CVE-2023-24533 (published 2023-03-08T20:15Z)

Multiplication of certain unreduced P-256 scalars produce incorrect results. There are no protocols known at this time that can be attacked due to this.

CVSS v3 base score: 7.5, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-682
cwe_name: Incorrect Calculation
description: The product performs a calculation that generates incorrect or unintended results that are later used in security-critical decisions or resource management.
extended_description: When product performs a security-critical calculation incorrectly, it might lead to incorrect resource allocations, incorrect privilege assignments, or failed comparisons among other things. Many of the direct results of an incorrect calculation can lead to even larger problems such as failed protection mechanisms or even arbitrary code execution.
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/FiloSottile/nistec
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/FiloSottile/nistec
author: Filippo Valsorda
author_date: 2023-02-13 15:16:27+01:00
msg: crypto/internal/nistec: reduce P-256 scalar

Unlike the rest of nistec, the P-256 assembly doesn't use complete
addition formulas, meaning that p256PointAdd[Affine]Asm won't return the
correct value if the two inputs are equal.

This was (undocumentedly) ignored in the scalar multiplication loops
because as long as the input point is not the identity and the scalar is
lower than the order of the group, the addition inputs can't be the same.

As part of the math/big rewrite, we went however from always reducing
the scalar to only checking its length, under the incorrect assumption
that the scalar multiplication loop didn't require reduction.

Added a reduction, and while at it added it in P256OrdInverse, too, to
enforce a universal reduction invariant on p256OrdElement values.

Note that if the input point is the infinity, the code currently still
relies on undefined behavior, but that's easily tested to behave
acceptably, and will be addressed in a future CL.

Fixes #58647
Fixes CVE-2023-24532

(Filed with the "safe APIs like complete addition formulas are good" dept.)

Change-Id: I7b2c75238440e6852be2710fad66ff1fdc4e2b24
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/FiloSottile/nistec
repo_name: FiloSottile/nistec
description: NIST P elliptic curves (re-exported from crypto/internal/nistec)
repo_language: Assembly
owner: FiloSottile
file_changes: filename: nistec_test.go
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ package nistec_test
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"fmt"
 	"math/big"
 	"math/rand"
 	"testing"
@@ -163,6 +164,86 @@ func testEquivalents[P nistPoint[P]](t *testing.T, newPoint func() P, c elliptic
 	}
 }
 
+func TestScalarMult(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("P224", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP224Point, elliptic.P224())
+	})
+	t.Run("P256", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP256Point, elliptic.P256())
+	})
+	t.Run("P384", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP384Point, elliptic.P384())
+	})
+	t.Run("P521", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testScalarMult(t, nistec.NewP521Point, elliptic.P521())
+	})
+}
+
+func testScalarMult[P nistPoint[P]](t *testing.T, newPoint func() P, c elliptic.Curve) {
+	G := newPoint().SetGenerator()
+	checkScalar := func(t *testing.T, scalar []byte) {
+		p1, err := newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(scalar)
+		fatalIfErr(t, err)
+		p2, err := newPoint().ScalarMult(G, scalar)
+		fatalIfErr(t, err)
+		if !bytes.Equal(p1.Bytes(), p2.Bytes()) {
+			t.Error("[k]G != ScalarBaseMult(k)")
+		}
+
+		d := new(big.Int).SetBytes(scalar)
+		d.Sub(c.Params().N, d)
+		d.Mod(d, c.Params().N)
+		g1, err := newPoint().ScalarBaseMult(d.FillBytes(make([]byte, len(scalar))))
+		fatalIfErr(t, err)
+		g1.Add(g1, p1)
+		if !bytes.Equal(g1.Bytes(), newPoint().Bytes()) {
+			t.Error("[N - k]G + [k]G != ∞")
+		}
+	}
+
+	byteLen := len(c.Params().N.Bytes())
+	bitLen := c.Params().N.BitLen()
+	t.Run("0", func(t *testing.T) { checkScalar(t, make([]byte, byteLen)) })
+	t.Run("1", func(t *testing.T) {
+		checkScalar(t, big.NewInt(1).FillBytes(make([]byte, byteLen)))
+	})
+	t.Run("N-1", func(t *testing.T) {
+		checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Sub(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(1)).Bytes())
+	})
+	t.Run("N", func(t *testing.T) { checkScalar(t, c.Params().N.Bytes()) })
+	t.Run("N+1", func(t *testing.T) {
+		checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Add(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(1)).Bytes())
+	})
+	t.Run("all1s", func(t *testing.T) {
+		s := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(bitLen))
+		s.Sub(s, big.NewInt(1))
+		checkScalar(t, s.Bytes())
+	})
+	if testing.Short() {
+		return
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < bitLen; i++ {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("1<<%d", i), func(t *testing.T) {
+			s := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), uint(i))
+			checkScalar(t, s.FillBytes(make([]byte, byteLen)))
+		})
+	}
+	// Test N+1...N+32 since they risk overlapping with precomputed table values
+	// in the final additions.
+	for i := int64(2); i <= 32; i++ {
+		t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("N+%d", i), func(t *testing.T) {
+			checkScalar(t, new(big.Int).Add(c.Params().N, big.NewInt(i)).Bytes())
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func fatalIfErr(t *testing.T, err error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+}
+
 func BenchmarkScalarMult(b *testing.B) {
 	b.Run("P224", func(b *testing.B) {
 		benchmarkScalarMult(b, nistec.NewP224Point().SetGenerator(), 28)

programming_language: Go
filename: p256_asm.go
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -364,6 +364,21 @@ func p256PointDoubleAsm(res, in *P256Point)
 // Montgomery domain (with R 2²⁵⁶) as four uint64 limbs in little-endian order.
 type p256OrdElement [4]uint64
 
+// p256OrdReduce ensures s is in the range [0, ord(G)-1].
+func p256OrdReduce(s *p256OrdElement) {
+	// Since 2 * ord(G) > 2²⁵⁶, we can just conditionally subtract ord(G),
+	// keeping the result if it doesn't underflow.
+	t0, b := bits.Sub64(s[0], 0xf3b9cac2fc632551, 0)
+	t1, b := bits.Sub64(s[1], 0xbce6faada7179e84, b)
+	t2, b := bits.Sub64(s[2], 0xffffffffffffffff, b)
+	t3, b := bits.Sub64(s[3], 0xffffffff00000000, b)
+	tMask := b - 1 // zero if subtraction underflowed
+	s[0] ^= (t0 ^ s[0]) & tMask
+	s[1] ^= (t1 ^ s[1]) & tMask
+	s[2] ^= (t2 ^ s[2]) & tMask
+	s[3] ^= (t3 ^ s[3]) & tMask
+}
+
 // Add sets q = p1 + p2, and returns q. The points may overlap.
 func (q *P256Point) Add(r1, r2 *P256Point) *P256Point {
 	var sum, double P256Point
@@ -393,6 +408,7 @@ func (r *P256Point) ScalarBaseMult(scalar []byte) (*P256Point, error) {
 	}
 	scalarReversed := new(p256OrdElement)
 	p256OrdBigToLittle(scalarReversed, (*[32]byte)(scalar))
+	p256OrdReduce(scalarReversed)
 
 	r.p256BaseMult(scalarReversed)
 	return r, nil
@@ -407,6 +423,7 @@ func (r *P256Point) ScalarMult(q *P256Point, scalar []byte) (*P256Point, error)
 	}
 	scalarReversed := new(p256OrdElement)
 	p256OrdBigToLittle(scalarReversed, (*[32]byte)(scalar))
+	p256OrdReduce(scalarReversed)
 
 	r.Set(q).p256ScalarMult(scalarReversed)
 	return r, nil

programming_language: Go
filename: p256_ordinv.go
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ func p256OrdInverse(k []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 
 	x := new(p256OrdElement)
 	p256OrdBigToLittle(x, (*[32]byte)(k))
+	p256OrdReduce(x)
 
 	// Inversion is implemented as exponentiation by n - 2, per Fermat's little theorem.
 	//

programming_language: Go