CVE-2017-8831 (published 2017-05-08T06:29Z)

The saa7164_bus_get function in drivers/media/pci/saa7164/saa7164-bus.c in the Linux kernel through 4.11.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds array access) or possibly have unspecified other impact by changing a certain sequence-number value, aka a "double fetch" vulnerability.

Severity: MEDIUM
CVSS v2 base score: 6.9 (AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
CVSS v3 base score: 6.4, MEDIUM (CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Weakness information:
cwe_id: CWE-125
cwe_name: Out-of-bounds Read
description: The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
extended_description: 
            
            
             
			 
         
         

Fix information:
repo_url: https://github.com/stoth68000/media-tree
commit_details: repo_url: https://github.com/stoth68000/media-tree
author: Steven Toth
author_date: 2017-06-06 08:30:27-04:00
msg: [PATCH] saa7164: Bug - Double fetch PCIe access condition

Avoid a double fetch by reusing the values from the prior transfer.

Originally reported via https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195559

Thanks to Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com> for reporting.

Signed-off-by: Steven Toth <stoth@kernellabs.com>
repository: repo_url: https://github.com/stoth68000/media-tree
repo_name: stoth68000/media-tree
description: LinuxTV related
repo_language: C
owner: stoth68000
file_changes: filename: saa7164-bus.c
change_type: ModificationType.MODIFY
diff: @@ -389,11 +389,11 @@ int saa7164_bus_get(struct saa7164_dev *dev, struct tmComResInfo* msg,
 	msg_tmp.size = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg_tmp.size);
 	msg_tmp.command = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)msg_tmp.command);
 	msg_tmp.controlselector = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg_tmp.controlselector);
+	memcpy(msg, &msg_tmp, sizeof(*msg));
 
 	/* No need to update the read positions, because this was a peek */
 	/* If the caller specifically want to peek, return */
 	if (peekonly) {
-		memcpy(msg, &msg_tmp, sizeof(*msg));
 		goto peekout;
 	}
 
@@ -438,21 +438,15 @@ int saa7164_bus_get(struct saa7164_dev *dev, struct tmComResInfo* msg,
 		space_rem = bus->m_dwSizeGetRing - curr_grp;
 
 		if (space_rem < sizeof(*msg)) {
-			/* msg wraps around the ring */
-			memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, space_rem);
-			memcpy_fromio((u8 *)msg + space_rem, bus->m_pdwGetRing,
-				sizeof(*msg) - space_rem);
 			if (buf)
 				memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + sizeof(*msg) -
 					space_rem, buf_size);
 
 		} else if (space_rem == sizeof(*msg)) {
-			memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
 			if (buf)
 				memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing, buf_size);
 		} else {
 			/* Additional data wraps around the ring */
-			memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
 			if (buf) {
 				memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp +
 					sizeof(*msg), space_rem - sizeof(*msg));
@@ -465,15 +459,10 @@ int saa7164_bus_get(struct saa7164_dev *dev, struct tmComResInfo* msg,
 
 	} else {
 		/* No wrapping */
-		memcpy_fromio(msg, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp, sizeof(*msg));
 		if (buf)
 			memcpy_fromio(buf, bus->m_pdwGetRing + curr_grp + sizeof(*msg),
 				buf_size);
 	}
-	/* Convert from little endian to CPU */
-	msg->size = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg->size);
-	msg->command = le32_to_cpu((__force __le32)msg->command);
-	msg->controlselector = le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)msg->controlselector);
 
 	/* Update the read positions, adjusting the ring */
 	saa7164_writel(bus->m_dwGetReadPos, new_grp);

programming_language: C