( i ) By pursuing the development of a State-level safeguards approach based on a comprehensive understanding of the activities and technologies implemented in States ; by pursuing the implementation of integrated safeguards , internal pooling of the information available to the Agency , and conducting on-site control activities on the basis of the broadest possible analysis of all available information ( information-driven safeguards ) ; ( ii ) By enforcing strictly the obligation resting on States to provide information and clarifications to the Agency , including , in particular , the provision of design information on nuclear facilities as soon as a decision is taken to build or authorize construction or to modify a facility , as well as the Agency 's standing right to verify the design information over the life of a facility , including decommissioning , as provided for by revised code 3.1 of the general part of the subsidiary arrangement to the model comprehensive safeguards agreement ; ( iii ) By expanding the use of modern technologies for measurement and remote monitoring , continuous monitoring , and measures to detect undeclared activities , and by relying more broadly on information from and cooperation with strong independent national or regional safeguards systems , such as the European Atomic Energy Community ( EURATOM ) ; ( iv ) By granting States assurances , as and where necessary and legitimate , that their confidential information will remain protected when IAEA fulfils its verification mission under comprehensive safeguards agreements in facilities that are described as defence-related ;