set out to prove that they did not work. 
  
 In her foreword to the report, Feinstein does not characterize the CIA’s actions as torture but says the trauma of 9/11 led the agency to employ “brutal interrogation techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.” The report should serve as “a warning for the future,” she says. 
  
 “We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past mistakes to be repeated,” Feinstein says. 
  
 The reaction to the report, however, only reinforced how polarizing the CIA program remains more than five years after it was ordered dismantled by Obama. 
  
 Over the past year, the CIA assembled a lengthy and detailed rebuttal to the committee’s findings that argues that all but a few of the panel’s conclusions are unfounded. Hayden and other agency veterans have for months been planning a similarly aggressive response. 
  
 The report also faced criticism from Republicans on the Intelligence Committee who submitted a response to the report that cited alleged inaccuracies and faulted the committee’s decision to base its findings exclusively on CIA documents without interviewing any of the operatives involved. Democrats have said they did so to avoid interfering with a separate Justice Department inquiry. 
  
 The program’s start 
  
 At its height, the CIA program included secret prisons in countries including Afghanistan, Thailand, Romania, Lithuania and Poland — locations that are referred to only by color-themed codes in the report, such as “COBALT,” to preserve a veneer of secrecy. 
  
 The establishment of the “black sites” was part of a broader transformation of the CIA in which it rapidly morphed from an agency focused on intelligence-gathering into a paramilitary force with new powers to capture prisoners, disrupt plots, and assemble a fleet of armed drones to carry out targeted killings of al-Qaeda militants. 
  
 The report reveals the often haphazard ways in which the agency assumed these new roles. Within days of the 9/11 attacks, for example, President George W. Bush had signed a secret memorandum giving the CIA new authority to “undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests.” 
  
 But the memo made no reference to interrogations, providing no explicit authority for what would become an elaborately drawn list of measures — including sleep deprivation, slams against cell walls and simulated drowning — to get detainees to talk. The Bush memo was a murky point of origin for a program that is portrayed throughout the Senate report as chaotically mismanaged. 
  
 One of the most lengthy sections describes the interrogation of the CIA’s first prisoner, Abu Zubaida, who was detained in Pakistan in March 2002. Abu Zubaida, badly injured when he was captured, was largely cooperative when jointly questioned by the CIA and FBI but was then subjected to confusing and increasingly violent interrogation as the agency assumed control. 
  
 After being transferred to a site in Thailand, Abu Zubaida was placed in isolation for 47 days, a period during which the presumably important source on al-Qaeda faced no questions. Then, at 11:50 a.m. on Aug. 4, 2002, the CIA launched a round-the-clock interrogation assault — slamming him against walls, stuffing him into a coffin-size box and waterboarding him until he coughed, vomited, and had “involuntary spasms of the torso and extremities.” 
  
 The treatment continued for 17 days. At one point, the waterboarding left Abu Zubaida “completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth.” CIA memos described employees who were distraught and concerned about the legality of what they had witnessed. One said that “two, perhaps three” were “likely to elect transfer.” 
  
 The Senate report suggests top CIA officials at headquarters had little sympathy. When a cable from Thailand warned that the Abu Zubaida interrogation was “approach[ing] the legal limit,” Jose Rodriguez, then chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, cautioned subordinates to refrain from such “speculative language as to the legality” of the interrogation. “Such language is not helpful.” 
  
 Through a spokesman, Rodriguez told The Washington Post that he never instructed employees not to send cables about the legality of interrogations. 
  
 Abu Zubaida, also known as Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, was waterboarded 83 times and kept in cramped boxes for nearly 300 hours. In October 2002, Bush was informed in his daily intelligence briefing that Abu Zubaida was still withholding “significant threat information,” despite views from the black site that he had been truthful from the outset and was “compliant and cooperative,” the report said. 
  
 The document provides a similarly detailed account of the interrogation of the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who fed his interrogators a stream of falsehoods and intelligence fragments. Waterboarding was supposed to simulate suffocation with a damp cloth and a trickle of liquid. But with Mohammed, CIA operatives used their hands to form a standing pool of water over his mouth. KSM, as he is known in agency documents, was ingesting “a LOT of water,” a CIA medical officer wrote, saying that the application had been so altered that “we are basically doing a series of near drownings.” 
  
 The CIA has maintained that only three prisoners were subjected to waterboarding, but the report alludes to evidence that it may have been used on others, including photographs of a well-worn waterboard at a black site where its use was never officially recorded. The committee said the agency could not explain the presence of the board and water-dousing equipment at the site, which is not named in the report but is believed to be the “Salt Pit” in Afghanistan. 
  
 There are also references to other procedures, including the use of tubes to administer “rectal rehydration” and feeding. CIA documents describe a case in which a prisoner’s lunch tray “consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was ‘pureed’ and rectally infused.” At least five CIA detainees were subjected to “rectal rehydration” or rectal feeding without documented medical necessity. 
  
 At times, senior CIA operatives voiced deep misgivings. In early 2003, a CIA officer in the interrogation program described it as a “train [wreck] waiting to happen” and that “I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens.” The officer, identified by former colleagues as Charlie Wise, subsequently retired and died in 2003. He had been picked for the job despite being reprimanded for his role in other troubled interrogation efforts in the 1980s in Beirut, former officials said. 
  
 The agency’s records of the program were so riddled with errors, according to the report, that the CIA often offered conflicting counts of how many prisoners it had. 
  
 In 2007, then-CIA Director Hayden testified in a closed-door session with the Senate panel that “in the history of the program, we’ve had 97 detainees.” In reality, the number was 119, according to the report, including 39 who had been subjected to harsh interrogation methods. 
  
 Two years later, when Hayden was preparing to deliver an early intelligence briefing for senior aides to newly elected President Obama, a subordinate noted that the actual count was significantly higher. Hayden “instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98,” the employee wrote to himself in an e-mail, “pick whatever date i needed to make that happen but the number is 98.” 
  
 Hayden comes under particularly pointed scrutiny in the report, which includes a 38-page table comparing his statements to often conflicting agency documents. The section is listed as an “example of inaccurate CIA testimony.” 
  
 In an e-mail to The Post, Hayden said the discrepancy in the prisoner numbers reflected the fact that detainees captured before the start of the interrogation program were counted separately from those held at the black sites. “This is a question of booking, not a question of deception,” Hayden said. He also said he directed the analyst who had called the discrepancy to his attention to confirm the revised accounting and then inform the incoming CIA director, Leon E. Panetta, that there was a new number and that the figure should be corrected with Congress. 
  
 Hayden said he would have explained this to the committee if given the chance. “Maybe if the committee had talked to real people and accessed their notes we wouldn’t have to have this conversation,” he said, describing the matter as an “example of [committee] methodology. Take a stray ‘fact’ and claim its meaning to fit the desired narrative (mass deception).” 
  
 The report cites other cases in which CIA officials are alleged to have obscured facts about the program. In 2003, when David Addington, a lawyer who worked for Vice President Richard B. Cheney, asked whether the CIA had videotaped interrogations of Abu Zubaida, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller informed agency colleagues that he had “told him that tapes were not being made.” Muller apparently did not mention that the CIA had recorded dozens of interrogation sessions or that some in the agency were eager to have them destroyed. 
  
 The tapes were destroyed in 2005 at the behest of Rodriguez, a move that triggered a Justice Department investigation. The committee also revealed that a 21-hour section of recordings — which depicted the waterboarding of Abu Zubaida — had gone missing years earlier when then-CIA Inspector General John Hel­gerson’s office sought to review them as part of an inquiry into the interrogation program. 
  
 Helgerson would go on to find substantial problems with the program. But, in contrast to the Senate panel’s findings, his report concluded that the agency’s “interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world.” 
  
 Intelligence claims 
  
 A prominent section of the Senate report is devoted to high-profile claims that the interrogation program produced “unique” and otherwise unobtainable intelligence that helped thwart plots or led to the capture of senior al-Qaeda operatives. 
  
 Senate investigators said none of the claims held up under scrutiny, with some unraveling because information was erroneously attributed to detainees subjected to harsh interrogations, others because the CIA already had information from other sources. In some cases, according to the panel, there was no viable terrorist plot to disrupt. 
  
 A document prepared for Cheney before a March 8, 2005, National Security Council meeting noted in a section titled “Interrogation Results” that “operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned to build and detonate a ‘dirty bomb’ in the Washington DC area.” 
  
 But according to an April 2003 CIA e-mail, Padilla and Mohammed had apparently taken seriously a “ludicrous and humorous” article about building a dirty bomb in a kitchen by swinging buckets of uranium to enrich it. 
  
 KSM dismissed the idea, as did a government assessment of the proposed plot: “CIA and Lawrence Livermore National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in the death of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and definitely would not result in a nuclear explosion,” noted another CIA e-mail in April 2003. The agency nonetheless continued to directly cite the “dirty bomb” plot while defending the interrogation program until at least 2007, the report notes. 
  
 The report also deconstructs the timeline leading to the identification of Padilla and his alleged accomplice. It notes that in April 2002, Pakistani authorities who detained Padilla suspected he was an al-Qaeda member. A few days later, Abu Zubaida described two individuals who were pursuing what was described as a “cockamamie” dirty-bomb plot. The connection was made by the CIA immediately, months before the use of harsh interrogation on Abu Zubaida. 
  
 Some within the CIA were derisive of the continuing exploitation of the dirty-bomb plot by the agency. “We’ll never be able to successfully expunge Padilla and the ‘dirty bomb’ plot from the lore of disruption, but once again I’d like to go on the record that Padilla admitted that the only reason he came up with so-called ‘dirty bomb’ was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if he came up with something spectacular, they’d finance him,” wrote the head of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear group at the CIA Counterterrorism Center. “Even KSM says Padilla had a screw loose.” 
  
 In the CIA’s rebuttal, which was delivered in 2013 to the Senate but released publicly on Tuesday for the first time, the agency acknowledged that it took “too long to stop making references to his infeasible ‘Dirty Bomb’ plot” but said Padilla was a legitimate threat and “a good example of the importance of intelligence derived from the detainee program.” 
  
 In another high-profile case, the CIA credited the interrogation program with the capture of Hambali, a senior member of the Southeast Asian militant group Jemaah Islamiah and the suspected mastermind of the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed more than 200 people. In a briefing for the president’s chief of staff, for instance, the CIA wrote, “During [KSM’s] interrogation we acquired information that led to the capture of Hambali.” But the Senate found that information from KSM played no role in Hambali’s capture and that, in fact, information leading to his detention came from signals intelligence, a CIA source, and investigations by the Thai authorities. 
  
 Similarly, the CIA said the interrogation program led to the discovery of the “Second Wave” attacks, a plan by KSM to employ non-Arabs to use airplanes to hit targets on the West Coast. Associated with this in CIA reporting was the identification of al-Ghuraba, a cell of Jemaah Is­lamiah. 
  
 In a November 2007 briefing for Bush on “Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs,” or “enhanced interrogation techniques,” the CIA said it “learned” about the Second Wave and al-Ghuraba “after applying the waterboard along with interrogation techniques.” But the Senate report says the plot was disrupted by a series of arrests and interrogations that had nothing to do with the CIA program. 
  
 Even the hunt for bin Laden was accompanied by exaggerations of the role of brutal interrogation techniques, according to the report. In particular, the committee found that the interrogations played no meaningful role in the identification of a courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who would lead the agency to bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. 
  
 The CIA’s document reiterates its claim that coercive measures helped, saying the tactics led two detainees in agency custody, Ammar al-Baluchi and Hassan Ghul, to provide important clues to the courier. Baluchi was the first to identify Kuwaiti as bin Laden’s messenger, and did so only “after undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques.” 
  
 Ghul, who was captured in Iraq, went even further, confirming under coercive pressure that Kuwaiti had delivered a letter from bin Laden to another al-Qaeda operative and had vanished along with the al-Qaeda chief in 2002. 
  
 But the committee cited CIA records showing that Ghul’s revelations came before he was subjected to harsh measures. In an interview with the CIA inspector general’s office, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul’s case said that he “sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.” 
  
 Steven Rich and Swati Sharma contributed to this report. ||||| America 
  
 Report Says CIA Misled Congress, White House On Interrogation Program 
  
 i itoggle caption Reuters/Landov Reuters/Landov 
  
 The CIA "provided inaccurate information to the White House, Congress, the Justice Department, the CIA inspector general, the media and the American public" about the "brutal" interrogation techniques it used on terrorism suspects, a long-held Senate intelligence committee report finds. 
  
 The report provides the most comprehensive public accounting of the interrogation techniques used by the Central Intelligence Agency after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. 
  
 It looked at more than 6 million pages of CIA material over the course of more than three years, and it came to two major conclusions: The CIA misrepresented the interrogation techniques it was using at secret prisons abroad, and it also overstated the techniques' efficacy. The report details the techniques used on detainees and found that those interrogations led to no useful intelligence. 
  
 The report does not use the word torture, and it doesn't weigh the legality of the program. But Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the Democratic chairwoman of the intelligence committee, writes in the report that it is her "personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured." 
  
 The CIA rejects those criticisms, saying the Senate report is wrong. 
  
 In a statement, Director John Brennan admitted to some "shortcomings" and said the CIA had implemented some "remedial measures." 
  
 "Our review indicates that interrogations of detainees on whom EITs were used did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists and save lives," Brennan said. "The intelligence gained from the program was critical to our understanding of al-Qaida and continues to inform our counterterrorism efforts to this day." 
  
 What's in it is so sensitive and controversial that the report's release has sparked public spats between the CIA and Senate lawmakers. 
  
 It all came to a dramatic head on the floor of the Senate in March. Feinstein accused the CIA of trying to thwart her committee's work by deleting files and later by illegally spying on Senate computers. The CIA — which eventually apologized to the Senate — had accused Feinstein and her committee of improperly removing classified documents from a government network. 
  
 Today, the Senate made public a 500-page executive summary of the report, which still remains classified. 
  
 Announcing its release, Feinstein said the report found a program that is a "stain on our values and our history." But she said it is important to release this report because it will show the world that "America is big enough to admit when it is wrong." 
  
 The release of this report is important, she said, because the U.S. needs to "face an ugly truth and say never again." 
  
 We'll use this space to post the document and share what we learn as we learn it. To see the latest, refresh this page. 
  
 Updated at 4:46 p.m. ET Ex-CIA Official On NPR 
  
 Former Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin tells NPR's Audie Cornish that "every charge in here is off-base." 
  
 "We may have made a few terrorists uncomfortable for a short period of time in order to get information that we felt was essential to protecting the United States," he said. 
  
 You can listen to the full interview on All Things Considered. 
  
 Update at 1:37 p.m. ET. Former CIA Directors Reject Findings: 
  
 Writing in the Wall Street Journal, former CIA Directors George Tenet, Porter Goss and Michael Hayden, and former CIA Deputy Directors John McLaughlin, Albert Calland and Stephen Kappes defended the CIA. 
  
 They say this report is critically flawed. Specifically, they say the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to important intelligence and helped in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. 
  
 They write: 
  
 "There is no doubt that information provided by the totality of detainees in CIA custody, those who were subjected to interrogation and those who were not, was essential to bringing bin Laden to justice. The CIA never would have focused on the individual who turned out to be bin Laden's personal courier without the detention and interrogation program. "Specifically, information developed in the interrogation program piqued the CIA's interest in the courier, placing him at the top of the list of leads to bin Laden. A detainee subjected to interrogation provided the most specific information on the courier. Additionally, KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi—both subjected to interrogation—lied about the courier at a time when both were providing honest answers to a large number of other critical questions. Since other detainees had already linked the courier to KSM and Abu Faraj, their dissembling about him had great significance. "So the bottom line is this: The interrogation program formed an essential part of the foundation from which the CIA and the U.S. military mounted the bin Laden operation." 
  
 Update at 12:22 p.m. ET. Minority View: 
  
 The committee's Republican minorities view the report as flawed, saying it is biased and does not take into account the context in which these programs were formed, and because the committee did not talk to key witnesses. 
  
 Here's a small excerpt from their report (pdf): 
  
 "With respect to the standard of objectivity, we were disappointed to find that the updated Study still contains evidence of strongly held biases. John Brennan emphasized this point prior to his confirmation as the Director of the CIA, when he told Vice Chairman Chambliss that, based on his reading of the originally approved Executive Summary and the Findings and Conclusions, the Study was 'not objective' and was a 'prosecutor's brief,' written with an eye toward finding problems. "We agree with Director Brennan's assessments. We also agree with the criticism he relayed from Intelligence Community officials that it was written with a 'bent on the part of the authors' with 'political motivations.'" 
  
 Update at 12:14 p.m. ET. Detainees Were Tortured: 
  
 The report does not use the word torture and it doesn't weigh the legality of the program. 
  
 But Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the chairwoman of the Senate intelligence committee, writes in the report that it is her "personal conclusion that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured." 
  
 Update at 11:45 a.m. ET. 'Contrary To Our Values': 
  
 In a statement, President Obama said his predecessors were making decisions after an unprecedented attack on the United States. The U.S., he said, did many things right. 
  
 But what this committee finds today is "contrary to our values." 
  
 "Moreover, these techniques did significant damage to America's standing in the world and made it harder to pursue our interests with allies and partners," Obama said. "That is why I will continue to use my authority as President to make sure we never resort to those methods again." 
  
 Update at 11:27 a.m. ET. No New Charges: 
  
 A Justice Department official says they will bring no new charges in response to the report. 
  
 The Justice Department launched two criminal investigations in 2009 and decided against bringing new charges. 
  
 "Those investigators have reviewed the committee's full report and did not find any new information that they had not previously considered in reaching their determination," the official said. 
  
 Update at 11:25 a.m. ET. CIA Rejects Conclusions: 
  
 In a statement, Director John Brennan admitted to some "shortcomings" and said the CIA had implemented some "remedial measures." 
  
 He said that while the CIA agrees with some of the committee's findings, it diverges with the committee's two main findings: The CIA says the program was effective and it did not mislead other parts of the government about its enhanced interrogations. 
  
 "Our review indicates that interrogations of detainees on whom EITs were used did produce intelligence that helped thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives," Brennan said. "The intelligence gained from the program was critical to our understanding of al-Qaida and continues to inform our counterterrorism efforts to this day." 
  
 Update at 11:22 a.m. ET. Techniques: 
  
 The report itself does not conclude whether these techniques were legal. The report also doesn't use the word torture. But here are some of the techniques described. Fair warning — some are disturbing: 
  
 — At a site called COBALT, CIA officers strayed from the techniques approved by the White House. In November 2002, a detainee died from hypothermia after he was held "partially nude and chained to a concrete floor." 
  
 — Some detainees were kept awake for up to 180 hours, "usually standing or in painful stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads." 
  
 — The CIA told several detainees that they would not leave custody alive. One was told he would only leave in a "coffin-shaped box." 
  
 — Some naked detainees were "hooded and dragged up and down corridors while being slapped and punched." 
  
 — The CIA may have waterboarded more than the three detainees it said it waterboarded. 
  
 — "At least five CIA detainees were subjected to 'rectal feeding' or 'rectal hydration' without documented medical need," Feinstein's office says. We're not sure what that means. 
  
 Update at 11:18 a.m. ET. A Summary: 
  
 From a summary of the report provided by Feinstein's office, there are two main takeaways of the report: 
  
 — In many cases, the CIA misrepresented the efficacy and the techniques used on detainees. This line from Feinstein's office sums it up: "The CIA provided inaccurate information to the White House, Congress, the Justice Department, the CIA inspector general, the media and the American public." 
  
 — These interrogation techniques were not effective. The CIA, the report concludes, misled the rest of the government — including the president — on the efficacy of the program. 
  
 The Senate committee reviewed 20 cases the CIA held up as its most prominent successes. The committee found that in all of those cases, either the information attained had nothing to do with the success or it was acquired from the detainee before the harsh techniques were applied or the information was "already available to the intelligence communities from other sources." 
  
 Update at 8:53 a.m. ET. Some Remedial Reading: 
  
 We're expecting the Senate to issue its report around 11 a.m. ET. That gives you some time for some remedial reading. Here's what we recommend: 
  
 — "CIA misled on interrogation program, Senate report says" (Washington Post): This is a report based on interviews with officials who have read the "torture report." According to the Post, the CIA misled the Bush administration and Congress on the extent and success of the interrogation techniques. 
  
 Here's a key quote: "The CIA described [its program] repeatedly both to the Department of Justice and eventually to Congress as getting unique, otherwise unobtainable intelligence that helped disrupt terrorist plots and save thousands of lives," one U.S. official briefed on the report told the Post. "Was that actually true? The answer is no." 
  
 — "Bush and C.I.A. Ex-Officials Rebut Torture Report" (New York Times): Before the report's release, the Bush administration is staking out a position. Mostly, it appears they will not take the opportunity offered by the report to distance itself from the CIA. 
  
 In an interview with CNN, President George Bush made that clear: "We're fortunate to have men and women who work hard at the C.I.A. serving on our behalf," he said. "These are patriots and whatever the report says, if it diminishes their contributions to our country, it is way off base." 
  
 — Sen. Feinstein Accuses CIA of Searching Congressional Computers (C-Span): Arguably the climax of this whole thing came back in March, when Feinstein delivered a more than 30-minute speech on the floor of the Senate. 
  
 In it, she accused the CIA of trying to thwart her committee's work by deleting files and spying on their computers. 
  
 Update at 8:23 a.m. ET. What We'll Be Looking For: 
  
 The Senate torture report is set up as a series of case studies, looking at how dozens of detainees were treated by the United States. As we sift through the report, we'll be focused on answering five questions: 
  
 — Did these interrogation methods yield any useful intelligence? 
  
 — Was it torture? 
  
 — Was anyone held accountable? 
  
 — Are interrogation methods that went beyond the methods approved by Bush administration lawyers described? 
  
 — Did the CIA mislead the Bush administration about the extent or severity of the methods used? ||||| WASHINGTON (AP) — President Barack Obama says he hopes the release of a Senate report on harsh CIA interrogations helps leave the harsh torture techniques "where they belong — in the past." 
  
 Obama says in a written statement that the report reinforces his view that harsh interrogations techniques "were not only inconsistent with our values as nation, they did not serve our broader counterterrorism efforts or our national security interests." 
  
 The president's statement comes moments after a Senate committee released a long-anticipated report on CIA interrogations during the administration of his predecessor, President George W. Bush. 
  
 The report says the CIA deceived the nation with its insistence that the harsh interrogation tactics had saved lives. It says those claims are unsubstantiated by the CIA's own records. |||||