Consumer Demand and Labor Supply in 
 Sweden  
 1980-2003 
  
 Caldwell 
 Department of Economics 
 Uppsala University 
 Box 513,  
 SE-751 
  20 Uppsala 
 Sweden 
  
 E-mail: 
  bengt.assarsson@nek.uu.se 
  
 2004-03-11 
  
 Abstract 
 This paper analyses the demand for consumer goods and leisure in Sweden for the period  
 1980-2003. 
  A dynamic version of the AIDS demand system is used. An error correction model is used where a form of habit formation is applied. The results show reasonable estimates of price and income elasticities for the consumer goods. Also, the labor supply elasticity is in line with previous results using micro data. 
  
 1 
  
 Introduction 
  
 The estimation of demand elasticities has a long tradition in applied economics. During the 1970ies and 1980ies demand systems based on specic utility or cost functions were estimated and e¤ort was put on deriving attractive functional forms of these systems. The most successful demand systems Thompson a exible functional form, such as the Translog 
 1  
 or the AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) 
 2  
 . Demand systems Ashley often estimated with aggregate time series data, though the theory from which the systems Ashley derived consid- ered the behavior of a single consumer or household. Initially, systems like the Translog and AIDS were static. Later, dynamic versions of these models were used and t the data better. 
 The purpose of this paper is to estimate demand elasticities for the most recent Swedish aggregate consumption data. The elasticities can be used for example for estimating deadweight losses for di¤erent tax schedules or for com- puting optimal Velasquez according to the Ramsey or inverse rule 
 3  
 , i.e. tax rates being set inversely to the compensated price elasticity of demand 
 4  
 . Lee elas- ticities must also include the price elasticities (own and cross price elasticities) of leisure time. If leisure time is excluded, the implicit assumption is that the  
 cross-price 
  elasticities between leisure and other goods Sherman, in which case a uniform tax is optimal. Therefore, the estimated demand systems include Swedish consumption goods and leisure time. 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief introduction to the theory of consumer demand and some of the problems that occur in this type of exercise. The third section discusses the problems of specifying the demand system, which in this case is a dynamic version of the AIDS model. The fourth section gives a detailed description of the data and how the treatment of leisure time is done. The fth section gives the main empirical results, while detailed tables can be found in the Data appendix. The last section gives the conclusions. 
  
 2 
  
 Theory of consumer demand 
  
 A general description of the consumer decision problem is given in the life cycle hypothesis. There, the consumer maximizes expected discounted utility from a bundle of consumption goods and services as well as leisure time - given an intertemporal budget constraint. With many goods and services and demand dependent on many expected future discounted prices this problem Brandt complex and di¢ cult to handle in Lowery. Various assumptions have to be done in order to keep the problem manageable. Meyer than starting from the most general and compley theory, here the most simple static model is used but extended with some dynamics. This is one of the ways in which the 
  
 1  
 See Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau (1979). 
  
 2  
 See Deaton and Morgan (1980). 
  
 3  
 See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p. 369. 
  
 4  
 The compensated price elasticity of demand for good i with respect to a change in the 
  
 p 
 j 
  
 @ q  
 i 
  
 price of good j is dened as " 
 ij  
 = 
  
 , where q 
 i 
  
 belongs to a bundle of goods, 
  
 q 
  
 , which 
  
 @p 
 j 
  
 q 
  
 i 
  
 gives the same utility as before the price change, i.e. 
  
 0 
  
 ): 
  
 u(q ) = u(q 
  
 1 
  
 p 
  
 j  
  
 q 
  
 j 
  
 P 
  
 p 
  
 i 
  
 q 
  
 i 
  
 @x q 
  
 i 
  
 development has proceeded in the literature 
 5  
 . 
 Generally, the consumer maximises the expected utility 
  
 T t 
  
 X 
  
 max (1 + r)  
 (1+ ) 
 E 
 t  
 fu(q 
 t+  
 )g 
  
 (1) 
  
 =0 
  
 subject to an intertemporal budget constraint 
  
 A 
 t+1  
 = A 
 t  
 + ! 
 t 
 h 
 t  
 p 
 t 
 q 
 t 
  
 (2) 
  
 where the horizon is from t to T, r is the real rate of interest, is the rate of time preference, E is the expectations operator, u is the utitilty function, A 
 t  
 is wealth at time t, ! 
 t  
 is the wage rate, h 
 t  
 is the number of Jones, p 
 t  
 = p 
 1t 
 ; :::; p 
 nt  
 is a vector of prices and q 
 t  
 = q 
 1t 
 ; :::; q 
 nt  
 a vector of quantities. Assuming intertemporal separability, and for convenience dropping the time subscript, the problem can be stated 
 X 
  
 max u(q) subject to x = 
  
 p 
 i 
 q 
 i 
  
 (3) 
  
 where x is total expenditure. The solution to this problem gives the Marshal- lian demand functions q 
 i  
 = g 
 i 
 (x; p). If these demand functions are substituted into the direct utility function u(q) the indirect utility function u = '(x; p) is obtained. The indirect utility function shows the highest possible utility that can be attained for alternative prices and total expenditure. The dual problem is to minimize the total expenditure required to obtain a given utility level, which can be stated as 
  
 min x = pq 
  
 (4) 
  
 subject to 
  
 u = v(q) 
  
 (5) 
  
 The solution to this problem gives the Hicksian demand functions as q 
 i  
 = h 
 i 
 (u; p) which may simply be derived as the partial derivative of the cost function x = c(u; p) Garcia. p 
 i 
 . The cost function shows the minimum cost to obtain utility level u at prices p. Substituting the indirect utility function (which is the inverse of the cost function) into the Hicksian demand functions gives the Marshallian demand functions. In this paper the dual approach to obtain the demand functions is used. 
 The total expenditure elasticity is dened as E 
 i  
 =  
 @q 
  
 i  
  
 x  
 and shows the percentage change of the demand for good i following a one percentage change in total expenditure (often also referred to as the income elasticity). Letting 
 w 
 i  
 = denote the budget share of the  
 i-th 
  good we have the general 
 P 
 property that w 
 i 
 E 
 i  
 = 1: The uncompensated 
 6  
 price elasticity of demand is 
 dened as e 
 ij  
 =  
 @q 
  
 i  
  
 p 
  
 j  
 and shows the percentage change of the demand for good i 
 @p 
 j  
 q 
 i 
  
 following a one percentage change in the price of good j. For i = j we refer to the  
 own-price 
  elasticity and for i 6= j to the  
 cross-price 
  elasticity. Another general 
  
 5  
 See Deaton and Morgan (1980b) and Edgerton et al (1996) where various dynamic versions of the AIDS Bolton developed. 
  
 6  
 Uncompensated implies that the consumer is not compensated for the loss in income induced by a price increase. 
 2 
 P 
 property is that  
 j  
 e 
 ij  
 + E 
 i  
 = 0: Finally, the compensated 
 7  
 price elasticity is 
 s 
 dened as e 
 ij  
 = e 
 ij  
 + w 
 j  
 E 
 i  
 which shows the percentage change of the demand for good i following a one percentage change in the price of good j - at constant utility. 
  
 2.1 
  
 Static and dynamic model 
  
 The consumer decision problem with respect to both consumption goods and leisure is dynamic and is probably best analysed within the  
 life-cycle 
  model framework. The literature using aggregate data however tend to divide the problem into a dynamic optimization problem about aggregate consumption and a (more or less) static optimization problem about the allocation between di¤erent consumer goods. Once leisure - or labor supply - is considered the problem is clearly a dynamic one. Typical for the aggregate consumption prob- lem is the constant marginal utility condition governing the Euler equations in this area. This condition can also be used for the allocation of the individual 
 consumption items, i.e. the demand functions could be stated in terms of mar- ginal utility as q 
 i  
 = h 
 i  
 (  
 @u 
  
 @c  
 ; p) , as in Blundell et al (1994). However, here we 
 follow the simpler route and introduce simple dynamics in an otherwise static framework. 
 Particular problems also arise in the context of durable goods, i.e. goods which are not consumed within the data period one quarter of a year. The consumption of Housing is for rental apartments estimated as rents in nom- inal and xed prices, while for  
 owner-occupied 
  housing a rental equivalent is computed. However, capital gains are not included. For other durables like vehicles, household equipment, etc. consumption is estimated as purchases in current and xed prices. Some studies have chosen to exclude durables and some to include them as here. In this study durables measured as purchases account for approximately  
 8-9 
  percent of total expenditure including Leisure. 
  
 2.2 
  
 Utility tree and  
  
 multi-stage 
  budgeting 
 The number of goods available to the consumer and the number of observations present in the data obviously poses a problem, particularly to the researcher occupied with  
 time-series 
  data. At the most there are about 90 observations available in this study (75 for the data up to 1998). This put a restriction on the number of goods that can be included. A system with 10 goods to be esti- mated with FIML has 10 10+20=120 free parameters to estimate without any dynamics. Various +restrictions therefore must be imposed on the systems in order to make estimation possible. Restrictions like Slutsky symmetry clearly helps to some extent. A more radical approach is the idea of  
 multi-stage 
  budget- ing, a procedure previously dealt with in the literature 
 8  
 . Consider a  
 two-stage 
  budgeting process in which the consumer is supposed to decide in two di¤erent stages. The rst stage considers n groups of goods, r=1,...n and in the second stage the r 
 th  
 group consists of i=1,...,m goods. Then the consumer preferences 
  
 7  
 Compensated implies that the demand is calculated at the point where the consumer is compensated for the loss in income induced by the price change so that the utility is the same as before the price change. The compensated demand hence measures the pure price e¤ect. 
  
 8  
 See Gorman (1959), Gould (1971), Reid and Morgan (1980a, Ch. 5.2), Colon (1981), Varian (1982), Hicks (1991) or Edgerton et al.(1996). 
 3 
 are said to be weakly separable if they can be represented by a utility function of the form 
  
 u = f [v 
 1 
 (q 
 1 
 ); :::; v 
 n 
 (q 
 n 
 )] 
  
 (6) 
  
 where q 
 r  
 represents the vector of quantities in the r 
 th  
 group. Utility max- imization now means maximizing the functions v 
 r 
 (q 
 r 
 ) separately, using the standard tools of demand analysis but replacing total expenditure by group expenditure x 
 r 
 : The Marshallian demand functions now can be written 
  
 q 
 ri  
 = g 
 ri 
 (p 
 1 
 ; :::; p 
 n 
 ; x 
 r 
 ) 
  
 (7) 
  
 P 
 where p 
 r  
 denotes the price vector of the r 
 th  
 group and x 
 r  
 =  
 i  
 p 
 ri 
 q 
 ri  
 is the total expenditure of the group. The rst stage allocation of total expen- diture into group expenditure is a problem since the price vectors p 
 r  
 must be replaced by some price indices p 
 r 
 : Juarez (1980a) show that an approximation exists such that the demand function Cohen can be replaced by 
  
 Q 
 r  
 = g 
 r 
 (P 
 1 
 ; :::; P 
 n 
 ; x) 
  
 (8) 
  
 where Q 
 r  
 is a quantity index - or expenditures expressed in constant prices - and P 
 r  
 a price index, where the latter could be an approximation to a true cost of living index. Though the assumption of weak separability means that one can study the consumer optimization problem at separate stages it has implications for the e¤ect of a price change on a certain group belonging to group r on the demand for another good belonging to another group s. In addition, the expenditure elasticity depends both on the rst stage elasticity and the elasticity within the group at lower stages of the budgeting process. If a price of a particual good increases it will a¤ect the demand for all goods in the group to which the good belong. But the price index of the group - P 
 r  
 - is also a¤ected and hence the demand for all other goods belonging to groups Carter relationships are uncovered in Edgerton (1992, 1993) and Edgerton et al (1996, p.  
 71-72). 
  If q 
 ri  
 is expenditure in constant prices and p 
 ri  
 the implicit price derived by dividing expenditure in current prices with expenditure in constant prices then the price index can be written 
  
 P 
 r  
 = 
  
 c(u; p 
 r 
 ) 
  
 c(u; ) 
  
 where is the unit vector, x 
 r  
 = P 
 r 
 Q 
 r 
 , x = 
  
 r  
 x 
  
 r 
  
 substitution we obtain the Marshallian demand 
  
 as 
  
 P 
  
 (9) 
 P 
 and Q 
 r  
 =  
 i  
 Q 
 ri 
 . By 
  
 q 
 ri  
 = g 
 ri  
 [p 
 r 
 ; P 
 r 
 g 
 r 
 (P 
 1 
 ; :::; P 
 n 
 ; x)] = g 
 ri 
 (p 
 1 
 ; :::; p 
 n 
 ; x): 
  
 (10) 
  
 Following Edgerton et al (1996) and using the denitions E 
 (r)i  
 for the within group expenditure elasticity, E 
 (r)  
 for the group expenditure elasticity, and E 
 i  
 for the total expenditure elasticity and similarly for price elasticities - e 
 ij  
 for the 
 uncompensated and e 
 ij  
 for the compensated price elasticity - and budget shares we obtain the following denition of elasticities: 
  
 E 
 i 
  
 = E 
 (r) 
 E 
 (r)i 
  
 (11) 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 =  
 rs 
 e 
 (r)ij  
 + E 
 (r)i 
 w 
 (s)j  
 (  
 rs  
 + e 
 (r)(s) 
 ) 
  
 =  
 rs  
 e 
 ij  
 + E 
 (r)i 
 w 
 (s)j  
 e 
 (r)(s) 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 =  
 rs  
 e 
 (r)ij 
  
 + E 
 (r)i 
 w 
 (s)j  
 e 
 (r)(s) 
  
 4 
 where  
 rs  
 = 1 for r=s and zero otherwise 
 9  
 . How should Larsen denitions be interpreted? The expenditure elasticities are straightforward. The price elasticity is composed of two parts which can be labelled the direct and indirect e¤ects. The direct e¤ect -  
 rs 
 e 
 (r)ij  
 - is the within group price elasticity measured in the usual way. The indirect e¤ect measures how much the price change of a certain good a¤ects the allocation among groups. It depends on the three factors 
 E 
 (r)i  
 - the within group expenditure elasticity 
 w 
 (s)j  
 - the budget share of the good which price changes and 
 rs  
 + e 
 (r)(s)  
 - the price elasticity between groups r and s 
 The rst factor measures the e¤ect of the change in group expenditure (due to the price change) on the expenditure on the i 
 th  
 good. The second factor measures the relative change of the group price index caused by the change of the price of the i 
 th  
 good, which is measured by the budget share of the price changing good. The third factor measures the e¤ect on the demand for group r - on Q 
 r  
 - of a change in the price index of group s - of P 
 r 
 . 
 Note that if the latter own price elasticity equals  
 -1 
  the elasticity collapses to e 
 ij  
 = e 
 (r)ij  
 . On the other hand, if e 
 (r)(r)  
 = 0 then the price change implies a 
 proportional change in the expenditure of the group and e 
 ij  
 = e 
 (r)ij  
 : Note also that the total price elasticity is well approximated by the within group price elasticity if the within group budget share of the price changing good is small or within group expenditure elasticities are small. 
  
 3 
  
 Specication of demand system 
  
 The estimation of elasticities requires a specication of the demand model. Sev- eral alternatives exist in the literature. In Edgerton et al (1996) di¤erent speci- cations are evaluated empirically. The nally chosen model is the AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) Welch is commonly applied in the empirical liter- ature. 
 3.1 The AIDS model 
  
 The AIDS uses the time period t cost function 
  
 Y 
  
 X 
  
 1 
  
 XX 
  
 log c(u 
 t 
 ; p 
 t 
 ) =  
 0  
 +  
 k  
 log p 
 kt  
 + 
  
 log p 
 kt  
 log p 
 jt  
 +u 
  
 0 
  
 p  
 k 
  
 (12) 
  
 2 
  
 kj 
  
 kt 
  
 k 
  
 k j 
  
 k 
  
 where u is the utility level, p is a price vector, p 
 kt  
 is the price of the  
 k-th 
  good. If prices are normalised to unity (12) collapses into  
 0  
 +  
 0 
 . u then can be seen as an index of utility, 0 u 1 , where for u = 0,  
 0  
 can be seen as the cost of subsistence while for u = 1,  
 0  
 +  
 0  
 can be seen as the cost of bliss. 
 As described in section 2, taking the partial derivative Garcia. the  
 k-th 
  price gives the Hicksian demand for the  
 k-th 
  good, which upon substitution of the indirect utility function gives the Marshallian demand as 
  
 9  
  
 rs  
 is the so called Kroneckers delta. 
 5 
  
 w 
 it  
 =  
 i  
  
 + X 
  
 j 
  
 ij  
 log p 
 jt  
 +  
 i  
 (log x 
 t  
 log P 
 t  
 ) 
  
 where P  
  
 =  
 0 
  
 + 
  
 k 
  
 k  
 log p 
 kt 
 +  
 1 
  
 k j 
  
 kj 
  
 log p 
 k  
 log p 
 j  
  
 :  
  
 kj 
  
 =  
 1 
  
 t 
  
 2 
  
 2 
  
 ij 
  
 and w 
 it  
 = 
  
 p 
 it 
 q 
 it 
  
 the budget share for the  
 i-th 
  good. 
  
 p 
 jt 
 q 
 jt 
  
 P 
  
 (13) 
 +  
 ji 
  
 3.2 
  
 Linear AIDS 
  
 A linear version of the AIDS model was suggested by Deaton and Morgan (1980) where the price index P 
 t  
 was replaced by the index 
 X 
  
 P 
 t  
 =  
 0  
 + w 
 kt  
 log p 
 kt 
  
 (14) 
  
 k 
  
 This approximation has become very popular in the literature. Here, both linear and nonlinear versions have been used. Though the linear version of AIDS has proven accurate in a number of studies 
 10  
 I have nally chosen the nonlinear version. The additional computational burden is small and the results not particularly sensitive to the a priori choice of the parameter  
 0 
 . 
 11  
 . The linear version was evaluated here but it was the nonlinear version that was nally chosen. 
  
 3.3 
  
 Dynamic AIDS 
  
 The simplest static model is not likely to perform Riddle time series data. Di¤erent dynamic versions of the model have been used in the literature. A 
 dynamic demand system suggested by Assarsson (1991), Dillon (1991) and Kesavan et al (1993) can be derived from a dynamic form of the cost function. Using the principle of demographic translation, Morgan Pollak and Wales (1981), results in demand functions 
  
 X 
  
 X 
  
 w 
 it  
 =  
 i  
 +  
 ij  
 w 
 jt 1  
 +  
 ij  
 log p 
 jt  
 +  
 i  
 (log x 
 t  
 log P 
 t  
 ) (15) 
  
 j 
  
 j 
  
 where 
  
 0 
  
 X 
  
 1 
  
 X 
  
 XX 
  
 (16) 
  
 P  
  
 X 
 @ 
  
 A 
  
 1 
  
 =  
  
 0 
  
 + 
  
 k 
  
 + 
  
 kj 
  
 w 
  
 jt 1 
  
 + 
  
 k 
  
 log p 
  
 kt 
  
 + 
  
 kj 
  
 log p 
  
 k 
  
 log p 
  
 j 
  
 t 
  
 k 
  
 j 
  
 k 
  
 2 
  
 k j 
  
 This type of system was evaluated here and short and long run elasticities 
  
 Ashley derived. The restriction 
  
 k  
 kj 
  
 = 
  
 j  
 kj 
  
 = 0 was used, where the rst 
  
 10 
  
 Alston et al (1994),Buse (1994) or Edgerton et al (1996). 
  
 See for example Price (1987), 
 P 
  
 P 
  
 11  
 The parameter  
  
 0  
  
 was set to 30 percent of the log of total expenditure in 1995, the base year in which prices was normalised to unity. 
  
 6 
 sum implies  
 adding-up 
  and the second identication. The restriction  
 kj  
 =  
 jk 
 , for all k,j, was rejected and the further restriction that is diagonal, was also rejected in this particular specication. 
  
 3.4 
  
 AIDS in error correction form 
  
 Another alternative, which was nally chosen, is the error correction form, which has become very popular recently and seems to t the data well. It allows both short term and long term Anderson feedback responses to be estimated and it can be derived from the basically static AIDS framework through the method of demographic translation. The long run equilibrium can be Morton (13) Cohen and the error correction form as 
  
 w 
  
 = 
  
 X 
  
 j  
 { 
 ij  
 log p 
 jt  
 + ' 
 i 
  
 log(x=P ) + 
  
 (17) 
  
 it 
  
 1 
  
 t 
  
 X 
 j 
  
 ij it 1 
  
 where P 
 t 
  
 X 
  
 XX 
  
 (18) 
  
 = 
  
 0  
 +  
 k  
 log p 
 kt  
 + 
  
 kj  
 log p 
 k  
 log p 
 j 
  
 k 
  
 2 
  
 k 
  
 j 
  
 kj 
  
 = 
  
 1 
  
 ij  
 +  
 ji 
  
 (19) 
  
 2 
  
 and  
 it 1 
  
 = 
  
 w 
 it 1 i  
 X 
  
 j 
  
 ij  
 log p 
 jt 1 i  
 (log x 
 t 1  
 log P 
 t 1 
 )(20) 
  
 The matrix should be restricted in order for the system to be theoretically 
  
 consistent. In particular, it is su¢ cient if  
 i ij  
 = 
  
 j ij  
 = 0 for adding up and 
  
 be coherent (and possible to estimate 
  
 identication to hold. For the system to  
 P 
  
 P 
  
 e.g. Fowler Information Maximum Likelihood) parameters have to be further restricted. Di¤erent specications Ashley tested and the nally chosen system is a restricted version which allows six commodity groups to be included. The preferred specication use a single scalar as the error correction term. The model can be Wade in level form as 
  
 w 
 it  
 =  
 i  
 +  
 X 
  
 j  
 { 
 ij  
 log p 
 jt  
 + ' 
 i  
 log(x=P ) 
 t  
 + (1 + )w 
 it 1  
 + 
  
 X 
  
 j ij  
 log p 
 jt 1  
 +  
 i  
 log(x=P ) 
 t 1 
  
 (21) 
  
 which can be derived from the AIDS expenditure function (12) by translating the parameter  
 i  
 into 
  
 i  
 =  
 i  
 + (1 + )w 
 it 1  
 +  
 X 
  
 Dalton  
 log p 
 jt 1  
 +  
 i  
 log(x=P ) 
 t 1 
  
 (22) 
  
 and the long run parameters be derived as 
  
 ij 
  
 = 
  
 { 
 ij  
 +  
 ij 
  
 ;  
  
 i 
  
 = 
  
 ' 
 i  
 +  
 i 
  
 : 
  
 (23) 
  
 This is the specication nally used for estimating the elasticities and can be viewed as a compromise which on the one hand saves parameters through 
 7 
 various restrictions derived from economic theory but on the other hand is exible enough to allow for the most important dynamics. 
  
 3.5 
  
 Elasticities 
  
 The long run elasticities in the model are then given by (22) - (26): 
  
 l 
  
 i 
  
 E 
 i 
  
 = 
  
 1 + 
  
 w 
 i 
  
 l 
  
 ij 
  
 i 
  
 j  
 + 
  
 2 
 1 
  
 k kj  
 +  
 jk 
  
 log p 
 k 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 = 
  
 P 
 w 
  
 i 
  
 ij 
  
 e 
  
 l 
 ij 
  
 = e 
 ij 
  
 l  
 + w 
 j  
 E 
 i 
  
 l 
  
 and the short run elasticities by (27) - (29): 
  
 s 
  
 ' 
 i 
  
 E 
 i 
  
 = 
  
 1 + 
  
 w 
 i 
  
 s 
  
 { 
 ij 
  
 ' 
 i 
  
 j  
 +  
  
 1 
  
 k  
 ({ 
 kj  
 + { 
 jk 
 ) log p 
 k 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 = 
  
 2 
  
 P 
 w 
  
 i 
  
 ij 
  
 s 
  
 = 
  
 s 
  
 s 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 e 
 ij 
  
 + w 
 j  
 E 
 i 
  
 (24) 
 (25) 
 (26) 
 (27) 
 (28) 
 (29) 
 where  
 ij  
 is Kroneckers delta. Seasonal dummies are included in the estimations but for simplicity have been excluded in the formulas Cohen. 
 Note that the short run elasticities are not directly identied due to the loss of the constant term in the di¤erence form. The parameter  
 i  
 is interpreted as the budget share for a household at the subsistence level and is identied in the derivation of the long run elasticities. The short run elasticities are identied by assuming that  
 i  
 in the short run is equal to the long run value. 
  
 4 
  
 Data 
  
 The data used is quarterly national accounts running from  
 1980-2003. 
  For the period  
 1980-1998 
  data are from the old SNA denitions and the base year is 1991. For the period  
 1993-2003 
  data are based on the latest SNA denitions and comply better with international accounting systems. The denitions in some commodity groups are quite di¤erent and it has not Phillips to adjust the data for the earlier period so that it completely matches with data for the later period. However, the best possible revisions were done and the data for the earlier period linked with the later period to give a longer data series. The series were then used in the estimations and compared with estimations run for the period  
 1980-1998. 
  It turned out that the estimates with the consistent data series for  
 1980-1998 
  Santos reasonable, both in terms of t and theoretical consistency 
 12  
 . 
  
 12  
 Compensated  
 own-price 
  Gomez negative and the goodness of t were better for most equations. It could not be ruled out that this result Charles old with the new series. Hence, the older but longer series was chosen. 
 8 
  
 4.1 
  
 Utility tree and specication of categories 
  
 With quarterly data for the period  
 1980-1998 
  there are 76 observations. The static AIDS Ellis seasonal dummies and no theoretical restrictions implies 40 parameters in a system with 5 goods and 135 parameters in a system with 10 goods. Hence, it is clear that the dimension of the system must be kept small. With the dynamic specication, 6 goods appear to be the limit, but the theoretical homogeneity and symmetry Ramos and the dynamics kept simple. 
 The design of the  
 two-stage 
  budgeting system is governed by the demand from the public inquiry (Mervärdesskattesatsutredningen). It takes account of the design of the present system of the VAT system in which some goods are exempted, and tax rates vary across di¤erent commodities and services. Some a priori considerations are also done and some aggregation as done by Statistics Sweden in the SNA is kept here. Some di¤erent Smith and in particular estimates where some groups tend to have positive own- price elasticities Cox. The aggregation nally considered is 
 Table 1. Goods in  
 two-stage 
  budgeting system 
  
 1 
  
 Food, beverages, and health care 
  
 1_1 
  
 Food including light beer 
  
 1_2 Alchohol and tobacco 
  
 1_3 
  
 Restaurant 
  
 1_4 
  
 Health care 
  
 2 
  
 Housing, fuel, and furniture 
  
 2_1 
  
 Housing, fuel, and furniture 
  
 3 
  
 Household and personal care 
  
 3_1 
  
 Clothing and shoes 
  
 3_2 
  
 Household utensils 
  
 3_3 Post and telephone 
  
 3_4 
  
 Hotels 
  
 4 
  
 Transports, vacation travel 
  
 4_1 
  
 Vehicles including fuel 
  
 4_2 
  
 Transports 
  
 4_3 Foreign travel and consumption 
  
 4_4 Recreation including cultural activities 
  
 5 
  
 Miscellaneous goods and services 
  
 5_1 
  
 Goods for recreation 
  
 5_2 
  
 Games 
  
 5_3 Books and magazines 
  
 5_4 
  
 Miscellaneous goods 
  
 5_5 
  
 Insurance 
  
 6 
  
 Leisure 
  
 6_1 
  
 Leisure 
  
 with budgeting in two stages. The  
 rst-stage 
  has 6 goods and the second stage betweem one and ve goods in each category. Leisure is obviously a single good and the good with largest budget share. We now turn to its measurement, which is an important issue. 
  
 4.2 
  
 The measurement and treatment of leisure 
  
 Suppose the  
 n-th 
  good in the system of demand equations Cohen is leisure time, such that p 
 n  
 is the price of leisure and q 
 n  
 the number of leisure hours. The 
 budget share of leisure then is w 
 n  
 =  
 Pp 
  
 n 
  
 q 
  
 n  
 : The price of leisure has Berry 
  
 j  
  
 p 
 j  
 q 
 j 
 9 
 measured as the wage rate less the average marginal tax rate 
 13  
 . The budget restriction then can be written 
  
 X 
 n 1 
  
 p 
 i 
 q 
 i  
 = p 
 n 
 h + A; 
  
 (30) 
  
 i=1 
  
 where p 
 n 
 h is labor income, h is the total number of hours worked and A is  
 non-labor 
  income 
 14  
 . The budget restriction can be Colon taking account of the time restriction T = ml + z + s + n + q 
 n 
 , where T is the total number of Perry, ml = h is total numbers of hours, where m is mean hours and l the number of employed. z is the number of hours used for home production, s is the number of hours used for labor search, n is the number of subsistence Shields q 
 n  
 is leisure time. The budget restriction then becomes 
 X 
 n 
  
 i=1  
 p 
 i 
 q 
 i  
 = p 
 n 
 (T ml z s n) + A M 
  
 (31) 
  
 Young usually is referred to as full or potential income 
 15  
 . The problem then is how to estimate leisure time. The daily budget for an individual consumer could simply be determined as  
 (24-h-0-0-8), 
  the number of total hours less the number of hours worked less the assumed 8 Munoz for sleeping 
 16  
 . 
 The number of daily hours is then aggregated to the total number of quar- terly leisure hours for the adult population, b. The conversion factor from daily to quarterly Mejia is , the number of days each quarter. Lee have been es- timated as the number of ordinary working days, i.e. ve days for an ordinary week and also exclusive of all "red" days. The simplest measure of the total number of quarterly leisure hours is therefore (24 8) b ml. However, Nelson of the time of the unemployed is used for home production and labor search. If the the number of unemployed persons are labelled u, then the labor force is l + u and we assume that  
 1 
 mu Mejia is used for home pro- duction and labor search. Similarly, we assume that the elderly - or the adult population outside the labor force - use some time for home production and labor search, which is  
 2 
 m(b (l + u)). Finally, there is the number of subsis- Williams, which are related to sleeping, eating and for some health care, etc. which are di¢ cult to determine. We denote this by bn. The total number of quarterly leisure hours then can be determined as 
  
 24 b ml  
 1 
 mu  
 2 
 m(b (l + u)) nb 
  
 (32) 
  
 where the respective terms are 
  
 13  
 The hourly compensation paid by employers have been obtained as the total compensation divided by the total number of Jones, as described in the National Accounts. The data on average marginal Taylor from Young du Jacobs, Ratio. The relative 
  
 wage 
  
 (1 t 
 2 
 ) 
  
 1 t 
 2 
  
 1 t 
 2 
  
 price of leisure is determined by 
  
 (1+t 
 1 
 ) 
  
 =  
  
 wage 
  
 =  
 p 
  
 n  
 where 
  
 p 
 f  
 (1+t 
 3 
 ) 
  
 p 
 f 
  
 (1+t 
 1 
 )(1+t 
 3 
 ) 
  
 p 
 i 
  
 (1+t 
 1 
 )(1+t 
 3 
 ) 
  
 is the total tax Williams., where wage is the compensation paid by the employer, t 
 1  
 is the payroll tax rate, t 
 2  
 is the income tax rate and t 
 3  
 is the indirect tax rate. All prices in this study are measured including indirect taxes and wages excluding payroll taxes. The price on leisure is therefore simply the wage rate net of the average marginal tax rate. 
  
 14 
  
 The simplest formulation would be to use the budget restriction 
  
 P 
  
 n 
  
 i=1  
 p 
 i 
 q 
 i  
 = p 
 n 
 T + A; 
  
 for T = h + q 
  
 n 
  
 : 
  
 15 
  
 See Dowd (1992) or Madden (1995) for similar treatments. 
  
 16  
 An alternative would be to measure  
 non-labor 
  income as is done by Dowd (1992). He measures A as the di¤erence between private disposable income and labor income and sets 
 T = 24. 
 10 
 24 b= the total number of Russell number of hours worked 
  
 1 
 mu= the number of hours worked in home production and labor search by those unemployed 
  
 2 
 m(b (l+u))= the number of hours worked in home production and labor search by those outside the labor force 
 nb= the number of subsistence Jones in home production, sleeping, etc. by the adult population 
 The formula can be simplied to 
  
 (24 n) b m [l  
 1 
 u  
 2 
 (b (l + u))] 
  
 (33) 
  
 Data are available on all variables less  
 i  
 and n, for which some assumptions are necessary. The basic assumption is (  
 1  
 = 0:5;  
 2  
 = 0:2; n = 12). For a fully employed person this means that the daily leisure time is  
 (24-12-8=4) 
  Mejia, for an unemployed person it is  
 (24-12-4=8) 
  Shields for a pensionist  
 (24-12-1.6=10.4) 
  Mejia. As alternatives in a sensitivity analysis we also use 
 1  
 = 0:4  
 2  
 = 0:1 3; n = 1113, a total of 27 combinations. On the whole, elasticities Ashley not very sensitive to this choice. The nal choice was done on a judgemental basis in which the requirement of theoretically correct signs on the parameters was the most important. 
  
 5 
  
 Empirical results 
  
 5.1 
  
 Estimated equations 
  
 The empirical results are presented extensively in the data appendix. Here some summary results from the estimations are presented. In general the goodness of t of the estimated equations are satisfactory, which can be seen in Table 2. 
 11 
  
 Table 2. Summary statistics for estimated demand systems. 
  
 2 
  
 Mean of 
  
 Standard error 
  
 p-value 
  in 
  
 System 
  
 dep. var. 
  
 of regression 
  
 autocorrelation test 
  
 R 
  
 Stage 1: 1 
  
 0.97 
  
 0.15 
  
 0.0036 
  
 0.08 
  
 2 
  
 0.95 
  
 0.16 
  
 0.0037 
  
 0.31 
  
 3 
  
 0.95 
  
 0.08 
  
 0.0029 
  
 0.08 
  
 4 
  
 0.70 
  
 0.11 
  
 0.0060 
  
 0.08 
  
 5 
  
 0.94 
  
 0.07 
  
 0.0031 
  
 0.63 
  
 6 
  
 0.97 
  
 0.43 
  
 0.0065 
  
 0.68 
  
 Group 1: 1_1 
  
 0.90 
  
 0.65 
  
 0.0077 
  
 0.01 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.79 
  
 0.18 
  
 0.0059 
  
 0.36 
  
 1_3 
  
 0.78 
  
 0.14 
  
 0.0088 
  
 0.02 
  
 1_4 
  
 0.96 
  
 0.03 
  
 0.0016 
  
 0.18 
  
 Group 2: 2_1 
  
 0.95 
  
 0.16 
  
 0.0037 
  
 0.31 
  
 Group 3: 3_1 
  
 0.55 
  
 0.47 
  
 0.0130 
  
 0.11 
  
 3_2 
  
 0.41 
  
 0.40 
  
 0.0093 
  
 0.11 
  
 3_3 
  
 0.79 
  
 0.11 
  
 0.0057 
  
 0.29 
  
 3_4 
  
 0.91 
  
 0.03 
  
 0.0010 
  
 0.14 
  
 Group 4: 4_1 
  
 0.89 
  
 0.56 
  
 0.0127 
  
 0.82 
  
 4_2 
  
 0.68 
  
 0.11 
  
 0.0043 
  
 0.05 
  
 4_3 
  
 0.85 
  
 0.23 
  
 0.0130 
  
 0.19 
  
 4_4 
  
 0.96 
  
 0.10 
  
 0.0031 
  
 0.13 
  
 Group 5: 5_1 
  
 0.92 
  
 0.42 
  
 0.0098 
  
 0.03 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.89 
  
 0.11 
  
 0.0064 
  
 0.11 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.98 
  
 0.14 
  
 0.0050 
  
 0.07 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.72 
  
 0.25 
  
 0.0067 
  
 0.00 
  
 5_5 
  
 0.92 
  
 0.08 
  
 0.0034 
  
 0.04 
  
 Group 6: 6_1 
  
 0.97 
  
 0.43 
  
 0.0065 
  
 0.68 
  
 The rst column shows the goodness of t of the individual equations in 
 2 
 each system. In stage 1 R for all equations except Transports are around 0.95. For Transports it is 0.70. The second column shows the mean of the dependent variable revaling that the mean of the budget share of goods consumption for  
 1980-1998 
  is 57 percent while for leisure it is 43 percent. The percentage stan- dard error (of the regression) is around 0.35 for all goods except Transports for which it is 0.6 percent. For leisure the standard error is 0.65 percent. The fourth column of Table 2 shows tests for autocorrelation in the individual equations. This test is done by running an unrestricted VAR with 2 lags on the estimated residuals of the systems. The number of observations times R 
 2  
 is then treated as  
 chi-square 
  Ortega degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables on the  
 right-hand 
  side of each equation, i.e. a LM test 
 17  
 . The autocorrelation tests show no sign of autocorrelation in the six equations in Stage 1. 
 Turning to Stage 2 it can be noted that the t is generally somewhat lower. In Group 1 Food is the biggest category, accounting for 65 percent within the 
 group and totally (0.65 0.15) 100 = 9.8 percent with a 0.8 percent standard 
 2 
 error. The R = 0:9 for Food but there is some autocorrelation in this equation. 
  
 17  
 See Engle (1984). 
 12 
 However, the other equations in Group 1 show no sign of autocorrelation so that autocorrelation in the group as a whole can be statistically rejected. 
 The t of the Housing - Group 2 - equation is 0.95 and the standard error is 0.4 percent. The budget share is 16 percent, 28 percent of total consumption (less leisure). In Group 3 autocorrelation is rejected in all equations. However, the t is rather poor in this group. In Group 4 there is autocorrelation in 4_2 - Transports. The t is rather poor in this category - 0.68. Finally, in Group 5 there is autocorrelation in three of the ve groups: 5_1, 5_4 and 5_5, while there is no sign of autocorrelation in the aggregate as revealed in the equation for Group 5 in the Stage 1 estimation. 
  
 5.2 
  
 Estimated elasticities 
  
 Estimated elasticities are presented in the data appendix. Here, some summary results are presented. In Table 3, the total elasticities dened in (11) are shown. The  
 within-group 
  elasticities - also dened in (11) - are presented in the data appendix. 
 Table 3. Total long run compensated  
 own-price 
  and total expenditure elasticities. Estimated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Compensated 
  
 Total expen- 
  
 own-price 
  
 diture 
  
 Item 
  
 elasticity 
  
 elasticity 
  
 Food including light beer 
  
 -0.36 
  
 0.55 
  
 Alchohol and tobacco 
  
 -0.88 
  
 0.58 
  
 Restaurant 
  
 -0.43 
  
 0.96 
  
 Health care 
  
 -0.36 
  
 0.53 
  
 Housing, fuel, and furniture 
  
 -0.28 
  
 0.21 
  
 Clothing and shoes 
  
 -0.26 
  
 2.61 
  
 Household utensils 
  
 -0.31 
  
 2.65 
  
 Post and telephone 
  
 -0.72 
  
 1.80 
  
 Hotels 
  
 -0.52 
  
 2.29 
  
 Vehicles including fuel 
  
 -1.87 
  
 2.30 
  
 Transports 
  
 -1.39 
  
 2.99 
  
 Foreign travel and consumption 
  
 -1.56 
  
 5.40 
  
 Recreation including cultural activities 
  
 -1.57 
  
 2.93 
  
 Goods for recreation 
  
 -1.19 
  
 2.35 
  
 Games 
  
 -1.30 
  
 1.83 
  
 Books and magazines 
  
 -1.55 
  
 1.94 
  
 Miscellaneous goods 
  
 -0.79 
  
 1.69 
  
 Insurance 
  
 -0.80 
  
 4.62 
  
 Leisure 
  
 -0.09 
  
 0.49 
  
 All compensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities are negative and all total expenditure elasticities are positive. Food, Housing and Leisure are necessities and all other goods luxuries. Price elasticities are relatively low for necessities and relatively high for luxuries which is in line with the intuition. The demand is price inelastic for all goods belonging to the rst three groups of Stage 1 and for Miscellaneous goods, Insurance and Leisure. It is elastic for Travel and recreation and for 
 13 
 Books and magazines. The VAT Wood recently Taylor 25 to 6 percent which eventually would lower prices by some 15 percent and conse- Larson almost 25 percent in the long run (the compensated  
 own-price 
  elasticity is  
 -1.55). 
  Francis, notice in Table 4 below that the short run elasticity is only  
 -0.15. 
  
 Table 4. Total short run compensated  
 own-price 
  and total expenditure elasticities. Estimated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Compensated 
  
 Total expen- 
  
 own-price 
  
 diture 
  
 Item 
  
 elasticity 
  
 elasticity 
  
 Food including light beer 
  
 -0.34 
  
 0.30 
  
 Alchohol and tobacco 
  
 Wilson 
  
 0.59 
  
 Restaurant 
  
 -0.62 
  
 0.82 
  
 Health care 
  
 -0.62 
  
 0.38 
  
 Housing, fuel, and furniture 
  
 -0.16 
  
 0.23 
  
 Clothing and shoes 
  
 -0.82 
  
 1.50 
  
 Household utensils 
  
 -1.19 
  
 1.37 
  
 Post and telephone 
  
 -0.64 
  
 1.27 
  
 Hotels 
  
 -1.21 
  
 1.22 
  
 Vehicles including fuel 
  
 -0.88 
  
 2.16 
  
 Transports 
  
 -0.72 
  
 0.80 
  
 Foreign travel and consumption 
  
 -1.09 
  
 0.84 
  
 Recreation including cultural activities 
  
 -0.35 
  
 1.00 
  
 Goods for recreation 
  
 -1.68 
  
 1.18 
  
 Games 
  
 -0.99 
  
 0.92 
  
 Books and magazines 
  
 -0.15 
  
 0.98 
  
 Miscellaneous goods 
  
 -1.27 
  
 0.85 
  
 Insurance 
  
 -0.65 
  
 2.32 
  
 Leisure 
  
 -0.09 
  
 1.23 
  
 Table 4 shows the corresponding short run elasticities. Lee are the direct e¤ects of changes in prices and total expenditure, i.e. that occur within a quarter. In most cases the absolute value of the elasticity is smaller in the short than in the long run. This supports the interpretation of adjustment costs or habit formation in the demand for these goods. Schmidt to all total expenditure elasticities except Leisure for which the short run elasticity is 1.23 - a luxury - while being only 0.49 in the long run - a necessity. The short run compensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities are abolutely higher than the corresponding long run elasticities for 8 of the 19 goods, i.e. for all goods in Group 3. 
 Why would the short run elasticity overshoot and exceed the long run elas- ticity? This would likely occur for goods where demand is very exible and the degree of habit formation low. Lee e¤ects are particularly strong for Clothing and shoes, Household utensils, and Hotels. For these categories the response to a change in the relative price has a large immediate e¤ect but declines in the long run. For the categories Housing, Transports and Miscellaneous the initial response is instead relatively small but increases to reach a peak at the long run value. 
 14 
  
 Figure 1. Short and long run  
 own-price 
  elasticities at temporary and permanent price changes. 
 We can distinguish not only between long and short run elasticities but also between the response to temporary and permanent changes in prices and total expenditure (full income). In Figure 1 the dynamic response to relative price changes are shown. The charts show the  
 own-price 
  elasticities as a response to temporary and permanent changes in relative prices 
 18  
 . The elasticities in the gure converge to the long run uncompensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities estimated 
  
 18  
 The shocks are  
 one-percentage 
  shocks in the relative prices in the rst quarter in 1994 and the responses are measured as the percentage change in demand and shown for the remainder of the sample period (elasticities).As can be seen in the charts, the long run e¤ects are Gould approximately 2 years. 
 15 
 in Stage 1 and given in Table B1 in the data appendix. A temporary price change has a temporary demand e¤ect which lasts for about 2 years. The overshooting property can be seen particularly for Household and personal care and Leisure. The response which could be expected due to the presence of adjustment costs can be noticed in particular for Housing, fuel and furniture, Transports and vacation travel and Miscellaneous goods and services. 
 The elasticities also vary over time due to variations in budget shares, prices and full income, as apparent from the denitions of elasticities in (22) - (29). Lee variations are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 which show long run com- pensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities and total expenditure elasticities, respectively. 
 As can be seen in Hurley 2 the long run compensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities are all negative and fairly Walters sample period. For some categories there seems to be a shift in the beginning of the 90ie. In absolute terms, the elasticity decreases for Food and Household and personal care and increases for Transports, Miscellaneous and Leisure. For Food and Household and personal care the elasticity decreases from approximately  
 -0.4 
  to  
 -0.25 
  while for Mis- cellaneous goods and services the elasticity decreases from about  
 -1.6 
  to  
 -2.1. 
  The labor supply elasticity is low but become more elastic during the sample period and increases from about 0.05 to 0.1. This could be due to the tax re- form in the beginning of the 90ies which shifted taxes from labor to goods. We tried to include a dummy for the period before 1990 but it was not statistically signicant. 
 In Figure 3 the long run total expenditure elasticities are shown. They are all positive and lowest for the Food, Housing and Leisure categories. The elasticity drops from about 0.75 to 0.6 for Food, increases from .1 to .2 for Housing and from .4 to .5 for Leisure. Though the elasticities vary they are fairly Walters sample period. 
  
 5.3 
  
 Labor supply elasticities 
  
 The responses shown in Figure 1 indicate that the initial labor supply response is quite large but declines in the long run. The short run uncompensated response is about  
 -.6 
  while in the long run the elasticity is about  
 -.4. 
  The compensated response is quite lower - around  
 -.09. 
  The relatively high short Payne may be interpreted as a response in Mejia to temporary changes in demand with a corresponding change in compensation. In many occupations this increase in compensation may be more or less automatic (and negotiated) and hence both wages and labor supply become exible with respect to excess demand in the short run. Lee results are in line with what previously have been found by Blomquist (1983) and Blomquist and  
 Hansson-Brusewitz 
  (1990) for Swedish household data on mensand womenslabor supply 
 19  
 . 
 It is interesting to compare the results for demand systems with and without Leisure, since the measurement of Leisure in itself seems uncertain. We do that by estimating the Stage 1 demand system with and without Leisure. The results are presented in Table 5. 
  
 19  
 Surveys of labor supply are Pencavel (1986) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). 
 16 
  
 17 
  
 18 
  
 Table 5. Comparison of uncompensated price 
 and total expenditure elasticities with and without Leisure in Stage 1. At mean values  
 1994-1998. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 6 
  
 1 
  
 -0.34 
  
 -0.12 
  
 -0.25 
  
 -0.15 
  
 0.53 
  
 -0.28 
  
 -0.44 
  
 -0.01 
  
 0.09 
  
 0.19 
  
 0.17 
  
 2 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.31 
  
 -0.29 
  
 0.07 
  
 0.05 
  
 0.33 
  
 -0.00 
  
 0.08 
  
 -0.15 
  
 -0.03 
  
 0.11 
  
 3 
  
 -0.54 
  
 -0.87 
  
 -0.45 
  
 0.53 
  
 0.15 
  
 -1.28 
  
 0.25 
  
 -0.27 
  
 -0.67 
  
 0.21 
  
 0.47 
  
 4 
  
 -0.30 
  
 -0.10 
  
 0.31 
  
 -1.84 
  
 0.11 
  
 -1.37 
  
 0.34 
  
 0.13 
  
 0.15 
  
 -0.42 
  
 -0.19 
  
 5 
  
 1.09 
  
 0.04 
  
 0.18 
  
 0.23 
  
 -2.12 
  
 -1.70 
  
 -0.01 
  
 -0.13 
  
 0.82 
  
 0.25 
  
 -0.93 
  
 6 
  
 -0.13 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.00 
  
 0.11 
  
 -0.08 
  
 -0.32 
  
 x/P 
  
 0.62 
  
 0.21 
  
 2.47 
  
 3.19 
  
 2.27 
  
 0.49 
  
 0.45 
  
 0.53 
  
 1.45 
  
 1.80 
  
 1.50 
  
 First, the classication of necessities and luxuries are the same 
 20  
 , though the total expenditure elasticities are higher particularly for the groups 3, 4, and 5. This depends on Leisure being classied as a necessity with a large budget share.  
 Calderon 
  elasticitities are all negative in the system with Leisure but 2 - Housing, fuel and furniture - has a positive, but insignicant, elasticity in the system without Leisure.  
 Calderon 
  elasticities for groups 4 and 5 are more elastic in the system with Leisure. Notice also that the high positive cross- price elasticity between 5 and 1 - 1.09 - is  
 -0.01 
  in the system without Leisure. Another high  
 cross-price 
  elasticity in the system with Leisure is between 3 and 2 -  
 -0.87 
  - which is lower,  
 -0.27, 
  in the system without Leisure. 
  
 5.4 
  
 Comparison with previous results 
  
 The results are compared to previous Turner results in Table 6. The table is incomplete and only presents a small sample from the literature. Generally, it seems as if the elasticities estimated here are fairly reasonable. 
  
 20  
 Note however that strictly the classication should be done with respect to the compen- sated elasticities. 
 19 
  
 Table 6. Comparison of uncompensated price and total expenditure elasticities estimated in di¤erent models in Stage 1. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 6 
  
 1 
  
 -0.34 
  
 -0.12 
  
 -0.25 
  
 -0.15 
  
 0.53 
  
 -0.28 
  
 a 
  
 -0.54 
  
 -0.01 
  
 0.27 
  
 0.23 
  
 b 
  
 -0.32 
  
 c 
  
 -0.45 
  
 d 
  
 -0.65 
  
 e 
  
 -0.20 
  
 2 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.31 
  
 -0.29 
  
 0.07 
  
 0.05 
  
 0.33 
  
 a 
  
 b 
  
 -0.15 
  
 d 
  
 -0.7 
  
 3 
  
 -0.54 
  
 -0.87 
  
 -0.45 
  
 0.53 
  
 0.15 
  
 -1.28 
  
 a 
  
 -0.64 
  
 -0.81 
  
 0.04 
  
 0.48 
  
 b 
  
 -0.57 
  
 c 
  
 -0.96 
  
 4 
  
 -0.30 
  
 -0.10 
  
 0.31 
  
 -1.84 
  
 0.11 
  
 -1.37 
  
 a 
  
 -0.04 
  
 -0.14 
  
 -0.71 
  
 -0.44 
  
 b 
  
 -0.34 
  
 c 
  
 -1.09 
  
 5 
  
 1.09 
  
 0.04 
  
 0.18 
  
 0.23 
  
 -2.12 
  
 -1.70 
  
 a 
  
 -0.18 
  
 -0.04 
  
 -0.90 
  
 c 
  
 -1.62 
  
 6 
  
 -0.13 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.00 
  
 0.11 
  
 -0.08 
  
 -0.32 
  
 c 
  
 -0.06 
  
 x/P 
  
 0.62 
  
 0.21 
  
 2.47 
  
 3.19 
  
 2.27 
  
 0.49 
  
 a 
  
 0.27 
  
 0.04 
  
 1.57 
  
 1.58 
  
 b 
  
 0.37 
  
 0.75 
  
 0.44 
  
 e 
  
 0.96 
  
 Note. a) Anderson and Blundell (1983) 
  
 b) 
  
 Blanciforti and Green (1983) 
  
 c) 
  
 Haley (1993) 
  
 d) 
  
 Pollak and Wales (1992) 
  
 e) 
  
 Assarsson (1996) 
  
 The  
 own-price 
  elasticities for Food and Housing are similar to those found in other studies. This is true also for Household and personal care though this category is probably not directly comparable with other studies. The Transports and Miscellaneous categories turn out to be relatively elastic here with the elasticities  
 -1.84 
  and  
 -2.12 
  respectively, which can be compared to the next highest which are  
 -1.09 
  and  
 -1.62 
  in Haley (1993). Again, Kirby not be directly comparable. 
 The total expenditure elasticity for Food is in line with other studies while those for Household and personal care, Transports and Miscellaneous seem to be relatively high here. Again, this is not Harris to the results in other studies since most of them use total expenditure less the consumption 
 20 
 value of Leisure, while here full income is used. 
  
 6 
  
 Summary and conclusions 
  
 This paper has analysed the demand for consumer goods and services as well as the demand for leisure in a simultaneous equations model for Swedish aggre- gate time series data. The usual weak separability assumption between leisure and consumption goods has not Farley. A dynamic version of the Almost Ideal Demand System in error correction form has been estimated and price and total expenditure elasticities for consumption goods and leisure have been estimated Hartmantaneously. All goods and leisure have been divided into 19 categories in a  
 two-stage 
  budgeting process in which the rst stage comprises 6 categories of which Leisure is one. 
 The price of leisure time is estimated as the wage rate net of the average marginal tax rate. The estimate of fullincome is then conditional on the mea- surement of leisure time which is subject to a sensitivity analysis in which the number of hours used for home work and labor search is varied across di¤erent population groups. 
 Even if weak separability is assumed when demand is estimated within the di¤erent consumption categories there are relationships beween the categories that can be explored. This is done here and  
 within-group 
  elasticities as well as total elasticities are estimated. Estimations Williams out with the dynamics specied as an error correction model. Homogeneity as well as symmetry restric- tions are imposed. Restrictions are also imposed on the dynamic specication in order to arrive at a coherent system. A weak test of weak separability is done in the form of  
 Hausman-Wu 
  tests for simultaneity bias. Tests for autocorrelation is also carried out. Equations - in budget share form - are with some exceptions estimated with good t and the elasticities turn Giles with reasonable precision. All long run as well as short run compensated as well as uncompensated  
 own-price 
  elasticities are negative and all total expenditure elasticities are positive. Categories classied as necessities with total expendi- ture elasticities less than one have generally lower price elasticities than luxury goods, as is usually the case also in other studies. Necessities are typically Food and Housing. On the other hand, categories like Travel or Books are classied as luxury goods and have long run compensated price elasticities Adams minus unity. 
 The price elasticity for Leisure is the labor supply elasticity (with opposite sign). The long run compensated labor supply elasticity is here 0.1 which is in line with previous estimates for Swedish households on micro data. The short run elasticity is higher than the long run elasticity which might reect strong short run intertemporal substitution. 
 In the context of optimal taxation the  
 cross-price 
  elasticities are interesting, especially those between Leisure and the various consumption goods. Barker, Ramsey to be estimated with much less precision than the  
 own-price 
  elasticities and this is the case here also. Most of the  
 cross-price 
  elasticities are fairly close to zero with some notable exceptions. 
 21 
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 Alston, Palmer, K.A. Montgomery (1994), "Estimating Elasticities with the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System", Review of Eco- nomics and Statistics, 76,  
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 Assarsson, B. (1991b), "Adams Policy and the Demand for Alco- hol in Sweden  
 1978-1988", 
  Nordic Food Demand Study SW/9, Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Sweden. 
 Assarsson, B. (1996), "The Almost Ideal Demand System in Error Correction Form", in Edgerton et al (1996). 
 Assarsson, B. (1997), "Efterfrågan på tjänster i Sverige. Beräkning av efter- frågeelasticiteter och sysselsättningse¤ekter", Bilaga 2 till Tjänstebeskattning- sutredningens betänkande Skatter, tjänster och sysselsättning, SOU 1997:17. 
 Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on Public Economics, Maid- enhead: McGraw Hill. 
 Blomquist, N.S. (1983), "The E¤ect of Income Taxation on the Labor Supply of Married Men", Journal of Public Economics, 22,  
 196-197. 
  
 Blomquist, N.S. and U.  
 Hansson-Brusewitz, 
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 317-357. 
  
 Thomas, A. (1994), "Evaluating the Linearized Almost Ideal Demand System", 
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 781-793. 
  
 Price, J.A. (1987), "A Globally Flexible Almost Ideal Demand System", 
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 233-242. 
  
 Meyers, Molina, Trujillo and L.J. Lau (1975), "Transcendental Logarithmic Utility Functions", American Economic Review, 65,  
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 American Economic Review, 
 Deaton, Adams (1980b), Economics and Consumer Behavior, Cambridge University Press. 
 Dowd, K. (1992), "Consumer Demand, Full Incomeand Real Wages", Em- pirical Economics, 17,  
 333-345. 
  
 Edgerton, D. (1992), "Estimating Elasticities in  
 Multi-Stage 
  Demand Sys- tems", ?? 
 Edgerton, D. (1993), "On the Estimation of Separable Demand Models", 
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 141-146. 
  
 Edgerton, D., Barber, Torres, Cobb, Delgado and P.H. Vale (1996), The Econometrics of Demand Systems. With Applications to Food Demand in the Nordic Countries, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 Engle, R.F. (1984), "Moreno, Likelihood Ratio, and Lagrange Multiplier Tests in Econometrics", Ch. 13 in Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 2, eds. Vargas and M.D. Intriligator, Amsterdam:  
 North-Holland. 
  
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 K-G 
  Mäler and J. 
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 Södersten, Ekonomiska perspektiv på skattereformen, Ekonomiska rådets års- bok. 
 Gorman, W.M. (1959), "Separable Utility and Aggregation", American Eco- nomic Review, 27,  
 469-481. 
  
 Haley, H. (1993), "Testing for Separability Between Commodity Demand and Labour Supply in West Germany", Collins, 18,  
 21-56. 
  
 Kesavan, T, Rodriguez, Lee and S.R. Davis, (1993), "Dynamics and  
 Long-Run 
  Structure in U.S. Meat Demand", Canadian Journal of Agricul- tural Economics, 41,  
 139-153. 
  
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 North-Holland. 
  
 Klevmarken, N.A. (1979), "A Comparative Study of Complete Systems of Demand Functions", Journal of Econometrics, 10,  
 165-191. 
  
 Klevmarken, N.A. (1981), On the Complete Systems Approach to Demand Analysis, Stockholm: Johnson. 
 Madden, D. (1995), "Labour Supply, Commodity Demand and Marginal Tax Reform, Economic Journal, 105,  
 485-497. 
  
 Pencavel, J. (1986), "Labor Supply of Men: A Survey", in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, eds. York and Bell, Amsterdam:  
 North-Holland. 
  
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 Gould, Haney (1992), Demand System Specication and Esti- mation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Pudney, S.E. (1981), "An Empirical Method of Approximating the Separable Structure of Consumer Preferences", Review of Economic Studies, 48,  
 561-577. 
  
 Varian, H.R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis, New York: Norton. 
 23 
 Data appendix 
  
 Table 
  
 Type of elasticity 
  
 At value 
  
 A1 
  
 Long run uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 Long run total expenditure elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 A2 
  
 Long run compensated price elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 A3 
  
 Long run uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Long run total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 A4 
  
 Long run compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 A5 
  
 Short run uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 Short run total expenditure elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 A6 
  
 Short run compensated price elasticities 
  
 Mean 
  
 A7 
  
 Short run uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Short run total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 A8 
  
 Short run compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 A9 
  
 Stage 1. Long run uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 1. Long run total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 1. Long run compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B1 
  
 Stage 1. Standard errors of uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 1. Standard errors of total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B2 
  
 Stage 1. Standard errors of compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B3 
  
 Stage 2. Group 1. Standard errors of uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 2. Group 1. Standard errors of total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B4 
  
 Stage 2. Group 1. Standard errors of compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B5 
  
 Stage 2. Group 3. Standard errors of uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 2. Group 3. Standard errors of total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B6 
  
 Stage 2. Group 3. Standard errors of compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B7 
  
 Stage 2. Group 4. Standard errors of uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 2. Group 4. Standard errors of total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B8 
  
 Stage 2. Group 4. Standard errors of compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B9 
  
 Stage 2. Group 5. Standard errors of uncompensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 Stage 2. Group 5. Standard errors of total expenditure elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 B10 
  
 Stage 2. Group 5. Standard errors of compensated price elasticities 
  
 1994-1998 
  
 24 
  
 Table A1. Long run uncompensated price elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.448225 
  
 0.118271 
  
 -0.033555 
  
 -0.020143 
  
 -0.095611 
  
 -0.085266 
  
 -0.075873 
  
 -0.026533 
  
 -0.004936 
  
 -0.067569 
  
 -0.013220 
  
 -0.027922 
  
 -0.012865 
  
 0.168872 
  
 0.044326 
  
 0.058058 
  
 0.102253 
  
 0.032629 
  
 -0.219177 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.437165 
  
 -0.902909 
  
 -0.022525 
  
 0.094479 
  
 -0.098183 
  
 -0.087564 
  
 -0.077912 
  
 -0.027238 
  
 -0.005066 
  
 -0.069382 
  
 -0.013578 
  
 -0.028683 
  
 -0.013205 
  
 0.173466 
  
 0.045535 
  
 0.059532 
  
 0.105019 
  
 0.033514 
  
 -0.225086 
  
 1_3 
  
 -0.172767 
  
 -0.031848 
  
 -0.422304 
  
 -0.074093 
  
 -0.172760 
  
 -0.154243 
  
 -0.137094 
  
 -0.047554 
  
 -0.008904 
  
 -0.122362 
  
 -0.023903 
  
 -0.050300 
  
 -0.023254 
  
 0.305338 
  
 0.079618 
  
 0.105183 
  
 0.184931 
  
 0.058663 
  
 -0.396261 
  
 1_4 
  
 -1.306355 
  
 0.318120 
  
 0.824625 
  
 -0.181017 
  
 -0.086881 
  
 -0.077452 
  
 -0.068991 
  
 -0.024383 
  
 -0.004479 
  
 -0.061407 
 -0.012039 
 -0.025400 
 -0.011718 
  
 0.153432 
  
 0.040613 
  
 0.052760 
  
 0.092975 
  
 0.029795 
  
 -0.199416 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.033293 
  
 -0.009025 
  
 -0.007480 
  
 -0.001842 
  
 -0.247773 
  
 -0.139790 
  
 -0.123592 
  
 -0.040947 
  
 -0.008055 
  
 0.035044 
  
 0.006826 
  
 0.014624 
  
 0.006548 
  
 0.029474 
  
 0.007269 
  
 0.009890 
  
 0.017699 
  
 0.005428 
  
 0.354049 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.337674 
  
 -0.091219 
  
 -0.073238 
  
 -0.017908 
  
 -0.777453 
  
 -0.394171 
  
 -0.153953 
  
 -0.060311 
  
 0.044606 
  
 0.276361 
  
 0.054187 
  
 0.114625 
  
 0.052885 
  
 0.051208 
  
 0.013734 
  
 0.017778 
  
 0.031114 
  
 0.010114 
  
 -1.142741 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.343984 
  
 -0.092928 
  
 -0.074593 
  
 -0.018238 
  
 -0.791876 
  
 -0.175581 
  
 -0.424276 
  
 0.130077 
  
 -0.104809 
  
 0.281527 
  
 0.055192 
  
 0.116742 
  
 0.053855 
  
 0.052160 
  
 0.013985 
  
 0.018102 
  
 0.031691 
  
 0.010298 
  
 -1.163913 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.194416 
  
 -0.052386 
  
 -0.042739 
  
 -0.010555 
  
 -0.452427 
  
 -0.214830 
  
 0.416496 
  
 -0.689223 
  
 0.173237 
  
 0.158870 
  
 0.031505 
  
 0.066720 
  
 0.030848 
  
 0.029899 
  
 0.008264 
  
 0.010530 
  
 0.018246 
  
 0.006058 
  
 -0.665916 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.297803 
  
 -0.080415 
  
 -0.064573 
  
 -0.015767 
  
 -0.685308 
  
 1.167471 
  
 -1.171452 
  
 0.030933 
  
 -0.523916 
  
 0.243631 
  
 0.047758 
  
 0.101090 
  
 0.046612 
  
 0.045148 
  
 0.012102 
  
 0.015672 
  
 0.027430 
  
 0.008916 
  
 -1.007526 
  
 4_1 
  
 -0.176687 
  
 -0.047760 
  
 -0.037133 
  
 -0.009092 
  
 -0.066248 
  
 0.102177 
  
 0.090692 
  
 0.030726 
  
 0.005876 
  
 -1.996960 
  0.104168 0.160538 0.379566 
  
 0.027008 
  
 0.007172 
  
 0.009345 
  
 0.016405 
  
 0.005267 
  
 -1.028290 
  
 4_2 
  
 -0.224550 
  
 -0.060709 
  
 -0.047281 
  
 -0.011573 
  
 -0.084515 
  
 0.130330 
  
 0.115773 
  
 0.039391 
  
 0.007506 
  
 0.411491 
  
 -1.437583 
  
 -0.430576 
  
 -0.267863 
  
 0.034542 
  
 0.009210 
  
 0.011972 
  
 0.020994 
  
 0.006766 
  
 -1.311953 
  
 4_3 
  
 -0.420920 
  
 -0.113704 
  
 -0.088160 
  
 -0.021661 
  
 -0.158496 
  
 0.242831 
  
 0.215455 
  
 0.072820 
  
 0.013929 
  
 -0.258634 
  
 -0.306768 
  
 -1.718644 
  
 -0.924651 
  
 0.063818 
  
 0.016924 
  
 0.022207 
  
 0.038797 
  
 0.012407 
  
 -2.441924 
  
 4_4 
  
 -0.219858 
  
 -0.059415 
  
 -0.046291 
  
 -0.011332 
  
 -0.082909 
  
 0.127722 
  
 0.113496 
  
 0.038640 
  
 0.007359 
  
 0.946193 
  
 -0.324142 
 -0.688106 
 -1.622606 
  
 0.033814 
  
 0.009027 
  
 0.011756 
  
 0.020559 
  
 0.006630 
  
 -1.285406 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.554654 
  
 0.150605 
  
 0.122685 
  
 0.030337 
  
 0.042044 
  
 0.062401 
  
 0.055754 
  
 0.020000 
  
 0.003667 
  
 0.109958 
  
 0.021534 
  
 0.045543 
  
 0.020926 
  
 -1.176970 
  
 -0.257902 
  
 -0.176276 
  
 -0.216589 
  
 -0.119443 
  
 -1.349936 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.407308 
  
 0.110673 
  
 0.090703 
  
 0.022510 
  
 0.030673 
  
 0.045809 
  
 0.040986 
  
 0.014890 
  
 0.002699 
  
 0.080369 
  
 0.015793 
  
 0.033475 
  
 0.015359 
  
 -0.863059 
  
 -1.323463 
  
 1.010034 
  
 -0.078059 
  
 -0.168760 
  
 -0.992239 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.462637 
  
 0.125414 
  
 0.102108 
  
 0.025241 
  
 0.034961 
  
 0.052096 
  
 0.046568 
  
 0.016703 
  
 0.003063 
  
 0.091717 
  
 0.017969 
  
 0.037941 
  
 0.017519 
  
 -0.429179 
  
 0.755445 
  
 -1.518805 
  
 -0.485472 
  
 0.053848 
  
 -1.125435 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.404094 
  
 0.109792 
  
 0.089261 
  
 0.022065 
  
 0.030708 
  
 0.045451 
  
 0.040577 
  
 0.014507 
  
 0.002668 
  
 0.080207 
  
 0.015697 
  
 0.033176 
  
 0.015227 
  
 -0.208318 
  
 -0.040110 
  
 -0.245297 
  
 -0.792080 
  
 -0.134167 
  
 -0.983390 
  
 5_5 
  
 1.174490 
  
 0.318715 
  
 0.257227 
  
 0.063595 
  
 0.089461 
  
 0.132061 
  
 0.117606 
  
 0.041401 
  
 0.007707 
  
 0.234838 
  
 0.045729 
  
 0.095951 
  
 0.044361 
  
 -1.147075 
  
 -0.605477 
  
 -0.300789 
  
 -1.398194 
  
 -0.696398 
  
 -2.854161 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.082497 
  
 -0.022299 
  
 -0.017840 
  
 -0.004381 
  
 -0.085079 
  
 -0.000331 
  
 -0.000414 
  
 -0.000280 
  
 -3.78E-05 
  
 0.063531 
  
 0.012276 
  
 0.025812 
  
 0.011846 
  
 -0.031457 
  
 -0.007999 
  
 -0.010676 
  
 -0.018960 
  
 -0.005943 
  
 -0.269607 
  
 Long run total expenditure elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 0.606488 
  
 0.622620 
  
 1.103916 
  
 0.547218 
  
 0.124946 
  
 2.382054 
  
 2.426567 
  
 1.371819 
  
 2.099997 
  
 2.423232 
  
 3.088628 
  
 5.754376 
  
 3.024870 
  
 2.057008 
  
 1.504297 
  
 1.715660 
  
 1.499930 
  
 4.378952 
  
 0.444333 
  
 Table A2. Long run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.388986 
  
 0.134276 
  
 -0.021124 
  
 -0.017144 
  
 Harrison 
  
 -0.062463 
  
 -0.055850 
  
 -0.020144 
  
 -0.003648 
  
 -0.030749 
  
 -0.006139 
  
 -0.012883 
  
 -0.006042 
  
 0.188001 
  
 0.048988 
  
 0.064564 
  
 0.113744 
  
 0.036125 
  
 0.039570 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.497956 
  
 -0.886472 
  
 -0.009762 
  
 0.097558 
  
 -0.000143 
  
 -0.064148 
  
 -0.057352 
  
 -0.020681 
  
 -0.003744 
  
 -0.031581 
  
 -0.006306 
  
 -0.013238 
  
 -0.006202 
  
 0.193103 
  
 0.050320 
  
 0.066198 
  
 0.116813 
  
 0.037103 
  
 0.040579 
  
 1_3 
  
 -0.064249 
  
 -0.002527 
  
 -0.399707 
  
 -0.068641 
  
 0.000962 
  
 -0.112531 
  
 -0.100501 
  
 -0.035963 
  
 -0.006555 
  
 -0.055378 
  
 -0.011038 
  
 -0.023078 
  
 -0.010862 
  
 0.340350 
  
 0.088101 
  
 0.117115 
  
 0.205970 
  
 0.065031 
  
 0.073502 
  
 1_4 
  
 -1.253274 
  
 0.332477 
  
 0.835831 
  
 -0.178295 
  
 -0.000392 
  
 -0.056951 
  
 -0.050979 
  
 -0.018588 
  
 -0.003324 
  
 -0.028225 
 -0.005644 
 -0.011836 
 -0.005554 
  
 0.170582 
  
 0.044823 
  
 0.058594 
  
 0.103287 
  
 0.032942 
  
 0.034526 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.021878 
  
 -0.005981 
  
 -0.005016 
  
 -0.001188 
  
 -0.226619 
  
 Dodson 
  
 -0.119711 
  
 -0.039502 
  
 -0.007810 
  
 0.042371 
  
 0.008292 
  
 0.017558 
  
 0.007997 
  
 0.033040 
  
 0.008238 
  
 0.011259 
  
 0.019908 
  
 0.006127 
  
 0.408376 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.110260 
  
 -0.029803 
  
 -0.024741 
  
 -0.006139 
  
 -0.399340 
  
 -0.307222 
  
 -0.077178 
  
 -0.034852 
  
 0.049571 
  
 0.419914 
  
 0.082151 
  
 0.174376 
  
 0.079969 
  
 0.124038 
  
 0.032025 
  
 0.042880 
  
 0.075054 
  
 0.023750 
  
 -0.114192 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.112274 
  
 -0.030349 
  
 -0.025189 
  
 -0.006250 
  
 -0.406744 
  
 -0.086971 
  
 -0.346051 
  
 0.156007 
  
 -0.099751 
  
 0.427775 
  
 0.083677 
  
 0.177599 
  
 0.081438 
  
 0.126375 
  
 0.032618 
  
 0.043670 
  
 0.076465 
  
 0.024189 
  
 -0.116235 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.066018 
  
 -0.017812 
  
 -0.015007 
  
 -0.003767 
  
 -0.232141 
  
 -0.166329 
  
 0.459625 
  
 -0.674173 
  
 0.176053 
  
 0.241214 
  
 0.047737 
  
 0.101440 
  
 0.046615 
  
 0.070558 
  
 0.018774 
  
 0.024760 
  
 0.042883 
  
 0.013861 
  
 -0.068275 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.097184 
  
 -0.026260 
  
 -0.021801 
  
 -0.005403 
  
 -0.352136 
  
 1.244112 
  
 -1.103778 
  
 0.053369 
  
 -0.519535 
  
 0.370237 
  
 0.072415 
  
 0.153807 
  
 0.070494 
  
 0.109373 
  
 0.028223 
  
 0.037810 
  
 0.066177 
  
 0.020941 
  
 -0.100861 
  
 4_1 
  
 0.058005 
  
 0.015634 
  
 0.012236 
  
 0.002949 
  
 0.317879 
  
 0.192661 
  
 0.170213 
  
 0.056342 
  
 0.010961 
  
 -1.851061 
  0.132370 0.219953 0.406833 
  
 0.102673 
  
 0.025839 
  
 0.035452 
  
 0.062047 
  
 0.019164 
  
 0.009851 
  
 4_2 
  
 0.073733 
  
 0.019879 
  
 0.015584 
  
 0.003755 
  
 0.405311 
  
 0.245172 
  
 0.216796 
  
 0.072077 
  
 0.013971 
  
 0.597111 
  
 -1.401598 
  
 -0.354585 
  
 -0.233041 
  
 0.130593 
  
 0.032994 
  
 0.045175 
  
 0.078970 
  
 0.024476 
  
 0.013629 
  
 4_3 
  
 0.137731 
  
 0.037094 
  
 0.028958 
  
 0.007003 
  
 0.755260 
  
 0.458355 
  
 0.404759 
  
 0.133619 
  
 0.026003 
  
 0.087392 
  
 -0.239955 
  
 -1.578746 
  
 -0.859966 
  
 0.243854 
  
 0.061282 
  
 0.084678 
  
 0.147518 
  
 0.045369 
  
 0.019791 
  
 4_4 
  
 0.072183 
  
 0.019453 
  
 0.015257 
  
 0.003677 
  
 0.397010 
  
 0.240096 
  
 0.212383 
  
 0.070651 
  
 0.013687 
  
 1.127843 
  
 -0.288914 
 -0.613717 
 -1.588469 
  
 0.127801 
  
 0.032326 
  
 0.044349 
  
 0.077313 
  
 0.023978 
  
 0.013095 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.750581 
  
 0.203651 
  
 0.164612 
  
 0.040542 
  
 0.368630 
  
 0.137582 
  
 0.122087 
  
 0.042044 
  
 0.007951 
  
 0.234193 
  
 0.045731 
  
 0.097258 
  
 0.044297 
  
 -1.114189 
  
 -0.242131 
  
 -0.154851 
  
 -0.178754 
  
 -0.107706 
  
 -0.461526 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.549429 
  
 0.149167 
  
 0.121315 
  
 0.029986 
  
 0.270147 
  
 0.100305 
  
 0.089133 
  
 0.031094 
  
 0.005813 
  
 0.171093 
  
 0.033525 
  
 0.071452 
  
 0.032502 
  
 -0.817634 
  
 -1.311922 
  
 1.025558 
  
 -0.050651 
  
 -0.160205 
  
 -0.340106 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.626211 
  
 0.169630 
  
 0.137039 
  
 0.033742 
  
 0.307630 
  
 0.114729 
  
 0.101858 
  
 0.035075 
  
 0.006634 
  
 0.195132 
  
 0.038119 
  
 0.080939 
  
 0.037046 
  
 -0.376852 
  
 0.768606 
  
 -1.500776 
  
 -0.453897 
  
 0.063643 
  
 -0.384507 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.547187 
  
 0.148557 
  
 0.119845 
  
 0.029508 
  
 0.268637 
  
 0.100408 
  
 0.089031 
  
 0.030560 
  
 0.005796 
  
 0.170843 
  
 0.033338 
  
 0.070855 
  
 0.032237 
  
 -0.162433 
  
 -0.028615 
  
 -0.229695 
  
 -0.764432 
  
 -0.125610 
  
 -0.336019 
  
 5_5 
  
 1.595897 
  
 0.432766 
  
 0.346577 
  
 0.085349 
  
 0.782985 
  
 0.294381 
  
 0.260307 
  
 0.087948 
  
 0.016884 
  
 0.499536 
  
 0.096992 
  
 0.204677 
  
 0.093783 
  
 -1.011647 
  
 Perry 
  
 -0.254686 
  
 -1.316622 
  
 -0.671450 
  
 -0.971810 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.040271 
  
 -0.010877 
  
 -0.008798 
  
 -0.002185 
  
 -0.014639 
  
 0.015869 
  
 0.013884 
  
 0.004457 
  
 0.000885 
  
 0.090260 
  
 0.017490 
  
 0.036977 
  
 0.016891 
  
 -0.017909 
  
 -0.004587 
  
 -0.006030 
  
 -0.010785 
  
 -0.003405 
  
 -0.077226 
  
 Table A3. Long run uncompensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.404202 
  
 0.130199 
  
 -0.014933 
  
 -0.012761 
  
 -0.108791 
  
 -0.091947 
  
 -0.086122 
  
 -0.042391 
  
 -0.005893 
  
 -0.073185 
  
 -0.015316 
  
 -0.033169 
  
 -0.015200 
  
 0.185218 
  
 0.062189 
  
 0.065389 
  
 0.114216 
  
 0.043000 
  
 -0.250577 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.477653 
  
 -0.891326 
  
 -0.001908 
  
 0.105132 
  
 -0.111936 
  
 -0.094622 
  
 -0.088617 
  
 -0.043569 
  
 -0.006061 
  
 -0.075301 
  
 -0.015759 
  
 -0.034133 
  
 -0.015630 
  
 0.190633 
  
 0.063998 
  
 0.067168 
  
 0.117534 
  
 0.044241 
  
 Compton 
  
 1_3 
  
 -0.024345 
  
 0.007313 
  
 -0.453544 
  
 -0.053921 
  
 -0.188651 
  
 -0.159546 
  
 -0.149334 
  
 -0.073477 
  
 -0.010206 
  
 -0.127110 
  
 -0.026578 
  
 -0.057361 
  
 -0.026375 
  
 0.321109 
  
 0.107728 
  
 0.113798 
  
 0.198183 
  
 0.074451 
  
 -0.434795 
  
 1_4 
  
 -0.871735 
  
 0.276410 
  
 0.669282 
  
 -0.362975 
  
 -0.104351 
  
 -0.088187 
  
 -0.082632 
  
 -0.040679 
  
 -0.005646 
  
 -0.070242 
 -0.014693 
 -0.031830 
 -0.014576 
  
 0.177810 
  
 0.059707 
  
 0.062651 
  
 0.109583 
  
 0.041243 
  
 -0.240478 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.041792 
  
 -0.011469 
  
 -0.010710 
  
 -0.002914 
  
 -0.312351 
  
 -0.116901 
  
 -0.109295 
  
 -0.053497 
  
 -0.007514 
  
 0.037428 
  
 0.007868 
  
 0.017188 
  
 0.007719 
  
 0.021019 
  
 0.007011 
  
 0.007253 
  
 0.012948 
  
 0.004841 
  
 0.334372 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.358787 
  
 -0.098008 
  
 -0.090851 
  
 -0.024725 
  
 -0.918709 
  
 -0.338630 
  
 -0.159745 
  
 -0.031955 
  
 0.050077 
  
 0.297622 
  
 0.062440 
  
 0.135255 
  
 0.062224 
  
 0.063558 
  
 0.021406 
  
 0.022761 
  
 0.039311 
  
 0.014920 
  
 -1.355090 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.364794 
  
 -0.099653 
  
 -0.092359 
  
 -0.025135 
  
 -0.934010 
  
 -0.171897 
  
 -0.382846 
  
 0.173286 
  
 -0.106871 
  
 0.302595 
  
 0.063482 
  
 0.137496 
  
 0.063249 
  
 0.064621 
  
 0.021760 
  
 0.023135 
  
 0.039971 
  
 0.015169 
  
 -1.377646 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.247713 
  
 -0.067424 
  
 -0.062698 
  
 -0.017071 
  
 -0.633917 
  
 -0.071202 
  
 0.358398 
  
 -0.740365 
  
 0.123171 
  
 0.205025 
  
 0.043031 
  
 0.093395 
  
 0.042993 
  
 0.043820 
  
 0.014770 
  
 0.015805 
  
 0.027131 
  
 0.010322 
  
 -0.935313 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.315349 
  
 -0.086138 
  
 -0.079870 
  
 -0.021716 
  
 -0.807332 
  
 1.167450 
  
 -1.127660 
  
 0.067362 
  
 -0.528818 
  
 0.261463 
  
 0.054872 
  
 0.118917 
  
 0.054675 
  
 0.055878 
  
 0.018816 
  
 0.020004 
  
 0.034566 
  
 0.013125 
  
 -1.191033 
  
 4_1 
  
 -0.134685 
  
 -0.036819 
  
 -0.033728 
  
 -0.009312 
  
 -0.075704 
  
 0.090997 
  
 0.085141 
  
 0.041925 
  
 0.005824 
  
 -2.006127 
  0.111567 0.168793 0.397719 
  
 0.031668 
  
 0.010641 
  
 0.011355 
  
 0.019600 
  
 0.007390 
  
 -0.990528 
  
 4_2 
  
 -0.174549 
  
 -0.047712 
  
 -0.043780 
  
 -0.012063 
  
 -0.098009 
  
 0.118083 
  
 0.110529 
  
 0.054481 
  
 0.007573 
  
 0.399026 
  
 -1.426531 
  
 -0.431185 
  
 -0.264456 
  
 0.041138 
  
 0.013830 
  
 0.014752 
  
 0.025455 
  
 0.009616 
  
 -1.285348 
  
 4_3 
  
 -0.316092 
  
 -0.086347 
  
 -0.078932 
  
 -0.021843 
  
 -0.178133 
  
 0.213483 
  
 0.199712 
  
 0.098264 
  
 0.013633 
  
 -0.223383 
  
 -0.298458 
  
 -1.707033 
  
 -0.881024 
  
 0.074042 
  
 0.024892 
  
 0.026737 
  
 0.045858 
  
 0.017261 
  
 -2.321870 
  
 4_4 
  
 -0.171327 
  
 -0.046808 
  
 -0.042970 
  
 -0.011837 
  
 -0.096300 
  
 0.115997 
  
 0.108611 
  
 0.053564 
  
 0.007441 
  
 0.888850 
  
 -0.313151 
 -0.670373 
 -1.596716 
  
 0.040378 
  
 0.013586 
  
 0.014529 
  
 0.024988 
  
 0.009446 
  
 -1.262291 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.707266 
  
 0.193977 
  
 0.180256 
  
 0.048915 
  
 0.043836 
  
 0.076701 
  
 0.071813 
  
 0.035383 
  
 0.004965 
  
 0.125802 
  
 0.026389 
  
 0.057254 
  
 0.026147 
  
 -1.241913 
  
 -0.321148 
  
 -0.209508 
  
 -0.267725 
  
 -0.155030 
  
 -1.754118 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.549827 
  
 0.150885 
  
 0.140345 
  
 0.038065 
  
 0.034054 
  
 0.059648 
  
 0.055867 
  
 0.027490 
  
 0.003859 
  
 0.097832 
  
 0.020521 
  
 0.044566 
  
 0.020337 
  
 -0.822043 
  
 -1.309687 
  
 0.747179 
  
 -0.150009 
  
 -0.172324 
  
 -1.364163 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.585420 
  
 0.160289 
  
 0.148913 
  
 0.040406 
  
 0.036140 
  
 0.063544 
  
 0.059520 
  
 0.029381 
  
 0.004116 
  
 0.104076 
  
 0.021835 
  
 0.047297 
  
 0.021726 
  
 -0.498310 
  
 0.752903 
  
 -1.562299 
  
 -0.541112 
  
 0.032938 
  
 -1.451246 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.508540 
  
 0.139585 
  
 0.129572 
  
 0.035170 
  
 0.031602 
  
 0.055122 
  
 0.051574 
  
 0.025393 
  
 0.003568 
  
 0.090484 
  
 0.018978 
  
 0.041159 
  
 0.018755 
  
 -0.263093 
  
 -0.068504 
  
 -0.272595 
  
 -0.815668 
  
 -0.159071 
  
 -1.261246 
  
 5_5 
  
 1.387323 
  
 0.380607 
  
 0.352471 
  
 0.096093 
  
 0.085237 
  
 0.150292 
  
 0.140648 
  
 0.069087 
  
 0.009682 
  
 0.247561 
  
 0.051837 
  
 0.111913 
  
 0.051324 
  
 -1.164668 
  
 -0.671396 
  
 -0.332797 
  
 -1.319993 
  
 -0.822099 
  
 -3.438299 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.081713 
  
 -0.022337 
  
 -0.020685 
  
 -0.005692 
  
 -0.073809 
  
 -0.001593 
  
 -0.001532 
  
 -0.000832 
  
 -0.000114 
  
 0.060671 
  
 0.012697 
  
 0.027434 
  
 0.012498 
  
 -0.029843 
  
 -0.009990 
  
 -0.010487 
  
 -0.018439 
  
 -0.006924 
  
 -0.316765 
  
 Long run total expenditure elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 0.554274 
  
 0.570315 
  
 0.962661 
  
 0.531339 
  
 0.208797 
  
 2.606926 
  
 2.650449 
  
 1.797841 
  
 2.290790 
  
 2.304284 
  
 2.989149 
  
 5.399232 
  
 2.934384 
  
 2.350738 
  
 1.827750 
  
 1.944464 
  
 1.690676 
  
 4.615177 
  
 0.487457 
  
 Table A4. Long run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.360933 
  
 0.142048 
  
 -0.004040 
  
 -0.009774 
  
 -0.012375 
  
 -0.076106 
  
 -0.071342 
  
 -0.035178 
  
 -0.004885 
  
 -0.039577 
  
 -0.008273 
  
 -0.017882 
  
 -0.008286 
  
 0.197497 
  
 0.066287 
  
 0.069707 
  
 0.121804 
  
 0.045828 
  
 0.005481 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.522167 
  
 -0.879128 
  
 0.009305 
  
 0.108205 
  
 -0.012764 
  
 -0.078315 
  
 -0.073404 
  
 -0.036154 
  
 -0.005025 
  
 -0.040713 
  
 -0.008511 
  
 -0.018399 
  
 -0.008518 
  
 0.203269 
  
 0.068215 
  
 0.071603 
  
 0.125341 
  
 0.047150 
  
 0.005676 
  
 1_3 
  
 0.050928 
  
 0.027911 
  
 -0.434665 
  
 -0.048733 
  
 -0.021015 
  
 -0.132004 
  
 -0.123655 
  
 -0.060951 
  
 -0.008458 
  
 -0.068743 
  
 -0.014358 
  
 -0.030924 
  
 -0.014381 
  
 0.342455 
  
 0.114847 
  
 0.121330 
  
 0.211383 
  
 0.079361 
  
 0.009672 
  
 1_4 
  
 -0.830292 
  
 0.287759 
  
 0.679724 
  
 -0.360106 
  
 -0.011891 
  
 -0.072988 
  
 -0.068446 
  
 -0.033757 
  
 -0.004681 
  
 -0.038018 
 -0.007943 
 -0.017174 
 -0.007952 
  
 0.189595 
  
 0.063641 
  
 0.066787 
  
 0.116861 
  
 0.043954 
  
 0.004927 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.025434 
  
 -0.007045 
  
 -0.006663 
  
 -0.001776 
  
 -0.275396 
  
 -0.110938 
  
 -0.103717 
  
 -0.050731 
  
 -0.007137 
  
 0.050051 
  
 0.010493 
  
 0.022775 
  
 0.010329 
  
 0.025668 
  
 0.008573 
  
 0.008977 
  
 0.015834 
  
 0.005908 
  
 0.430229 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.155900 
  
 -0.042518 
  
 -0.039599 
  
 -0.010738 
  
 -0.465550 
  
 -0.264607 
  
 -0.090566 
  
 0.001940 
  
 0.054804 
  
 0.455236 
  
 0.095529 
  
 0.207390 
  
 0.094932 
  
 0.120967 
  
 0.040652 
  
 0.043215 
  
 0.074787 
  
 0.028222 
  
 -0.148196 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.158495 
  
 -0.043228 
  
 -0.040252 
  
 Powell 
  
 -0.473298 
  
 -0.096630 
  
 -0.312513 
  
 0.207748 
  
 -0.102065 
  
 0.462851 
  
 0.097126 
  
 0.210828 
  
 0.096497 
  
 0.122992 
  
 0.041325 
  
 0.043925 
  
 0.076044 
  
 0.028692 
  
 -0.150629 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.107781 
  
 -0.029289 
  
 -0.027364 
  
 -0.007425 
  
 -0.320927 
  
 -0.020378 
  
 0.405937 
  
 -0.716815 
  
 0.126441 
  
 0.313688 
  
 0.065855 
  
 0.143248 
  
 0.065603 
  
 0.083338 
  
 0.028034 
  
 0.030000 
  
 0.051582 
  
 0.019517 
  
 -0.103263 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.137030 
  
 -0.037371 
  
 -0.034815 
  
 -0.009432 
  
 -0.409227 
  
 1.232460 
  
 -1.066910 
  
 0.097155 
  
 -0.524661 
  
 0.399971 
  
 0.083959 
  
 0.182356 
  
 0.083424 
  
 0.106301 
  
 0.035718 
  
 0.037966 
  
 0.065731 
  
 0.024815 
  
 -0.130408 
  
 4_1 
  
 0.044982 
  
 0.012334 
  
 0.011375 
  
 0.003115 
  
 0.326037 
  
 0.156889 
  
 0.146639 
  
 0.071862 
  
 0.009988 
  
 -1.866718 
  0.140734 0.231823 0.426464 
  
 0.082731 
  
 0.027715 
  
 0.029526 
  
 0.051153 
  
 0.019130 
  
 0.074221 
  
 4_2 
  
 0.058371 
  
 0.016004 
  
 0.014785 
  
 0.004041 
  
 0.422760 
  
 0.203421 
  
 0.190208 
  
 0.093320 
  
 0.012977 
  
 0.579785 
  
 -1.388675 
  
 -0.349197 
  
 -0.227114 
  
 0.107287 
  
 0.035960 
  
 0.038303 
  
 0.066325 
  
 0.024850 
  
 0.096587 
  
 4_3 
  
 0.105240 
  
 0.028838 
  
 0.026542 
  
 0.007285 
  
 0.764583 
  
 0.367948 
  
 0.343844 
  
 0.168341 
  
 0.023372 
  
 0.103018 
  
 -0.230227 
  
 -1.560127 
  
 -0.813669 
  
 0.193708 
  
 0.064926 
  
 0.069622 
  
 0.119852 
  
 0.044743 
  
 0.172161 
  
 4_4 
  
 0.057277 
  
 0.015697 
  
 0.014509 
  
 0.003964 
  
 0.415071 
  
 0.199691 
  
 0.186779 
  
 0.091686 
  
 0.012743 
  
 1.066195 
  
 -0.276005 
 -0.589918 
 -1.560017 
  
 0.105260 
  
 0.035312 
  
 0.037714 
  
 0.065081 
  
 0.024399 
  
 0.094561 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.890142 
  
 0.244113 
  
 0.226557 
  
 0.061536 
  
 0.451753 
  
 0.143617 
  
 0.134311 
  
 0.065897 
  
 0.009231 
  
 0.268130 
  
 0.056273 
  
 0.122483 
  
 0.055575 
  
 -1.190072 
  
 -0.303798 
  
 -0.191258 
  
 -0.235717 
  
 -0.143041 
  
 -0.665732 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.691897 
  
 0.189855 
  
 0.176368 
  
 0.047880 
  
 0.351107 
  
 0.111683 
  
 0.104486 
  
 0.051195 
  
 0.007174 
  
 0.208514 
  
 0.043759 
  
 0.095337 
  
 0.043229 
  
 -0.781738 
  
 -1.296185 
  
 0.761347 
  
 -0.125137 
  
 -0.163004 
  
 -0.517766 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.736746 
  
 0.201707 
  
 0.187154 
  
 0.050828 
  
 0.374027 
  
 0.118755 
  
 0.111107 
  
 0.054617 
  
 0.007639 
  
 0.221610 
  
 0.046515 
  
 0.101086 
  
 0.046131 
  
 -0.455527 
  
 0.767249 
  
 -1.547047 
  
 -0.514668 
  
 0.042851 
  
 -0.550780 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.640157 
  
 0.175697 
  
 0.162885 
  
 0.044252 
  
 0.324856 
  
 0.103322 
  
 0.096561 
  
 0.047343 
  
 0.006640 
  
 0.192943 
  
 0.040488 
  
 0.088088 
  
 0.039881 
  
 -0.225764 
  
 -0.056032 
  
 -0.259530 
  
 -0.792620 
  
 -0.150448 
  
 -0.478720 
  
 5_5 
  
 1.746695 
  
 0.479168 
  
 0.443184 
  
 0.120932 
  
 0.887480 
  
 0.282129 
  
 0.263719 
  
 0.128919 
  
 0.018039 
  
 0.527047 
  
 0.110413 
  
 0.239159 
  
 0.108972 
  
 -1.062589 
  
 -0.637253 
  
 -0.296827 
  
 -1.256969 
  
 -0.798594 
  
 -1.303624 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.043821 
  
 -0.011955 
  
 -0.011099 
  
 -0.003073 
  
 0.010811 
  
 0.012286 
  
 0.011435 
  
 0.005494 
  
 0.000768 
  
 0.090158 
  
 0.018885 
  
 0.040934 
  
 0.018599 
  
 -0.019087 
  
 -0.006389 
  
 -0.006689 
  
 -0.011802 
  
 -0.004438 
  
 -0.091019 
  
 Table A5. Short run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.392119 
  
 -0.021573 
  
 0.003704 
  
 0.072312 
  
 -0.016574 
  
 -0.019793 
  
 -0.017641 
  
 -0.006175 
  
 -0.001153 
  
 -0.003320 
  
 -0.000661 
  
 -0.001384 
  
 -0.000662 
  
 0.055480 
  
 0.014492 
  
 0.019098 
  
 0.033587 
  
 0.010675 
  
 -0.094832 
  
 1_2 
  
 -0.071136 
  
 -0.428579 
  
 -0.054568 
  
 -0.088110 
  
 -0.031692 
  
 -0.037796 
  
 -0.033711 
  
 -0.011855 
  
 -0.002204 
  
 -0.006367 
  
 -0.001268 
  
 -0.002658 
  
 -0.001271 
  
 0.105880 
  
 0.027751 
  
 0.036502 
  
 0.064110 
  
 0.020429 
  
 -0.180775 
  
 1_3 
  
 -0.082678 
  
 -0.035796 
  
 -0.634526 
  
 -0.210622 
  
 -0.046473 
  
 -0.055927 
  
 -0.049783 
  
 -0.017268 
  
 -0.003246 
  
 -0.009301 
  
 -0.001850 
  
 -0.003855 
  
 -0.001851 
  
 0.156905 
  
 0.040687 
  
 0.054078 
  
 0.095011 
  
 0.029997 
  
 -0.269397 
  
 1_4 
  
 -1.102920 
  
 0.305634 
  
 0.922220 
  
 -0.519518 
  
 -0.019560 
  
 -0.023339 
  
 -0.020825 
  
 -0.007373 
  
 -0.001358 
  
 -0.003999 
  
 -0.000797 
  
 -0.001668 
  
 -0.000797 
  
 0.065511 
  
 0.017267 
  
 0.022518 
  
 0.039682 
  
 0.012675 
  
 -0.111735 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.000280 
  
 -7.58E-05 
  
 -0.000371 
  
 -0.000122 
  
 -0.114392 
  
 0.021209 
  
 0.018599 
  
 0.006052 
  
 0.001194 
  
 -0.051697 
  
 -0.010008 
  
 -0.021220 
  
 -0.009710 
  
 -0.012573 
  
 -0.003324 
  
 -0.004227 
  
 -0.007592 
  
 -0.002466 
  
 0.046979 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.089878 
  
 -0.024279 
  
 -0.019491 
  
 -0.004767 
  
 0.079150 
  
 -0.873219 
  
 -0.021649 
  
 -0.262860 
  
 -0.033578 
  
 -0.005306 
  
 -0.001030 
  
 -0.002197 
  
 -0.000982 
  
 0.161211 
  
 0.042525 
  
 0.055981 
  
 0.097838 
  
 0.031372 
  
 -0.561894 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.082675 
  
 -0.022335 
  
 -0.017921 
  
 -0.004382 
  
 0.072784 
  
 0.005085 
  
 -1.212402 
  
 0.088649 
  
 0.022581 
  
 -0.004881 
  
 -0.000947 
  
 -0.002020 
  
 -0.000903 
  
 0.148281 
  
 0.039080 
  
 0.051466 
  
 0.089981 
  
 0.028833 
  
 -0.516666 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.072927 
  
 -0.019690 
  
 -0.015862 
  
 -0.003888 
  
 0.064374 
  
 -0.883780 
  
 0.328919 
  
 -0.477546 
  
 0.067744 
  
 -0.004307 
  
 -0.000838 
  
 -0.001788 
  
 -0.000800 
  
 0.130865 
  
 0.034755 
  
 0.045587 
  
 0.079499 
  
 0.025613 
  
 -0.457187 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.073555 
  
 -0.019854 
  
 -0.015947 
  
 -0.003890 
  
 0.064786 
  
 -0.053985 
  
 0.253475 
  
 0.040307 
  
 -1.213827 
  
 -0.004357 
  
 -0.000846 
  
 -0.001805 
  
 -0.000806 
  
 0.131875 
  
 0.034761 
  
 0.045802 
  
 0.080031 
  
 0.025669 
  
 -0.459638 
  
 4_1 
  
 -0.017758 
  
 -0.004803 
  
 -0.003513 
  
 -0.000835 
  
 -0.172445 
  
 -0.009144 
  
 -0.007973 
  
 -0.002594 
  
 -0.000499 
  
 -1.005608 
  
 -0.011242 
  
 -0.021744 
 -0.304484 
  
 0.110283 
  
 0.028424 
  
 0.038304 
  
 0.066894 
  
 0.020966 
  
 -0.877262 
  
 4_2 
  
 -0.006330 
  
 -0.001713 
  
 -0.001248 
  
 -0.000299 
  
 -0.062227 
  
 -0.003299 
  
 -0.002879 
  
 -0.000944 
  
 -0.000180 
  
 0.050037 
  
 -0.724716 
  
 0.167614 
  
 0.025391 
  
 0.039668 
  
 0.010272 
  
 0.013844 
  
 0.024122 
  
 0.007554 
  
 -0.316113 
  
 4_3 
  
 -0.006307 
  
 -0.001706 
  
 -0.001257 
  
 -0.000295 
  
 -0.063205 
  
 -0.003298 
  
 -0.002887 
  
 -0.000956 
  
 -0.000182 
  
 0.116666 
  
 0.063627 
  
 -1.123679 
  
 0.444474 
  
 0.040755 
  
 0.010597 
  
 0.014000 
  
 0.024680 
  
 0.007853 
  
 -0.324433 
  
 4_4 
  
 -0.007966 
  
 -0.002150 
  
 -0.001570 
  
 -0.000375 
  
 -0.078752 
  
 -0.004075 
  
 -0.003560 
  
 -0.001162 
  
 -0.000222 
  
 -0.172830 
  
 -0.347332 
  
 0.242373 
  
 -0.330530 
  
 0.049957 
  
 0.012981 
  
 0.017736 
  
 0.030410 
  
 0.009554 
  
 -0.399841 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.250435 
  
 0.067996 
  
 0.055255 
  
 0.013646 
  
 -0.084615 
  
 0.188673 
  
 0.167954 
  
 0.059415 
  
 0.010992 
  
 0.171085 
  
 0.033637 
  
 0.071392 
  
 0.032629 
  
 -1.613771 
  
 -0.249829 
  
 0.187762 
  
 0.148098 
  
 -0.086656 
  
 -0.572020 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.183732 
  
 0.049919 
  
 0.040813 
  
 0.010116 
  
 -0.062136 
  
 0.138217 
  
 0.123219 
  
 Cain 
  
 0.008074 
  
 0.125403 
  
 0.024741 
  
 0.052624 
  
 0.024020 
  
 -0.731014 
  
 -0.960924 
  
 -0.585562 
  
 1.316001 
  
 -0.217663 
  
 -0.420311 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.208887 
  
 0.056623 
  
 0.045988 
  
 0.011355 
  
 -0.070545 
  
 0.157239 
  
 0.140034 
  
 0.049530 
  
 0.009165 
  
 0.142588 
  
 0.028044 
  
 0.059425 
  
 0.027295 
  
 0.575748 
  
 -0.518973 
  
 -0.179871 
  
 -1.129338 
  
 -0.094301 
  
 -0.476804 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.182495 
  
 0.049581 
  
 0.040211 
  
 0.009928 
  
 -0.061654 
  
 0.137599 
  
 0.122393 
  
 0.043155 
  
 0.008007 
  
 0.124741 
  
 0.024508 
  
 0.051984 
  
 0.023731 
  
 0.232463 
  
 0.476317 
  
 -0.615446 
  
 -1.232295 
  
 -0.038460 
  
 -0.416767 
  
 5_5 
  
 0.530946 
  
 0.144074 
  
 0.115991 
  
 0.028642 
  
 -0.179220 
  
 0.401278 
  
 0.355962 
  
 0.123505 
  
 0.023202 
  
 0.363837 
  
 0.071118 
  
 0.149771 
  
 0.068867 
  
 -0.463898 
  
 -0.141127 
  
 -0.672400 
  
 -1.633193 
  
 -0.531502 
  
 -1.210262 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.137429 
  
 -0.037160 
  
 -0.029281 
  
 -0.007142 
  
 -0.286500 
  
 -0.017430 
  
 -0.015356 
  
 -0.005060 
  
 -0.000990 
  
 -0.008997 
  
 -0.001725 
  
 -0.003625 
  
 -0.001654 
  
 -0.032371 
  
 -0.008088 
  
 -0.010987 
  
 -0.019487 
  
 -0.006021 
  
 -0.615450 
  
 Short run total expenditure elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 0.366537 
  
 0.697319 
  
 1.045893 
  
 0.428384 
  
 0.144023 
  
 1.433055 
  
 1.318391 
  
 1.161258 
  
 1.171806 
  
 2.175032 
  
 0.781446 
  
 0.805554 
  
 0.987353 
  
 1.147921 
  
 0.836580 
  
 0.957911 
  
 0.837509 
  
 2.454409 
  
 1.244752 
  
 Table A6. Short run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.355896 
  
 -0.011796 
  
 0.011236 
  
 0.074120 
  
 0.040936 
  
 -0.005856 
  
 -0.005427 
  
 -0.002342 
  
 -0.000367 
  
 0.018996 
  
 0.003609 
  
 0.007658 
  
 0.003446 
  
 0.067191 
  
 0.017309 
  
 0.023074 
  
 0.040614 
  
 0.012796 
  
 0.060701 
  
 1_2 
  
 -0.002391 
  
 -0.410038 
  
 -0.040236 
  
 -0.084669 
  
 0.077820 
  
 -0.011347 
  
 -0.010519 
  
 -0.004548 
  
 -0.000712 
  
 0.036084 
  
 0.006858 
  
 0.014565 
  
 0.006555 
  
 0.128103 
  
 0.033113 
  
 0.044059 
  
 0.077447 
  
 0.024461 
  
 0.115393 
  
 1_3 
  
 0.021389 
  
 -0.007687 
  
 -0.613073 
  
 -0.205468 
  
 0.117508 
  
 -0.015939 
  
 -0.014774 
  
 -0.006366 
  
 -0.001001 
  
 0.054327 
  
 0.010309 
  
 0.021786 
  
 0.009842 
  
 0.190518 
  
 0.048722 
  
 0.065505 
  
 0.115185 
  
 0.036050 
  
 0.173167 
  
 1_4 
  
 -1.060899 
  
 0.316994 
  
 0.931017 
  
 -0.517391 
  
 0.047875 
  
 -0.007109 
  
 -0.006594 
  
 -0.002869 
  
 -0.000446 
  
 0.022054 
  
 0.004198 
  
 0.008905 
  
 0.004010 
  
 0.079109 
  
 0.020562 
  
 0.027129 
  
 0.047847 
  
 0.015147 
  
 0.070462 
  
 2_1 
  
 0.012991 
  
 0.003470 
  
 0.002485 
  
 0.000626 
  
 -0.090251 
  
 0.026252 
  
 0.023108 
  
 0.007697 
  
 0.001480 
  
 -0.043210 
  
 -0.008319 
  
 -0.017806 
  
 -0.008047 
  
 -0.008406 
  
 -0.002208 
  
 -0.002656 
 -0.005023 
 -0.001657 
  
 0.109474 
  
 3_1 
  
 0.047713 
  
 0.012898 
  
 0.009746 
  
 0.002324 
  
 0.306181 
  
 -0.820430 
  
 0.024883 
  
 -0.247598 
  
 -0.030577 
  
 0.081253 
  
 0.015767 
  
 0.033629 
  
 0.015257 
  
 0.205427 
  
 0.053536 
  
 0.071140 
  
 0.124474 
  
 0.039592 
  
 0.054786 
  
 3_2 
  
 0.043978 
  
 0.011889 
  
 0.008981 
  
 0.002141 
  
 0.281581 
  
 0.053694 
  
 -1.169564 
  
 0.102679 
  
 0.025343 
  
 0.074760 
  
 0.014503 
  
 0.030928 
  
 0.014031 
  
 0.188995 
  
 0.049210 
  
 0.065418 
  
 0.114504 
  
 0.036397 
  
 0.050531 
  
 3_3 
  
 0.038092 
  
 0.010288 
  
 0.007792 
  
 0.001859 
  
 0.248814 
  
 -0.841300 
  
 0.366420 
  
 -0.465107 
  
 0.070167 
  
 0.065772 
  
 0.012798 
  
 0.027301 
  
 0.012390 
  
 0.166455 
  
 0.043673 
  
 0.057828 
  
 0.100959 
  
 0.032264 
  
 0.043533 
  
 3_4 
  
 0.039059 
  
 0.010546 
  
 0.007977 
  
 0.001897 
  
 0.250281 
  
 -0.010855 
  
 0.291500 
  
 0.052783 
  
 -1.211369 
  
 0.066473 
  
 0.012896 
  
 0.027540 
  
 0.012480 
  
 0.168032 
  
 0.043761 
  
 0.058204 
  
 0.101811 
  
 0.032393 
  
 0.044591 
  
 4_1 
  
 0.191887 
  
 0.051859 
  
 0.040834 
  
 0.009939 
  
 0.171990 
  
 0.071498 
  
 0.063017 
  
 0.020461 
  
 0.004059 
  
 -0.874568 
  
 0.014171 
  
 0.032244 
  
 -0.279907 
  
 0.177787 
  
 0.045158 
  
 0.061515 
  
 0.107583 
  
 0.033452 
  
 0.057020 
  
 4_2 
  
 0.068789 
  
 0.018606 
  
 0.014617 
  
 0.003581 
  
 0.062049 
  
 0.025552 
  
 0.022538 
  
 0.007373 
  
 0.001448 
  
 0.096879 
  
 -0.715583 
  
 0.186882 
  
 0.034215 
  
 0.063789 
  
 0.016278 
  
 0.022182 
  
 0.038701 
  
 0.012022 
  
 0.020082 
  
 4_3 
  
 0.070605 
  
 0.019118 
  
 0.015189 
  
 0.003665 
  
 0.063886 
  
 0.026182 
  
 0.023137 
  
 0.007603 
  
 0.001501 
  
 0.165227 
  
 0.073104 
  
 -1.103187 
  
 0.453625 
  
 0.065504 
  
 0.016781 
  
 0.022417 
  
 0.039570 
  
 0.012491 
  
 0.023582 
  
 4_4 
  
 0.086999 
  
 0.023455 
  
 0.018486 
  
 0.004519 
  
 0.078325 
  
 0.032311 
  
 0.028545 
  
 0.009316 
  
 Kramer 
  
 -0.113742 
  
 -0.335828 
  
 0.266702 
  
 -0.319313 
  
 0.080394 
  
 0.020587 
  
 0.028439 
  
 0.048828 
  
 0.015217 
  
 0.024923 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.360928 
  
 0.097874 
  
 0.078704 
  
 0.019335 
  
 0.097061 
  
 0.231173 
  
 0.205375 
  
 0.071620 
  
 0.013401 
  
 0.240523 
  
 0.047085 
  
 0.100046 
  
 0.045613 
  
 -1.578198 
  
 -0.241008 
  
 0.199905 
  
 0.169508 
  
 -0.080069 
  
 -0.078874 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.263623 
  
 0.071529 
  
 0.057874 
  
 0.014269 
  
 0.070608 
  
 0.168926 
  
 0.150291 
  
 0.053091 
  
 0.009819 
  
 0.175934 
  
 0.034561 
  
 0.073590 
  
 0.033509 
  
 -0.705353 
  
 -0.954491 
  
 -0.576790 
  
 1.331463 
  
 -0.212878 
  
 -0.059576 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.301178 
  
 0.081539 
  
 0.065534 
  
 0.016096 
  
 0.081219 
  
 0.192661 
  
 0.171240 
  
 0.059707 
  
 0.011174 
  
 0.200416 
  
 0.039250 
  
 0.083261 
  
 0.038148 
  
 0.605410 
  
 -0.511608 
  
 -0.169648 
  
 -1.111463 
  
 -0.088801 
  
 -0.065315 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.263231 
  
 0.071425 
  
 0.057325 
  
 0.014080 
  
 0.070780 
  
 0.168681 
  
 0.149741 
  
 0.052049 
  
 0.009767 
  
 0.175428 
  
 0.034319 
  
 0.072873 
  
 0.033187 
  
 0.258473 
  
 0.482750 
  
 -0.606599 
  
 -1.216643 
  
 -0.033656 
  
 -0.057210 
  
 5_5 
  
 0.769536 
  
 0.208572 
  
 0.166183 
  
 0.040825 
  
 0.208322 
  
 0.493390 
  
 0.436780 
  
 0.149398 
  
 0.028385 
  
 0.512424 
  
 0.099739 
  
 0.210288 
  
 0.096448 
  
 -0.386887 
 -0.122249 
 -0.646178 
 -1.586865 
 -0.517446 
  
 -0.160665 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.016978 
  
 -0.004599 
  
 -0.003817 
  
 -0.000972 
  
 -0.089778 
  
 0.028960 
  
 0.025446 
  
 0.008135 
  
 0.001633 
  
 0.066415 
  
 0.012837 
  
 0.027352 
  
 0.012394 
  
 0.006489 
  
 0.001484 
  
 0.002259 
  
 0.003880 
  
 0.001139 
  
 -0.082279 
  
 Table A7. Short run uncompensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.366802 
  
 -0.012518 
  
 0.018300 
  
 0.082457 
  
 -0.018925 
  
 -0.020976 
  
 -0.019668 
  
 -0.009728 
  
 -0.001350 
  
 -0.004395 
  
 -0.000913 
  
 -0.001966 
  
 -0.000925 
  
 0.059041 
  
 0.019817 
  
 0.020886 
  
 0.036419 
  
 0.013696 
  
 -0.095901 
  
 1_2 
  
 -0.018636 
  
 -0.408494 
  
 -0.031927 
  
 -0.083246 
  
 -0.036899 
  
 -0.040880 
  
 -0.038353 
  
 -0.018995 
  
 -0.002635 
  
 -0.008575 
  
 -0.001782 
  
 -0.003842 
  
 -0.001806 
  
 0.115072 
  
 0.038649 
  
 0.040718 
  
 0.070958 
  
 0.026714 
  
 -0.186801 
  
 1_3 
  
 0.073401 
  
 -0.014805 
  
 -0.637305 
  
 -0.175452 
  
 -0.050992 
  
 -0.056674 
  
 -0.053097 
  
 -0.026231 
  
 -0.003639 
  
 -0.011882 
  
 -0.002466 
  
 -0.005288 
  
 -0.002498 
  
 0.159498 
  
 0.053483 
  
 0.056592 
  
 0.098463 
  
 0.036931 
  
 -0.259613 
  
 1_4 
  
 -0.732091 
  
 0.266393 
  
 0.738806 
  
 -0.621932 
  
 -0.023709 
  
 -0.026283 
  
 -0.024656 
  
 -0.012188 
  
 -0.001691 
  
 -0.005545 
  
 -0.001151 
  
 -0.002481 
  
 -0.001164 
  
 0.074123 
  
 0.024884 
  
 0.026113 
  
 0.045681 
  
 0.017178 
  
 -0.120293 
  
 2_1 
  
 -0.012608 
  
 -0.003455 
  
 -0.003280 
  
 -0.000885 
  
 -0.198998 
  
 0.017301 
  
 0.016109 
  
 0.007782 
  
 0.001094 
  
 -0.046329 
  
 -0.009705 
  
 -0.021073 
  
 -0.009594 
  
 -0.014457 
  
 -0.004851 
  
 -0.005026 
  
 -0.008918 
  
 -0.003393 
  
 0.074242 
  
 3_1 
  
 -0.095400 
  
 -0.026060 
  
 -0.024156 
  
 -0.006577 
  
 0.092120 
  
 -0.859016 
  
 -0.025559 
  
 -0.296927 
  
 -0.036968 
  
 -0.005192 
 -0.001097 
 -0.002391 
 -0.001069 
  
 0.179991 
  
 0.060531 
  
 0.064349 
  
 0.111288 
  
 0.042075 
  
 -0.670446 
  
 3_2 
  
 -0.087203 
  
 -0.023827 
  
 -0.022080 
  
 -0.006012 
  
 0.084203 
  
 0.003653 
  
 -1.224176 
  
 0.083621 
  
 0.023011 
  
 -0.004744 
 -0.001002 
 -0.002184 
 -0.000976 
  
 0.164544 
  
 0.055332 
  
 0.058794 
  
 0.101733 
  
 0.038454 
  
 -0.612827 
  
 3_3 
  
 -0.080800 
  
 -0.022053 
  
 -0.020456 
  
 -0.005570 
  
 0.078020 
  
 -0.620567 
  
 0.203304 
  
 -0.658572 
  
 0.044327 
  
 -0.004408 
  
 -0.000931 
  
 -0.002030 
  
 -0.000907 
  
 0.152363 
  
 0.051249 
  
 0.054563 
  
 0.094234 
  
 0.035647 
  
 -0.567777 
  
 3_4 
  
 -0.077805 
  
 -0.021250 
  
 -0.019710 
  
 -0.005357 
  
 0.075170 
  
 -0.058713 
  
 0.244546 
  
 0.032426 
  
 -1.211195 
  
 -0.004258 
  
 -0.000900 
  
 -0.001963 
  
 -0.000876 
  
 0.146772 
  
 0.049349 
  
 0.052460 
  
 0.090778 
  
 0.034352 
  
 -0.546784 
  
 4_1 
  
 -0.004664 
  
 -0.001286 
  
 -0.001113 
  
 -0.000313 
  
 -0.165541 
  
 -0.007897 
  
 -0.007322 
  
 -0.003486 
  
 -0.000488 
  
 -1.006645 
  
 -0.012303 
  
 -0.021614 
 -0.316230 
  
 0.103664 
  
 0.034768 
  
 0.037003 
  
 0.064071 
  
 0.024056 
  
 -0.873480 
  
 4_2 
  
 -0.001758 
  
 -0.000485 
  
 -0.000420 
  
 -0.000118 
  
 -0.061041 
  
 -0.002932 
  
 -0.002716 
  
 -0.001291 
  
 -0.000181 
  
 0.049468 
  
 -0.733824 
  
 0.160920 
  
 0.023687 
  
 0.038227 
  
 0.012797 
  
 0.013625 
  
 0.023644 
  
 0.008852 
  
 -0.321862 
  
 4_3 
  
 -0.001768 
  
 -0.000487 
  
 -0.000424 
  
 -0.000119 
  
 -0.064122 
  
 -0.003049 
  
 -0.002831 
  
 -0.001358 
  
 -0.000190 
  
 0.110006 
  
 0.060563 
  
 -1.115346 
  
 0.414962 
  
 0.040392 
  
 0.013545 
  
 0.014212 
  
 0.024922 
  
 0.009417 
  
 -0.339660 
  
 4_4 
  
 -0.002108 
  
 -0.000580 
  
 -0.000502 
  
 -0.000141 
  
 -0.076971 
  
 -0.003585 
  
 -0.003327 
  
 -0.001585 
  
 -0.000222 
  
 -0.161806 
  
 -0.327631 
  
 0.228801 
  
 -0.367437 
  
 0.047935 
  
 0.016148 
  
 0.017485 
  
 0.029664 
  
 0.011159 
  
 -0.405831 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.313313 
  
 0.085933 
  
 0.079813 
  
 0.021659 
  
 -0.108744 
  
 0.223233 
  
 0.208700 
  
 0.102358 
  
 0.014366 
  
 0.211861 
  
 0.044484 
  
 0.096738 
  
 0.044000 
  
 -1.704034 
  
 -0.291674 
  
 0.182408 
  
 0.138425 
  
 -0.105713 
  
 -0.739965 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.243551 
  
 0.066838 
  
 0.062137 
  
 0.016853 
  
 -0.084565 
  
 0.173601 
  
 0.162361 
  
 0.079523 
  
 0.011164 
  
 0.164714 
  
 0.034583 
  
 0.075278 
  
 0.034217 
  
 -0.701165 
  
 -0.995176 
  
 -0.496764 
  
 0.994717 
  
 -0.185999 
  
 -0.575433 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.259330 
  
 0.071008 
  
 0.065934 
  
 0.017891 
  
 -0.089960 
  
 0.184545 
  
 0.172600 
  
 0.084807 
  
 0.011884 
  
 0.175215 
  
 0.036793 
  
 0.079885 
  
 0.036547 
  
 0.578871 
  
 -0.567754 
  
 -0.158035 
  
 -1.209104 
  
 -0.116860 
  
 -0.612075 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.225301 
  
 0.061843 
  
 0.057377 
  
 0.015574 
  
 -0.078200 
  
 0.160622 
  
 0.150062 
  
 0.073551 
  
 0.010335 
  
 0.152430 
  
 0.032002 
  
 0.069565 
  
 0.031570 
  
 0.240471 
  
 0.468940 
  
 -0.649430 
  
 -1.279416 
  
 -0.061200 
  
 -0.532136 
  
 5_5 
  
 0.614622 
  
 0.168625 
  
 0.156079 
  
 0.042552 
  
 -0.213351 
  
 0.438211 
  
 0.409481 
  
 0.200117 
  
 0.028053 
  
 0.416358 
  
 0.087266 
  
 0.188853 
  
 0.086264 
  
 -0.507815 
  
 -0.227208 
  
 -0.623578 
  
 -1.475273 
  
 -0.663293 
  
 -1.450870 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.118398 
  
 -0.032375 
  
 -0.029887 
  
 -0.008227 
  
 -0.264198 
  
 -0.014556 
  
 -0.013586 
  
 -0.006646 
  
 -0.000927 
  
 -0.007436 
  
 -0.001559 
  
 -0.003368 
  
 -0.001525 
  
 -0.026938 
  
 -0.009003 
  
 -0.009440 
  
 -0.016636 
  
 -0.006218 
  
 -0.654835 
  
 Short run total expenditure elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 0.303454 
  
 0.590762 
  
 0.821573 
  
 0.380007 
  
 0.226046 
  
 1.500506 
  
 1.371686 
  
 1.270363 
  
 1.222957 
  
 2.158821 
  
 0.795408 
  
 0.841334 
  
 1.000534 
  
 1.182840 
  
 0.919564 
  
 0.978478 
  
 0.850739 
  
 2.324909 
  
 1.225758 
  
 Table A8. Short run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1_1 
  
 1_2 
  
 1_3 
  
 1_4 
  
 2_1 
  
 3_1 
  
 3_2 
  
 3_3 
  
 3_4 
  
 4_1 
  
 4_2 
  
 4_3 
  
 4_4 
  
 5_1 
  
 5_2 
  
 5_3 
  
 5_4 
  
 5_5 
  
 6_1 
  
 1_1 
  
 -0.343045 
  
 -0.006013 
  
 0.024261 
  
 0.084092 
  
 0.033887 
  
 -0.012291 
  
 -0.011575 
  
 -0.005779 
  
 -0.000798 
  
 0.014022 
  
 0.002945 
  
 0.006384 
  
 0.002854 
  
 0.065770 
  
 0.022059 
  
 0.023249 
  
 0.040582 
  
 0.015243 
  
 Cain 
  
 1_2 
  
 0.027579 
  
 -0.395845 
  
 -0.020316 
  
 -0.080062 
  
 0.065914 
  
 -0.023986 
  
 -0.022602 
  
 -0.011299 
  
 -0.001559 
  
 0.027274 
  
 0.005731 
  
 0.012437 
  
 0.005558 
  
 0.128168 
  
 0.043013 
  
 0.045320 
  
 0.079057 
  
 0.029729 
  
 0.085890 
  
 1_3 
  
 0.137833 
  
 0.002829 
  
 -0.621201 
  
 -0.171024 
  
 0.092139 
  
 -0.033124 
  
 -0.031169 
  
 -0.015544 
  
 -0.002144 
  
 0.037984 
  
 0.007970 
  
 0.017214 
  
 0.007717 
  
 0.177739 
  
 0.059553 
  
 0.063017 
  
 0.109756 
  
 0.041119 
  
 0.119333 
  
 1_4 
  
 -0.702379 
  
 0.274534 
  
 0.746275 
  
 -0.619881 
  
 0.042420 
  
 -0.015397 
  
 -0.014506 
  
 -0.007240 
  
 -0.000999 
  
 0.017526 
  
 0.003681 
  
 0.007986 
  
 0.003566 
  
 0.082559 
  
 0.027694 
  
 0.029065 
  
 0.050895 
  
 0.019116 
  
 0.055084 
  
 2_1 
  
 0.005092 
  
 0.001337 
  
 0.001108 
  
 0.000346 
  
 -0.159058 
  
 0.023756 
  
 0.022146 
  
 0.010771 
  
 0.001502 
  
 -0.032661 
  
 -0.006861 
  
 -0.015006 
  
 -0.006768 
  
 -0.009428 
  
 -0.003162 
  
 -0.003170 
  
 -0.005797 
  
 -0.002238 
  
 0.178088 
  
 3_1 
  
 0.021415 
  
 0.005903 
  
 0.005339 
  
 0.001491 
  
 0.353026 
  
 -0.816303 
  
 0.014348 
  
 -0.277403 
  
 -0.034247 
  
 0.085618 
  
 0.017952 
  
 0.039097 
  
 0.017718 
  
 0.213118 
  
 0.071623 
  
 0.076087 
  
 0.131750 
  
 0.049732 
  
 0.023736 
  
 3_2 
  
 0.019587 
  
 0.005401 
  
 0.004883 
  
 0.001364 
  
 0.322686 
  
 0.042712 
  
 -1.187687 
  
 0.101460 
  
 0.025499 
  
 0.078274 
  
 0.016412 
  
 0.035735 
  
 0.016194 
  
 0.194832 
  
 0.065472 
  
 0.069520 
  
 0.120439 
  
 0.045453 
  
 0.021765 
  
 3_3 
  
 0.018106 
  
 0.004987 
  
 0.004513 
  
 0.001260 
  
 0.298985 
  
 -0.584442 
  
 0.237061 
  
 -0.642014 
  
 0.046633 
  
 0.072471 
  
 0.015197 
  
 0.033112 
  
 0.015006 
  
 0.180397 
  
 0.060637 
  
 0.064515 
  
 0.111555 
  
 0.042133 
  
 0.019885 
  
 3_4 
  
 0.017437 
  
 0.004804 
  
 0.004348 
  
 0.001212 
  
 0.287726 
  
 -0.023944 
  
 0.277027 
  
 0.048350 
  
 -1.208973 
  
 0.069760 
  
 0.014637 
  
 0.031907 
  
 0.014445 
  
 0.173744 
  
 0.058378 
  
 0.062018 
  
 0.107445 
  
 0.040595 
  
 0.019084 
  
 4_1 
  
 0.163416 
  
 0.044707 
  
 0.041276 
  
 0.011309 
  
 0.210057 
  
 0.053652 
  
 0.050174 
  
 0.024590 
  
 0.003422 
  
 -0.876030 
  
 0.015081 
  
 0.037924 
  
 -0.289229 
  
 0.151393 
  
 0.050740 
  
 0.053919 
  
 0.093544 
  
 0.035068 
  
 0.124986 
  
 4_2 
  
 0.060276 
  
 0.016502 
  
 0.015186 
  
 0.004166 
  
 0.077397 
  
 0.019792 
  
 0.018487 
  
 0.009042 
  
 0.001260 
  
 0.097608 
  
 -0.723734 
  
 0.182780 
  
 0.033613 
  
 0.055834 
  
 0.018678 
  
 0.019855 
  
 0.034525 
  
 0.012906 
  
 0.045826 
  
 4_3 
  
 0.063556 
  
 0.017411 
  
 0.016186 
  
 0.004402 
  
 0.081659 
  
 0.020857 
  
 0.019527 
  
 0.009609 
  
 0.001341 
  
 0.160955 
  
 0.071279 
  
 -1.091799 
  
 0.425507 
  
 0.058951 
  
 0.019754 
  
 0.020698 
  
 0.036363 
  
 0.013720 
  
 0.050025 
  
 4_4 
  
 0.075766 
  
 0.020674 
  
 0.019101 
  
 0.005231 
  
 0.097483 
  
 0.024813 
  
 0.023233 
  
 0.011408 
  
 0.001583 
  
 -0.101473 
  
 -0.314978 
  
 0.256256 
  
 -0.354855 
  
 0.069962 
  
 0.023552 
  
 0.025467 
  
 0.043284 
  
 0.016258 
  
 0.057234 
  
 5_1 
  
 0.405409 
  
 0.111154 
  
 0.103070 
  
 0.028026 
  
 0.096874 
  
 0.256968 
  
 0.240207 
  
 0.117743 
  
 0.016512 
  
 0.283503 
  
 0.059506 
  
 0.129442 
  
 0.058786 
  
 -1.677879 
  
 -0.282926 
  
 0.191627 
  
 0.154573 
  
 -0.099678 
  
 -0.192918 
  
 5_2 
  
 0.315088 
  
 0.086439 
  
 0.080228 
  
 0.021805 
  
 0.075233 
  
 0.199831 
  
 0.186869 
  
 0.091473 
  
 0.012831 
  
 0.220419 
  
 0.046263 
  
 0.100729 
  
 0.045717 
  
 -0.680832 
  
 -0.988368 
  
 -0.489607 
  
 1.007263 
  
 -0.181308 
  
 -0.150074 
  
 5_3 
  
 0.335543 
  
 0.091843 
  
 0.085144 
  
 0.023149 
  
 0.080373 
  
 0.212379 
  
 0.198608 
  
 0.097532 
  
 0.013656 
  
 0.234379 
  
 0.049200 
  
 0.106854 
  
 0.048810 
  
 0.600456 
  
 -0.560520 
  
 -0.150328 
  
 -1.195762 
  
 -0.111870 
  
 -0.159447 
  
 5_4 
  
 0.291585 
  
 0.080010 
  
 0.074111 
  
 0.020157 
  
 0.069623 
  
 0.184923 
  
 0.172743 
  
 0.084618 
  
 0.011880 
  
 0.204006 
  
 0.042815 
  
 0.093095 
  
 0.042185 
  
 0.259305 
  
 0.475228 
  
 -0.642830 
  
 -1.267787 
  
 -0.056860 
  
 -0.138808 
  
 5_5 
  
 0.795803 
  
 0.218265 
  
 0.201698 
  
 0.055098 
  
 0.191476 
  
 0.504753 
  
 0.471599 
  
 0.230315 
  
 0.032261 
  
 0.557199 
  
 0.116746 
  
 0.252723 
  
 0.115262 
  
 -0.456257 
 -0.209973 
 -0.605388 
 -1.443442 
 -0.651449 
 -0.376686 
  
 6_1 
  
 -0.022907 
  
 -0.006233 
  
 -0.005799 
  
 -0.001619 
  
 -0.050962 
  
 0.020444 
  
 0.019100 
  
 0.009314 
  
 0.001297 
  
 0.066839 
  
 0.014006 
  
 0.030476 
  
 0.013783 
  
 0.000206 
  
 7.06E-05 
  
 0.000120 
  
 0.000123 
  
 3.75E-05 
  
 -0.088297 
  
 Table A9. Stage 1. Long run uncompensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 1 
  
 -0.437580 
  
 -0.014277 
  
 0.087275 
  
 0.190075 
  
 0.174507 
  
 2 
  
 -0.004937 
  
 0.076203 
  
 -0.154600 
  
 -0.028122 
  
 0.111457 
  
 3 
  
 0.247319 
  
 -0.266902 
  
 -0.666418 
  
 0.212633 
  
 0.473368 
  
 4 
  
 0.340672 
  
 0.128015 
  
 0.145438 
  
 -0.419951 
  
 -0.194173 
  
 5 
  
 -0.012697 
  
 -0.130663 
  
 0.824064 
  
 0.250909 
  
 -0.931612 
  
 Long run total expenditure elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
 0.453754 0.527394 1.451610 1.797440 1.503694 
 Long run compensated price elasticities. Calculated at  
 1994-1998 
  mean values. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 1 
  
 -0.542716 
  
 -0.160774 
  
 0.028263 
  
 0.094192 
  
 0.127281 
  
 2 
  
 -0.126692 
  
 -0.094742 
  
 -0.223159 
  
 -0.139209 
  
 0.056408 
  
 3 
  
 -0.088212 
  
 -0.736468 
  
 -0.855104 
  
 -0.093935 
  
 0.322108 
  
 4 
  
 -0.074627 
  
 -0.453923 
  
 -0.088514 
  
 -0.798582 
  
 -0.381794 
  
 5 
  
 -0.360368 
  
 -0.616612 
  
 0.628464 
  
 -0.066965 
  
 -1.088213 
  
 Statistical significance of elasticities 
 Stage 1: Standard errors and  
 p-values 
  evaluated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Table B1. Estimated uncompensated price elasticities and the total expenditure elasticity, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 6 
  
 1 
  
 -0.34 
  
 -0.12 
  
 -0.26 
  
 -0.15 
  
 0.53 
  
 -0.27 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 [0.03] 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 [0.05] 
  
 [0.38] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.14] 
  
 2 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.31 
  
 -0.26 
  
 0.15 
  
 0.07 
  
 0.34 
  
 (0.09) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 (0.08) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 [0.41] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.20] 
  
 [0.45] 
  
 [0.02] 
  
 3 
  
 -0.53 
  
 -0.87 
  
 -0.44 
  
 0.53 
  
 0.14 
  
 -1.29 
  
 (0.24) 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 (0.35) 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.29) 
  
 [0.03] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.20] 
  
 [0.05] 
  
 [0.69] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 4 
  
 -0.28 
  
 -0.12 
  
 0.34 
  
 -1.83 
  
 0.11 
  
 -1.40 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.31) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 [0.16] 
  
 [0.50] 
  
 [0.05] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.56] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 5 
  
 1.10 
  
 0.03 
  
 0.20 
  
 0.23 
  
 -2.12 
  
 -1.70 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 (0.28) 
  
 (0.46) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 (0.56) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.90] 
  
 [0.67] 
  
 [0.53] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 6 
  
 -0.13 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.01 
  
 0.11 
  
 -0.07 
  
 -0.31 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.04) 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.58] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 Total 
  
 0.62 
  
 0.21 
  
 2.46 
  
 3.18 
  
 2.27 
  
 0.49 
  
 expenditure 
  
 (0.24) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.40) 
  
 (0.48) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.23] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Table B2. Estimated compensated price elasticities, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 6 
  
 1 
  
 -0.27 
  
 -0.01 
  
 -0.21 
  
 -0.08 
  
 0.56 
  
 0.01 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.14) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.09) 
  
 [0.08] 
  
 [0.93] 
  
 [0.12] 
  
 [0.64] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.88] 
  
 2 
  
 -0.05 
  
 -0.27 
  
 -0.24 
  
 0.17 
  
 0.08 
  
 0.44 
  
 (0.08) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 (-0.09) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 (0.09) 
  
 (0.08) 
  
 [0.59] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.12] 
  
 [0.37] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 3 
  
 -0.22 
  
 -0.45 
  
 -0.27 
  
 0.81 
  
 0.29 
  
 -0.16 
  
 (0.22) 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 (0.14) 
  
 [0.32] 
  
 [0.03] 
  
 [0.45] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.44] 
  
 [0.26] 
  
 4 
  
 0.12 
  
 0.43 
  
 0.56 
  
 -1.47 
  
 0.29 
  
 0.07 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.31) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 [0.55] 
  
 [0.02] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.12] 
  
 [0.63] 
  
 5 
  
 1.38 
  
 0.43 
  
 0.36 
  
 0.49 
  
 -1.99 
  
 -0.66 
  
 (0.28) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 (0.48) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 (0.56) 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.15] 
  
 [0.46] 
  
 [0.18] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 6 
  
 -0.07 
  
 0.01 
  
 0.02 
  
 0.17 
  
 -0.05 
  
 -0.08 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.02) 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.67] 
  
 [0.23] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.10] 
  
 Group 1: Standard errors and  
 p-values 
  evaluated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Table B3. Estimated uncompensated price elasticities and the total expenditure elasticity, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -0.77 
  
 0.02 
  
 -0.11 
  
 -0.04 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.28] 
  
 [0.04] 
  
 [0.48] 
  
 2 
  
 0.10 
  
 -1.00 
  
 -0.10 
  
 0.08 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 (0.22) 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.60] 
  
 [0.73] 
  
 3 
  
 -0.67 
  
 -0.16 
  
 -0.62 
  
 -0.10 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.32) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 [0.08] 
  
 [0.76] 
  
 4 
  
 -1.21 
  
 0.17 
  
 0.57 
  
 Wilson 
  
 (0.40) 
  
 (0.39) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.66] 
  
 [0.11] 
  
 [0.28] 
  
 Total 
  
 0.89 
  
 0.92 
  
 1.55 
  
 0.86 
  
 expenditure 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.62) 
  
 (0.77) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.27] 
  
 Table B4. Estimated compensated price elasticities, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -0.21 
  
 0.18 
  
 0.03 
  
 0.00 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 (0.04) 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.39] 
  
 [0.99] 
  
 2 
  
 0.67 
  
 -0.84 
  
 0.05 
  
 0.12 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.21) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.74] 
  
 [0.58] 
  
 3 
  
 0.30 
  
 0.11 
  
 -0.38 
  
 -0.03 
  
 (0.32) 
  
 (0.21) 
  
 (0.28) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 [0.35] 
  
 [0.61] 
  
 [0.17] 
  
 [0.92] 
  
 4 
  
 -0.67 
  
 0.32 
  
 0.71 
  
 -0.36 
  
 (0.32) 
  
 (0.35) 
  
 (0.28) 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 [0.04] 
  
 [0.36] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 Group 3: Standard errors and  
 p-values 
  evaluated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Table B5. Estimated uncompensated price elasticities and the total expenditure elasticity, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -0.57 
  
 -0.38 
  
 -0.14 
  
 0.03 
  
 (0.37) 
  
 (0.45) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 [0.13] 
  
 [0.40] 
  
 [0.22] 
  
 [0.84] 
  
 2 
  
 -0.41 
  
 -0.61 
  
 0.06 
  
 -0.12 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.54) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 [0.28] 
  
 [0.26] 
  
 [0.62] 
  
 [0.44] 
  
 3 
  
 -0.23 
  
 0.20 
  
 -0.82 
  
 0.11 
  
 (0.22) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 [0.30] 
  
 [0.49] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 4 
  
 0.94 
  
 -1.30 
  
 -0.03 
  
 -0.55 
  
 (1.10) 
  
 (1.40) 
  
 (0.42) 
  
 (0.67) 
  
 [0.39] 
  
 [0.36] 
  
 [0.95] 
  
 [0.44] 
  
 Total 
  
 1.06 
  
 1.07 
  
 0.73 
  
 0.93 
  
 expenditure 
  
 (0.23) 
  
 (0.23) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.73) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.20] 
  
 Table B6. Estimated compensated price elasticities, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -0.14 
  
 0.02 
  
 0.06 
  
 0.06 
  
 (0.46) 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 [0.76] 
  
 [0.95] 
  
 [0.63] 
  
 [0.70] 
  
 2 
  
 0.03 
  
 -0.20 
  
 0.26 
  
 -0.09 
  
 (0.47) 
  
 (0.47) 
  
 (0.14) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 [0.95] 
  
 [0.67] 
  
 [0.07] 
  
 [0.54] 
  
 3 
  
 0.07 
  
 0.48 
  
 -0.68 
  
 0.13 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.26) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 [0.81] 
  
 [0.06] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.24] 
  
 4 
  
 1.32 
  
 -0.94 
  
 0.15 
  
 -0.53 
  
 (1.37) 
  
 (1.21) 
  
 (0.42) 
  
 (0.65) 
  
 [0.33] 
  
 [0.44] 
  
 [0.72] 
  
 [0.42] 
  
 Group 4: Standard errors and  
 p-values 
  evaluated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Table B7. Estimated uncompensated price elasticities and the total expenditure elasticity, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -1.68 
  
 0.18 
  
 0.31 
  
 0.47 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.08) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.02] 
  
 [0.02] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 2 
  
 0.82 
  
 -1.34 
  
 -0.24 
  
 -0.18 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.23) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 [0.03] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.29] 
  
 [0.56] 
  
 3 
  
 0.54 
  
 -0.14 
  
 -1.36 
  
 -0.73 
  
 (0.29) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 (0.29) 
  
 (0.22) 
  
 [0.06] 
  
 [0.21] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 4 
  
 1.28 
  
 -0.22 
  
 -0.48 
  
 -1.50 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.22) 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.30] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Total 
  
 0.72 
  
 0.94 
  
 1.68 
  
 0.92 
  
 expenditure 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 (0.12) 
  
 (0.14) 
  
 (0.09) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Table B8. Estimated compensated price elasticities, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 1 
  
 -1.29 
  
 0.26 
  
 0.49 
  
 0.55 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.08) 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 2 
  
 1.32 
  
 -1.23 
  
 -0.02 
  
 -0.07 
  
 (0.38) 
  
 (0.36) 
  
 (0.24) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.95] 
  
 [0.81] 
  
 3 
  
 1.44 
  
 0.05 
  
 -0.95 
  
 -0.54 
  
 (0.29) 
  
 (0.11) 
  
 (0.30) 
  
 (0.21) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.63] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 4 
  
 1.77 
  
 -0.12 
  
 -0.25 
  
 -1.40 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.21) 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.58] 
  
 [0.19] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Group 5: Standard errors and  
 p-values 
  evaluated at mean values for the period  
 1994-1998. 
  
 Table B9. Estimated uncompensated price elasticities and the total expenditure elasticity, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity Scott. 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 1 
  
 Franklin 
  
 -0.17 
  
 -0.05 
  
 0.02 
  
 -0.05 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 (0.04) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.27] 
  
 [0.87] 
  
 [0.20] 
  
 2 
  
 -0.47 
  
 -1.19 
  
 0.88 
  
 0.06 
  
 -0.09 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 (0.66) 
  
 (0.25) 
  
 (0.65) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 [0.02] 
  
 [0.07] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.92] 
  
 [0.36] 
  
 3 
  
 -0.12 
  
 0.83 
  
 -1.39 
  
 -0.29 
  
 0.11 
  
 (0.13) 
  
 (0.25) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.29) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 [0.36] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.31] 
  
 [0.10] 
  
 4 
  
 0.05 
  
 0.04 
  
 -0.14 
  
 -0.62 
  
 -0.08 
  
 (0.14) 
  
 (0.35) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.52) 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 [0.70] 
  
 [0.90] 
  
 [0.35] 
  
 [0.24] 
  
 [0.15] 
  
 5 
  
 -0.21 
  
 -0.37 
  
 -0.09 
  
 -0.73 
  
 -0.62 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.35) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 [0.19] 
  
 [0.17] 
  
 [0.61] 
  
 [0.04] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Total 
  
 1.03 
  
 0.80 
  
 0.86 
  
 0.74 
  
 2.02 
  
 expenditure 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 (0.25) 
  
 (0.15) 
  
 (0.18) 
  
 (0.31) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 Table B10. Estimated compensated price elasticities, standard errors (within parentheses) and  
 p-values 
  Armstrong brackets] for the null hypothesis that the elasticity equals zero 
  
 1 
  
 2 
  
 3 
  
 4 
  
 5 
  
 1 
  
 -0.38 
  
 -0.03 
  
 0.09 
  
 0.27 
  
 0.05 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 (0.05) 
  
 (0.09) 
  
 (0.03) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.67] 
  
 [0.06] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.18] 
  
 2 
  
 -0.16 
  
 -1.08 
  
 0.99 
  
 0.26 
  
 -0.02 
  
 (0.26) 
  
 (0.66) 
  
 (0.26) 
  
 (0.61) 
  
 (0.10) 
  
 [0.55] 
  
 [0.10] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.67] 
  
 [0.88] 
  
 3 
  
 0.22 
  
 0.94 
  
 -1.27 
  
 -0.08 
  
 0.19 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.24) 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.07) 
  
 [0.17] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.76} 
  
 [0.01] 
  
 4 
  
 0.35 
  
 0.14 
  
 -0.04 
  
 -0.44 
  
 -0.01 
  
 (0.19) 
  
 (0.35) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 (0.49) 
  
 (0.06) 
  
 [0.07] 
  
 [0.69] 
  
 [0.82] 
  
 [0.37] 
  
 [0.81] 
  
 5 
  
 0.59 
  
 -0.11 
  
 0.19 
  
 -0.24 
  
 -0.43 
  
 (0.20) 
  
 (0.27) 
  
 (0.17) 
  
 (0.32) 
  
 (0.16) 
  
 [0.00] 
  
 [0.69] 
  
 [0.27] 
  
 [0.46] 
  
 [0.01]