PATENT DOCUMENT

Publication Number: US-11516003-B2
Application Number: US-202117211749-A
Country: US
Kind Code: B2

Title: Electronic subscriber identity module transfer credential wrapping

Abstract:
Embodiments described herein relate to credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMs (eSIMs) between wireless devices. Transfer of an eSIM from a source device to a target device includes re-encryption of sensitive eSIM data, e.g., eSIM encryption keys, financial transaction credentials, transit authority credentials, and the like, using new encryption keys that include ephemeral elements applicable to a single, particular transfer session between the source device and the target device. The sensitive eSIM data encrypted with a symmetric key (Ks) is re-wrapped with a new header that includes a version of Ks encrypted with a new key encryption key (KEK) and information to derive KEK by the target device. The re-encrypted sensitive SIM data is formatted with additional eSIM data into a new bound profile package (BPP) to transfer the eSIM from the source device to the target device.

Claims:
What is claimed is: 
     
       1. A source device configured for transfer of an electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) profile with credential rewrapping to a target device, the source device comprising:
 one or more antennas; 
 a storage element; 
 an embedded universal integrated circuity card (eUICC); and 
 at least one processor communicatively coupled to a memory storing instructions that when executed by the at least one processor cause the eUICC of the source device to perform actions including:
 obtaining, from the storage element and previously extracted from a bound profile package (BPP), i) an encrypted symmetric key (K s ) encrypted with a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ), and ii) K s  encrypted eSIM data; 
 establishing an eSIM transfer session with an eUICC of the target device; 
 deriving an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) for transfer of the eSIM profile, wherein ePK source  comprises a source device public key and eSK source  comprises a source device private key; 
 exchanging ephemeral public keys (ePK source , ePK target ) with the eUICC of the target device, wherein ePK target  comprises a target device public key; 
 deriving a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) based on the target device public key ePK target  and the source device private key eSK source ; 
 decrypting the encrypted symmetric key K s  with KEK 1  and generating a re-encrypted symmetric key K s  by re-encrypting K s  with KEK 2 ; 
 formatting a new BPP based at least in part on: i) the K s  encrypted eSIM data, and ii) the re-encrypted symmetric key K s ; and 
 sending the new BPP to the target device to transfer the eSIM profile from the eUICC of the source device to the eUICC of the target device. 
 
 
     
     
       2. The source device of  claim 1 , wherein the actions performed by the eUICC of the source device further include:
 receiving the BPP from a provisioning server; 
 extracting the encrypted symmetric key K s  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data from the BPP; and 
 storing the encrypted symmetric key K s  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data in the storage element. 
 
     
     
       3. The source device of  claim 2 , wherein the BPP received from the provisioning server includes information in a header of the BPP with which to derive KEK 1 . 
     
     
       4. The source device of  claim 2 , wherein the BPP received from the provisioning server includes:
 the eSIM profile in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format; and 
 the K s  encrypted eSIM data comprises K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data. 
 
     
     
       5. The source device of  claim 1 , wherein the new BPP provided to the eUICC of the target device includes information in a header of the new BPP with which to derive KEK 2 . 
     
     
       6. The source device of  claim 1 , wherein the new BPP provided to the eUICC of the target device includes the eSIM profile in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format. 
     
     
       7. The source device of  claim 1 , wherein the actions performed by the eUICC of the source device further include:
 generating the eSIM profile to include in the new BPP based at least in part on an installed eSIM profile on the eUICC of the source device. 
 
     
     
       8. The source device of  claim 7 , wherein the installed eSIM profile includes one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates received from a mobile network operator (MNO) associated with the eSIM profile. 
     
     
       9. The source device of  claim 7 , wherein the installed eSIM profile includes one or more user customizations applied after initial installation on the eUICC of the source device of an initial eSIM profile extracted from the BPP. 
     
     
       10. The source device of  claim 1 , wherein the new BPP includes K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data. 
     
     
       11. The source device of  claim 10 , wherein:
 the new BPP further includes eSIM supplemental data encrypted with K s  or with a second encryption key known to or provided to the eUICC of the target device, and 
 the eSIM supplemental data includes information for updating sensitive data in the eSIM algorithm data. 
 
     
     
       12. The source device of  claim 11 , wherein the eSIM supplemental data further includes sensitive data for one or more applets associated with the eSIM profile. 
     
     
       13. An embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) configured for electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) profile transfer with credential rewrapping from a source device to a target device, the eUICC comprising:
 at least one processor communicatively coupled to a memory storing instructions that when executed by the at least one processor cause the eUICC of the source device to perform actions including:
 obtaining, from a storage element and previously extracted from a bound profile package (BPP), i) an encrypted symmetric key (K s ) encrypted with a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ), and ii) K s  encrypted eSIM data; 
 establishing an eSIM transfer session with an eUICC of the target device; 
 deriving an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) for transfer of the eSIM profile, wherein ePK source  comprises a source device public key and eSK source  comprises a source device private key; 
 exchanging ephemeral public keys (ePK source , ePK target ) with the eUICC of the target device, wherein ePK target  comprises a target device public key; 
 deriving a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) based on the target device public key ePK target  and the source device private key eSK source ; 
 decrypting the encrypted symmetric key K s  with KEK 1  and generating a re-encrypted symmetric key K s  by re-encrypting K s  with KEK 2 ; 
 formatting a new BPP based at least in part on: i) the K s  encrypted eSIM data, and ii) the re-encrypted symmetric key K s ; and 
 sending the new BPP to the target device to transfer the eSIM profile from the eUICC of the source device to the eUICC of the target device. 
 
 
     
     
       14. The eUICC of  claim 13 , wherein the actions performed by the eUICC of the source device further include:
 receiving the BPP from a provisioning server; 
 extracting the encrypted K s  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data from the BPP; and 
 storing the encrypted K s  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data in the storage element. 
 
     
     
       15. The eUICC of  claim 14 , wherein the actions performed by the eUICC of the source device further include:
 obtaining from the K s  encrypted eSIM data the eSIM profile; and 
 installing the eSIM profile in a profile issuer security domain (ISD-P) on the eUICC of the source device. 
 
     
     
       16. The eUICC of  claim 14 , wherein the BPP received from the provisioning server includes:
 the eSIM profile in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format; and 
 the K s  encrypted eSIM data comprises K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data. 
 
     
     
       17. The eUICC of  claim 13 , wherein:
 the actions performed by the eUICC of the source device further include generating the eSIM profile to include in the new BPP based at least in part on an installed eSIM profile on the eUICC of the source device. 
 
     
     
       18. The eUICC of  claim 17 , wherein the installed eSIM profile includes one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates received from a mobile network operator (MNO) associated with the eSIM profile. 
     
     
       19. The eUICC of  claim 13 , wherein:
 the new BPP includes eSIM supplemental data encrypted with K s  or with a second encryption key known to or provided to the eUICC of the target device, and 
 the supplemental data includes information for updating sensitive data for one or more applets associated with the eSIM profile. 
 
     
     
       20. A method for electronic subscriber identity module (eSIM) profile transfer with credential rewrapping from a source device to a target device, the method comprising:
 at an embedded universal integrated circuity card (eUICC) of the source device:
 obtaining, from a storage element and previously extracted from a bound profile package (BPP), i) an encrypted symmetric key (K s ) encrypted with a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ), and ii) K s  encrypted eSIM data; 
 establishing an eSIM transfer session with an eUICC of the target device; 
 deriving an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) for transfer of the eSIM profile, wherein ePK source  comprises a source device public key and eSK source  comprises a source device private key; 
 exchanging ephemeral public keys (ePK source , ePK target ) with the eUICC of the target device, wherein ePK target  comprises a target device public key; 
 deriving a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) based on the target device public key ePK target  and the source device private key eSK source ; 
 decrypting the encrypted symmetric key K s  with KEK 1  and generating a re-encrypted symmetric key K s  by re-encrypting K s  with KEK 2 ; 
 formatting a new BPP based at least in part on: i) the K s  encrypted eSIM data, and ii) the re-encrypted symmetric key K s ; and 
 sending the new BPP to the target device to transfer the eSIM profile from the eUICC of the source device to the eUICC of the target device.

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     The present application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 63/004,829, entitled “ELECTRONIC SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY MODULE TRANSFER CREDENTIAL WRAPPING,” filed Apr. 3, 2020, the content of which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety for all purposes. 
    
    
     FIELD 
     The described embodiments relate to wireless communications, including methods and apparatus to support credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMs (eSIMs) between wireless devices. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Newer generation, e.g., fourth generation (4G) and fifth generation (5G), cellular wireless networks that implement one or more 3 rd  Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE), LTE Advanced (LTE-A), and 5G standards are rapidly being developed and deployed by network operators worldwide. The newer cellular wireless networks provide a range of packet-based services. A user of a wireless device can access services offered by a wireless network service provider, also referred to as a mobile network operator (MNO), based on service subscriptions controlled by authentication credentials included in a profile, also referred to as a subscriber identity module (SIM), when included in a removable universal integrated circuit card (UICC), also referred to as a SIM card, or as an electronic SIM (eSIM), when included in an embedded UICC (eUICC) of the wireless device. With a removable UICC and an unlocked wireless device, a user can access different services by replacing the UICC/SIM combination, e.g., by transferring the SIM card from one wireless device to another wireless device. Transfer of the credentials of the SIM card is secure, as the sensitive data remains contained in the secure element of the SIM card. With a configurable eUICC, eSIMs can be downloaded to the eUICC for access to different wireless services. The eSIMs are decrypted and written by an eUICC operating system (OS) into dedicated security domains (protected processing environments) within the eUICC. The eSIM credentials, securely stored in the dedicated security domains, are difficult to access without breaking eUICC security countermeasures. Protection of installed credentials to ensure tamper resistance is a requirement of various eSIM standards. A user can seek to transfer one or more eSIMs between wireless devices, such as when changing between different wireless devices or when purchasing and configuring a new wireless device to replace an older wireless device. There exists a need for mechanisms to ensure secure transfer of one or more eSIMs between wireless devices. 
     SUMMARY 
     This application describes various embodiments that relate to wireless communications, including methods and apparatus to support credential wrapping for secure transfer of electronic SIMS (eSIMs) between wireless devices. Transfer of one or more eSIMs can occur between two devices that are within proximity of each other, e.g., where the devices can connect securely via a local connection, such as via a wireless personal area network (WPAN) connection, via a wireless local area network (WLAN) connection, via a peer-to-peer connection, or the like. Transfer of eSIMs can also occur via an online network-based service, such as via an MNO-managed service or via a third-party service, where the devices need not be in proximity to each other. Transfer of an eSIM from a source device to a target device can be preceded or accompanied by re-encryption of sensitive eSIM data, e.g., eSIM encryption keys, financial transaction credentials, transit authority credentials, and the like, using new encryption keys that include ephemeral elements applicable to a single, particular transfer session between the source device and the target device. The re-encrypted sensitive SIM data can be formatted with additional eSIM data into a new bound profile package (BPP) to transfer the eSIM from the source device to the target device. In some embodiments, eSIM data, as encrypted originally by a network-based provisioning server with a symmetric key (K s ) can be re-wrapped with a new header that includes a version of K s  encrypted with a new key encryption key (KEK) and information to derive KEK by the target device. The new BPP can then be transferred from the eUICC of the source device to the eUICC of the target device for decryption and installation. In some embodiments, a BPP received from the provisioning server by the eUICC of the source device can include eSIM data divided into an eSIM profile in a standards-based readable format and a separate encrypted data block that includes sensitive eSIM data. The eUICC of the source device can re-wrap the eSIM profile and encrypted data with a new header including a newly encrypted K s  (using a new KEK) to form a new BPP to transfer to the eUICC of the target device. In some embodiments, the eSIM profile standards-based format portion is constructed by the eUICC of the source device from an installed eSIM profile, which can include OTA updates and/or user customization that occurred after initial installation. In some embodiments, the new BPP includes multiple data portions that each include separate sensitive data in encrypted format for transfer to the eUICC of the target device. In some embodiments, the one or more of the multiple data portions include updated sensitive data for transfer to the eUICC of the target device. 
     Other aspects and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings which illustrate, by way of example, the principles of the described embodiments. 
     This Summary is provided merely for purposes of summarizing some example embodiments so as to provide a basic understanding of some aspects of the subject matter described herein. Accordingly, it will be appreciated that the above-described features are merely examples and should not be construed to narrow the scope or spirit of the subject matter described herein in any way. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the subject matter described herein will become apparent from the following Detailed Description, Figures, and Claims. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       The disclosure will be readily understood by the following detailed description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein like reference numerals designate like structural elements. 
         FIG. 1  illustrates a block diagram of different components of an exemplary system configured to implement eSIM transfer with credential wrapping, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 2  illustrates a block diagram of a more detailed view of exemplary components of the system of  FIG. 1 , according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 3  illustrates a diagram of an exemplary transfer of cellular service account credentials for access to cellular services from a source device to a target device, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 4  illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary transfer of an eSIM from a network-based provisioning server to a device eUICC, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 5  illustrates a flow chart of an exemplary transfer of an eSIM with credential rewrapping from a source device eUICC to a target device eUICC, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 6  illustrates an example of whole eSIM rewrapping to generate a bound profile package for transfer of an eSIM, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 7  illustrates an example of partial eSIM rewrapping of sensitive data to generate a bound profile package for transfer of an eSIM, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 8  illustrates an example of partial eSIM rewrapping of sensitive data with data updating to generate a bound profile package for transfer of an eSIM, according to some embodiments. 
         FIG. 9  illustrates a block diagram of exemplary elements of a mobile wireless device, according to some embodiments. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
     Representative applications of methods and apparatus according to the present application are described in this section. These examples are being provided solely to add context and aid in the understanding of the described embodiments. It will thus be apparent to one skilled in the art that the described embodiments may be practiced without some or all of these specific details. In other instances, well known process steps have not been described in detail in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the described embodiments. Other applications are possible, such that the following examples should not be taken as limiting. 
     In the following detailed description, references are made to the accompanying drawings, which form a part of the description and in which are shown, by way of illustration, specific embodiments in accordance with the described embodiments. Although these embodiments are described in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the described embodiments, it is understood that these examples are not limiting; such that other embodiments may be used, and changes may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the described embodiments. 
     These and other embodiments are discussed below with reference to  FIGS. 1 through 9 ; however, those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that the detailed description given herein with respect to these figures is for explanatory purposes only and should not be construed as limiting. 
       FIG. 1  illustrates a block diagram of different components of a system  100  that includes i) a mobile wireless device  102 , which can also be referred to as a wireless device, a mobile wireless device, a mobile device, a user equipment (UE), a device, and the like, ii) a group of base stations  112 - 1  to  112 -N that are managed by different Mobile Network Operators (MNOs)  114 , and iii) a set of provisioning servers  116  that are in communication with the MNOs  114 . The mobile wireless device  102  can represent a mobile computing device (e.g., an iPhone®, an iPad®, or an Apple Watch® by Apple®), the base stations  112 - 1  to  112 -N can represent cellular wireless network entities including evolved NodeBs (eNodeBs or eNBs) and/or next generation NodeBs (gNodeBs or gNBs) that are configured to communicate with the mobile wireless device  102 , and the MNOs  114  can represent different wireless service providers that provide specific services (e.g., voice and data) to which the mobile wireless device  102  can subscribe. The mobile wireless device  102  can include processing circuitry, which can include one or more processors  104  and a memory  106 , an embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card (eUICC)  108 , and a baseband component  110 . In some embodiments, the mobile wireless device  102  includes one or more physical UICCs, also referred to as Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards (not shown), in addition to the eUICC  108 . The components of the mobile wireless device  102  work together to enable the mobile wireless device  102  to provide useful features to a user of the mobile wireless device  102 , such as cellular wireless network access, non-cellular wireless network access, localized computing, location-based services, and Internet connectivity. The eUICC  108  can be configured to store multiple electronic SIMs (eSIMs) for accessing services offered by one or more different MNOs  114  via communication through base stations  112 - 1  to  112 -N. To be able to access services provided by the MNOs, an eSIM can be provisioned to the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102 . In some embodiments, the eUICC  108  obtains one or more eSIMs (or updates for one or more eSIMs) from one or more associated provisioning servers  116 . It is noted that provisioning servers  116  can be maintained by a manufacturer of the mobile wireless device  102 , the MNOs  114 , third party entities, and the like. Communication of eSIM data between a provisioning server  116  and the eUICC  108  (or between the provisioning server  116  and processing circuitry of the mobile wireless device  102  external to the eUICC  108 , e.g., the processor  104 ) can use a secure communication channel, and the provisioning server  116  can seek to ensure that the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  is compatible with an eSIM to be downloaded to the mobile wireless device  102 . Additionally, MNOs  114  can require that all or portions of an eSIM be securely stored in dedicated security domains on the eUICC  108  to protect against tampering and/or cloning of sensitive eSIM data. 
       FIG. 2  illustrates a block diagram  200  of a more detailed view of exemplary components of the system  100  of  FIG. 1 . The one or more processors  104 , in conjunction with the memory  106 , can implement a main operating system (OS)  202  that is configured to execute applications  204  (e.g., native OS applications and user applications). The eUICC  108  can be configured to implement an eUICC OS  206  that is configured to manage the hardware resources of the eUICC  108  (e.g., a processor and a memory embedded in the eUICC  108 ). The eUICC OS  206  can also be configured to manage eSIMs  208  that are stored by the eUICC  108 , e.g., by enabling, disabling, modifying, or otherwise performing management of the eSIMs  208  within the eUICC  108  and providing the baseband component  110  with access to the eSIMs  208  to provide access to wireless services for the mobile wireless device  102 . The eUICC OS  206  can include an eSIM manager  210 , which can perform management functions for various eSIMs  208 . Each eSIM  208  can include a number of applets  212  that define the manner in which the eSIM  208  operates. For example, one or more of the applets  212 , when implemented by the baseband component  110  and the eUICC  108 , can be configured to enable the mobile wireless device  102  to communicate with an MNO  114  and provide useful features (e.g., phone calls and internet) to a user of the mobile wireless device  102 . 
     A baseband component  110  of the mobile wireless device  102  can include a baseband OS  214  that is configured to manage hardware resources of the baseband component  110  (e.g., a processor, a memory, different radio components, etc.). According to some embodiments, the baseband component  110  can implement a baseband manager  216  that is configured to interface with the eUICC  108  to establish a secure channel with a provisioning server  116  and obtaining information (such as eSIM data) from the provisioning server  116  for purposes of managing eSIMs  208 . The baseband manager  216  can be configured to implement services  218 , which represents a collection of software modules that are instantiated by way of the various applets  212  of enabled eSIMs  208  that are included in the eUICC  108 . For example, services  218  can be configured to manage different connections between the mobile wireless device  102  and MNOs  114  according to the different eSIMs  208  that are enabled within the eUICC  108 . 
       FIG. 3  illustrates a diagram  300  of an exemplary transfer  320  of cellular service account credentials for access to cellular services from a source device  102 - 1  to a target device  102 - 2 . The source device  102 - 1  and the target device  102 - 2  may be within proximity of each other to establish a direct secure connection between them or may be separated by a distance where transfer occurs via an indirect connection, such as over a wireless local area network (WLAN) and/or via one or more cellular wireless networks  330 . Transfer of credentials that permit access to services of cellular wireless networks  330  can also be referred to as transfer of one or more virtual credentials, such as one or more eSIMs  208 , also referred to as profiles or plans, from the source device  102 - 1  to the target device  102 - 2 . The eSIMs  208  may be initially present on the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1 , and a user may seek to transfer one or more of the eSIMs  208  from the source device  102 - 1  to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 . The eSIMs  208  may be associated with one or more cellular service accounts for one or more cellular service providers, also referred to as mobile network operators (MNOs). Transfer of one or more eSIMs  208  can occur without transferring a UICC  304 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  or replacement of a UICC  304 - 2  of the target device  1 - 202 . As illustrated, the source device  102 - 1  and the target device  102 - 2  can each include one or more processors  104  and wireless circuitry  308  that can be used to communicate with one or more wireless networks  330 . The eSIMs  208  that are transferred can allow the target device  102 - 2  to access cellular services for one or more cellular wireless networks that previously were accessible by the source device  102 - 1 . 
       FIG. 4  illustrates a flow chart  400  of an exemplary transfer of an eSIM  208  from a network-based provisioning server  116  to an eUICC  108  of a mobile wireless device  102 . At  402 , the provisioning server  116  encrypts an eSIM  208  with a symmetric key (K s ). Encryption of the eSIM  208  can be performed by the provisioning server  116  without knowledge of the mobile wireless device  102  or an eUICC  108  thereon to which the eSIM  208  can later be downloaded. This allows for encryption of the eSIM  208  to occur off-line and reduces time for later download of an eSIM  208  to the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102 . At  404 , the provisioning server  116  can determine the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  to which to provision the eSIM  208 . At  406 , the provisioning server  116  can derive a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ) based on a private key of the provisioning server  116  (SK server ) and a public key of the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  (PK eUICC ). For example KEK 1  can be derived based on a key derivation function (KDF) using an Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key-agreement protocol, KEK 1 =KDF(ECDH(PK eUICC , SK server )). In some embodiments, the public and/or private keys are ephemeral keys, e.g., ePK eUICC , eSK server , applicable to a provisioning session for downloading the eSIM  208  from the provisioning server  116  to the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102 . At  408 , the provisioning server  116  encrypts the symmetric key K s  with the generated key encryption key KEK 1 . At  410 , the provisioning server  116  formats an eSIM bound profile package (BPP) that includes the previously K s  encrypted eSIM  208  and the KEK 1  encrypted symmetric key K s . In some embodiments, the KEK 1  encrypted symmetric key K s  is combined with information for deriving KEK 1  in a header that combines with the K s  encrypted eSIM  208  to form the BPP. At  412 , the provisioning server  116  sends the BPP to the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102 . At  414 , the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  receives the BPP from the provisioning server  116 . At  416 , the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  derives KEK 1 , e.g., based on the ECDH KDF using a public key of the provisioning server  116  (PK server ) that corresponds to SK server  and a private key of the eUICC (SK eUICC ) that corresponds to PK eUICC . For example, the eUICC  108  derives KEK 1 =KDF(EDCH(PK server , SK eUICC )). At  418 , the eUICC  108  of the mobile wireless device  102  uses KEK 1  to decrypt K s , and subsequently at  420 , the eUICC  108  uses the decrypted K s  to decrypt the eSIM  208 . At  422 , the eUICC  108  installs the decrypted eSIM data on the eUICC  108 . At  424 , in some embodiments, all or portions of the BPP, e.g., sensitive eSIM data, are installed in one or more dedicated security domains within the eUICC  108 , e.g., within a profile issuer security domain (ISD-P) for the MNO associated with the eSIM  208 , and are inaccessible to the eUICC OS  206  of the eUICC  108  to protect the sensitive eSIM data from tampering. In some embodiments, less sensitive eSIM data and/or encrypted sensitive eSIM data are stored in a security domain associated with the eUICC OS  206 , e.g., within a root issuer security domain (ISD-R), and are accessible to the eUICC OS  206  of the eUICC  108 . In some embodiments, KEK 1  is stored securely on the eUICC  108 , e.g., within an ISD-P. In some embodiments, the BPP or portions thereof are stored securely on the eUICC  108 , e.g., within an ISD-P. 
       FIG. 5  illustrates a flow chart  500  of an exemplary transfer of an eSIM  208  with credential rewrapping from an eUICC  108 - 1  of a source device  102 - 1  to an eUICC  108 - 2  of a target device  102 - 2 . At  502 / 520 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  or the target device eUICC  108 - 2  initiates an eSIM transfer session for secure transfer of an eSIM  208  (or multiple eSIMs  208 ) from the source device eUICC  108 - 1  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . At  504 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  derives an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) to use for secure transfer of the eSIM(s)  208  during the eSIM transfer session. Similarly, at  524 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  derives an ephemeral key pair (ePK target , eSK target ) to use for secure transfer of the eSIM(s)  208  during the eSIM transfer session. At  506 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  provides the ephemeral public key ePK source  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 , while at  526 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  provides the ephemeral public key ePK target  to the source device eUICC  108 - 1 . After exchanging ephemeral public keys with the target device eUICC  108 - 2 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , at  508 , derives a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) with which to encrypt a symmetric key K s  for transfer of the eSIM  208  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . For example, KEK 2  can be generated by the source device eUICC  108 - 1  using an ECDH KDF and the ephemeral keys, such as KEK 2 =KDF(EDCH(ePK target , eSK source )). At  510 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  obtains a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ) and a stored eSIM BPP that includes a symmetric key K s  encrypted with KEK 1 . The stored eSIM BPP also includes eSIM data encrypted with K s . KEK 1  and the eSIM BPP can have been previously stored securely on the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , e.g., in an ISD-P for an MNO associated with the eSIM  208  to be transferred. At  512 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  decrypts the encrypted symmetric key K s  using the first key encryption key KEK 1 , and at  514 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  re-encrypts the decrypted symmetric key K s  with the second key encryption key KEK 2 . At  516 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  formats a new eSIM BPP including the eSIM data (encrypted with K s ) with the re-encrypted symmetric key K s  (encrypted with KEK 2 ). At  518 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  sends the new eSIM BPP to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 , which receives the new eSIM BPP at  528 . At  530 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  derives the second key encryption key KEK 2  using an ECDH KDF and the ephemeral keys, e.g., KEK 2 =KDF(EDCH(ePK source , eSK target )). At  532 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  uses KEK 2  to decrypt the symmetric key K s , and subsequently, at  534 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  uses K s  to decrypt the eSIM. At  536 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  installs the decrypted eSIM in a dedicated security domain, e.g., in an ISD-P, on the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . At  538 , the target device eUICC  108 - 2  securely stores the second key encryption key KEK 2  and the received eSIM package on the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . The stored KEK 2  and eSIM package can be later used to transfer the eSIM to an eUICC  108  of another mobile wireless device  102 . 
       FIG. 6  illustrates a diagram  600  of an example of whole eSIM rewrapping to generate a new bound profile package (BPP) for transfer of an eSIM  208  from a source device eUICC  108 - 1  to a target device eUICC  108 - 2 . A BPP  602 , received previously by the source device eUICC  108 - 1  from a provisioning server  116  and stored by the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , includes a BPP header  604 , which includes information from which the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can derive a first key encryption key KEK 1 , and a symmetric key K s    606  encrypted with KEK 1 . The BPP header  604  and encrypted symmetric key K s    606  is bundled with eSIM data  608  encrypted with the symmetric key K s . Upon installation of the eSIM  208  obtained from the BPP  602 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can store the first key encryption key KEK 1  securely within a dedicated security domain of the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , e.g., within a profile issuer security domain (ISD-P) associated with the installed eSIM  208 . For transfer (export) of the eSIM  208  to another mobile wireless device  102 , e.g., to a target device eUICC  108 - 2 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can establish an eSIM transfer session with the target device eUICC  108 - 2  and exchange ephemeral keys, e.g., ePK source  and ePK target  as described with regards to the flow chart illustrated in  FIG. 5 . The source device eUICC  108 - 1  can generate a second key encryption key KEK 2 , e.g., using an ECDH KDF function KEK 2 =KDF(ECDH(ePK target , eSK source )), and re-encrypt the symmetric key K s  (decrypted with KEK 1 ) using KEK 2 . The source device eUICC  108 - 1  can then generate a new header  610  including information with which the target device eUICC  108 - 2  can derive the second key encryption key KEK 2 . The new header  610  and the re-encrypted symmetric key K s    612  can be bundled with the symmetric key K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  to form a new BPP  614  to transfer the eSIM to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . The target device eUICC  108 - 2  can derive the same second key encryption key KEK 2  using information from the BPP header  610 , e.g., using the ECDH KDF function KEK 2 =KDF(ECDH(eSK target , ePK source )). Because the K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  remains encrypted (and thus secure) while stored by the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , the eSIM data  608  can be stored on the source device eUICC  108 - 1  outside of the dedicated security domain (e.g., outside of ISD-P associated with the eSIM  208 , such as in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or external to the source device eUICC  108 - 1  (on memory of the mobile wireless device  102 ) depending on storage requirements for the encrypted eSIM data  608  and on availability of non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM) storage on the source device eUICC  108 - 1 . If stored external to source device eUICC  108 - 1 , a device/eUICC command can be used to reload the encrypted eSIM data  608  to the source device eUICC  108 - 1  to process for rewrapping on the source device eUICC  108 - 1  and for subsequent transfer of the eSIM  208  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . The rewrapped BPP  614  can be sent securely by the source device eUICC  108 - 1  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2  for installation on the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . 
       FIG. 7  illustrates a diagram  700  of an example of partial eSIM (sensitive data) rewrapping to generate a new bound profile package (BPP)  714  for transfer of an eSIM  208  from a source device eUICC  108 - 1  to a target device eUICC  108 - 2 . A BPP  702 , received previously from a provisioning server  116  by the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , can include a BPP header  604  with information to derive a first key encryption key KEK 1  and a symmetric key K s    606  encrypted with KEK 1 . The BPP  702  can also include eSIM data divided into two (as shown) or more (not shown) portions, such as an eSIM profile  704  in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format, and separate eSIM algorithm data  706  encrypted with the symmetric key K s . In some embodiments, the BPP  702  includes multiple distinct eSIM data portions, each encrypted with the same symmetric key K s  or with distinct symmetric keys. The eSIM profile  704  (along with sensitive data extracted from a decrypted version of the eSIM algorithm data  706 ) can be installed on the source device eUICC  108 - 1  within a dedicated security domain for the eSIM  208 , e.g., within an ISD-P, while the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  can be stored at the source device eUICC  108 - 1  (e.g., inside or outside the ISD-P containing the installed eSIM  208 , e.g., in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or in some embodiments on a memory of the mobile wireless device  102  external to the source device eUICC  108 - 1 . Upon installation of the eSIM  208  from the BPP  602 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can also store the first key encryption key KEK 1  securely within the dedicated security domain of the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , e.g., within the ISD-P associated with the installed eSIM  208 , to use for later transfer of the eSIM  208  to another mobile wireless device  102 . For transfer (export) of the eSIM  208  to another mobile wireless device  102 , e.g., to a target device eUICC  108 - 2 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can establish an eSIM transfer session with the target device eUICC  108 - 2 , exchange ephemeral keys, derive a second key encryption key KEK 2 , re-encrypt the symmetric key K s  with KEK 2 , and generate the new BPP header  610  as described previously for  FIGS. 5 and 6 . With partial eSIM rewrapping, however, an up-to-date eSIM profile  710  in an SMA ASN.1 format can be generated by the source device eUICC  108 - 1  based on the installed eSIM profile  708 , which can include over-the-air (OTA) updates from an MNO  114  associated with the eSIM  208  and/or user customizations that occurred after initial installation of the eSIM profile  708 . The source device eUICC  108 - 1  can combine the newly generated eSIM profile  710  with the previously stored K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  and append the BPP header  610  (with information for derivation of KEK 2 ) and the KEK 2  encrypted symmetric key K s  to form a new BPP  714  to send to the target device eUICC  108 - 2  to transfer the eSIM  208 . In some embodiments, additional sensitive data associated with the eSIM  208  can be encrypted with the symmetric key K s  (or with another encryption key that is known or provided directly/indirectly to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 ) and formatted into K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  for transfer within the BPP  714  from the source device eUICC  108 - 1  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . In some embodiments, the K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  includes information for updating eSIM sensitive data in the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706 . In some embodiments, the K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  includes sensitive data for applets associated with the eSIM  208 . For example, some applets  212  of the eSIM  208  can store sensitive data that requires encryption protection for transfer between the source device eUICC  108 - 1  and the target device eUICC  108 - 2 , such as financial transaction information, credit/debit card data, transit authority credentials, etc. In some embodiments, an owner of the eSIM  208 , e.g., an MNO  114  associated with the eSIM  208 , can designate which information to protect for transfer and therefore can be included in the K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712 . In some embodiments, an indication of which information to protect can be included in and/or accompany the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  and K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  received from the provisioning server  116 . 
       FIG. 8  illustrates a diagram  800  of an example of partial eSIM rewrapping of sensitive data with data updating to generate a new bound profile package (BPP)  814  for transfer of an eSIM  208 . A BPP  702 , received previously from a provisioning server  116  by the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , can include a BPP header  604  with information to derive a first key encryption key KEK 1  and a symmetric key K s    606  encrypted with KEK 1 . The BPP  702  can also include eSIM data divided into two (as shown) or more (not shown) portions, such as an eSIM profile  704  in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format, and separate eSIM algorithm data  706  encrypted with the symmetric key K s . In some embodiments, the BPP  702  includes multiple distinct eSIM data portions, each encrypted with the same symmetric key K s  or with distinct symmetric keys. The eSIM profile  704  (along with sensitive data extracted from a decrypted version of the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706 ) can be installed on the source device eUICC  108 - 1  within a dedicated security domain for the eSIM  208 , e.g., within an ISD-P, while the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  can be stored at the source device eUICC  108 - 1  (e.g., inside or outside the ISD-P containing the installed eSIM  208 , e.g., in a root issuer security domain ISD-R) or in some embodiments on a memory of the mobile wireless device  102  external to the source device eUICC  108 - 1 . Upon installation of the eSIM  208  from the BPP  602 , the source device eUICC  108 - 1  can also store the first key encryption key KEK 1  securely within the dedicated security domain of the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , e.g., within the ISD-P associated with the installed eSIM  208 , to use for later transfer of the eSIM  208  to another mobile wireless device  102 . In some embodiments, the installed eSIM profile  708  can be updated, e.g., based on MNO OTA updates and/or user customizations, to produce an updated installed eSIM profile  808 . In some embodiments, the K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  can be updated (within a secure protected environment of the source device eUICC  108 - 1 , such as in the ISD-P) and re-encrypted with K s  and stored as K s  encrypted updated algorithm data  806  (which can be stored inside or outside the ISD-P). Updating of the eSIM profile and the eSIM algorithm data can occur independently, e.g., one or both may be updated prior to re-wrapping for transfer of the eSIM  208  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . In some embodiments, the BPP  702  includes multiple encrypted data portions, each which can be updated separately. In some embodiments, the source device eUICC  108 - 1  forms eSIM supplemental data  712  encrypted with K s  (or another key) to include with the BPP  714  for transfer of the eSIM  208  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . The K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  can be based on additional eSIM data included with the original BPP  702  (not shown) or based on additional information provided to the source device eUICC  108 - 1  after initial installation of the eSIM  208 . The K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712  can include sensitive data information for one or more applets of the eSIM  208 , such as financial transaction data, credit/debit card data, transit authority credentials, or the like. The source device eUICC  108 - 1  forms the new BPP  814  to include the updated eSIM profile  810  (e.g., in SIMalliance ASN.1 format), the K s  encrypted updated eSIM algorithm data  806 , the BPP header  610 , the KEK 2  encrypted symmetric key K s    612 , and optionally the K s  encrypted eSIM supplemental data  712 . The new BPP  814  can be sent by the source device eUICC  108 - 1  to the target device eUICC  108 - 2  to transfer the eSIM  208  for subsequent installation on the target device eUICC  108 - 2 . 
     Representative Embodiments 
     A source device  102 - 1  can be configured for transfer of an eSIM profile  208  with credential rewrapping to a target device  102 - 2 . The source device  102 - 1  can include at least: one or more antennas, a storage element, an eUICC  108 - 1 , and at least one processor  104  communicatively coupled to a memory storing instructions that when executed by the at least one processor cause the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  to perform actions including: i) obtaining, from the storage element and previously extracted from a bound profile package (BPP)  602  (or  702 ), a) an encrypted symmetric key (K s )  606  encrypted with a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ), and b) K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ); ii) establishing an eSIM transfer session with an eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 ; iii) deriving an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) for transfer of the eSIM profile  208 ; iv) exchanging ephemeral public keys (ePK source , ePK target ) with the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 ; v) deriving a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) based on the target device  102 - 2  ephemeral public key ePK target  and the source device  102 - 1  private key eSK source ; vi) decrypting the encrypted symmetric key K s  with KEK 1  and generating a re-encrypted symmetric key K s  by re-encrypting K s  with KEK 2 ; vii) formatting a new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) based at least in part on: a) the K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ), and b) the re-encrypted symmetric key K s    612 ; and viii) sending the new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) to the target device  102 - 2  to transfer the eSIM profile  208  from the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  120 - 2 . 
     In some embodiments, the actions performed by the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  further include: receiving the BPP  602  (or  702 ) from a provisioning server  116 ; extracting the encrypted symmetric key K s    606  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ); and storing the encrypted symmetric key K s    606  and the K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ) in the storage element. In some embodiment, the BPP  602  (or  702 ) received from the provisioning server  116  includes information in a header  604  of the BPP  602  (or  702 ) with which to derive KEK 1 . In some embodiments, the BPP  702  received from the provisioning server  116  includes: i) the eSIM profile  704  in a SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format, and ii) the K s  encrypted eSIM data includes K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706 . In some embodiments, the new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) provided to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2  includes information in a header  610  of the new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) with which to derive KEK 2 . In some embodiments, the new BPP  714  (or  814 ) provided to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2  includes the eSIM profile  710  (or  810 ) in the SIMalliance (SMA) Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) format. In some embodiments, the actions performed by the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  further include generating the eSIM profile  710  (or  810 ) to include in the new BPP  714  (or  814 ) based at least in part on an installed eSIM profile  708  (or  808 ) on the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1 . In some embodiments, the installed eSIM profile  808  includes one or more over-the-air (OTA) updates received from a mobile network operator (MNO)  114  associated with the eSIM profile  208  (or  808 ). In some embodiments, the installed eSIM profile  708  (or  808 ) includes one or more user customizations applied after initial installation on the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  of an initial eSIM profile  704  extracted from the BPP  714  (or  814 ). In some embodiments, the new BPP  714  (or  814 ) includes K s  encrypted eSIM algorithm data  706  (or  806 ). In some embodiments, the new BPP  714  (or  814 ) further includes eSIM supplemental data  712  encrypted with K s  or with a second encryption key known to or provided to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 . In some embodiments, the eSIM supplemental data  712  includes information for updating sensitive data in the eSIM algorithm data  706  (or  806 ). In some embodiments, the eSIM supplemental data  712  further includes sensitive data for one or more applets  212  associated with the eSIM profile  208  (or  808 ). 
     In some embodiments, an eUICC  108 - 1  is configured for eSIM profile  208  transfer with credential rewrapping from a source device  102 - 1  to a target device  102 - 2  and includes at least one processor communicatively coupled to a memory storing instructions that when executed by the at least one processor cause the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  to perform actions as described herein. 
     In some embodiments, an eUICC  108 - 2  is configured for eSIM profile  208  transfer with credential rewrapping from a source device  102 - 1  to a target device  102 - 2  and includes at least one processor communicatively coupled to a memory storing instructions that when executed by the at least one processor cause the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2  to perform actions as described herein. 
     In some embodiments, a method for eSIM profile  208  transfer with credential rewrapping from a source device  102 - 1  to a target device  102 - 2  includes an eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1 : i) obtaining, from the storage element and previously extracted from a bound profile package (BPP)  602  (or  702 ), a) an encrypted symmetric key (K s )  606  encrypted with a first key encryption key (KEK 1 ), and b) K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ); ii) establishing an eSIM transfer session with an eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 ; iii) deriving an ephemeral key pair (ePK source , eSK source ) for transfer of the eSIM profile  208 ; iv) exchanging ephemeral public keys (ePK source , ePK target ) with the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  102 - 2 ; v) deriving a second key encryption key (KEK 2 ) based on the target device  102 - 2  ephemeral public key ePK target  and the source device  102 - 1  private key eSK source ; vi) decrypting the encrypted symmetric key K s  with KEK 1  and generating a re-encrypted symmetric key K s  by re-encrypting K s  with KEK 2 ; vii) formatting a new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) based at least in part on: a) the K s  encrypted eSIM data  608  (or  706 ), and b) the re-encrypted symmetric key K s    612 ; and viii) sending the new BPP  614  (or  714  or  814 ) to the target device  102 - 2  to transfer the eSIM profile  208  from the eUICC  108 - 1  of the source device  102 - 1  to the eUICC  108 - 2  of the target device  120 - 2 . 
     Representative Exemplary Apparatus 
       FIG. 9  illustrates in block diagram format an exemplary computing device  900  that can be used to implement the various components and techniques described herein, according to some embodiments. In particular, the detailed view of the exemplary computing device  900  illustrates various components that can be included in the source device  102 - 1  and/or the target device  102 - 2 . As shown in  FIG. 9 , the computing device  900  can include one or more processors  902  that represent microprocessors or controllers for controlling the overall operation of computing device  900 . In some embodiments, the computing device  900  can also include a user input device  908  that allows a user of the computing device  900  to interact with the computing device  900 . For example, in some embodiments, the user input device  908  can take a variety of forms, such as a button, keypad, dial, touch screen, audio input interface, visual/image capture input interface, input in the form of sensor data, etc. In some embodiments, the computing device  900  can include a display  910  (screen display) that can be controlled by the processor(s)  902  to display information to the user (for example, information relating to incoming, outgoing, or active communication sessions). A data bus  916  can facilitate data transfer between at least a storage device  940 , the processor(s)  902 , and a controller  913 . The controller  913  can be used to interface with and control different equipment through an equipment control bus  914 . The computing device  900  can also include a network/bus interface  911  that couples to a data link  912 . In the case of a wireless connection, the network/bus interface  911  can include wireless circuitry, such as a wireless transceiver and/or baseband processor. The computing device  900  can also include a secure element  924 . The secure element  924  can include an eUICC  108 . 
     The computing device  900  also includes a storage device  940 , which can include a single storage or a plurality of storages (e.g., hard drives), and includes a storage management module that manages one or more partitions within the storage device  940 . In some embodiments, storage device  940  can include flash memory, semiconductor (solid state) memory or the like. The computing device  900  can also include a Random-Access Memory (RAM)  920  and a Read-Only Memory (ROM)  922 . The ROM  922  can store programs, utilities or processes to be executed in a non-volatile manner. The RAM  920  can provide volatile data storage, and stores instructions related to the operation of the computing device  900 . 
     Wireless Terminology 
     In accordance with various embodiments described herein, the terms “wireless communication device,” “wireless device,” “mobile device,” “mobile station,” and “user equipment” (UE) may be used interchangeably herein to describe one or more common consumer electronic devices that may be capable of performing procedures associated with various embodiments of the disclosure. In accordance with various implementations, any one of these consumer electronic devices may relate to: a cellular phone or a smart phone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a personal computer, a netbook computer, a media player device, an electronic book device, a MiFi® device, a wearable computing device, as well as any other type of electronic computing device having wireless communication capability that can include communication via one or more wireless communication protocols such as used for communication on: a wireless wide area network (WWAN), a wireless metro area network (WMAN) a wireless local area network (WLAN), a wireless personal area network (WPAN), a near field communication (NFC), a cellular wireless network, a fourth generation (4G) LTE, LTE Advanced (LTE-A), and/or 5G or other present or future developed advanced cellular wireless networks. 
     The wireless communication device, in some embodiments, can also operate as part of a wireless communication system, which can include a set of client devices, which can also be referred to as stations, client wireless devices, or client wireless communication devices, interconnected to an access point (AP), e.g., as part of a WLAN, and/or to each other, e.g., as part of a WPAN and/or an “ad hoc” wireless network. In some embodiments, the client device can be any wireless communication device that is capable of communicating via a WLAN technology, e.g., in accordance with a wireless local area network communication protocol. In some embodiments, the WLAN technology can include a Wi-Fi (or more generically a WLAN) wireless communication subsystem or radio, the Wi-Fi radio can implement an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 technology, such as one or more of: IEEE 802.11a; IEEE 802.11b; IEEE 802.11g; IEEE 802.11-2007; IEEE 802.11n; IEEE 802.11-2012; IEEE 802.11ac; or other present or future developed IEEE 802.11 technologies. 
     Additionally, it should be understood that the UEs described herein may be configured as multi-mode wireless communication devices that are also capable of communicating via different third generation (3G) and/or second generation (2G) RATs. In these scenarios, a multi-mode user equipment (UE) can be configured to prefer attachment to LTE networks offering faster data rate throughput, as compared to other 3G legacy networks offering lower data rate throughputs. For instance, in some implementations, a multi-mode UE may be configured to fall back to a 3G legacy network, e.g., an Evolved High Speed Packet Access (HSPA+) network or a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 2000 Evolution-Data Only (EV-DO) network, when LTE and LTE-A networks are otherwise unavailable. 
     It is well understood that the use of personally identifiable information should follow privacy policies and practices that are generally recognized as meeting or exceeding industry or governmental requirements for maintaining the privacy of users. In particular, personally identifiable information data should be managed and handled so as to minimize risks of unintentional or unauthorized access or use, and the nature of authorized use should be clearly indicated to users. 
     The various aspects, embodiments, implementations or features of the described embodiments can be used separately or in any combination. Various aspects of the described embodiments can be implemented by software, hardware or a combination of hardware and software. The described embodiments can also be embodied as computer readable code on a non-transitory computer readable medium. The non-transitory computer readable medium is any data storage device that can store data which can thereafter be read by a computer system. Examples of the non-transitory computer readable medium include read-only memory, random-access memory, CD-ROMs, HDDs, DVDs, magnetic tape, and optical data storage devices. The non-transitory computer readable medium can also be distributed over network-coupled computer systems so that the computer readable code is stored and executed in a distributed fashion. 
     The foregoing description, for purposes of explanation, used specific nomenclature to provide a thorough understanding of the described embodiments. However, it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that the specific details are not required in order to practice the described embodiments. Thus, the foregoing descriptions of specific embodiments are presented for purposes of illustration and description. They are not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the described embodiments to the precise forms disclosed. It will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art that many modifications and variations are possible in view of the above teachings.

Metadata:
Filing Date: 20210324
Publication Date: 20221129
Grant Date: 20221129
Priority Date: 20200403
Inventors: YANG, XIANGYING
PADOVA, JEAN-MARC
Assignee: APPLE INC
CPC Classifications: [{"code": "H04L9/0822", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/14", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/43", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/088", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3073", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0822", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/03", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/037", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L2209/80", "inventive": false, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W8/205", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0861", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W8/183", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0894", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/72", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0877", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0822", "inventive": true, "first": true, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/72", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/037", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/0894", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04L9/3073", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/35", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/48", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/72", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}, {"code": "H04W12/02", "inventive": true, "first": false, "tree": "[]"}]
Family ID: 77922473