CVE-2024-22205 (published 2024-01-23T18:15Z)

Whoogle Search is a self-hosted metasearch engine. In versions 0.8.3 and prior, the `window` endpoint does not sanitize user-supplied input from the `location` variable and passes it to the `send` method which sends a `GET` request on lines 339-343 in `request.py,` which leads to a server-side request forgery. This issue allows for crafting GET requests to internal and external resources on behalf of the server. For example, this issue would allow for accessing resources on the internal network that the server has access to, even though these resources may not be accessible on the internet. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.4.\n\n

CVSS v3 base score: 9.8, CRITICAL (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-918
cwe_name: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
description: The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
extended_description: By providing URLs to unexpected hosts or ports, attackers can make it appear that the server is sending the request, possibly bypassing access controls such as firewalls that prevent the attackers from accessing the URLs directly. The server can be used as a proxy to conduct port scanning of hosts in internal networks, use other URLs such as that can access documents on the system (using file://), or use other protocols such as gopher:// or tftp://, which may provide greater control over the contents of requests.
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search
author: Ben Busby
author_date: 2023-09-13 15:45:30-06:00
msg: Validate urls in `element` and `window` endpoints

Domains were previously not validated before being handled, leading to a
potential scenario where someone could pass something like
"element_url=127.0.0.1:<port>/<resource>" to access other resources on a
machine running Whoogle. This change ensures that the resource used in
both endpoints is a valid domain.

This also includes validation of config names to prevent names from
including path values such as "../../(etc)".
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/benbusby/whoogle-search
repo_name: benbusby/whoogle-search
description: A self-hosted, ad-free, privacy-respecting metasearch engine
repo_language: Python
owner: benbusby
file_changes: filename: routes.py
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ import io
 import json
 import os
 import pickle
+import re
 import urllib.parse as urlparse
 import uuid
+import validators
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 from functools import wraps
 
@@ -420,13 +422,18 @@ def config():
     config_disabled = (
             app.config['CONFIG_DISABLE'] or
             not valid_user_session(session))
+
+    name = ''
+    if 'name' in request.args:
+        name = os.path.normpath(request.args.get('name'))
+        if not re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.+-]+$', name):
+            return make_response('Invalid config name', 400)
+
     if request.method == 'GET':
         return json.dumps(g.user_config.__dict__)
     elif request.method == 'PUT' and not config_disabled:
-        if 'name' in request.args:
-            config_pkl = os.path.join(
-                app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],
-                request.args.get('name'))
+        if name:
+            config_pkl = os.path.join(app.config['CONFIG_PATH'], name)
             session['config'] = (pickle.load(open(config_pkl, 'rb'))
                                  if os.path.exists(config_pkl)
                                  else session['config'])
@@ -444,7 +451,7 @@ def config():
                 config_data,
                 open(os.path.join(
                     app.config['CONFIG_PATH'],
-                    request.args.get('name')), 'wb'))
+                    name), 'wb'))
 
         session['config'] = config_data
         return redirect(config_data['url'])
@@ -463,6 +470,8 @@ def imgres():
 @session_required
 @auth_required
 def element():
+    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(
+        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')
     element_url = src_url = request.args.get('url')
     if element_url.startswith('gAAAAA'):
         try:
@@ -475,6 +484,11 @@ def element():
 
     src_type = request.args.get('type')
 
+    # Ensure requested element is from a valid domain
+    domain = urlparse.urlparse(src_url).netloc
+    if not validators.domain(domain):
+        return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')
+
     try:
         file_data = g.user_request.send(base_url=src_url).content
         tmp_mem = io.BytesIO()
@@ -485,8 +499,6 @@ def element():
     except exceptions.RequestException:
         pass
 
-    empty_gif = base64.b64decode(
-        'R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAP///////yH5BAEKAAEALAAAAAABAAEAAAICTAEAOw==')
     return send_file(io.BytesIO(empty_gif), mimetype='image/gif')
 
 
@@ -504,6 +516,13 @@ def window():
         root_url=request.url_root,
         config=g.user_config)
     target = urlparse.urlparse(target_url)
+
+    # Ensure requested URL has a valid domain
+    if not validators.domain(target.netloc):
+        return render_template(
+            'error.html',
+            error_message='Invalid location'), 400
+
     host_url = f'{target.scheme}://{target.netloc}'
 
     get_body = g.user_request.send(base_url=target_url).text

programming_language: Python