CVE-2023-45143 (published 2023-10-12T17:15Z)

Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client written from scratch for Node.js. Prior to version 5.26.2, Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since undici handles headers more liberally than the spec, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a third-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the third party site. This was patched in version 5.26.2. There are no known workarounds.

CVSS v3 base score: 3.5, LOW (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-200
cwe_name: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
description: The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
extended_description: 
	   There are many different kinds of mistakes that introduce information exposures. The severity of the error can range widely, depending on the context in which the product operates, the type of sensitive information that is revealed, and the benefits it may provide to an attacker.  Some kinds of sensitive information include:
       
         private, personal information, such as personal messages, financial data, health records, geographic location, or contact details
         system status and environment, such as the operating system and installed packages
		 business secrets and intellectual property
		 network status and configuration
		 the product's own code or internal state
         metadata, e.g. logging of connections or message headers
		 indirect information, such as a discrepancy between two internal operations that can be observed by an outsider
       
	    Information might be sensitive to different parties, each of which may have their own expectations for whether the information should be protected.  These parties include:
               
                  the product's own users
                  people or organizations whose information is created or used by the product, even if they are not direct product users
		  the product's administrators, including the admins of the system(s) and/or networks on which the product operates
                  the developer
               
	    Information exposures can occur in different ways:
               
                  the code explicitly inserts sensitive information into resources or messages that are intentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors, but should not contain the information - i.e., the information should have been "scrubbed" or "sanitized"
                  a different weakness or mistake indirectly inserts the sensitive information into resources, such as a web script error revealing the full system path of the program.
                  the code manages resources that intentionally contain sensitive information, but the resources are unintentionally made accessible to unauthorized actors. In this case, the information exposure is resultant - i.e., a different weakness enabled the access to the information in the first place.
               
	    It is common practice to describe any loss of confidentiality as an "information exposure," but this can lead to overuse of CWE-200 in CWE mapping. From the CWE perspective, loss of confidentiality is a technical impact that can arise from dozens of different weaknesses, such as insecure file permissions or out-of-bounds read.  CWE-200 and its lower-level descendants are intended to cover the mistakes that occur in behaviors that explicitly manage, store, transfer, or cleanse sensitive information.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/nodejs/undici
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/nodejs/undici
author: Khafra
author_date: 2023-10-11 14:56:38-04:00
msg: Merge pull request from GHSA-wqq4-5wpv-mx2g

* fix: delete 'cookie' and 'host' headers on cross-origin redirect

* apply suggestion
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/nodejs/undici
repo_name: nodejs/undici
description: An HTTP/1.1 client, written from scratch for Node.js
repo_language: JavaScript
owner: nodejs
file_changes: filename: index.js
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -1200,6 +1200,10 @@ async function httpRedirectFetch (fetchParams, response) {
   if (!sameOrigin(requestCurrentURL(request), locationURL)) {
     // https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#cors-non-wildcard-request-header-name
     request.headersList.delete('authorization')
+
+    // "Cookie" and "Host" are forbidden request-headers, which undici doesn't implement.
+    request.headersList.delete('cookie')
+    request.headersList.delete('host')
   }
 
   // 14. If request’s body is non-null, then set request’s body to the first return

programming_language: JavaScript
filename: redirect-cross-origin-header.js
change_type: ModificationType.ADD
diff: @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+'use strict'
+
+const { test } = require('tap')
+const { createServer } = require('http')
+const { once } = require('events')
+const { fetch } = require('../..')
+
+test('Cross-origin redirects clear forbidden headers', async (t) => {
+  t.plan(5)
+
+  const server1 = createServer((req, res) => {
+    t.equal(req.headers.cookie, undefined)
+    t.equal(req.headers.authorization, undefined)
+
+    res.end('redirected')
+  }).listen(0)
+
+  const server2 = createServer((req, res) => {
+    t.equal(req.headers.authorization, 'test')
+    t.equal(req.headers.cookie, 'ddd=dddd')
+
+    res.writeHead(302, {
+      ...req.headers,
+      Location: `http://localhost:${server1.address().port}`
+    })
+    res.end()
+  }).listen(0)
+
+  t.teardown(() => {
+    server1.close()
+    server2.close()
+  })
+
+  await Promise.all([
+    once(server1, 'listening'),
+    once(server2, 'listening')
+  ])
+
+  const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${server2.address().port}`, {
+    headers: {
+      Authorization: 'test',
+      Cookie: 'ddd=dddd'
+    }
+  })
+
+  const text = await res.text()
+  t.equal(text, 'redirected')
+})

programming_language: JavaScript