CVE-2011-4914 (published 2012-06-21T23:55Z)

The ROSE protocol implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not verify that certain data-length values are consistent with the amount of data sent, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted data to a ROSE socket.

Severity: MEDIUM
CVSS v2 base score: 6.4 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:P)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-20
cwe_name: Improper Input Validation
description: The product receives input or data, but it does
        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
        properties that are required to process the data safely and
        correctly.
extended_description: 
	   Input validation is a frequently-used technique
	   for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
	   ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
	   code, or when communicating with other components.  When
	   software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
	   able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
	   the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
	   system receiving unintended input, which may result in
	   altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
	   arbitrary code execution.
	   Input validation is not the only technique for
	   processing input, however.  Other techniques attempt to
	   transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
	   as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
	   inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
	   ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
	   in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
	   (see CWE-138 for more examples.)
	   Input validation can be applied to:
	   
	     raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
	     metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
	   
	   Data can be simple or structured.  Structured data
	   can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
	   combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
	   structured data.
	   Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
	   to be validated upon entry into the code, such
	   as:
	   
	     specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
	     implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
	     indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
	     symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
	     well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax 
	     lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
	     specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
	     consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
	     conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic 
	     equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
	     authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
	   
	   Implied or derived properties of data must often
	   be calculated or inferred by the code itself.  Errors in
	   deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
	   to improper input validation.
	   
	   Note that "input validation" has very different
	   meanings to different people, or within different
	   classification schemes.  Caution must be used when
	   referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it.  For example,
	   some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
	   to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
	   to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
	   to as input validation.
	   Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
	   distinctions between input validation and output escaping
	   are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
	   understand the difference, including how input validation
	   is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
	   especially when less stringent data types must be
	   supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
	   scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
	   query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
	   step since it is a common last name in the English
	   language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
	   inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
	   apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
	   otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
	   apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
	   would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
	   would be recorded.
       
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
author: Ben Hutchings
author_date: 2011-03-20 06:48:05+00:00
msg: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing

Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses.  Use them
consistently.  Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
repo_name: torvalds/linux
description: Linux kernel source tree
repo_language: C
owner: torvalds
file_changes: filename: rose.h
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 
 #define	ROSE_MIN_LEN			3
 
+#define	ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_OFF	3
+#define	ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL	0xAA	/* each address is 10 digits */
+#define	ROSE_CALL_REQ_DEST_ADDR_OFF	4
+#define	ROSE_CALL_REQ_SRC_ADDR_OFF	9
+#define	ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF	14
+
 #define	ROSE_GFI			0x10
 #define	ROSE_Q_BIT			0x80
 #define	ROSE_D_BIT			0x40
@@ -214,7 +220,7 @@ extern void rose_requeue_frames(struct sock *);
 extern int  rose_validate_nr(struct sock *, unsigned short);
 extern void rose_write_internal(struct sock *, int);
 extern int  rose_decode(struct sk_buff *, int *, int *, int *, int *, int *);
-extern int  rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *, struct rose_facilities_struct *);
+extern int  rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *, unsigned int, struct rose_facilities_struct *);
 extern void rose_disconnect(struct sock *, int, int, int);
 
 /* rose_timer.c */

programming_language: C
filename: af_rose.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ int rose_rx_call_request(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct ros
 	struct sock *make;
 	struct rose_sock *make_rose;
 	struct rose_facilities_struct facilities;
-	int n, len;
+	int n;
 
 	skb->sk = NULL;		/* Initially we don't know who it's for */
 
@@ -987,9 +987,9 @@ int rose_rx_call_request(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, struct ros
 	 */
 	memset(&facilities, 0x00, sizeof(struct rose_facilities_struct));
 
-	len  = (((skb->data[3] >> 4) & 0x0F) + 1) >> 1;
-	len += (((skb->data[3] >> 0) & 0x0F) + 1) >> 1;
-	if (!rose_parse_facilities(skb->data + len + 4, &facilities)) {
+	if (!rose_parse_facilities(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF,
+				   skb->len - ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF,
+				   &facilities)) {
 		rose_transmit_clear_request(neigh, lci, ROSE_INVALID_FACILITY, 76);
 		return 0;
 	}

programming_language: C
filename: rose_loopback.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -73,9 +73,20 @@ static void rose_loopback_timer(unsigned long param)
 	unsigned int lci_i, lci_o;
 
 	while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&loopback_queue)) != NULL) {
+		if (skb->len < ROSE_MIN_LEN) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			continue;
+		}
 		lci_i     = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF);
 		frametype = skb->data[2];
-		dest      = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 4);
+		if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST &&
+		    (skb->len <= ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF ||
+		     skb->data[ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_OFF] !=
+		     ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL)) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			continue;
+		}
+		dest      = (rose_address *)(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_DEST_ADDR_OFF);
 		lci_o     = ROSE_DEFAULT_MAXVC + 1 - lci_i;
 
 		skb_reset_transport_header(skb);

programming_language: C
filename: rose_route.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ int rose_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
 	unsigned int lci, new_lci;
 	unsigned char cause, diagnostic;
 	struct net_device *dev;
-	int len, res = 0;
+	int res = 0;
 	char buf[11];
 
 #if 0
@@ -869,10 +869,17 @@ int rose_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
 		return res;
 #endif
 
+	if (skb->len < ROSE_MIN_LEN)
+		return res;
 	frametype = skb->data[2];
 	lci = ((skb->data[0] << 8) & 0xF00) + ((skb->data[1] << 0) & 0x0FF);
-	src_addr  = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 9);
-	dest_addr = (rose_address *)(skb->data + 4);
+	if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST &&
+	    (skb->len <= ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF ||
+	     skb->data[ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_OFF] !=
+	     ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL))
+		return res;
+	src_addr  = (rose_address *)(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_SRC_ADDR_OFF);
+	dest_addr = (rose_address *)(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_DEST_ADDR_OFF);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&rose_neigh_list_lock);
 	spin_lock_bh(&rose_route_list_lock);
@@ -1010,12 +1017,11 @@ int rose_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	len  = (((skb->data[3] >> 4) & 0x0F) + 1) >> 1;
-	len += (((skb->data[3] >> 0) & 0x0F) + 1) >> 1;
-
 	memset(&facilities, 0x00, sizeof(struct rose_facilities_struct));
 
-	if (!rose_parse_facilities(skb->data + len + 4, &facilities)) {
+	if (!rose_parse_facilities(skb->data + ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF,
+				   skb->len - ROSE_CALL_REQ_FACILITIES_OFF,
+				   &facilities)) {
 		rose_transmit_clear_request(rose_neigh, lci, ROSE_INVALID_FACILITY, 76);
 		goto out;
 	}

programming_language: C
filename: rose_subr.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ void rose_write_internal(struct sock *sk, int frametype)
 		*dptr++ = ROSE_GFI | lci1;
 		*dptr++ = lci2;
 		*dptr++ = frametype;
-		*dptr++ = 0xAA;
+		*dptr++ = ROSE_CALL_REQ_ADDR_LEN_VAL;
 		memcpy(dptr, &rose->dest_addr,  ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
 		dptr   += ROSE_ADDR_LEN;
 		memcpy(dptr, &rose->source_addr, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
@@ -246,12 +246,16 @@ static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *
 	do {
 		switch (*p & 0xC0) {
 		case 0x00:
+			if (len < 2)
+				return -1;
 			p   += 2;
 			n   += 2;
 			len -= 2;
 			break;
 
 		case 0x40:
+			if (len < 3)
+				return -1;
 			if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
 				facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
 			p   += 3;
@@ -260,32 +264,48 @@ static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *
 			break;
 
 		case 0x80:
+			if (len < 4)
+				return -1;
 			p   += 4;
 			n   += 4;
 			len -= 4;
 			break;
 
 		case 0xC0:
+			if (len < 2)
+				return -1;
 			l = p[1];
+			if (len < 2 + l)
+				return -1;
 			if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
 				if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
+					if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
+						return -1;
 					memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
 					facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
 				}
 			}
 			else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
 				if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
+					if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
+						return -1;
 					memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
 					facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
 				}
 			}
 			else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
+				if (l < AX25_ADDR_LEN)
+					return -1;
 				memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
 			}
 			else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
+				if (l < 1 + ROSE_ADDR_LEN)
+					return -1;
 				memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
 			}
 			else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
+				if (l % AX25_ADDR_LEN)
+					return -1;
 				fac_national_digis_received = 1;
 				facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
 				facilities->dest_ndigis   = 0;
@@ -319,24 +339,32 @@ static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *fac
 	do {
 		switch (*p & 0xC0) {
 		case 0x00:
+			if (len < 2)
+				return -1;
 			p   += 2;
 			n   += 2;
 			len -= 2;
 			break;
 
 		case 0x40:
+			if (len < 3)
+				return -1;
 			p   += 3;
 			n   += 3;
 			len -= 3;
 			break;
 
 		case 0x80:
+			if (len < 4)
+				return -1;
 			p   += 4;
 			n   += 4;
 			len -= 4;
 			break;
 
 		case 0xC0:
+			if (len < 2)
+				return -1;
 			l = p[1];
 
 			/* Prevent overflows*/
@@ -365,49 +393,44 @@ static int rose_parse_ccitt(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *fac
 	return n;
 }
 
-int rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *p,
+int rose_parse_facilities(unsigned char *p, unsigned packet_len,
 	struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities)
 {
 	int facilities_len, len;
 
 	facilities_len = *p++;
 
-	if (facilities_len == 0)
+	if (facilities_len == 0 || (unsigned)facilities_len > packet_len)
 		return 0;
 
-	while (facilities_len > 0) {
-		if (*p == 0x00) {
-			facilities_len--;
-			p++;
-
-			switch (*p) {
-			case FAC_NATIONAL:		/* National */
-				len = rose_parse_national(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
-				if (len < 0)
-					return 0;
-				facilities_len -= len + 1;
-				p += len + 1;
-				break;
-
-			case FAC_CCITT:		/* CCITT */
-				len = rose_parse_ccitt(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
-				if (len < 0)
-					return 0;
-				facilities_len -= len + 1;
-				p += len + 1;
-				break;
-
-			default:
-				printk(KERN_DEBUG "ROSE: rose_parse_facilities - unknown facilities family %02X\n", *p);
-				facilities_len--;
-				p++;
-				break;
-			}
-		} else
-			break;	/* Error in facilities format */
+	while (facilities_len >= 3 && *p == 0x00) {
+		facilities_len--;
+		p++;
+
+		switch (*p) {
+		case FAC_NATIONAL:		/* National */
+			len = rose_parse_national(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
+			break;
+
+		case FAC_CCITT:		/* CCITT */
+			len = rose_parse_ccitt(p + 1, facilities, facilities_len - 1);
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "ROSE: rose_parse_facilities - unknown facilities family %02X\n", *p);
+			len = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (len < 0)
+			return 0;
+		if (WARN_ON(len >= facilities_len))
+			return 0;
+		facilities_len -= len + 1;
+		p += len + 1;
 	}
 
-	return 1;
+	return facilities_len == 0;
 }
 
 static int rose_create_facilities(unsigned char *buffer, struct rose_sock *rose)

programming_language: C