CVE-2017-17712 (published 2017-12-16T01:29Z)

The raw_sendmsg() function in net/ipv4/raw.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.6 has a race condition in inet->hdrincl that leads to uninitialized stack pointer usage; this allows a local user to execute code and gain privileges.

Severity: MEDIUM
CVSS v2 base score: 6.9 (AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
CVSS v3 base score: 7.0, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-362
cwe_name: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
description: The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
extended_description: 
            This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
            A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
            A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
               
                  Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
                  Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
               
            A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
            The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
author: Mohamed Ghannam
author_date: 2017-12-10 03:50:58+00:00
msg: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg

inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.

Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
repo_name: torvalds/linux
description: Linux kernel source tree
repo_language: C
owner: torvalds
file_changes: filename: raw.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -513,11 +513,16 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	int err;
 	struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
 	struct raw_frag_vec rfv;
+	int hdrincl;
 
 	err = -EMSGSIZE;
 	if (len > 0xFFFF)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* hdrincl should be READ_ONCE(inet->hdrincl)
+	 * but READ_ONCE() doesn't work with bit fields
+	 */
+	hdrincl = inet->hdrincl;
 	/*
 	 *	Check the flags.
 	 */
@@ -593,7 +598,7 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 		/* Linux does not mangle headers on raw sockets,
 		 * so that IP options + IP_HDRINCL is non-sense.
 		 */
-		if (inet->hdrincl)
+		if (hdrincl)
 			goto done;
 		if (ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
 			if (!daddr)
@@ -615,12 +620,12 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 
 	flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
 			   RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
-			   inet->hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
+			   hdrincl ? IPPROTO_RAW : sk->sk_protocol,
 			   inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) |
-			    (inet->hdrincl ? FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH : 0),
+			    (hdrincl ? FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH : 0),
 			   daddr, saddr, 0, 0, sk->sk_uid);
 
-	if (!inet->hdrincl) {
+	if (!hdrincl) {
 		rfv.msg = msg;
 		rfv.hlen = 0;
 
@@ -645,7 +650,7 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 		goto do_confirm;
 back_from_confirm:
 
-	if (inet->hdrincl)
+	if (hdrincl)
 		err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, &fl4, msg, len,
 				      &rt, msg->msg_flags, &ipc.sockc);
 

programming_language: C