CVE-2024-1520 (published 2024-04-10T17:15Z)

An OS Command Injection vulnerability exists in the '/open_code_folder' endpoint of the parisneo/lollms-webui application, due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the 'discussion_id' parameter. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious OS commands, leading to unauthorized command execution on the underlying operating system. This could result in unauthorized access, data leakage, or complete system compromise.


Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-78
cwe_name: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
description: The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
extended_description: 
		   This weakness can lead to a vulnerability in environments in which the attacker does not have direct access to the operating system, such as in web applications. Alternately, if the weakness occurs in a privileged program, it could allow the attacker to specify commands that normally would not be accessible, or to call alternate commands with privileges that the attacker does not have. The problem is exacerbated if the compromised process does not follow the principle of least privilege, because the attacker-controlled commands may run with special system privileges that increases the amount of damage.
            There are at least two subtypes of OS command injection:
               
				 The application intends to execute a single, fixed program that is under its own control. It intends to use externally-supplied inputs as arguments to that program. For example, the program might use system("nslookup [HOSTNAME]") to run nslookup and allow the user to supply a HOSTNAME, which is used as an argument. Attackers cannot prevent nslookup from executing. However, if the program does not remove command separators from the HOSTNAME argument, attackers could place the separators into the arguments, which allows them to execute their own program after nslookup has finished executing.
				 The application accepts an input that it uses to fully select which program to run, as well as which commands to use. The application simply redirects this entire command to the operating system. For example, the program might use "exec([COMMAND])" to execute the [COMMAND] that was supplied by the user. If the COMMAND is under attacker control, then the attacker can execute arbitrary commands or programs. If the command is being executed using functions like exec() and CreateProcess(), the attacker might not be able to combine multiple commands together in the same line.
               
            From a weakness standpoint, these variants represent distinct programmer errors. In the first variant, the programmer clearly intends that input from untrusted parties will be part of the arguments in the command to be executed. In the second variant, the programmer does not intend for the command to be accessible to any untrusted party, but the programmer probably has not accounted for alternate ways in which malicious attackers can provide input.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui
author: Saifeddine ALOUI
author_date: 2024-02-15 09:19:47+01:00
msg: Update lollms_advanced.py
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui
repo_name: ParisNeo/lollms-webui
description: Lord of Large Language Models Web User Interface
repo_language: Vue
owner: parisneo
file_changes: filename: lollms_advanced.py
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ async def open_file(file_path: FilePath):
         path = os.path.realpath(path)
         
         # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file
-        subprocess.Popen(["start", path], shell=True)
+        subprocess.Popen(["start", path])
         
         return {"status": True, "execution_time": 0}
     
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ async def open_code_in_vs_code(vs_code_data: VSCodeData):
             f.write(code)
         
         # Use subprocess.Popen to safely open the file
-        subprocess.Popen(["code", str(root_folder)], shell=True)
+        subprocess.Popen(["code", str(root_folder)])
         
         return {"status": True, "execution_time": 0}
     except Exception as ex:
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ async def open_code_folder(request: FolderRequest):
             root_folder = lollmsElfServer.lollms_paths.personal_outputs_path / "discussions" / f"d_{discussion_id}"
             root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
             if platform.system() == 'Windows':
-                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)
+                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)
             elif platform.system() == 'Linux':
                 subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)
             elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ async def open_code_folder(request: FolderRequest):
             # Create a temporary file.
             root_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
             if platform.system() == 'Windows':
-                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True, shell=True)
+                subprocess.run(['start', str(root_folder)], check=True)
             elif platform.system() == 'Linux':
                 subprocess.run(['xdg-open', str(root_folder)], check=True)
             elif platform.system() == 'Darwin':

programming_language: Python