CVE-2017-5986 (published 2017-02-18T21:59Z)

Race condition in the sctp_wait_for_sndbuf function in net/sctp/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.11 allows local users to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and panic) via a multithreaded application that peels off an association in a certain buffer-full state.

Severity: HIGH
CVSS v2 base score: 7.1 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C)
CVSS v3 base score: 5.5, MEDIUM (CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-362
cwe_name: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
description: The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
extended_description: 
            This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
            A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
            A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
               
                  Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
                  Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
               
            A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
            The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.
         
         
cwe_id: CWE-617
cwe_name: Reachable Assertion
description: The product contains an assert() or similar statement that can be triggered by an attacker, which leads to an application exit or other behavior that is more severe than necessary.
extended_description: 
            While assertion is good for catching logic errors and reducing the chances of reaching more serious vulnerability conditions, it can still lead to a denial of service.
            For example, if a server handles multiple simultaneous connections, and an assert() occurs in one single connection that causes all other connections to be dropped, this is a reachable assertion that leads to a denial of service.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
author: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
author_date: 2017-02-06 18:10:31-02:00
msg: sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf

Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.

This patch replaces the BUG_ON call with a proper error handling. It
will return -EPIPE to the original sendmsg call, similarly to what would
have been done if the association wasn't found in the first place.

Acked-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
repo_name: torvalds/linux
description: Linux kernel source tree
repo_language: C
owner: torvalds
file_changes: filename: socket.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -7426,7 +7426,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p,
 		 */
 		release_sock(sk);
 		current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
-		BUG_ON(sk != asoc->base.sk);
+		if (sk != asoc->base.sk)
+			goto do_error;
 		lock_sock(sk);
 
 		*timeo_p = current_timeo;

programming_language: C