CVE-2022-24805 (published 2024-04-16T20:15Z)

net-snmp provides various tools relating to the Simple Network Management Protocol. Prior to version 5.9.2, a buffer overflow in the handling of the `INDEX` of             `NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB` can cause an out-of-bounds memory access. A user with read-only credentials can exploit the issue. Version 5.9.2 contains a patch. Users should use strong SNMPv3 credentials and avoid sharing the credentials. Those who must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c should use a complex community string and enhance the protection by restricting access to a given IP address range.\n


Weakness information:
cwe_id: NVD-CWE-noinfo
cwe_name: Insufficient Information
description: There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified.
extended_description: Insufficient Information

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
author: Wes Hardaker
author_date: 2022-06-22 15:00:17-07:00
msg: updates to CHANGES/NEWS
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
repo_name: net-snmp/net-snmp
description: A SNMP application library, tools and daemon
repo_language: C
owner: net-snmp
file_changes: filename: CHANGES
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -4,10 +4,28 @@ a summary of the major changes, and the ChangeLog file for a comprehensive
 listing of all changes made to the code.
 
 *5.9.2*:
-    misc:
-      - snmp-create-v3-user: Fix the snmpd.conf path   @datadir@ is
-	expanded in ${datarootdir} so datarootdir must be set before
-	@datadir@ is used.
+    security:
+      - These two CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-only credentials:
+          - CVE-2022-24805 A buffer overflow in the handling of the INDEX of
+            NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB can cause an out-of-bounds memory access.
+          - CVE-2022-24809 A malformed OID in a GET-NEXT to the nsVacmAccessTable
+            can cause a NULL pointer dereference.
+      - These CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-write credentials:
+          - CVE-2022-24806 Improper Input Validation when SETing malformed
+            OIDs in master agent and subagent simultaneously
+          - CVE-2022-24807 A malformed OID in a SET request to
+            SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB::vacmAccessTable can cause an
+            out-of-bounds memory access.
+          - CVE-2022-24808 A malformed OID in a SET request to
+            NET-SNMP-AGENT-MIB::nsLogTable can cause a NULL pointer dereference
+          - CVE-2022-24810 A malformed OID in a SET to the nsVacmAccessTable
+            can cause a NULL pointer dereference.
+      - To avoid these flaws, use strong SNMPv3 credentials and do not share them.
+        If you must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, use a complex community string
+        and enhance the protection by restricting access to a given IP address range.
+      - Thanks are due to Yu Zhang of VARAS@IIE and Nanyu Zhong of VARAS@IIE for
+        reporting the following CVEs that have been fixed in this release, and
+        to Arista Networks for providing fixes.
 
     Windows:
       - WinExtDLL: Fix multiple compiler warnings
@@ -27,6 +45,10 @@ listing of all changes made to the code.
       - Moved transport code into a separate subdirectory in snmplib
       - Snmplib: remove inline versions of container funcs".
 
+    misc:
+      - snmp-create-v3-user: Fix the snmpd.conf path   @datadir@ is
+	expanded in ${datarootdir} so datarootdir must be set before
+	@datadir@ is used.
 
 *5.9.1*:
     General: Many bug fixes

programming_language: Markdown
filename: NEWS
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -4,13 +4,36 @@ that have been fixed/applied, and the ChangeLog file for a comprehensive
 listing of all changes made to the code.
 
 *5.9.2*:
-    general: Many bug fixes
+    security:
+      - These two CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-only credentials:
+          - CVE-2022-24805 A buffer overflow in the handling of the INDEX of
+            NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB can cause an out-of-bounds memory access.
+          - CVE-2022-24809 A malformed OID in a GET-NEXT to the nsVacmAccessTable
+            can cause a NULL pointer dereference.
+      - These CVEs can be exploited by a user with read-write credentials:
+          - CVE-2022-24806 Improper Input Validation when SETing malformed
+            OIDs in master agent and subagent simultaneously
+          - CVE-2022-24807 A malformed OID in a SET request to
+            SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB::vacmAccessTable can cause an
+            out-of-bounds memory access.
+          - CVE-2022-24808 A malformed OID in a SET request to
+            NET-SNMP-AGENT-MIB::nsLogTable can cause a NULL pointer dereference
+          - CVE-2022-24810 A malformed OID in a SET to the nsVacmAccessTable
+            can cause a NULL pointer dereference.
+      - To avoid these flaws, use strong SNMPv3 credentials and do not share them.
+        If you must use SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, use a complex community string
+        and enhance the protection by restricting access to a given IP address range.
+      - Thanks are due to Yu Zhang of VARAS@IIE and Nanyu Zhong of VARAS@IIE for
+        reporting the following CVEs that have been fixed in this release, and
+        to Arista Networks for providing fixes.
 
     misc:
       - Snmp-create-v3-user: Fix the snmpd.conf path   @datadir@ is
 	expanded in ${datarootdir} so datarootdir must be set before
 	@datadir@ is used.
 
+    general: Many bug fixes
+
 *5.9.1*:
     General: Many bug fixes
 

programming_language: Markdown
repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
author: Bill Fenner
author_date: 2021-06-30 14:00:28-07:00
msg: CHANGES: snmpd: fix bounds checking in NET-SNMP-AGENT-MIB, NET-SNMP-VACM-MIB, SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB, SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB

Reported by: Yu Zhang of VARAS@IIE, Nanyu Zhong of VARAS@IIE
Fixes by: Arista Networks
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/net-snmp/net-snmp
repo_name: net-snmp/net-snmp
description: A SNMP application library, tools and daemon
repo_language: C
owner: net-snmp
file_changes: filename: nsLogging.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ handle_nsLoggingTable(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
                 continue;
             logh = (netsnmp_log_handler*)netsnmp_extract_iterator_context(request);
             table_info  =                netsnmp_extract_table_info(request);
+            if (!table_info || !table_info->indexes)
+                continue;
 
             switch (table_info->colnum) {
             case NSLOGGING_TYPE:
@@ -201,6 +203,8 @@ handle_nsLoggingTable(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
             }
             logh = (netsnmp_log_handler*)netsnmp_extract_iterator_context(request);
             table_info  =                 netsnmp_extract_table_info(request);
+            if (!table_info || !table_info->indexes)
+                continue;
 
             switch (table_info->colnum) {
             case NSLOGGING_TYPE:
@@ -394,6 +398,8 @@ handle_nsLoggingTable(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
                 continue;
             logh = (netsnmp_log_handler*)netsnmp_extract_iterator_context(request);
             table_info  =                 netsnmp_extract_table_info(request);
+            if (!table_info || !table_info->indexes)
+                continue;
 
             switch (table_info->colnum) {
             case NSLOGGING_TYPE:

programming_language: C
filename: nsVacmAccessTable.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -170,9 +170,13 @@ nsVacmAccessTable_handler(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
             entry = (struct vacm_accessEntry *)
                 netsnmp_extract_iterator_context(request);
             table_info = netsnmp_extract_table_info(request);
+            if (!table_info || !table_info->indexes)
+                continue;
 
             /* Extract the authType token from the list of indexes */
             idx = table_info->indexes->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable;
+            if (idx->val_len >= sizeof(atype))
+                continue;
             memset(atype, 0, sizeof(atype));
             memcpy(atype, (char *)idx->val.string, idx->val_len);
             viewIdx = se_find_value_in_slist(VACM_VIEW_ENUM_NAME, atype);
@@ -212,6 +216,8 @@ nsVacmAccessTable_handler(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
             entry = (struct vacm_accessEntry *)
                 netsnmp_extract_iterator_context(request);
             table_info = netsnmp_extract_table_info(request);
+            if (!table_info || !table_info->indexes)
+                continue;
             ret = SNMP_ERR_NOERROR;
 
             switch (table_info->colnum) {
@@ -247,6 +253,8 @@ nsVacmAccessTable_handler(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
                  * Extract the authType token from the list of indexes
                  */
                 idx = table_info->indexes->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable;
+                if (idx->val_len >= sizeof(atype))
+                    continue;
                 memset(atype, 0, sizeof(atype));
                 memcpy(atype, (char *)idx->val.string, idx->val_len);
                 viewIdx = se_find_value_in_slist(VACM_VIEW_ENUM_NAME, atype);
@@ -294,8 +302,10 @@ nsVacmAccessTable_handler(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
                          idx = idx->next_variable;  model = *idx->val.integer;
                          idx = idx->next_variable;  level = *idx->val.integer;
                          entry = vacm_createAccessEntry( gName, cPrefix, model, level );
-                         entry->storageType = ST_NONVOLATILE;
-                         netsnmp_insert_iterator_context(request, (void*)entry);
+                         if (entry) {
+                             entry->storageType = ST_NONVOLATILE;
+                             netsnmp_insert_iterator_context(request, (void*)entry);
+                         }
                     }
                 }
             }
@@ -321,6 +331,8 @@ nsVacmAccessTable_handler(netsnmp_mib_handler *handler,
 
             /* Extract the authType token from the list of indexes */
             idx = table_info->indexes->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable->next_variable;
+            if (idx->val_len >= sizeof(atype))
+                continue;
             memset(atype, 0, sizeof(atype));
             memcpy(atype, (char *)idx->val.string, idx->val_len);
             viewIdx = se_find_value_in_slist(VACM_VIEW_ENUM_NAME, atype);

programming_language: C
filename: vacm_vars.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -997,6 +997,9 @@ access_parse_oid(oid * oidIndex, size_t oidLen,
         return 1;
     }
     groupNameL = oidIndex[0];
+    if ((groupNameL + 1) > (int) oidLen) {
+        return 1;
+    }
     contextPrefixL = oidIndex[groupNameL + 1];  /* the initial name length */
     if ((int) oidLen != groupNameL + contextPrefixL + 4) {
         return 1;

programming_language: C
filename: usmUser.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -1505,8 +1505,6 @@ write_usmUserStatus(int action,
                 if (usmStatusCheck(uptr)) {
                     uptr->userStatus = RS_ACTIVE;
                 } else {
-                    SNMP_FREE(engineID);
-                    SNMP_FREE(newName);
                     return SNMP_ERR_INCONSISTENTVALUE;
                 }
             } else if (long_ret == RS_CREATEANDWAIT) {

programming_language: C