PATENT DOCUMENT

Publication Number: US-7650507-B2
Application Number: US-35570709-A
Country: US
Kind Code: B2

Title: Small memory footprint fast elliptic encryption

Abstract:
A method of generating a digital signature includes generating a first random number from a finite field of numbers, and generating field elements defining a first point on an elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the first random number and an initial public point on the elliptic curve. The method continues by generating a product from a field element, a private key, and a second random number received from a challenger seeking verification of a digital signature, and generating a signature component by summing the product and the first random number. The signature component is reduced using one or more modular reduction operations, using a modulus equal to an order of the elliptic curve, and then the reduced signature component and the field elements are sent to the challenger as a digital signature for verification by the challenger.

Claims:
1. A digital signature verification system, comprising:
 a processor; 
 a computer readable medium coupled to the processor and having stored thereon instructions, which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform the operations of: 
 generating a first random number from a finite field of numbers; 
 sending the first random number to a signing device; 
 receiving a digital signature packet from the signing device including a first point on an elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers and a signature component, wherein the signature component is a function of the first random number and a second random number generated by the signing device; 
 generating a second point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the signature component and an initial public point on the elliptic curve; 
 generating a product from the first random number and a field element of the first point; 
 reducing the product using one or more modular operations, wherein the one or more modular operations are based on a modulus equal to an order of the elliptic curve; 
 generating a third point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the reduced product and a public point on the elliptic curve representing a public key of the signing device and distinct from the initial public point; and 
 evaluating an elliptic identity using the first, second and third points to produce a result indicative of either a positive or negative verification of the digital signature packet. 
 
   
   
     2. The system of  claim 1 , wherein one or more of the generating steps uses unsigned field arithmetic. 
   
   
     3. The system of  claim 2 , wherein the unsigned field arithmetic includes modular operations that are performed without explicit divisions. 
   
   
     4. The system of  claim 2 , wherein subtract operations on a field element of a respective point on the elliptic curve are performed by negating the field element of the respective point using the identity (−y)mod p w s −(y+k)mod p, where y is the field element to be negated, p is a field prime, w is an n-bit segment of memory, k is a positive integer, and s is an exponent used to set a security level. 
   
   
     5. The system of  claim 2 , wherein the unsigned field arithmetic does not use field inversion operations. 
   
   
     6. The system of  claim 2 , wherein the field arithmetic does not use dynamically allocated memory. 
   
   
     7. The system of  claim 2 , wherein a maximum number of bytes of memory allocated for temporary storage of variables used by field arithmetic operations used to verify the digital signature packet does not exceed 226 bytes. 
   
   
     8. The system of  claim 2 , wherein at least one temporary variable used by the unsigned field arithmetic is shared by at least two field arithmetic operations. 
   
   
     9. The system of  claim 2 , wherein the digital signature packet received from the signing device is a packet not exceeding 3s+3 memory segments w, wherein s represents the number of n-bit memory segments w used to store unsigned integer values for the signature component and field elements of the first point. 
   
   
     10. The system of  claim 2 , wherein the computer-readable medium includes a data structure for storing nine parameters used to verify the digital signature packet, wherein eight parameters are stored in no more than s+1 n-bit memory segments w and one parameter is stored in no more than 2s n-bit segments w, where s is a positive integer. 
   
   
     11. The system of  claim 10 , wherein s is equal to 10 and n is equal to 16. 
   
   
     12. The system of  claim 1 , wherein the elliptic curve has a curve order o=w s −j, wherein w is an n-bit segment of computer memory, and s and j are positive integers. 
   
   
     13. The system of  claim 12 , wherein the first random number is an integer constrained to reside in the interval [2, o−1]. 
   
   
     14. The system of  claim 12 , wherein the initial public point on the elliptic curve has a point order that divides the curve order o and contains the largest prime factor in the curve order o. 
   
   
     15. The system of  claim 12 , wherein j is greater than 0 and less than w 1+s/2 . 
   
   
     16. The system of  claim 1 , wherein field elements of the first, second, and third points are Montgomery coordinate pairs. 
   
   
     17. The system of  claim 1 , wherein the elliptic curve is defined in an x-y coordinate plane by the equation y 2 =x 3 +cx 2 +x. 
   
   
     18. The system of  claim 17 , wherein c is equal to 4. 
   
   
     19. The system of  claim 1 , wherein field elements of the first, second, and third points reside in an interval [0, p−1], wherein p is a field prime. 
   
   
     20. The system of  claim 1 , wherein the second random number has a Hamming weight less than or equal to 48. 
   
   
     21. A computer-implemented method of verifying a digital signature, comprising:
 at an electronic device comprising one or more processors and a communications interface coupled to a signing device; 
 generating a first random number from a finite field of numbers; 
 sending the first random number to a signing device; 
 receiving a digital signature packet from a signing device including a first point on an elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers and a signature component, wherein the signature component is a function of the first random number and a second random number generated by the signing device; 
 generating a second point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the signature component and an initial public point on the elliptic curve; 
 generating a product from the first random number and a field element of the first point; 
 reducing the product using one or more modular operations, wherein the one or more modular operations are based on a modulus equal to an order of the elliptic curve; 
 generating a third point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the reduced product and a public point on the elliptic curve representing a public key of the signing device and distinct from the initial public point; and 
 evaluating an elliptic identity using the first, second and third points to produce a result indicative of either a positive or negative verification of the digital signature packet. 
 
   
   
     22. A computer-readable medium having stored thereon instructions, which, when executed by a processor in a system for generating a digital signature, cause the processor to perform the operations of:
 generating a first random number from a finite field of numbers; 
 sending the first random number to a signing device; 
 receiving a digital signature packet from a signing device including a first point on an elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers and a signature component, wherein the signature component is a function of the first random number and a second random number generated by the signing device; 
 generating a second point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the signature component and an initial public point on the elliptic curve; 
 generating a product from the first random number and a field element of the first point; 
 reducing the product using one or more modular operations, wherein the one or more modular operations are based on a modulus equal to an order of the elliptic curve; 
 generating a third point on the elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the reduced product and a public point on the elliptic curve representing a public key of the signing device and distinct from the initial public point; and 
 evaluating an elliptic identity using the first, second and third points to produce a result indicative of either a positive or negative verification of the digital signature packet.

Description:
RELATED APPLICATIONS 
   This application is a division of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/051,441, filed Feb. 3, 2005, entitled “Small Memory Footprint Fast Elliptic Encryption, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
   This application is related to U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/642,340, filed Jan. 7, 2005, entitled “Accessory Authentication for Electronic Devices,” which provisional application is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 
   This application is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/051,499, filed Feb. 3, 2005, entitled “Accessory Authentication for Electronic Devices,” which application is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. 

   COPYRIGHT AUTHORIZATION STATEMENT 
   A portion of the disclosure of this patent document contains material which is subject to copyright protection. The copyright owner has no objection to the facsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent disclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office patent files or records, but otherwise reserves all copyright rights whatsoever. 
   TECHNICAL FIELD 
   The disclosed embodiments relate generally to asymmetric cryptography, and in particular to small memory implementations of fast elliptic encryption (FEE). 
   BACKGROUND 
   Since the advent of public-key cryptography numerous public-key cryptographic systems have been proposed. Today, only three types of systems are still considered secure and efficient. These systems include integer factorization systems, discrete logarithm systems and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) systems. The security afforded by integer factorization rests on the difficulty of factoring a large product of two prime numbers. The security of discrete logarithm systems rests on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The security of ECC systems rests on the difficulty of solving the elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP) problem, which amounts to finding a log in a group of points defined on an elliptic curve over a prime field. ECC&#39;s advantage over other systems is that its inverse operation gets harder, faster, against increasing key length, making it suitable for portable devices having small form factors with limited power and memory. 
   In recent years FEE has emerged as a strong option for memory constrained devices due, in part, to its speed and efficiency. FEE uses special primes and fast finite field and modular operations to reduce processor cycles, leading to less power consumption and heat dissipation. Various embodiments of FEE systems are described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,307,935, issued Oct. 23, 2001, entitled “Method and Apparatus For Fast Elliptic Encryption With Direct Embedding,” and U.S. Pat. No. 6,285,760, issued Sep. 4, 2001, entitled “Method and Apparatus For Digital Signature Authentication,” each of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Although existing FEE systems provide reduced processor cycles, there remains a need for small memory implementations of FEE. 
   SUMMARY OF EMBODIMENTS 
   The disclosed embodiments provide small memory implementations of FEE. In one embodiment, a method of generating a digital signature includes generating a first random number from a finite field of numbers, and generating field elements defining a first point on an elliptic curve defined over the finite field of numbers by performing elliptic curve arithmetic on the first random number and an initial public point on the elliptic curve. The method continues by generating a product from a field element, a private key, and a second random number received from a challenger seeking verification of a digital signature, and generating a signature component by summing the product and the first random number. The signature component is reduced using one or more modular reduction operations, using a modulus equal to an order of the elliptic curve, and then the reduced signature component and the field elements are sent to the challenger as a digital signature for verification by the challenger. 

   
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       FIG. 1  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a signature signing and verification system. 
       FIG. 2  is a block diagram of one embodiment of the signing device shown in  FIG. 1 . 
       FIG. 3  is a block diagram of one embodiment of the challenging device shown in  FIG. 1 . 
       FIG. 4  is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a signature generation process. 
       FIG. 5  is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a signature verification process. 
       FIG. 6  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a signing device architecture. 
       FIG. 7  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a challenging device architecture. 
       FIG. 8  is an illustration of a memory stack for the signature generation process of  FIG. 4 . 
       FIG. 9  is an illustration of a memory stack for the signature verification process of  FIG. 5 . 
   

   DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS 
   The following description of embodiments assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of ECC and its underlying mathematics. A detailed discussion of ECC can be found in numerous publicly available references, such as D. Hankerson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone,  Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography , Springer-Verlag, 2004. Asymmetric cryptographic systems and applications using Fast Elliptic Encryption (FEE) are described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,159,632 and 6,285,760. 
   Small Memory Fast Elliptic Encryption (SFEE) 
   The SFEE embodiments described herein were developed based on certain assumptions and defining constraints. First, an elliptic curve over finite field Fp for odd prime p was assumed to have an equation (in Montgomery form) given by
 
 y   2   =x   3   +cx   2   +x,c≠± 2,  (1)
 
wherein the parameters x and y are field elements describing a point (x, y) on the elliptic curve if x and y satisfy equation (1).
 
   Next, it was assumed that the prime characteristic p given by
 
 p=w   s   −k, kε[ 1 ,w− 1 ], k≡ 1(mod 4),  (2)
 
wherein w is a word size for the field arithmetic (e.g., 16 bits), and s is a chosen exponent, which can be used to set the security level of the SFEE.
 
   For SFEE, specific elliptic curves are selected such that the curve order o is of the form
 
 o=w   s   −j,   (3)
 
wherein j&gt;0 and initial public points are selected with point orders that divide the curve order o and contain the largest prime number in the curve order o. Note that in some embodiments where, for example, 16×16, 32-bit machine operations are available, w=2 16  is an efficient choice for a word size. One may think of the exponent s as a security level, subject to the difficulty of breaking the ECDL problem. Thus, if w=2 16  and s=10, then 160 bit encryption can be achieved, i.e., (2 16 ) 10 =2 160 . In some embodiments, extra optimization is possible when c in equation (1) is set equal to 4.
 
   The foregoing SFEE assumptions and defining constraints imply both p, o&lt;w s . It also follows from the Hasse theorem that 0≦j≦w (1+s)/2 , so that j can be about half the allocation of a typical (mod p) residue, if desired. It is also noted that Montgomery curves typically cannot have a prime curve order o. Rather, the curve order o should be divisible by 4. For maximum security, however, p can be selected such that o is divisible by a large prime. 
   SFEE Definitions of Software Variable Types 
   To facilitate discussion regarding the memory saving features of the disclosed embodiments the software types “lGiant” and “bGiant” will be assumed. lGiant means a “little giant” type and bGiant means a “big Giant” type. The actual number of bytes used to represent an lGiant or bGiant is dependent on the size in bits of the lGiant or bGiant. 
   Although lGiant and bGiant types are platform dependent, in some embodiments, these types have constrained upper limits. For example, an lGiant variable type is defined to have at most s+1 digits (i.e., arithmetic words) and one word to count significant digits. Thus, the number of significant digits in an lGiant is less than or equal to s+1. For example, if s=10 and a word is 16-bits, then an lGiant would occupy 22 bytes of storage. A bGiant type has at most 2s digits. Thus, the number of significant digits in a bGiant is less than or equal to 2s. For example, if s=10 and a word is 16-bits, then a bGiant would occupy 40 bytes of storage. The reason for the (s+1) digit upper limit on the lGiant type is that certain field arithmetic functions (such as adding two lGiants) results in another lGiant. This is due to each lGiant being a field element in the interval [0, p−1] and 2p−2&lt;w s−1 . Similarly, a vector multiply function used in SFEE, such as
 
vecmulg(a, x); //Replace x with a*x,  (4)
 
where a is one word and x is a field element, results in a modified x which is still an lGiant, because ax≦(w−1)(w s −1)&lt;w s+1 . Note that an example code layout for the function vecmulg(a, x) is included in Appendix A hereto.
 
   SFEE Features 
   Various features of SFEE were developed to provide tight control of array sizes to ensure the smallest possible memory footprint. In some embodiments, the arithmetic for the SFEE system is unsigned and field elements are constrained to lGiant integer types by forcing the field elements to reside in the interval [0, p−1], where p is the field prime characteristic. Also, there are no subtract operations in some embodiments of SFEE. Rather, negation of a field element y can be handled modulo p, using the identity
 
(− y )mod  p≡w   s −( y+k )mod  p.   (5)
 
   In some embodiments of SFEE, modular operations, whether in the field or not, use a “feemod” procedure involving shifts, multiplications, and adds. That is, there are no explicit divisions, which are speed-costly operations. An example of such an efficient “feemod” procedure involving only shifts, multiplications and adds is included in Appendix A. Note that in embodiments involving signature schemes, there can be extra modular reductions with respect to, for example, the point order, which can also benefit from the “feemod” function included in Appendix A. Another feature of SFEE is the avoidance of field inversion operations, which are costly in the sense that Montgomery coordinate pairs (x, z) are used throughout SFEE. 
   Signature Algorithm 
     FIG. 1  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a signature signing and verification system  100 . The system  100  includes a challenging device  102  coupled to a signing device  104  via an unsecured communications channel. The challenging device  102  and signing device  104  can be any type of memory constrained communication device, including but not limited to, computers, network devices, media players (e.g., music recorders/players), smart cards, email devices, instant messaging devices, mobile phones, digital cameras, personal digital assistants (PDAs), docking stations and the like. The unsecured channel can be any physical and/or wireless link or connection, including but not limited to, buses and networks (e.g., Universal Serial Bus (USB), IEEE 1394 (FireWire™), Ethernet, Internet, WLAN, etc.). 
   For purposes of this embodiment, it is assumed that certain parameters have been specified, including the parameters s, k, j and word-size w, which are variables in equations (2) and (3) for the prime field characteristic p and the curve order o, respectively. There is an initial public point P 1 =(x 1 ,1) specified on the elliptic curve with point order dividing o. In some embodiments, the signing device  104  has access to a private key K, which is an lGiant variable type and Kε[2,o,−2]. Because o has (s lg w) bits always, the constraint on K can be easily handled by forcing the high bit of an s-word random lGiant to be 0. Then K will have at most ((s lg w)−1) significant bits, the values K=0, 1 are excluded, and the key constraint is effected with no modular operations. 
   It is also assumed that the signing device  104  has access to a public key P pub =(x p , z p ) defined by
 
( x   p   ,z   p )= K ·( x   1 ,1),  (6)
 
where K·(x 1 ,1) is obtained through elliptic multiplication. For instance, the public key may be obtained from a registry or other trusted source of public keys, or the public key may be obtained from the signing device and then validated by a trusted validation service. In some embodiments, each of the field elements x p  and z p  are an lGiant. Generally, if some lGiant xε[2, o−1], it suffices to limit x to (s lg w−1) bits and exclude the values x=0, 1.
 
   Referring again to  FIG. 1 , the challenging device  102  sends a challenge m to the signing device  104 . In some embodiments, the challenge m is a random number generated by the challenging device  102 . The random number m is constrained to be an integer within the interval mε[2,o−1]. The random number m can be generated by hardware or software or a combination of both. In other embodiments, m can be a message hash derivable by one or both the challenging and signing devices  102 ,  104 . An example of a suitable message hash is the MD5 message-digest algorithm co-developed by MIT Laboratory for Computer Science and RSA Data Security, Inc. While the term “random number” may be strictly defined to mean “a number whose value can not be predicted,” for the purposes of this patent document, the term “random number” is defined to mean either a number who value cannot be predicted or a pseudorandom number. A pseudorandom number is a number extracted from a pseudorandom sequence, which is a sequence of values with qualities similar to that of a truly random sequence, but is typically produced by a deterministic function. 
   The signing device  104  receives the random number m from the unsecured channel and performs the signing operation, as described with respect to  FIGS. 2 and 4 . The result of the signing operation is a digital signature represented by the parameter triplet (u, x r , z r ). The challenging device  102  receives the triplet from the signing device  104  and performs a verification process, as described with respect to  FIGS. 3 and 5 . If verification results in a valid signature, then a communication session can be established between the challenging device  102  and the signing device  104 . The system  100  can be used for a variety of applications requiring digital signature signing and verification. For example, a media player can use the system  100  to prevent unauthorized devices (e.g., computer, smart card, camera, speaker system, accessory devices, etc.) from receiving or sending files or other information from or to the media player. In some embodiments, a successful signature verification allows certain functionality in the challenging device  102  to be accessed or unlocked that otherwise would not have been available to the challenging and/or signing devices  102 ,  104 , as described in U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 60/642,340, filed Jan. 7, 2005, entitled “Authentication For Electronic Devices.” 
     FIG. 2  is a block diagram of one embodiment of the signing device  104  shown in  FIG. 1 . The signing device  104  includes interface circuitry  202 , mod module  204 , summing module  206 , multiply module  208 , elliptic multiplier module  210  and random number generator  212 . Each of the modules,  204 ,  206 ,  208  and  210  can be implemented in hardware or software or a combination of both. For example, in some embodiments the modules  204 ,  206 ,  208  and  210  are implemented by one or more software functions disclosed in Appendix A. 
   The interface circuitry  202  includes circuitry for establishing and maintaining a connection and communication session with other devices or with a network. Such circuitry may include a transmitter, a receiver, line drivers, buffers, logic devices, signal conditioning circuitry, etc. If the signing device  104  is wireless, then the interface circuitry  202  would include appropriate wireless circuitry (e.g., a wireless transceiver) for establishing and maintaining a wireless communication session with another device or network. The random number generator  212  can be implemented in software or hardware or a combination of both. 
   In some embodiments, the challenging device  102  generates a random lGiant type integer mε[2, o−1] and sends it to the signing device  104  over a communication channel (shown as an unsecured channel in  FIG. 2 ). The random number m is received by the interface circuitry  202  and supplied to the multiply module  208 . The multiply module  208  forms a product from the random number m a private key K and the field element x r . The field element x r  is computed by the elliptic multiplier module  210  based on the formula
 
( x   r   ,z   r )= r ·( x   1 ,1),  (7)
 
wherein r is a random number generated by the random number generator  212  and (x 1 , 1) is an initial public point on the elliptic curve in Montgomery form. Note that in some embodiments, the random number r is an lGiant in the interval [2, o−1] and is further constrained to have a low Hamming weight (e.g., 48). The “1” bits, however, can be in any bit position.
 
   The multiply module  208  forms a product x r km using non-field multiplication, wherein x r  is the x field element of the point (x r , z r ) on the elliptic curve, K is a private key (e.g., a bGiant type) and m is the random number sent by the challenging device  102 . Using non-field addition, the summing module  206  adds this product to the random number r to form the sum x r Km+r. The mod module  204  reduces this value by the curve order o using fast modular operations (e.g., the “feemod” function in Appendix A) to produce a signature component u given by
 
 u:= ( x   r   Km+r )mod  o.   (8)
 
   The signature component u and the field elements x r , z r  are then sent to the challenging device  102  as a digital signature packet via the interface circuitry  202 . Note that u is an lGiant because of the defining constraint o&lt;p, and therefore at most a 3s+3 word signature is sent to the challenging device  102  for verification. 
     FIG. 3  is a block diagram of one embodiment of the challenging device  102  shown in  FIG. 1 . The challenging device  102  includes a compare module  302 , mod module  304 , non-field multiply module  306 , random number generator  308 , elliptic multiplier module  310  and interface circuitry  312 . Each of the modules,  302 ,  304 ,  306 , and  310  can be implemented in hardware or software or a combination of both. For example, in some embodiments the modules  302 ,  304 ,  306 , and  310  can be implemented by one or more software functions disclosed in Appendix A. 
   The challenging device  102  receives the signature packet (u, x r , z r ) from the signing device  104 . The elliptic multiplier module  310  computes the point
 
( x,z )= u ·( x   1 ,1),  (9)
 
wherein u is the signature component of the signature packet received from the signing device  104 . The point (x, z) is sent to the compare module  302  where it is used to validate the digital signature.
 
   Next, the multiplication module  306  used non-field multiplication to form a product x r m from the field element x r  received from the signing device  104  and the random number m generated by the random number generator  308 . This is the same random number m previously sent by the challenging device and used by the signing device to produce its digital signature. The product x r m is sent to the mod module  304 , where it is reduced to a temporary component h using FEE modular operations and a modulus set equal to the curve order o. Thus, the multiplication and modular operations give
 
h=x r m mod o  (10)
 
   The elliptic multiplier module  310  receives the temporary component h and a public key represented by the public point (x p , z p ) on the elliptic curve, and performs an elliptic multiplication on these values to give
 
( x   v   ,z   v )= h ·( x   p   ,z   p ).  (11)
 
   After computing equation (10), the points (x v , z v ) and (x r , z r ) are then sent to the compare module  302  where they are used to validate or invalidate the signature sent by the signing device  104 . In some embodiments, the compare module  302  uses the points (x v , z v ) and (x, z), and the point (x r , z r ) sent by the signing device  104  to determine whether there is an elliptic identity given by
 
( x   r   ,z   r )±( x   v   ,z   v )=( x,z ),  (12)
 
wherein the elliptic identity is determined by the algebraic expression
 
( x   r   z   v   −z   r   x   v ) 2   x   2 −2 xz [( x   r   x   v   +z   r   z   v )( x   r   z   v   +x   v   z   r )+2 cx   r   x   v   z   r   z   v ]+( x   r   x   v   −z   r   z   v ) 2 =0  (13)
 
   In some embodiments, the sigcompare (x r , z r , x v , z v , x, z) function included in Appendix A calculates the algebraic expression modulo the prime p and returns TRUE if and only if the result is 0. In these embodiments, the sigcompare( ) function uses four auxiliary lGiant variables. Note that the sigcompare( ) function determines whether P=P 1 +/−P 2  on an elliptic curve, without explicit elliptic addition, as described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,285,760. 
     FIG. 4  is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a signature generation process  400 . While the process  400  described below includes a number of steps that appear to occur in a specific order, it should be apparent that the process  400  can include more or fewer steps, which can be executed serially or in parallel (e.g., using parallel processors or a multi-threading environment). 
   The process  400  begins when a connection is established (step  402 ) with a challenging device  102 . In some embodiments, the challenging device  102  can be plugged directly into a port (e.g., USB, FireWire™, Ethernet, PCI slots, etc.) of the signing device  104  or vice versa, or otherwise attached via a cable or other physical medium. In other embodiments, a wireless connection is established between the challenging device  102  and the signing device  104  using known wireless protocols and techniques (e.g., IEEE 802.11, etc.). The challenging device  102  and signing device  104  can be physically separate devices from the devices that desire to communicate. For example, one or both devices  102 ,  104  can be key or dongle (e.g., Xkey™) that is coupled to a port on one or two other devices. 
   After a connection is established, the challenging device  102  generates and sends a random number m to the signing device  140  as a challenge. The signing device  104  receives the random number m (step  404 ) and generates another, different, random number r (step  406 ). In some embodiments, the random numbers m and r are generated local to the devices  102 ,  104 . In other embodiments, the random numbers are generated elsewhere (e.g., network computer) and provided to the devices  102 ,  104 . For example, the random numbers m and r may be downloaded from the Internet or other network as part of a registration process. 
   Upon generation of a random number r, the signing device  104  computes the public point (x r , z r ) from r and a initial public point (x 1 ,1), as previously described with respect to  FIG. 2 . (step  408 ). Next, the signature component u is computed (step  410 ) using field element x r , m, r and a private key K. If the signature component u is zero, then the process  400  repeats step  406 , generates a new random number r and proceeds again. The signature component u is then sent to the challenging device (step  412 ) as part of a signature packet (u, x r , z r ) for use in the verification process  500  described with respect to  FIG. 5 . 
     FIG. 5  is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a signature verification process  500 . While the process  500  described below includes a number of steps that appear to occur in a specific order, it should be apparent that the process  500  can include more or fewer steps, which can be executed serially or in parallel (e.g., using parallel processors or a multi-threading environment). 
   The process  500  begins when a signing device  104  is detected (step  502 ). Upon detection of a signing device  104 , the challenging device  102  generates a random number m, sends it to the signing device  104  (step  504 ) as a challenge, then waits for a signature packet (u, x r , z r ) from the signing device  104 . When the challenging device  102  receives the signature packet (step  506 ) it computes the public point (x, z) from the signature component u and the initial public point (x 1 , 1) (step  508 ), as described with respect to  FIG. 3 . Next, the temporary component h is computed from the field element x r  and the random number m using modular reduction with the modulus set equal to the curve order o (step  510 ). Another public point (x v , z v ) is computed from h and the signing device&#39;s public key, public point (x p , z p ) (step  512 ). The public points (x, z), (x r , z r ) and (x v , z v ) are then all provided to a compare module which uses the points to evaluate an elliptic identity, as described with respect to  FIG. 3  (step  514 ). If the elliptic identify is satisfied (step  516 ), then the signature is deemed valid (step  520 ). Otherwise, the signature is deemed invalid (step  518 ). 
     FIG. 6  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a signing device  600 . The signing device  600  includes a bus  606  coupled to one or more processors  602 , a communications interface  604 , optional control device(s)  605 , optional display device(s)  607  and one or more computer-readable mediums  608 . The computer-readable medium(s)  608  can be any device or medium that can store code and/or data for use by the one or more processors  602 . The medium can include a memory hierarchy, including but not limited to, cache, main memory and secondary memory. The memory hierarchy can be implemented using any combination of RAM (e.g., SRAM, DRAM, DDRAM), ROM, FLASH, magnetic and/or optical storage devices, such as disk drives, magnetic tape, CDs (compact disks) and DVDs (digital video discs). 
   The signing device  600  can optionally include one or more control devices  605  (e.g., mouse and keyboard, or keypad, touch sensitive display, etc.) and may optionally include a display device  607  (e.g., CRT, LCD, etc.) for enabling a user to communicate and control various aspects of the signing device architecture  600 . The communications interface  604  can be a port, network interface card, wireless interface card and the like. In some embodiments, the communications interface is a USB or FireWire™ port for connecting directly with a challenging device  102  or indirectly through a network. 
   The computer-readable medium  608  includes an operating system  610  (e.g., Mac O/S, Linux, Windows™, Unix, etc.) having various software components and drivers for controlling and managing various tasks (e.g., memory management, hard disc control, power management, etc.). A network communication module  612  includes software programs and/or protocol stacks for establishing and maintaining communication links with other devices or networks via the communications interface  604 . The computer-readable medium  608  also includes a signature generation module  614 , which includes various software components containing code or instructions for performing or controlling the signature generation process  400  described with respect to  FIG. 4 . For example, the signature generation module  614  includes the initial public point (x 1 ,1)  616 , a random number generator  618 , a curve parameter structure  620 , private key K  622 , and various functions  624  for performing the various computations used in SFEE, including but not limited to unsigned finite field arithmetic. The operations of the various software components of the signature generation module  614  have been previously described with respect to  FIGS. 2 and 4 . Examples of functions  624  for performing various SFEE calculations in the Signature generation process  400  are included in Appendix A. In some embodiments, the random number generator  618  can be implemented completely or partially in hardware, for example, using a set of arithmetic computation circuits (e.g., corresponding to the computational elements  204 ,  206 ,  208 ,  210  shown in  FIG. 2 ) and one or more finite state machines to perform the signature generation process or portions of that process. 
   Curve Parameter Structure 
   In some embodiments, the curve parameter structure  620  is used to define a complete set of curve parameters. Preferably, the curve parameter structure  620  has a total word size less than a single lGiant&#39;s allocation. An example of such a curve parameter structure  620  is as follows: 
   
     
       
         
             
           
             
                 
             
           
          
             
               paramstruct { 
             
          
         
         
             
             
          
             
                word16 s; 
               // Security exponent. 
             
             
                word16 k; 
               // The field prime characteristic is p := w s  − k, 
             
             
                 
               with k ε [0,w −1]. 
             
             
                 
             
             
                1Giant j; 
               // The curve order is o := w s  − j, 
             
             
                 
               
                 
                   
                     
                       
                         with 
                         ⁢ 
                         
                             
                         
                         ⁢ 
                         j 
                       
                       → 
                       
                         count 
                         &lt; 
                         
                           1 
                           + 
                           
                             
                               s 
                               2 
                             
                             . 
                           
                         
                       
                     
                   
                 
               
             
             
                 
             
             
                word16 x1; 
               //The initial public point is P 1  := (x 1 , 1). 
             
             
                word 16 c; 
               //Montgomery parameter for elliptic curve 
             
             
                 
               y 2  = x 3  + cx 2  + x. 
             
             
               } 
             
             
                 
             
          
         
       
     
   
   Note that the curve parameter structure  620  disclosed above does not explicitly store the field prime characteristic p or the curve order o. Only one lGiant type is used and all other entries are significantly smaller “word16” types. In this embodiment, the “word16” type is an unsigned integer of 16 bits. If desired, once j is known, the lGiant type can be changed to an even smaller type, since j will typically be about one half the size of an lGiant type. Assuming a word size of w=2 16 , a suitable curve parameter structure  620  would be: 
   
     
       
         
             
             
           
             
                 
                 
             
           
          
             
                 
               par → s = 10; //Selected for desired level of security. 
             
             
                 
               par→ k = 57; //Selected so the field prime is p = 2 160  −57 
             
             
                 
               (which is not explicitly stored). 
             
             
                 
               par→ j = 1347399065782960596453580; //Selected so the curve 
             
             
                 
               order is o = 2 160  − j 
             
             
                 
               par→ x1 = 30; //Selected so the public point is P 1  :=(30,1), 
             
             
                 
               with point order dividing o. 
             
             
                 
               par→ c = 4; //Selected to provide extra optimization. 
             
             
                 
                 
             
          
         
       
     
   
   With the above parameter assignments, P 1 =(30, 1) has a point order=curve order=o:=w 10 −j. The curve order o can be factored as: 
   
     
       
         
           
             
               
                 
                   o 
                   = 
                   
                     
                       2 
                       160 
                     
                     - 
                     1347399065782960596453580 
                   
                 
                 , 
               
             
           
           
             
               
                 
                   = 
                   14615016373309029182036834853172172366965336089396 
                 
                 , 
               
             
           
           
             
               
                 = 
                 
                   2 
                   ⋆ 
                   2 
                   ⋆ 
                   3 
                   ⋆ 
                   3 
                   ⋆ 
                   40597267703636192172324541258811589908203780261. 
                 
               
             
           
         
       
     
   
   Thus, the point order of x 1 , which is also the curve order o, is minimally composite. However, security is still afforded because of the large prime factor of the order. It is well-known that signature schemes work when the order is minimally composite. 
     FIG. 7  is a block diagram of one embodiment of a challenging device  700 . The challenging device  700  includes a bus  706  coupled to one or more processors  702 , a communications interface  704 , optional control device(s)  705 , optional display device(s)  707  and one or more computer-readable mediums  708 . All of these components operate as previously described with respect to  FIG. 6 . 
   The computer-readable medium  708  includes an operating system  710  (e.g., Mac O/S, Linux, Windows, Unix, etc.) having various software components and drivers, executable by the processor(s)  702 , for controlling and managing various tasks (e.g., memory management, hard disc control, power management, etc.). The network communication module  712  includes software programs and/or protocol stacks (executable by the processor(s)  702 ) for establishing and maintaining communication links with other devices or a network via the communications interface  704 . The computer-readable medium  708  also includes a signature verification module  714 , which includes various software components containing code or instructions for generating the various steps of the signature verification process  500  described with respect to  FIG. 5 . For example, the signature verification module  714  includes the initial public point (x 1 ,1)  716 , a random number generator  718 , a curve parameter structure  720 , a public key of the signing device (x p , z p ), and various functions  724  for performing the various computations used in SFEE, including but not limited to unsigned finite field arithmetic. The operations of the various software components of the signature verification module  714  have been previously described with respect to  FIGS. 3 and 5 . Examples of functions  724  for performing various SFEE calculations in the signature verification process  500  are included in Appendix A. Note that in some embodiments, the random number generator  718  can be implemented completely or partially in hardware depending upon the platform design. The curve parameter structure  722  operates as previously described with respect to  FIG. 6 . 
   Unsigned Finite Field Arithmetic 
   An advantage of the disclosed embodiments is the use of unsigned finite field arithmetic. Appendix A includes code layouts of examples of functions that can be used in SFEE calculations. These example functions have been specifically designed for small memory environments and minimize the amount of memory allocated to a memory stack. In some embodiments, the amount of storage allocated for the memory stack to perform a signature generation operation does not exceed the amount of storage required to store several lGiant values, one bGiant value and a predetermined number of n-byte length fields per lGiant or bGiant. In some embodiments, the amount of storage allocated for storing temporary values in a memory stack to perform a signature generation operation does not exceed an amount of storage associated with 7 lGiants and 1 bGiant, plus a 2-byte length field. In some embodiments, the amount of storage allocated for storing temporary values in a memory stack to perform a signature verification operation does not exceed an amount of storage associated with 8 lGiants and 1 bGiant, plus a 2-byte length field. In an embodiment in which an lGiant value requires 22 bytes of storage and a bGiant value requires 40 bytes of storage, the stack allocation required to store temporary values while performing a signature generation operation does not exceed 200 bytes, plus a small amount of memory for storing procedure return information. The stack allocation required to perform a signature verification operation does not exceed 230 bytes, plus a small amount of memory for storing procedure return information. 
   In some embodiments, the amount of storage allocated for storing temporary variable to perform a signature generation operation does not exceed an amount of storage associated with 10 lGiants, where the storage associated with an lGiant is the amount of storage required to store the largest value in the finite field of integers in which the signature verification operation is performed. Similarly, in some embodiments, the amount of storage allocated for storing temporary variable to perform a signature verification operation does not exceed an amount of storage associated with 11 lGiants, where the storage associated with an lGiant is the amount of storage required to store the largest value in the finite field of integers in which the signature verification operation is performed. 
   The functions can be implemented in any suitable software language (e.g., “C” code, assembly language, etc.) or hardware (e.g., digital signal processors, ASICs, microprocessors, etc.). The example functions included in Appendix A assume a priori the existence of fundamental giant-integer operations, where each of the example functions listed in Table I below involves either lGiant types, bGiant types, or a combination of both. 
   
     
       
         
             
           
             
               TABLE I 
             
           
          
             
                 
             
             
               Example SFEE Functions 
             
          
         
         
             
             
             
             
          
             
               Function Name 
               Function 
               Inputs 
               Outputs 
             
             
                 
             
             
               iaddg(a, y) 
               non-field addition of 
               word a 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               a word and a giant 
               lGiant y 
             
             
               addg(x, y) 
               non-field addition of 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               two giants 
               lGiant y 
             
             
               mulg(x, y) 
               non-field 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               multiplication of 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               two giants 
             
             
               squareg(y) 
               non-field square of 
               lGiant 
               lGiant 
             
             
                 
               giant. 
             
             
               vecmulg(a, y) 
               non-field vector 
               word a 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               multiplication of 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               giant 
             
             
               gtog(x, y) 
               copying a lGiant to 
               lGiant or 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               a bGiant 
               bGiant or 
               or bGiant 
             
             
                 
                 
               word 
             
             
               itog(a, y) 
               copying a word to a 
               word a 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               giant 
               lGiant y 
             
             
               boolean isZero(y) 
               checking if a giant 
               lGiant y 
               Boolean 
             
             
                 
               is zero 
             
             
               gshiftwordsright(a, y) 
               right-shifting by a 
               word a 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               given word count 
               lGiant y 
             
             
               justg(y) 
               justifying a giant to 
               lGiant y 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               have the correct 
             
             
                 
               word count 
             
             
               fadd(x, y, par) 
               field addition of two 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               giants 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               fneg(y, par) 
               field negation of 
               lGiant y 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               giant 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               fsub(x, y, par) 
               field subtraction of 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               two giants 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               fmul(x, y, par) 
               field multiplication 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               of two giants 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               fsmul(a, y, par) 
               field multiplication 
               word a 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               of a word and giant 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               fsquare(y, par) 
               field square a giant 
               lGiant y 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               feeMod(y, par, mod) 
               fast elliptic 
               word mod 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               encryption modular 
               lGiant y 
             
             
                 
               reduction of giant 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               boolean 
               signature compare 
               lGiant x1 
               Boolean 
             
             
               sigcompare(x1, z1, 
               using giants 
               lGiant z1 
             
             
               x2, z2, x, z, par) 
                 
               lGiant x2 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant z2 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant x 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant z 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               elleven(x1, z1, x2, 
               Montgomery even 
               lGiant x1 
               lGiant x1 
             
             
               z2, par) 
               ladder arithmetic on 
               lGiant z1 
               lGiant z1 
             
             
                 
               giants 
               lGiant x2 
               lGiant x2 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant z2 
               lGiant z2 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
               ellodd(x1, z1, x2, z2, 
               Montgomery odd 
               lGiant x1 
               lGiant x1 
             
             
               x, z, par) 
               ladder arithmetic on 
               lGiant z1 
               lGiant z1 
             
             
                 
               giants 
               lGiant x2 
               lGiant x2 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant z2 
               lGiant z2 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant x 
               lGiant x 
             
             
                 
                 
               lGiant z 
               lGiant z 
             
             
                 
                 
               paramstruct par 
             
             
                 
             
          
         
       
     
   
   Note that the “feemod” function includes the integer “whichmod” for enabling the use of a different modulus in the FEE modular reduction. For this particular embodiment, if whichmod==0, the prime characteristic p is used as the modulus. When whichmod !=0, then the curve order o is used as the modulus. One example of using whichmod !=0 would be for computing the signature component given by
 
 u:= ( K*m+r )mod  o,   (14)
 
where m is a message to be encrypted and K is the public key of the challenging device  102  and not the k parameter in the curve order field prime equation p:=w s −k. This basic signature scheme was described more fully in U.S. Pat. No. 6,285,760.
 
   An advantage of the example functions included in Appendix A and summarized in Table I is the ability to operate in a small memory environment while still maintaining robust security. Specifically, these example functions provide small memory implementations of fast elliptic encryption (FEE) through the use of: 1) Montgomery algebra, 2) compact curve parameter structures, 3) small memory finite field arithmetic, 4) special fast primes, and 5) fast modular arithmetic with respect to either field prime characteristic p or curve order o. In addition to the signature generation and verification processes  400 ,  500 , the functions in Appendix A can be used with any of the FEE techniques described in U.S. Pat. No. 6,285,760, with little or no modifications. 
   SFEE Stack Memory Allocation 
   The example functions included in Appendix A reduce the total number of stack memory allocations during signature signing and verification.  FIGS. 8 and 9  are illustrations of a memory stack operations for the signature generation and verification processes  400 ,  500 , described with respect to  FIGS. 4 and 5 , respectively.  FIG. 8  illustrates that the signature generation process  400  can be implemented by allocating at most 1 temporary bGiant and 7 temporary lGiants on the stack. Assuming an lGiant is 22 bytes and a bGiant is 40 bytes, then the maximum number of bytes allocated to the memory stack for temporary giants is on the order of 200 bytes. Similarly,  FIG. 9  illustrates that the signature verification process  500  can be implemented by allocating at most 1 temporary bGiant and 8 temporary lGiants on the stack. Assuming an lGiant is 22 bytes and a bGiant is 40 bytes, then the maximum number of bytes allocated to the stack for temporary giants is on the order of 226 bytes. Thus, with this particular embodiment, the entire signature generation and verification process will take at most 200 bytes of memory in the signing device and 226 bytes of memory in the challenging device  102 , thus making this embodiment suitable for small memory environments. 
   Note that  FIGS. 8 and 9  are illustrative and do not imply that bGiants are always at the top of the memory stack. Additionally, this embodiment does not use global variables or dynamically allocated memory (e.g., no malloc( ) calls are made). Also, the number of local variables is reduced by sharing temporary storage. 
   The disclosed embodiments are not intended to be exhaustive or limited to the precise forms disclosed. Many modifications and variations to the disclosed embodiments are possible in view of the above teachings. 
   
     
       
         
             
           
             
               APPENDIX A 
             
             
                 
             
             
               Example Functions 
             
             
                 
             
           
          
             
                 
             
          
         
         
             
          
             
               A.   Code Layout For Finite Field Arithmetic 
             
             
               © 2005 Apple Computer. All rights reserved. 
             
             
               fadd(lGiant x, iGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (x + y) mod p. 
             
             
               { 
             
             
               addg(x, y); // An lGiant ((s+1)-words capacity) can absorb any carry. 
             
             
               feeMod(y, par, 0); // Call feeMod with respect to modulus p. 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               fneg(lGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (−y) mod p. 
             
             
               { 
             
             
               if(isZero(y)) return; 
             
             
               fadd(par-&gt;k, y, par); 
             
             
               for(j = 0; j &lt; y-&gt;count; j++) y-&gt;n[j] = (y-&gt;n[j]); // Complement. 
             
             
               for(j = y-&gt;count; j &lt; s; j++) y-&gt;n[j] = 65535; // Complement 0. 
             
             
               y-&gt;count = s; 
             
             
               justg(y); // Justify y to have correct y-&gt;count; 
             
             
               iaddg(1, y); // y := 1 + y. 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               fsub(lGiant x, lGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (y−x) mod p. 
             
             
               { // Assume one lGiant L1. 
             
             
               gtog(x, L1); //L1=x 
             
             
               fneg(L1, par); 
             
             
               fadd(L1, y, par); 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               fmul(lGiant x, lGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (x*y) mod p. 
             
             
               {// Assume bGiant B1. 
             
             
               gtog(y, B1); 
             
             
               mul(x, B1); 
             
             
               feeMod(B1, par, 0); // Call feeMod with respect to modulus p. 
             
             
               gtog(B1, y); 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               fsmul(word16 a, lGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (a*y) mod p, but a is a word. 
             
             
               {// No local giants needed. 
             
             
               vecmulg(a, y); 
             
             
               feeMod(y, par, 0); // Call feeMod with respect to modulus p. 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               fsquare(lGiant y, paramstruct par) 
             
             
               // y := (y*y) mod p. 
             
             
               {// Assume bGiant B1. 
             
             
               gtog(y, B1); 
             
             
               squareg(B1); 
             
             
               feeMod(B1, par, 0); // Call feeMod with respect to modulus p. 
             
             
               gtog(B1, y); 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               B.   Code Layout For FEE Modular Reduction Function 
             
             
               © 2005 Apple Computer. All rights reserved. 
             
             
               feeMod(giant z, paramstruct par, int whichmod) 
             
             
               // z can be any-size giant, yet will get reduced to lGiant size, 
             
             
               // reduced in fact to interval [0, modulus−1] where modulus is given by: 
             
             
               // when whichmod == 0, z := z mod p; 
             
             
               // when whichmod != 0, z := z mod o. 
             
             
               {// Assume lGiant L1. 
             
             
               s = par-&gt;s; 
             
             
               while(z-&gt;count &gt; s) { for(j = 0; j &lt; s; j++) L1-&gt;n[j] = z-&gt;n[j]; 
             
             
               // Copy words. 
             
             
               L1-&gt;count = s; 
             
             
               justg(L1); 
             
             
               gshiftwordsright(s, z); // Right-shift z by s words. 
             
             
               if(whichmod) mulg(par -&gt; j, z); // Mul by giant par -&gt; j. 
             
             
               else vecmulg(par -&gt; k, z); // Mul by single word par -&gt; k. 
             
             
               addg(L1, z); 
             
             
               } //Here, z-&gt;count &lt;= s. 
             
             
               if(z-&gt;count &lt; s) return; 
             
             
               if(z-&gt;n[s−1] &lt; word) return; 
             
             
               // At this juncture, z might be greater than p.. 
             
             
               gtog(z, L1); 
             
             
               if(whichmod) addg(par -&gt; j, z); // Giant add of par -&gt; j. 
             
             
               else iaddg(par -&gt; k, z); // Word add of par -&gt; k. 
             
             
               if(z-&gt;count &gt; s) { --(z-&gt;count); 
             
             
               justg(z); 
             
             
               } else { gtog(L1, z); 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               C.   Code Layout For Signature Comparison Function 
             
             
               © 2005 Apple Computer. All rights reserved. 
             
             
               boolean sigcompare(lGiants x1, z1, x2, z2, x, z, parstruct par) 
             
             
               // Asks whether (x1,z1) ± (x2, z2) = (x,z) on the elliptic curve. 
             
             
               {// Assume local lGiants a1, a2, b1, b2. 
             
             
               // Note that some of the passed lGiants will be modified. 
             
             
               gtog(x1, a1); fmul(x2, a1, par); // a1 := x1 x2 in the field. 
             
             
               gtog(x1, a2); fmul(z2, a2, par); // a2 := x1 z2. 
             
             
               gtog(z1, b1); fmul(z2, b1, par); // b1 = z1 z2. 
             
             
               gtog(z1, b2); fmul(x2, b2, par); // b2 = z1 x2. 
             
             
               gtog(a2, x1); fsub(b2, x1, par); fsquare(x1, par); 
             
             
               fmul(x, x1, par); fmul(x, x1, par); 
             
             
               gtog(a1, x2); fsub(b1, x2, par); fsquare(x2, par); 
             
             
               fmul(z, x2, par); fmul(z, x2, par); 
             
             
               fadd(x2, x1, par); 
             
             
               gtog(a2, x2); fadd(b2, x2, par); 
             
             
               gtog(a1, z1); fadd(b1, z1, par); fmul(z1, x2, par); 
             
             
               itog(par-&gt;c, z1); fmul(a2, z1, par); fmul(b2, z1, par); fadd(z1,z1,par); 
             
             
               fadd(z1, x2, par); fmul(x, x2, par); fmul(z, x2, par); 
             
             
               fadd(x2, x2, par); 
             
             
               fsub(x2, x1, par); 
             
             
               if(isZero(x1)) return “TRUE: signature verified”; 
             
             
               return “FALSE: signature not verified”; 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               D.   Code Layout For Small Memory Elliptic Multiplication 
             
             
               © 2005 Apple Computer. All rights reserved. 
             
             
               elleven(lGiants x1, z1, x2, z2, parstruct par) 
             
             
               // Here equipped with field arithmetic for minimal-memory usage. 
             
             
               {// Assume auxiliary lGiants t1, t2, t3; 
             
             
               gtog(x1, t1); fsquare(t1, par); // t1 := x1*x1. 
             
             
               gtog(z1, t2); fsquare(t2, par); // t2 := z1*z1. 
             
             
               gtog(x1, t3); fmul(z1, t3, par); 
             
             
               gtog(t3, z2); fsmul(par-&gt;c, z2, par); 
             
             
               fadd(t1, z2, par); fadd(t2, z2, par); fmul(t3, z2, par); fsmul(4, z2, par); 
             
             
               gtog(t11, x2); fsub(t2, x2, par); 
             
             
               fsquare(x2, par); 
             
             
               } 
             
             
               ellodd(lGiants x1, z1, x2, z2, x, z, parstruct par) 
             
             
               // Here equipped with field arithmetic for minimal-memory usage. 
             
             
               {// Assume auxiliary lGiants t1, t2; 
             
             
               gtog(x1, t1); fmul(x2, t1, par); 
             
             
               gtog(z1, t2); fmul(z2, t2, par); 
             
             
               fsub(t2,t1, par); 
             
             
               gtog(z1, t2); fmul(x2, t2); 
             
             
               gtog(t1, x2); fsquare(x2, par); 
             
             
               fmul(x1, z2); fsub(t2, z2, par); fsquare(z2, par); 
             
             
               fmul(x, z2, par); 
             
             
               fmul(z, x2, par); 
             
             
               }

Metadata:
Filing Date: 20090116
Publication Date: 20100119
Grant Date: 20100119
Priority Date: 20050107
Inventors: CRANDALL RICHARD E.
MITCHELL DOUGLAS P.
Assignee: APPLE INC
CPC Classifications: [{"code": "H04L9/3271", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3073", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3247", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3247", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L2209/80", "inventive": false, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3271", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3073", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L2209/80", "inventive": false, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}]
Family ID: 36758063