CVE-2017-17852 (published 2017-12-27T17:08Z)

kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging mishandling of 32-bit ALU ops.

Severity: HIGH
CVSS v2 base score: 7.2 (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
CVSS v3 base score: 7.8, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-119
cwe_name: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
description: The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it reads from or writes to a memory location outside the buffer's intended boundary. This may result in read or write operations on unexpected memory locations that could be linked to other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
extended_description: 
            Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
author: Jann Horn
author_date: 2017-12-18 20:11:56-08:00
msg: bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification

32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.

Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
repo_name: torvalds/linux
description: Linux kernel source tree
repo_language: C
owner: torvalds
file_changes: filename: verifier.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -2017,6 +2017,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* WARNING: This function does calculations on 64-bit values, but the actual
+ * execution may occur on 32-bit values. Therefore, things like bitshifts
+ * need extra checks in the 32-bit case.
+ */
 static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				      struct bpf_insn *insn,
 				      struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
@@ -2027,12 +2031,8 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	bool src_known, dst_known;
 	s64 smin_val, smax_val;
 	u64 umin_val, umax_val;
+	u64 insn_bitness = (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) ? 64 : 32;
 
-	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
-		/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
-		coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
-		coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
-	}
 	smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
 	smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
 	umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
@@ -2168,9 +2168,9 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
 		break;
 	case BPF_LSH:
-		if (umax_val > 63) {
-			/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined.  This includes
-			 * shifts by a negative number.
+		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
+			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
+			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
 			 */
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 			break;
@@ -2196,9 +2196,9 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
 		break;
 	case BPF_RSH:
-		if (umax_val > 63) {
-			/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined.  This includes
-			 * shifts by a negative number.
+		if (umax_val >= insn_bitness) {
+			/* Shifts greater than 31 or 63 are undefined.
+			 * This includes shifts by a negative number.
 			 */
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
 			break;
@@ -2234,6 +2234,12 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		break;
 	}
 
+	if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
+		/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->32 */
+		coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
+		coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
+	}
+
 	__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
 	__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 	return 0;

programming_language: C