CVE-2023-50722 (published 2023-12-15T19:15Z)

XWiki Platform is a generic wiki platform. Starting in 2.3 and prior to versions 14.10.15, 15.5.2, and 15.7-rc-1, there is a reflected XSS or also direct remote code execution vulnerability in the code for displaying configurable admin sections. The code that can be passed through a URL parameter is only executed when the user who is visiting the crafted URL has edit right on at least one configuration section. While any user of the wiki could easily create such a section, this vulnerability doesn't require the attacker to have an account or any access on the wiki. It is sufficient to trick any admin user of the XWiki installation to visit the crafted URL. This vulnerability allows full remote code execution with programming rights and thus impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. This has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.15, 15.5.2 and 15.7RC1. The patch can be manually applied to the document `XWiki.ConfigurableClass`.\n

CVSS v3 base score: 8.8, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-352
cwe_name: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
description: The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
extended_description: When a web server is designed to receive a request from a client without any mechanism for verifying that it was intentionally sent, then it might be possible for an attacker to trick a client into making an unintentional request to the web server which will be treated as an authentic request. This can be done via a URL, image load, XMLHttpRequest, etc. and can result in exposure of data or unintended code execution.
         
cwe_id: CWE-79
cwe_name: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
description: The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
extended_description: 
            Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities occur when:
            
               Untrusted data enters a web application, typically from a web request.
               The web application dynamically generates a web page that contains this untrusted data.
               During page generation, the application does not prevent the data from containing content that is executable by a web browser, such as JavaScript, HTML tags, HTML attributes, mouse events, Flash, ActiveX, etc.
               A victim visits the generated web page through a web browser, which contains malicious script that was injected using the untrusted data.
               Since the script comes from a web page that was sent by the web server, the victim's web browser executes the malicious script in the context of the web server's domain.
               This effectively violates the intention of the web browser's same-origin policy, which states that scripts in one domain should not be able to access resources or run code in a different domain.
            
            There are three main kinds of XSS:
            
               
                  Type 1: Reflected XSS (or Non-Persistent) - 
         			The server reads data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a victim to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the victim and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces a victim to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the victim, the content is executed by the victim's browser.
               
                  Type 2: Stored XSS (or Persistent) - 
               The application stores dangerous data in a database, message forum, visitor log, or other trusted data store. At a later time, the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content. From an attacker's perspective, the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user. For example, the attacker might inject XSS into a log message, which might not be handled properly when an administrator views the logs.
            
               
                  Type 0: DOM-Based XSS - 
               In DOM-based XSS, the client performs the injection of XSS into the page; in the other types, the server performs the injection. DOM-based XSS generally involves server-controlled, trusted script that is sent to the client, such as Javascript that performs sanity checks on a form before the user submits it. If the server-supplied script processes user-supplied data and then injects it back into the web page (such as with dynamic HTML), then DOM-based XSS is possible.
            
            
            Once the malicious script is injected, the attacker can perform a variety of malicious activities. The attacker could transfer private information, such as cookies that may include session information, from the victim's machine to the attacker. The attacker could send malicious requests to a web site on behalf of the victim, which could be especially dangerous to the site if the victim has administrator privileges to manage that site. Phishing attacks could be used to emulate trusted web sites and trick the victim into entering a password, allowing the attacker to compromise the victim's account on that web site. Finally, the script could exploit a vulnerability in the web browser itself possibly taking over the victim's machine, sometimes referred to as "drive-by hacking."
            In many cases, the attack can be launched without the victim even being aware of it. Even with careful users, attackers frequently use a variety of methods to encode the malicious portion of the attack, such as URL encoding or Unicode, so the request looks less suspicious.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform
author: Michael Hamann
author_date: 2023-08-02 14:04:16+02:00
msg: XWIKI-21167: Improve escaping of space parameter in ConfigurableClass
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform
repo_name: xwiki/xwiki-platform
description: The XWiki platform
repo_language: Java
owner: xwiki
file_changes: filename: ConfigurableClass.xml
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@
   #if($globaladmin)
     #set($queryString = "editor=globaladmin&amp;amp;section=")
   #else
-    #set($queryString = "space=${currentSpace}&amp;amp;section=")
+    #set($queryString = "space=$escapetool.url($currentSpace)&amp;amp;section=")
     #if($request.getParameter('editor'))
       #set($queryString = "editor=$escapetool.url($request.getParameter('editor'))&amp;amp;$queryString")
     #end

programming_language: PHP
filename: ConfigurableClassPageTest.java
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -19,10 +19,13 @@
  */
 package org.xwiki.administration;
 
+import java.net.URI;
+import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.Map;
 import java.util.Objects;
 
+import org.apache.http.client.utils.URLEncodedUtils;
 import org.jsoup.nodes.Document;
 import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
 import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
@@ -54,6 +57,7 @@
 import com.xpn.xwiki.objects.BaseObject;
 
 import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.fail;
 import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
 import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyInt;
 import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString;
@@ -208,4 +212,39 @@ void escapeNonViewableSections() throws Exception
         assertEquals(String.format("xe.admin.configurable.noViewAccessSomeApplications [[%s]]", MY_SECTION_SERIALIZED),
             errorMessage);
     }
+
+    @Test
+    void escapeSectionLink() throws Exception
+    {
+        // Create a new section document.
+        XWikiDocument mySectionDoc = new XWikiDocument(MY_SECTION);
+        BaseObject object = mySectionDoc.newXObject(CONFIGURABLE_CLASS, this.context);
+        object.setStringValue("displayInCategory", "other");
+        object.setStringValue("displayInSection", "other");
+        object.set("scope", "WIKI+ALL_SPACES", this.context);
+        this.xwiki.saveDocument(mySectionDoc, this.context);
+
+        // Make sure the section document is returned by the query and the user has access to edit.
+        when(this.query.execute()).thenReturn(List.of(MY_SECTION_SERIALIZED)).thenReturn(List.of());
+        when(this.oldcore.getMockRightService()
+            .hasAccessLevel(eq("edit"), any(), any(), any())).thenReturn(true);
+
+        // Set a new document with space ">{{/html}}{{noscript /}} as context document to check escaping of the
+        // current space.
+        String spaceName = "\">{{/html}}{{noscript /}}";
+        DocumentReference docRef = new DocumentReference(WIKI_NAME, spaceName, "WebHome");
+        XWikiDocument contextDoc = new XWikiDocument(docRef);
+        this.xwiki.saveDocument(contextDoc, this.context);
+        this.context.setDoc(contextDoc);
+
+        XWikiDocument doc = loadPage(CONFIGURABLE_CLASS);
+        Document htmlPage = renderHTMLPage(doc);
+        String link = Objects.requireNonNull(htmlPage.selectFirst("li.other a")).attr("href");
+        URI uri = new URI(link);
+        // Parse the query parameters and check the space name.
+        URLEncodedUtils.parse(uri, StandardCharsets.UTF_8).stream()
+            .filter(pair -> pair.getName().equals("space"))
+            .findFirst()
+            .ifPresentOrElse(pair -> assertEquals(spaceName, pair.getValue()), () -> fail("No space parameter in URL"));
+    }
 }

programming_language: Java