CVE-2023-30628 (published 2023-04-24T22:15Z)

Kiwi TCMS is an open source test management system. In kiwitcms/Kiwi v12.2 and prior and kiwitcms/enterprise v12.2 and prior,\nthe `changelog.yml` workflow is vulnerable to command injection attacks because of using an untrusted `github.head_ref` field. The `github.head_ref` value is an attacker-controlled value. Assigning the value to `zzz";echo${IFS}"hello";#` can lead to command injection. Since the permission is not restricted, the attacker has a write-access to the repository. Commit 834c86dfd1b2492ccad7ebbfd6304bfec895fed2 of the kiwitcms/Kiwi repository and commit e39f7e156fdaf6fec09a15ea6f4e8fec8cdbf751 of the kiwitcms/enterprise repository contain a fix for this issue.

CVSS v3 base score: 8.8, HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-78
cwe_name: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
description: The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
extended_description: 
		   This weakness can lead to a vulnerability in environments in which the attacker does not have direct access to the operating system, such as in web applications. Alternately, if the weakness occurs in a privileged program, it could allow the attacker to specify commands that normally would not be accessible, or to call alternate commands with privileges that the attacker does not have. The problem is exacerbated if the compromised process does not follow the principle of least privilege, because the attacker-controlled commands may run with special system privileges that increases the amount of damage.
            There are at least two subtypes of OS command injection:
               
				 The application intends to execute a single, fixed program that is under its own control. It intends to use externally-supplied inputs as arguments to that program. For example, the program might use system("nslookup [HOSTNAME]") to run nslookup and allow the user to supply a HOSTNAME, which is used as an argument. Attackers cannot prevent nslookup from executing. However, if the program does not remove command separators from the HOSTNAME argument, attackers could place the separators into the arguments, which allows them to execute their own program after nslookup has finished executing.
				 The application accepts an input that it uses to fully select which program to run, as well as which commands to use. The application simply redirects this entire command to the operating system. For example, the program might use "exec([COMMAND])" to execute the [COMMAND] that was supplied by the user. If the COMMAND is under attacker control, then the attacker can execute arbitrary commands or programs. If the command is being executed using functions like exec() and CreateProcess(), the attacker might not be able to combine multiple commands together in the same line.
               
            From a weakness standpoint, these variants represent distinct programmer errors. In the first variant, the programmer clearly intends that input from untrusted parties will be part of the arguments in the command to be executed. In the second variant, the programmer does not intend for the command to be accessible to any untrusted party, but the programmer probably has not accounted for alternate ways in which malicious attackers can provide input.
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/enterprise
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/enterprise
author: Alexander Todorov
author_date: 2023-04-24 17:57:41+03:00
msg: Pass untrusted input via intermediate ENV vars in CI jobs
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/enterprise
repo_name: kiwitcms/enterprise
description: Kiwi TCMS Enterprise Edition
repo_language: Shell
owner: kiwitcms
file_changes: filename: changelog.yml
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ jobs:
     - uses: actions/checkout@v3
 
     - name: check-source-branch-and-modified-files
+      env:
+        HEAD_REF: ${{ github.head_ref }}
       run: |
-        echo "INFO: source branch is: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
+        echo "INFO: source branch is: $HEAD_REF"
 
         # if this PR modifies README.md or setup.py file it needs to come from a branch
         # that follows the pattern 'prepare/vX.Y' b/c we want to run some extra jobs for such branches!
-        if [[ ! "${{ github.head_ref }}" =~ ^prepare/v.+$ ]]; then
+        if [[ ! "$HEAD_REF" =~ ^prepare/v.+$ ]]; then
             echo "FAIL: Modifications to README.md or setup.py are only accepted from 'prepare/vX.Y' branches!"
             echo "INFO: Otherwise aarch64 jobs in Circle CI will not be executed."
             exit 1

programming_language: Shell
repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi
author: Alexander Todorov
author_date: 2023-04-24 17:28:55+03:00
msg: Pass untrusted input via intermediate ENV vars in CI jobs
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi
repo_name: kiwitcms/Kiwi
description: open source test management system with over 2 million downloads!
repo_language: Python
owner: kiwitcms
file_changes: filename: changelog.yml
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -13,20 +13,23 @@ jobs:
     - uses: actions/checkout@v3
 
     - name: check-source-branch-and-modified-files
+      env:
+        HEAD_REF: ${{ github.head_ref }}
+        DIFF_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.diff_url }}
       run: |
         # fail if curl fails
         set -e
 
-        echo "INFO: source branch is: ${{ github.head_ref }}"
+        echo "INFO: source branch is: $HEAD_REF"
         echo "INFO: modified files"
-        curl -o- -L "${{ github.event.pull_request.diff_url }}" 2>/dev/null | grep "^diff --git"
+        curl -o- -L "$DIFF_URL" 2>/dev/null | grep "^diff --git"
 
         set +e
 
         # if this PR modifies the CHANGELOG file it needs to come from a branch
         # that follows the pattern 'prepare/vX.Y' b/c we want to run some extra jobs for such branches!
-        if curl -o- -L "${{ github.event.pull_request.diff_url }}" 2>/dev/null | grep "^diff --git" | grep "CHANGELOG"; then
-            if [[ ! "${{ github.head_ref }}" =~ ^prepare/v.+$ ]]; then
+        if curl -o- -L "$DIFF_URL" 2>/dev/null | grep "^diff --git" | grep "CHANGELOG"; then
+            if [[ ! "$HEAD_REF" =~ ^prepare/v.+$ ]]; then
                 echo "FAIL: Modifications to CHANGELOG are only accepted from 'prepate/vX.Y' branches!"
                 echo "INFO: Otherwise aarch64 jobs in Circle CI will not be executed."
                 exit 1

programming_language: Shell