CVE-2020-35517 (published 2021-01-28T20:15Z)

A flaw was found in qemu. A host privilege escalation issue was found in the virtio-fs shared file system daemon where a privileged guest user is able to create a device special file in the shared directory and use it to r/w access host devices.

Severity: MEDIUM
CVSS v2 base score: 4.6 (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P)
CVSS v3 base score: 8.2, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-269
cwe_name: Improper Privilege Management
description: The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
extended_description: 
            
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/qemu/qemu
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/qemu/qemu
author: Stefan Hajnoczi
author_date: 2020-10-06 10:58:26+01:00
msg: virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir

In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
read-only file systems.

Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
do this.

Path traversal can be tested with the following function:

  static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
  {
      int fd;
      int level = 0;
      ino_t last_ino = 0;

      fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
      for (;;) {
          struct stat st;

          if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
              perror("fstat");
              return;
          }
          if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
              fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
              return;
          }
          last_ino = st.st_ino;

          fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
                  (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
                  (unsigned long)last_ino);
          fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
          level++;
      }
  }

Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
directories.

Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201006095826.59813-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/qemu/qemu
repo_name: qemu/qemu
description: Official QEMU mirror. Please see https://www.qemu.org/contribute/ for how to submit changes to QEMU. Pull Requests are ignored. Please only use release tarballs from the QEMU website.
repo_language: C
owner: qemu
file_changes: filename: passthrough_ll.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -2393,8 +2393,6 @@ static void setup_wait_parent_capabilities(void)
 static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
 {
     pid_t child;
-    char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
-    char *tmpdir;
 
     /*
      * Create a new pid namespace for *child* processes.  We'll have to
@@ -2458,33 +2456,23 @@ static void setup_namespaces(struct lo_data *lo, struct fuse_session *se)
         exit(1);
     }
 
-    tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
-    if (!tmpdir) {
-        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
-        exit(1);
-    }
-
-    if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
-        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
-                 tmpdir);
+    /*
+     * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
+     * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
+     * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
+     * affects our process.
+     */
+    if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
         exit(1);
     }
 
-    /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
-    lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
+    /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
+    lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
     if (lo->proc_self_fd == -1) {
-        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);
+        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");
         exit(1);
     }
-
-    if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
-        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
-        exit(1);
-    }
-
-    if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
-        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
-    }
 }
 
 /*

programming_language: C