So we're going to let this run and I'll speed this up.


How do you Create a Quantum Resistant Wallet? Full QRL Wallet Walkthrough

So now that we've gone over how to create wallets in two different manners strike.


It would be a good idea I think now to send a few transactions back in four if it would be cool with you if we'd ping back and forth some transactions.


Can you want to open up your wallet and check make sure you got some quantum.


Yeah, let's do that.


All right, so I'll share my screen here.


There we go.


And I'm opening my ledger nano and typing in the pin.


Which we just went over.


Okay.


Reading from ledger device.


It's also worth noting if you are using a ledger nano right now.


You'll need to run the local wallet from the website rather than the web wallet.


So I installed this in the download section.


So here is the, as you can see, the wallet opened right up off the ledger nano.


And that's it.


The private keys are stored on here.


It communicates that through a USB API with the browser.


It's great in order to send back and forth that you don't have any you have any quantity.


You don't have any.


No, this is a new account.


Okay, I hear if you say quanta three times that might work with getting a few.


We can try it out.


Let's go.


Quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, quanta, don't they?


Is that Jack?


Jack is that you heard somebody needs quanta.


I don't know why I keep out of hearing in these things.


Hey, Jack. Hey, we can use a help.


We can use smell.


Yeah, it's a good time.


We're live on a YouTube video.


So we want to, we'd like to send some transactions back and forth if you could drop a sum.


Okay, Michael, your address ends in eight F, right?


Yep.


Okay.


There's a hundred quanta being sent your way and Ryan, your address ends in 18.


Okay, it's a hundred quanta.


I think your way as well should arrive within, you know, five minutes.


The block time is a minute.


All right.


Sounds good.


Awesome.


Is that your lifesaver?


Appreciate it.


So let's do a simple transfer here.


Looks like Jack, our savior is his 100 quanta.


Show it up.


So this is as easy as it gets.


We're just, I'm just going to put your address in there.


Ryan, is that you?


Yep.


That is your right there.


That's you do.


I'm going to send you, let's say I'm going to send you 50 quanta.


Feeling generous today.


Right.


A little bit.


And you could also add another recipient if you wanted to, but we don't need to in this case.


So confirm and sign.


Then what on the ledger, you actually have to open it up and confirm the transaction.


So I'm opening the ledger now.


I'm in the QRL app and I'm clicking sign transaction now.


Signing 10%, 50%, 70, and 100%.


And that is because the private keys are held on the ledger.


And you can't do any transactions without, from the wallet, without the ledger.


Okay.


And now I sent.


All right.


So this is an appending status that's been submitted to nodes on the network.


As soon as the next proof of work node finds a block,


they should have that transaction in their mempool and we should see it.


That didn't take very long.


Ryan, I'm going to stop sharing.


Why don't you switch over to your screen.


Awesome.


Where am I?


Well, now strike it looks like your transaction came through.


Let's see it right here.


Quick 50, a quanta.


Perfect.


I am going to grab strike is your address.


Does it end in eight F.


Yep.


Right.


You sent me 25 back.


Okay.


I'm feeling less generous than you, but I'm feeling more generous.


I sent you 50.


I mean, I'm feeling less generous.


And I'm going to send this to you.


We are just confirming.


You have to really small fee there.


I hit confirm here.


We're going to be sending you back recipients here.


I'm going to send.


Transaction details below.


It's going to take a moment.


It's pending.


All right.


And I'm watching my wallet.


Perfect.


You should go through shortly.


It's checking the balance here.


Yep.


I got you a 25 quanta.


That was pretty quick.


A minute or two.


And.


Easy.


Yes.


Super easy back and forth.


Can I can exchange it really flawlessly?


And a strike.


I appreciate you kind of walking through some of these.


It was good to kind of show people a variety of ways for wallet


creation.


And an upcoming video.


What we're going to be doing is we're going to be creating a video


walk through tutorial on multi-sig as well.


We're going to be having a few special guests coming up on next


couple episodes.


And if you're watching this and you feel like you're a little


overwhelmed.


With different steps or, you know, what a tree is or, you know, the


hatch or things of that nature.


Just start out with an easy web wallets in your browser.


Then maybe you can move over to a hardware.


But really, whatever works best for you.


And if you have any questions, make sure that you either put


your questions in the comments below.


Don't be shy.


Ask us.


And if you like this video, make sure that you have that


subscribe button.


And we're going to keep coming out each week with new content.


Related to our project, which is the QRL and the industry as a


whole strike.


I appreciate you coming on today's call.


And we will all see you in next week's episode.


Always my pleasure.


Thank you.


Thanks.


Bye bye.


AMA with Geometry Labs- Techniques for Efficient Post-Quantum Finance

Hey everyone, welcome back to another episode of the Quantum Resistant


Ledger channel, the place where you come for the crypto in stay for the quantum.


On today's episode of Michael Striken, I are joined by the team at


Geometry Labs to have an AMA episode where we discuss the recent blog series


that they put out this past few months on techniques for efficient post quantum


finance. We're joined today by Brandon Goodell and Mitchell


Craviot-Stayer from Geometry Labs to have an AMA.


Ask some questions. Big and small. Good to have you guys.


Hi, guys. Thanks. You're good to be here.


Yeah. Michael, good to see you as well. And looking forward to diving in.


We've had a lot of community questions over, you know,


this got pushed back a few weeks. So we have a handful of questions from there.


A couple others from our social channels. And while we're going through this


AMA in a minute, we're going to dive into the AMA questions. But if you're


at any time while we're going through this episode,


if we're referencing any parts of the series, just look in the show notes.


I'm going to have links to all of the blogs in the series.


So you can quickly reference all of those. And guys, is it good on your side?


If myself and Michael, we start going through the list of questions from the


community. Great. Great. We're going off.


Cool. Well, we can start out kind of with at the top here.


We had a question from one of our community members,


Otslayer, which had to do with what was publicly available, which is private.


I'm kind of short in that one a little bit. Just based on the work that you guys are doing,


Jam Shrelabs. What's public? What's not public? What's the short answer there?


We'll just keep start moving through some of these. So the short answer is all of it is or


will shortly be public on the signature library and lattice algebra library.


We have open source code bases on GitHub. We have the packages available through


PyPy, the logic behind these is explained in the article series that you just referenced.


Basically, we don't we don't have any secrets off. It's like all everything you do for


QL is open source. The piece we're working on right now, which is secure,


Fountains architecture, we'll be getting flipped public very shortly.


Everything we do is open and also licensed under the MIT license,


which is the same one the QRL code base uses. Very permissive.


Yeah.


Sounds good. This next question, I think it's kind of just pass the mic around just to see if


any of whatever one's take is on the next couple of ones. But this one, it's from an unknown


community member. And the question is, it's a good one. Every day that passes,


it seems that there is a new attack on post quantum lattices or a new paper that emerges showing


weakness of them. That's definitely concerning in terms of post quantum security.


The question is, would you recommend the QRL stay with HBS or layer one protocol and deploy


post quantum lattices as layer two parachane? Or would you rather recommend migrating from HBS to


lattices, assuming the uncertainty risk paired with that? That's the question. So whoever wants


to kind of take this one and we can't just grab your gear.


Sorry, if that's okay, Mitchell. So the short answer is, there's not a short answer to this one.


The best test of any cryptographic algorithm is time and security or a test of a security is time,


right, letting it hang around for years and then see who can break it. So actually every single


time that a new attack on post quantum lattices comes up and we see something like a moderate


improvement in the exponential time of the algorithm or something like that. We're actually


not too concerned. And the reason is because if it's still taking exponential time, then you can


still easily just tweak the security parameter a little bit in order to make it secure for 128 bits


of security or 256 bits of security or whatever. On the other hand, people fall for this


gamblers fallacy a lot where they're like, oh, I've been seeing a lot of these papers breaking


post quantum lattices and stuff lately. That means it's going to be falling soon. That's not


necessarily the case. There is a conjecturely sub-exponential algorithm that solves certain lattice


problems that Dan Bernstein is working on right now, DJB, Daniel Jay Bernstein. I know a little bit


about it. It uses S unit attacks and beyond that, I actually haven't gotten very far into his word.


But he is very careful to say every single time he's making these statements that


it's sub-exponential, it's conjecturally sub-exponential. We still don't have any evidence that any of


the lattice assumptions upon which post quantum cryptography is built are in danger.


Having said that, keen-eyed readers will notice that only two types of algorithms made it through


the NIST competition. There were lattice algorithms and hash-based security. The question that


Ryan just asked, he said, HBS, that's hash-based security. The functions like the Sphinx function,


the XMSS signature function, these are hash-based. Whereas crystals that are lithium and


crystals, kyber are lattice-based. The question is, are we really concerned or should we migrate


away from hash-based toward lattice-based? Well, unfortunately, only one hash-based algorithm made it


through the NIST competition and all the other algorithms were lattice-based.


And only one encryption algorithm made it through the competition and it's lattice-based.


So if you're going to be doing a keen-capsulation mechanism up to NIST standards in the future,


you have to use crystal-scibre period, which is lattice-based. That doesn't mean that QRL has to.


They might use some other key exchange mechanism and then use hash-based protocols just like


they're doing now, but that does mean it won't be up to NIST standards or rather in accordance


with NIST standards because up to implies that it'd be worse. It's not up to NIST standards,


but that's not the case. The real issue is that QRL would be using hash-based stuff when most of


the competition basically eliminated everything except for lattice-based stuff.


I'm pretty sure that I did a pretty good job of answering that question. Would I recommend


migrating away from hash-based toward lattice-based? I don't know about that. Personally,


I really like hash-based protocols, but lattice-based protocols can be easy to work with. They can


be easier to understand. You don't have to rely on this little black box hash function as much.


Thanks for covering that one. Mitchell or strike anything to add on that part or we


could move on to the next question. I was just going to say, I actually love that there's a


new paper coming out every week breaking this stuff. It's really wide in a situation where we're


now building crypto systems against new and future adversaries and then people are inventing new


methods as new adversaries to break those. What a time to be alive. This is the cutting edge.


I just love it. It's more of a philosophical statement, but I think it's really cool.


Mike, where are you going to say? There's a part of me that believes in keeping things simple,


but also there's a part of me that's a bit of a security purist at times, I think.


I can't help but think of what the advantages might be in order to do one at layer one,


in one at layer two, sorry, if that's confusing, in which a potential attack factor or bad


actor would have to compromise both of them in order to compromise the chain as a whole.


So while that's a generally, it's an interesting idea. Generally, so this actually gets back to


a question that's a little unrelated that somebody asked me the other day and it might have been


Mitchell, but let's say you have, yeah, I think you and I were talking about this, Mitchell,


we're talking about encrypting something classically and then encrypting the cypher text post quantum


Stitchable or vice versa. And generally, cryptographers really don't like doing that because if you


can break one, then you can break the others. There's no reason to use the weaker one under any


like under any circumstances. But this isn't exactly the situation you described because the


hash-based protocols are unbroken and the lattice-based protocols are unbroken. But the way that you


just described it where you'd have to penetrate both layers in order to rewrite the ledger,


that would be like a sort of a tricky thing to do because in the end, all you really need to do


to rewrite a ledger surrounds somebody with your friends and then lie to them about what the ledger


is. And that's true in Bitcoin is true in QRL, it's true pretty much across the board.


Having said that, lattice-based crypto can be aggregated easily, it's smaller keys and so on and so


forth. Actually, I shouldn't say smaller keys. But lattice-based crypto has some benefits. And if


QRL built a layer two protocol, like a lightning network using the lattice-based protocol that


settles with the XMS or some other hash-based signature system on the base layer, I can see a lot


of benefits associated with that. So yeah, I mean, like this is the thing about blockchain design


is every way that for every person on the planet who has an opinion, there's a different way


to design a blockchain. That actually gets me thinking that it would be challenging to use this


layer one layer two with different schemes to protect the whole thing. But I could imagine a version


where if there's some kind of experimental thing that is pretty sure it's


but there's a missing security proof on the hardness assumption or something, I wonder if there


would be a version where it could be out on a side chain for damage control so that if there does


turn out to be a flaw in that, that the you've kind of like quarantined it so that everything on the


base, base layer still moving. I don't know, that's kind of a weird thought. Probably wouldn't roll


anything out that experimental. Unfortunately, for testing, though, for testing, though, unfortunately


composability, taking two cryptographic things and just composing them and gluing them together,


oftentimes doesn't give you the security of either of the underlying things.


So you can be like, oh, I have this great new encryption scheme. First, I'll do RSA and then I'll do


a group signature and then I'll do with discrete logarithms and then I'll do a lot of space


signature on top of that. And then nobody will be able to break it. It turns out that because


the way that you glue things together, you just basically glued like three bicycles together,


but you glued them by the axle and the wheels. So like the wheels aren't going to rotate like it's


just so long story short. Cryptographic engineering, oftentimes we come up with these ideas and then


after thinking about them, they just fall apart. So I actually can't answer the question and further


detail of that, but I can say that having two different layers, two different hardness assumptions


underlying them may have some benefits, but it may also have some drawbacks other than that. That's


this. That's the best type of. I like that answer tonight and I agree. Yeah.


Yeah. Well, let's let's go into a couple more. Some of these might be quicker than we might


have a couple of ones that get drawn out a little bit longer depending on the question. But


this next one is from Tim G community member. He's got two questions. So I'll ask both his back


to back. First one is on staking. What are the implications of having smaller staking amounts of


versus larger ones? Some of the community lean towards smaller staking, but I would like to see


unpalatable effects down the road. Please expand on the subject if you guys have time to do so.


So we'll cover that one first if you guys would like whoever wants to take this one.


I have I have some thoughts on that. And these are these are my own personal opinions.


I I would lean towards smaller amounts. The motivation being one, just making it as egalitarian as


possible. I mean, there's always going to be some floor because you have to run a node and either


by the hardware or rent the rent the cloud or whatever. There's going to be some floor cost.


But by and large, I think the more people running validators theoretically, the better,


one benefit of having small amounts that are accessible to a larger group is let's say you do


have some of these people. There's always going to be some funder, whatever. That just has like


millions of dollars. And is going to without other incentivization would just run one node. And then


this is where people start to get the hay rich getting richer criticism and all of that.


When there's smaller node amounts, especially if there's some incentivization like your payouts


being quadratic with respect to your stake, then what you're doing is sure this person could plunk


you know, 10 million in a node, but then they're incentivized to actually spread it across


a variety of nodes. And so we're incentivizing them to make the network infrastructure more secure.


So I like small stake for accessibility, for encouraging a more robust infrastructure and just


decentralization in general. My thoughts on this are a little bit more complicated. And part of


this is that I don't necessarily know as much about stake as Mitchell. So actually, I would very much


like to encourage the listener to listen to Mitchell not me. However, there's a cost and a drawback


to having a small amounts. Moreover, one of the benefits that Mitchell described is actually


a fake benefit. So let's tackle these two things one at a time. First off, the cost of having


small amounts, if every single time you want to stake something, you need to broadcast a transaction


and you have a million coins or whatever and you can only stake one at a time,


then that means you need to broadcast a million transactions that need to be recorded to a ledger


in order to get your million nodes fired up, which is true if you have a million nodes


period is that a million transactions are going to have to end up on the blockchain eventually


in order to get those nodes fired up. But the amount of weight on the blockchain in terms of


kilobytes is therefore significantly greater because each transaction has a minimum size.


And so if I could do all of them at once, then I only need to make one transaction that puts the weight


on miners and other stakers. It reduces the weight on other stakers. However,


that may or may not be a big deal, number one, because everybody knows spaces and that big of a deal.


The real issue is communicating that information to new nodes, right, so that they could boot


straps. So it's not so much that I have to pay for having storage costs, but it takes longer for


new nodes to bootstrap that way. But also the benefit of having a million nodes actually sounds


great. And in fact, actually is topologically good for a lot of reasons. That surrounding


problem that I mentioned earlier starts to go away if you have people doing this. However,


it doesn't change the fact that 50% of the network has to be assumed to be


dishonest or 33% or whatever the staking protocol is allowing. And so it's just advocating for


the network robustness. It doesn't change centralization in terms of entity ownership. Absolutely.


Bingo, great minds think of life. That was exactly what it was going to say. You still have one


party controlling those nodes. So if they're dishonest, you haven't really gained any security. But


what you have gained is a graceful degradation of the network. So if that nodes start to drop off,


the network still has no problem. But if you only have a few nodes, one network drops or one


node drops off, it's possible the whole network gets split into. I think by the way, I love


what you were I think implicitly pitching, which was in a situation where hide no counts are


encouraged by one way or another, that it would be useful for the protocol to include a


transaction that can batch load nodes instead of doing like one for each. I don't know if you


were expecting that or not, but it was what came to mind. I wasn't pitching it specifically,


but that's actually one of the reasons aggregatable signatures attracted to me or attracted to me


in the first place. This way, if every single block has a single aggregate signature that's


describing all of the new proof of state nodes, then every block has that minimum size of aggregated


signature. And you can be adding a thousand nodes per block. It's great. So yeah,


brings a full circle. Yeah, that brings us back to one of our previous chats with Ryan and Michael


about aggregatable one time signatures. Oh, there was another thing that came up about the


stake thing is that if you're using a protocol that uses one time signatures, then you have to


have a signature for each key that you want staking. Whereas if you have a many use signature scheme,


many many time signature scheme, you can reuse the key multiple times. And so you don't have to


keep posting keys on the blockchain. Right? So this is one of the negative traits of one time


signatures is that you're going to end up with more keys posted to the blockchain, whereas with


many time signatures, you have fewer. And that's one of the issues that is relevant. Which may or


may not be an issue if you're in a situation where for the one time you can fit the signature


and verification key in the same space is just the signature for reusable. Yes, that's a weird


nuance. But these are all these details. Right. Yeah, yeah. Inside baseball. Yeah. So we'll


we'll put you strike anything else on the staking dead to add to that. Yeah. So I figured you


had a few. We've talked about consensus before. So I think I did give this one thought and I believe


in uh, as many validators is I guess more validators, even if smaller ones


are more beneficial to the security of the network because they're less like there's with a bunch


of smaller validators, even though they're weighted as smaller, I would say that the possibility


of collusion on the network in order to garner consensus decreases quite a bit. So even if you had


like 20% of small smaller balances, I think that that I think that that helps secure consensus.


But with that being said, I also like the idea of existing excuse me, existential deposit


in that in order to maintain the account, you have to have certain amount of coin in your account,


which can't elapse. I don't know. Let's say call X 30 days, take a balance. So that's your 30 days,


if you've got less than one quanta or one, you know, or one, whatever, whatever arbitrary amount


that that people that democratic governance agrees to, then that would then that reduces some of


the overhead of, you know, of the ultra fine sand, I suppose that needs to be maintained in the


state files and that could potentially clog up the network. That could be a middle ground. Yeah.


As like, as like a middle ground. So I didn't intentionally pick middle ground between kind of


Mitchell, what you're describing in Brandon, in fault, you know, to be honest, I had this was kind


of an answer as soon as Ryan had asked the question, but cry analogically, there's no way to go


back in time. So I guess we'll really know. It makes sense to me. Yeah. Well, the right that I saw


you shaking your head though on something I said. It's a small bit actually. Okay, please,


the idea that you're reducing the probability of collusion is assuming that each node doesn't


know each other and they don't talk at the coffee shop down the street and they don't know that


they're all operated by the same malicious entity. Right. So in cryptography oftentimes when we


think about security for things like consensus mechanisms, we don't assume a multitude of the


adversaries, which is what kind of like how we imagine the Bitcoin network is like, oh, there's a


student basement over here who wants my money and there's these dudes and I ran who want my money and


so on and so forth. By the way, nothing wrong with basements or I ran for that matter. But


the idea that like if I'm a single entity like I'm Jeff Bezos and I've just decided to own


that own some proof of stake blockchain, I might end up firing up 10,000 nodes specifically to try


to convince people that a lot of people have joined the network and that they're all honest.


Right. But in the back end, I'm actually running that from a common database and I know which


nodes are mine. So this is why I say the topological properties of the network are graceful,


right? Because you're adding more nodes and legs to the network. And so if you pluck any one of


them out, the whole network won't get split into two. And you're less likely to be surrounded


entirely by malicious nodes if you're an honest node. But you can't say much about the consensus


mechanism, unfortunately, that's actually one of the big drawbacks of proof of stake.


So I did reference collusion in there, not because I think it is more difficult for collusion to


happen. And when there's multiple upon multiple of multiple smaller wallets. But as far as in


your scenario, you're not talking about collusion, you're talking about a one-part guy.


Essentially a civil attack is one in a series of ways. Many different identities on the network,


which comes back to 51%. So yes, I would have to give some thought to exactly the differences


between the collusion and the civil part that the pros and excuse me, the commonalities.


Yeah. So the main thing is the worst case scenario is what cryptographer's


strategy protect against and the worst case scenario is that all the malicious nodes are operated


by one person. And so that's pretty much the cryptography philosophy behind,


I shouldn't put quotes around that. That's the philosophy behind cryptography security schemes is


to just assume the worst case of an adversary who has turned the entire universe into a computer.


Right. We don't need even 800 bits of security. We don't need 100 bits. We might need


80 bits of security eventually. But like already cryptographers go for 256 bits so that there's


no hope that somebody could come along and turn the whole universe into a computer and break your


scheme. And like honestly, yes, I that's a fantasy world. Right. But like when we're running a financial


network, where's the cutoff between a couple of colluding bad guys and this omnipotent invisible


force, it's a smooth ramping thing and it's just easier to I should say it's actually harder to


just assume that they're all one bad guy. Right. So yeah, anyway, but at the end of the day, if there's


consensus, I mean code is law. So depending on the consensus mechanism, can you call that?


Yeah, I use the word, but even sometimes have difficulty saying the word bad actor because the rules


are already set. Now, if I'm counting cards at a table, then I'm just advantaged to play.


But that's going to take us down a different road. I'm reminded of an old math joke, which actually


gets us to another question that we have later, but I'm going to tell it now and then I'll tell


a different joke later. A Russian topologist told me this joke. Okay, just to forgive the background


is English is the second language. He says, one time his friends, oh gosh, it had to do with


like the inside of a circle versus the outside of a circle. And somebody was in a jail cell, right?


And this guy's like, I'm on the outside of the jail cell, you're on the inside. And you know, if


51% of the parties on the network are malicious, doesn't that make them the honest ones and everybody


else malicious? That's a joke. It just makes me think. That's because I'm thinking about it.


Yeah, I mean, I forgot the punch line in the setup and everything.


Well, the consensus is greater than that. I wouldn't say that's who's right or wrong.


That the 51% or more becomes truth. Yes. And that becomes truth. Yes. Not right or wrong.


My point earlier was an ideological one in that there is a necessarily right or wrong.


There's just rules and actions and what consensus means to be truth and untrue and Mitchell,


you got kind of a couple of times apologies, please. So I guess I'll work backwards on terms of


like the code is law. There's no bad actors. I think that we can look at it through that framework


and then say like, okay, well, anything that passes consensus laws is allowed and is behavior.


And we can just kind of group it into like benign or constructive, which are people that are just


extending the longest chain and moving things forward and not censoring transactions or like


malicious question mark depending on your perspective if they're sensing transiting.


Yeah, that's all hey, I'm just going to actually not even touch that. I do think the big picture


for a lot of the consensus stuff is like, by and large, if there's a stake weight of decisions


being made, whether that stake is divided into many nodes for robustness or one node for


convenience doesn't change. It's still the same actor. It's still the same malicious capital.


You can almost think of it rather instead of malicious people think of it as malicious capital


regardless of how that's split up. I do think this is a place where proof of stake actually has


a nice benefit of a proof of work and this is strictly a practical thing. And that is that the majority


of your proof of work miners are joining pools, right? And the pools always just seem to hover


around like 45, 50%, right? And very few people are checking the blobs coming in from their pools


to see if their pool is censoring anything. And so you could be very easily complicit in malicious


mining. And in fact, I don't want to name and shame anyone particular, but I found public pools


that we're doing like data encoding in fields that they shouldn't have. And this is just people


mining these blocks for years having no idea that their pool is sending them really weird blobs.


With proof of stake, I think it's more likely that you're going to, and by the way,


asterisk, there's cool solutions like this, like Pita pool. Lots of awesome work happening there.


But I think by and large, in proof of stake, if you're doing your own transaction selection and


processing, then if I do just decide to spend something up, it's less likely than I'm going to


like, I'm not going to like join a pool and accidentally contribute to something that I don't want to.


Anyways, that's the end of the ramble.


Yeah, you said you said me to a pool and then oh, sorry, Brandon.


When you submit to a pool, that's the pool and the block that's the block that's the


excuse me, the problem that's solved in the subsequent reward, that's essentially an unclatterized loan.


Then within the pool, right?


Wait, say that again.


Okay, so you have a mining pool. This is called a proof of work for now.


Okay.


You're mining. You have all this process of power going to a central entity.


And the work that's being done is essentially an unclatterized loan of your processing power


to the mining pool.


There's no guarantee that you're going to pay your block.


And there's no guarantee that the blocks that are being found are being reported honestly


in the first place.


How would like, how would you know it?


It's distributed.


All the computing is distributed.


So, and then without going too much down a rabbit hole, the other ideological question that comes


out of what you were talking about Mitchell, I think is if code is law, what becomes the difference


between a bad actor per se and just someone executing game theory.


So there's my thoughts.


There's also one yet another angle to the proof of state question that we haven't, none of us have


addressed yet that just occurred to me. This goes back to the layer one layer two stuff that


you mentioned earlier, Michael. It occurred to me just now.


Every extra layer that you add is more code that every node needs to know forever in order to


verify that blockchain. So if you add extra parts of a protocol, you are adding to the code base that


that the node needs to run forever. You still ability.


Operational operational complexity. Correct. Yes. All of these things increases. You might not be


able to move. For example, if you added that extra layer of complexity because you want to be


ultra secure, the irony is that you might not be able, you know, that extra code,


that extra code, and it does not allow you to go pulse quantum secure for some unimagined


reason or whatever. Assuming that they would have been able to and then their small minority


have actually been able to pull off this hat trick.


So let's see. I think I have an unsatisfying answer to your like what the undercoat is law,


like what's malicious enough. And this is like, I'm just going to like arbitrarily draw a line


and say like rolling back blocks, I'll consider malicious, even if there's an economic incentive,


censoring transactions, I'll consider malicious, even if there's an economic or regulatory incentive.


Beyond that, I think everything's kind of gray area like minor extracted value on a theory,


I'm like kind of gray area. There's ways to do it that don't hurt the people you're extracting


value from like back running. There's ways to do it that do hurt the people that would be


extracted from like front running. That's where it gets like to me morally gray and I could


start telling you where I draw the lines, but then it's just getting into like now we've now moved


away from code is law to like opinions on types of activity. So if you don't want to roll back the


chain, then don't upgrade your note. Yeah, I'm going to go into the next, I'm going to go


anyway, I'm going to take us into the next. Ryan, I'm going to put us back on track.


If you don't want to run a note at all.


Yes. And this next one, the second one from Tingi, we cover the first one for a quite a while.


And this one is in layman terms, what efficiencies do stateless encryption schemes have


over stateful schemes like SMS. I actually have a real, real short answer to this question.


And it's perhaps oversimplified, but in a stateful encryption, or by the way, first off,


Tingi means signature schemes because XMS as a signature scheme, Sphinx is a signature scheme


and so on. So what's the difference between stateless versus stateful signatures? And the answer


is that for a stateful signature scheme, you need to remember which signatures you're


already signed. So you need to store every message and signature that you produced so far from


that key and remember them forever, which is a drag. Like even if it's not that big of a deal in


terms of space or whatever, it's a drag. It makes each individual wallet have a linearly


increasing storage requirement. Compare that to like Bitcoin, for example, right? Your wallet


doesn't get bigger when you've spent more money. I think that. Yeah, I'll use strike.


I can add onto that if you don't mind. Go ahead. The other thing is for the


the signy algorithms for the public private key pairs, you have to front-load the processing


for for hash based. Yeah, Hans, although had a question on will a sajinese be explored by


Jamichy Labs on behalf of QRL. I know we already chatted on this there that you guys had no plans


currently, but of course, obviously, you know, if QRL wanted to move forward in that in any capacity,


you know, could look into that. But I'll jump into the next question here. We got a good one on


Python Falcon here. This is an unknown question. And it is is your Python library using Falcon or


Delithium Kiber lattice work? And which one of these is your favorite for blockchain application and why


what we want to take and run with this one? So the Python library lattice algebra that we're using


is capable of supporting most of the stuff that you need in order to implement either Falcon


signatures or Delithium signatures or Kiber encryption. It's missing some sampling algorithms and


things like that basically ran a number generators that are specific to those algorithms that weren't


included in our nice general Python library, which lattice work we're using. It turns out that all


three of those signature schemes use a very, very, very similar ring and the main


difference and by ring, I mean like the environment, the lattice that you're working in. And


the main differences have to do with technical things like sampling, how the Falcon uses a trap


door to generate signatures. So you need to like sample that trap door, things like that.


So the short answer is is our library is one level lower on the infrastructure level than either


Falcon or the crystals schemes. We are an infrastructure that you could use to implement those things.


The next part of the question is which is my favorite. I think Falcon is cool personally.


Kiber is the only key encapsulation mechanism that survived the competition and you can build


using a key encapsulation mechanism and a signature scheme using just those two things,


you can build a claim or refund model of a cryptocurrency that is capable of


rather rich scripting and stuff, which is really cool. So if I was going to do a post quantum


encryption or a post quantum cryptocurrency starting today from scratch, I would use Kiber as the


key encapsulation mechanism to generate keys on the fly. And I would use probably Falcon or


these aggregatable one-time signatures that we've developed as the signatures. The problem with Falcon


again, similar to other similar to crystals, dilithium, it's not necessarily aggregatable easily.


So as far as efficiency goes, I'm not actually a fan of either of them, but comparing


either of them to an aggregatable one-time signature scheme isn't fair because both Falcon and


dilithium are many times signature schemes. And the aggregatable scheme that we've been working on


is a one-time signature scheme. And so every single time you use the aggregatable guy, you have


to publish a key and a signature, whereas every time you publish a Falcon signature, you just


need to publish a reference to the key and a signature. And usually that reference to the key


is already built into the transaction somehow. So yeah, I would, I would, I like Falcon more than


dilithium. I understand dilithium more than Falcon. I will cover the next one. This one's kind of


a, for you guys, a question either or. Post quantum super singular. I said, Jenny's, I always


butcher that, versus homomorphic encryption fight. This is a, and you guys, any, any takes here,


this one, I didn't, yeah. All right, so there you go. You got to wait better than a


super singular as


I saw Jenny's. These, okay, so actually, and I saw Jenny's easy to understand. Super singular


ones may be not so much, but I saw Jenny, you take a nice smooth map through a nice smooth space,


there's a path, not a map path, and you send it to another nice smooth path in space. And the map


carrying each point to each point is the I saw Jenny. That's what I saw Jenny is. That's it,


super easy. Unfortunately, super singular ones have basically divide by zero errors in the


function that describes that map. Okay, so something like one divided by x cubed at zero goes nuts,


right? It's a bad function to use, except somehow mathematicians and cryptographers have figured out


how to use these super singularisogenes as hardness assumptions underlying cryptoskeets. So,


super singularisogenes are more like discrete logarithm based groups. Okay, they are a hardness,


they're related to a hardness assumption from which you build cryptography schemes.


Homomorphic encryption is one such cryptography scheme, and in fact, we can build homomorphic


encryption functions out of super singularisogenes or lattices or discrete logarithm based


group functions, stuff like that. In fact, the reason that range proofs work in Monero. Actually,


I'm not even going to mention Monero. If you look at Mimble Whimble, that's an even simpler example of


this. Basically, they exploit homomorphic encryption to show that you encrypted something to a


version of zero, right, and that you're showing them an encryption of zero. And the way that you do


that is you do math on the ciphertexts. And that's what homomorphic encryption is. The homomorphic


part just means that it respects addition and multiplication. So, A x plus B, push that through a


function, you get f of A times f of x plus f of B. That's all homomorphisms are. So, what that means


is that you're allowed to do math on the ciphertexts, and it will match the math on the underlying


plaintexts. And so, instead of having to reveal the plaintexts to figure out if somebody's


still doing some math correctly, you can actually just do it on the ciphertexts and never actually


understand, like learn what was encrypted in the first place. So, the question itself actually


reveals a little bit of a misunderstanding. Super singularized subgenies are hardness assumptions


from which we build crypto protocols, and homomorphic encryption is a crypto protocol.


So, how would I have them fight in the same way that I would have?


We should just close that answer. We should close that answer with that.


I would.


So, I think you might have in our last episode touched on benchmarking maybe it was you


Brandon, but I'm just going to read their question. Have you done any benchmark if so, do we need


a good CPU to run this library? I didn't expand on it too much more than that within the


question, but any of you guys might make mention here?


Yeah.


So, not only did we do benchmarks, the code to run the benchmarking is included in the open source


repositories. So, if you go to let us crypto the top folder is benchmarks, you can pop it up and


run it yourself. The main thing that matters is you generally verification time, right, because


that's the thing you want to do a million of in a row when you're syncing up a node.


On my computer, it was like 60 milliseconds per signature that I was verifying. This was


batched on like a research work station. So, it would be a little bit slower, but you don't need,


you know, it's going to be a super computer or anything to run these. And in fact, it would be


really great to kind of get some benchmarks from people running on very hard way.


Especially because if you look at like something like discrete logarithm based stuff,


we're talking about what 10 milliseconds or am I, yeah. So, like if we're down at like 60 or


something for post guanam, that's pretty comparable. It's pretty good.


Yeah. With the sub-matching, but I think, but we're definitely down on like a reasonable


a reasonable skill. And especially by the way, our code, because we wanted it to be a super


clean, super interpretable, you know, reference code that doesn't involve knowledge of numpy and


all these different sub-libraries, we use the built-in Python types. So, if you're porting this


over to C or go, it's going to be faster if you start using, uh, just some time compiling or C-based


functions in Python even. Uh, it could be faster. The, so these are even just the benchmarks for the


implementation that's meant to be readable primarily.


So, I'm a user and I don't, I don't want to or necessarily know how to go through the code


in order to do this. Uh, maybe, uh, what about a simple answer, guys, for the rest, you know, for


someone that might not be as well versed in benchmarking software, top three things in order,


uh, network CPU RAM, well, hard drive is going to be pretty much. It's just can build it,


have to hold the chain, right? But what, what ordered, what are I, I took a guess, network CPU RAM?


That's my guess. I don't know.


Network would be kind of a not an issue or it's just, or it's just proportional to your signature


size. Uh, but in terms of carrying out these operations, CPU RAM brand and view,


um, I don't know how to compare those two things with each other, right? Because RAM is


a specific context. Like if you'll play it a bunch from the user, that's a


kind of a few hundred bucks.


Five hundred dollar budget. Sorry.


Not being clear.


Okay.


Um, a typical hard drive on any pretty much any computer even now is going to be able to handle,


um, handling signatures and keys, no problem. We're talking about maybe like 15 kilobytes


maximum for a signature and a key.


Right. So that's not that big of a deal.


Correct. Um, if I was on a budget, look, I'll be perfectly honest, I can verify,


uh, sign and verify things on a, on a crappy Chromebook quickly. Um, I think that people


worried about low budget devices being able to verify these signatures are, uh,


um, unless you have some very, very specific use cases in which case the questions are very,


very detailed. Uh, the general answer is you don't have to worry about it. This is going to


be no, should be no worse than, than discrete logarithm stuff, maybe times a hundred at worst case


scenario, maybe times 10. So, um, CPUs nowadays, any CPU on the market will be able to do it,


no problem. And we'll be able to do it quickly, no problem. Um, space might be the bigger


constraint because the keys are bigger than discrete logarithm. So the good answer,


so any modern computer, I think that's why I picked network first in order to be able to download


transactions faster, uh, because the CPU is just going to be able to crank through them with


any modern computer. So I think the answer for the community, uh, any modern computer will be able


to, will be able to function in this way. So yeah. And if we ever do a cryptocurrency-based


implementation of using these signatures, then all of the, the reason that we were interested in


these signatures in the first places, because it puts all the burden on the network. It puts the


burden on transferring information to nodes. It doesn't put the burden on verifying it or storing it.


So, uh, as a consequence, I think network is probably going to be the, the biggest cost in terms


of being able to support these things. And when network, I think, uh, low latency, not necessarily


high bandwidth. But I mean, that's, that's probably a different conversation. Well,


so this is, so this actually gets, gets us away from the cryptography stuff and towards secure


fountain architecture stuff, which is a more network-based question. And for the secure fountain


architecture stuff, what you're doing is you're exchanging local storage space for higher bandwidth.


Um, latency doesn't even come into the question. So, um, but that, that, that's for the, the next


piece of software that we haven't even started talking about yet, which is secure fountain


architecture. So the idea is basically specifically if storage space is going to become a long-term


problem, which with blockchain bloat, we all know is, um, then it would be better to reduce that


local storage space in exchange for high bandwidth, because everybody's going to be having higher


faster and faster network speeds for a long, long time. Um, but in terms of, uh, the blockchain


growing, like we can pretty carefully track that and we know how bad that's going to get.


Um, we don't know how fast internet's going to get, right? Well, actually, we do know it's not


going to get faster than speed of light. Um, uh, I don't know what's a, what's the mass of a bit.


Actually, this is an answerable question. I want to measure the length of the bit.


If you look at it, but depends on how fast it's modulated, right? It has to be a, it has to be a,


uh, it has to be a construct of the plank length. Right. It has to be like, we're saying in some


multiple of the plank, like, it's the high how much energy is necessary to flip a bit. If the bit


is made of material that is like on the plank scale depends on frequency. A bit is like this long.


Yeah. It's right.


But that depends on, yeah, it's free. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. They could be meters.


The last one we're going to cover. I'm going to read it out. Um, and then whoever wants to take


this one, um, this is from a community member John Cedar recently a report from center of encryption


and information security, uh, Matt's off in Israel presents on several algorithmic improvements to


the dual lattice attack, which allow it to exceed the efficiency of primal attacks in the improved


attack. They enumerate over more coordinates of the secret and use and improve distinguished


based on FFT combining these improvements considerably reduces the security levels of


Kyber, savor, dilifium. Um, and, uh, LWE, LWR based finalist bringing them below the thresholds,


uh, and recently announced lattice algebra blog between Q and L all geometrolabs, one of the potential


applications of the module is noted as being a Python implementation of NIST, uh, competitor, uh,


crystals, dilithium signature scheme. Uh, finally to their question, which is, um, what security


impact if any, uh, with this recent report have, um, on the form mentioned dilithium,


Python implementation. I know we talked about earlier in this AMA that stuff's coming out over


week, kind of, um, answered that part already, um, but this, this question is a good one. So


whoever wants to, uh, take this one and then we'll wrap up our AMA for today. So the short


answer is the dilithium standard has now basically been set. So if I was going to be implementing


the dilithium to Python using our lattice algebra library, I would be following the specifications


and dilithium period because that's the standard. That's the point. The more practical question is,


what security impact would this have on the implementation? So I wouldn't change what I was


implementing if I was going to dilithium, but the result of MOTSOV's, uh, um, recent, uh,


discoveries or rather work, recent work would mainly lead to larger dilithium parameters if we


were going to change the standard to take the new attacks into account, which we should do.


The chance standards should still be malleable for another two years or three years until more


study has been done. I personally don't think the standard process should be really completed yet.


Having said that, uh, the work at MOTSOV as far as I know hasn't really improved the,


going back to the very, very first question we talked about today hasn't really broken through


that exponential barrier that I was describing. It has made things faster, but it's still exponential.


Moreover, it's only certain attacks against lattice crypto that they've improved. And if you look


in the literature, the most efficient attack quantum sieving is not involved in this. So


right now, what we've been doing for our parameter selection is we've been assuming the worst


possible attack, which is quantum sieving and we've been basing our parameter selections based on that.


This work that, uh, um, teeter is asking about or tighter is asking about, which by the way, great name, John.


This work here is about improving classical and some quantum attacks against lattices, but not the best known attack


against lattices, as far as I know. Um, granted, I'm not perfect. I read a lot of literature.


I may have, have misunderstood things. Um, so from my, my algorithms that I've been setting parameters for


this would have no impact on my parameters. If I was going to be re parameterizing dilithium in order


to take these into attacks into account, um, that might lead to slightly larger key sizes and


signature sizes. Um, but other than that, it won't have too much of a practical impact is it because


specifically because they're studying, um, the work, the, the not so good attacks against lattices.


On the other hand, that work that I mentioned by Bernstein earlier, um, that he conjectures might


be made sub exponential using se unit attacks. That one may have more of an impact on things.


And we have to keep a very close eye on that as they make their developments because it's possible


possible exclamation point, big caveat here. It is possible that that algorithm would be capable


of breaking lattices in sub exponential time. Having said that, even if it did, that doesn't necessarily


mean it can do it fast enough in our lifetime for us to really be worried about it.


You mentioned, if anyone had any, um, good match jokes or anything like that, um, we had,


um, someone in the community asked, um, let us know what's your favorite veggie. Um, um,


uh, anything there, guys, uh, I'm going to roam in silent on this one, but I don't have anything,


I don't have anything further other than my cheesy comments. Yeah. Oh, my God. I have an answer.


I take offense. So what do you have some of these questions that veggies are liked in the first


place? That personal, you know, doesn't, not seeing that I don't, but it's, I don't, but the


question implies, implies that someone does already and that's a little bit presumptuous.


Yeah. My favorite vegetable, actually, all my favorite vegetables, they can't really eat a lot of


because I'm on blood dinners. So things like Brussels sprouts and kale and broccoli. I love those


things, but I can't eat them in quantity anyway. Um, uh, but I actually, uh, um, it really depends


on how much I've been hanging out with Zuko lately. Cause Zuko's a carnivore. Zuko, by the way,


favorite for viewers. Yes, yes, CEO of Zcash. Anyway, uh, what about you, Mitchell? What's your


favorite vegetable? And your favorite mathematical constant, Brandon? My favorite map out of


mid-constinant. Mitchell, I'll, Mitchell, I'll you, then we'll move back. Cause it doesn't exist.


Oh, here we go. Here we go. Oh, let's see. I, I feel like I should, I should favor


a lettuce to paste cryptography. Um, actually, actually, there's always like a sweet spot in my heart


for brassica wrapa, cause back in grad school, some of my friends and I, we, we took a bunch of


uh, uh, samples. Did Gene sequencing did, we're dimensionality reduction to turn it into like numeric,


uh, parameter, or numeric, uh, representation. And then when you start plotting them, if we plot,


like the first two principal components, you could see whether it was an oil seed or a cabbage


or a mustard weed. And then if you split on PCA3, you could actually tell geographically whether it


was like, uh, which kind of hemisphere it was from. And then if you split on the fourth principal


component, you could actually even tell whether it was like weedy or cultivated. Um, so I know it's


a super nerdy answer, but brassica wrapa is just really cool from like a genetic lineage perspective.


So this is what happens when nerds get unmoderated, but Brian, you actually do have the time stamps


and the QRL video, people can skip ahead and skip back. Uh, for my answer on favorite mathematical


constant, I'm going to give an answer with a twist. Uh, I'm going to have to go with the speed of light


300 kilometers per second or 106,231 miles per second. But my answer is actually BS. Not on my preference,


but that's not the best answer because the speed of light isn't based on the speed of light. The


speed of light is based on causality. Speed of causality. This is so much. So for a wall for some


whatever, and then accepted my answer at face value, that's not actually the best answer, a better


answer would be the causality because cause and effect, uh, speed of light is simply, uh,


in effect of cause and effect on the speed of cause and effect. I feel like there has to be some


mathematical paradox in explaining why you selected causality. We're going to be having an


upcoming Reddit AMA following this. So if you're watching this, we might have already had the AMA


by then, but, um, if you haven't had, if another question, uh, let us, not let us, let us know in the


comments of our video. Um, and, uh, other than that, I appreciate myself and, um, Michael, appreciate


Brandon and Mitchell, you guys coming on. It's always always good conversation. And, uh, as Michael


said, um, there's going to be, you know, notes in the show, links to all the parts in the series,


as well as any other, um, mentions. I know Mitchell, you also mentioned, uh, an upcoming


paper, um, on the blog that's going to be coming out. So, um, other than that, appreciate you guys


coming on, enjoy the conversation, hope the community did it as well. And we look forward to


chatting next time, guys.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Greetings, QRL community crypto and quantum enthusiasts.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

My name is Michael Strike, AKA Strike Attack, and I'm thrilled to welcome you to the official


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Quantum Resistance Lecture channel, your video portal, into post quantum blockchain security.


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If you don't know who we are, we are the only purpose-built open source industrial grade


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externally and dual audited quantum computer-resistant blockchain that uses an NIST, the


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US government draft recommended, post quantum secure digital signature scheme.


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See the links below for more information.


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So as a minute of you aware, the crypto space has been playing a cyclical battle and


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sophisticated game of cat and mouse between developer creativity and ASIC engineer ingenuity.


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Developers hold off the ASIC engineers for as long as possible, but eventually the algorithm


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gets ported over to an ASIC.


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ASIC manufacturers then must slowly phase themselves into the ecosystem, so as to avoid


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detection and maximize your turn in order to turn a profit on capital they've already spent


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to build the hardware, and then position themselves for the next cycle.


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With millions, possibly hundreds of millions of dollars hanging in the balance or more, this


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modern-day digital game of cloaking dagger has been playing out under a shroud of secrecy


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behind the scenes, a lot of times suspected by a community but at times very difficult to prove.


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Some projects have taken a stance of scheduled automatic hard forks over six months


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and others have their own strategies.


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So before we get into the details of random X or Q-random X as it's referred to on the team,


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we need a couple of, we need to cover a couple important things that you need to know.


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It's important to understand that ASIC resistance does not mean an ASIC cannot or will not be


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developed. Similar to a water-resistant watch which can fail under pressure or time,


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history has shown us that enough incentive ASIC manufacturers have been very successful in adapting


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the hardware to algorithms. Ultimately this means that the goal of ASIC resistance is to drive


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the cost of manufacturing to be as high as possible, or as complex as possible, or both,


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in order to make production of them, uneconomical.


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So random X is the latest proof of work algorithm that is optimized specifically for general


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purpose CPUs. It uses a special instruction set in a German math, floating point math, branches,


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and a few other techniques. So let's get down to it. How is random X different? What do I need to know?


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Random X uses hard memory techniques in order to minimize efficiency of specialized hardware.


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It's been independently audited four times and at the time of this video it's successfully


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running at Monero. To summarize how it works, it generates a random program using a special


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instruction set, compiles it, and executes it. The outputs then generate it into a cryptographic


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256 bits secure hash, and it goes from there. So let's summarize it a little bit more.


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Here are the important things that you need to know. The QRL team is ultimately working towards


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proof of stake and favor of proof of work as a longer term strategy. And random X is considered


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an interim solution. You're going to need a 64-bit CPU as many cores as possible, logical,


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or physical, and these will give you the best hash rates. This is probably the most single


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important factor. DDR4 RAM, clacked higher than 2133 MHz, has a big impact on hash rates as well.


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And depending on your operating system or minor, you'll want to enable something called


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huge page support and enable something called locked pages in memory. And these can result in


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usually at least a 30% hash rate when combined together. GPUs can be used to mine random


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X, but they're not very economical. For example, at around 200 watts you can expect 1200 hashes


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per second on a Vega 64. But if you're considering using a CPU which you should, the AMD


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Ryzen CPU is specifically the 3,900 X and the 3950X offer the best hash rates. 3900X can give


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you around 10,000 hash rates or more per second and the 3950 can give you upwards of 15,000


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hash rates per second. So this should give you a good 10,000-foot view of a random X is about.


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For more information about the project, you can find our website at www.dub-dub-dub.qRL.org.


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And if you'd like to be notified of future videos, feel free to subscribe and thank you for watching.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Welcome everyone. My name is Michael Strike, AKA Strike Attack. And welcome to the official


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Quantum Resistance Ledger channel, your video portal, into Pulse Quantum Blockchain Digital Asset


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Security. So this video is going to be part one of two. In this video, I'm going to run you through


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some of the fundamental differences between a future Pulse Quantum Secure QRL wallet,


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compared to that of a standard issue cryptocurrency wallet like Bitcoin or other altcoins.


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In a follow-up video, I'm going to walk you through step by step in the website on how to create


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one so you can get started right away. Okay, so what makes a Quantum wallet different from a


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traditional crypto wallet? Probably the most fundamental difference is regard in regards to how


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public-private key pairs are used. In traditional private public key pairs, a message is signed


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against a recipient's public key in the private key to Cryptsy. But this is also the Achilles


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heel of traditional asymmetric encryption in a Pulse Quantum world. One private key and one public key.


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This dates all the way back into the 1970s, and your QRL wallet is similar, but with one big


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difference. It uses many, many keys, so let me explain. When you create a new wallet, you create


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what's called an XMSS tree. This tree contains many signatures, which we're referred to as the


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one-time signature scheme. Here's the important part. Each signature in the OTS can only be used


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one time because each tree containing key pairs has a limited number of branches. But don't worry,


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you can create a tree without the 262,000 public private key pairs, and the web interface will not


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only start to shoot warnings when you've reached this limit, but you can also see how many keys


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

you have left based on the web altogether. So this one-time use policy is a fundamental


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

concept behind Quantum-resistant asymmetric encryption. Each key pair is presented to the network


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

only one time, and any keys that attempt to be reused will be automatically rejected.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So what is all this mean? It means that every time you submit a transaction, a counter on your


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

wallet decrements by one. You need to generate a new wallet and transfer your Q1 over to it before


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

it reaches zero. The takeaway here is that you are creating NIST draft recommended Q1


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

on them secure wallet. Your funds are current tech, future step tech secure using state of the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

art encryption, but this additional complexity is what is keeping your digital asset secure for


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

now and in the future. So let's talk about how to store your private key information. Security


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

professional consensus is that a hardware wallet is the best option here. QRL is compatible


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

with the ledger hardware line of products. If you buy one, I definitely recommend you buy it


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

from Dub Dub Dub Ledger.com. There have been a few scams circulating around in which a second


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

hand wall has been sold as new and the instructions inside them have been replaced by someone with


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

less than pure and honest intentions. Whether or not you use a hardware wallet or not, you'll need


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

to store your private wallet information somewhere. Now this area is a little bit debatable, but


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

here are some reasonable options to consider. You can download your wallet, JSON file, after you


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

create it on the website and pass from protected without any third party software. This is pretty


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

easy. You can, whenever you want to open your wallet, you just take your file and upload it to the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

website. Make sure you use a strong password and keep it off any network attached device,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

especially any internet network attached device, for example, two USB drives and different locations.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Another option is you can take information and write it down by hand and keep at least two physical


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

paper copies in separate secure locations. A disadvantage is that you'll need to write down the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

information from the website manually. And if you do this, that's always prone to error.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

A third option is you can use a program called key pass and put your private information there.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Key pass is free wear. That's trusted by Fortune 500 companies for years.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

It's for a secure pass or storage. This might be useful if you have multiple keys across multiple


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

currencies, but you still have the issue in that you need a complex password to keep somewhere.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So if you still have questions, you can join our Discord community. We have an active


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and vibrant community there. That's full of discussion. And you can find our website at


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

www.dub-dub.qRL.org. And our online documentation is at docs.duck-qRL.org.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Thanks for watching. More videos to come. Thanks. Welcome back everyone. Michael Stray,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

AK Strike Attack. And this is the official Quantum Resistance Ledger channel, your video


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

portal into Pulse Quantum Blockchain Digital Asset Security. This video is part two of two. We're


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

going to show you how to create a wallet step-by-step through the Graphical User Interface.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So without further ado, let's get started. I'm going to walk you through creating a wallet step-by-step


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and explain things along the way. So the first thing we're going to do is we are going to go to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

a website, passwordgenerator.net. We're not going to create a password quite yet, but this is one


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

option as far as just being able to generate a secure password quickly. It's something I use.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And it's just an easy quick tool. So keep that open on your screen. And we're going to go to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

www.dub-dub-duck-qRL.org. And we're going to download the desktop wallet. So we'll save that.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

We're going to check our downloads folder. We're going to have a couple different versions in there.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And we're going to install this.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And go ahead and just let it run through the installation.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

All right, well, it's done. It does take a little bit of time in Windows, so just be a little bit


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

patient there. So let's go on to the next step. Close this. It's worth mentioning that the web wallet


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

that you can see on the screen down here has the same function. You can do, you can create a wallet here.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

The difference is that we're creating a wallet offline. It's a little bit more secure.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

If there was anything installed on the PC or cameras or something like that that, you know,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

that you weren't aware of, it's a little bit more secure to generate a wallet offline.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So let's go on to the next step. So now that we have the wallet installed,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

we are going to take ourselves offline. But let's first make sure that we are online.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

We'll just set up some pings to Google here.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And there's even a better way to do this.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Tell that tunnel, dabbling, and lights.nl. This will actually play Star Wars.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

There's a telenet session, which is my personal favorite to make sure that you're connected


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

to the internet. Put this right there. And what I'm going to do next is pull out my ethernet adapter.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So now I'm offline.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And windows, typically jump in here.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Now I have good rest as you're offline.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

8.8.8 has stopped and the telenet has stopped. So we are offline. So let's do this.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Generate a QRL wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Okay. And while that's loading, we're going to go back to our generated password.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

This will generate a password on your machine.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

It does not send it across the internet. Since we're off the internet, that seems to check out.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

For now, I'm just going to put everything in the null pad to keep things simple.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So we're going to go to wallet. We're going to take that passphrase.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

We're generated.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And we're going to create a wallet this way. So this is, if you can see on the right here,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

the description, this is what's going to encrypt your wallet file that you'll be able to download.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Keep this passphrase. You're going to need it. Here you can select the tree height. We went


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

over tree heights and one time signatures in the previous video. So I'm going to select one of,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

I'm going to select 4,096. I'll keep this hashing algorithm as a default. There's a few different


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

options are here, all of which are secure. We're going to create a wallet. And that was pretty quick.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

A little disclaimer there.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So this is all of your wallet information. This is the most important information that you need to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

keep. So here we have your passphrase that we used that we created. This is your public key that


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

you can give to anyone. This is your new manic phrase for retrieving your wallet or opening your wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And this is your hex seed key, which also can be used to open your wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So there's three different ways to open your wallet here. You'll be able to, we're going to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

we're going to save this and we're going to save a secure wallet file.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Which is under downloads.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And the three different ways are through this mnemonic phrase, you can open your wallet. You can open


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

your wallet through this hex seed or you can also open your wallet by simply using your JSON file,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

which is password protected based on this password that we created right there.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So what we're going to do is close this down now. We have our wallet created. We'll close the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

password generator. We don't need that anymore. Put that away. Close this.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And of course we are offline still. So let's plug in the ethernet adapter and go back online.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

You can see Google is returning.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Looks like telling that Star Wars doesn't recover.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

All right, so we'll go back to www.cural.org. Let's just go into web wallet


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and let's open up the wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Good. Good. Different ways. You have all this information saved. I'll just copy this to the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

clipboard right here. You can open your wallet with the mnemonic phrase.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And it's coming up just now. There it is. Your wallet is open.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

It's close to the wallet. You can also open up with a hex seed.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Here.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

I'll open up in just a moment and the other way is you can open up


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

with your JSON file. Close the wallet back down over here.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

We'll go to wallet file. We're going to browse the wallet to my downloads.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

JSON and we're going to type in the password that we typed in earlier.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And that will open up.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And it's also worth mentioning that the preferred option here, the most secure option,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

is obviously a hardware wallet. You can find that on www.ludger.com. You would open your wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

You would plug in your wallet through ledger nano here. You would plug it in to USB.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And it would just open it up through your ledger. So there's one other thing that we need to go


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

over. We talked about one time signature schemes in the in the Merkel tree. So let's


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

if you want to check anyone can check any public address and how many won't OTS's it has.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

You so I type in the public address here, which is you're probably going to do that.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

You share out to someone if you want to be able to have them send you a quantum.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So right here, this is all. This is all.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

All right, here this is all private information here. And this is public.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Keep this locked down as secure as possible and you can share this out.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Okay, so if you see the OTS tracker here, this is the number of times that you can submit a


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

transaction to the network. As you can see, you have lots of options. You can actually go over


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

262,000. It just takes a little bit of time to create. But as you use your as a


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

performance transaction on the on the blockchain, these will start to go red and you'll be able to see


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

that. So that's it. If you have any other questions, those are all the best, those are best practices


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

step by step how to create a wallet. If you have any other questions or anything like that,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

just feel free to join our discord community red dub dub dub dub dot ql dot org or you can also visit


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

docs dot dot ql dot org. Thanks for watching more videos to come.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Welcome, curl and crypto enthusiasts, Michael strike, aka strike attack. Welcome back to your


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

official quantum resistant ledger channel, your video portal into pulse quantum digital asset


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

security. Today, we're going to go over the advantages of running a node on the network.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Then a follow up video, I'm going to walk you through step by step, different ways to get you


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

started, but let's go over some of the fundamentals first. Okay, so what's a note in the first place?


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

A note is a service that runs on a server or any computer that can be run by anyone with internet


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

access and minimal hardware in order to support the network through validating or rejecting


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

submitted transactions and then really in those results to other nodes through a peer-to-peer


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

protocol. This is fundamentally different than mining or simply owning a wallet and then you are


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

actually part of the network. Miners perform the work to solve problems and nodes approve or deny


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

their submissions. In other words, nodes had nodes have a direct vote on what is approved to be


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

written to the blockchain. So it's also worth mentioning that mining is generally referred to and


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

talking about proof of work algorithms such as crypto night, which the goal is to cryptographically


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

solve difficult puzzles. If you know what happens to find approved of work solution, it keeps the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

entire reward. In proof of stake, instead of miners, there are validators. The validators will


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

stake or lock up their crypto in the blockchain and while the rules on how rewards are given are


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

different from implementation implementation, the more stake generally means a higher reward.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

As you know, one of the core values of blockchain is decentralization. If you use a pool,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

you're relying on them to not only be available in online, but also to properly relay your


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

transactions to the network. But if you run your own QRL node, you don't need anybody,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

except other nodes to submit your transactions and the transaction of others, which reduces your


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

overall counter-party risk. Many of us have also heard of the concept of zero trust or trustless


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

consensus. In crypto land, running a node is a little bit analogous to a declaration of crypto


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

sovereignty. While you're still part of the network, you're acting on your own behalf and taking


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

an active role in pioneering blockchain technology forward. Running a node also makes you an


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

active participant in the project, giving you the ability to vote into what eventually gets


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

irrefutably written into the blockchain. So let's go over any potential disadvantages.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

You'll need some technical expertise on how to spin one up, but I'm going to walk you through it


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

in a future video. As of right now, the disk-based requirements are pretty low under 10 gig.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Also, if you do mine from your node, you won't get the trickle of quanta like you would from


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

mining to a pool. But think about Gradleby when you find your first block and get the first reward


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and decide to tell all your friends. Well, maybe not that last part. Depending on your perspective,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

this could also be an additional advantage. You'll need a computer to run the node


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

on, but this can be accomplished using VMs, simple computers, background processes, and many other


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

different ways. Okay, so you've got your node up and running now what? The QRL online web wallet,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

downloadable wallet, and mobile wallet can connect to a custom node. If you do have your own


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

node, it's recommended that use one of those options to connect it to your node's internal IP


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

address. Connecting from the online web wallet to your external IP address will probably fail


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

unless you have network address translation configured on your firewall, which comes with a whole


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

different list of security considerations. And that's it. If you want to get started right now,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

be sure to visit docs.duck QRL.org. If you want a quick startup guide on this topic, be sure to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

check out the Docker node that's listed on the website. If you have more questions,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

feel free to join our active QRL community on Discord. Thanks for watching, and be sure to keep


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

an eye on for the next video in which we'll walk you through step by step on spinning up the node


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

for yourself. Take care and thank you.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Welcome back, crypto and quantum YouTubers to the official Quantum Resistance


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Lighter channel, your video portal, and the pulse quantum digital asset security.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Today we're going to go over one of the features of the QRL 2020 Bromine hard fork,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

specifically multi-signature transactions or multi-sig for short. So multi-sigs are relatively new,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

right? Well, kind of. Personally, I kind of wanted to know where it came from. So I started it again.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

According to internet lore, multi-sigs first use was recorded, going back thousands of years in


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

which partial keys were given to Byzantine monks in order to safeguard precious relics.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

In this way, no one key could be used to open the door today, access them. The monks at the time


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

were seeking what we would call a secure custody solution, and while this may seem like a bit of an


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

antiquated representation, the concept still applies. Even more interesting, if you look at the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

recent popularity of hard wallets such as crypto steel or people engraving,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

new mount up phrases and the different types of mediums, I was reminded of the first known


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

encrypted tax discovered in Egyptian tomb in 1900 BC. It didn't become hard to see some of the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

interesting correlations between ancient custody and cryptographic practices that were once used


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

by our ancestors that eventually evolved and repurposed for what we use today. So regarding the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

rest of multi-seig, I'm going to keep this pretty high level. Multi-sig is all about security.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Paper wallets can be burned, fade, or thrown away by a significant other if left on the kitchen


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

counter while you are searching for that perfect hiding place, not that that has ever happened.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Harder wallets can be opened under duress. Mobile walls can get lost with a smartphone and third-party


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

custody solutions can come with counterparty risk, as far as hacks or exit scams. So possession


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

might be 9-10ths of the law, but with crypto possessing the private key is the law. With multi-seig,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

a different approach is taken in that custody of funds and transactions are shared across different


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

users. This can reduce risk by decentralizing custody, helping to remove the human equation,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

acts of God or mistakes as a single point of failure, and you know subsequently a loss of funds.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So instead of going through all of the details, some of this is probably a little bit confusing.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

I'm not going to list them all out. For click by click instructions, go to docs.duckurl.org


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and follow through the steps. Step number one, create a multi-seig wallet. Remember this is not a normal


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

wallet that you can log into. It does not have one-time signature scheme limitations. It's a shared


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

wallet that is owned by signatories that can be weighted and threshold set based on whatever is entered


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

when it's created. You can't log into it and also there's no new money key or hexade,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

so follow the instructions on the website and it'll become a lot more clear.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Step number two, populate the wallet with some funds from another wallet.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Need some come from anywhere. When you create the multi-seig wallet, it will show you the public


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

average to send to and that's how you populate it with funds. Step number three, select the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

multi-seig wallet and or set you created and submit a proposed transaction to be approved or


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

disapproved by the signatories. Step number four, that's it. Voting is performed by the signatories


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and once a threshold is met, the transaction is executed and submitted to the blockchain.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So what are a few use case scenarios in which we could do, in which we would use this technology?


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

One example might be a joint account in which both parties have a weight of one. Another example


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

might be a hedge fund or institutional account in which three parties have a weight of one


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and the transaction threshold is set to two. If two parties sign the transaction, it's executed,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

approved and sent through. Trustless escrow. The could use the eBay example, I'm going to use


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

a different one. Your friend offered you a generous price for your GPU gaming rate because he


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

just heard about this crypto thing and he really wants to start mining. But he hasn't quite paid


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

you back for that night of which neither of you speak about anymore and you bailed him out of a


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

jam sometime ago. Let's just say trust is less than 100%. So you tell him that this would be a good


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

way for him to spin up and get more knowledge about crypto. You create a multi-seig transaction


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

with three parties in a threshold of two. The third party is someone you both trust so that


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

he or she can be a third party mediator in case you two don't agree. You didn't over exaggerate


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

the hash rates I'm assuming. So once he receives the rig, you sign the transaction before he figures


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

out that there's not really any money left to GPU mining. Irrespective of anything else,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

if things don't go well or if rig gets lost in the mail, your third party can decide to approve


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

or deny the transaction and sorry I know the to the GPU miners out there it's probably a little


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

too soon to run that joke. If it does help I was one too. But that's it. Thank you for watching.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Next we're going to cover ephemeral messaging in a future video. It's a great conversation for


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

small talk and social events. Well depending on who you're talking to and the event I guess.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

But thank you for watching. Subscribe if you'd like what you see here and for more detail. Again,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

see docs.duckcural.org. Thanks.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Welcome back everyone to the official quantum resistant ledger channel your video


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

portal in the post quantum digital asset security. So since the successful launch of QRL 2.0,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

we've been talking a lot about multi-sick, the ephemeral messaging, randomx proof of work, proof of


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

stake, xyz element, op etc etc. We focused a lot on new material, new features, walk throughs


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and other really great things that are happening with this project. I was giving this some thought


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

and I think it makes us to take a technical material breather and circle back a little bit to who we


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

are, what we're doing so that new comforts for the project can get caught up to speed. So if you


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

knew to the QRL, you want to know what it is, you want to know what we do and why we do it.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

This video is written just for you. It wouldn't be a good start without first talking about the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

team behind the project. So a little summary on that. We're made up of a bunch of forward thinking,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

technology, enthusiasts across the world, the varying professional technical backgrounds and disciplines.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Despite indifference in areas of expertise, one thing in common is that we're all quantum


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

computer optimists that believe we are witnessing one of the greatest most technological revolutions


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

since the television, the personal computer, the internet, the smartphone, pick. If you're


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

familiar with what quantum computing is, there's a lot of information and equally as much


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

misinformation online about it. YouTube is a good place to start. So in the near future,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

quantum computers will play the role of a bit of a double agent, having the ability to both


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

strengthen some industries and disrupt others. It's fairly well accepted that quantum computers


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

have use cases and molecular simulation which can lead to new drug discoveries,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

scenario simulations such as evaluating risk, pricing, things that might be beneficial to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

financial markets, optimization advantages, such as supply to change management and logistics.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And there's some fringe use cases that people talk about in respective to artificial intelligence.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

And of course, there's a little thing called factorization which leads us into the next topic.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So the 1970s brought us a lot of interesting things that helped define the decade, Star Wars,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Pong, Southern Night Live and the movie Jaws. One thing in particular that stood the test of time,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

okay, Star Wars has stood the test of time as well. It's something known as asymmetric cryptography,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

which today is as important as the internal combustion or electric lighting, but as invisible


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

to society, yet equally as it's indispensable as, for example, radio waves. Starting in the 1970s,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

all modern public-private key cryptography, the kind that secures your credit card on the web,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

secures your smartphone, encrypts your bank transactions, and almost certainly all of the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

cryptocurrencies in your portfolio rely on something called factorization to encrypt it.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

Factorization, simply put, is breaking down a number into smaller numbers


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

that when multiplied together give you that original number. For example, multiplying 4,289


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

with 3,559 is easy to do and will give you a result of 15,264,551. But doing this in reverse order


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

is much more difficult. Now, suppose you want to find the two prime numbers that when multiplied


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

together equal to very large number, as this number increases, this becomes exponentially more


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

difficult, as there is no classical way to efficiently solve this problem. And therefore,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

this became the basis of all modern public-private key cryptography, including Bitcoin.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So enter the quantum computer. Instead of approaching the problem by brute force, forcing your


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

way through on a classical computer with a slide-chamber, quantum computers have the ability to


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

use nature itself in a strange world of subatomic phenomena to try multiple combinations to get


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

the solution all at the same time. This simple advantage is what makes the technology so disruptive.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So at the time of this article, there are two commercial quantum computers available, one by


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

B.M., and one by D. Wave. These can be purchased and are being purchased by large organizations.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

So how do quantum computers resolve this factorization issue? In 1994, Peter Shor of AT&T Bell Labs,


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

in New Jersey, discovered an algorithm that allows for polynomial time in a geofactorization.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

This means that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer would be able to theoretically


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

calculate a private key from a public key, allowing effortless decryption of whatever was


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

secured by that private key. In the case of Bitcoin, this would translate the access to the complete


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

wallet. This also applies to almost all other altcoins in the marketplace today.


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

This algorithm became known as Shor's algorithm, and for a while remain to curiosity in the


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

back of cryptographers everywhere, but fast forward in 2020, while Shor's isn't the only algorithm


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

available to solve this problem, it is the most well-known. Over time, the question of quantum computing


Quantum Resistant Ledger TV

using Chore algorithm or one of its variants will become cryptographically disruptive.